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
GHANA'S POROUS BORDERS AND THE THREAT TO NATIONAL
SECURITY



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Faculty of Arts, College of Humanities and Legal Studies, University of Cape
Coast, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Master of
Philosophy degree in International Studies

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DECLARATION

Candidate's Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my original research and that no part of it has been presented for another degree in this university or elsewhere.

Candidate's Signature..... Date.....

Name.....

Supervisors' Declaration

We hereby declare that the preparation and presentation of the thesis were supervised in accordance with the guidelines on supervision of thesis laid down by the University of Cape Coast.

Principal Supervisor's Signature..... Date.....

Name.....

ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on Ghana's international land borders, detailing the factors contributing to its porous nature and how that poses threats to the country's stability. Using qualitative research approach, the study collected data from various Border Sector Commands (BSC) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) and argues that, given the porosity of Ghana's international land borders and her position in a West African sub-region engulfed in violent activities, the country is vulnerable to cross-border criminal activities which threaten its stability. Key to the factors accounting for the porosity of the country's international land borders are its border architecture, ineffective checkpoints and challenges of the Border Patrol Unit (BPU). Consequently, evidence of traces of terrorism, smuggling of arms and humans among others, have been recorded in the country. In this vein, various government regimes and stakeholders in border management have taken measures to prevent cross-border crime crisis in the country. Internally, there is an ongoing sensitisation of various communities, the establishment of periodic joint task forces, counter-terrorism units and the provision of working logistics among others. Externally, Ghana has rectified various United Nations (UN) conventions on anti-terrorism, suspension of financing of terrorism and money laundering. However, these measures are inadequate to effectively tackle the conundrum of porous borders. The thesis proposed several measures, including a review of Ghana's international land borders, re-design of a border management plan, provision and incorporation of border communities into development schemes and encouraging inter-agency collaboration in border management.

KEYWORDS

Criminality

Ghana

National Security

Neighbours

Porous Borders

Security

Terrorism

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DEDICATION

To my family especially, my father, Insp. Isaac Ofei Darko, my mother, Lydia Arday and my ground mother, Agnes Asheley Tetteh.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AI	Ansarul Islam
AML	Anti-Money Laundering
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ASI	Assistant Superintendent of Immigration
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Cooperation
BCP	Border Crossing Point
BPU	Border Patrol Unit
BSC	Border Sector Command
CEPS	Customs Excise and Preventive Service
CTF	Combating Terrorism Financing
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
GIMMA	Ghana Integrated Migration Management Approach
GIS	Ghana Immigration Service
GoG	Gulf of Guinea
GoTa	Global Open Trunking Architecture
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICO	Immigration Control Officer
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
ISGS	Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
JNIM	Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam Waal Muslimeen
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
RAT	Routine Activity Theory

RRU	Rapid Response Unit
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
VNSA	Violent Non-State Actors

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

The stability of any nation is seriously threatened by porous borders (Crush, Tawodzera, Chikanda, Ramachandran & Tevera, 2017). In the wake of the terrorism act in the United States of America on September 11, 2001, governments all over the world have expressed worry about the security of their international borders. In Africa more specifically, the porousness of borders has been occasioned by artificially created boundaries, which in many cases cut across ethnic lines. For example, the Maasai split between Kenya and Tanzania, Chewa between Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe, Ndembu split between Angola, Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo), and Zambia and Nukwe, split between Angola, Namibia, Zambia, and Botswana (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2016). This has created a difficult task of securing borders by various governments in the post-independent era of Africa. Relatively, borders have turned into international crime hotspots because of their porous nature. Recently, waves of acts of terrorism and various forms of transnational crimes have steadily grown in West Africa and Ghana is vulnerable since it is a member state.

In West Africa, recent records of cross-border criminal activities and the magnitude of their impact on Ghana's neighbouring states and the porous nature of Ghana's international land borders, have prompted a review of Ghana's international land borders. This thesis focuses on Ghana's international land borders, detailing the factors contributing to its porous nature and how that poses threats to the country's stability. It argues that Ghana's porous international land

borders engender cross-border crimes, which pose severe threats to the country's stability.

The issue of Ghana's porous international land borders spanning 2,104 km and covering a total land mass of 238,535 km² continues to be a cause for worry in recent years (Sosuah, 2011, Quartey, 2019, Azure 2009). This concern is because porous borders have engendered and continue to facilitate cross-border crimes, such as terrorist attacks, drug trafficking, illegal trade including the smuggling of contraband and non-paid car duty, among others, in many African states (Akinyemi, 2013). The issue of porous borders, especially in the West African sub-region, additionally encouraged an unchecked influx of undocumented immigrants and criminal activity among Ghana's close neighbours (Togo, Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire). This continues to pose serious challenges for law enforcement agencies in these countries to manage.

In Ghana, the conundrum of porous international land borders can be analysed from the colonial and post-colonial geo-political history of the African continent. Before the advent of the European colonialists on the continent of Africa, Africans possessed a sense of delimited region even in the absence of physical borders. Nugent observes that Africans did not lack a sense of territoriality. They psychologically, rather than cartographically, mapped political space (Nugent, 1996). For them, the distance was measured 'anthropometrically' by the number of days it took to move from one point to another (Nugent, 1996: 36). Ivor Wilks explains that 'Greater Asante was plotted as a hypothetical forty days' trip from the centre in all directions' (Wilks, 1992: 182). However, because of the interaction between Europeans and Africans, the latter saw a balkanisation (the process of fragmenting a unit into multiple smaller and hostile

parts) of their demographic and political geography (Asiwaju, 1985). This encounter and subsequent balkanisation was marked by ill-defined and physically undefined limits, which were formalised at the Berlin Conference of 1884 and 1885 (Herbst, 1989). The frontiers became entirely a matter of administrative convenience for the imperialist (European colonialists) powers. They had little, if anything, to do with the 'native' political geography or cultural boundaries of the ethnic groups (Lentz, 2003). For instance, a colonial agent's response, as recorded by Mark Leopold, when asked to define the line between Uganda and Congo was that;

The West Nile section of the border had been defined by a treaty between Britain and Belgium as the watershed of the Nile and Congo rivers, and it, therefore, ran for much of its length along the top of a range of hills. He asked his superior how he was to know which side was which and was told that, where the streams ran west (towards the River Congo) this was the Congo side, and where they ran east (towards the Nile) that was Uganda. 'What about where there are no streams?' he asked and was told 'Then just piss on the ground and see which way it flows' (Leopold, 2009: 470).

Herbst (1989) is moderate in the face of evidence in support of the imperial and economic motives of the Berlin Conference of 1884 and 1885. He argues that the Berlin Conference of 1884 and 1885 did not lay down the ground rules for colonial ventures. Its primary objective was to lessen Germany, France, and England's imperial rivalry. However, the European powers used the conference's declarations as a springboard to set up protectorates that satisfied their fundamental needs, ignoring the challenges presented by Africa's topography and demography (Herbst, 1989).

On the Guinea Coast more specifically, the boundaries of territories that would become present-day Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Togo and Burkina Faso, were arbitrarily and artificially demarcated by three colonial powers, that is Britain,

Germany and France (Lentz, 2000). The British occupied the Gold Coast while their competitors, Germany, occupied Togoland and France occupied the Ivory Coast (Cote d'Ivoire) and Burkina Faso. The carving up of territories in the Guinea Coast region of Africa was done through treaties of 'friendship and trade' (later of 'protection') between the Europeans and Africans. That is, per the trade or friendship agreement between Europeans and a native group of a particular area, the Europeans carved up a territory that excluded other 'natives' who were not signatories to these friendship and trade agreements. Some treaties were also signed between European powers through boundary commissions as argued by Lentz (2000) and Bening (1983). The First World War (1914-1919) saw a power shift on the Guinea Coast with the French replacing the Germans in Togoland (McMillan, 2007). Subsequently, an agreement between the British and the French established a final, three hundred (300) kilometre-long, boundary plotted at an abstract 11th parallel between present-day Ghana and Togo (Bening, 1983, Lentz, 2000).

The treaties of 'friendship and trade' (later of 'protection') revealed an African geo-political map, however, treaties between the European powers on territorial jurisdiction did not consider the territorial and demographic integrity of the Africans. For example, the final three hundred (300) kilometre long boundary agreement between the British and the French which was plotted at an abstract 11th parallel cut through several villages like Dagomba, Krachi, Kotokoli, Bassari, Chakosi and B'Moba (Bening, 1983, Lentz, 2000). This resulted in an unsatisfactory and ill-defined territorial boundary, which was lamented and repeatedly criticised by G. E. Ferguson, a Fanti and a representative official of the British (Arhin, 1974).

Michalopoulos & Papaioannou (2016) maintain that one of the blights on the continent is, in general, the many straight lines (or even the wiggly ones) that follow rivers or other features on the modern map of Africa. On the one hand, they unjustly combined groups of people who had separate histories and customs and who, had they had the opportunity, would have formed distinct national identities. However, at the time of independence, it split peoples between two or even more states (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2016). There is no denying the impact the scramble for Africa had on Africa's geo-political cartography. It spawned nation-states that are multiethnic, multilingual, and multicultural. Comparable to how the treaties that followed World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires shaped the artificial and doomed governments of Yugoslavia and those in Eastern and Central Europe, whose borders are still up for debate. Funte (2015) indicates that 177 cultural or ethnic groups in Africa were split up by 109 international borders.

That notwithstanding, the continent's pioneering integration organisation, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now African Union (AU), in its first Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments, held in Cairo (Egypt) in July 1964, adopted and reaffirmed the *Uti possidetis juris*. This reiterated the principle of respect for existing borders on the achievement of national independence. This was to avert the likelihood of chaos and anarchy resulting from boundary contestations and re-demarcations (Touval, 1967; Ikome, 2012).

In as much as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and its successor, the African Union (AU), voted to maintain the status quo on African borders to avert chaos, post-independent African governments continue to grapple with the

problems of their inherited borders (Ikome, 2012). Over one hundred (100) continuing border disputes erupted and continue to erupt between states in Africa. Examples include the Ethiopian-Eritrean border confrontation (constantly in danger of setting off a new conflict between uneasy neighbours) to the current Malawi-Tanzania ruckus over the demarcation of the lake border between the two countries. More precisely, Mali-Mauritania (1961-1964), Morocco-Algeria (1963), Somalia-Kenya (Northern Kenya) (1967), Uganda-Tanzania (part of Tanza) (1972-1979), Mali-Burkina Faso (Agacha area) (1974 - 1987), Libya-Chad Aouzou Band (1973-1994), Somalia-Ogaden Region in Ethiopia (1977-1978), Nigeria-Cameroon Bakasi Island (1994), Ethiopia-Eritrea (1998-2000) all had been border-related inter-state conflicts in Africa with grave impact on citizens. Others, subject to arbitration or judicial settlement at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), included Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case (1982), Guinea-Bissau-Senegal (1984), Burkina Faso-Mali (1986), Libya-Chad (1973-1994), Cameroon-Nigeria (1991), Botswana-Namibia (1995) and Ghana-Cote d'Ivoire maritime dispute (2010) (Somerville, 2013).

The nature of the continent's conflict has evolved over time. While border-related inter-state conflicts remained prevalent, there were also more intra-state and cross-border governance conflicts, giving rise to violent non-state actors (VNSA) such as Boko Haram, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam Waal Muslimeen (JNIM), and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Based on the information available, it appears that a considerable number of internal disputes in Africa during the previous decade have resulted from governments' failure to adequately address and resolve national, political, economic, and socio-cultural policy discrepancies. Due to Africa's porous borders and the underdeveloped

character of its borderlands, internal wars have easily spread to neighbouring states and destabilised entire regions, a phenomenon known as the regionalisation of violence in Africa (Ikome, 2012). As was the case in the Great Lakes Region, where the conflict that engulfed Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) spread into other neighbouring countries and was dubbed the 'African World War,' areas along borders are prone to transmit internal conflicts to other parts of a region (Prunier, 2008). This was also the case in the Liberian War, which spread to Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire; the Sudanese Civil War, which had destabilising effects on the Republic of Chad, the Central African Republic and the Republic of the Congo; and the collapse of the Somali, state that has destabilised the entire Horn of Africa.

Relatively, Africa's borders have become even more problematic than those in contested areas of Europe, Asia and Latin America. While they are frequently porous and nearly difficult to manage for weak state institutions, small militaries, and underfunded police forces, they frequently sever people and create significant barriers to statehood. Also, corruption and the desire of people to buy and sell goods across borders create endless opportunities for smuggling, tax evasion and cross-border crime. These cross-border activities are not just problems in themselves but often provide the funding for insurgency and revolt.

In West Africa, Mali is a great instance of a border porosity-related problem. Mali shares a 1,376-kilometer border with Algeria, 1,000 kilometres with Burkina Faso, 2,237 kilometres with Mauritania, and 821 kilometres with Niger. Even with French assistance, US drones, and the collaboration of neighbouring countries, they are unable to police this boundary. Criminal networks, militants,

and smugglers exploit the remote and sparsely inhabited Sahel/Sahara with porous borders to circumvent security efforts (Stewart, 2013).

Ghana, also located in the West Africa sub-region, shares a 668km long border with Côte d'Ivoire to the west, 877km with Togo to the east, 549km with Burkina Faso to the north and the southern shore washed by the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) of the Atlantic Ocean (Sosuah, 2011) remains a standout case. Since its independence in 1957, Ghana has accommodated the aspirations of people with different languages, cultures, economic and social lifestyles. Ghana has been relatively stable, although, the country has had alternating systems of government in her democratic dispensation. In the fourth republic, Ghana has seen successful alternation of democratically elected governments without violence (Yayoh, 2006). Ghana has earned the accolade 'Gateway to Africa' due to the relative stability it enjoys. However, the lack of effective border controls, security and boundary policing, coupled with the magnitude of criminal activities, along the country's international land borders have raised concerns over threats of insurgency, smuggling, money laundering and spill over from political unrest in neighbouring states network of cross-border criminal syndicates.

Statement of the Problem

Ghana has become susceptible to cross-border criminal incursions partly due to its geographical position in the West African sub-region engulfed in cross-border crime crisis and partly by the country's porous international land borders. Ghana serves as a route for and to landlocked countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso to its north. In proximity, it shares borders with Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, and Burkina Faso (Sosuah, 2011). By virtue of its geo-political position, it is exposed to the adverse effects of political turmoil, organised criminal

activities, insurgencies and proliferation of small and light weapons which characterise the West African sub-region and has the potential to destabilise its national peace and security (Sosuah, 2011). Recent events of the increasing wave of insurgencies and terrorist attacks, in neighbouring countries have heightened anxiety about the nature of Ghana's international land borders and the efficacy of law enforcement along the country's borders.

As it stands today, none of Ghana's international land borders can be described as truly watertight. On the Aflao stretch, there are over one hundred unapproved routes used by residents and illegal immigrants into Ghana (Citi News, 2020). Government officials recount that there are about 250 illegal routes and well over 500 footpaths into Ghana from neighbouring countries (Citi Newsroom, 2020). This presupposes that, all manner of illegalities in the form of illegal migration, drug trafficking, movement of contraband goods and its attendant threats and implications exist along the country's frontiers. It is, therefore, important to research into the porous nature of Ghana's international land borders and how that poses threats to the country's stability given the volatile nature of the sub-region. This thesis aims to review Ghana's international land borders, detailing the factors contributing to their porous nature and how that poses threats to the country's stability. The thesis argues that Ghana's international land borders engender the vulnerability of the country to cross-border crimes

Significance of the Study

The study will serve as a reference for future stakeholders in the implementation of sound border management practices, policies and ethics in Ghana and the West African region as a whole. Again, it would provide ample and vital

information on the nature and factors responsible for Ghana's porous borders and the problems that they pose for the country's stability. Finally, the research will add to the existing literature on Africa's geopolitics and set the tone for further research on the topic

Scope of the Study

The study focuses on Ghana's international land borders, detailing the factors contributing to its porous nature and how they pose a threat to the country's stability. Even though different state departments work together to manage border security, the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) is the subject of this study. The emphasis is on the causes of porous borders and their effects on Ghana's national security.

The participants in this study are officers of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) stationed at the three main international land border posts namely Aflao, Paga and Elubo responsible for safeguarding the country's international land borders. The areas of Ghana's International land borders that need attention and threats to the national stability are assessed, and remedial actions are proposed.

Research Questions

This thesis is driven by three major questions.

1. What are the factors that contribute to the porous nature of Ghana's international borders?
2. What are the threats to Ghana's stability as a result of its porous borders?
3. How effective are the internal and external responses/measures to safeguard Ghana's porous international land borders?

Objectives

1. To examine the factors responsible for the porous nature of Ghana's international land borders.
2. To explore the threats to Ghana's stability as a result of its porous international land borders.
3. To analyse the effectiveness of internal and external responses/measures to safeguard Ghana's porous borders.

Organisation of the Study

The thesis comprises five chapters. Chapter One covers the Background of the Study, Research Problem, Research Questions and Objectives, Significance of the Study, Scope of the Study, and Organisation of the Study. Chapter Two consists of the Theoretical Framework and the review of relevant literature. Chapter Three examines the Methodology. Chapter Four discusses findings along the lines of the research questions. First, what are the factors that contribute to the porous nature of Ghana's international borders? What are the potential threats to Ghana's stability as a result of its porous borders? How effective are the internal and external responses or measures to safeguard Ghana's porous borders? Chapter Five covers the Summary of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This chapter discusses theoretical framework underpinning this study, namely the routine activity theory (RAT). The relevance and application of the theory to this study is deliberated. In addition, the chapter examines existing literature published and unpublished in the context of porous borders and their effects on national security and territorial stability. Key concepts in the field of state borders are defined.

