UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST

AN APPRAISAL OF SUSAN HAACK'S FOUNDHERENTISM

AS A THEORY OF JUSTIFICATION

FATAW WANIMPA

2021

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST

AN APPRAISAL OF SUSAN HAACK'S FOUNDHERENTISM

AS A THEORY OF JUSTIFICATION

BY

FATAW WANIMPA

Thesis submitted to the Department of Classics and Philosophy of the Faculty

of Arts, College of Humanities and Legal Studies, University of Cape Coast,

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Master of

Philosophy degree in Philosophy

SEPTEMBER 2021

DECLARATION

Candidate's Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my original research and that no part of it has been presented for another degree in this university or elsewhere.

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Name: Fataw Wanimpa

Supervisor's Declaration

I hereby declare that the preparation and presentation of this thesis were supervised in accordance with the guidelines on supervision of thesis laid down by the University of Cape Coast.

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Name: Dr. Husein Inusah

ABSTRACT

This study is an appraisal of Susan Haack's foundherentism. Foundherentism as theory of justification is enmeshed in controversies. Some critics claim that the theory is not any different from already existing theories of justification such as foundationalism, coherentism and reliabilism. Haack on the other hand insists that foundherentism is a distinct theory of justification. By employing the method of epistemological theorizing, a means of conceptual analysis and critical argumentation, this study set out to ascertain whether foundherentism is actually distinct from the other theories of justification. The study, through an analysis of the internal dialectics of foundherentism and a critical examination of the critiques and responses to the theory, reveals that foundherentism is neither foundationalism nor coherentism *inter alia* but a hybrid theory of justification. The study found that the critics of foundherentism mainly ignore the character in virtue of which foundherentism is distinct from the other theories but brood over its similarity to the other theories. The study, however, identified some challenges with foundherentism, in its concepts of explication and ratification—the problem of transitioning from non-propositional to propositional source of justification, due to Haack's double-aspect conception of justification. So, an attempt is made at the end to modify the theory in order to avoid those challenges.

KEY WORDS

Coherentism

Epistemic justification

Foundationalism

Foundherentism

Haack, Susan

Theory of Justification

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DEDICATION

To my brothers and a sister: Abubakar, Abdul-Razak, and Sadia

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Susan Haack's foundherentism, which seeks to reconcile rival theories, foundationalism and coherentism and to put an end to their long-standing debate, is no exception of criticisms. Some critics (e.g. BonJour, 1997; Clune, 1997; Thagard, 2000; Tramel, 2008) hold that Haack's foundherentism is not different from some already existing theories of justification. Haack's responses seem not to settle the matter. This study examines and clarifies the above controversy. This is done by examining Haack's arguments and the criticisms and responses to foundherentism, examining the internal dialectics of foundherentism and identifying its distinctive features, and by discharging some of the criticisms against the theory.

Many philosophers still hold on to the canons of doing epistemology as well as seeking and developing new tools in addressing epistemological problems, and Susan Haack is one of them. A motivating factor for Haack's reconstruction of epistemology is the battle for the legitimacy and reality of epistemological questions or problems, and the reconciliations of very exaggerated dichotomies in epistemology, like foundationalism versus coherentism, internalism versus externalism, among others. Her objective is to demystify and to reconcile, and the reconciliation between foundationalism and coherentism is what Haack calls foundherentism, a hybrid theory of justification. The rationale is that these two rival theories, though prevalent, have setbacks and do not exhaust the options about the structure of justification (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 48). The strategy therefore is to incorporate

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their strengths while avoiding the drawbacks. It is this reconcile strategy, a foundherentist move, that attracts a lot of attention and attacks from various camps, particularly the foundationalists and coherentists about the structure of justification. Laurence BonJour, a notable scholar in the field of epistemology, for instance doubts if Haack's foundherentism is not actually a version of foundationalism (BonJour, 1997, p. 15). Later scholars like Peter Tramel affirm this doubt that foundherentism is a foundationalism (Tramel, 2008). The other camps, the coherentists and the reliabilists, have their doubts and claims too (Clune, 1997; Thagard, 2000).

Reconciling other theories, finding a midway between theories, an alternative theory is not a practice peculiar to Haack but philosophers in general, and for that matter epistemologists in their attempts to address the regress problem. The regress problem is the view that you need reasons for your reasons if your belief is to be justified: every justified belief would rest on further justified beliefs, *ad infinitum*. So epistemologists over the years make efforts to resolve such regression: (1) *Infinitists* accept the problem as it is and the resulting infinite regress; (2) *Skeptics* maintain that no beliefs whatever are justified; (3) *Positists* maintain that chains of justifying reasons can terminate in reasons that are not justified themselves, but are simply individual or societal posits; (4) *Foundationalists* maintain that some beliefs are basic (foundational) and are justified in the absence of any other reasons, and other justified beliefs rest upon them; (5) *Coherentists* maintain that beliefs can be justified in virtue of relations of mutual support (coherence); among others (Feldman, 2003, p. 51; Cleve, 2013, p. 168). Each of these traditional positions have their own challenges. Foundationalism, for

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instance, is accused of arbitrariness (ending the regress forcefully with basic beliefs), and coherentism, the isolation problem (making a subject's experience irrelevant to the justification his belief). So, it appears these theories are not exhaustive of the problems about justification, and there come the attempts to either moderate or reconcile them.

Haack's foundherentism is just one of such theories, theories that intend to reconcile others. Contextualism is another third alternative, or rather, third possibility theory of justification, to the rival theories. Contextualists conceive justification in terms of conformity to the standards of some epistemic community. The problem with this conception is that different epistemic communities are likely to conform to different standards, and this results in contradictory justification and ratification (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 58, p. 248-49). Some other theories that attempt to either moderate or reconcile others include: BonJour's 'impure' coherentism, which incorporates a foundationalist element, an experiential input, "Observational Requirement" into coherentism (BonJour, 1985); Herzberg's coherentism and infinitism which synthesises infinitism and coherentism (Herzberg, 2014); and Aikin's strong impure infinitism which integrates a non-doxastic component of foundationalism into infinitism (Aikin, 2005). According to Inusah, Aikin's position differs from the others like Haack's foundherentism because Aikin holds that his theory is not a dialectics of infinitism and foundationalism (Inusah, 2021, p. 344). These theories of the structure of justification are regarded as mixed or hybrid theories. Even 'modest' versions of the traditional theories are sometimes considered as hybrid, take BonJour's weak foundationalism for example which allows basic beliefs to be amplified by

coherence (Cleve, 2013, p. 169). One thing is clear here: moderating or reconciling other theories seems to have become a better alternative by such scholars regarding the structure of justification. Justification concerns providing good or adequate reasons for a belief; and theories of justifications concern providing accounts of justification that show that we actually know a particular belief.

Haack's foundherentism is popular among the other mixed theories, probably, because of her bold attempt and relentless effort to reconcile the two rival theories, foundationalism and coherentism at all cost. But again, Haack is not the first to envisage such a possibility. Sosa (1980), for example, in the analogy of "The Raft and the Pyramid" identifies a kin relationship between foundationalism and coherentism, which he calls "formal foundationalism". It is the idea that justification conditions are normative and so epistemic factors supervene on non-epistemic ones, and thus coherentism is reducible to foundationalism. In spite of the fact that this line of thought is akin to the reconciliatory strategy, Sosa fails to develop it further by simply giving primacy to foundationalism because he argues that coherentism lacks epistemic and for that matter normative status (Sosa, 1980). Conee (1988) is direct with the possibility of the reconciliation of foundationalism and coherentism, the result of which he calls "foundational coherentism". The idea is that the obstacles between foundationalism and coherentism are not insurmountable. The reason is that the "substantiation of experience calls for an explanation, and so does coherence among beliefs. There is no need to think that these are two problematic relations" (Conee, 1988, p. 393). In other words, both experience and coherence are necessary if a belief is to be

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justified. So, the best theory of justification would be the one that combines the two. That is what Conee's analysis points to, a "foundational coherentism". It is Haack who takes a bold step to fully articulate "foundherentism" in her fascinating book *Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology*.

Foundherentism is a gradationalist account of empirical justification, with both causal and evaluative (logical) aspects—making it a "double-aspect theory". 'Gradationalist' in the sense that belief as well as justification comes in degrees; and 'double-aspect' because Haack distinguishes between state of belief (non-propositional) and content of belief (propositional), that is, S-belief and C-belief respectively, which are to be integrated. There are also designates for S-evidence and C-evidence, among others. Roughly, foundherentism is the view that "A [a subject] is more/less justified, at t, in believing that p, depending on how good his evidence is" (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 118). And "how good A's evidence is" depends on "how well the belief in question is supported by his experiential evidence and reasons [supportiveness]; how justified his reasons are, independent of the belief in question [independent security]; and how much of the relevant evidence his evidence includes [comprehensiveness]" (Haack, 2002, p. 423). This is represented in a crossword puzzle analogy where the clues are the analogue of experiential evidence, and already completed intersecting entries the analogue of reasons. Both the clues and the intersecting entries indicate how reasonable a crossword entry is (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 126; 2002, p. 423). The rationale is to incorporate the relevance of experience (similar to foundationalism) and

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pervasive relations of mutual support among beliefs (similar to coherentism) in empirical justification.

The foundherentist recognises the relevance of a subject's experience and denies privileged class of basic beliefs, to justification, undermines one-directionality and accepts pervasive relations of mutual support, in justification (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 57-8). The ratification of foundherentism is "truth indicative" (Haack, p. 49, p. 265). Ratification, the criteria of justification (*metajustification*) is the linking of justification with truth (Clune 1997, p. 461). "Truth indicative" because unlike "truth conducive" which describes the reliability of belief forming processes, foundherentism describes the experiential evidence a subject has access to (Clune, p. 462). This is basically the foundherentist account of empirical justification. Empirical justification concerns sense experience or evidence of the senses (empirical beliefs). It is this account that has received attention and attacks from critics, which is worth examining.

The foregoing briefly shows that the traditional efforts to address epistemological problems and to resolve the regress problem seem not to have exhausted the options. So, a quite number of hybrid and moderate theories came into the scene. Obviously, it appears that a reconciliation of the two rival theories, foundationalism and coherentism is the toughest thing to do. Nonetheless, a number of scholars point to that possibility. Haack's foundherentism seems to stand out among theories that attempted such a possibility, but her theory also attracts a lot of criticisms from most of the camps about the structure of justification. The motivation for this study, therefore, is to an examine and appraise foundherentism as a theory of

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justification, taking into consideration Haack's explication and ratification of it, and the critiques thereof.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Haack is motivated by the idea that both foundationalism and coherentism are not exhaustive as theories of empirical justification. For Haack, a drawback of foundationalism is that it requires a privileged class of basic beliefs, and ignores the pervasive interdependence among a person's beliefs, and coherentism that it allows no role for the subject's experience (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 57; 2002, p. 418). So, Haack reconciles the two into foundherentism.

However, the theory is enmeshed in controversies and criticisms. Critics, for instance, Lawrence BonJour (1997) and Peter Tramel (2008), have argued that foundherentism is a foundationalism in disguise. Paul Thagard (2000) on his part subsumes foundherentism within coherentism. For Clune (1997), Haack's foundherentism is a kind of reliabilism if it is to be adequate. Thus, the critics claim foundherentism is not distinct from these already existing theories. Haack thinks otherwise. So, is foundherentism really a hybrid and a distinct theory of justification? Again, Haack, in an interview, 2002 by Chen Bo (2007), laments that her critics are misinterpreting and misrepresenting her position. Are their criticisms actually a misrepresentation of foundherentism? In short, the problem is whether foundherentism is distinct and whether the theory is misrepresented.

1.3 Thesis Statement

Broadly speaking, this study is a critical appraisal of Susan Haack's foundherentism. Specifically, the thesis of the study is that Haack's

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foundherentism is neither foundationalism nor coherentism *inter alia* but a hybrid theory of justification. The import is to establish that foundherentism, though with challenges, is a distinct theory of justification, and can be improved to surmount many of the problems about empirical justification.

1.4 Purpose and Objectives of the Study

The purpose of this study is to critically appraise Susan Haack's foundherentism, taking into consideration her position and the critics of her theory. Specific objectives of the study include:

a) an exposition of Haack's arguments against the foundationalist and the coherentist theories of justification

b) an analysis of Haack's foundherentism

c) an examination of critiques and responses to Haack's foundherentism

d) an appraisal of foundherentism. This will involve:

    i. discharging the theory from criticisms

    ii. defending the position that foundherentism is a distinct theory of justification

    iii. attempting a modification of foundherentism

1.5 Methodology and Sources

The study employs epistemological theorisingwhich originates in analytic philosophy or philosophical analysis. It is a qualitative research approach that makes it possible for the researcher to analyse complex concepts and ideas in a simpler, logical and comprehensive manner (Daly, 2010). Epistemological theorising a means to address philosophical, specifically, epistemological issues via conceptual analysis and critical argumentation which provides a means of explication, clarification, refutation and rebuttal of

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concepts, ideas and evidence (Jackson, 1998; Watson, 2006). Thus, resources for this research are taken from the library and internet sources, both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include Haack's *Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology* (1993a) and 'Double-Aspect Foundherentism: A New Theory of Empirical Justification' (1993b). Other works of Haack that have been consulted are *Defending Science—Within Reason* (2003) and *Evidence Matters* (2014). Secondary sources, including, commentaries and other critical studies written by scholars on Haack's theory of foundherentism have been consulted.

1.6 Organisation of the Study

The study is organised into five chapters. Chapter one introduces and sets the grounds for further discussions on the study. The chapter is in two main parts. The first part of the chapter is made up of eight sub-sections: background to the study, statement of problem, thesis statement, purpose and objectives of the study, methodology and sources, organisation of the study, scope of the study, and significance of the study. The background to the study describes the context of the research problem, explains the key concepts and the motivation for the study; the statement of the problem spells out the gap or lacuna left for the study; the thesis statement declares the position the researcher intends to defend; the purpose and objectives of the study outlines the rationale behind the study and what the study seeks to achieve; methodology and sources identifies the method and the research data to be employed in the study; and we have the organisation of the study; the scope of the study sets the boundary of the research area; and the significance of the

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study points out the benefits of the study. The second part of the chapter reviews literature related to the study, to point to the gap left behind.

Chapter two exposes Haack's arguments against the foundationalist and the coherentist theories of justification. It is to give us an insight into and the rationale behind Haack's foundherentism, which is discussed in chapter three of the study. Chapter three analyses Haack's foundherentism. It spells out Haack's arguments for her position, and some potential problems for her theory. Chapter four examines critiques and responses to Haack's foundherentism. It is to examine the arguments levelled against and the responses to foundherentism. Chapter five appraises and projects foundherentism. It summarises and concludes the study.

1.7 Scope of the Study

This study is restricted within the confines of Haack's epistemology, particularly, her theory of foundherentism. All other areas of Haack's philosophy fall without (beyond) the scope of this study. I only make references to the other areas if and when need be. Haack also focuses on the experientialist and evidentialist theories of knowledge (e.g., empirical foundationalism rather than *a priori* foundationalism), and I limit study to this as well. Haack's aim is simple and straightforward; (a) to address those who try to undermine the canons of epistemology and tend to pronounce it dead, (b) to invite and incite those who still believe or are ready to hold on to the canons of epistemology—epistemic justification and ratification—to be firm, (c) to diagnose the two traditional prevalent positions—foundationalism and coherentism, and to treat them, that is, to synthesise them, into what she calls foundherentism. Briefly, Haack's main aim in her *Evidence and Inquiry* is to

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defend foundherentism—its articulation and ratification. This is her reconstruction in epistemology, and we will examine that accordingly. However, issues and challenges that may be beyond the control of this study are acknowledged here as limitations to the study.

1.8 Significance of the Study

This study, apart from being a study and a reference material in the literature, would help in the clarification of concepts, misconceptions and positions of theories of justification. It would be relevant to those who want to theorise, to come up with effective theories of justification. It highlights the role and limits of experience in empirical justification, and this may help theorists avoid the infinite regress. The study illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of theories of justification, and this would be of help to those in the field of law, that is, to apply theories based on their merits. It may well contribute to studies by moralists who seek common grounds for assessment of religious and moral beliefs.

1.9 Literature Review

There are some controversies about Haack's foundherentism, about its explication and ratification. Her attempt to reconcile foundationalism and coherentism has received attacks from both camps and even from those outside these camps. In the following, I review some few literatures on those controversies. Much of the reviews have been spread across the other chapters. Because of the nature of the problem under investigation, I have spread the literature review throughout the study, leaving only very few specific cases here, in order to avoid unnecessary repetitions. The proceeding chapters discuss and examine justification and the regress problem, the traditional

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theories (foundationalism and coherentism), Haack's foundherentism, criticisms and responses to Haack's foundherentism, among others. So, the review is done alongside those sections. Hence, the review below focuses on very specific and much related works to this current study.

In an examination of foundherentism as a theory of epistemic justification, Lightbody (2006) acknowledges that foundherentism is a promising theory that has not received its due (in the secondary literature). Lightbody purports to defend foundherentism against charges of reliabilism; while arguing that foundherentism needs to be supplemented with "a virtuous component", an additional component that brings about what Lightbody calls "virtue foundherentism". Defending Haack against Clune (1997), Lightbody (2006) argues that Clune's misrepresentation of Haack's position is what leads Clune to conclude that "because of Haack's reliabilism on the level of justification […] she must also be a reliabilist on the level of ratification" (Lightbody 2006, p. 18). In other words, Lightbody agrees with Clune that Haack is a reliabilist on the level of justification but disagrees with Clune on the level of ratification. So, on the level of ratification, Lightbody argues that Haack's foundherentism unlike reliabilism, is not "truth conducive" but "truth indicative', and so the ultimate ratification of foundherentism, as Lightbody rightly observes, is not causal but rather *evaluative and internal*. That is to say, foundherentism does not depend only on the assumption that the senses are reliable but on that the subject has rational and cogent reasons for his or her beliefs. Besides, the senses, Lightbody agrees with Haack, are not purely infallible and reliable empirical causal structures and sources of information, and so evaluative and interpretative processes are still necessary here for

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empirical justification. But without the ratification aspect of foundherentism, says Lightbody, Haack does appear to be a reliabilist (Lightbody, 2006). I differ from Lightbody on this; for if the evaluative aspect of foundherentism as Haack has it, which Lightbody agrees "applies across the board"—both causally and logically—then, so *a fortiori* would Haack not be a reliabilist on the level of justification, because justification itself is an *evaluative* concept.

Since Lightbody thinks that foundherentism is reliabilism on the level of justification, Lightbody (2006) argues then that foundherentism needs to be supplemented with a virtuous component. Lightbody argues that Haack's theory places too much epistemic and *ethical* responsibility on the subject without considering his/her cognitive abilities or character and without providing guidelines or tools to facilitate this process. So, for Lightbody, virtuous components such as *good judgement,* vigilance*,* guardedness and *courage*—intellectual virtues are needed for "A [a subject] to *be able to distinguish between* what is the sustaining evidence for *p* as opposed to the inhibiting evidence for *p*" (Lightbody, 2006, p. 19). This is basically what Lightbody calls "virtue foundherentism", and according to Lightbody, it is "objective" and "truth conducive", not "subjective" or "truth indicative", and more like reliabilist, and so incoherent with foundherentism. So, Haack, more correctly, says Lightbody, would be a "*virtue reliabilist*" (Lightbody, p. 20). Here it seems Lightbody is obsessed with virtuous components, for Haack is aware of the responsibility she places on her subject. She talks about "A as a normal subject or observer", "truth-indicativeness as facts about *all normal humans*", and also provides factors that sustains or inhibits a subject's belief (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 120-121, p. 133, p. 269; 1993a, p. 115-16, p. 126; 2002,

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p. 422-23). So, the proposal of virtuous component to foundherentism seems to be superfluous and unnecessary.