Theoretical framework

The Routine Activity Theory (RAT) serves as the research's theoretical foundation. Marcus Felson and Lawrence E. Cohen originally put forward this theory in 1979, and Felson later developed it (Cohen & Felson, 1979). The theory states that crime is more likely to occur when three key essentials congregate in time and space (Groff, 2008). These three components are the lack of capable guardians, an appropriate target, and a motivated perpetrator. In the absence of one of the elements, crimes would not take place. Routine Activity Theory (RAT) broadens the scope of the explanation of crime beyond the criminal alone. It includes the suitable targets, and the guardians of those targets. According to this theory, crime happens when an appropriate target is within the reach of a motivated criminal in the absence of a capable guardian (Cohen & Felson, 1979).

A likely wrongdoer might be anybody with an intention to commit a crime as well as the capacity to do so (Felson & Cohen, 1980). Notwithstanding the likelihood that it will be an unemployed lad, a school dropout, a person with

a history of traffic accidents or frequent emergency room visits (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). In the context of cross-border crime, motivated offenders can include individuals or organised criminal networks, terrorists, smugglers, kidnappers, extremists, and bandits who are driven by various factors such as economic gains, religious ideologies, and personal vendetta, among others. These offenders exploit porous borders, differences in legal systems, weak regulatory frameworks and lack of enforcement capacities across borders to carry out their activities.

The Routine Activity Theory (RAT) identifies a suitable target as its second key component. Felson and Clarke (1998) describe this as an individual or property potentially at risk from an offender. They prefer “target” over “victim, highlighting that many crimes aim to acquire objects, often occurring without the victim’s presence (Felson & Clarke, 1998). RAT posits that more accessible suitable targets elevate victimization risk. In cross-border crime scenarios, suitable targets may encompass susceptible groups or locations. These targets become vulnerable due to weak and porous borders, or due to the availability of specific goods and resources that are more accessible or valuable in certain jurisdictions. Also, factors such as corruption, inadequate law enforcement, economic disparities between countries and haven enclaves can contribute to the selection of cross-border targets for criminal activities. The theory emphasises four characteristics, value, inertia, visibility, and access (VIVA), which describe a target’s level of risk (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Felson & Clarke, 1998).

The third and final element of the theory is the absence of a capable guardian. A capable guardian is an individual who can prevent or hinder a potential crime through various means (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Crimes are less

likely to occur when a guardian is present, but the risk increases in their absence. In cross-border crime scenarios, this concept extends to anyone traversing an area or safeguarding people or property (Felson, 1995). However, the notion of a capable guardian is not limited to law enforcement or security personnel. Paradoxically, these figures become capable guardians when crimes happen without their presence (Felson & Boba, 2010). A capable guardian is an individual who, while going about their daily business, can, by presence or activity, protect others, themselves, or their own or others' property. These people can be even more important in preventing crime than home owners, brothers, friends, bystanders, or any other type of person.

In the context of cross-border crime, engendered primarily by porous borders, capable guardians refer to law enforcement agencies, border control authorities, and international cooperation mechanisms that can detect, prevent, and respond to criminal activities. Inadequate border security, limited cooperation between countries, and resource constraints can weaken the guardianship capacity, making it easier for cross-border crimes to occur.

Routine Activity Theory (RAT) stands out as a highly influential and extensively applied framework in criminology. RAT diverges from traditional criminological approaches by examining crime as an occurrence intimately tied to its surroundings. This theory underscores the ecological aspects of criminal activity, shifting scholarly focus beyond just offenders to encompass targets and guardians as well. Among works that tested the theory include; *Porous Border and Human Trafficking in Nigeria, Guardians and Targets*, and other work titled *A Routine Activity Approach to Terrorism in Asia, Porous Borders, Small Arms*

Proliferation, and Insecurity in Oke-Ogun Area of Oyo State, Nigeria, among others.

Relatively, the theory's citations and application can be traced to its simplicity. Its core concepts are easy to understand and apply, making it accessible to both researchers and practitioners. It provides a straightforward framework for analysing and explaining crime patterns, which can be valuable in various contexts. Again, Routine Activity Theory (RAT) has received empirical support from numerous studies. Researchers have found correlations between the three elements (motivated offender, suitable target, absence of capable guardian) and the occurrence of various types of crimes. The theory has been particularly useful in understanding property crimes, such as burglary and theft.

Routine Activity Theory (RAT) provides a framework to analyze how permeable borders facilitate cross-border criminal activities, potentially destabilizing a nation. Ghana exemplifies this issue, confronting various transnational crimes including narcotics and human trafficking, smuggling operations, and illicit trade. These challenges stem from Ghana's poorly secured land borders within the volatile West African region. Routine Activity Theory (RAT) suggests that the convergence of motivated offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of capable guardianship at Ghana's porous international land borders increases the likelihood of criminal activities, including smuggling, human trafficking, drug trafficking, and illegal trade that threatens the country's peace, stability and security.

Literature Review

As a critical component of this study, this review aims to examine the current state of knowledge, identify gaps in the literature, and offer insights for

further investigation. A conceptual and empirical review of state borders, bordering process, functions of a state border, globalisation, and Africa's international boundaries are reviewed to find out how this work fits into the existing literature.

State Borders

The concept of a state refers to a politically organised community living within defined borders and having a recognised government with authority over its territory and population (Brons, 2001). In the contemporary international system, the state is a crucial political organisational unit. It is the most pervasive and potent of all social structures. According to Aristotle, humans are social animals and political beings by nature. For him, being a man and residing in the state were the same thing (Logs, 1897). The word 'status' is the root of the modern term 'state'. It was coined by Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) in his earlier writings (Korvela, 2002). The State is essential since it was created to meet the necessities of life. The State translates human beings' goals, hopes, and wishes into action.

A number of academics and philosophers have defined the word 'state.' Aristotle defined the State as a 'union of families and villages having for its end a perfect and self-sufficing life by which it meant a happy and honourable life' (Olasupo & Adekunle, 2017: 16). Max Weber, a prominent sociologist, defined the state as 'a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.' He emphasised the state's ability to exercise authority and enforce its decisions through coercion (Tilly, 2014: 65). Political scientist and historian Charles Tilly further concurs with the concept of the state as an entity that effectively asserts exclusive rights

to sanctioned physical force within its borders (Tilly, 2014). While agreeing with Weber's emphasis on the state's control over force, Tilly also underscores the importance of coercion in preserving order and mobilizing resources.

Anthony Giddens, a sociologist, defined the state as 'a bordered power container.' (Shaw, 2004: 212) He states that the borders of a state are not merely for administrative divisions but potentially, at least, lines along which violence can erupt.' (Shaw, 2004). Jackson, Sørensen and Jackson in their book *Introduction to International Relations*, define the state as a legal and political entity with sovereignty over a particular territory and the population that resides within it (Jackson, Sørensen & Jackson, 2022). They emphasise the legal and political aspects of the state, including its territorial jurisdiction and the concept of sovereignty. Immanuel Kant, from the philosophical spectrum, defined the state as the legal union of several people under public laws, thereby subjecting them to a common coercive power (Chotaš, 2019). He emphasised the role of law and the state's ability to exercise coercive power over its citizens. In all these scholarly definitions of the state, the element of a well-defined territory is key and very binding for any state to be defined by its territorial boundaries or borders.

The contemporary importance and particularity of state boundaries will be better understood when the history and the essential features of the state of which it forms a crucial part are appraised. Kireev (2015) holds that, although the foremost states developed in the third millennium BC (in Egypt and Mesopotamia), most human societies persisted for a very long time as stateless. This assertion is further corroborated by Anghie (1999). According to her perspective, states only became a global phenomenon in the late 19th century, following the division of the world into colonial empires and the subsequent formal

declarations of independence by nations in Africa and the Americas. Osterhammel (2015) avers, noting that by the end of the 1900s, the world had evolved into a system of sovereign states as formally independent nation-states emerged. In Europe, the origins of statehood are typically traced to the Treaty of Westphalia, which concluded the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). These scholars thus viewed societies in sub-Saharan Africa and the Americas as entities with authority structures, rather than as nation-states defined by political boundaries.

A crucial element in the definition of sovereignty is a defined territorial boundary. Contemporary societies possess a state form of organisation regardless of whether they are post-industrial, industrial or pre-industrial (Kireev, 2015). Put differently, the presence of a state organisation is an essential characteristic of any independent social system (a nation). The state possesses several social, political and economic boundaries. The international limits of a state are one of the many different kinds of boundaries that exist in the modern period. State borders establish a nation's sovereignty by demarcating its territory and the limits of its authority and jurisdiction (Elden, 2006). Scorgie (2011) defined state borders as 'barriers of penetration, lines of separation, and the legal limits of a state's sovereignty. Hanlon and Herbet (2015) define the state boundary as a country's last frontier of territorial integrity and the first line of protection against external threats. The most commonly acknowledged and institutionalised means of demarcating the expanse of the planet are state borders. This expresses what Balibar (2009) terms a regime of meaning and power under which the world is represented as a 'unity' of different parts. A State border is also seen as a subsystem of the state that delineates the boundaries of its sovereignty and guarantees the authoritative control of social (transborder)

connections. Generally speaking, borders convey the idea of actual or imagined lines separating two areas of land. These lines are known as international boundaries when they separate two national governments and they are typically delineated point-by-point in treaties, arbitration rulings, or boundary commission reports (Ikome, 2004).

In most countries, any location at or within the twelve (12) nautical mile limit according to international law where the state has statutory power is typically defined by customs officers as the border. Relatively, designated borders such as airports in many instances are located hundreds of kilometres from the boundaries. Through the use of Advanced Passenger Information or Advanced Passenger Processing (API/APP), immigration officials have closed borders to foreign nations (Okumu, 2016). It is noteworthy that nations do not share a single border, especially those whose marine boundaries vary in length from over two hundred (200) nautical miles to twelve (12) nautical miles, contingent upon the continental shelf's edge.

According to Anderson (1996), a border is a dynamic and crucial component of a nation-state. In three dimensions, he highlights the many aspects of state boundary preservation. Firstly, they serve as a tool of state policy when governments alter the location and purpose of borders for particular advantages to their people, the state, or both. Furthermore, the degree of control that state authorities have over a certain border influences its policies and actions. A state may only aspire to be the exclusive source of power and influence when its boundaries are impenetrable and sealed off from unauthorised outside penetration. Anderson's view, therefore, highlights the problematic nature of the threat confronting Ghana. In conclusion, borders determine a nation's identity and are

linked to the notion of territorial cohesiveness and people's sense of oneness. However, borders can change due to political unrest, conflict, or revolution within a state's borders.

Well-defined borders are not only crucial to the definition of statehood in the modern state but their establishment has been found to be one of the three main components necessary to create stable states and societies, along with the establishment of state institutions and the development of national consciousness. Without a clear definition and understanding of the territory where such authority is to be exercised, legitimate governmental aims cannot be articulated or carried out (Ikome, 2012). Ghana is yet to consolidate its borders. For example, Ghana's Eastern border with neighbouring Togo is still not well defined. Therefore, it is impossible to consolidate its borders.

In the modern era, every state is concerned with borders because it wants to expand its authority and capacity to govern over a certain area. While the creation of more or less stable borders has been noted as a prerequisite for the development of stable governments on the one hand, unconsolidated boundaries, when coupled with inefficient political institutions and unfinished nationalist projects, have been recipes for instability and bloodshed on the other (Laremont, 2005). "Tell a man today to go and build a state and he will try to establish a definite and defensible territorial boundary and compel those who live inside it to obey him" is a classic example of Finer's advice on the importance of stable, well-defined boundaries for state survival and interstate relations (Finer, 1974). The popular saying by Weber that a state must claim "the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a territory" in order to qualify as a state emphasises the importance of borders even more (Weber,

1958). It is important to note that no state may assert a monopoly over any territory that it is unable to effectively define and protect.

Bordering Process

Our knowledge of border management and the degree to which borders are more or less porous to movements depends on the process and standards used to create and demarcate borders (Newman, 2003). By demarcation, one refers not only to the lines and points of coordination that are plotted graphically on maps but about the laws and policies that determine whether or not they even exist in the first place and consequently, the surrounding borders (Galletti, Fattori, Battaglini, Shipp & Zeki, 1996; Steinberg, 2009). A crucial step in this process is figuring out exactly what and who is included or excluded when a border is drawn. Newman holds that, the process that determines where mobility becomes more challenging or, in certain situations, impossible is not restricted to the rigid, drawn boundaries of a country (Newman, 2003).

In instances of geopolitical borders, there are no 'natural' borders such as mountains and rivers, every border is a social construct created, defined, and marked by individuals (Newman, 2006). That is to say, people have a tendency to consciously draw borders based on their political beliefs such as in the case of Africa where the creation of boundaries corresponded with the economic and political ambition of the European imperialists without much respect for demography and geography. Nonetheless, certain standards are more practical for determining cut-off positions since they necessitate less physical delineation by border authorities (Newman, 2003; Kolossov, 2005). In terms of geography, they could be mountain ranges, rivers or deserts. In terms of municipalities, these could be public buildings, rail lines, and important thoroughfares for

transit. Social constructs that define borders include age groupings (retirement age, school leaving age), religious groups (born to a mother of the same faith, ritual practise, conversion), economic statuses (homeless, unemployed for a while) and so on (Newman, 2003; Yuval-Davis, Anthias, & Kofman, 2005). These preset standards are helpful in establishing boundaries and a point of cut-off, but they also frequently fall victim to the ecological fallacy by incorporating some people who belong in the group or the region and rejecting others who should not.

Ulfa, Fimmastuti and Rahmah (2018) assert that there are two governance models in the discourse of international state borders. They identified hard borders and soft borders as the two paradigms in international politics. State domination in border representation of governance in the hard border paradigm is manifested in borders managed by putting safety and sovereignty forward through military representation (DeBardeleben, 2017). This paradigm makes the state the actor in charge of the border 'space'. The soft border paradigm puts forward basic human needs, such as food, habitable housing, education, health, and infrastructure development (Koithara, 2005; Kamazima, 2018). Mostov (2008) is of the view that the weakness in the hard border paradigm necessitated the soft border paradigm. In the case of Africa and Ghana to be precise, there is a mild combination of these two paradigms in the management of state borders. Border regions remain very far removed from the centre of the state and dominated by the security forces tasked with the mandate of border protection and border community residents who go about their economic activities such as farming and trading

Functions of Borders

Using the extensive and well-researched body of work that is currently available on borders and boundaries, it is possible to pinpoint at least four optimal purposes for national borders (Kearney, 2004 & 1991; Donnan & Wilson, 1999; Wilson & Donnan, 1998; Anderson & O'Dowd, 1999). Essentially, they establish the boundaries of a state's *de jure* sovereignty, or the boundaries of its jurisdiction and authority. Since at least the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, legitimate political authority in Europe has been regularly established by precisely defined, mutually recognised borders, beyond which a state does not have any jurisdiction or powers of interference, notwithstanding frequent violations in practice. The *quid pro quo* of this limitation is the right of non-interference by other states into a state's territory (Krasner, 1999, Shinoda, 2000). Therefore, boundaries serve as potent emblems of state authority (Kearney, 2004). Borders symbolically indicate the spatial extent of a state's legal authority and right to use force, regardless of whether they are drawn on a map or are physically marked like the Berlin Wall or the 'fence' dividing Mexico and the United States.

Secondly, borders control the flow of capital, persons, goods and information between states. Thus, they serve as both obstacles to and means of transportation at the same time (Wilson & Donnan, 1998). Borders from time past to present have served as a shield precluding the entry of undesired elements and people including, extremists, terrorists, criminals and insurgents in addition to goods like arms, illicit drugs, and information, among others. They function as obstacles due to the fact that they hinder, delay or otherwise interfere with movement between different jurisdictions. Borders can impose restrictions on

mobility through import taxes, duties, tariffs, and the ability to refuse admission, to name a few. Nevertheless, they also act as entrance points into various governmental, permissible, and administrative spheres.

Thirdly, borders define the geographical extent of a certain set of rights and obligations associated with citizenship (Cox, 2004; Andrijasevic, 2010). In democracies, people who are born inside a state's boundaries or who have been awarded citizenship by that state are considered equals before the law and have the right to vote collectively to determine who leads the state (Rubio-Marin, 2000). As payment for this, they are required to obey its laws, pay taxes to the state, and aid it during times of conflict.

Lastly, boundaries serve as tools for population classification, offering a mental map of the geographic distribution of identified people who are described in certain ways. They are organisations that decide who is included and who is not, classifying individuals based on national identities that are abstract and categorically similar, masking socioeconomic and cultural differences within designated populations (Calhoun, 1997). They have a significant impact on how cultural identity is produced and received, frequently acting as the "container" or "bullet" that shapes national imaginaries (Castoriadis, 1987). In summary, the traditional uses of modern boundaries have included defining sovereignty, controlling migration, defining citizenship, and categorising people based on fictitious identities.

Globalisation

Globalisation, one of the tenets of the modern international system, despite its value, also doubles as one of the obstacles to state borders. Numerous academics hold the view that the gradual eroding of borders echoed in the

deterioration in the significance of territorial forms of organisation, are constitutive of the very definition of globalisation. Rosenau (1997) argues that the distinctive characteristic of globalising processes 'is that they are not hindered or prevented by territorial or jurisdictional barriers' (p. 80). Castells (1996 & 2001) claims that as a result of globalisation, the "space of flows" is displacing the "space of places." Similarly, Hoogvelt (1997) defines globalisation as a series of changes that signal the arrival of a new framework for cross-border communication. Waters (1995: 3) elaborates further defining it as a "social process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding". Scholte (1996) admits Waters (1995)'s position to its logical conclusion, even though he admits the permanence of territorial ties in some domains. Scholte further insists that globalisation tends to disintegrate territoriality as a component of social relations. It is important to distinguish between global relations, which are trans-border, super-territorial and territorialised relations. Therefore, the emergence and spread of a super-territorial dimension of social relations is referred to as globalisation. Distance and location have no bearing on these relationships; 'Global relations are not links at a distance across territory but circumstances without distance and relatively disconnected from particular locations' (Scholte, 1996: 49). These kinds of relationships are often interpreted as mirror images of the profound shifts in the global political and cultural economy that have occurred since the 1970s.

Pivotal to the dynamics of globalisation has been the emergence and development of transportation and communication. They have stretched social relations beyond regional and political boundaries and compressed time and space

on a global scale. Social ties are pushed to the point where their impacts are protracted in both geography and time. They are elevated out of home-grown settings and re-expressed across unbounded swaths of time and place (Giddens, 1991). Due to this, there is an expanding spatial and temporal disconnect between social causes and consequences and between human decisions and their impacts, which transcends international boundaries. An illustrative example is the universal ecology. Despite the numerous scientific disagreements surrounding the matter, a rising body of evidence indicates that transnational pollution, continental desertification, global warming, and ozone weakening are all on the rise and that they negatively impact the planet's environment regardless of political boundaries. (Goldblatt, 1997). The limits that humans set up are completely disregarded by acid rain, nuclear fallout, and increasing sea levels. These changes have coincided with broader economic, cultural, and political shifts that are generally referred to as the result of globalisation. Economic factors that are thought to have contributed to the border-subverting global turnover observed over the past three decades include the growth of global supply chains spanning multiple national jurisdictions, the size and scope of multinational corporations and foreign direct investment, and the explosion of cross-border financial networks and transactions. One commentator believes this to be the end of geography (O'Brien, 1992).

Culturally speaking, there is a perception that the rise of tourists and internet users, the expansion of multinational media conglomerates, and the globalisation of uniform brands and goods have all severed or weakened the bond between culture and location (Tomlinson, 1999; Garcia, 1995; Appadurai, 1996). Even while persons are still confined to specific locations, they are now

more than ever forced to deal with the mediated experiences of far-off events and processes. As a result, contact with culturally significant images, statements, and artefacts from far-off places is part of the mundane, daily lived experiences of the majority of people. These convey the 'world' into their most private areas, collapsing or obfuscating the line separating intra and inter-political realms and promoting awareness of the ecosphere as a sole place (Robertson, 1992). In terms of the politics of globalisation, it is assumed that the above-mentioned cultural and economic developments, along with the proliferation and significance of supra-state institutions, cross-border political ties, and international peace and security concerns, have weakened state capabilities and shattered national identities.

According to the widely quoted phrase from Reggie (1993), globalisation has caused the 'unbundling' of the relationship between states, territoriality, sovereignty, and, one could argue, identity. Simply put, numerous issues with border functions are attributed to these changes. Resilient globalisation proponents have seen these modifications as both a precursor to and a contributing factor in the dissolution of national boundaries and territoriality. It is commonly asserted that globalisation weakens states' ability to maintain border security in relation to the sovereignty and demarcating roles of national borders. Thus, globalisation renders state borders largely redundant. The integrity of borders erodes as globalisation weakens sovereignty. In the West African context, globalisation in all its facets is facilitated by the Economic Community of West Africa State (ECOWAS). One of its ways to ensure globalisation while at the same time preserving the territorial integrity of member states is through its Protocol on free movement. However, this protocol poses various challenges to member

states such as Ghana as it is seen as the eroding of its borders. Immigration is chief among these problems.

The immigration problem is a big difficulty for movement in the West African sub-region militating against the enforcement of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) protocol on entry, residents and settlement. It appears that the states who have ratified this treaty respect the right of individuals to travel freely. The regularisation of documentation for settlement-related purposes is still a nightmare, nevertheless. The prevalence of intimidation at crossings and prejudice directed towards migrants continue to rise as native populations perceive the potential of immigrants as a danger to their opportunities and resources, regardless of their pursuits (Yaro, 2015). The illegal movement of human beings, goods and services within the West African territories constitutes serious problems, thereby negating socio-economic integration in the sub-region. According to this perspective, political borders that obstruct the mobility of trade and capital are remnants of a bygone era, and their removal is a sign of global progress. For the latter, globalisation has weakened state capacities to maintain territoriality, state sovereignty, and identity, though this is viewed as a reason for remorse instead of excitement. According to these unconventional proponents of globalisation, capitalism has progressed beyond the limiting confines of nation-states and is now in a new development phase of growth and development (Sklair, 2001; Castells, 1996; Gill, 1995).

African Borders

The influence of Europeans during the colonial era is at the core of modern African development (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001). The scramble for Africa was one of the most pivotal moments of the colonial era, as stated

by African historical records, and it had negative and enduring effects. The ‘Scramble for Africa’ saw Europeans divide Africa into protectorates, colonies and spheres of influence between 1884 and 1885, at the Berlin Conference, and held on to them until the turn of the 20th century (Craven, 2015). Before the advent of European powers coming to the African continent and even without a better overview and knowledge of the African interior, they had demarcated the content by way of maps and boundaries drawn in their capital cities without recourse to the African topography and demography. In as much as these boundaries were and still are arbitrary, they have transcended the colonial era (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2016; Herbst, 1989).

The significance of borders and boundaries in relation to the African continent is undeniable; however, its persistently negative image is in question (Touval, 1967). Put simply, African borders, like the African states themselves, have been characterised in various ways as ‘arbitrary’ and ‘artificial’ colonial constructs imposed on Africans who chose not to participate in the process and who have either ignored or suffered greatly as a result (Scorgie-Porter, 2015). African borders have faced several challenges, according to Ikome (2012). These include the boundaries’ arbitrary colonial origins and the fact that, regardless of their official recognition and consolidation by African ruling classes, they have remained porous, undefended, and even un-defendable. Okumu (2011), explains that the somewhat uneven demarcation led to the combination of various social groups into a single polity, which has a history of being extremely unstable, inflexible, and occasionally even irrelevant. Relative to the bounding of various social groups, Asiwaju (1985) identifies one-hundred and seventy-seven (177) partitioned ethnicities in Africa. According to estimates

made by Englebert, Tarango and Carter (2002), these divided groups account for roughly forty (40) per cent of the populations. Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski (2011) calculated that more than eighty per cent (80%) of people live in fragmented groups in a number of African nations. For example, Guinea-Bissau, eighty (80) per cent; Guinea, eighty-eight point four (88.4) per cent; Eritrea, eighty-three (83) per cent; Burundi, ninety-seven point four (97.4) per cent; Malawi, eighty-nine (89) per cent; Senegal, ninety-one (91) per cent; Rwanda, one-hundred (100) per cent; Zimbabwe, ninety-nine (99) per cent, among others. These high percentages as demonstrated portrays how sharply the African continent is fragmented due to the creation of artificial boundaries by the colonialists. A historical analysis of African borders reveals that European colonizers arbitrarily partitioned numerous ethnic and cultural groups to create administrative regions that suited their purposes. These divisions, which later became national boundaries in Africa, were not effectively managed or controlled. The colonizers employed geographical coordinates, geometric shapes, and linear demarcations to draw these borders, often disregarding existing social and cultural landscapes (Onuoha, 2013).

With decolonisation, these ill-defined boundaries developed into national borders, but in actuality, they were not always completely solidified. Since there are unofficial entry and exit points along the frontiers, which all contribute to the porousness of borders, cultural ties have flourished through common cross-border activities (Isoke, 2017). Scorgie-porter (2015) supports this argument by stating that although borders are not frequently porous (the example of Zaire and the Congo being exceptional), ethnic solidarity across borders is far more potent than the official citizenships that individuals so happen

to possess. This appears to indicate that the statutory limits of modern borders do not always coincide with cultural or social norms, which is the first step towards the porous nature of African borders.

A post-colonial geographic depiction of Africa is presented by Okumu (2011). According to him, the international boundaries of Africa span approximately 28,000 miles and number one hundred and nine (109). Less than twenty-five per cent (25%) of these boundaries are clearly defined, according to Okumu's additional explanation. African borders are marked by poor or non-existent management and a high degree of porosity or permeation. More precisely, there are about 350 official road crossing stations that guard African international boundaries, or one for every 80 miles along a boundary (most control posts are situated 16–20 km from the border) (Okumu, 2011). Roads, railroads or waterways do not connect several geographical borders in Africa (Central Africa Republic-Congo, Tanzania-Democratic Republic of the Congo). Almost one-hundred and nine (109) international boundaries divide one-hundred and seventy-seven (177) cultural or ethnic groups. The presence of twenty-seven (27) national parks and game/nature reserves makes up about twenty per cent (20%) of Africa's borders less permeable. In Africa, there are just 414 (four hundred and fourteen) roads that cross borders. Roads that cross borders without customs posts number sixty-nine (69). There are only twenty (20) African borders that railways cross. Twenty (20) cross-border ferry routes are available.

According to a number of academics, the reasons behind border management issues in Africa is that many governments are largely unaware of the nature of the borders, their characteristics and what passes through them (Krasner, 1999). The difficulty of routinely monitoring, patrolling, or controlling borders

is a result of this development. Herbst (2000) raises an argument that a state can only be sustainable if it maintains oversight of all of its borders, and one of the reasons why civil wars occur so often in Africa is the inability of the continent to broadcast its infrastructure. Ikome (2012) and Pickering (2004) make inferences, suggesting that today's terrorist dangers are also exacerbated by the brittle infrastructure, especially at the borders. Both Lamptey (2013) and Okumu (2011) concur that smugglers of people, drugs, guns and contrabands have easy access to African borders due to the continent's high porosity. Additionally, money made at borders has been utilised to finance illegal activity and to worsen societal issues, including prostitution and the high occurrence of HIV/AIDS and STDs at border crossing points (BCPs). Shaw (2002) similarly draws the conclusion that most borders in sub-Saharan Africa are transnational crime zones because African borders have turned into hubs for illicit activity.

Additional major issues that also affect border management include a shortage of security personnel to man the borders, a lack of expertise in border management, including a lack of map reading and interrogation techniques, and a lack of additional training to prepare security personnel for contemporary border surveillance methods. Once more, there is a dearth of facilities and equipment as well as a lack of information harmonisation between surrounding countries. Oscar (1994) characterised these concerns as the core of all border-related difficulties. In addition to the difficulties listed above, outdated communication devices and insufficient offices and housing for border personnel exacerbate the larger issue with border management. Although border security and its administration support national security, they have often been compromised throughout Africa (Bush, 2002). The security policies of nations indicate the degree of

safety and tranquillity along their borders as well as their capacity to change border security measures. The rise in border crimes has been mostly caused by the incompetence of border control mechanisms (Nkoroi, 2016; Titeca & De Herdt, 2010). The lack of practical methods for border control practises is the cause of many of the difficulties. Hess (2010) also notes that some empirical research has shown that the absence of institutions for managing border issues illustrates how African nations handle difficulties associated with border crossing.

Governments in sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, have demonstrated a strong commitment to border control, but many of the countries in the region lack organisations with the necessary training to effectively police their borders. Again, controlling border crossings is hampered by a lack of collaboration at all levels. This problem stems from a lack of collaboration at various levels, including the local level, where border communities are not typically involved in border security and control initiatives (Guerette, 2007; Lamptey, 2013). According to Hlovor (2020), national security and ungoverned spaces are two state-centric issues that form the foundation of border security policy in Africa. He goes on to say that this has prevented border-landers' welfare and economic needs from being taken into account by security strategies. Border-landers now have the motivation to challenge and get beyond border safety precautions to make a living because of this failure. Consequently, border people help criminals get over border security measures, making the frontiers more porous. Thomas and Tow (2002) underlined that since most residents have a comprehensive understanding of the border region, border control is impacted when state officials deploy law enforcement without first consulting the locals. The

problems are also further exacerbated by the lack of coordination and integration between government agencies, including customs, immigration, police and other security personnel.

Some border checkpoints in the West African sub region, particularly those located farther from the capital, lack the necessary infrastructure, such as scanners and detection devices. Additionally, national databases about criminals, their networks, and the kinds and quantities of illegal goods are typically not available to the border authorities entrusted with administrative duty in the various nations in the region. Opanike and Aduloju (2015) hold the view that the success of the terrorist, extremist and insurgency groups in West Africa, which has caused political instability in countries like Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, and Mali, among others, could be attributed to the porous nature of the West African borders. Among the major cross-border issues in the sub-region, include forced displacement, massive refugee migrations, unemployment among young people, social isolation and persistent deterioration of the security sector (Aning & McIntyre, 2004).

Empirically, Azure (2009) writes on the challenges facing the Ghana Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS) in Ghana. In his view, Ghana is privileged to have a sizable sub-regional economy made up of approximately two hundred and twenty (220) million people who share comparable preferences plus international relationships. This market is readily available when the country takes international trade more seriously. The Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) provides an even more pragmatic way to tap into this market with the introduction of its Protocol on Free Movement. This policy has encouraged member states' relentless efforts to guarantee the unrestricted

flow of people, products, and services across national borders. Relatively, the Ghana Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS) is the organisation in charge of implementing free movement and trade facilitation in Ghana. Azure (2009) further notes that over time, transnational criminal activity has gotten in the way of trade and freedom of movement.

With evidence, he identifies Ghana's Eastern Frontier, which runs from the Togo border at Aflao to the northern Volta's periphery at Tinjase to support his argument. The absence of suitable facilities to monitor illicit cross-border activities is the reason why the porous border persists in creating cross-border crime and instability within the nation (Azure, 2009). Consequently, Ghana and the broader West African sub-region are experiencing a surge in both non-violent and violent cross-border criminal activities. Non-violent crimes include smuggling of textiles, vehicles, fuel, and cocoa; cyber fraud; money laundering; and counterfeiting or piracy. Violent crimes encompass drug and arms trafficking, human trafficking, armed robbery, and vehicle theft. These illicit activities are on the rise, impacting both the country and the surrounding region. Azure (2009) further argues that the institution responsible is tirelessly fighting this problem however; they are under-resourced which makes them overwhelmed by these thriving criminal activities bedevilling the country and region. His work adopted the qualitative methodological approach. This allowed him to interact through interviews with a section of the managers of Ghana's Borders Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS). As a result, it provides a blend of rich experience and intuition of the interviewees. However, his work leaves out key issues of terrorism-motivated infiltration as a result of the porous

borders. Again, he does not do an appraisal of the nature of the porous borders to reveal the factors accounting for them.

Addo (2006), writes on cross-border crimes in West Africa. According to him, the dearth of an effective system for keeping an eye on international trafficking and illicit activity is the reason why West Africa's porous borders continue to fuel instability and the canker of cross-border crimes in the sub-region. Further, he identifies that transnational criminal activity threatens security and good governance and it also has an adverse effect on the sub region's general advancement of society and culture, the rule of law, economic activity and growth. Citing illegal trafficking of small arms, light weapons, ammunition, and people-particularly women and children as part of some of these dangers to the state. Mercenarism, the enlistment and deployment of minors as combatants, international organisations engaged in drug trafficking, violent robberies and "419" operations are also noted as contributive factors.

Besides Addo (2006) maintains that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the United Nations (UN), and the European Union (EU) have all recommended adopting a more cogent and harmonised regional tactic to resolving the issue as a result of the failure of specific national approaches in addressing the conundrum of cross-border challenges in West Africa. Addo fully concentrates on crimes in the West African sub-region. However, he does not address the issue of the nature of porous borders in Ghana. Touching on porous borders in the West African sub-region would have been too large an exercise given that, the factors responsible for border porosity may differ, albeit not entirely, from state to state in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sub-region.

Premising his opening argument on the event of September 2001 in the United States of America, Quartey (2019) raises the issues of international borders and security concerns to governments around the globe. He says that as countries strengthen frontier security to counter 'perceived threats such as terrorism,' the debate around securitisation has taken centre stage. He makes the argument that many African nations struggle with border security. Due to a number of obstacles in this area, borders have turned into hotspots for transnational crime.

Quartey claims that terrorist attacks and transnational security threats have been spreading throughout the West African sub region recently, and Ghana is vulnerable as a member of the region. He contends that the difficulties immigration officers face in policing cross-border commuting on Ghana's Paga frontier undermine their capacity to uphold security and leave the nation vulnerable to crimes and threats to transnational security. Using data from ninety-two (92) immigration officials randomly selected from the Paga Sector Command, he statistically concludes that in managing the commuting needs of citizens across the borders, the passport which forms eighty-point four per cent (80.4%) of the documents checked remained the most important document examined by the officers of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS). The use of modern implements and machines for screening commuters who frequent the border constituted forty-eight-point nine per cent (48.9%) indicating that it was not a common practice.

Regarding the challenges of keeping an eye on cross-border movements in Ghana, he says that border officials have numerous obstacles to overcome. Consequently, 98.9%, ninety-eight percent, made reference to this fact. The

primary ones are those related to logistics. It constitutes thirty-two-point five per cent (32.5%) and lack of modern tools in patrolling the border is thirty-two-point zero per cent (32.0%). As the usage of illegal routes by commuters to either enter or exit the country continued to grow, handling illegal border crossing saw a large proportion of the respondents calling for intense patrolling forty-nine-point four per cent (49.4%) and blocking of illegal routes twenty-two-point seven per cent (22.7%).

Regarding cross-border crimes, a significant majority (91.3%) of respondents confirmed their presence. The main crimes identified were smuggling of goods (47.6%), human trafficking (29.8%), and drug trafficking (14.3%). When asked about potential transnational security threats, three-quarters (75.0%) of the same group acknowledged their existence along the country's border. The most prominent threats cited were terrorism (37.2%) and drug and arms trafficking (24.2%). Quarthey's (2019) work provides lots of data on the conundrum of Ghana's International Land borders. However, he solely identifies the challenges of the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) in relation to mobility leaving out the full complement of factors which make Ghana's international land borders porous.

In the view of Sosuah (2011), border security has faced concerns ever since imperial nations drew borders. For her, the organisations in the industrialised world tasked with keeping an eye on their borders, in contrast to those in the developing world, are frequently equipped to handle these dangers. One of the biggest obstacles to border security in Ghana and the majority of developing nations is having the necessary institutional ability to enforce the law at the borders. She continues by saying that the problems that threaten Ghana's border

security are the same problems that affect her bordering nations. This, in her opinion, is the case because the crimes transcend national boundaries. She acknowledges that as a result of globalisation, the use of better technology-like the internet and mobile phones facilitate crime.