From the above, it is clear that Lightbody only purports to defend foundherentism against Clune's reliabilist charges, but the only difference between the two is that Clune's misrepresentation of Haack's position leads Clune to hold that Haack is a "closet reliabilist", while Lightbody's obsession with virtuous components leads Lightbody to hold that Haack is a "*virtue reliabilist*". I hold a similar view as Lightbody that Haack's foundherentism is a promising theory of justification that has not received due attention; however, I differ from Lightbody's conclusion that foundherentism without "virtuous component" or without being "truth conducive" is inadequate. Besides, this study focuses more on the foundationalist and the coherentist than the reliabilist charges on foundherentism, and more encompassing to show that foundherentism is a hybrid theory of justification distinctive from any other theory.

Boone (2014) avers that it is only foundherentism and a weak version of foundationalism that can satisfy the criteria for the correct and complete account of the structure of knowledge. But as to whether foundherentism is a variant of foundationalism or not, Boone does not make matters clear. Boone prefers one of two possible considerations of the matter.

Whether Haack's view is really any different from foundationalism, of course, depends on the correct definition of foundationalism. On her preferred definition, her view is *not* foundationalist because beliefs with foundational warrant also have other warrant; warrant is transferred in many directions, not just one. Moreover, on the definition I [Boone] prefer, her view is *not* a

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foundationalism because she denies that there are properly basic beliefs, beliefs with *enough* foundational warrant to be *known* without additional warrant of another variety (Boone, 2014, p. 394).

So, on the first consideration of the definition of foundationalism, Boone thinks foundherentism is *not* a foundationalism. On a second consideration, on BonJour and Tramel's definition, however, Boone thinks, foundherentism *is* a foundationalism simply because it acknowledges the importance of foundational warrant (Boone, 2014). Now, what is BonJour and Tramel's conceptions of foundationalism? For them, basic beliefs can receive support from derived beliefs, or some beliefs have foundational warrant, on the foundationalist construal of justification and knowledge (BonJour, 1978, 1997; Boone, 2014; Tramel, 2008). What underlines Boone, BonJour, Haack and Tramel, what underlines all their conceptions of foundationalism is that the foundationalists endorse foundational or basic beliefs.

Since Boone concedes that, on his preferred definition of foundationalism, foundherentism is *not* a foundationalism, one would expect that he makes it clear that foundherentism in all the cases is not a foundationalism. I disagree with Boone that there are two ways about the matter. Either on Boone's definition or any other's proper definition of foundationalism, foundherentism is *not* a foundationalism. On the foundherentist construal of justification, there are no foundational or basic beliefs since all beliefs are anchored in experience and support relation is multi-dimensional (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 122; 1996, p. 649). Therefore, it seems inappropriate to reduce foundherentism to foundationalism. Because

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Boone believes that there are "properly basic beliefs", he intends to defend a version of weak foundationalism. This study defends foundherentism.

Kitchen (2018) in a thesis that attempts to defend Rorty's neo-pragmatism from the criticism of fellow pragmatist Susan Haack, briefly observes that if the suspicions of Bonjour and Tramel are right, then foundherentism is not a hybrid of foundationalism and coherentism, not a new brand of epistemology altogether, but a brand of foundationalism—"one that at best sits at the weakest end of foundationalism" (Kitchen, 2018, p. 35). Kitchen, however, observes that Haack is right for thinking the basic/derived belief distinction irrelevant, for in a holistic sense, no belief can be wholly basic. That is, "foundherentism is not a foundationalism is the classical sense" (Kitchen, 2018, p. 38). In *the real sense*, if I get Kitchen right, as Kitchen notes, this does not end what about basic beliefs that worried us originally, nor BonJour and Tramel's worry, because "the dissolution of the basic/derived dualism would not make our commitment to the remaining basic beliefs any less 'foundationalist' in the relevant sense" (Kitchen, 2018, p. 38). In other words, Kitchen thinks that there is no relevant difference between foundherentism and foundationalism. So, Kitchen does not pursue this idea of "classical sense" further, for that is not what Kitchen's thesis concerns. Besides, Kitchen thinks this "classical sense" does not make any relevant difference. Kitchen's observations are crucial (to this current study), but I am indifferent with Kitchen that BonJour and Tramel probably are right, or that foundherentism in the actual sense is not different from foundationalism. For foundherentism, as Haack articulates, undermines core tenets of foundationalism and coherentism, avoids for the most part the pitfalls of both

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foundationalism and coherentism, and its distinctiveness is not merely one of classical.

Abbah (2020) in an examination of foundherentism in Haack's philosophy assesses that the articulation of foundherentism is necessary; it is novel, superior, but inadequate as a theory of justification. With regard to novelty, Abbah argues that foundherentism is not a form of foundationalism or coherentism or any other theory simply because similarity is not identity (Abbah, 2020, p. 65). Abbah rightly observes, as Haack does, that the critics' arguments stem from the notion that foundherentism shares certain traits with such theories, like foundationalism, and this only shows that all the theories attempt to respond to similar issues (Haack, 2016, p. 159). I agree with Abbah that similarity is not necessarily identity. But unlike Abbah, I demonstrate that the argument whether foundherentism is distinct from the other theories or not goes beyond the issue of similarity. It stems from the internal dialectics of foundherentism, which needs crucial examination. I hold that similarity is just one of the issues at contention; but transition, integration, basicness, directionality and reliability are at core here, and on the part of critics, misrepresentation. These issues underlie the contention. So, an examination of these issues would bring to bare whether foundherentism is indeed a hybrid and a distinct theory of justification.

Since Abbah points that foundherentism is inadequate, he proposes that elements of the other theories, beside foundationalism and coherentism (including *a prior* forms), be incorporated into foundherentism. He, however, expresses fear about whether the theory, foundherentism would retain its identity afterwards, because such modification may lead to a new theory

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altogether (Abbah, 2020). I think such a move may prove fatal not only as a deviation from Haack's epistemic project but as a theory that sidelines with similarity over identity and adequacy. For the similarity of foundherentism with the other theories presupposes that the theory has already considered largely the problems that these theories seek to address. I propose that what is needed is that we look into the internal dialectics of foundherentism and appropriate any explanatory and ratification inadequacies. In short, Abbah's study motivates this study to penetrate deeper into Haack's foundherentism and the controversies surrounding it.

The foregoing indicates that both the explication and ratification of foundherentism are questioned, regarding its distinctiveness and adequacy. One could observe that little responses have been raised in favour of Haack's foundherentism on the charges levelled against her position. Few are ready to contend that foundherentism is indeed a hybrid theory of justification, and most of these few express doubts about its hybridity, or fail to examine and defend its hybridity and novelty taking into account the internal dialectics of the theory, and misrepresentation on the part of critics. I advance that a critical examination of the internal dialectics of Haack's foundherentism reveals that the theory is indeed a hybrid theory distinctive of any other theory of justification. I, however, disclose some challenges about the theory, and this reveals that, as almost all theories would face, foundherentism too does not exhaust the options about empirical justification but can be developed to address many a challenge that arises.

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CHAPTER TWO

HAACK ON FOUNDATIONALISM AND COHERENTISM: AN EXPOSITION

2.0 Introduction

The previous chapter indicated that there are various attempts to reconcile other theories of justification in search for better alternatives; and that to reconcile the two rival theories, foundationalism and coherentism is a hard thing to do. Consequently, Haack's foundherentism which attempts this reconciliation is enmeshed in controversies. In this chapter I attempt to answer the question, "Do the foundationalists and coherentists not exhaust the options about the structure of justification, and does Haack actually have a case against them?" The chapter begins with a brief introduction to the regress problem and justification.

2.1 Justification and the Regress Problem

Justification and the regress problem are bedfellows. One is the resultant of the other. This is so because the attempt to justify our beliefs leads to the regress problem (Atkinson & Peijnenburg, 2017, p. 1). The idea is that in justification we attempt to provide evidence or reasons for our beliefs, and this may result in a regress because we would need reasons for our reasons (those already advanced in support of our beliefs). This last point that we would need reasons for our reasons and so on gives rise to the regress problem. The challenge therefore is to either stop the regress or incorporate it in justification.

The regress problem can be traced back to the Greek philosopher Agrippa. We get to know Agrippa through the writings of Sextus Empiricus, who is usually credited to be the chief proponent of justification skepticism, in

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his famous work *Outlines of Pyrrhonism,* which discusses the Five Modes of Agrippa (Atkinson & Peijnenburg, 2017, p. 3; Inusah, 2020, p. 223-24). Among the five modes is the Mode of Infinite Regress. This mode holds that we would end up giving endless reasons in our attempt to justify our beliefs. Basically, the regress problem is a question of whether a belief can be justified at all. Consider any belief, say p. Are you justified in holding the belief that p? Obviously, you would be justified if only you have a (good) reason, say A1, for it. But are you justified in this latter reason given? If you are, then what reason do you have for that reason? And so on… (p←A1←A2←A3...). So, in the end you are forced (1) to continue giving endless reasons, (2) to reason in circles (your premise(s) and conclusion become identical), or (3) to end the chain of reasons arbitrarily. This is known as the 'Agrippa's Trilemma'. The import of the regress problem is that we are never justified in claiming that we know (anything) because we will never be able to show that our beliefs are justified (Atkinson & Peijnenburg, 2017; Wieland, 2012). The best we can do is to suspend judgement.

The concept of justification has different senses or connotations. (Here I consider two of such senses.) For instance, subject, S may be justified in believing a proposition, p for different reasons. Perhaps believing p serves the interest of or is beneficial to S. Consider a situation where S has to undergo a surgical operation in order to survive. Here, S would be justified in believing that he will survive the surgical operation as against not believing it, for it would be prudent for S and in S's best interest to believe so since that may yield the best consequence for S. On this account, S is morally (prudentially) justified in believing that p. Nonetheless, S may want to know whether such a

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belief is true, which may increase S's chances of survival. This leads us to the other sense of justification. In this sense of justification, S would be justified in believing that p if and only if S has the right evidence or reasons for believing that p is true. On this other account, S is epistemically justified for believing that p is true. Thus, a belief may be morally or epistemically justified (BonJour, 1978, p. 5; Feldman, 2003, p. 44-45; Fumerton, 2002, p. 205). The two senses of justification correspond to the generic terms non-epistemic and epistemic justification respectively. The former aims at prudence and best consequences; the latter has truth as its goal. Because epistemic justification aims at the truth and avoids falsity, primacy is given to epistemic justification over non-epistemic justification. Nonetheless, both have epistemic implications, and both attract the attention of epistemologists.

Epistemic justification can be empirical (a posterior) or non-empirical (a priori). Empirical justification concerns sense experience, evidence and reasons (empirical beliefs), while non-empirical justification depends solely on the use of reason (non-empirical beliefs). It is empirical justification that Haack's account of justification concerns (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 57). Now, epistemic justification entails inferential justification. So, a belief would be justified based on inferences from other beliefs, and each inferential evidence would require another evidence. So, obviously, epistemic justification faces the regress problem. The regress problem is thus simple but challenging. It presupposes that: (1) all justification is inferential, (2) beliefs cannot be justified by unjustified beliefs, and that (3) a belief cannot be justifiably inferred (directly or indirectly) from itself (Dancy, 1985, p. 55). Thus, in the attempt to justify our beliefs, either we continue giving endless chain of

reasons, end the chain arbitrarily or end up in circular reasoning, and so, if the regress problem is right, our beliefs are never justified.

There are number of responses to the regress problem. They include infinitism, foundationalism and coherentism. The infinitist response is that justification is inferential and it is infinite (no end is ever reached). So infinitists accept the challenge posed by statements or items (1)-(3) as part of the structure of justification. The foundationalist response is that there are non-inferentially justified beliefs, a special class of beliefs from which other beliefs are inferred. So, the foundationalists simply deny statement (1). The coherentist response is that beliefs are justified in virtue of their mutual support relations. So, the coherentists deny statement (3) (and perhaps statement (1)). Infinitism, foundationalism and coherentism are therefore the three main traditional responses to the regress problem.

Another alternative response, which forms the core of this study, is the foundherentist response. The foundherentist in responding to the regress problem merges foundationalism and coherentism. The foundherentist denies the foundationalist special class of basic beliefs, denies one-directionality of justification, but allows relevance of experience to justification and pervasive relations of mutual support among beliefs (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 57-58). So, the foundherentist aims at denying all the claims of the regress problem without falling into the pitfalls of both foundationalism and coherentism.

From the above, it is clear that the regress problem cannot be ignored when it comes to matters of epistemic justification. It is a crucial issue that epistemologists cannot ignore. Both the foundationalist and the coherentist responses to the regress problem have setbacks. So, since the foundherentist

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merges the two, its distinctiveness would depend on how well it is able to avoid their drawbacks.

2.2 Variants of Foundationalism

The foundationalist response to the regress problem results in different versions of foundationalism. Nonetheless, the main idea of foundationalism is straightforward, and this study considers the main varieties by focusing on the criteria of strong, weak, pure, impure classification of foundationalism, which reflect the objectives of this study. The central idea of foundationalism is that there are basic, foundational beliefs that are non-inferentially justified and non-basic beliefs which derive their justification from these basic ones. In other words, some instances of justification are noninferential, or foundational, and the rest are inferential, or nonfoundational, in that they derive ultimately from foundational justification (Moser, 2010, p. 5). Like a building, the basic, immediate beliefs form the foundation, and the non-basic, mediate beliefs form the superstructure. This is illustrated with an analogy of a pyramid, where the base serves as the foundation upon which the top rests (Sosa, 1980, p. 5). This kind of relationship between basic and non-basic beliefs is called "*basing relation*" (Hábl, 2011, p. 5). The relationship is mostly conceived as *asymmetrical*, that is, non-basic beliefs rest ultimately on basic beliefs, and never vice versa, which, thereby, makes justification in foundationalism one-directional (Chisholm, 2008; Haack, 1993/2009; Moore, 2008).

So foundationalists agree on the two kinds of beliefs, basic and non-basic beliefs that stand in need of justification. What they disagree on is (1) the nature of basic beliefs, what constitute basic beliefs, and (2) the relationship between basic and non-basic beliefs, how justification can be

transmitted from basic beliefs to non-basic beliefs (Moser 2010, p. 5). It is this disagreement that gives rise to the different versions of foundationalism. It is worth noting, here, that the classes of foundationalism can either be empirical (justification depends largely on the subject's experience) or non-empirical (justification depends largely on reason, i.e., logical or mathematical truths); and either internalist (internal factors of the subject confers justification) or externalist (external factors to the subject confers justification). But as said earlier, this study focuses on the strong, weak, pure and impure classifications.

2.2.1 Strong foundationalism

Strong foundationalism is the view that basic beliefs are certain; infallible, indubitable and incorrigible. That is to say basic beliefs are immune to falsity, because they cannot be mistaken, doubted or be corrected. In other words, basic beliefs are considered as self-evident in justification. For that matter basic beliefs are completely, conclusively and decisively justified independently of the support of other beliefs (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 54). A notable proponent of this view is René Descartes; so strong foundationalism is sometimes referred to as Cartesian foundationalism. The view does not only require that basic beliefs be certain but that they guarantee the certainty of non-basic beliefs (Moser, 2010, p. 5). Thus, non-basic beliefs are derived deductively from basic beliefs. The idea of certainty of beliefs is appealing, but the challenge is that it is doubtful whether our perceptual beliefs are certain since our senses are not (100 percent) reliable source of information, and doubtful whether basic beliefs are self-evident or self-justifying. Some strong foundationalists, like Bertrand Russell (1959), are considered as neo-strong foundationalists. They agree that basic beliefs must be certain but that

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non-basic beliefs can be derived inductively or probably from the basic ones—a kind of moderation in strong foundationalism. This does lower the strictness of the transmissibility of justification from basic to non-basic beliefs but it does not lower the strength of justification.

2.2.2 Weak foundationalism

Weak foundationalism holds that basic beliefs are *prima facie* but defeasibly justified, rather than being completely and conclusively justified, independently of the support of other beliefs (BonJour, 1997, p. 16; Haack, 1993/2009, p. 54). Here basic beliefs need not to be certain, and need not deductively support non-basic beliefs. Weak foundationalism, according to Haack, requires only that basic beliefs be justified to some degree by experience (Haack, 2002, p. 418). This view lessens the demands of what makes a belief count as basic, and the transmission of justification from basic to non-basic beliefs. Some adherents of weak foundationalism like Laurence BonJour (1985) conceive basic beliefs to have some relatively weak initial justification or to be only "initially credible", which is then enhanced or amplified by "coherence" (BonJour, 1985, p. 28-29; 1997, p. 16-17). In other words, weak foundationalism accepts that there are foundational beliefs, but it requires that these foundational beliefs can be built into a system of coherent beliefs (Sosa, 1980, p. 16). Here, one could observe that the conception of weak foundationalism is a bit fuzzy and slightly varies, and seems to incorporate elements of coherentism; and this is one of the issues that belie the controversy about the distinctiveness of foundherentism. But the crux of weak foundationalism is that basic beliefs are defeasible and inconclusive, and need to be supported.

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2.2.3 Pure foundationalism

Pure foundationalism results from considerations of how non-basic beliefs derive their justification. It is the idea that basic beliefs do not receive support from non-basic beliefs but non-basic beliefs must receive all of their support from basic beliefs. Pure foundationalism, according to Haack, requires that non-basic beliefs be justified exclusively by the support, direct or indirect, of basic beliefs (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 55; 2002, p. 418). So here non-basic beliefs depend solely on basic beliefs for their support. Pure foundationalism and strong foundationalism are closely related; but while strong foundationalism focuses on the nature and strength of basic beliefs (as to whether they are certain or self-evident), pure foundationalism focuses on the kind or level of support that basic beliefs give to non-basic beliefs (as to whether the support is full or complete). Thus, in pure foundationalism non-basic beliefs receive their support not among themselves but all of these support from basic beliefs.

2.2.4 Impure foundationalism

Impure foundationalism like pure foundationalism results from considerations of the justification of non-basic beliefs. Unlike pure foundationalism, however, impure foundationalism allows that non-basic beliefs receive *partial* justification from basic beliefs. It requires that non-basic beliefs get some support from basic beliefs, but allows mutual support among non-basic beliefs to raise their degree of justification (Haack, 2002, p. 418). Stated differently, impure foundationalism allows that non-basic, nonfoundational beliefs may derive some support from each other, rather than having all their support come from the basic beliefs (BonJour, 1997, p. 16).

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So, the upshot of impure foundationalism is to portray the justificatory potency of non-basic beliefs and to encourage the idea of mutual support among beliefs. Impure foundationalism, closely related to weak foundationalism, aims at moderation.

Basically, the strength or the degree of certainty of basic beliefs or the level of support they give non-basic beliefs is what give rise to classification of foundationalism into strong and weak. Also, the degree at which non-basic beliefs derive their justification from basic beliefs divide pure and impure foundationalism. From the strong/weak and pure/impure distinctions of foundationalism, we may have the following possible combinations: strong, pure foundationalism; weak, pure foundationalism; strong, impure foundationalism; and weak, impure foundationalism (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 55). Among these possible combinations, the weak, pure seems to be an awkward combination, for if a theory is 'weak', it connotes the idea of being impure than being pure.