Sosuah makes a strong argument for border security; however, her generalisation of Ghana's international borders is a bit problematic. She argues that the country's international land borders remain the most porous as compared to the Air (Kotoka International Airport) and Sea (Tema, Takoradi) ports respectively. She also acknowledges the fact that the land borders are porous but does not consider the factors which make the international land borders porous.

Nigeria's exceptionally porous borders, according to Adewoyin (2019), are a significant contributor to national security risks and may continue to be so for some time. According to him, smugglers now freely enter and exit Nigeria through its land borders, bringing with them a variety of illicit commodities, including tiny guns that are used to commit crimes, with little to no hesitation. He believed that porosity was a characteristic that all borders in the nation had, regardless of where they were placed or how they were geographically situated.

According to his explanation, there is a direct correlation between weapons proliferation, insecurity, and porous borders. These borders allow for the unrestricted entry and exit of small arms into and out of Nigeria. The majority of these arms are held by non-state actors, who use them to incite unrest and create an environment that is hostile, ungoverned, and unstable in both Nigeria and the West African sub-region. The increase in violence and mass deaths in Nigeria can be partially attributed to the detrimental effects of armaments proliferation, which are plaguing the nation.

He states that there is a contentious dispute among academics regarding the connection between small gun proliferation, porous borders and insecurity. While some contend that small arms proliferation and porous borders are the direct causes of insecurity, others say that these factors contribute to the nation's level of insecurity. Nevertheless, academics have generally concurred that small gun proliferation and porous borders present significant threats to national security. In his work, he makes use of excellent literature which explains the current situation. The nexus between porous borders is elaborated. However, there are no statistics on the number of illegal arms or no evidence of intercepted illegal arms to affirm his position on the nexus between porous borders and the proliferation of arms in the Oke-Ogun Area of the Oyo State.

Conclusion

This chapter reviewed relevant literature and covered the study's theoretical foundations. Numerous hypotheses concerning threats, crime and susceptibility have been proposed. Nevertheless, this study adopted the routine activity theory (RAT). The theory states that crime is engendered when a motivated offender, in this context terrorists, extremists, bandits, smugglers and other criminal syndicates hoovering around the cross-border crime-infested West African sub-region on the one hand, suitable target, in this case Ghana, located in the west African sub-region, with its long-standing ethos of national stability, hospitality and economic viability and the absence of a capable guardian, in this case the factors responsible for the porous nature of Ghana's international land borders converge in space and time. These three elements

An analysis of the literature in existence reveals that, despite the emergence of the first governments in Mesopotamia and Egypt circa 3000 BC,

the majority of human cultures remained stateless for a considerable amount of time. Only when the world was divided up among colonial powers and states in Africa and the Americas formally declared their independence at the end of the nineteenth century did the idea of a nation-state become a worldwide phenomenon. Every state worries about borders because it wants to expand its power and capacity to govern over a certain area. State borders in recent times have been very instrumental in the international system. A more stable border has been recognised as a necessary condition for the development of stable governments and states, despite the fact that unconsolidated borders, when paired with inefficient political institutions and unfinished nationalist projects, have proven to be a recipe for instability and conflict.

An empirical review of available literature on the state of Ghana's borders revealed the challenges associated with Ghana's international borders. It highlighted the need to remedy the shortfalls, particularly, as Ghana finds itself in a West African sub-region infested with all forms of cross-border criminal activities. The next chapter discusses the methods and procedures used in carrying out the study.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODS

Introduction

This thesis focuses on Ghana's international land borders, detailing the factors contributing to its porous nature and how they pose threats to the country's stability. This chapter describes the methodology used in conducting the study. The focus of the chapter includes a discussion of the research design, target population, sample and sampling procedures, data collection instruments, data collection procedure and data analysis plan as well as the ethical considerations.

Research Methodology

The nature of the research topic and question(s) under investigation dictates a research methodology or plan, according to Denzin (2005). Therefore, it is important to view the study format utilised in an investigation as a tool for answering the research question(s).

Research Design

There are three major research designs which suit the nature of any research being undertaken at any point in time. These research designs are quantitative, qualitative and mixed-method (a combination of both qualitative and quantitative) which equips researchers in their investigations (McCusker & Gunaydin, 2015).

For the objectives of this research, the qualitative research design was chosen as the method to answer the research questions. The qualitative research design was selected because it strengthens the comprehension and interpretation of the meaning and motives that underline human contact. Qualitative research

enables a researcher to engage in “an inquiry process of understanding” by developing a “complex, holistic picture, analyse words, report detailed views of informants, and conduct the study in a natural setting” (Creswell, 1998.p.15). In this approach, a researcher makes claims grounded in knowledge (Guba & Lincoln, 1982) or advocacy or participatory (Mertens, 2003,) perspectives. Qualitative research is defined by Denzin and Lincoln (2005) as a multidisciplinary research methodology that takes a naturalistic and interpretive stance towards the research topic. When conducting qualitative research, information is gathered from participants who are fully engaged in the context of the study. The values that these individuals see in their environment serve as the foundation for data analysis. Ultimately, it produces an understanding of the problem based on multiple contextual factors.

Again, I find a qualitative approach suitable for this study because it permits an in-depth exploration of participants’ views on the topic under review. It provides for an in-depth comprehension of the subject and aids in gaining an advantage in determining the significance of the study. Qualitative research aids in acquiring a wider viewpoint on the topic because the data it produces is the responses of the interviewees. Qualitative methods enable a broader and deeper grasp of how to interpret occurrences by allowing for deeper analysis (Ruona, 2005). This decision is also influenced by Spicer’s (2004) claim that the qualitative method emphasises, interacts with and construes the actions and discernments of people to comprehend the world. This stands in stark contrast to quantitative research, where variables are managed in controlled settings. These factors influenced the researcher’s choice to gather the data for this study using a qualitative method.

In as much as qualitative research design comes in handy in research, it has some flaws. This design has been critiqued in the academic community for its flaws. One such critique is that qualitative research depends too heavily on the researcher's frequently ad hoc judgments on what is noteworthy and important and that the researcher's prejudices may impact the study findings (Spicer, 2004). This is evident in the use of open-ended questions in interviews, as well as the distribution of leading questions to participants. Furthermore, it is sometimes said that the scope of qualitative research is limited to specific cases. This makes generalising or duplicating the findings in other comparable scenarios challenging. As a result, the rationale for information obtained through qualitative research is unclear, given that interviews and observations produced from qualitative research are typically unstructured and informal.

Although these criticisms are factual, qualitative research is recognised as a legitimate method of producing scientific information that does not need statistical presentations and explanations. This research relied on several participants who are representative of the population to be able to generalise the findings.

Target Population

A population in research consists of groups selected for a specific study (Acharya, Acharya, Prakash, Saxena & Nigam, 2013). In this study, the population comprised Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) officials stationed at Paga, Aflao, and Elubo Border Sector Commands (BSCs) respectively, as well as members of the immediate border communities; Paga, Aflao township, and finally Elubo (Cocoville).

Sample Technique and Sampling Size

Numerous sampling techniques can be used while doing research, yet researchers in qualitative research often concentrate on relatively small samples (Luborsky & Rubinstein, 1995). Research participants are often chosen based on their ability to describe their experiences in depth and their willingness to do so. This results in rich data that may both challenge and deepen the researcher's understanding (Crabtree & Miller, 1992).

For this study, purposive sampling was used to choose the participants. With purposive sampling, a researcher selects participants from a population based on how closely they relate to the study's objectives. This sampling technique was required since it made it possible to select study participants based on their traits, contributions, knowledge and competence in the field of investigation. Moreover, the interviewees were easily identifiable.

A total of twenty-four (24) participants were approached by the researcher from the three research areas namely Paga, Elubo and Aflao Border Sector Commands (BSCs) as well as their immediate border communities respectively. The sampled members included six (6) key informants, two (2) each from the General Patrol, Intelligence, Anti-Human Smuggling and Trafficking Units of the border sector commands (BSC) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS). The various sections of the Border Sector Commands (BSCs) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) are the actual managers of the mobility on the country's borders and are custodians of rich vital information for analysis for the topic under review. Also, two members from the immediate border communities or towns, that is, Paga, Aflao and Elubo (Cocoville). (See Fig. 1). This sample size was deemed critical ascertain the validity in the studies

Sampled participants who fit into the research framework were officers of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) Border Sector Commands (BSCs) based on their thorough knowledge of border control and management, duration of stay in office, two (2) years and above, as a border patrol, and rank not below Immigration Control Officer (ICO). Again, residents who had in-depth knowledge about the borderland terrain, and were eager to contribute to the study were subsequently interviewed. Relatively, thirteen (13) interviewees were subsequently interviewed out of an anticipated twenty-four (24) due to circumstances beyond the remedy of the interviewer.

Data Collection Instruments

For this research and research design, semi-structured interviews were used as the main instrument for data collection. Interviews are personal, unstructured, structured and semi-structured conversations, which aim to identify a participant's emotions, feelings, and opinions regarding a certain research subject, theme, or topic. The one-on-one interview method allowed the researcher to interact with the participants and observe nonverbal cues during the interview process. Through interviews, the researcher gained a deeper understanding of the problem under investigation. The interview method allowed the researcher to seek precision and probe for a deeper comprehension of themes in the research topic. In effect, the report and analysis of data are reflective of the views of the participants.

An advantage of personal interviews is that they include direct interaction between interviewers and interviewees. Interviews, once again, helped the participants to feel more at ease since it made them seem like experts on the

subject, which encouraged them to share more than just their experiences but also their ideas, observations and worries.

To guarantee an orderly interview, a semi-structured interview was used to collect data for the study. Relatively, an interview guide was developed by the researcher to solicit information in parts and bits to answer the research questions. The interview guide included a preliminary list of inquiries to be brought up during the interview. That notwithstanding, additional questions were asked during the interviews which were not captured in the interview guide. The interview guide helped to maintain consistency in data collection and improved the comparability of responses among the participants because this study included a variety of individuals.

A semi-structured interview guide was prepared and divided into two main sections (A) and (B). This was used to guide data collection from members of the various units of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) Border Patrol Unit (BPU), at the various international land ports of entry and exit as well as identified members of the immediate communities and townships. The interview guide designated section (A) which contained questions for the members of the Border Sector Commands (BSCs) and its Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) explored the nature of Ghana's borders and their porosity, general practices for control of embarkation and disembarkation, challenges border officials face in terms of resourcing, nationals who frequently use the border, type of activities engaged in by major nationals who cross the border, relations with border residents and challenges they pose to the smooth administration of Ghana's international land borders. Again, it focused on ascertaining ways to minimise illegal border crossings and how to deal with the

crimes and potential transnational territorial threats as a result of the porosity of Ghana's international land borders.

Section (B) of the interview guide contained questions for the various members of the immediate communities. It explored the awareness, readiness, and cooperation between them (members of the border communities) and the officials at the ports of entry and exit to maximise the security of the community and nation. This enabled the researcher to obtain information in a lengthy conversation with respondents in a one-on-one interaction.

The study also employed documentary review and personal observation. The documentary review involved official reports, books, articles, news items, internet sources and video documentaries. This offered extensive and reliable data, which strengthened the reliability of the study's findings. Furthermore, it made it simple to do crosschecks to guarantee accuracy and dependability. The research's conclusions were made clearer and more exact by utilising a variety of informational sources and data collection techniques.

Data Collection Process

Semi-structured interviews with the participants served as the primary data collection method. Interviews were conducted between December 2019 and February 2020. Interview participation was optional. The various Border Commands were served unofficial letters of permission (Scanned letters of permission were sent to the various Border Commands electronically) in November 2019, through a liaison, requesting prior authorisation for participants to take part in the study after explaining the nature and the scope of the study. Official letters of introduction were served to the various Border Sector Commands (BSCs) on the day of the interview. Generally, the respondents were willing to

participate in the research. The interviews were scheduled and conducted between December and January 2019 and 2020 respectively. For the officers of the various units of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS)'s Border Sector Commands (BSCs), the interviews were carried out in their various offices and duty posts. The interview setting for identified individuals in the community varied. Participants were met at their places of convenience (parks and homes). Generally, in advance of the interviews, plans were made with people and key informants regarding locations they thought would be comfortable for the interview to take place. That notwithstanding, slight changes were made subsequently. For example, some officers who fit into the sampled population and were willing to be interviewed had to change the location of the interview due to changes in patrol duties. The goal was to provide participants with a high sense of anonymity that would encourage honest responses while also making them feel at ease and comfortable. Before the interview, the researcher gave participants a thorough explanation of the study's objectives, answered all of their questions and concerns, and gained their informed consent. The interviews were conducted in English, Twi and Ewe depending on which group of participants were being interviewed.

The discussions took place at the offices, unapproved route checkpoints, and the vicinity in the communities of the officers and residents. The interviews lasted approximately fifteen (15) to twenty (20) minutes. This made it possible for the researcher to gather extensive information on a variety of topics, including the concept of border porosity, the conduct of individuals and nationals who cross the border frequently, the use of unauthorized routes, potential threats to transnational security, criminal activity, and the difficulties in regulating cross-

border mobility. The researcher was at some point prompted by officers to personally observe some abnormalities and the nature of the phenomenon being discussed. The interviews were recorded with an audio recorder and the researcher noted significant points raised by participants in writing. This was to aid the researcher in easy analysis of the data gathered.

Data Analysis

In-depth data through semi-structured interviews were documented and audio-recorded by the researcher. Interviews recorded were transcribed without difficulty. The interviews were then manually coded and put into themes in line with the research questions. This helped to categorise and analyse the themes thereby reducing many words into coherent and logical phrases that supported the explanations of the quantitative data.

Ethical Consideration

The researcher takes extreme precautions to ensure the safety and dignity of research participants, given the significance of ethics in academic research and the difficulties associated with conducting research in general (Bos, 2020). A request for authorisation to conduct research was created, outlining the project's purpose, methodology, steps, and participants. This was submitted to the Centre for African and International Studies at the University of Cape Coast for a letter of introduction to the respondents. Considering that, the researcher projected to implore opinions and thoughts from respondents to add to existing knowledge in the area of research, the rights of the respondents were not to be jeopardised.

The researcher introduced himself appropriately to the respondents by displaying his students' identification cards, which improved the study's ethical

considerations. Additionally, the researcher needed to spend time thoroughly outlining the significance and goal of the study. This helped in obtaining the consent of the respondents and the need for them to support in giving credible information for the study. The confidentiality of the respondents was also guaranteed throughout the data collection and analysis phases. This was done by concealing some of the respondents' identities, using pseudonyms. Others also only opted to speak off the record. After the conversation, voices captured during the interviews were handled with the highest confidentiality. Following the conclusion of the various interviews, the researcher and the participants had a debriefing whereby they discussed the interview's impact and the interview process as a whole. As the participants reported enjoying the talks, the study's tangible effects were apparent right away.

Limitation

In order to conduct interviews to solicit information for the study, the researcher had to follow bureaucratic processes, which presented some problems. One such difficulty was waiting for administrative clearance from the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) and various border sector commands (BSC) before conducting interviews with participants. This delayed the whole data-gathering process. Again, the issue of communication barrier posed a challenge to the interview. At Aflao, the interviewees spoke in Ewe which was challenging for the interviewer. However, the Immigration officers who accompanied me to speak to these interviewees served as interpreters. This remedied the challenge. Ultimately, the research that had originally targeted all major border agencies had to be confined to immigration officers stationed at the main land crossings owing to time and resource restrictions.

Conclusion

This chapter describes the research perspectives, research design, target population, sample technique and sampling size, data collection instruments used, data collection procedure, and data analysis plan. For this investigation, a qualitative research approach was judged suitable. The main instruments used were semi-structured interviews and personal observation. Interview participation was entirely a choice. Interviews were conducted over a period of time. To easily reduce the whole bulk of data into smaller units, data was gathered for the un-coded questions and arranged in sequence. The analysis of data was done based on themes. The researcher captured the data electronically and manually utilising audio recording and writing notes. The next chapter presents the results and discussion.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Introduction

This chapter covers the findings, analysis and interpretation of the data collected by the researcher. The analysis and discussions answer the three research questions; What are the factors that contribute to the porous nature of Ghana's international borders? What are the potential threats to Ghana's stability as a result of its porous borders? Finally, how effective are the internal and external responses or measures to safeguard Ghana's porous international land borders? It also considered the possible outcomes of views expressed by the participants by coding similar ideas and diverse views based on semi-structured interviews with officers of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS). Also, data was sourced from residents of the immediate border communities and secondary sources to give trajectory and meaning to the study.

Factors contributing to the porous nature of Ghana's International land Borders

This section of the chapter answers the first research question:

1. *What are the factors that contribute to the porous nature of Ghana's international land borders?*

Porous borders are spongy and leaky boundaries without the existence of border security agents. The porosity of borders refers to the flexibility and penetrability brought about by the lack of any kind of control and unofficial transactions outside of officialdom which are unhealthy and damaging (Oshita, Alumona, and Onuoha, 2019). The conundrum of Ghana's porous borders can be partly attributed to the hasty nature with which the colonialists carved out the

territory (Ghana) for their economic and political gains and partly due to how post-independent successive governments have managed the borders (Okumu, 2011). The former has remained a legacy throughout Africa as the African Union (AU) and its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), voted to maintain the status quo on Africa's international borders as inherited at statehood (Asiwaju, 1984). The latter, in recent times, has revealed that there is a lack of maintenance of a tight grip on the country's international land borders. In Ghana, governments have institutionalised the various borders, putting forward their presence in the form of border security agencies. However, the fight against the porosity of Ghana's international land borders remains far from being won. Several factors have contributed and continue to contribute to the porous nature of Ghana's international land borders.

Border Architecture

The layout and spatial architectural distribution of Ghana's international land border crossing points (BCPs) or points of embarkation and disembarkation or points of entry and exit have contributed to its porous nature. Officially, Ghana has three (3) major international land border crossing points (BCPs). These are strategically positioned to facilitate commuting by foot and vehicle into and from neighbouring countries, Togo to the East, Cote d'Ivoire to the west and Burkina Faso to the north. These three are positioned specifically at Paga in the Upper East, Elubo in the Western and Aflao in the Volta regions of Ghana respectively. Aside, these three (3), there are forty (40) other minor land ports of entry and exit which complement the major ones, woven onto a perimeter of a total landmass of 238,533 km² (see Fig 2).

These official points of embarkation and disembarkation or border crossing points (BCPs) or ports of entry and exit, both major and minor, are loosely knit together. The loosely knit nature of the country's international land borders has left vast spaces between the various points of embarkation and disembarkation. Relatively, there is a proliferation of countless illegal or unapproved routes into and from neighbouring countries. *Distances between ports of entry and exit are not uniform and sometimes stretch beyond the average accessible coverage area of 5km to each side of the control Office of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) patrolled by its Border Patrol Unit (BPU) personnel* (Sup. Micheal Nonoo at Paga, 2019). These ports of entry and exit have not evolved with contemporary state border architecture and population growth over time. Simply put, one of the characteristics of Ghana's international land borders is that the various major and minor border crossing points (BCPs) are positioned in a way that they are relatively far from each other. *The growth of various settlements along these borders has placed undue pressure on the existing ports of entry and exit leading to the creation of unapproved borders by the inhabitants of the various international land border communities. This contributes to the porous nature of the country's international land borders* (ASI Thomas Martey at Paga, 2019).

A spatial geographical analysis of the border crossing points' (BCPs) distribution and positioning was done with the aid of Google Maps. The results confirmed that the official and unofficial border crossing points (BCPs) on the various international land frontiers of Ghana are not uniformly distributed and as such they are far apart and beyond the patrolling radar of the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS). For example, the Paga Border Sector Command, (BSC) which serves as the main point of embarkation

and disembarkation with neighbouring Burkina Faso, situated in the Upper East Region of Ghana, stood at a distance of approximately 95.59km away from the Tumu Border Crossing Point (BCP) to its west (See Fig. 3). Tumu is a small town and the capital of the Sisala East District. The Tumu Border Crossing Point (BCP) is not considered one of the main international land border crossings. Again, a spatial measurement between Paga Border Crossing Point (BCP) and Namoo Border Crossing Point (BCP) to its east, revealed a distance of approximately 34.59km (see Fig 4). Also, the Hamile Border Crossing Point (BCP) located in the upper west region, stood at a distance of approximately 203.87km from Bole-Chache (see Fig 5). Other minor land border crossing points (BCPs) include Magnori, Bawku-misiga, Kulungugu, Bunprugu and Tatale. These also exhibited the same irregular long distances between them.

Along the eastern frontier, Ghana's southeast border with Togo is covered by the Volta Region. The main border sector command (BSC) is at Aflao. The border extends from the shore at Aflao to Tinjasi in Nkwanta, where it merges with Oti and by projection the Northern, Northeast and Upper East regions of Ghana respectively. The stretch from Aflao to Tinjasi has 15 minor routes, including Agotime Afegame, Nyive, Shia, Honuta, Kpoglu, Akanu and Asikuma, among others. Based on Google Earth's geographical spatial measurements, Aflao, the main border stands at a distance of approximately 15.32km from Kpoglu, the next minor border crossing point (BCP) (see Fig. 6). Again, the distance between Kpoglu and Akanu, both to the north of Aflao, is 11.20km (see Fig. 7). Agortime Afegame, another land border crossing point (BCP), under the Akanu sector command, stands approximately 21.57km from its sister crossing point Nyive to its north (See Fig 8).

On the western frontier of Ghana, Elubo Sector Command is the main border crossing point (BCP) between Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire. The Elubo Border is the second largest border in Ghana. The spatial measurement revealed that from the Elubo Border Crossing Point (BCP) in the Jomoro district, to Sewum Border Crossing Point (BCP), north of Elubo is approximately 42.32km (see Fig 9). Again, from the Elubo Border Crossing Point (BCP) to the New Town Border Crossing Point (BCP) also in the Jomoro District, on the Half Assini highway, to the south is approximately 41.40km (See Fig 10). Finally, from Sewum Border Crossing Point (BCP) to Antokrom Border Crossing Point (BCP), near Dadieso to its north reveals a distance of approximately 54.16km (see Fig. 11)

Further, the spatial analysis of the border crossing points (BCPs) distribution and positioning on Ghana's international land borders reveals that coupled with these long irregular distances between the official and unofficial points of embarkation and disembarkation, is the population growth factor. The country has seen relatively significant population growth. This has impacted the conundrum of porous borders in the country. Numerous sparsely populated satellite communities on both sides of the various international land borders, especially on the Ghana side. *Every year the population increases and the various communities expand beyond the commuting capabilities of the various ports of entry and exit. This has made the proliferation and use of unapproved routes rampant and convenient* (Sup. Micheal Nonoo at Paga, 2019). More specifically, from the Paga Border Crossing Point (BCP) to the Tumu Border Crossing Point (BCP), there are more than twenty satellite communities that straddle the border Crossing points (BCPs) on both sides. Among these communities are

Kayoro, Dakrenia, Bensi, Piina, Wuru, Pudo, Kasapuoh Kasana, Silibele Djarwia, Leo, Sanga, Sabooure, Bega, Pien, Sia, Lambolo among others.

Geographical constraints play a vital part relative to the patrol duties of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS). Officers under the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) grapple with patrol duties as they are able to mount steady foot patrols of up to 3 to 4 km to each side of a control office. On patrol duties, they tend to be positioned on unauthorised paths for up to a day at a time. This leaves room for unabated entry, and exit as most parts of the unapproved routes are inaccessible by vehicles and very challenging when patrolled on foot. Environmental constraints, underdevelopment in international border areas and the lack of logistics to work together hinder effective patrol of Ghana's international land borders. *Ghana's international land borders are a barely discernible line through forests, water bodies and mountain ranges. They lack proper demarcation. These features humper an even distribution of the various minor ports of embarkation and disembarkation. As a result, resources are primarily deployed to places of accessibility and not a priority. Some parts are barely accessible; thus, sometimes, one has to walk through a thick forest to get to the border* (ICO James Moore at Elubo, 2019).

Ineffective Checkpoints

Inefficient checkpoints have also contributed to the porous nature of the county's international land borders. The Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) operates checkpoints on Ghana's roads in the international land border regions, especially where most potential illegal activities may occur. These operations are part of a strategy to re-enforce its establishing objectives, that is, physical patrol of borders, checking for illegal migration,

checking for drug and human trafficking, checking for smuggling across the border, checking animal trafficking, reporting on all forms of alleged subversive activities and readiness to act as the first line of defence against external antagonists for the Ghana Armed Forces.

To enforce the restriction of illegal entry, the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) has implemented a multi-layered enforcement strategy. The Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) operates permanent and tactical checkpoints. These differ by virtue of geography, scope and infrastructure. Whereas both categories of barriers are typically operated at fixed locations, permanent checkpoints, as so named, are distinguished by relative infrastructure which could include off-highway covered lanes for inspecting vehicles and structures, such as administrative ones; holding individuals who are suspected of smuggling or engaging in other criminal activities; and other locations where individuals are imprisoned.

Tactical checkpoints are also operated at locations based on intelligence. These do not have permanent buildings or facilities. Among the purposes of tactical checkpoints is to augment permanent checkpoints by monitoring and scrutinising traffic on illegal routes that the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) sees as likely to be utilised by illegal aliens or traffickers to avoid capture at ongoing roadblocks. Tactical checkpoint infrastructure may include a few border patrol vehicles that the agents will use to go to the area, orange cones to halt and direct traffic, a temporary water supply, portable restrooms, and warning signs. Tactical checkpoints often aim to be put up for brief or intermittent usage, opening and closing based on intelligence and

shifting patterns of illegal alien smuggling routes. Consequently, the quantity and location of tactical checkpoints in use may change on a daily basis.

That notwithstanding, checkpoints, be it permanent or tactical, have underlived their core mandate. Most of the checkpoints are either absent or under-resourced for effective operations. *One of the tactical checkpoints at Elubo along the Bank of the Tano River is a structure built of logs and roofed with palm fronds* (ICO James Moore at Elubo 2019). Officers stationed at various checkpoints barely accessible by vehicle (unapproved routes) mostly face a difficult challenge of patrolling areas in proximity, as the geography of these areas is very challenging. In addition, a lack of logistics and resources means that those available are shared. For example, assigned vehicles drop off officers at tactical checkpoints and return to sector commands for other use. *At night, some officers are forced to leave or abandon checkpoints because there is low motivation by way of infrastructure, electricity and water, among others. This makes room for people who want to embark and disembark the country to do so with ease* (ICO Samuel Tawiah at Aflao, 2020). The ineffectiveness of the country's various immigration checkpoints is generally premised on the administrative challenges that confront the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) and its Border Patrol Unit (BPU).

Challenges of the Border Patrol Unit (BPU)

Working to secure Ghana's international land borders is severe under tooling and resourcing of the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS). The Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) is in charge of immigration and emigration into and out of Ghana respectively. Its unit, the Border Patrol Unit (BPU), took over from the Border Guard Regiment of the Ghana

Army in 2005 and was tasked with ensuring the country's territorial frontiers. However, a severe lack of working tools and equipment has made the discharge of their duties very difficult thereby contributing to the porosity of the country's international land border. In no particular order, the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) grapples with the following challenges;

Transportation

Transportation at the various border sector commands (BSCs) has been a serious challenge over the period. Motorcycles, quad bikes, and other vehicles that are in good working order are extremely scarce. This has usually made effective patrol and even sometimes re-enforcement in critical situations very challenging. *Officers are left with no option but to use personal vehicles or motorbikes. The latter is preferred at the various international land borders. That notwithstanding, fueling these personal automobiles is classified as an unbudgeted cost of the service, meaning officers (owners) are not always reimbursed for the cost of fuel* (ASI Mathew Okoh at Elubo, 2019).

Additionally, border patrols in many areas on the various international land border regions have to be done on foot in the absence of motorcycles or four-wheel drive amidst a challenging environment, thus restricting the scope of operation. Discussing the issue of transport, ASI Martey stated that, *the situation is very disturbing as there is only one serviceable vehicle that the sector commander uses. The only means of patrol remains personal motorbikes. Available bikes of the service are seriously in need of servicing and maintenance* (ASI Martey at Paga, 2019). The problem of fuelling, maintenance and servicing of vehicles can be traced to the budgetary allocations of the Border Patrol Unit. The budget here is not big enough to fuel the vehicle to enable effective

petrol. Vehicle maintenance is poor, resulting in unreliability. Officers are sometimes forced under circumstances to use their own money for maintenance or, better still, use their motorbikes when deployed on patrol duty.

Further on the issue of transportation, especially with the allocation of vehicles, motor and quad bikes, it was noted that aside donations from state, non-state actors and other stakeholders in the country's border management, the Ministry of Interior (Ghana), which operates through ten agencies including, the Ghana Police Service, Ghana Prisons Service, Ghana National Fire Service, Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), Narcotics Control Commission, National Disaster Management Organisation, Gaming Commission of Ghana, National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons, National Peace Council and Ghana Refugee Board, prioritises the Ghana Police Service over the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) in the distribution of vehicles, motor and quad bikes. ICO Moore with the Elubo Border Sector Command (BSC) commented saying, *if a total of one hundred cars were to be distributed by the ministry, the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) would get about ten (10) cars which are distributed to places with accessibility along the borders, and these come not very often. In general, the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) has a smaller number of vehicles relative to the Ghana Police Service* (ICO James Moore, 2019).

Lastly, road networks linking the various major border Crossing points (BCPs) to the minor ones, and the various unapproved routes, are almost unusable. For example, the road network linking Aflao's Border Crossing Point (BCP) to the 'BEATS' (Beats is a wire fencing serving as a barrier between Ghana and Togo. These BEATs were a security measure by the Togolese government. It consists of a wire barbed fence more than 2km in length. The Beats

are numbered 1 to 14) is an untarred zigzag road through the locality. *The road system around the Paga Border Crossing Point (BCP) also remains in a bad state. Officers grapple with driving on those roads. All these significantly contribute to not fulfilling our mandate for border protection or border safeguarding* (ASI Thomas Martey at Paga, 2019).

Communication

The need for effective and efficient communication for easy deployment of officers to address prominent issues cannot be overemphasised. Two-way communication using Global Open Trunking Architecture (GoTa) has been one of the modes of communication for the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS). Global Open Trunking Architecture (GoTa) provides a framework for enhanced collaboration, standardised communication, and efficient resource utilisation, ultimately benefiting organisations and individuals who rely on trunking services for their critical communication needs.

The Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) personnel use the Global Open Trunking Architecture (GoTa) to call for backup and also officers on patrol duty use it to check up on the location of other officers to keep in touch. However, the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) over the years has been faced with communication challenges. This is as a result of the grossly inadequate number of Global Open Trunking Architecture (GoTa) phones among border patrol officers. This has created a situation where officers of the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) have had to rely on conventional point-to-point communication methods with the use of cellular phones. Prior to the use of the GoTa, communication was predominantly done by the Very High

Frequency (VHF) system, which was donated by the Spanish government and installed almost two and a half decades ago (GIS Annual Report, 2016).

One of the challenges of using cellular phones is signal availability. Ghanaian telecommunication signals on the various international land border communities remain patchy and do not cover a broader range of zones. This compromises the work of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) officers. Generally, the network is a problem at most border posts, not to talk about the minor border crossing points (BCPs) and unapproved routes. The Aflao sector command, there is a limited number of computers used mainly for word processing with weak or no internet connection. In one instance, a broken radio network took months if not years to be repaired and subsequently replaced, and officers rely on personal mobile phones for communication in the line of duty (Sup. Ernest Awummey at Aflao, 2020). At various border crossing points (BCPs), signals are patchy or non-existent, like in the case of Paga, Glo Ghana has no service while MTN Ghana's signal is very weak. Sometimes, officers lose track of colleagues on patrol duty which is attributed to inadequate means of communication.

Again, cellular network strength on the various international land borders automatically alternates between networks with positioning. For example, upon arrival at the Aflao Sector Command, it was realised that the cellular signal of MTN Ghana, a telecommunication network in Ghana was completely down. However, the telecommunication network signal of MTN Togo was strong. As a result of cellular networks alternating between signals and positioning, positioning adjustment remains the only alternative to relatively good cellular signal strength. This makes it very difficult to make calls, let alone make emergency

calls. This situation leaves officers with the choice to move to certain spots in the neighbourhood where a calling signal is present.

Finally, concerns about privacy and safety arise when mobile phones are used for security communication. Mobile phones can be vulnerable to hacking, eavesdropping and interception by adversaries. This can compromise sensitive information and jeopardise the operational security of the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS). A Modern Ghana report revealed that a leaked document containing intelligence of an eminent terror attack on Ghana was released to the general public without clearance from the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) hierarchy. According to the spokesperson of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) Francis Palmdeti, the intelligence document was classified and intended for internal use, however, was leaked to the public hence investigations have been commenced to find the source of the leak. (Peacefm Online, 2016).

Protective gears

Adding to the challenges faced by the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) has been the unavailability of various protective gear to enhance efficiency in border monitoring. As a result, the officers in the line of duty are severely handicapped in terms of working logistics. The Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) is sanctioned to use guns like other security agencies that patrol the sea and the airports. Consequently, the officers of the GIS have undergone military training at the Asutuary training school on the use of firearms (Souah, 2011). However, the unavailability of sufficient firearms for the officers of the Ghana Immigration

Service's (GIS) Border Patrol Unit (BPU) has necessitated a situation where officers on patrol duty have had to manage with inadequate firearms.

Officers are trained and cautioned for the time being not to endanger their lives in the line of duty as they may face adversaries. *One very exemplary situation unfolded when a group of eight (8) smugglers were intercepted at Bongo Feo. The officers on duty were three and had only one pistol. The smugglers were eight, but with tactical manoeuvring, the officers engaged the smugglers while they called to the nearest military deployment for assistance* (ASI. Thomas Martey at Paga, 2019). Officers are encouraged not to risk their lives in the meantime in the line of duty but to use their training until the arms arrive.

At the Aflao Border Sector Command (BSC), for example, the Togolese Immigration officers, along the BEATS, appeared armed with guns and other security weapons, unlike their counterparts the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS). This situation has raised issues of personal protection dilemma, especially as smugglers and criminal syndicates sometimes carry firearms. These criminals have advanced in their criminal activities and carry sophisticated weapons. They see officers tasked with the mandate of protecting the borders as their first line of resistance and will not hesitate to kill him or her or inflict severe injuries on them at the least chance.

Other safety equipment that officers determined was necessary included, in no particular order of importance; tents to provide shade when officers are stationed on unapproved routes, camp beds for overnight patrols, Raincoats, electric shock batons and night vision equipment, among others.

At Elubo, some officers complained of how they have had to sometimes leave their duty post along the unapproved routes in very remote areas where

there is no camp tent or no raincoats. Also, along the 'BEATS' at Aflao, officers have to provide benches or plastic chairs themselves or take them from residents during the day or at night. The situation is dreadful as officers are forced to vacate their posts under extreme weather and go home, leaving the routes unpatrolled.

Poor cooperation with local communities

Ghana's border communities sit directly on the border. This means that the communities in themselves serve as the borders. Residents of the various border townships view government (border security) officials' meddling in their long-standing cross-border economic and cultural relations as disruptive. This mindset undermines stakeholder cooperation at borders and has resulted in confrontations with border enforcement personnel (Titeca & de Herdt, 2010). In the border communities, relations are long-established. Community members who perceive restrictions on their ability to travel and trade often feel resentful. The necessity for the country to keep control over immigration, transportation, and security thus becomes a recipe for conflict between the populace and the authorities.

According to reports, the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) has been making an effort to foster friendly relationships with members of the local community. However, it has not been an easy task. Violence incidents against law enforcement officials are not unusual and vice versa. Some citizens of the community act inappropriately toward the officers, especially if the officers are still relatively new. Errand boys for the community's opinion leaders over the period have had misunderstandings with security officers at their duty posts. *Some of these boys are largely protected when incidents like these occur. Even senior*

officers have sometimes shielded them from prosecution on occasion (ICO Samuel Tawiah at Aflao, 2020).