The above discussion of the different versions of foundationalism shows how far and wide the foundationalists have conceived the concept of epistemic justification. The variants of foundationalism reveal the foundationalists attempt to exhaust all possible options about the structure of justification. So, if Haack has any case against them, it would be very narrow.

2.3 Variants of Coherentism

Coherentism is the main rival of foundationalism. The coherentists reject the idea of foundationalist basic beliefs, a key tenet of foundationalism. For the coherentists "coherence relations" is the key to the justification of beliefs. The central thesis of coherentism is that beliefs are justified in virtue

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of their mutual support relations. In other words, a belief is justified if and only if it belongs to a coherent set of beliefs, or depending on how it "coheres" with other beliefs that one holds (Audi, 1988, p. 419; Haack, 1993/2009, p. 55). A metaphor for coherentism is that of a raft where each belief helps form an interlock of planks of the raft, of a balance system (Sosa, 1980). So, each belief belongs to a coherent system of beliefs and is justified by such "belongingness". That is to say beliefs not experience that confer justification. So, in coherentism, chains of inferential justification circle or loop back upon themselves, rather than ending in unjustified beliefs, going on infinitely, or terminating with foundational beliefs (BonJour, 2010, p. 189).

Depending on how coherentists perceive the nature of coherence among beliefs, and/or how a justified belief must fit into a belief-system, there are different classification of coherentism. But as indicated earlier, this study focuses on the strong/weak and pure/impure classification, and thus, pure and impure coherentism are considered here. However, it is good to note that these classes can either be linear (flow of justification from one belief to another) or holistic (justification via entire system of beliefs); and either positive (consideration of positive support a belief has in a system) or negative (consideration of negative support a belief receives from a system).

2.3.1 Pure coherentism

Pure coherentism is a strong or radical version of coherentism. Pure coherentists claim that a belief can only be justified by its relations to other beliefs (Pryor, 2014, p. 207). So, a pure coherence theory takes the justification of every belief to be a matter of coherence (Furmeton, 2002, p. 226). Pure coherentism in Haack's classification is referred to as

"uncompromising egalitarian coherentism". For Haack, these versions of coherentism hold that only overall coherence matters, and insist that all the beliefs in a coherent set are equally justified (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 55; 2002, p. 418). So, in pure coherentism, no priority is given any belief in a coherent system of beliefs.

2.3.2 Impure coherentism

Impure coherentism may be considered as a weak version of coherentism. Impure coherentists allow non-belief states such as perceptual experiences to play a justificatory role, in addition to relations of support among beliefs; the non-belief states may serve as background justifiers, but unable to justify a belief all by themselves (Pryor, 2014, p. 207). So, an impure coherence theory restricts the thesis to a subclass of beliefs, perhaps propositional states (Furmeton, 2002, p. 226). Impure coherentism in Haack's classification is known as "moderated inegalitarian coherentism". According to Haack, these versions of coherentism allow the possibility of inequality among a subject's beliefs about his experience. They allow either that some beliefs have more weighted mutual support than others, having a distinguished initial status, or that some beliefs are more embedded in a coherent set of beliefs than others, though, having no distinguished initial status (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 56; 2002, p. 419). In other words, the moderated inegalitarian, unlike the uncompromising egalitarian, versions of coherentism give priority to some beliefs in a coherent system of beliefs than others. It is the impure coherence theories that are likely to undermine the novelty of foundherentism, for they seem to allow non-belief input.

The variants of coherentism, as discussed above, demonstrate the efforts of the coherentists to exhaust the options about justification. The moderations in coherentism, just as the moderations in foundationalism, not only increase the plausibility of the theories but also close the gap between these rival theories. For this reason, the logical space left between the two theories is very little, and if Haack has a case against them, it would be a narrow one. This implies that the moderate versions of both foundationalism and coherentism would be a major challenge to Haack's position.

2.4 Haack's Arguments Against Foundationalism and Coherentism

With all the refinements and modifications in both foundationalism and coherentism, Haack still believes that they do not exhaust the options— there is still a logical space in between foundationalism and coherentism. Her case is straightforward:

> At its simplest, the argument is this: foundationalism requires one-directionality, coherentism does not; coherentism requires justification to be exclusively a matter of relations among beliefs, foundationalism does not (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 57).

So, it appears each of the rival theories has a setback about the structure of justification. Of course, the debate is not as simple as Haack simplifies in the passage here.

For Haack, the merit of foundationalism is that it acknowledges the relevance of a person's experience to justification (and it also *allows*, but does not *require*, non-belief input); its drawback is that it requires a privileged class of basic beliefs, and ignores the pervasive interdependence among a person's beliefs (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 57; 2002, p. 418). In contrast, the merit of

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coherentism is that it acknowledges pervasive interdependence among a person's beliefs, and requires no distinction of basic and derived beliefs; its drawback is that it allows no role for the subject's experience (i.e., a person's perception, introspection and memory traces) ((Haack, 2002, p. 418). The result is that each of the rival theories has a vital component of justification of which the other lacks, and each has a pitfall which must be avoided. It is these pitfalls that the various forms of both foundationalism and coherentism attempt to override.

However, Haack observes that the moderations in both foundationalism and coherentism is the right move, but unstable one (Haack, 2002, p. 419). The reason Haack provides is that the moderation of foundationalism and coherentism, though aim at refinement, those forms are unwilling to "sacrifice" their ancestral character—they still insist on some key tenets of their origins. The foundationalist versions insist on privileged class of basic beliefs and one-directionality of justification, the coherentist versions insist on a pervasive mutual support (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 57). But one may ask, what makes them foundationalism if not the character of their origins? What Haack attempts to do here is to show that those tenets that the moderate versions are unwilling to abandon are actually the weaknesses of those versions. In others, they would lose their identity should they let go those core tenets; and this is what Haack's foundherentism claims to do—letting go of those tenets. Thus, for Haack, the moderated forms of foundationalism and coherentism are inadequate, because neither of the traditional theories can be made satisfactory without sacrificing its distinctive character (Haack, 2002, p. 419). So, it seems obvious that there is the need for another theory, the one

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that is willing to do this "sacrifice"—foundherentism. Now, the question is whether foundherentism can do this without being "destabilized" or subsumed.

In the following, Haack takes advantage of the criticisms that the foundationalists and coherentists level against each other, in attempt to expose their inadequacies.

2.4.1 Against foundationalism

The "no tolerable alternative argument" is one of Haack's arguments against foundationalism. In the first place, Haack points out that the foundationalists response to the regress problem, by terminating the regress of reasons with basic beliefs, is inconclusive; because there are other possible options to end the chain of reasons without basic beliefs (Haack 1993/2009, p. 59-60). But since the foundationalists would 'rubbish' these other alternatives, Haack reformulates the infinite regress argument called the "no tolerable alternative argument" in order to respond to the foundationalists. This argument is the assumption that foundationalism is the only tolerable alternative because it claims to end the chain of reasons with non-inferentially justified beliefs. So, it seems then that coherentism and the other theories are just unsatisfactory. Haack calls this false assumption because for her there need not be a chain of reasons at all (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 61). For there can be legitimate mutual support, loops of justification which need not necessarily involve a vicious circularity (Haack, p. 62).

The "evidentialist objection" and "the irrelevance of causation argument" are closely related arguments against foundationalism (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 67-8). The former, the evidentialist objection targets extrinsic and experientialist versions of foundationalism which seem to make

justification a matter of necessary connection between the subject's belief-state and the state of affairs. The idea is that such assumption violates the intuition that what justifies a belief should be a thing of which the subject is aware of (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 67). The consequence, Haack says, is that a subject who has no evidence for a belief or has evidence against it is likely to be accorded justification, while a subject that has good evidence, but there is no such connection, be denied justification (Haack, p. 67-8). This leads to the second part of the argument that causation is irrelevant to justification. So, the irrelevance of causation argument is simply that justification is a logical matter, a matter exclusively of relations among beliefs, because "there can be *causal* relations, [but] there cannot be *logical* relations between a person's experiences and his beliefs" (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 68). Haack deems this argument inconclusive, because for her justification is not solely a logical matter but both causal and logical, and beliefs have *state* and *content*, making justification *dual*, and for that matter foundherentism a double-aspect theory (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 68-9, p. 118-121; 1993b, p. 113-14; 1997b, p. 8; 2002, p. 420).

The "swings and roundabouts argument", Haack believes, is a persuasive argument against foundationalism. The argument is basically directed to the radical forms of foundationalism that conceive basic beliefs to be infallible, indubitable and certain. The argument urges that the requirements that basic beliefs be secure (need not be supported) and rich (but give support to other beliefs) is untenable (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 69). For the security and the richness requirements, Haack argues, would be in competition; the first requires "stripping down" (restricting), the second

requires "beefing up" (amplifying) the content of basic beliefs; thus, making foundationalism indecisive (swing back and forth)–between insisting on security at expense of content, vice versa (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 69-70). However, this argument, as Haack notes, is less effective against the other versions of foundationalism, for infallibilism is inessential to foundationalism (Haack, p. 69). So, Haack concludes that the effectiveness of the argument lessens accordingly against weak, impure, and weak impure forms of foundationalism; and finally has *no* force against foundherentism which requires no privileged class of basic beliefs at all (Haack, p. 70). The last point that the "swings and roundabouts argument" has no effect against foundherentism seems redundant since the argument is not meant be against foundherentism in the first place. Nonetheless, the concern here is that though foundherentism is entirely free from the charges of the swings and roundabouts argument, the weak and impure versions, unlike the strong and pure versions of foundationalism, are likely to survive those charges. That is, what then makes foundherentism more plausible than these forms of foundationalism? This leads Haack to the "up and back all the way down arguments".

The "up and back all the way down arguments" emphasise that the modest forms of foundationalism cannot be satisfactory without abandoning the foundationalist distinctive character. Weak foundationalism cannot be satisfactory except by abandoning the one-directional character of justification, that is, by allowing basic beliefs receive support from both experience and other beliefs; but if that possibility is allowed, weak foundationalism, Haack believes, would be transmuted into a form of

foundherentism (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 70-71). Impure foundationalism, on its part, argues Haack, lacks cogent rationale, for it weakens without abandoning the one-directionality character altogether. That is, it allows mutual support among derived beliefs and maintains that justification never goes from derived to basic beliefs but still assumes that basic beliefs receive experiential input, and still insists on basic-derived beliefs distinction (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 70-71; 2002, p. 419). This possibility or assumption for which no reason is given would transmute impure foundationalism into a form of foundherentism (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 71). So for Haack, when one-directionality is abandoned, and weak and impure foundationalism are transmuted into foundherentism, the basic/derived distinction becomes purely a *pro forma*, pointless (Haack, 1997a, p. 29; 2002, p. 419).

2.4.2 Against coherentism

What Haack calls the "too much to ask objection" is an argument against coherentism. It urges that consistency is too strong a requirement for justification; for it implies that a subject who has inconsistent beliefs, and hence an incoherent belief-set, is not justified in any of his beliefs (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 64-5). For her, this objection is devastating because an inconsistency in a sub-set does not annul the justification of the subject's whole belief-set. She, however, notes that the foundationalists are a "bit too low-minded" about the possibility of inconsistencies in a person's reasons for a belief, for they take deductivism to imply conclusiveness, and inconsistent reasons conclusive (Haack, p. 64). For Haack, this is counter-intuitive and should if possible be avoided. This concern of Haack seems a bit hasty, for as we have seen from the discussion so far, some versions of foundationalism

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allow inductive and probabilistic entailment, and so may be mindful of inconsistencies.

Conversely, another objection to coherentism, the "consistent fairy story objection", as Haack calls it, urges that consistency is too weak a requirement for justification (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 65). This is so because consistency does not guarantee, or is not an indication of, the truth of a set of beliefs. For that matter Haack believes that no explanatory coherence, no amount of coherence can guarantee the justification and ratification of a person's beliefs (Haack, p. 65). This is why Haack holds that coherence alone is not enough (for justification).

2.4.3 Against both foundationalism and coherentism

According to Haack, the "drunken sailors argument" is a fatal objection to coherentism. This argument seeks to render coherentism unsatisfactory since it allows no role to experience; for an empirical belief, avers Haack, cannot be justified and be truth indicative without experiential input (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 66). This argument, Haack claims, applies to the moderated forms of coherentism, because it would force them to respond to why some beliefs in a coherent set have initial distinctive status, similar to the foundationalists' basic beliefs, or inevitably sacrifice their coherentist character, and thereby be transmuted to foundherentism (Haack, p. 66). Not only is the "drunken sailors argument" a good argument against coherentism but a good argument, as Haack claims, against a version of foundationalism, self-justificatory foundationalism. For it motivates the idea that some beliefs are epistemically distinguished in virtue of their character, content (Haack, p.

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67). So, the argument is simply that no beliefs can support each other in virtue of their relation or content.

So, since it appears the rival theories cannot withstand all the above arguments levelled against them, Haack concludes that neither foundationalism nor coherentism is satisfactory or adequate as theories of justification (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 72). Since foundherentism seems to be able to survive all those arguments against foundationalism and coherentism, Haack makes her prima facie case for foundherentism (Haack, p. 72). However, this conclusion is inconclusive until we analyse Haack's own theory, foundherentism, which is done in chapter three of the study. In short, Haack's case for foundherentism is that foundationalism and coherentism do not exhaust the options about the structure of justification, neither is satisfactory or adequate. A theory, says Haack, that allows non-belief input, the relevance of experience, and allows pervasive interdependence among beliefs to justification; but denies one-directionality and privileged class of basic beliefs; a theory that has both causal and logical aspects, a double-aspect theory, is neither foundationalism nor coherentism, but intermediate— foundherentism (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 57, p. 118; 1993b, p. 113; 1997b, p. 8; 2002, p. 419).

From the above arguments and objections, Haack seems to be persuasive in her arguments against the rival theories, foundationalism and coherentism. The arguments appear devastating from Haack's standpoint. Haack deploys already existing arguments the rival theories levelled against each other efficaciously. These arguments reveal the drawbacks and advantages of the rival theories, and from this, Haack makes a case for

foundherentism. However, a critical look at her arguments also reveals that the moderations of foundationalism and coherentism, the various forms will still poise as rivals to foundherentism. For Haack's arguments seem to not decisively dismantle the efficacy of all the versions of foundationalism and coherentism. When each of her arguments is considered based on a particular version of the rival theories it targets, it is damaging; but then the argument may do little damage to other versions, as we can see from the above, each argument targets a particular category or some categories of the rival theories and not all the versions at a go. So, the arguments lose their efficacy against the rival theories, taking as a whole. Nonetheless, Haack arguments unravel a gap, a logical space between foundationalism and coherentism, a space for the case of foundherentism.

2.5 Case Studies of Foundationalism and Coherentism

To undermine foundationalism and coherentism, Haack uses C. I. Lewis' foundationalist theory of justification, and BonJour's coherence theory and Davidson's defense of coherentism as case studies respectively (Haack, 1993/2009, Chapters 2 & 3). In Lewis' case, Haack seeks to show that his foundationalist theory fails in ways that points in a direction of foundherentism. Likewise, Haack points that BonJour and Davidson's coherentist theories fail in ways that calls for a move in the direction of foundherentism. These specific cases of Lewis, and BonJour and Davidson, if I get Haack right, are representatives of the foundationalist and coherentist theories of justification respectively. These case studies are specifics of Haack's general criticisms of the two rival theories discussed earlier. What Haack does basically is to assess these individual theories as propounded by

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their various proponents as instantiations of the traditional theories, to demonstrate how and why they fail as theories. So, with Lewis, BonJour and Davidson's cases, Haack argues that their theories are plaqued with ambiguities, are false and untenable.

Regarding Lewis' foundationalism, a kind of infallibilist (strong) foundationalism, Haack identifies three theses that Lewis defends: (1) that one's apprehensions of what is given to one in immediate experience are certain, (2) that unless there were such absolutely certain apprehensions of experience, no empirical belief would be justified to any degree, and (3) that the justification of all one's (justified) empirical beliefs depends ultimately at least in part on the support of these certain apprehensions of experience (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 75). These three theses, Haack argues, coupled with ambiguities are inconclusive and false (Haack p. 75). Thesis (1), according Haack, is false because Lewis is unable to establish unequivocally in his argument the meaning of the word "certain"; he uses it to mean both "immune from error" and "immune from unjustifiedness" (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 76-82). Haack notes that Lewis does not distinguish between the question of the truth of a belief and its justification in the case of "apprehensions of experience", and so takes "certain" to mean both "immune from error" and "immune from unjustifiedness" (Haack, p. 76). Not only that but also, she thinks, Lewis' use of "apprehensions of the given" equivocates: it refers sometimes to judgements about one's immediate sensory experiences, and sometimes to those experiences themselves (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 77). Matters of the meaning of "certain" are made difficult, as Haack notes, because Lewis uses "infallible", "incorrigible" and "indubitable" interchangeably, when they have

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significantly different meanings (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 77-78). For Haack, such ambiguities make thesis (1) in any epistemological interest untrue. But do ambiguities in themselves make a thesis false? One may argue that ambiguities themselves or lack of clarity do not falsify a thesis, because what makes a thesis unclear is not coterminous with what makes it false. Ambiguities make the thesis unclear and implausible at best not untrue. Perhaps the point Haack seeks to arrive at is that these ambiguities in Lewis' thesis make his theory implausible and inadequate. So, she continues by arguing that Lewis' arguments for thesis (2) are invalid.

Thesis (2), according to Haack, is also false, because the arguments Lewis advances in support of the thesis are non sequiturs (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 82). The idea is that not certainty but probability is required for degrees of justification. That is to say, the grounds of a belief do not have to be certain (fully and completely justified) in order to transmit some degree of justification to other beliefs, and so an objective belief could be justified provided the chain of reasons come to an end with some beliefs or beliefs justified to some degree independently of any further beliefs (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 84-86). Lastly, thesis (3) is where, Haack observes, Lewis repudiates his own thesis. Haack argues that Lewis is eventually forced to concede that thesis (3) is false, because Lewis (1946) himself acknowledges that it is not "present apprehensions of memorial experience", but "judgements of one's past sensory experience" which are required for the justification of most empirical beliefs, and such memories, Lewis concedes, are *not* certain (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 87-9; Lewis, 1946, p. 264, p. 334). It appears certainty is not a requirement for justification of empirical beliefs. And so, Lewis,

argues Haack, is forced to retreat from strong foundationalism to weak foundationalism, and likely, to a kind of proto-foundherentism (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 89). Such a retreat, according to her, undermines the foundationalist one-directional character of support relations (Haack, p. 90). In light of the difficulties Haack identifies with Lewis' theses (1)-(3), she modifies them to: (1*) that one has various sensory, introspective and memory experiences; (2*) that unless one had such experiences, none of one's empirical beliefs would be justified to any degree; (3*) that the justification of all one's (justified) empirical beliefs depends ultimately at least in part these experiences. These modifications, Haack believes, can be better accommodated by a foundherentist theory than a foundationalist one (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 91).

On the coherentists side, Haack takes on BonJour and Davidson. BonJour (1985) in his attempt to overcome the challenges in coherentism introduces experiential input, the "Observational Requirement", into the coherentist structure of justification (BonJour, 1985; Haack, 1993/2009, p. 94). The idea is to incorporate non-inferential beliefs (in virtue of their origin and in virtue of their justification) in the coherentist structure of justification to allow a role to experience (Haack, p. 96); so that the non-inferential beliefs may be justified, inferentially, by virtue of their non-inferential origin (Haack, p. 96). This, for Haack, seems vague. So, Haack argues that BonJour's Observation Requirement equivocates—between a theory which is genuinely coherentist, but cannot allow the relevance of experience (doxastic interpretation), and a theory which allows the relevance of experience, but is not genuinely coherentist (experientialist interpretation) (Haack, 1993/2009, p.