In recent years conflicts between residents of border communities in Ghana and immigration officers have become too many. These have in most cases led to violence, injuries and sometimes death. In 2009, there was a report of an attack on Ghanaian Immigration Service (GIS) officers in Tinjase near Kpassa, in the Nkwanta-North District of the Volta region by a group of Togolese from Sarakawa, a community in Togo. The attack resulted in the loss of documents, patrol motorcycles, and the burning down of the immigration control office (AllAfrica, 2009). In order to get two people who were being held at the border post for questioning due to illegal entry into the country released, the crowd ignored immigration procedures at the border, crossing into the country, and began to assault any officers wearing green uniforms that they came across. (AllAfrica, 2009).

This circumstance is exacerbated by the fact that officers live in the same rented homes as these residents and as a result, immigration officers are easily identified, stereotyped and targeted. Co-tenants of some officers often serve as potters, hawkers and forex traders across the border. Officers of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) are compelled to exempt residents from the checks done before embarking or disembarking the border. *Sometimes people found using unapproved routes are apprehended by officers and when they find out that they are residents or relatives of residents of the border community, they are allowed to go* (ICO Samuel Tawiah at Aflao 2020) This has created an avenue for unscrupulous residents who tend to aid smuggling by assisting outsiders through clandestine routes.

Infrastructure

Inadequate infrastructure erodes productivity in the monitoring of Ghana's international land borders, especially, the ones open predominantly to vehicular and human traffic. Office space, accommodation, and fencing infrastructure are either inadequate, in need of rehabilitation, or absent altogether. Such deficiencies reduce employees' desire to work hard, cause inefficiencies, and may even encourage officers to act unethically.

The six main approved borders have some infrastructure, especially the Kotoka International Airport (KIA) which in recent years has been given a facelift with the addition of an ultramodern terminal three. Paga, Aflao and Elubo Sector Commands also have relatively good infrastructure. However, other approved borders serving as minor border crossing points (BCPs), not to mention unapproved routes, have a deplorable state of infrastructure for office space and accommodation. This has made the effectiveness of work by the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) very difficult. *Officers term these remote border crossing points (BCPs) as 'villages'. Most officers see transfer to these places as punishment* (ICO James Moore at Elubo 2019). In Hedzokope, ICO Samuel Tawiah recounts the state of the infrastructure present. *He articulates that, the control office is a wooden shack at the side of the road which is also used for sleeping. It has no source of electricity and potable water* (ICO Samuel Tawiah at Aflao 2020).

Highlighting places with deplorable infrastructure and accommodation for the officers of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), Border Patrol Unit (BPU), officers mentioned in no particular order Dadieso Border Crossing Point (BCP), stating that this border crossing point (BCP) shares the same fate with

all other minor border crossing points (BCPs). *There is a lack of proper infrastructure as the available office block is substandard and cramped accommodation without electricity. The Dadieso immigration building is better characterised as a shack. It is shoddily built of wood planks on a concrete foundation with a corrugated iron-pitched roof. It has an obvious state of rot and decay and hasn't been painted in a long time. It is located a short distance from the border, which is marked by a rope that is stretched across the street, on the left side of the street. The building's front houses the immigration office, with two bedrooms and living rooms behind it. There is no generator or water supply at the post* (ASI George Kumi at Elubo 2019).

Accommodation just like other factors inhibiting the effectiveness of border patrol cut across all the various international land borders. Speaking to augment the argument of poor infrastructure, James Moore also described the accommodation and office space at Oscar and Kyensee Kokoo Unapproved Border Crossing Points (BCPs). *As a partially open, sparsely private shelter with a corrugated iron roof supported by widely spaced wooden slats. It is accessible via an unpaved road, has rudimentary sleeping platforms, and is manned by three officers on rotation from Dadieso. They stay there for a week before going on to their next assignment.* (ICO James Moore at Elubo, 2019)

The lack of infrastructure and office space lamented by the officers of the Border Patrol Units (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) is traced to the transfer of responsibility of border patrol from the Border Guards Unit of the Ghana Army to the Ghana Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS) before subsequently to the Ghana Immigration Service's (GIS) Border Patrol Unit (BPU) in 2005. During the transfer, the Border Guard's logistics and

infrastructure were handed over to CEPS. However, in 2005 when the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) was created to augment the duties and mandate of border security by the Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS), the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) had to settle for a share of logistics and infrastructure which to a large extent were not enough to accommodate both border security agencies.

Cultural Solidarity and Residents' Activities across Ghana's Borders

Ghana's porous borders have been engendered to some extent by a web of cultural solidarity and illegal activities such as the creation and usage of unapproved routes across the various international land borders. As many borderlands ethnic groups found in Ghana today were split across a plural of states, caused by the scramble for Africa, and its subsequent affirmation at independence, they have continued to live in solidarity with kindred across these borders. For the border residents living on Ghana's international land borders, political borders are illusionary and not realistic. According to Prunier (2004), African borders are often porous because the ethnic ties that bind them are far stronger than the official citizenship that individuals happen to possess. Visits and participation in social, economic and even political gatherings are mostly common in Ghana's international land border regions with neighbouring towns (countries). *To better put it, most of the residents are born on one side of the border and raised on the other side of the same. For example, the people along the Ghana-Burkina Faso border on either side are mostly kindreds. They hold and participate in social gatherings like funerals, birth ceremonies and festivals* (Adam Yussif at Paga, 2019).

According to Aning (2018), the dynamics of local trafficking in Ghana are significantly influenced by cross-border communal ties. The inhabitants of Hamile and Tumu, the principal hubs for travel to Burkina Faso in northwest Ghana, are associated with neighbouring Burkinabe communities through shared cultural practices, local dialects, and a hybrid identity that combines aspects of Ghanaian and Burkinabe identity. In the Bono Region of Ghana, residents of the Sampa as part of their day-to-day socio-economic activities, especially cashew farming, cross into and form neighbouring Bondoukou in Cote d'Ivoire. This serves as a pretext for smugglers as the scale of movement at these border crossings makes it difficult for border officials to identify and intercept trafficked goods.

At Aflao, in the Ketu South district, the cross-border ties are even much stronger as compared to other international land border regions in the country. *There are children with Togolese fathers and Ghanaian mothers and vice versa. Some of these children live in Ghana and school in Togo and speak fluent French as compared to English. Parents on the other hand work in Togo and live in Ghana and vice versa, depending on the affordability of rent* (Saviour at Aflao, 2020).

Citizens' obeisance and cultural dislocation have strengthened cultural solidarity across Ghana's international land borders. This has made the issue of nationalism necessary, as people who live in Ghana's inter-national land border regions frequently encounter circumstances in which nationalism is not easily accepted but rather contested in social relations. Meanwhile, currencies like the CFA franc are more widely used than Cedi because market facilities and other infrastructure are more easily accessible in neighbouring countries, especially

Togo, Cote d'Ivoire, and Burkina Faso. Residents' radio and television broadcasts are obtained from media outlets in neighbouring countries; consequently, these nations have a greater influence on their vocabularies and mind-sets than Ghanaian culture does. This has fostered a strong sense of cultural solidarity with bordering communities.

To further increase this problem, in contributing to the deteriorating international land border conundrum in Ghana, has been the activities (mostly illegal) of border residents. Residents have either created or contributed to creating illegal routes of entry and exit (unapproved routes) which they see as part of their commuting needs for convenience and also to engage in all manner of activities. This act of creating illegal or unapproved routes through the remote part of the borders which are inaccessible to vehicles renders patrol teams handicapped resulting in the patrol of these places on foot. These unapproved routes which are sometimes created, not to commit a crime, end up aiding cross-border criminal activities as many people enter the country illegally and smuggle goods and other items out of it without being detected.

The Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) acknowledges that the porosity of the country's international land borders is due to residents' activities, although most of the time their intention was not to commit crime. *Residents of the immediate community who live a distance away from the main point of embarkation and disembarkation find it convenient to create and use shortcuts as compared to using a rather long and tiring route to the designated border crossing point (BCP) for security checks before embarking on unofficial and short trips to visit friends, family, attend social gatherings or even children attending school in neighbouring communities and vice versa* (Sup. Ernest Awumey at

Aflao 2020). As acknowledged by the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), residents are responsible for most of the illegal routes and residents of the communities on these international land borders accept the blame for the same. However, residents maintain that these routes are only for convenience's sake and not for the perpetuation of crime. *These activities by border residents have left the daunting task of surveying the border almost every day to find unauthorised routes and block them by the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS)* (ASI Abigail Kubegina at Paga, 2019).

On the eastern frontier where Ghana shares a boundary stretching from Aflao in the south to Tinjiso in the north with Togo, the main border is at Aflao. The situation of illegal activities and the proliferation of numerous unapproved routes is complicated by the geography as well as the historical antecedence of the place and its people. The busy community of Aflao sits directly on the border and interferes greatly with the general activities of border officials. Aflao can be said to be the busiest among the three international land borders. This is partly due to the proximity with the Togolese capital Lomé and also partly due to the geographical position of the Republic of Nigeria, one of Africa's economic hubs (Azure, 2009).

The usage of the 'BEATS' is very frequent as compared to the use of the approved borders. This situation creates an impression where it seems that the approved main border is for just the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Citizens and the other nationals entering Ghana by road. The residents prefer to use the various BEATS instead of using the main border which is sometimes very far away from their places of residence. Residents have opened illegal routes, which they referred to as BEAT. *There are several BEATS*

numbered 1 to 14, some of which have been blocked and others stationed with officers both day and night. The growing population of the border community led to one of the BEATS being legalised for residents. This BEAT has permanent Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) officers there to check illegalities (ASI William Ashitey at Aflao, 2020). Across the wire fencing and the buffer zone between Ghana and Togo, there are several shops and mini-marts, which sell all manner of glossaries and items. These shops are sometimes patronised by border residents on the Ghana side of the border and sometimes residents are tempted to cut through the wire fence to shop for glossaries in person (Horlali, at Aflao, 2020).

At Elubo, the issue of the proliferation of unapproved routes by community residents is also prevalent and greatly influenced by the presence of the Tano River which in a way serves as a natural border for Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire. *Residents make it very difficult to patrol the border as they create and recreate numerous illegal paths. The Tano River serves as a smuggling route as the banks of the river stretch a long distance (Sup. Raymond Lardi at Elubo, 2019).*

The Tano River poses the most severe environmental constraints in the positioning of points of entry and exit. *The banks of the river make it difficult to patrol these illegal routes. Officers are unable to block illegal routes because they are soon re-opened for use by residents. There are no Jet Ski or speedboats to chase criminals and likewise, officers cannot be stationed at a point on the bank of the river every time. The usage of the river and the unapproved routes go hand in hand and serve as an occupation for some of the residents (ICO James Moore at Elubo, 2019). The use of unapproved routes is a big business*

for some residents which encourages the prevalence of the creation of unapproved routes. These routes especially in the CocoVille community at Elubo, are used to smuggle rice, oil, and flour among other goods with the excuse that the duty at the main border is expensive. Some also prefer the use of unapproved routes as they deem them quicker and more convenient. The unapproved routes across the Tano River also serve as a source of income for others. Paddlers ferry passengers and goods across the river for a fee (Seidu at Elubo, 2019).

Poor development in border communities

It is important to note that there are two main issues that arise from the low level of development in international land border communities. To begin with, the absence of physical infrastructure has historically posed a significant obstacle to the integration of border communities and businesses on a national and regional level, resulting in largely informal interactions and exchanges. Furthermore, border areas have been blatantly neglected, making them especially vulnerable to criminal activity and acting as havens for armed insurgents and even terrorist organisations. A close look at Ghana's international land border communities reveals glaring neglect and under-development. Most of the areas on the country's international land border regions are in a deplorable state of development. Generally, there is a lack of socio-economic development in border communities as well as border infrastructure.

At Aflao where Ghana shares an international land border with Togo, there is contrasting evidence of border area development. The Togolese side of the border had good road infrastructure, well-constructed from Aflao to Segbe, allowing their security to patrol relatively efficiently and there is also the barbed wire (which they open at will) all aimed at protecting their land borders. In the

case of Ghana, there are zigzag and untarred roads through residential slums, with no proper lighting system at night, no buffer and a patchy telecommunication network.

In general, most of the communities where these unapproved routes are situated have relatively no electricity, potable water supply and telecommunication services to facilitate effective monitoring and patrol. Even when officers are stationed at these places at night, they do not man these positions for long. This makes the country's international land borders vulnerable to criminals.

Threats and Implications to national stability

This section of the chapter answers the second research question:

2. What are the potential threats to Ghana's stability as a result of its porous borders?

Developments and situations at Ghana's international land borders engender criminal activities which threaten the stability of the country. In recent times, Ghana has been faced with numerous threats to its national stability due to its porous international land borders and insecurities in neighbouring countries. The stability of Ghana is a position that is enviable to several countries in Africa and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It is imperative to highlight critical emerging threats both immediate and remote which threaten Ghana's stability due to its porous international land borders.

Terrorism

Generally, because of the current circumstances, which include poor governance, conflict, poverty, illness, and corruption, Africa is thought to be a breeding ground for terrorism. Relatively, what qualifies as the definition of terrorism in the case of Africa is exceedingly difficult to accept given that many

people have used violent methods to advance their recognised national cause and liberation. That notwithstanding, terrorist acts are defined by the United Nations Security Council in resolution 1566 of October 2004 as a ‘criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror’ (UN, 2004). Ghana faces dangers from foreign terrorism, financing of terrorism, and the potential use of the nation as a haven. Based on injuries per million people, Ghana was placed 82nd out of 163 countries in the world in the 2019 global terrorism statistics. Ghana scored 1.74, the highest ever for the nation, according to the statistics. It represented a considerable rise over the index from two years earlier. On a scale from 0 to 10, the index calculates the direct and indirect effects of terrorism (Dokua, 2021).

Cross-border terrorism is currently posing a direct threat to Ghana’s unity, integrity, and sovereignty. Recorded incidents of infiltrations on the borders with the vicious purpose of destabilising Ghana as a state are increasing. Cross-border terrorist host centres orchestrate, finance, and support acts of cross-border terrorism. Groups such as Boko Haram, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam Waal Muslimeen (JNIM), the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Ansarul Islam (AI) (United Nations, n.d), continue to threaten the stability of states in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sub-region. With the great strategic objective of ruling the entire West African region, these terrorist organisations have comparatively lately expanded their illicit operations from the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin region to the coastal regions around the Gulf of Guinea (GoG). The Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam Waal Muslimeen (JNIM) (which is made up of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar

Dine, al-Mourabitoun and the Macina Liberation Front) for instance, have repeatedly urged their militants to mobilise for the sake of jihad in Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea, Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, and Cameroon in addition to Mali. However, while Ghana, Senegal, and Guinea, remained free from these attacks, the Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam Waal Muslimeen (JNIM) and its affiliates have attacked most of the targeted countries (Counterterrorism, 2019).

The threat and dangers posed by terrorist and violent extremists in blueprint attacks in neighbouring and targeted states in West Africa and the porous nature of Ghana's international land borders have heightened discourse across the security circles in Ghana. *For example, intelligence indicates that there is a southward spread of extremist groups in Burkina Faso* (Supt. Michael Nonoo at Paga, 2019). The state of Ghana's international borders does not guarantee a shield of protection as there are concerns over cross-border incursion into Ghana. It is recorded that, in the space of two (2) years (2017 to June 2019), Burkina Faso recorded 288 violent incidents of terrorist attacks and an analysis of the pattern of these attacks calls for a more proactive measure by the border security personnel, especially the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS).

In 2019, unsettling reports of intercommunal violence in north-central Burkina Faso and central Mali highlighted the tragic fact that the Sahel region was still stuck in a state of crisis. *Government authorities in the region are understandably concerned about the rise in violent acts since they fear that things could get worse or even start to destabilise the countries bordering the Gulf of Guinea* (Supt. Michael Nonoo at Paga, 2019). Cultural solidarity along the Ghana-Burkina Faso Border Region has proven somewhat useful in instances

of terror attack intelligence gathering. *Community residents also allude to the fact that attacks in communities in Burkina Faso very close to Ghana's border are disseminated through the radio and from friends in these Burkinabe communities* (Adam Yussif, at Paga, 2019). Ghana has not yet been the target of a terrorist attack, but given its proximity to neighbouring countries like Burkina Faso, where Ansarul Islam militants and Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam Waal Muslimeen (JNIM) operate, as well as its porous international land borders, Ghana is susceptible to attacks.

Following reported terrorist attacks on churches in Ghana, on June 2, 2019, a Burkinabe was apprehended by police in a packed Catholic church in Hamile, Upper West Region, with a foreign handgun loaded with two rounds of ammunition. This arrest proved that Ghana was under urgent threat (Citi Newsroom, 2019). Again, on 5 June 2019, a Burkinabe who had entered Ghana illegally through the border was apprehended in Hamile with several rounds of ammunition and a handgun made locally. Prior, a militant attack in Nohao, close to the Ghanaian border, had earlier claimed the lives of a Spanish priest and four Burkinabe customs officers. In February 2019, three automobiles were wrecked at a security gate. (Joy Online, 2019). In light of these incidents, there is a growing belief that extremist groups are coordinating their efforts to take advantage of security lapses in the nation, establish their presence, and escalate bloodshed. Given these new dangers, the nation is extremely vigilant about potential terrorist acts. Closely connected with the threat of terrorism is the emerging and unabated threat of arms smuggling in Ghana.

Arms Smuggling

The activities of arms smuggling pose a threat to both national and international security. It influences a nation's political and socioeconomic development. Armed smuggling, with its concomitant consequences of youth restlessness, ethnic militias, terrorism, and other related trans-border crimes, damages a nation's reputation as a corporate and independent entity (Mark, and Iwebi, 2019). One common finding among the various perspectives on arms smuggling is that it encompasses a broad range of weapons and the illegal introduction of those weapons into a state. The 2006 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Arms Smuggling and Other Related Materials, for example, defines weapons as destructive weapons and ammunition of war and serves as the sub-regional standard for regulating arms and ammunition among member countries in West Africa. This comprises weapons and other potentially lethal equipment like mines, rocket launchers, grenades, incendiary bombs, gas bombs and bursting bombs. Other kinds of weapons include automatic-loading revolvers and pistols, rifles, carbines, assault rifles, machine guns, and light machine guns (Chuma-Okoro, 2011).

Ghana is quickly moving from being a place where smuggled arms were transited to becoming a destination. Chuma-Okoro (2011) stated that the main causes of arms smuggling include cross-border smuggling, porous borders, black marketing, privatisation of security, insecurity, poverty, economic crisis, and mass unemployment. This is concerning because illicit weapons could lead to threats against the nation in the form of robberies, uprisings, subversion, sabotage, religious crises, inter-communal disputes, social unrest, insurrection, terrorism, riots, militancy, political violence, social unrest, and ethnic tensions.

Terrorists exploit the illegal flow of goods because those who can smuggle drugs can also smuggle weapons, explosives, and other potentially dangerous items (Sup. Michael Nonoo at Paga, 2019). Today several border communities on the frontiers of Ghana largely function as entry, transit-resting points and exit for smuggled arms. Most members of these communities often engage in the illegitimate business of the sales of these arms, thereby attracting a score of buyers within and around the border areas, with their varied intents and purposes constituting a high-security risk to Ghana and her neighbours. Security experts have maintained the position that the shared number and advanced type of firearms in the hands of some residents are more advanced than those of the various security services.

According to Mangan and Nowak, (2019), several key routes that circumvent security agencies in the tri-border areas of Ghana-Côte d'Ivoire-Burkina Faso are used to smuggle licit and illicit goods of all kinds from one country to another. These goods are mostly transported by motorcycles and include small quantities of weapons that are hidden in cargo loads. Important routes include the Bondoukou-Bouna-Varalé-Doropo that operates the southern part of Burkina Faso, which includes the city of Gaoua; routes that avoid the border posts in Ivory at Léraba and Pogo, the Burkinabe post at Yendere, and the Malian post at Zégoua; crossing points near Tingréla in the northern part of Côte d'Ivoire; and important smuggling hubs in and around the towns of Bawku, Tumu, Hamile, Sampa, and Elubo in Ghana (see Fig 12).

Incidents of arms smuggling have been reported widely in recent times. In 2015, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Africa Live reported that a 72-year-old man and four other individuals were arrested in Ghana. The

former on the charge of arms smuggling and the latter on the illegal purchase of guns. According to the reportage, the man confessed to smuggling guns from Burkina Faso and Niger (BBC, 2015).

The menace of arms smuggling implies that most of these smuggled arms will negatively affect the entire system. It ends up in the wrong hands and eventually, its usage is abused. This could also principally continue to support the escalation of kidnapping, ethnic militias, communal clashes, herdsmen attacks and youth reactiveness.

Immigrants Influx

Apart from the perennial clashes in the northern region of Ghana and other minor skirmishes of conflict, Ghana has long drawn people from other parts of the region who are fleeing various forms of crisis in their countries of origin due to its geostrategic location, relatively sound economic position in comparison to its neighbours and reputation for liberal democracy. Refugees and illegal immigrants from Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire and Togo have obtained refuge in Ghana. In contrast to the relatively organised handling of refugees from places like Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d'Ivoire, the flood of illegal immigrants from Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria, and other countries has gone mostly unchecked.

Ghana's third decade of relative stability since the inception of the 1992 constitution is constantly coming under threat as the country has not been spared of refugee and illegal immigrant influx. The country has hosted some refugee populations from West Africa as the Political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire Sierra Leone and Liberia resulted in a lot of refugees fleeing into the Ghanaian territory

(UNHCR Global Report of 2007). However, these refugees were assisted by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees.

Apart from the mass exodus of people into the country as a result of war, there have been other organised individual groups who come in through unapproved routes to accomplish their agenda. One such instance was the arrival, in April 2005, of a few refugees from Sudan. It wasn't until they openly declared themselves at a police station to regularise their stay that their presence was noticed at any of the nation's international borders (Sosuah 2011).

In recent times, evidence of undocumented immigrants with foreign nationalities has been seen on the streets of the capitals of various international border regions and beyond. In Accra, the capital of Ghana, this menace has been lamented by commuters. The share number of illegal immigrants on a begging spree on major roads, roundabouts, shopping malls overhead bridges among others is alarming. As they go about their everyday activities of begging for alms, they obstruct traffic and more importantly, they could be exploited to perpetuate criminal activities. *Unfortunately, the majority of illegal immigrants lack the necessary skills to find employment and thus contribute to the high rate of unemployment or unemployability in our nation. As a result, societal problems and criminality rise. This decreases Ghana's investment appeal and puts further strain on the meagre resources we have to deal with the country's pressing problems.* (ASI Abigail Kubegina at Paga, 2019). Some have expressed worry about the future of these 'Begger Immigrants' as they are mostly children without education and skills and could grow up, integrate into society and become a menace to society.

In 2020, the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) reported that the number of illegal immigrants entering the country through unapproved borders is rising by the day. The deputy Comptroller General of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), Mr Laud Kwesi Obiri Afrifa, said in the face of the coronavirus pandemic and the closure of the country's international land border, scores of illegal immigrants have been able to circumvent security and made their way into the country while others have been intercepted on their attempt (Sand West Africa, 2020). In 2021, the Ghana police service through its intelligence-led operation arrested a total of 507 illegal immigrants in the upper east region of Ghana. These illegal immigrants comprised 494 Nigerians and 13 Burkina Faso nationals (Ghana Web, 2021).

Statistical data currently available shows that between January 2019 and May 2022, roughly 4500 migrants fled radical attacks in Burkina Faso and arrived in Northern Ghana. Accordingly, WANEP NEWS reports that Tumu Navrongo, Wuru, Kwapun, Banu, Pido, Kunchorkor and Basian communities in the Upper West Region have become a haven for immigrants largely made up of women and children. Consequently, the influx of immigrants into these communities is escalating tension between residents and migrants over competition for limited resources including farmlands, water and food (WANEP, 2019). The refugee crisis impacts internal security. In addition to straining the economy, environment, and social infrastructure, they can have a criminal tendency, particularly if they are from areas where civil wars have occurred. They might bring guns and use them for illegal activity.

Animal Crossing

The movement of animals across borders, particularly cattle and donkeys, into Ghana is another noteworthy issue. In most cases, this movement is viewed as a threat to national security and stability. This phenomenon, which first surfaced in the late 1990s and has since led to farmer-herder conflicts, has become a yearly problem for Ghana's various government regimes. This conflict usually occurs between local farmers in Ghana and herdsmen, mostly undocumented immigrants of Fulani origin, due to overgrazing lands, competition for water sources between cattle and humans and finally, the destruction of farms in certain parts of the country. The conflict has been prevalent in Agogo, in the Ashanti Region, and Afram Plains in the Eastern region. The phenomenon is easily precipitated by the entry of these animals and their nomadic owners into the country through unapproved routes. Additionally, there have also been recorded incidences of farmer-header conflicts in some parts of the Northern and Brong Ahafo regions (Graphic Online, 2016). The Fulani herdsmen are depicted as ruthless, violent and berserk men who allow their cattle to destroy farms, rape and kill innocent citizens.

Expulsion policies have been implemented by several governments over the years, but these have mostly been viewed as reactive measures as they have failed to find a long-term solution to the issue. Conflicts between farmers and herders first came to the attention of parliament in 2003 when Major Courage Quashigah, the then Minister of Food and Agriculture, suggested an identification process for both the owners and their cattle to help identify the illegal ones. (Sosuah, 2011).

A dossier on the period between 2017 to 2018 carried by the Graphic Online news portal discusses and reports several incidents related to animal crossing and farmer herder conflicts. The farmer-herder conflicts in Ghana have metamorphosed into a national issue with implications for not only the country but also the sub-region. Like most armed conflicts, it has led to the loss of lives, damage to the social fabric as well as the destruction of physical infrastructure. In 2021, reports of clashes between Fulani herdsmen and the farmers in the Atakrom in the Buem Constituency in the newly created Oti Region left one dead and four in critical condition. Police investigations found that the Fulani herdsmen who were undocumented and allegedly entering the country illegally had supervised the destruction of farms in the said area leading to confrontations with local farmers (Ghana Web, 2021).

Kidnappings

The emerging threat and recent surge in kidnappings and abductions in the country can be directly and indirectly linked to the deteriorating nature of Ghana's porous international land borders. It is reported that there have been 13 incidences of kidnapping and abduction of women and girls between January and May 2019 in Ho, Tamale, Takoradi, Kumasi, and Accra (WANEP, 2019). For example, in August 2018, three (3) Ghanaian girls were abducted in Takoradi and two (2) Canadians were also kidnapped in Kumasi in June 2019, among others. These events have heightened general uneasiness and revealed the public's concern for life and security in the nation. It further implies that organised crime networks in the nation and even beyond are increasingly focusing on such vulnerable demographics. *Foreign crime organisations are forming networks with some Ghanaians who constantly examine the surroundings for holes that*

could be exploited by lucrative crimes like human smuggling and hostage-taking (Sup. Ernest Awummey at Aflao, 2020)

The trend of kidnappings especially foreign nationals impedes the perception of the country as a travel destination, which could result in a decline in industry revenue and the designation as a terrorist hub. For example, reports state that foreign missions in the capital of Ghana, Accra, particularly the High Commissions of Canada and the United Kingdom, have issued travel warnings and terror alerts to their citizens both inside and outside of Ghana due to the country's current trends in kidnapping and human trafficking. Such advisories have increased tensions and panic among locals and visitors to the nation. Although the security authorities were able to free the two kidnapped Canadians, the arrest of eight individuals, including five (5) Ghanaians and three (3) Nigerians, shows the extent of cooperation and alliances between and among criminal networks in the region aided by porous borders. Furthermore, the lack of legal documentation on the perpetrators of the crime by the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) reveals serious stability threats posed by the lack of effective management of the country's international border system. Ghana's long-standing reputation as a bulwark of stability and democratic governance on the African continent could be severely damaged by the abduction problem. Likewise, it may deter foreign investors and tourists from entering the nation.

Mitigation and response

This section of the chapter answers the third research question:

3. How effective are the internal and external responses/measures to safeguard Ghana's porous international land borders?

Ghana continues to become susceptible to the prevalence of territorial threats from violent non-state actors (VNSA). Criminal syndicates have grown dynamically in Western Africa in the twenty-first century as these organisations have sought new methods to further their ideologies and goals. Countermeasures, thus, require a similar evolution that undoubtedly reverses the historic trend wherein countermeasures have been merely reactive. In this regard, Ghana has to some extent instituted measures to mitigate the lapses in the country's international land borders to secure the country against unforeseen external threats to national stability in future.

Internal Measures

Education

As part of measures to prevent, limit or slow the infiltration of Ghana through its deteriorating international land borders, there has been an awareness campaign on the part of the government through various stakeholders on Ghana's international border management. Channels of information continue to be made available to residents on international land border regions and the country as a whole. Echoing potential cross-border threats to citizens on the one hand, and encouraging people to report suspicion through the same avenues. Closer collaboration between the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS), other sister border protection agencies and media outlets in various international border regions has proven fruitful. The Ghana Immigration Service's (GIS) Border Patrol Unit (BPU) has also embarked on radio campaigns to educate people in the immediate border communities. Highlighting the dangers of aiding and abetting criminals in the name of

hospitality and the need to report foreigners who use unapproved routes to enter the country. *Public relations of the various border sector commands (BSCs) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) in this regard have periodically visited the various radio stations to educate the residents and also throw light on the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) Protocol on free movement. At the same time, it curtails the infringement on their rights as well as its abuse* (ASI Mathew Okoh at Elubo, 2019).

A documentary series dubbed ‘Porous Borders’, aired on Joy News, a multimedia news outlet highlights border-related issues. Information is sourced from top-ranked officials from the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), Ghana Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS), the Ghana Police Service and the Ghana Armed Forces. Episodes from the documentary film have revealed a lot of loopholes in Ghana’s border management and measures to secure them.

Further, a campaign by the Ministry of National Security dubbed see ‘something, say something’ was launched in 2022. This campaign aimed at creating awareness among citizens in the collective quest to protect the country against terrorist attacks. As part of the measures, a toll-free line ‘999’ was provided for citizens to swiftly report suspicious activities to state security institutions. Also, the social media platforms of the Ghana Police Services and Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) were made available. According to the deputy national security coordinator, Mr Edward Kwaku Asomani, terrorists and extremely violent groups undermine the security of a country and render states ungovernable which could trigger humanitarian crises. For this reason, the campaign should be regarded as a clarion call on all citizens to play their part in national security (Graphic Online, 2022).

Protective and Self-Defence Tools

The Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) over the years have received aid in logistics from state, non-state and supranational organisation to enhance its effort to efficiently protect the country's international land borders and also check irregular migration. These logistics have included weapons, protective gear, vehicles and uniforms among others. As dangers of cross-border crimes loom around the country's international land borders, officers need to be well prepared and better equipped for the worst situations. Most officers have either lost their lives or have been seriously injured in the line of duty due to a lack of working logistics per reports from various countries in the West African sub-region.

One of the decisions to enhance border security in cross-border criminal activities infested West African sub-region, is the amendment and passage of the Ghana Immigration Bill by the parliament of Ghana. Passed some eight years ago, the Immigration Service Bill, 2015 allowed officers of the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) to be armed with guns for the first time since its inception at the various border crossing points (BCPs) (Immigration Act, 2015). Relative to the passage of the Immigration Service Bill 2015, the Comptroller General of Immigration Mr Kwame Asuah Takyi in 2019 reassured officers of the eminence of the arrival of the guns for border patrol duties. He said the arms had already been procured with funds from the government and were being shipped to Ghana. This assurance was given when he inspected the *Saru*, *Sawla kabla*, *Tanglyiri*, *Vouvou* and *Kalba* approved and unapproved border crossing in the Northern, Upper West, Savannah, and North Eastern regions

Again, the Ghana Integrated Migration Management Approach (GIMMA) Project, run by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), provided goods valued at two million three hundred thousand Ghana Cedis (GH2, 3000.000) to the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS). The items donated to the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) included two 4x4 Nissan Double Cabin Pick-Up and its accessories, five Suzuki Motorbikes DR200SE, 1 Motorola Shipping and Clearing, 2 Radio Handsets, 2 radio Car Kits, 50 radio base stations and 1 clearing of tent, 40 camp beds, 30 tent 16x16 expandable and 6 screen windows, 40 military raincoat -100% waterproof, 5 owl night vision binocular devices, 5 Yamaha generator single phase 6.0 KVA, 5 solar panels -2.5 and 4 Air - condition 2.5hp. The rest were 5 HP Desktop Computer, 5 Kaspersky Anti-Virus software 2016, 5 Microsoft Office Professional 2016, 5 multi-purpose printers, 5 UPS (Mercury Elite 850 PRO), 5 Prefab, 15 Office Desk with Drawers, 15 swivel chairs, 5 visitor chairs, 5 four-seater-chairs (4 -in -one chair) and 10 Filling Cabinet - Metal to the tune of GH¢1,482,424.70 (GIS, 2020).

Counter-Terrorism Unit

Terrorism and terrorist organisations have jumped to the forefront of territorial threats in the latter part of the twentieth century. The United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU), for example, have decided that acts of terrorism should be forbidden on a worldwide and regional scale (Addo,2004). The Criminal Offences Act of 1960 (Act 29), first made terrorism a crime in Ghana (Adarkwah, 2020). As part hijacking and attacks on international communications are considered criminal. The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2008 currently handles a considerably larger range of issues, including

clauses for the seizure and repatriation of terrorist finances and assets (Addo,2006).

The increase in terrorist-related acts and crimes has necessitated the establishment of the Rapid Response Unit (RRU), a regiment of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS). This is a permanent standby team for all counter-terrorism operations. Relatively, a permanent standby team is present in all regional capitals and sector commands of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) across the country. As part of efforts to establish the counter-terrorism permanent standby team, a maiden group of sixty officers of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) have undergone three weeks of training in Huhunya in the Eastern Region of Ghana (Ghanaian Times, 2019). The officers underwent specialised training in anti-terrorism, crowd control and weapon handling to enhance their capacity in the execution of their mandate.

As part of efforts to enhance the Rapid Response Unit (RRU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), the regiment in 2020, received six pickup vehicles and a minibus presented by the Government of Germany (Ghana Web, 2020). Receiving the donation on behalf of the Rapid Response Unit (RRU), the Comptroller General of Immigration, Mr Kwame Asuah Takyi stated that, the vehicles had come at the right time and he was confident that the vehicles would boost the morale of officers and also enhance quicker response in an event of an emergency.

Joint Armed Forces Intervention

To augment efforts of counter-terrorism and to further support and enhance the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) to secure the country's international land borders, there has been a periodic joint armed forces operation. The

Joint armed forces bring together officers from the Ghana Army, Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), Ghana Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS), Ghana Police Service and National Security. These joint security services occasionally patrol the country's international land borders based on intelligence.

One such joint task force is code-named *Operation Eagle Claws*. *Eagle Claws* is a combat preparation exercise against terrorism organised in Ghana's Upper West. It was a four-day joint training session designed to evaluate the abilities of troops in airmobile operations supervised by the Ghana Air Force as well as to train and prepare security professionals for their assigned role in the event of terrorist attacks. The Ghana Police Service, the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), the Customs Division of the Ghana Revenue Authority, and the Bureau of National Investigations worked together to host the exercise, which was coordinated by the Ghana Armed Forces. The forces participated in a coordinated military operation in a few border towns in the Upper East and Upper West regions, respectively, along the borders with Togo and Burkina Faso. Additionally, they started employing sniffer dogs to enforce camp drills and intentional car checks. (Africa Defense Forum, 2022).