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94, 101; 1997b, p. 8; 2002, p. 419). Consequently, BonJour, according to Haack, reverts to foundationalism.

Davidson (1986), like BonJour, faces similar difficulties in his attempt to overcome the problems with coherentism. Davidson employs both a positive and negative strategy to the coherentist structure of justification. The first, the positive strategy establishes that propositional attitudes, and beliefs for the most part are true—beliefs are veridical in nature; the second that a coherence theory is the only true account of justification possible, for any account that supposes that a belief may be justified by something other than a belief falls to the objection that it confuses justification with causation (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 94, 102-3). So, the first denies the role of experience to justification, and the second denies even such a possibility (Haack, p. 94, 102-3). Haack argues that such assumption is unacceptable and the conclusion unproven, because the intuition that beliefs by nature are generally true is unrealistic in the sense that truth cannot be maximised or generally be attributed to a believer; and because the negative thesis rests on the false assumption that justification is purely logical (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 102-111). Thus, both BonJour and Davidson are unable to overcome those challenges, observes Haack, because they take justification to be solely a logical matter, which for Haack is supposed to be both causal and logical, double-aspects.

Haack's arguments in her case studies seem decisive, and her choice of the studies is quite obvious. In Lewis' case, the difficulties in his analysis of the foundationalist structure of justification forces him to retreat, a retreat from strong to weak foundationalism towards foundherentism. Similar difficulties force BonJour to run away from coherentism to embrace a kind of weak

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foundationalism. In a similar vein, Davidson's positive and negative strategy fails on false, unacceptable, and unproven grounds. So, these case studies seem to bring home the point that neither foundationalism nor coherentism exhausts the options about the structure of justification, and a move in the direction of foundherentism is the best option. Haack's case studies, however, are problematic and quite unrepresentative. Lewis' (1946) analysis of the foundationalist concept of justification and of knowledge is one of the oldest of its kinds, and it is likely not to represent, to reflect the broader picture of foundationalism. Thus, not all foundationalists would be willing to accept such a representation and generalisation. In a similar vein, one would not be surprised to see a coherentist reject the case study of BonJour's coherentism (BonJour, "a runner away" coherentist, who acknowledges that coherentism is not satisfactory (BonJour, 1997, p. 13-15)). So, it seems these specific case studies are limited and limiting—they do not reflect the picture that Haack purports to portray. This is one of the controversies that belie foundherentism. Nonetheless, the way out for Haack is her general criticisms of both foundationalism and coherentism.

2.6 The Narrow Case Scenario

The discussion so far indicates that Haack has a case for foundherentism. But the challenges that arise thereof is also an indication that her case is a narrow one. So, while there appear to be the need to move in the direction of a new theory, foundherentism, the logical space left between foundationalism and coherentism is very little, and for that matter a reconciliatory theory must be prepared to face the consequences that await.

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The foundationalists and coherentist in response to the regress problem face challenges in their structures of justification, about experience, coherence, beliefs, truth and justification. Haack's foundherentism mediates these rival theories, and is likely to inherit similar challenges. But in Haack's case the controversies surround the issue of the relevance of experience to justification, the issue of one-directional character of justification, the issue of 'basicness' of beliefs, and the issue of sufficiency of coherence. It is these challenges and controversies that may render the theory into, as critics would like to have it, a brand of already existing theories; or on the flip side, distinguish the theory from the others. So, Haack has a narrow space to distinguish her theory from the others; and I examine this in the subsequent chapter, chapter three.

The challenges in justification, undoubtedly, force the rival theories to considerations of moderations. So, the variants of both foundationalism and coherentism is the foundationalists and coherentists attempt to exhaust the options about justification, as we noted from the discussion, and it is these moderated versions, particularly, the weak impure versions that are likely to undermine the novelty of foundherentism. As Haack (1997) also observes, the conception and classification of the variants of foundationalism and coherentism overlap, and this, in part, creates the confusion and controversies surrounding foundherentism (Haack, 1997, p. 26-7). Not only that but also Haack's criticisms of the rival theories indicate that, to be sure, Haack points out that the moderated versions of foundationalism and coherentism are transmutable into foundherentism. But this invites a critique from the other side whether foundherentism is not transmutable into those theories. This also, I examine critically in the proceeding chapters.

Haack's general arguments against foundationalism and coherentism, as indicated earlier, are devastating when considered individually against individual versions of the rival theories, but on a whole, they lose their effectiveness. Also, her case studies of Lewis' foundationalism, BonJour and Davidson's coherentism are somehow problematic; for such studies are limited and limiting, and may not reflect the broader picture of the rival theories, foundationalism and coherentism. What may strengthen her position is her ability to articulate and ratify foundherentism, which is considered in the following chapter.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter, thus far, has done an exposition of Haack's argumentation on foundationalism and coherentism, in making a case for foundherentism. The chapter started with a brief introduction to justification and the regress problem; this section of the chapter has related justification to the regress problem, establishing the necessity of theories of justification as a response to such a problem. What followed have exposed Haack's arguments that the rival theories do not exhaust the options about the structure of justification, and thus, foundherentism as intermediary theory is the best alternative. The chapter has established that Haack has a case for foundherentism but a very narrow one. The next chapter considers whether Haack is able to articulate and ratify this narrow case of foundherentism as a mark of its distinctiveness from other theories of justification.

CHAPTER THREE

HAACK'S FOUNDHERENTISM

3.0 Introduction

In chapter two, I indicated that Haack has a case for foundherentism but a narrow one. The reason being that the two rival theories, foundationalism and coherentism have come closer together leaving little logical space between them. I also pointed out that Haack's foundherentism as a hybrid of foundationalism and coherentism is likely to inherit similar challenges from the two. All these are issues and controversies surrounding her theory. In this chapter, I attempt to analyse Haack's explication and ratification of foundherentism, focusing on its internal dialectics that may or may not distinguish her theory from already existing theories of justification.

3.1 Haack's Explication of Foundherentism

Foundherentism as a theory of justification was first introduced in Haack, "Theories of Knowledge: An Analytic Framework", 1982/3, and fully articulated in Haack, *Evidence and Inquiry: Towards a Reconstruction in Epistemology*, 1993. Haack's articulation of foundherentism gets complicated along the way, and perhaps that is the reason behind some of the misinterpretations and misrepresentations of her theory. In what follows, my aim is rehearsing her arguments and clarifying some salient issues.

3.1.1 The main theses and four assumptions of justification

Haack makes a case for foundhaerentism by way of defending two main theses. The two main theses are that:

(FH1) A subject's experience is relevant to the justification of his empirical beliefs, but there need be no privileged class of empirical

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beliefs justified exclusively by the support of experience, independently of the support of other beliefs; and

(FH2) Justification is not exclusively one-directional, but involves pervasive relations of mutual support (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 57-58).

The two theses point out the advantages and shortfalls of foundationalism and coherentism, implying the need for a reconciliatory theory, foundherentism. The two theses also capture controversial issues which were noted in chapter two: the issue of the relevance of experience to justification, the issue of one-directional character of justification, the issue of 'basicness' of beliefs, and the issue of sufficiency of coherence.

In articulating foundherentism, Haack makes four assumptions about justification: that justification (1) comes in degrees, (2) is internally connected to evidence, (3) is personal, but not subjective, and (4) is relative to time (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 117-118; 2002, p. 240). For Haack, justification comes in degrees because a person may be more or less justified in believing something than he is in believing others; justification and evidence are internally connected because how justified a person is in believing something depends on the quality of his evidence with respect to the belief in question; justification is personal because one person may be more justified in believing something than another (person) is in believing the same thing (because of the qualities of their evidences), but not subjective because how justified a person is in believing something does not depend on how good he *thinks* his evidence is; and justification is relative to time because a person may be more justified in believing something at one time than at another (because of the qualities of his evidence at those times—one may be better than the other) (Haack, 2002,

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p. 420). If these four assumptions about justification are correct, then Haack seems to opt for a less radical route towards empirical justification, but as to whether her *meta*justification (ratification) is in consonance with this is another concern.

The above two main theses and four assumptions about justification is Haack's way of distinguishing foundherentism from foundationalism, coherentism and other theories, their conceptions and articulations. Although these theses and assumptions may have their own challenges and problems, they portray the novelty of Haack's foundherentism.

3.1.2 The three formulations of foundherentism

In line with the four assumptions about justification, Haack articulates her theory in three successive approximations. The first approximation, which Haack says is vague but plausible, is: "A is more/less justified, at time t, in believing that p, depending on how good his evidence is" (Haack 1993/2009, p. 118). One could see here that the first approximation captures the notion of justification being personal, in degrees, relative to time, and internally connected to evidence. The first approximation also captures the foundherentist double-aspect character of justification: "his evidence" presents the causal notion of justification, while "how good" presents the logical or quasi-logical character of justification (Haack, 2002, p. 420). The other two approximations are just expansions, elaborations and refinements of this first approximation. It is at this point that matters get complicated. To make matters clearer, let us consider some basic concepts and distinctions that Haack makes in her articulation (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 118-125; 2002, p. 420-422):

1. "A" refers to the person that believes a particular proposition p at a particular time t. Haack uses "A", personal instead of the impersonal "the belief that p" on purpose. One reason is to show that justification is personal but not subjective; another is her aim to demolish extreme dichotomies in epistemology (e.g., internalism vs externalism)

2. S-belief vs C-belief: Haack notes the word "belief" is ambiguous. Sometimes it refers to a mental state, someone's believing something (so she denotes that with "S-belief"), and sometimes it refers to the content of what is believed, a proposition (she denotes that with "C-belief"). For instance, if A is in the state of believing that there is a dog in the yard is S-belief (non-propositional), then what A believes, i.e., "There is a dog in the yard" is C-belief (propositional). And if A's belief state is actually caused by the presence of a dog in the yard, then A's C-belief is more likely to be true, and A more likely to be justified in his belief. Now S- (state of) and C- (content of) are used in similar vein in her use of evidence and reason—S-evidence vs C-evidence and S-reasons vs C-reasons respectively.

3. S-evidence vs C-evidence: Haack uses "evidence" technically to refer to what causes A's S-belief and the logical equivalent of what A believes, the proposition believed, C-belief. The former is denoted by S-evidence, and the latter C-evidence. That is S-evidence is causally related to S-belief while C-evidence is capable of standing in a logical or quasi-logical relation to C-belief.

4. S-evidence has two components: S-reasons and experiential S-evidence. The former includes other beliefs of A (apart from A's S-

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beliefs), and the latter includes A's experiences/non-beliefs (perception, introspection and memory traces). Both S-reasons and experiential S-evidence [S-evidence] has positive sustaining factors (A's evidence for p) and negative inhibiting factors (A's evidence against p); and the phrase "with respect to" implies both factors. Now S-evidence can be both direct and indirect in causal relation to S-belief.

5. C-evidence also has two components: C-reasons and experiential C-evidence. C-reasons are the logical equivalence of A's S-reasons, i.e., the propositions constituted by C-beliefs, while experiential C-evidence are logical equivalence of experiential S-evidence, which are certain propositions. So while propositions of C-reasons can be true or false, propositions of experiential C-evidence are all true. Now C-evidence can also be direct or indirect. (C-evidence is the most confusing but crucial concept of Haack's articulation of foundherentism. It is the last point of justification/is supposed to bridge the causal and the logical aspects, double-aspect of justification).

The distinctions of Haack's concepts made here seem clear enough. Haack's main target in the above distinctions is the C-evidence which plays a key role in the evaluative aspect of her theory. So, with the C-evidence, she arrives at the second approximation of foundherentism: "How justified someone is in believing something … depends on how good his C-evidence is" (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 125). (Note here that "his evidence", which carries a causal notion in the first approximation, is replaced with "his C-evidence" which carries a logical notion in this second approximation. This seems

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problematic. But Haack thinks C-evidence is dependent on S-evidence—it is a build-up).

The third approximation comes in as Haack attempts to explicate "how good" in "how good his C-evidence is". This is where she introduces the concepts of supportiveness, independent security and comprehensiveness. Thus "A is more justified in believing that p the more supportive his direct C-evidence with respect to p is, the more [less] independently secure his direct C-reasons for [against] believing that p are, and the more comprehensive his C-evidence with respect to p is" (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 133). In other words, someone is more justified in believing something if his belief is well supported by his evidence (experience and reasons), if his evidence is secure from (not influenced by) the belief in question, and if his evidence is actually relevant to the belief in question (comprehensive). To better the third approximation, Haack outlines three minimal conditions required for A to be justified to *any* degree in believing that p: (1) there must be A's C-evidence with respect to p, (2) A's C-evidence should include some experiential C-evidence (present experience and memory traces of past experience), and (3) A's C-evidence should be favorable/supportive, independently secure and comprehensive, with respect to p (Haack, 1993, p. 126; 2002, p. 426). In other words, A's C-evidence should or must be (almost) conclusive.

Basically, Haack articulates foundherentism in three formulations or approximations. Because of this three-step formulation of foundherentism, it is complex or it becomes difficult to fully grasp Haack's articulation if one fails to draw the connection between or among those three approximations. This is perhaps what creates some of the troubles in the interpretations and

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representations of the theory. In this conception of foundherentism, Haack has demonstrated that the theory is gradational; and it is this gradational character of foundherentism that may distinguish the theory from other theories of justification.

3.1.3 The double-aspect justification and the role of experience

Haack's distinction between S-belief and C-belief is the rationale behind her double-aspect of justification. Haack acknowledges that a person's experiences can stand in causal relations to his belief-states, but not in logical relations to his belief-content; nonetheless, to allow the relevance of experience to empirical justification, she concludes that justification is a double-aspect concept, partly causal and partly logical (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 68-9; 1997b, p. 8; 2002, p. 419). The idea is that "how justified someone is in believing something depends not only on *what* he believes [logical aspect], but on *why* he believes it [causal aspect]" (Haack, 1993b, p. 115; 2002, p. 420). So, *states* of belief, experience play the causal role, while the *contents* of those states play the logical or quasi-logical role (BonJour, 1997, p. 18; Haack, 1993/2009, p. 68-9). It is, therefore, this double-aspect—both the causal and logical that makes the role of experience pertinent to justification, and it is for the same reasons that foundherentism is a gradational account of justification, in three approximations, in stages.

The three approximations or formulations of foundherentism is Haack's way of explicating the dual aspects of her theory—the relations between the causal and the evaluative (logical) elements of justification. So Haack explicates in stages this: the first stage focuses on how experience is causally related to beliefs (S-beliefs and others), the second on how those

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beliefs can stand in logical relations in justification (intermediation of S-evidence and C-evidence), and the last stage completes the explication "by characterizing 'how good A's evidence with respect to p is'" (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 118-119). So, in this gradational account, experience is indispensably integrated into empirical justification.

Haack regards experience (experiential S-evidence) as the *ultimate* source or evidence for empirical justification. This is taken to be a distinguishing point between foundherentism and foundationalism. This is so because, for Haack, the foundationalists forcefully and unnaturally acknowledge the role of experience, by requiring "basic beliefs" justified by experience alone (Haack, 1993b, p. 117; 1993/2009, p. 122; 2002, p. 422). The role Haack gives to experience seems to clearly distinguish her theory from foundationalism, and coherentism as well. But there is one, or two concerns here: if experience is the *ultimate* evidence for justification, it appears to carry a *foundational* notion (similarly to that of the foundationalist basic/foundational beliefs), and if experience is *ultimate*, then would *coherence* among beliefs matter after all, that is, wherein lies the coherentist character of foundherentism? (These issues are considered further in chapter four, where I discuss critiques and responses to foundherentism).

Basically, the manner in which Haack integrates experience in justification and the double-aspect character of her theory are by far suggestive of the distinctiveness of foundherentism, from other theories of justification.

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3.1.4 The crossword puzzle analogy

An analogy for foundationalism is that of a pyramid, and coherentism a raft (Sosa 1980). Haack employs a crossword puzzle analogy. This analogy best explains the novelty and epistemic merits of Haack's theory (Lightbody, 2006, p. 16). It reflects a gradational account of justification, allows experiential input and permits pervasive mutual support in justification (Haack 1993, p. 120). A crossword puzzle has entries, their intersecting entries and respective clues. The entries depend on the clues, not vice versa; the intersecting entries indicate the mutual interdependence of the entries. For the entries to be filled, the clues are needed; already filled-in entries serve as reasons for other entries to be completed. So, "the clues are analogues of the subject's experiential evidence, already filled-entries the analogue of his reasons" (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 126). How reasonable an entry is depends on the clues (experiential evidence) and already filled-in intersecting entries (reasons). Thus, how justified an empirical belief is depends on the collaboration of experiential evidence and reasons (Haack, 2002, p. 423).

The reasonableness of the clues and already filled-in intersecting entries (independently of the entries) determine how much of the crossword puzzle is completed. So, the crossword puzzle apart from its being favoring a gradational account of justification, allowing experiential input and permitting pervasive mutual interdependence in justification, reflects Haack's notions of supportiveness/favorability (how well a belief is supported by evidence and reasons), independent security (how secure the reasons are independently of the belief), and comprehensiveness (the relevance of the evidence included) (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 126-27; 2002, p. 423).

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The crossword puzzle analogy basically is the foundherentist conception of empirical justification. Filling of the entries to completeness reflects its gradational character, and for that matter, the double-aspects; the clues as analogues of experiential evidence reflect its foundationalist character; and the already filled-in intersecting entries as analogue of reasons reflect its coherentist character. This implies that foundherentism is a hybrid of foundationalism and coherentism, but is neither of the two.

3.1.5 The concepts of experiential anchoring and explanatory integration

The idea of experiential input and pervasive mutual support in justification underlies Haack's concepts of "experiential anchoring" and explanatory integration. The concept of "experiential anchoring" is Haack's idea that every justified empirical belief is dependent on experience, directly or indirectly. Stated differently, experience is the *ultimate* evidence for empirical justification. This is Haack's way of abandoning the idea of "justified basic beliefs" and the one-directional character of justification, as conceived by foundationalists. The concept of explanatory integration is a refinement of 'crude' elements of both foundationalism and coherentism. It borrows from the foundationalist side the notion of "inference to the best explanation" and from the coherentist side "explanatory coherence" (Haack, 1993b, p. 122; 2002, p. 424). Explanatory integration, Haack says, does not imply deductive inferences, and so it is closer to the coherentist notion of explanatory coherence than the foundationalist notion of inference to the best explanation (Haack, p. 122, p. 424). Basically, explanatory integration captures the idea of how an evidence (C-evidence) E is conclusive or supportive with respect to p. The idea is that if E is conclusive, it leaves no

room for alternatives (competitors/rivals) to p, and if it is supportive but not conclusive, the less room it leaves for alternatives to p—making A more justified in believing that p (Haack, 1993, p. 120-21). That is, successively adding or integrating p to E explains why E is conclusive or favorable/supportive, and vice versa (i.e., a mutual reinforcement, supportiveness)—explanatory integration.

Both the concept of experiential anchoring and explanatory integration undergird Haack's idea of COMPLETE justification [caps are Haack's]. The notion of COMPLETE justification requires that "A is COMPLETELY justified in believing that p" if A's C-evidence is conclusive and maximally comprehensive, and his C-reasons maximally independently secure (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 134). In other words, for someone to be COMPLETELY justified in believing something, his evidence and reasons must be decisive (conclusive and comprehensive) and secure, that is, the belief in question and all other relevant propositions must be optimally supported by experience. But if one can achieve complete justification, how does one achieve complete justification in light of the view that justification according to foundherentism is gradational? Also, does this mean that complete justification is certain? Well, Haack does not conceive COMPLETE justification to be certain since justification comes in degrees, but she does conceive of it as the 'ideal' of which we can aspire even if no one can actually attain it (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 134, p. 276). And because justification is gradational in the foundherentist view, it has a lower and upper range. This implies that in justification one can actually move from the lower range to the upper range of the scale, towards

being completely justified. In other words, completeness is the ideal but gradation is what we are sure of.