The director, of Army operations, Colonel William Nii Nortey in an exclusive interview with Joy News stated that for them the training is the cornerstone of readiness. He further explained that it was the surest way of keeping the territorial integrity of the country intact (My Joy Online, 2020).

Again, in 2020, the Covid 19 (Corona Virus 2019) and activities of violent Non-state actors in neighbouring countries with its attendant spill-over threat across Ghana's borders as a result of proximity were considered among the main threats as Ghana prepared for its general parliamentary and presidential

elections. The latter saw the implementation of *Operation Conquered Fist*. This was a border security operation involving Ghana, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire to counter transnational crimes (Africa Defense Forum, 2022).

Operation Conquered fist saw the deployment of 648 military personnel in support of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), officially to manage and curb the spread of COVID-19 and dissuade potential terrorist incursion and assaults from outside. The operation has some success as over 5,000 illegal migrants were arrested. The government in relation, said most of them had tested positive for COVID-19. This message was in line with how the operation was presented, namely to help limit the virus from entering the country while also maintaining a frontline against terrorist attacks (DIIS, 2021).

The occasional joint-armed forces interventions is the operative hand of the heart of Ghana's well-coordinated inter-agency collaboration, which encourages proactive and timely sharing of information and intelligence, operational coordination and joint-strategy formulation to mitigate the threats of terrorism, arms smuggling which are engendered by the country's porous international land border in the West Africa region infested with various cross-border crimes. Despite its purpose, the joint-armed forces intervention has been criticised in political circles. One such criticism has had to do with its timing. In 2020 when the operation was rolled out, it coincided with the voter's registration exercise for the December general elections in Ghana. The opposition party accused the ruling government of using that as a pretext to disenfranchise eligible Ghanaians (DIIS, 2020).

External Response

On the international level, Ghana is a party to treaties and ratified conventions and has joined bodies at the regional and international levels to establish a common front to fight cross-border crimes as a result of its porous international borders. For instance, Ghana is a signatory to all UN treaties about money laundering, the suppression of terrorism financing, and terrorism. Additionally, the nation is a signatory to the UN Drug Convention. A financial intelligence centre has been formed to collect information related to anti-money laundering and countering terrorism financing (AML/CTF) as a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) and to perform its obligations (Addo, 2006).

Again, Ghana in her quest to strengthen her border security has entered into various pacts with states and supranational organisations. One such agreement is the Ghana-European Union (EU) pact on border security. The European Union (EU) through its Emergency Trust Fund agreed to commit five (5) million Euros to the programme. The scheme proposed to add to reducing illegal immigration and emigration, by consolidation cooperation at all levels including co-ordination with neighbouring countries, enhancing border security and building capacities (European Union, 2020).

The programme was part of the full aid to the government of Ghana's migration policy. It aims to defend a thorough and long-term method of managing migration that would maximise migration's potential to advance Ghana's development. The initiative will support the strategic plan of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) for 2018–2022, which includes, among other things, tracking immigration-related issues and identifying and averting dangers at the

nation's borders in order to contribute to national security. The action plan's primary objectives are to enhance coordination and service delivery at all levels, including cooperation and coordination with neighbouring nations, and to lessen irregular migration by enhancing the capabilities of national agencies, educational institutions, and civil society organisations involved in migration-related activities.

In 2020, efforts to further fix Ghana's porous international land borders led to the launch of the 'Strengthening Border Security and Border Community Resilience in the Gulf of Guinea' project by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS). The project received funding support from the German Federal Foreign Office. It aims to contribute to the enhancement of regional stability by firming up border management capacities at select border posts in northern border regions of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo (IOM, 2020).

The regional response in the form of the rectification of international conventions is to rid the country of its attractiveness to cross-border criminal syndicate networks and criminalise such acts on the one hand, while stakeholders work to proffer practical remedies to the conundrum of porous international land borders.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented the analysed findings on porous borders and the threat to Ghana's Stability. Findings were gathered through interviews and presented thematically to reflect research questions. Officers of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) tasked with the mandate of border control and immediate border community residents living on the various international land

borders, formed the core of interviewees as they were equipped with knowledge in thematic areas such as Ghana's porous border, factors responsible and the threats posed to the country's stability.

Participants recounted their knowledge and experiences in identifying factors such as the border architecture, geographical contains, ineffective checkpoints, challenges of the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), cultural solidarity and activities of the border residents responsible for the porous nature of Ghana's international land borders.

Careful analysis of data from documentary sources backed by semi-structured interviews revealed that the identified factors engender threats of terrorism, arms smuggling, the influx of undocumented immigrants, kidnappings and associated crimes which are very unhealthy for the country's long-standing ethos of democracy and stability in a fragile west African sub-region. Finally, the chapter also highlights some preventive measures although, largely reactive than proactive, it indicates that the conundrum of Ghana's porous borders is treated with some urgency as it constitutes a matter of national security and stability.

Chapter 5 presents a summary, and conclusions and gives recommendations.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

Porous borders make states vulnerable to cross-border criminal activities. They encourage all types of transnational crime, which threatens security and good governance. They also have detrimental effects on the rule of law, economic activity and growth, human rights, and the advancement of society and culture as a whole. In order to achieve peace and stability as well as to advance the relevant political and socioeconomic endeavours required for the integration of West African economies, efficient administration of Ghana's international land borders is imperative.

A review of Ghana's international land border reveals that the country's international land borders continue to remain porous. The loosely knitted points of embarkation and disembarkation or border crossing points (BCP), give room to the proliferation of countless unapproved routes, ineffective checkpoints mounted on highways in the international border region, challenges of the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) in terms of logistics for work, cultural solidarity and activities of residents of border communities mostly illegal; creating unapproved routes, smuggling of goods and aiding strangers into and out of the country, as well as the poor state of development in the country's international border regions, demonstrates the awful nature and extent of the countries porous border situation.

Relatively, this position has made the country vulnerable to threats to the stability and long-standing ethos of democracy in an already deteriorating and fragile West African region. The country's porous international land borders

continue to engender threats such as terrorism which is on the rise in the region with insurgent groups constantly calling on their militants for insurgent activities in the region. Terrorism in Burkina Faso and Mali and the movement of these terrorists in a downward direction towards the northern borders of Ghana puts the country at high risk. Also, an influx of illegal immigrants from politically unstable countries such as Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso to the west and north respectively, arms smuggling into Ghana through unapproved routes in the tri-border regions of Ghana, Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire which are used to perpetrate robberies and settling of personal vendetta, Animal crossing which is the major cause of farmer herder conflicts in the Northern and Asante regions of the country and the recent resurgence of kidnappings in the country with an alleged group of perpetuates made up of undocumented foreign national, has been in parts demonstrated the conundrum of the porosity of the country's borders and how they engender threats potent for instability.

Finally, with the porous nature of the country's international land borders and its vulnerability to threats of cross-border crime, Ghana is yet to experience a full-fledged repercussion of its effects in a fragile West African region. As a result, stakeholders in the management of the country's international land borders have responded with several measures. Education; educating immediate border residents and the country as a whole on the dangers of cross-border illegal activities which pose severe threat instability in the immediate border communities and the country as a whole. Again, this addresses the working challenges of the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS); provision of arms and other logistics needed for service. Joint inter-agency operations; members of the Ghana Army, Ghana Immigration Service (GIS),

Ghana Police Service, Ghana Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS) embark on occasional operations to safeguard the country's borders. The establishment of an anti-terrorism unit in the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS). Regionally, the country is party to concerts to strengthen the borders and mitigate the effects of porous borders in the West African region

Conclusions

Facts and evidence from the study point out that Ghana's porous international land borders engender cross-border criminal activities that threaten the long-standing ethos of political, economic and social stability in Ghana. Simply put, the country could be plunged into instability as a result of her porous international land borders on the one hand and the threats that loom in the West African sub-region. Albeit, Ghana's record of near-zero or no instance of a full-fledged cross-border criminal activity, the variables of the country seem a worry.

The rising position of the country on the global terrorism index places Ghana on an all-time high of 1.76 (83rd) on a scale of 1 to 10 with 160 countries from a previous 36th position from 1960 to 2005, resurgences of incessant kidnappings with alleged perpetrators made up of criminal gangs of transnational identity, animal crossing causing farmer-herder conflicts in the northern and Asante regions, and the smuggling of illicit goods especially arms through the tri-borer unapproved routes of Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso into and out of Ghana for the perpetuation of armed robberies and settlement of personal vendetta, all attest to the fact that the country is headed in a wrong security direction as a result of its porous borders.

Recommendations

Cross-border crimes that jeopardise the stability of the nation have been attempted to be prevented, controlled, and possibly eliminated. However, these efforts have not succeeded in dealing with the porosity of the country's international land borders and the ongoing cross-border crimes unhealthy for its stability. It is therefore imperative to note that the ongoing cases of arrests of alleged terrorists, kidnappings, farmer-herder conflicts, armed robberies and an influx of unauthorised and undocumented immigrants call for more effective responses to the management of the country's international land borders. In light of the above, the following recommendations are made;

A review of Ghana's international land border architecture to preferably readjust the various border crossing points (BCPs) to cater for the commuting needs of the growing population on the various international land borders in the country.

A well and robust border management plan which will encompass the views of all the stakeholders; the Ministry of Interior, Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), Ghana Police Service, Ghana Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS), Narcotics Control Board and Border residents, in border relations to effectively draw-up a long-lasting border management plan. A more favourable development plan should be implemented to bridge the development gap between the country's frontier regions and the capital to encourage cultural, social and political inclusion. Collaboration between agencies. In addition to working together and coordinating their efforts to combat crime domestically, the border's security agencies should also work with their counterparts in Togo and other

neighbouring countries, emphasising the sharing of intelligence via well-established organisational and electronic networks on suspicions.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A

Distribution of Research Participants

Area	Border Patrol Unit (BPU)	Number intended to be interviewed	Number interviewed
Paga Border Sector Command	General Patrol	2	1
	Intelligence Unit	2	1
	Anti-Smuggling and Trafficking	2	1
	Paga	2	1
Aflao Border Sector Command	General Patrol	2	1
	Intelligence Unit	2	1
	Anti-Smuggling and Trafficking	2	1
	Aflao	2	2
Elubo Border Sector Command	General Patrol	2	1
	Intelligence Unit	2	1
	Anti-Smuggling and Trafficking	2	1
	Cocoville	2	1
		Total 24	Total 13

Figure 1 Distribution of Research Participants

Appendix B

Official Political Map of Ghana showing the Sixteen Regions, Official and Unofficial Border Crossing Points.



Figure 2 Distribution of the official and unofficial Border Crossing Points (BCP) on the perimeter of the Map of Ghana

Source: Author

KEY	
●	Official Border Crossing Points (BCP)
●	Unofficial Border Crossing Points (BCP)

Spatial Measurement between Paga and Tumu Border Crossing




Figure 3 Spatial measurement between Paga Border Crossing Point (BCP) in the Upper East region and Tumu Border Crossing Point (BCP).

Source (author)

The official Border Crossing Point (BCP) is at Paga in the North East Region of Ghana.

Spatial Measurement between Paga and Namoo Border Crossing





Figure 4 Spatial measurement between Paga Border Crossing Point (BCP) and Namoo Border Crossing Point (BCP)

Source (author)

Namoo Unofficial Border Crossing Point (BCP) with a small control office is located in the Upper East region of Ghana. It complements the Paga Border Crossing Point (BCP) to the east.



Spatial Measurement between Aflao and Kpoglu




Figure 6 Spatial measurement between Aflao Border Crossing Point (BCP) and Kpoglu Unofficial Border Crossing Point (BCP) in the Volta region of Ghana.

Source (Author)

Aflao or Poste frontier Togo-Ghana is the main border crossing point (BCP) between Ghana and Togo. It is considered the main border crossing point (BCP).

Spatial measurement between Akanu and Kpoglu




Figure 7 Spatial measurement between Akanu Unofficial Border Crossing Point (BCP) and Kpoglu unofficial Border Crossing Point (BCP).

Source (Author)

Akanu Unofficial Border is located at Dzodze Penyi in the Volta region of Ghana.

Spatial measurement between Agortime Afagame and Nyive




Figure 8 Spatial measurement between Afagame Agortime Unofficial Border Crossing (BCP) and Nyive Unofficial Border Crossing Point (BCP).

Source (Author)

The Nyive border is located in Nyive, a town, in Ho Municipal in the Volta Region of Ghana.

Spatial measurement between Elubo and Sewum




Figure 9 Spatial measurement between Elubo Border Crossing Point (BCP) and Sewum Unofficial Border Crossing Point (BCP) to its North

Source (Author)

Elubo is a village in the Jomoro district of the Western Region of Ghana and is the main border crossing between Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire to the west.

Spatial measurement between Elubo and Newtown




Figure 10 Spatial measurement between Elubo Border Crossing Point (BCP) and Newtown Unofficial Border Crossing Point (BCP) to its south

Source (Author)

To the south of the Elubo Border Crossing, is the New Town border. New Town is a village also in the Jomoro district in the Western Region of Ghana, adjacent to the border with Cote d'Ivoire. The major highway that runs through the village is Half Assini- New Town Road

Spatial measurement between Dadieso and Sewum




Figure 11 Spatial measurement between Antokrom unofficial Border Crossing Point (BCP) near Dadieso and Sewum Unofficial Border Crossing Point (BCP) to its south.

Source (Author)

Antokrom Border Post near Dadieso in the Western North Region of Ghana is also a border crossing point (BCP) between Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire. The border post was established in 2017 to enable the Immigration Service to control the movement of persons and goods as well as to check illegal immigrants and smuggling activities. The Post is complemented by Sewum Unofficial Border Crossing Point (BCP) to the south.

Tri-border routes through Ghana, Togo and Burkina Faso



Figure 12 Map of Ghana showing the illegal tri-border smuggling routes between Ghana, Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire (Mangan, & Nowak, 2019)

Appendix C

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR BORDER MANAGEMENT OFFICIALS

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST

CENTER FOR AFRICAN AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

TOPIC: POROUS BORDERS AND THE THREAT TO CONTINUOUS STABILITY IN GHANA

Introduction

I am a Master of Philosophy Candidate at the Centre for African and International Studies of the University of Cape Coast. This survey is being conducted as part of my studies. I would be grateful if you could answer the questions below. Your participation in this study is very important but it is voluntary and you can withdraw at any point. Any information provided for this study will be treated with the utmost confidentiality and for academic purposes only.

Interview Guide for the key informant of the Border Patrol Unit (BPU) of Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) at the various Border Sector Commands (BSCs) and members of the various border Communities)

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Can you please tell me about yourself (Probe for age, level of education, marital status, years spent working at the border etc.)?

SECTION A: BORDER COMMAND POST AT THE VARIOUS BORDERS OF GHANA

1. Are records of all individuals entering the sovereign taken upon entry and exit at every border point?
2. Are the territorial boundaries secured to the teeth?
3. What are the factors contributing to porous borders in Ghana?

4. How many security agencies are responsible for securing Ghana's borders?
5. What challenges do the border security agencies face in safeguarding the borders?
6. How are the terrain conditions around Ghana's borders? Do these conditions hinder border patrol by South African National Defence Force members?
7. Is Ghana's stability and peace under any threat in the West African sub-region?
8. What types of crimes are prevalent and consistent across Ghana's borders?
9. How do cross-border criminal activities pose threats to Ghana's national stability?
10. In what conditions are the border infrastructures and facilities?
11. How can the existing border safeguarding capabilities be improved in securing the country's land borders?
12. Which border area/s in Ghana are the most vulnerable to illegal crossing, and what solutions can be implemented?
13. How does the border control deal with the ethnic group split into two as a result of the Berlin conference of 1884/5 who claim kinsman ship in two sovereigns thus Ghana and any of her neighbours?
14. Are there periodic joint task force operations to check border illegalities?
15. Is there periodic sensitisation in the form of civic education on the dangers of assisting illegal immigrants for the borderland settlers?
16. How porous can the Ghana border lands be described?
17. How do you deal with the likelihood of assailants and extremists crossing the borders unnoticed?
18. What is the cooperation, communication and information flow between the different state departments and border agencies operating within and along the borders?
19. Have there been incidents where farmers or rural communities were physically attacked by illegal migrants to gain access to borders? Elaborate on such incidents.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Can you please tell me about yourself (Probe for age, level of education, marital status, etc.)?

SECTION B: PEOPLE LIVING IN THE VARIOUS VILLAGES ON THE BORDERS BETWEEN GHANA AND HER NEIGHBOURS

1. How long have you lived in the community and what nationality do you belong to?
2. How well do you know the border on which you live?
3. Can you tell the point where you know you are no longer in Ghana but in a neighbouring country?
4. Are there different shortcuts to exit and enter the neighbouring county?
5. How easy is it to enter the neighbouring county on the other side of the border?
6. Do you part take in any of the respective country's electoral processes?
7. What is your relationship with the border guards?
8. How hospitable are the people of this community?
9. Do you see periodic patrol units in your communities?
10. Are you aware of any cross-border criminal activity?

Appendix D

Letter of introduction to the various target populations

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST
COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES AND LEGAL STUDIES
FACULTY OF ARTS

CENTRE FOR AFRICAN AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

PHONE: (233) 332092181/0502481788
EMAIL: cais@ucc.edu.gh
OUR REF: CAIS/T/6/83
YOUR REF:



DATE: 4TH DECEMBER, 2019

The Regional Commander
Ghana Immigration Service
Upper East-Bolgatanga

Dear Sir/Madam,

**LETTER OF INTRODUCTION
(MR. THEOPHILUS AKWASI GYIMAH)**

This is to introduce the above-named M.Phil. Student of the Centre to you for your kind assistance.

Mr. Gyimah is currently undertaking his academic research work on the topic: *Porous Borders and Political Stability in Ghana*.


He is seeking to collect data from your institution to aid his research.

We would be most grateful if you could accord him the needed assistance he may require from your outfit.

The Center appreciates your kind gesture to us in this regard.

Thank you.

Yours faithfully,


Joseph Obeng (Mr.)
Junior Assistant Registrar
For: Director