Haack's concepts of experiential anchoring and explanatory integration can be double-edged sword. On the one hand, as seen from the foregoing, they appear to be distinguishing elements of foundherentism. On the other hand, they leave behind doubt as to the novelty of foundherentism. If, for instance, explanatory integration borrows heavily from the coherentist notion of explanatory coherence and likewise from the foundationalist inference to the best explanation, how special then would its use in foundherentism be from the coherentists and the foundationalists conception of it? Thus, one is likely to contend that there would be no difference but just different ways of talking about the same thing. So, this is one of the things that invites criticisms from the foundationalists and coherentists.

3.2 Haack's Ratification of Foundherentism

Haack, like other epistemologists, holds that there should be criteria, to judge the correctness or incorrectness, of a theory of justification. The criteria of justification is what is referred to as ratification (metajustification). Ratification is the linking of justification with truth, and can either be truth conducive [describes the reliability of belief forming processes] or truth indicative [describes the experiential evidence a subject has access to] (Clune, 1997, p. 461-62). Haack holds that the ratification of foundherentism is truth indicative (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 49). Haack outlines two ways a theory of justification may be inadequate or fail to be ratified: (1) by failing to conform to our pre-analytic judgements (commonsense appraisals/intuitions) of justification, and (2) if no connection can be made between a belief's being

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justified and the likelihood that things are as it says (Haack, p. 49). So, Haack is bound by those standards and takes it upon herself to ratify foundherentism, if, indeed, there is such a thing like indications of the truth of a belief.

3.2.1 The arguments "from above" and "from below"

Haack takes the project of ratification seriously (Haack, 1997b, p. 10). So, she first argues against those—the skeptics, the relativists, or the pluralists who think such a project is meaningless or time wasting (i.e., there are no objective indications of truth). For Haack, the notion that diversity of times, cultures and epistemic communities imply different "evidential standards" is hyperbolic, illusion, and false; for "*variability* of standards does not, in and of itself, imply *relativity* of standards" (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 266-67; 2002, p. 427-28). The rationale is that since all beliefs are anchored, directly or indirectly, in experience (sensory and introspective), and which by nature is built into human cognitive capabilities, of *all* normal human beings, there is sure to be shared standards, commonality rather than divergence (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 265-68, p. 427). Thus the question of ratification is worth pursuing. And since Haack's ratification project depends partly, or rather largely, on the defensibility of presuppositions about human cognitive capabilities, she adopts a naturalistic approach to ratification of foundherentism (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 265-66).

So, are there reasons to believe that the ratification of foundherentism is truth indicative? Haack proffers two arguments: "from above" and "from below". The argument "from above" relates Haack's idea of COMPLETE justification to decisive indication of the truth of a belief, while the argument "from below" relates lesser degrees of justification to grades of truth-

indicativeness (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 274). In relation to clause (2) above, Haack presupposes that all that is required of the concept of truth is that a proposition or statement is true just in case things are as it says (Haack, 2002, p. 428). So, the truth-indicativeness of the foundherentist criteria of justification is dependent on empirical assumptions: (1) that experience (sensory and introspective) is a source of empirical information and (2) that it is the only ultimate source of such information available to us (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 274-75, p. 279). Thus, for Haack, the truth-indicativeness of the foundherentist criteria of justification basically requires that, though not *infallible*, our senses give us information about things and events around us and that introspection gives us information about our own mental goings-on. Both the "from above" and "from below" arguments rely on these empirical assumptions.

The argument "from above" proceeds, as indicated earlier, from Haack's notion of COMPLETE justification, which is deeply rooted in her concepts of experiential anchoring and explanatory integration. The idea is that for someone to be COMPLETELY justified in believing something, his evidence and reasons must be decisive (conclusive and comprehensive), that is, the belief in question and all other relevant propositions must be optimally supported by experience (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 276). In short, the argument "from above" implies that if COMPLETE justification is feasible, or if there is an ideal theory which is maximally experientially anchored and explanatorily integrated, or appropriately identified with the truth, then COMPLETE justification is a decisive indication of the truth of a belief, and for that matter, the foundherentist criteria of justification is truth indicative (Haack, p. 276).

COMPLETE justification, Haack notes, is rarely attainable, and so, she advances the argument "from below" which focuses on lesser degrees of justification. Haack relates lesser degrees of justification to her notions of supportiveness and comprehensiveness. The idea is that how justified someone is in believing something depends on how supportive and comprehensive his evidence is (and how independently secure his reasons are) with respect to the belief in question. Both supportiveness and comprehensiveness come in degrees. How supportive evidence E is depends on how little room E leaves for rivals of p, and how comprehensive E is depends on how closer E is to all the relevant evidence; and thus would determine the degree to which A is justified in believing that p (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 278). If this holds, then, Haack claims that degrees of justification seem to be as good as an indication of the truth of a belief, and the foundherentist criteria of justification truth-indicativeness (Haack, p. 278). In short, how supportive and comprehensive an evidence is to a belief is the indication of the truth of the belief.

Basically, Haack's ratification of foundherentism rests on the assumption that how well a belief is anchored in experience (sensory and introspective) and how tightly it is woven into an explanatory mesh of beliefs is an indication of the truth of the belief. So, if any truth-indication is possible for us, satisfaction of the foundherentist criteria of justification, says Haack, is the best truth-indication we can have (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 282).

How different is the ratification of foundherentism from the other theories of justification? Haack's ratification of foundherentism implies that relativist theories of justification (e.g., contextualism, conversationalism, conventionalism) are inadequate. For instance, the conventionalists, who take

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the criteria of justification to be entirely conventional (i.e., epistemic community basis), undermine the project of ratification (i.e., for them it doesn't make sense); but for Haack, the project of ratification matters and any theory of justification is rendered inadequate if no connection can be made between a belief's being justified and the likelihood that things are as it says (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 49, p. 274). Haack distinguishes the foundherentist criteria of justification from the reliabilist on the basis that the latter is trivial or illusory. For the latter is truth conducive, takes advantage of reliable belief-forming processes, but of which are problematic to be individuated (Haack, p. 270-71). On similar grounds, of triviality that Haack distinguishes the foundherentist criteria of justification from the coherentist. That is, the latter relies on a coherence theory of truth and on inductive patterns, which are powerless to reassure the quest for truth-indicativeness, that they only project that justified beliefs are likely to be true—trivially true (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 271-72).

Differing from the foundationalists (infallibists), Haack says their model, criteria of truth-indicativeness is instructive, perhaps relies on deductive inferences, but the foundherentist criteria of justification differs, says Haack, just as foundherentism differs from (infallibist) foundationalism (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 272-73). In short, Haack distinguishes the foundherentist criteria of justification from the other theories by pointing to their inadequacies and inefficiencies, which re-echoes her belief that if any truth-indication is possible for us, satisfaction of the foundherentist criteria of justification is the best truth-indication we can have (Haack, p. 282).

Haack, supposedly, is serious but not radical about ratification. She believes that a theory of justification is inadequate if it is not ratified. This seems to make the task of justification tedious and strict. Haack's two arguments, "from above" and "from below" reveal these inherent difficultly. The argument "from above" is a radical conception of ratification, while the argument "from below" is a moderation of the conception of ratification. However, both arguments reveal the limitations of the project of ratification. That is, they reveal that a conclusive and decisive indication of the truth of a belief is a hard thing to do if not impossible. Thus, the concept of ratification rests on the possibility of truth indication. Nonetheless, Haack's ratification project is an attempt to exhaust the options about justification, and thereby, a means of distinguishing foundherentism from other theories of justification.

3.3 Explication and Ratification Challenges

The main challenge of Haack's explication of foundherentism is how to integrate the non-propositional states and the propositional states of belief in justification. As indicated earlier, Haack identifies that the word "belief" is ambiguous (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 118). To disambiguate this, Haack designates S-belief and C-belief. The former has causal implications, and the latter logical or quasi-logical implications. This distinction is the rationale behind the double-aspects of her empirical theory of justification, that is, justification being partly causal and partly logical (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 68-9; 1997b, p. 8; 2002, p. 419). Now, the problem is it is difficult to identify the meeting point of these dual aspects. Where does the causal aspect of the theory launches into the logical, and for that matter, how do non-propositional states of beliefs stand in a logical relationship with the propositional states of

beliefs? One could observe from Haack's explication that every causal aspect of the theory has a corresponding logical equivalent (e.g. S-belief and C-belief, S-evidence and C-evidence, S-reasons and C-reasons, etc.). This initially seems appealing, but the challenge is, it creates a situation where the causal aspect of the theory only parallels the logical aspect and not integrated as Haack perceives it. This creates doubts as to whether Haack is able to integrate successfully a subject's experience in justification. (And if it matters, how do we incorporate that in justification? Of which Haack seems not to explicate satisfactorily.). This challenge of explication implicitly underpins some of the controversies surrounding Haack's foundherentism.

Now, regarding the ratification of foundherentism, the main challenge of Haack's ratification project is that it rests on the possibility of truth-indicativeness. That is to say, it is based on the likelihood that an objective indication of the truth of a belief is possible, but not of surety that there is such truth-indicativeness. But if the ratification of foundherentism is based on any possibility of truth-indicativeness, one begins to wonder if Haack is actually serious about the project of ratification. For it implies only that the project of ratification, the truth indication of a belief is superfluous, regarding theories of justification. Nonetheless, Haack's ratificatory efforts are expedient, for they serve as precautions (in case there is such a possibility of truth-indicativeness).

The upshot of these explication and ratification challenges about Haack's foundherentism is that there is bound to be controversies, about the theory, about its distinctiveness.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter is an analysis of Haack's foundherentism, its explication and ratification. The chapter has focused on the internal dialectics of the theory to ascertain whether foundherentism is distinct from already existing theories of justification. It is established that the internal dialectics of Haack's foundherentism, in its explication and ratification, are suggestive of the distinctiveness of her theory of justification. The chapter has, however, demonstrated that there are challenges regarding the explication and ratification of foundherentism, the main of which are the unsatisfactorily explication of the transition between non-propositional states and propositional states of beliefs in justification, and the case that the ratification of foundherentism is dependent on the possibility of truth-indicativeness not on certainty of such indication of the truth of a belief. These challenges, *inter alia*, leave room for doubts and criticisms about the theory. The subsequent chapter focuses on critiques and responses to the theory, to ascertain whether foundherentism as a theory of justification can withstand those criticisms.

CHAPTER FOUR

FOUNDHERENTISM: CRITIQUES AND RESPONSES

4.0 Introduction

In the previous chapter I indicated that the internal dialectics of Haack's foundherentism, in its explication and ratification, are suggestive of the distinctiveness of her theory of justification. The chapter, however, demonstrated that the explication and ratification of foundherentism face some challenges leaving room for doubts and criticisms. This chapter focuses on critiques and responses to the theory, with the aim of reiterating that foundherentism is distinct from already existing theories of justification.

4.1 The Controversies About Foundherentism

Haack has always insisted that her theory of justification, foundherentism is not a variant of foundationalism nor coherentism but intermediate theory (Haack, 1997b, p. 8; 2016, p. 159-162). Haack says that foundherentism, like some forms of foundationalism, allows that experience is relevant to the justification of empirical beliefs; and like coherentism, it allows for pervasive mutual support among beliefs; but it requires no distinction between a privileged class of basic beliefs and derived beliefs (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 57, p. 118; 1993b, p. 113; 1997b, p. 8; 2002, p. 419; 2016, p. 159). Nonetheless, the controversies still persist. I anticipated and hinted on the rationale behind some of these controversies in chapter two where Haack's arguments against the rival theories in making a case for foundherentism were exposed, and in chapter three where I analysed her explication and ratification of foundherentism. The criticisms and doubts about the distinctiveness of foundherentism revolve around the following main issues: the relevance of

experience, 'basicness' of beliefs, one-directionality of justification, coherence and supportiveness of beliefs, double-aspects of justification and the reliability of the senses. I identify these issues in line with the controversies surrounding foundherentism, the critiques and responses.

4.1.1 The issue of the relevance of experience

The relevance of experience to justification has been a debatable issue regarding theories of justification. Coherentists deny the relevance of experience to justification simply because a subject's experience is non-propositional, and only propositions can stand in logical relations in justification of beliefs. However, recent conceptualisation of coherentism, like the theory of explanatory coherence (TEC), an impure coherence theory tends to acknowledge the relevance of experience in justification. Even Jonathan Dancy's pure coherentism claims to allow experiential input to justification; and Laurence BonJour's "Observational Requirement" is an attempt to allow experiential input in coherentism (BonJour, 1985; Dancy, 1985). Some forms of foundationalism acknowledge the relevance of experience by allowing basic beliefs to receive *partial* support from experience (Clune, 1997, p. 461; Tramel, 2008, p. 217). Haack fully endorses the relevance of experience to justification, considering experience as the ultimate evidence or source of empirical justification (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 122, 130; 2002, p. 422). Now, how does this become a controversy about the distinctiveness of foundherentism? It is simply that some already existing theories of justification allow the relevance of experience to justification just like the foundherentist theory claims to allow.

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So, the issue of the relevance of experience to justification persists, as a controversy about foundherentism. One could see the contention as the following: either foundherentism cannot allow the relevance of experience to justification more than the other theories of justification or that Haack is unable to integrate and explicate the role of experience in justification satisfactorily. Strictly speaking, BonJour (1997) is critical of Haack's explication of the role of experience in her account of empirical justification. Laurence BonJour is critical of how experience which is non-propositional can become propositional. To be sure, Laurence BonJour is concerned about how experience could become available for the purpose of justification. According to BonJour, Haack arrives at this stage "by fiat", i.e., by simply stipulating without explanation, which for him is problematic since Haack holds firm to the view that experience plays merely a causal role; and according to him, this is likely not to result in any justification if experience cannot play "a justificatory role" (BonJour, 1997, p. 22). Also, Paul Thagard in his book *Coherence in Thought and Action* urges that his form of coherentism, the theory of explanatory coherence (TEC) allows the relevance of experience to justification. Paul Thagard basically re-interprets Haack's principles (FH1) that recognises the relevance of subject's experience and denies privileged class of beliefs in justification, and this launches into what he calls Data Priority (Principle E4). By the Data Priority principle, Thagard avers that "TEC is not a pure coherence theory that treats all propositions equally in the assessment of coherence but, like Haack's principle FH1, gives a certain priority to experience" (Thagard, 2000, p. 43-44). The point here is that some

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coherentists allow the relevance of experience in justification as well, and so foundherentism would be a closet coherentist theory.

In a response, Haack blames BonJour in misunderstanding her motivation for a double-aspect approach to justification (Haack, 1997, p. 30). The double-aspect, Haack believes, apply across the board: the causal aspect serves as the basis for the logical or quasi-logical aspect (i.e., A's S-evidence is the base on which A's C-evidence is constructed.). What this means is that the causal aspect identifies the role experience plays in justification. Now, an examination of the internal dialectics of foundherentism reveals that Haack actually explicates, via her double-aspect approach, the relevance of experience in justification. So BonJour's conclusion that Haack arrives at it "by fiat", by stipulating without explanation is a bit of vitiation, and somehow inconclusive. Nonetheless, BonJour's concern reveals that Haack's explication of foundherentism has some challenges, as indicated in the previous chapter. Regarding Thagard contention, Haack observes that Thagard "Principle of Data Priority" fudges experience and experiential propositions together, and thereby fails as a genuine coherentist theory, or it cannot truly allow the relevance of experience (Haack, 2007, p. 294). Haack seems to be right on this, for if coherence is paramount, it would be difficult to give experience a better place in a coherentist theory.

Now that some of these other theories, foundationalism and coherentism claim to also allow the relevance of experience in justification, what then makes foundherentism distinct from those other theories regarding the issue of the relevance of experience? Experience forms the basis of the causal aspect of foundherentism. Haack allows that experience is the ultimate

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evidence of empirical justification; some versions of foundationalism allow only basic beliefs to receive partial support from experience; TEC gives some priority to experience. They all give different levels of roles that experience plays in justification. Logically, if A, B and C give different roles to something, no matter how little the differences, A, B and C are not the same. So, the role that Haack gives to experience in justification indicates the distinctiveness of foundherentism.

4.1.2 The issue of basicness of beliefs

A core tenet of foundationalism is that some beliefs are basic and others derived. This conception of beliefs in justification has been contested, for the main rivals of foundationalism, the coherentists deny the idea of foundational beliefs. A distinguishing feature of foundherentism is that there are no privileged class of basic beliefs, for every belief is anchored in experience, directly or indirectly. Now, the controversy is the following: either Haack cannot avoid the basic/derived belief distinction in her own account of justification or that the arguments she advances against the basic/derived belief distinction are not effective enough to demolish foundationalism.

Peter Tramel argues that Haack cannot avoid the basic/derived belief distinction in her own account of foundherentism (Tramel, 2008). For Tramel, Haack's attempt to reject coherentism commits her to the basic/derived belief distinction. For if beliefs cannot be justified solely on the relations of mutual support as Haack conceives it, and if there are any justified beliefs to complete the task, there must be basic beliefs (Tramel, 2008, p. 222-23). Tramel points out that Haack's S/C account of justification exposes her implicit use of the basic/derived belief distinction. For if some beliefs are directly, and others

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indirectly, anchored in experience, and also if some evidence or reasons directly, and others indirectly, support beliefs, then this implies basic/derived distinction (Tramel, 2008, p. 222-226). Thus, for Tramel, Haack's "dual-aspect" theory is obtained via correlation, and only creates the illusion of no basic/derived belief distinction. So, Tramel relabels Haack's S/C belief distinction as S-basic beliefs and S-derived beliefs which become C-basic beliefs and C-derived beliefs respectively, which then correspond to the basic/derived belief distinction in feeble (or weak) foundationalism (Tramel, p. 225-26). Thus, foundherentism, for Tramel, is a variant of foundationalism.

Ruppert et al. (2016) raise similar concerns as that of Tramel's. They believe that Haack cannot avoid the basic/derived belief distinction since she cannot deny that there are beliefs justified at least in part by the support of other beliefs (i.e., these "other beliefs" are the basic ones). In a response, Haack thinks Tramel's confusion arises from BonJour's misleading classification of some variants of foundationalism (i.e., what BonJour calls "weak foundationalism" corresponds to what Haack calls "feeble foundationalism", BonJour's "modest strong foundationalism" corresponds to Haack's "weak-and-pure foundationalism", but Haack's "weak-and-impure foundationalism" has no correspondence in BonJour's category, a gap between BonJour and Haack). And part of Tramel's confusion, Haack believes, is his reinterpretation of foundationalism, and Tramel's move is what in turn motivates Ruppert et al.'s (Haack, 1997a, p. 27; 2016, p. 160-162). This, in Haack's view, is a misunderstanding of the epistemological conceptualisation of foundherentism.

Now, differences in taxonomy can actually create confusion. But as to whom, BonJour or Haack, presents us misleading taxonomies is a concern that needs further investigation. However, Tramel and Ruppert et al. concern here is that Haack cannot actually avoid the foundationalist basic/derived distinction. Here, it is clear that Haack's idea that every belief is anchored in experience directly or indirectly is the cause of this contention. One could argue that if there are no privileged class of basic beliefs, as Haack claims, but all beliefs receive justification *ultimately* on experience or if experience is the ultimate source of justification, then would not the experience on which the beliefs are anchored be basic? Besides, how warranted is experience in resolving the regress in justification? To avoid the regress problem then justification should terminate at experience. But then why not construe experience as basic albeit not in the same sense as foundationalists would use it? In other words, Haack denies the foundationalist basic beliefs only to endorse experience as the basic. But does this reduce foundherentism to foundationalism? I do not think it does.

Haack conception of experience does not translate into the foundationalists basic/derived belief distinction as the critics point out. Tramel and Ruppert et al. seem to miss the point on how Haack avoids this distinction. Haack unlike the foundationalist does not think it is only basic beliefs that get justification from experience, which in turn justify other beliefs, but all beliefs receive justification from experience. Also, Haack does not think beliefs that give partial support to other beliefs are privileged, but that all beliefs are justified in part by experience and their mutual support. In Haack's conception, experience is the source of the content of our beliefs which can

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stand in logical relations. So, not only on experience but together with mutual support relations among beliefs is what would terminate the regress problem in justification. A misconception of this articulation leads to misrepresentation and wrong conclusion. Besides, if any belief that gives support to another belief becomes basic, then coherentism couldn't be distinguished from foundationalism. Even if Haack's conception of experience carries a foundational notion, at least not in the foundationalists sense, and by virtue of this would be distinct.

Also, regarding the issue of basicness of beliefs, Richard Feldman contends that Haack's criteria for a theory to qualify as a foundationalist—her characterisation of basic belief(s) does not limit foundationalism as she thinks (Feldman, 1996). Feldman points out that Haack's view that weak foundationalists hold "that basic beliefs are prima facie *but not completely* justified by things other than beliefs, namely experiences … leaves open the possibility that basic beliefs get additional support from other beliefs" (Feldman, 1996, p. 173). This "additional support" can be from experience, 'other beliefs' or non-basic beliefs. That is to say that some foundationalists allow that basic beliefs are *not* independently justified and can be completed by other beliefs, and by things other than beliefs as source of justification, *not* only from experience. And those foundationalists, Feldman says, do not accept that any belief that gets any support from another belief is derived. Besides, Feldman thinks even foundationalists that allow that a basic belief must get all its justification from experiences may be able to escape Haack's objection. They may simply hold "that when a belief (…) gets some support from other beliefs it is not a basic belief. When it, or any other belief, does get all its

support from experience, then it is a basic belief. Whether it is basic depends upon how it is supported" (Feldman, 1996, p. 174). So, Feldman thinks Haack's argument (the basic/derived belief distinction) against foundationalism is less than compelling to put foundationalism to rest.

Feldman's contention is that basicness depends on how one conceives or defines basic beliefs—how a belief is supported determines whether it is basic or not. So, could there be an agreement on the usage of 'basic' or 'basicness' across all theories? Well, there is no need to derive the meaning of basic (belief) or basicness from across all theories since it is a foundationalist conception. So, in the foundationalist sense, what makes a belief basic? When a belief justifies or supports other beliefs but do not need support or justification from those other beliefs, it is basic. Now, Haack acknowledges that some foundationalists allow that basic beliefs receive *partial* support from experience. Feldman agrees that when a belief receive support from other beliefs, it is not basic, but if it receives *all* its support from experience, then it is basic. At least there is an agreement here that basic beliefs do not need support from other beliefs but receive support either partially or fully from experience. In either case, whether a belief is fully or partially supported by experience, Haack's point is that no belief is basic since all beliefs are anchored in experience. That is, it is needless to distinguish between beliefs. So, Feldman's idea that basicness would depend on how a belief is supported by experience—a belief fully supported by experience is basic—may not hold since in the foundationalist sense only basic beliefs receive support from experience. Besides, if basic beliefs can also receive support from other beliefs, it is doubtful whether the basic ones would still maintain their

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basicness when basic beliefs do not need support from non-basic beliefs, and when all beliefs are anchored in experience. It seems then that giving priority to some beliefs as basic in the foundationalist scheme is *ad hoc* or *pro-forma,* as Haack puts it (Haack, 1997). Thus, if Haack is successful in undermining the foundationalists' basic/derived belief distinction, then that is a way to distinguish foundherentism from foundationalism.

4.1.3 The issue of one-directionality of justification

The issue of one-directionality of justification is closely related to the issue of basicness of beliefs. Haack thinks that justification is multidimensional, with support coming from all directions: so, she denies the idea of one-directionality of justification. The idea is that there are no basic beliefs from which all other beliefs derive their support and justification from, and so, support relation is multidimensional, can come from any direction—support relations go "up and back all the way down" (Haack, 1996, p. 649). Now, the controversy is that Haack's reliance on one-directionality argument to undermine foundationalism to make a case for foundherentism is not compelling enough.

James Cargile argues that Haack's conception of one-directionality, which intends to undermine foundationalism, is problematic (Cargile, 1996). He notes that the only explanation given "one-directional" is trivial. That is, the explanation is limited to the view that in one-directionality basic beliefs can never be supported by non-basic belief or receive justification from them. For Cargile, this only implies that any belief supported by another belief cannot be basic, in that sense. However, Cargile argues that this does not dissolve one-directionality. For in that case, it could be granted that "basicness

is not required, while still maintaining that support is one-directional" (Cargile, 1996, p. 622). The rationale is that Haack's one-directionality argument is not a tenable charge against foundationalism.

Cargile argument implies that one can undermine 'basicness' yet maintain one-directionality because a rejection of basicness is not a rejection of one-directionality. In Haack's case, however, when one undermines basicness, justification becomes multidimensional. Now, Cargile's position may prove fatal, because the foundationalists' notion of one-directionality emanates from their idea that some beliefs are basic—the direction of justification, thus, move from the basic ones to the non-basic. So, if one undermines basicness, one also undermines one-directionality. Hence, if Haack is successful in undermining the foundationalist basic/derived belief distinction, then one-directionality is as well undermined, for in that case, support can come from any direction (among beliefs).

Like Cargile, BonJour (1997) argues against Haack's one-directionality charge against foundationalism. He points out that Haack's all-encompassing argument against foundationalism aims at its "one-directionality", where justification moves from basic beliefs to non-basic beliefs, and never vice versa (BonJour, 1997 p. 16). In other words, conferral of justification in all versions of foundationalism is one-directional. According to BonJour, this implies that weak and impure foundationalism that allow that other justified beliefs must receive some, but not necessarily all, of their justification from basic beliefs, are "left without any rationale for one-directionality", which means a surrender to foundherentism. But this, according to BonJour, is inconclusive. As he argues "no weak foundationalist

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need deny that basic beliefs can lend support to each other, or that they may do so via the connecting medium of non-basic beliefs" because "weak foundationalism, after all, is one in which basic beliefs have some relatively weak initial degree of justification, which is then enhanced by something like coherence to a level of sufficient knowledge" (BonJour, p. 16-17). By this, BonJour implies that weak foundationalism can avoid the one-directionality argument. However, this conception of support relation among beliefs by BonJour is problematic. For if the justification of basic beliefs is to be completed by 'coherence enhancement', it simply means that basic beliefs can support each other and also derive support from non-basic beliefs. But this confirms Haack's idea that justification is not one-directional; and if basic beliefs can derive support from non-basic beliefs, it is doubtful whether they can be basic in that sense, for they are basic in virtue of the fact that the other beliefs depend on them for justification, not otherwise. The idea is that before derived beliefs can give support to basic beliefs, they themselves must be anchored in experience, and if both the basic and non-basic beliefs are anchored experience, and likewise, justify or support each other, then wherein lies the distinction. Now, the relationship between basic and non-basic beliefs in the foundationalist construal is a 'basing relation' in that the non-basic beliefs rest ultimately on the basic ones, making conferral of justification in foundationalism one-directional (Chisholm, 2008; Moore, 2008; Hábl, 2011, p. 5). So, when one rejects basicness, one equally rejects one-directionality.

Similar to BonJour, Tramel (2008) argues that Haack's one-directionality condition against foundationalism does not rule out feeble foundationalism. Tramel acknowledges that if Haack has the right to "the

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'never vise [*sic*] versa' (NVV) part of her one-directionality condition", that basic beliefs cannot or must not receive justification from derived beliefs, then feeble foundationalism collapses (Tramel, 2008, p. 220). But not so, Tramel avers; for feeble foundationalism is consistent with "vise versa". That is to say, in feeble or "quasi-feeble" foundationalism, basic beliefs get justification from other basic beliefs and non-basic beliefs—and so override the one-directionality condition. Besides, Tramel advances that Haack provides no tangible reason for NVV (Tramel, p. 221).

Tramel's point is that feeble foundationalism avoids one-directionality by allowing basic beliefs to receive support or justification from derived beliefs. But this is problematic. To avoid the one-directionality condition, one accepts that justification is multi-dimensional; but to do this, one has to undermine basicness, and one cannot reject basicness and still hold that there is a basic/derived belief distinction. Therefore, the multi-dimensionality of justification on the construal of feeble foundationalism is problematic, because one-directionality and basicness are related in such a way that one cannot avoid one and retain the other.

It seems then that if foundationalists try to avoid the one-directional character of justification they risk losing the rationale of basic beliefs. Likewise, lowering the degree of justification of basic beliefs threatens the tenability of one-directionality, as Haack suspects.

4.1.4 The issue of coherence and supportiveness of beliefs

Efficiency of coherence and supportiveness among beliefs has been a controversy about theories of justification. Coherentists hold that coherence, how beliefs support each other is what matters in justification.

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Foundationalists hold otherwise; however, some foundationalists claim to allow coherence in the foundationalist conception of justification. Haack holds that though coherence, mutual support of beliefs is not enough, it is a key component of justification. Now, the controversy is that foundherentism does not allow coherence or support relations among beliefs more than the other theories of justification, or that Haack's conception of support relations is unconvincing.

Tramel (2008) argues that Haack cannot proclaim that foundherentism allows more "coherence" than feeble (weak) foundationalism does. For Tramel, the "dependence" between basic and non-basic beliefs is enough to serve the purpose of "coherence" in feeble (or weak) foundationalism (Tramel, 2008, p. 222). Thus, foundherentism would be just one of those weak versions of foundationalism. Haack attributes such conclusions to a conceptual gap between her and BonJour's classification of weak foundationalism—a confusion created by BonJour and amplified by Tramel (Haack, 1997a, p. 27; 2016, p. 160-61). Haack is right in identifying the significant gap of classification. However, assuming that BonJour is also right in his classification, it means that Tramel is as well right in his criticism. But then, if BonJour's conception of weak foundationalism holds, as it lowers the degree of justification of basic beliefs to be completed by coherence, it is hard to accept that as a genuine foundationalist theory. For basic beliefs in that sense would lose their rationale. That is why Haack regards such forms of foundationalism as proto-foundherentism. Here, coherence in weak foundationalism is only possible among non-basic beliefs. However, if the coherence relationship goes beyond non-basic beliefs to the basic ones, then

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the distinction between basic and derived beliefs has to be dissolved. Foundherentism distinguishes itself by abandoning the foundationalists' basic beliefs.

Unlike Tramel and BonJour on the issue of coherence, Thagard (2000) subsumes foundherentism within coherentism because he supposes that the theory of explanatory coherence (TEC) also allows experiential input to justification and "TEC goes beyond Haack's foundherentism in specifying more fully the nature of the coherence relations" (Thagard, 2000, p. 44). By this, Paul Thagard meant TEC demonstrates exactly how coherence relations work that bring about justification, and so, foundherentism would rather be regarded as a variant of coherentism. In response, Haack thinks Thagard oversells TEC and misrepresents foundherentism. For the coherentist character of foundherentism is not a model of explanatory coherence but a guide to the structure of evidence, the interaction of experience and reasons (Haack, 2007, p. 294). Haack is right in this regard, for foundherentism as a hybrid theory only incorporates some key elements not every component of the other theories (foundationalism and coherentism). Besides, Haack's point is that no amount of coherence (maximisation) whatsoever can save the coherentists from the troubles regarding empirical justification. Foundherentism, unlike TEC, does not conceive coherence as ultimate but regard it as indispensable in justification.

Bruce Aune on his part is worried about Haack's conception of support relations of beliefs. Aune (1996) holds that Haack's explication and ratification of foundherentism is unsatisfactory, because Aune thinks Haack fails to supply some details crucial for a plausible theory of epistemic

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justification. Aune claims that Haack's conception of support or supportiveness is basically "top-down support" approach to experiential beliefs. That is to say, support only comes from beliefs yet to be integrated into beliefs that are already anchored in experience. Aune claims further that Haack calls beliefs directly anchored in experience "experiential C-evidence", which means that other beliefs are *not* directly anchored in experience, and so for him it seems impossible for the latter beliefs to give a legitimate support to the former, since their (the latter's) explanation is not already well-founded (Aune, 1996, p. 629). So, for Aune such approach is unlikely to sustain. And the reason is, says Aune, Haack does not provide a detailed account of supportiveness. The only option he sees is for Haack to insist, like the foundationalists, that some beliefs are epistemically and evidentially fundamental. Moreover, Aune thinks the "top-down support" approach does not sustain, and is unconvincing for the ratification of foundherentism. He contends that Haack's principal argument "from below" which aims at demonstrating the plausibility of her foundherentist criteria of truth-indicativeness is "extremely general and provides no specification of the manner in which beliefs conferring top-down support are ultimately supported by empirical evidence" (Aune, 1966, p. 630). In other words, linking justification of empirical beliefs to truth on the "top-down support", in Haack's case, lacks detailed explanation.

Aune analysis seems quite interesting. However, Aune's argument stems from his misinterpretation and misrepresentation of Haack's articulation and ratification of foundherentism. First, Aune's allusion that Haack calls beliefs directly anchored in experience "experiential C-evidence" is

misleading; and in Haack's view the question of justification does not even arise with "experiential C-evidence". Besides, Haack provides a detailed account of how various beliefs are anchored in experience (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 124-25). Second, Aune misrepresents Haack's concept of support or supportiveness. Aune presents Haack's idea of supportiveness as a "top-down support" with "beliefs coffering top-down support" which he doubts get any support from empirical evidence. This interpretation is misleading. In Haack's conception, support relations go "up and back all the way down" (i.e., support comes and goes in all directions). And how supportive a belief is depends on its superiority over its *competitors* with respect to *explanatory integration* (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 128). Aune's misunderstanding of this conception leads him to think of the ratification of foundherentism unsatisfactorily. Even if Haack's explication and ratification of foundherentism is unconvincing, not on Aune's grounds.

4.1.5 The issue of double-aspect justification

To fully allow the relevance of experience to empirical justification, Haack strongly holds that justification is a double-aspect concept, partly causal and partly logical (Haack 1993/2009, p. 68-9; 1997, p. 8; 2002, p. 419). This conception, however, is hard to explicate. In the previous chapter, I identified that the main challenge of Haack's explication of foundherentism is how to integrate the non-propositional states and the propositional states of belief in justification. This challenge in explication has led to some of the criticisms of foundherentism. Laurence BonJour, Peter Tramel and Dionysis Christias are critical of this challenge.

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BonJour (1997) expresses worry about Haack's double-aspect conception of justification. According to BonJour, it is on the basis of the S-evidence (non-propositional) that the C-evidence (propositional) is to be formulated for the purpose of justification. But how this is characterised by Haack, for BonJour, is less clear (BonJour, 1997, p. 18-19). Thus, Haack arrives at this stage "by fiat", by simply stipulating without explanation (BonJour, p. 20-21). On similar grounds, Tramel (2008) points out that the evaluative aspect of Haack's theory of empirical justification, the "dual-aspect" of the theory is obtained via correlation. That is to say, there is no (any proper) connection between S- and C-evidence, but illusion (Tramel, 2008, p. 224). So, Haack's crossword puzzle analogy, according to Tramel, creates at best an illusion of no reduction of "coherence" to basic beliefs. So, Tramel relabels Haack's S/C belief distinction as S-basic beliefs and S-derived beliefs which become C-basic beliefs and C-derived beliefs respectively, which then correspond to the basic/derived belief distinction in feeble (weak) foundationalism. I agree with Tramel that Haack's explication of the transition from S- to C-evidence poses some obscurity, as Haack herself acknowledges (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 124). However, to rely on what Tramel calls "correlation", or to hold like BonJour that Haack arrives at it (experiential C-evidence) "by fiat" is inconclusive; for Haack provides reasons for every stipulation even if unsatisfactorily (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 118-22; 1997a, p. 31). And neither does this reduce foundherentism to foundationalism; for this raises the question of whether the foundationalist accept *experience* (experiential S-evidence), "non-belief" states as the *ultimate* source or evidence of empirical justification as the foundherentist do. Unless Tramel is

willing to accept S-belief as basic belief, which is non-propositional in Haack's conception, his conclusion that foundherentism is a weak foundationalism cannot hold.

Dionysis Christias contends that Haack's criteria of justification is unsatisfactory. Christias (2015) indicates that Haack's transition from the non-doxastic, non-conceptual, non-propositional source of justification (experiential S-evidence) to the doxastic, conceptual, propositional source of justification (experiential C-evidence) is explanatorily problematic. That is to say, Haack fails to demonstrate how the experiential C-evidence (the propositional) captures the justificatory powers of the experiential S-evidence (the non-propositional), "save only verbally" (Christias, 2015, p. 21). In other words, the non-doxastic, the non-propositional, which is intended to "anchor" *partial justification*, becomes epistemically inefficacious, because the non-doxastic kinds of beliefs cannot do so "without justificatory recourse to the *doxastic* or conceptual level" (Christias, p. 21). Again, I agree with Christias in this regard that Haack has a challenge, as she herself seems to realise it, in her explication of the transition from the non-propositional states to the propositional states of empirical beliefs. However, this does mean Haack's explication and ratification of foundherentism revolve around circularity, or automatically leads to inadequacy, as Christias perceives it. For Haack's account of empirical justification is gradational and integrative, even if there is a leap in the account, it does not imply a "justificatory recourse". Haack's account attempts to construct the propositional content from the non-propositional states. So, it is surprising to say that the non-propositional is ineffective without a justificatory recourse to the propositional level. The issue

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is rather whether the non-propositional kinds are able to transfer their justificatory powers to the propositional in Haack's account. Basically, there is a challenge with Haack's double-aspect conception of empirical justification, however, this in itself does not reduce foundherentism to another theory, or render the theory completely inadequate.

4.1.6 The issue of the reliability of the senses

Haack argues extensively against reliabilism (Haack, 1993 Chapter 7). Part of the reasons is that reliabilism seems to accommodate the characteristics of foundherentism. So, Haack rejects reliabilism on the basis that it is not a true or correct account of epistemic justification. That is, it does not relate a subject's experience or evidence with respect to his beliefs, but relies on truth-conduciveness of belief-forming processes, which is difficult to articulate and is counter-intuitive. The upshot is that reliabilism is indefensible. However, critics point out that Haack cannot explicate and ratify foundherentism without a resort to reliabilism, or cannot completely avoid reliabilism.

Clune (1997) argues that Haack has managed to incorporate some compatible elements of both foundationalism and coherentism into what she calls foundherentism, but unable to do so without being a reliabilist. Clune argues:

> In order for foundherentism to be adequate as a theory of justification, the subject's beliefs must be truth indicative, and this is only possible if the senses are a reliable means of detecting information about the environment (Clune, 1997, p. 462).

Thus, Haack's ratification of foundherentism, according to Alan C. Clune, rests on the presupposition that "the senses are *reliable* source of information"

(Clune, 1997, p. 462). This, he however believes, makes foundherentism external, "truth conducive" and reliabilist, rather than internal and "truth indicative". So, according to Clune, Haack is unable to ratify foundherentism, and per her own standards, foundherentism is inadequate. Clune, therefore, concludes that it is either Haack abandons her position and to accept some form of coherentism or foundationalism, or to simply embrace some form of reliabilist theory of justification.

Clune's argument is straightforward and clear enough. However, one needs to take into consideration the intent of Haack's ratification of foundherentism and her *double-aspect* of justification (justification being both causal and evaluative). For Haack does not think the senses or experience (sensory and introspective) is/are *sufficiently and infallibly reliable* source of information for empirical justification, but play the key role of "experiential anchoring". So, for Haack we need adequate and secure reasons or warranted evidence for our beliefs—justification, and to ensure our justified beliefs are "truth indicative"—ratification: both these are dependent on *evidential, internal and evaluative* principles. So, Haack only demonstrates or indicates that the senses are sources of information, not to rely solely on the senses but to evaluate and incorporate these sources of information in justification. So, in both justification and ratification, Haack clearly distinguishes herself from reliabilism.

Lightbody (2006) disagrees with Clune that Haack is reliabilist at level of ratification, but believes that at the level of justification Haack indeed is a reliabilist (Lightbody, 2006, p. 18). For Brian Lightbody, it is Haack's ratification project that distinguishes foundherentism from reliabilism. But

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without the ratification aspect of foundherentism, says Lightbody, Haack does appear to be a reliabilist (Lightbody, 2006). But Lightbody seems to be mistaking, for if the evaluative aspect of foundherentism, as Lightbody agrees, "applies across the board"—both causally and logically—then, so *a fortiori* would Haack not be a reliabilist on the level of justification, because justification itself is an *evaluative* concept. In short, simply holding that the senses are sources of empirical evidence does not make one a reliabilist.

4.1.7 Further views on the issues

Oftentimes than not, the critics of foundherentism try to show that the theory is not distinct from other theories or it is inadequate. As others claim it is foundationalism, others claim it is coherentism, some that it is reliabilism, among others.

Mandal (2013) argues that Haack's foundherentism is a foundationalist account of justification. Mandal's reason is that what Haack has articulated has been already anticipated by foundationalists, and for that matter Haack will be a foundationalist (Mandal, 2013, p. 174). Mandal attributes this to the foundationalists' anticipation of perceptual and general beliefs. Mandal's (2013) belief that Haack's theory is not novel simply because the foundationalists have already anticipated it is a mistake; for what the foundationalists hinted might not have yielded the results of the foundherentist, as Haack undermines some of the key components of the foundationalist tradition.

Vogel (1995) argues that Haack's foundherentism is not any different from weak foundationalism. For him, both foundherentism and weak foundationalism make no claims about the direction of justification, so both

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avoid one-directional character of justification. Besides, he points out that Haack denies the basic/derived belief distinction only to affirm that experience is the ultimate evidence for empirical justification, which, in a sense, carries a foundational notion (Vogel, 1995, p. 623).

Now, Haack's foundherentism, unlike weak foundationalism, actually takes support relation to be multi-dimensional, where support relations come from all directions. Again, Vogel's strategy that Haack's idea of experience being the ultimate evidence of justification commits her to foundationalism is unconvincing. Experience being ultimate in the foundherentist sense does amount to the foundationalist basic belief which receives partial justification from experience yet is regarded foundational.

Like Vogel, Shogenji (2001) classifies foundherentism as foundationalism. Shogenji thinks that justification is generated not channeled—no directionality (one- or multi-) is required. Thus, foundherentism is a version of foundationalism since relations among beliefs do not generate any justification in it, and because Haack claims experience to be the ultimate evidence of justification, which, in a sense, implies foundational (Shogenji, 2001, p. 93-94). Here, Shogenji's classification of theories of justification on the basis of generation of justification is misguided. In generating justification, different approaches are employed, leading to different theories. The variations in approach also determine whether a theory employs direction and relation in justification. Not only generation but direction and relation in justification that distinguish one theory from the other. So, Shogenji charges against foundherentism stems from misguided classification of theories of justification.

Wójcicki (2007) accuses Haack of infallibilism. Wójcicki believes that Haack's consideration of empirical beliefs as both sensory and introspective commits her to a class of infallible introspective beliefs. Wójcicki seems to miss the point. It is true that Haack takes experience to be both sensory and introspective, but she does not hold they are infallible. In fact, she does not think they bring about basic beliefs; they serve only as experiential input. Besides, Haack repudiates infallibilism throughout her articulation and ratification of foundherentism.

From the controversies surrounding foundherentism, it is clear that almost none of the critiques is in favour of foundherentism. In chapter one, in the literature review section, I have discussed some few scholars who attempt an analysis of foundherentism as a distinct theory of justification. Lightbody (2006), in his analysis, concludes that foundherentism is not reliabilism only at the level of ratification, but at the level of justification, it is. I counterpose that foundherentism is not reliabilsim both on the level of ratification and justification. Boone (2014) points out that whether foundherentism is distinct from foundationalism depends on the definition one prefers. I have demonstrated the issue goes beyond one's preferred definition—to the core tenets of the theories. Kitchen (2018) briefly observes that foundherentism is not foundationalism is the classical sense. In the real sense, Kitchen believes foundherentism would be a weakest version of foundationalism. This current analysis attempts to show that, not just in the classical sense but in the actual sense, foundherentism is a distinct theory. Abbah (2020) argues that foundherentism is distinct from the other theories simply because similarity is not identity. I agree with Abbah that similarity is one of the contentions.

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However, in this study, I have tried to identify some of the issues that underlie the debate, and also to outline features of foundherentism that make it distinct from the other theories.

4.2 Implications of Critiques and Responses

The controversies surrounding foundherentism and the issues identified here, particularly the criticisms, are claims that Haack's foundherentism is not distinct from already existing theories of justification and also inadequate. The critiques are pointing to unconvincing arguments advanced by Haack, unsatisfactory account of justification (explication and ratification challenges), among others. However, the responses are indications that the criticisms are not conclusive.

The critics argue that foundherentism cannot allow the relevance of experience to justification more than the other theories of justification, and also, that Haack is unable to integrate and explicate the role of experience in justification satisfactorily. That is to say, Haack seems unable to show exactly how experience which is non-propositional could become available for the purpose of justification. Again, the critics contend that Haack cannot avoid the basic/derived belief distinction in her own account of justification, and also, that the arguments she advances against the basic/derived belief distinction are not effective enough to demolish foundationalism. That is, her distinction between S- and C-belief, and for that matter S- and C-justification, or that some beliefs are directly and others indirectly anchored in experience, commits her to the foundationalist basic/derived belief distinction. Thus, Haack has a challenge explicating the dual aspects of justification. Besides, others believe that Haack cannot avoid the basic/derived belief distinction,

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because she cannot deny that there are beliefs justified at least in part by the support of other beliefs.

The critics, again, point out that Haack's reliance on the one-directionality argument to undermine foundationalism to make a case for foundherentism is not compelling enough. Some like Cargile point out that the explanation given "one-directional" is trivial, and so it is possible to undermine basicness while still maintaining that justification is one-directional. Others like BonJour and Tramel hold that foundationalism can avoid the one-directionality argument, because weak foundationalism allows basic beliefs to receive some support from other beliefs.

Also, the criticisms imply that foundherentism does not allow coherence or support relations among beliefs more than the other theories of justification, and that Haack's conception of support relations is unconvincing. That is, weak foundationalism allows coherence relations between and among basic and non-basic beliefs; TEC even allows it the more. Others like Aune believe that Haack does not provide a detailed account of support relations, so, the account is inadequate. Some of the critiques imply that foundherentism is reliabilism because its articulation and ratification rests on the presupposition that the senses are *reliable* source of information. In short, the criticisms imply that foundherentism is not distinct from these other theories.

However, the responses are to the contrary. Apart from Haack's complaint that there is a classification gap between her and the others' conception of foundationalism, and some misunderstandings between her and her critics, the internal dialectics, the features of foundherentism in its articulation and ratification are indications that foundherentism is distinct from

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the other theories. On the issue of experience, Haack endorses experience as the ultimate source or evidence for empirical justification. The others do not allow this, and that is a distinction. When experience becomes the ultimate evidence for justification it seems then that the basic beliefs become *ad hoc* or *pro-forma*. It also means that we cannot avoid one-directionality while holding on to basic beliefs. Besides, Haack unlike the foundationalists does not think it is only basic beliefs that get justification from experience, which in turn justify other beliefs, but all beliefs receive justification from experience. That is, all beliefs are justified in part by experience and their mutual support. This also means that no amount of maximisation of coherence or support relation is enough for justification. Also, to hold that the senses are sources of information for empirical justification does not translate into reliabilism. For foundherentism does not depend on reliability of the senses but evaluative and ratificatory principles. The upshot is that foundherentism is distinct though with challenges.

From the foregoing, I acknowledge that foundherentism faces some explication and ratification challenges but reiterate that foundherentism is distinctive from already existing theories of justification. That foundherentism has similarities with the other theories, that Haack's articulation of the transition between non-propositional and propositional source of justification is problematic, is undeniable. However, to reduce foundherentism to any of these other theories based on some of the issues identified here is a mistake, because despite the fact that it bears some semblances to the other theories, there are other features that distinguishes it from the others. Besides, a

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reconciliatory theory at least shares commonality with the theories in question, but it is in its other features that lie its distinctiveness.

4.3 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on critiques and responses to foundherentism. It has been revealed that the critiques basically undermine the distinctiveness and adequacy of foundherentism as a theory of justification. The responses, however, demonstrate how foundherentism survives those criticisms. By identifying some main controversies surrounding Haack's foundherentism, it is reiterated that foundherentism is distinct from already existing theories of justification. In the final chapter, conclusions are drawn and foundherentism as a theory of justification is projected.

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CHAPTER FIVE

TOWARDS A DEFENCE OF FOUNDHERENTISM

5.0 Introduction

In this chapter, I appraise Susan Haack's foundherentism as a theory of justification and defend the position that foundherentism is neither foundationalism nor coherentism *inter alia* but a distinct theory of justification. I tease out the distinguishing features of the theory, discharge the theory from some criticisms, and attempt a modification of the theory due to some challenges it encounters, mainly, the problem of transitioning from non-propositional to propositional source of justification. Some of the criticisms of foundherentism in the previous chapters are that foundherentism is not the only theory that allow the relevance of experience to justification, it does not allow support relations more than the other theories, it cannot avoid the basic/derived belief distinction, it cannot avoid reliabilism, so, it is not distinct. In the responses, it is identified that, apart from some of criticisms emanating from misunderstanding, misinterpretation and misrepresentation, as Haack laments, the arguments are inconclusive.

5.1 The Distinctiveness of Foundherentism

Is foundherentism actually distinct from already existing theories of justification? One might argue that it is. But is foundherentism similar to those other theories? One could argue again in the affirmative. The responses in affirmative seem self-contradictory and self-defeating. But is this really the case? The logic lies in the internal dialectics, the characteristics and the conception of foundherentism as a theory of justification. That is to say, it is in its integrative, accommodative, moderationist and gradationalist account of

justification. Hence, elements of other theories of justification are incorporated directly or indirectly in this novel theory, foundherentism. Perhaps in simple terms, we can say that foundherentism is similar to but distinct from the other theories of justification. As Haack conceives foundherentism, it is on the one hand similar to foundationalism, and on the other hand similar to coherentism, but different from both in its articulation and ratification (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 57, p. 118; 1993b, p. 113; 1997b, p. 8; 2002, p. 419; 2016, p. 159). This sums up the main crux of foundherentism. But the outlook of foundherentism portrays more than this conception even if Haack does not intend that or realise it. Foundherentism entails more than just being an intermediary of foundationalism and coherentism. That is why most of the other theorists claim it is theirs or one of their own. All the same, the standpoint of this study by far and at this stage is crystal clear: foundherentism is neither foundationalism nor coherentism, among others, but a hybrid theory of justification.

5.1.1 Foundherentism as a distinct reconciliatory theory

A hindsight of the distinctiveness of foundherentism rests on its reconciliatory character. Foundherentism is a reconciliation of foundationalism and coherentism. Not only these two, as I indicated, but other theories of justification indirectly. As a reconciliatory theory, foundherentism adapts the strengths of foundationalism and coherentism, and avoids their setbacks (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 57; 2002, p. 418). This entails incorporating some key components of justification from both theories, say, experiential input and mutual support relation. The idea is to end a seemingly unavoidable rivalry between the traditional theories, and the outcome is foundherentism, a

hybrid theory. A theory that sets out to reconcile others cannot be one of those. In the words of Haack, "a theory such as [this], which allows non-belief input… which allows the relevance of experience to justification, but requires no class of privileged beliefs justified exclusively by experience with no support from other beliefs, is neither foundationalist nor coherentist [among other theories], but is intermediate between the traditional rivals" (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 57). It is just what it is, foundherentism, a hybrid theory. Now, one may ask: but if foundationalism and coherentism already extend to each other, as Haack claims, then what is the point in reconciling them? Well, if two rival theories extend to each other already, then wherein lies their rivalry? Perhaps the rivalry is as a result of holding on to some core tenets of their origins, which in Haack's case are defects that need to be abandoned. Better still, if two theories extend to each other but just a narrow gap between them, then one of them is not needed. But if none of them is ready to give up, then the best one can do is to merge them; that is the point of Haack's foundherentism, a reconciliatory theory.

The reconciliatory character should have been enough to distinguish foundherentism from the other theories. But critics still contend that foundherentism is just like those other theories or it is a variant of such theories. However, similarity is not Haack's concern. In fact, Haack is not in denial of the semblance of foundherentism to the rival theories or other theories. After all, foundherentism as a reconciliatory theory would definitely bear semblance to the reconciled theories. But it is, specifically speaking, the reconciliatory character that makes foundherentism distinct. Besides, similarity is not identity (Abbah, 2020). Its semblance to the rival theories is

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the mark of its origins, and its distinctiveness as a reconciliatory theory depicts its novelty and hybridity. Consider, for example, the following analogy: a mule, a hybrid offspring of a male donkey and female horse, is similar to a donkey and a horse but a mule is distinct, and different from a zebra too. Let us assume a mule represents foundherentism, it is similar to a donkey (foundationalism) and a horse (coherentism) but at the same time distinct from them, and also different from a zebra (other theories). Hence, foundherentism is a hybrid theory just as a mule is a hybrid species. With the foregoing analogy, suppose we ask ourselves, "Does a mule look like a donkey and/or a horse?" The answer is obviously "yes". But is a mule a donkey, a horse or both? Here the answer is no. What if in one way or the other a mule happens to look like a zebra. Do we say that the mule is a zebra? A mule is a mule just as foundherentism is foundherentism. In short, we cannot deny foundherentism its reconciliatory character, be it adequate or not.

5.1.2 Foundherentism as a double-aspect theory

In order to avoid "the irrelevance of causation argument", Haack accounts for a double-aspect of justification. The irrelevance of causation argument simply implies that a subject's experiences are irrelevant to the justification of his beliefs. That is, justification is solely a logical matter because "while there can be *causal* relations, there cannot be *logical* relations between a person's experiences and his beliefs" (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 68). To avoid this argument, and to fully allow the relevance of experience to empirical justification, Haack strongly holds that justification is a double-aspect concept, partly causal and partly logical (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 68-9; 1997b, p. 8; 2002, p. 419). For instance, part of what justifies A in believing

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that "there is a dog present" is that "he is seeing the dog". The idea is that "how justified someone is in believing something depends not only on *what* he believes [logical aspect], but on *why* he believes it [causal aspect]" (Haack 1993b, p. 115; 2002, p. 420). So, Haack's foundherentism is a double-aspect theory of empirical justification.

Haack's double-aspect account of justification, *simpliciter*, distinguishes her theory from already existing theories of justification, though comes with a cost. Chapters three and four indicate that the double-aspect conception of justification is hard to explicate if not impossible. The main challenge identified is the transition from non-propositional source to the propositional source of justification. Haack has a challenge of explicating how to integrate the non-propositional states and the propositional states of belief in justification. This challenge in part is what has led to some of the criticisms of foundherentism. For if indeed justification is a double-aspect concept, then we must account for it in such a way that we do not end up with two evenly theories competing for logical space in the same theory.

Whatever the challenge of Haack's account may be, every theory has conceptual challenges, challenges that may be peculiar to it or general in nature. Let us accept that this challenge is peculiar to Haack's foundherentism. After all, the other theories do not ascribe to the double-aspect concept of justification. Now, if we accept this line of thought, do we still go ahead to insist that foundherentism is just like the other theories or one of their own? What is being clarified here is this: how do we subsume a double-aspect theory with its challenges into foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism, among others, which are 'non-double-aspect theories'? Should we ignore the

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character in virtue of which one theory is distinct from another just for argument's sake? Haack's foundherentism is a double-aspect account of justification, be it adequate or not, it is in virtue of this that the theory is distinct from other theories.

5.1.3 Foundherentism as an experientialist theory

As experientialist theory of justification, Haack's foundherentism regards experience as the essential source of empirical justification. In Haack's case, experience is the ultimate evidence for empirical justification (Haack, 1993b, p. 117; 1993/2009, p. 122; 2002, p. 422). It is also on the experientialist character of foundherentism that Haack ratifies the theory (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 278). As experientialist, Haack limits her thesis to foundationalism and coherentism *qua* rival theories of empirical justification (Haack, p. 57). What this means is that Haack has distinguished her theory from non-empirical theories of justification. I do not intend here to query whether those non-empirical theories may not be adequate theories of justification as well. I only intend to make it clear that in our assessment of Haack's foundherentism we should not ignore the concerns of her theses. Briefly, the reason why Haack's thesis concerns the empirical and not the non-empirical theories of justification can be seen in her canons of ratification: one is that a theory of justification may be inadequate if the criteria it offers are such that no connection can be made between a belief's being justified, by those criteria, and the likelihood that things are as it says (i.e., implying empirical grounds) (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 49). More importantly, Haack thinks that "what justifies a belief should be something of which … the subject

is aware" (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 67). So, foundherentism is distinct from non-empirical theories of justification.

What about the empirical theories of justification? To hold experience as the ultimate evidence for empirical justification is Haack's way of abandoning the basic beliefs of the foundationalists. To abandon basic beliefs or the basic/derived belief distinction is to abandon their one-directional character of justification, and to do that is to distinguish foundherentism from foundationalism. But some critics such as Tramel, Shogenji, Vogel would still contend that foundherentism is a foundationalism. The fact that foundherentism is an experientialist theory and some versions of foundationalism being experientialist does not make them the same. Besides, if we can distinguish weak foundationalism from strong foundationalism by lowering the degree of which basic beliefs support derived beliefs, foundherentism is distinguishable from foundationalism. As for coherentism, foundherentism is distinct from it in virtue of its experientialist character, by giving experience priority over coherence. In short, the experientialist character of foundherentism distinguishes it from non-empirical theories of justification and empirical and experientialist theories of justification as well.

5.1.4 The dialectics of foundherentism

Chapter three of this study focused on foundherentism as a theory of justification. It was shown that the internal dialectics of foundherentism are suggestive of its distinctiveness, and reiterated in chapter four that foundherentism is distinct from already existing theories of justification. How Haack explicates and ratifies her theory differentiates it from the other theories.

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To show that both foundationalism and coherentism do not exhaust the options about justification and that foundherentism is what is needed, Haack gives a gradationalist account of justification with double-aspects, both causal and evaluative. The gradationalist account ensures that belief as well as justification comes in degrees. This is why a person is or may be more/less justified with respect to a particular proposition. Inherent in this are Haack's four assumptions that justification (1) comes in degrees, (2) is personal, but not subjective, (3) is relative to time, and (4) is internally connected to evidence (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 117-118; 2002, p. 240). The gradational account also ensures that both experiential input and mutual support relations interlock into a mesh of justification. So, Haack employs the crossword puzzle analogy to illustrate this interpenetration and interdependence of the elements of empirical justification. Thus, in a crossword puzzle, "the clues are analogues of the subject's experiential evidence, already filled-in entries, the analogue of his reasons" (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 126). This also implies that basic beliefs are not required as the foundationalists conceive it, and coherence alone is not enough as coherentists perceive it, but how beliefs interrelate with evidence. So for Haack, the more/less a person is justified with respect to a proposition depends on how favorable the belief is (how well a belief is supported by evidence and reasons), how secure the reasons are independently of the belief in question, and how comprehensive the evidence is (the relevance of the evidence included) (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 126-127; 2002, p. 423). These entail Haack's notions of supportiveness, independent security and comprehensiveness respectively. Stated differently, in Haack's account of justification, someone (a person) is more justified in believing something if his

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belief is well supported by his evidence (experience and reasons), if his evidence is secure from (not influenced by) the belief in question, and if his evidence is actually relevant to the belief in question.

If we ignore these internal dialectics of foundherentism, then foundherentism as a theory of justification collapses into either foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism, or something else. But how can we or why should we ignore the elements or the character that distinguishes a theory from other theories and brood over the character in which it is similar to those other theories? To do that perhaps is to imply that foundherentism is not better than the other theories. But does this entail that foundherentism is not distint from those theories? If one account of justification is inadequate and another account is inadequate as well, do we conclude that since both are inadequate, they are the same, and vice versa? That aside, should we agree that foundherentism is foundationalism, coherentism or reliabilism, and others; then try to incorporate the distinguishing features of foundherentism into these theories of justification, do you think they will still retain the character in virtue of which they are what they are? Perhaps they will collapse as theories of justification, or in the language of Haack, they would be transmuted into foundherentism (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 66). Let us think about it this way: why are the other theorists of justification claiming foundherentism as their own, but still hold that their theories differ? The answer is not farfetched: foundherentism is a hybrid theory of justification. In virtue of what they claim their theories differ is how foundherentism differs from them. In short, the distinctiveness of foundherentism lies in its internal dialectics.

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5.1.5 Foundherentism is neither weak foundationalism nor weak coherentism

My analysis has shown that foundherentism is distinct from foundationalism, coherentism, or reliabilism, among others. Here, I want to narrow it down to the weak versions of foundationalism and coherentism. My use of 'weak' here refers to the 'modest' forms of foundationalism and coherentism. While weak foundationalism and coherentism are refinements and modifications of foundationalism and coherentism respectively, foundherentism is a reconciliation of both foundationalism and coherentism.

Weak foundationalism, as a refined foundationalist theory, sets out to do one or two things: (1) to show that there are basic beliefs but those beliefs need not to be certain or infallible, (2) to show that there can be support relations among either only non-basic beliefs or among both basic beliefs and non-basic beliefs. This is a good refinement. Now, to not delve much again into the challenges still associated with this refinement, let us consider how foundherentism is distinct from weak foundationalism in its conceptualisation. Foundherentism, apart from its reconciliatory character, does not ascribe to any basic beliefs, because it conceives experience as the ultimate source of justification. So, whereas weak foundationalism maintains basic beliefs, foundherentism abandons them.

Weak coherentism, as a refinement of coherentism, seeks to show that (1) all the beliefs in person's coherent set need not to be equal or consistent, (2) a person's non-belief state can be a requirement in coherentism. Now, the main focus of coherentism is the beliefs themselves not the source of the beliefs. So, the weak versions of coherentism that ascribe to clause (1) can be

considered as genuine refined versions of coherentism; those that extend it to clause (2) can be considered as 'vulgar' forms. In foundherentism beliefs must first be anchored in experience, then consideration is made for whether the beliefs in question are supportive (relation), secure (security) and comprehensive (relevance). So, in foundherentism unlike weak coherentism, it is experience not coherence that is the utmost in justification.

Foundherentism, as a reconciliatory theory of justification, considers how well a person's beliefs are anchored in experience and how supportive the beliefs in question are. If weak foundationalism only refines foundationalism, and weak coherentism refines coherentism, but foundherentism refines both foundationalism and coherentism, then one cannot conclude that they are the same. Hence, foundherentism is neither weak foundationalism nor weak coherentism.

5.2 Modification of Foundherentism

Here I attempt a modification of Haack's foundherentism. Part of the motivation is from Haack's vision for improvement in foundherentism, and the challenges identified with foundherentism in this study. I have identified in this study, through the critiques and responses to foundherentism, that there is a challenge with Haack's double-aspect concept of justification due to the difficulties in explicating the transition from non-propositional to the propositional source of justification. On Haack's part, she has a vision and hope: "In hopes that I [Haack], or someone else, may find it possible eventually to improve the articulation of the theory [foundherentism]" (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 119). Also, she has the hope for the possibility that we are able to also conceive an unconventional crossword puzzle compatible with

foundherentism (Haack, 1996, p. 649). The task would not be easy but I attempt to do my best.

There are already some attempts to modify foundherentism as a theory of justification or adopt foundherentism into other fields of study. There has been an attempt to make foundherentism truth conducive rather than truth indicative theory, by supplementing it with virtuous components such as good judgement, vigilance, guardedness and courage—"virtue foundherentism", as conceived by Lightbody (2006). Another one is conceived by Abbah (2020). It is an all-encompassing foundherentism that would accommodate both the *a priori* and *a posteriori,* probabilism included. I do not intend to argue much here about the inadequacies of such proposals, enough to say that they are misguided that they take away the idea of foundherentism itself when examined closely.

Lightbody's proposal is problematic because, as an experientialist and empirical theory of justification, Haack believes that a subject should have access to his experiential evidence. That is why foundherentism is truth indicative; so, to make foundherentism truth conducive, as Lightbody proposes, is to take away this accessibility that a subject has to evidence. Again, Lightbody's virtuous components such as good judgement, vigilance, guardedness and courage seem superfluous to foundherentism. Haack is aware of the responsibility she places on her subject. So, she talks about "A as a normal subject or observer", "truth-indicativeness as facts about *all normal humans*", and also provides factors that sustains or inhibits a subject's belief (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 120-121, p. 133, p. 269; 1993a, p. 115-16, p. 126; 2002,

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p. 422-23). Thus, Lightbody's proposal deviates from the foundherentist approach to justification.

The challenge with Abbah's proposal is that Haack's foundherentism is an experientialist, an empirical account of justification, and eventually, needs not to accommodate the *a priori*. Also, foundherentism needs not to incorporate probabilism in its account because foundherentism is already a gradationalist account of justification—beliefs as well as justification comes in degrees. Eventually, both Lightbody and Abbah concede that their proposals are deviants of foundherentism. That is, they have conceded that their proposals may lead to or lead to completely different theories altogether from foundherentism or the foundherentist approach to justification (Abbah, 2020; Lightbody, 2006).

Also, we have "moral foundherentism" as conceived by Cain (2013). It is an attempt to construct a moral analogue to (empirical) foundherentism, where moral intuitions are similitudes of experiential inputs as in Haack's foundherentism. Perhaps we can also conceive of "legal foundherentism" that would take into consideration how favorable and secure the evidence are, and capable of synthesising conflicting legal theories in the making and passing of legal judgements. But that is not the one I concern myself with now. The one I conceive here seeks to appropriate some of the explication and ratification challenges with Haack's foundherentism as identified in this study. This modification of Haack's foundherentism may be called "moderate foundherentism".

I propose the following principles to undergird my modification of foundherentism:

1. Justification depends on three components: experiential input, belief and mutual support relations.

2. The more/less A is justified with respect to p (in his belief) depends on how well his experiential evidence and mutual support relations interlock. (The degrees of belief and justification is dependent on the nature of this interlocking.)

3. A's evidence as well as the mutual support relations must be favorable and secure with respect to p (the belief in question).

Principle (1) captures a person's belief and how he or she comes to hold the belief. The belief can simply be a claim or an opinion he or she is holding. Now, he or she holds the belief based on certain evidence or other reasons she has. The evidence in question here can be his or her experiences (sensory experience, introspection or memory traces). This forms his experiential input. The other reasons the person has in addition to the experiential input for the belief may be her pre-analytic concepts or background information or other beliefs in relation to the belief in question. This would form her mutual support relations. For example, when a person says "there is a cat on the wall"—(belief), it means that the person is seeing or hearing the cat on the wall—(experiential input), and the person has pre-analytic concepts and background information or other beliefs about "cats", "walls", "seeing" and "hearing", among others—(mutual support relations).

Now, with principle (1) in place, principle (2) tells us how the person is being justified in his belief. Based on certain conditions or factors (e.g.,

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poor weather, sensory problems, faulty pre-analytic concepts and information, good evidence) at the time, the person may be more or less justified in his belief. This in part is as a result of how his or her experiential input and mutual support relations are interwoven or fit together (interlock). Consequently, the person's belief and justification would be in degrees (gradation) depending on how good his evidence and reasons are.

Principle (3) underlines the elements that are involved in evaluating the belief at the time. So, at the time, the person has to consider, or one has to consider: is the evidence or other reasons for the belief in question good enough? Are they favorable or supportive? Are they safe or free from inhibitors or competitors? In other words, is the experiential input and mutual support relations well interlock? This means that justification is not just about having experiential input at one hand and mutual support relations at the other hand for a belief, but considerations should be made for favorability and security of those elements involved. In short, justification is about evaluating a person's belief, and one has to evaluate the belief as one holds it or before holding it. This last principle captures Haack's notions of supportiveness, independent security and comprehensiveness. Favorability (supportiveness) and independent security are required here, for they already imply comprehensiveness (i.e., comprehensiveness is redundant in evaluating the belief). In other words, favorability and independent security are there to ensure that a person's evidence and reasons are relevant to the belief in question. So, how supportive and secure a person's evidence is and the mutual support relations thereof again makes him more/less justified with respect to the belief in question.

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The above proposed principles are not detached from the conception of foundherentism. They are meant to overcome some explication challenges in Haack's foundherentism. So, what are the implications of these principles? It means that foundherentism needs not to be double-aspect, and justification need not to have dual aspects, because justification itself is an evaluative concept (evaluating a belief). What is needed is that beliefs have causes and relations. This amount to what I call experiential input and mutual support relations. Stated differently, when experiential input, belief and mutual support relations is what is required for empirical justification, all that one needs to say is that beliefs have causes and relations. The next thing is how well they interlock, which is achieved through evaluation. The challenge of Haack's explication starts when she divides "belief" into "S-belief" and "C-belief", claiming that the word "belief" is ambiguous (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 118; 1993b, p. 114; 2002, p. 420). This in turn leads her to distinguish between S-evidence and C-evidence, S-reasons and C-reasons, among others. In effect, she holds that justification is double-aspect, partly causal and partly logical.

I disagree with Haack on such distinctions. Let me stress that when we say a "belief", in justification, it is simply the claim or opinion to be evaluated. The aspects that have to do with "sensing", "perceiving", "believing" or "disbelieving" forms part of a person's experiential input. In addition to this are the person's other reasons or beliefs, pre-analytic concepts or background information which forms the mutual support relations. Thus, it is needless to posit S-belief and C-belief, S-evidence and C-evidence, S-reasons and C-reasons, among others, in the conception of foundherentism. Haack faces explication challenges because she endorses such distinctions. That is, it

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becomes problematic demonstrating the transition between the distinctions—the non-propositional and the propositional. But as I try to show, when we undermine Haack's distinctions, and endorse the three components in justification, as I have proposed—that there is experiential input, the belief itself, and mutual support relations—then the transition problem faced by Haack dissipates. Moreover, the critics' claims that Haack's double-aspect concept of justification leads to a "justificatory recourse", or that it is obtained by correlation or by fiat, or that it commits her to the foundationalist basic/derived belief distinction, are dissolved, on this modified conception of foundherentism.

Haack uses crossword puzzle as an analogy for foundherentism. I would say here that it is a great analogy. However, Haack is still worried about the possibility of unconventional crossword puzzles. What I can say here is that analogies seem to do little about the adequacy and efficacy of theories themselves. In fact, they are just analogies, and do not represent completely the conceptualisation of the theories themselves. All the same, what is to be said here is that every crossword puzzle has clues and entries to be filled in. So, the clues, no matter how subtle they are, all that is needed are those clues and the layout of the entries to complete the puzzle, no matter how obliquely some entries support others. That is to say that every crossword puzzle, including the very complex ones, can be completed. Thus, no matter the crossword puzzle, clues however subtle they are would help and the layout of the entries would help in the completion of the crossword puzzle. What this means is that experiential input and mutual support relations and their interlocking is all that is needed for justification of beliefs.

What about the ratification of foundherentism? Actually, I do not believe it is ratification that makes a theory of justification adequate. Ratification is just an assessment of justification. Nonetheless, if only ratification is actually necessary for the adequacy of a theory of justification, and if truth indication (of a belief) is really possible, then I endorse the foundherentist criteria of justification as proposed by Haack. It is, by far, the best truth-indication we can have (Haack, 1993/2009, p. 282). The advantage of it is that it gives room for both the idea of COMPLETE justification and lesser degrees of justification. The former aims at completeness or certainty in justification, and the latter consideration of limitations to our theories of justification. That is, in justification, one's justification may start from the lower range and rise to the upper range of the scale. So, if ratification is really necessary to theories of justification, then the foundherentist criteria is the best by far.

In all, the envisage and conception of foundherentism has in it viable components that may help surmount most of the problems about justification. All that it needs is improvement. My proposed modification is but just one of the ways to improve the articulation of foundherentism.

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I set out in this study to appraise Susan Haack's foundherentism as a theory of justification; and to defend the position that foundherentism is neither foundationalism nor coherentism *inter alia* but a hybrid theory of justification. Chapter one is the introduction of the study, which laid the grounds for the rest of the chapters. In chapter two, I exposed Haack's criticisms of the rival theories, foundationalism and coherentism in making a case for foundherentism. There, I briefly discussed the regress problem and the concept of justification. The aim was to indicate the rationale behind theories of the structure of justification, the traditional theories and why alternative theories came to the scene. Afterwards, I discussed variants of foundationalism and coherentism, in anticipation of scrutinising Haack's criticisms against them. I therefore considered in-depth the criticisms thereof and establishes that Haack has a case for foundherentism but a narrow one.

Chapter three is the analysis of Haack's foundherentism. I analysed the internal dialectics of the theory, with the aim of unraveling the character in which foundherentism may be distinguished from other theories of justification. My analysis revealed that the internal dialectics of foundherentism are suggestive of the distinctiveness of the theory, though with challenges. In the fourth chapter I examined critiques and responses to foundherentism. Based on this examination, I reiterated that foundherentism is distinct from already existing theories of justification despite criticisms to the contrary. In this final chapter, chapter five, I pointed out why foundherentism is distinct from already existing theories of justification, thereby, defending the character of foundherentism. However, due to some of the challenges

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identified with foundherentism in this study, I attempted a modification of foundherentism, with the aim of avoiding those challenges faced by Haack's own position. This sums up the whole study.

In my appraisal of Haack's foundherentism, through epistemological theorising, a qualitative research approach, a means of conceptual analysis and critical argumentation, I arrived at some conclusions worth pointing out. There are intense controversies, criticisms about the distinctiveness and adequacy of Haack's foundherentism. So, in this thesis, I identified some of the issues surrounding the theory, exposed some of the misunderstandings between Haack and her critics, and clarified those issues on one hand. On the other hand, while I acknowledged some challenges with Haack's foundherentism, I advanced that her theory is a distinct theory of justification. Succinctly, the thesis is a clarification of controversies surrounding Haack's foundherentism and a defense of foundherentism.

I observed that while Haack has a (narrow) case against the rival theories, foundationalism and coherentism, her arguments weaken along the line. Her arguments seem devastating when they are considered individually against individual versions of the rival theories, but on a whole they lose their effectiveness. Also, her case studies of the rival theories qua foundationalism and coherentism are limited as representations of the broader of picture of the foundationalist and the coherentist conceptions of the structure of justification. Nonetheless, Haack's arguments against foundationalism and coherentism reveal both their strengths and drawbacks. So, I agree with Haack that the rival theories do not exhaust the options about the structure of justification, and

there was the need for an alternative theory, thus, foundherentism is on the right direction.

My analysis also indicated that Haack's articulation and ratification of foundherentism, the internal dialectics of the theory contain elements that make the theory distinct and unique from other theories. I observed that the critics ignore the character in virtue of which foundherentism is distinct but brood over the character in which it is similar to the other theories. I clarified that the semblances that foundherentism has with the other theories is the mark of its hybridity and reconciliatory character, yet with distinguishing features. Thus, the similarity of foundherentism to the other theories should not be taken to outweigh its distinctive features. I attempted in a number of ways to demonstrate that foundherentism is neither foundationalism nor coherentism, among others, but a hybrid theory of justification.

I, however, identified challenges with Haack's explication and ratification project. I identified, as some of the critics suspected, that Haack seems unable to explicate satisfactorily the transition between the non-propositional and propositional source of justification, which underlie her double-aspect concept of justification. I indicated that some of the criticisms of foundherentism arise, in part, as a result of this challenge. Due to some of the challenges I identified with Haack's foundherentism in this study and Haack's vision that the articulation of the theory can be improved either by herself or someone else, I attempted a modification of foundherentism. In this modified version of foundherentism, I simply undermined some distinctions (e.g., S/C-belief, -evidence, dual aspects) made by Haack in the conception of foundherentism. This modified version of foundherentism overcomes the

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articulation challenges faced by Haack's position. My modification may not be devoid of some challenges but it may be one of the best ways to improve the foundherentist notion of the structure of justification.

This study, an appraisal of Haack's foundherentism is one of the first works carried out to fully appreciate Haack's conception of empirical justification. Therefore, the study would be resourceful (as a reference material) to other studies to be carried out in this area. Also, since the study is an in-depth analysis of Haack's foundherentism, the study would contribute to a deeper and better understanding of foundherentism as a theory of justification.

One of the major problems identified in this study is the controversies that foundherentism is enmeshed in. The study also does a critical analysis of the critiques and responses to foundherentism. So, the study would contribute to clarification of the controversies surrounding foundherentism, as well as, clarification of concepts and misconceptions in theories of justification. Again, the modification of foundherentism in this study would contribute to the improvement of the foundherentist conception of justification, and by so doing, contribute to the best ways to terminate the regress problem.

One of the challenges faced by this study in the analysis and assessment of the criticisms and responses to Haack's foundherentism is that little of the literature available tend to defend Haack's foundherentism, and strictly speaking, those few only purport to be defending Haack's position. So, this current study seems to be in the offensive to almost all those previous studies. I, therefore, recommend that further studies be carried out to fully appreciate foundherentism as a theory of justification. Also, in the study, I

observed that some of the issues and controversies emanated from taxonomy and definition problems. Therefore, future researches can focus on examining classifications, misleading taxonomies and definitions in theories of justification, and of knowledge.

This study is one of the first to defend the foundherentist conception of justification, defending that foundherentism is a distinct theory of justification. So, further researches could be carried out in a bid to affirming that foundherentism is neither foundationalism nor coherentism, among others, but a hybrid theory of justification.

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