**UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST**

**CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN BEREKUM**

**MUNICIPALITY**

**YEBOAH ADJEI**

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UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST

CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN BEREKUM

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BY

YEBOAH ADJEI

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# DECLARATION

**Candidate's Declaration**

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of my own original work and that no part of it has been presented for another degree in this university or elsewhere.


Candidate's Name: Yeboah  Adjei

Signature:……………………… 　　　　　Date:…………………...


**Supervisor's Declaration**

I hereby declare that the preparation and presentation of the dissertation were supervised in accordance with the guidelines on supervision of dissertation laid down by the University of Cape Coast.


Supervisor's Name: Prof. S. B. Kendie

Signature:……………………… 　　　　　Date:…………………...

# ABSTRACT

The dissertation, which was a cross-sectional descriptive survey, aimed at investigating the causes and effects of political violence in Berekum Municipality. The study was informed by deepening intensity with which violence germinates and multiples before, during and after presidential and parliamentary electioneering campaigns in the Municipality

A sample of 226 respondents made up of 84 party members and 142 members of the public were selected for the study. The sample also consisted of 67 females and 159 males. Purposive sampling, proportional random sampling and quota sampling procedures were used to identify the sample. Respondents answered one set of hand-delivered questionnaire. The main statistical tools used in the data analysis were frequency distribution and percentages.

The study revealed among other things that inciting comments from politicians, the use of alcoholic drinks, collision of opposing political party members during political rallies and processions, unemployment and poverty are some of the main predominant factors that trigger political violence in the Municipality. It also revealed that the people of Berekum through the political violence have experienced physical injuries, voter apathy, trauma, loss of relatives as well as loss of businesses.

It was recommended that the Municipal Assembly should identify the unemployed in the Municipality and assist those with employable skills to find employment while those with no employable skills should be trained by the Assembly in collaboration with the central government to get some employable skills.

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# DEDICATION

To my mother, Afia Konama.

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| | |
|---|---|
| BETCO | Berekum College of Education |
| CCR | Centre for Conflict Research |
| CHRAJ | Commission for Human Rights and Administration Justice |
| CPP | Convention People's Party |
| DFP | Democratic Freedom Party |
| DPP | Democratic People's Party |
| EPRDF | Ethiopian Peoples' Revolution Democratic Front |
| FES | Friedrich Ebert Stiftung |
| FRELIMO | Front for the Liberation of Mozambique |
| GCPP | Great Consolidated Popular Party |
| GNA | Ghana News Agency |
| GRASAG | Graduate Students' Association of Ghana |
| ID | Independent Candidate |
| MCE | Municipal Chief Executive |
| MDGs | Millennium Development Goals |
| NDC | National Democratic Congress |
| NGOs | Non-Governmental Organisations |
| NIP | National Independence Party |
| NPFL | National Patriotic Front of Liberia |
| NPP | New Patriotic Party |
| NRP | National Reformed Party |
| OAU | Organisation of African Unity |
| PHP | People's Heritage Party |
| PNC | People's National Convention |

| | |
|---|---|
| PTSD | Post Traumatic Stress Disorder |
| RPD | Reformed Patriotic Democrats |
| RENAMO | Mozambique National Resistance |
| RPA | Rwandese Patriotic Army |
| RTLMC | Radio Television Libre Mille-Collines |
| RUF | Revolutionary United Front |
| SSA | Sub-Saharan Africa |
| UGM | United Ghana Movement |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WTO | World Trade Organisation |

## CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

**Background of the study**

Political violence is one of the most disturbing problems societies are facing today. It is found in almost all parts of the world, be it industrialised-capitalist societies, or the socialist societies, as well as the developing countries of Asia and Africa. However, there is a growing concern that democratic governance is the most important tool for achieving development, particularly in a developing country of which election is not only integral and the most single source of political participation but also the only source of legitimate power in all democracies. Yet, the 21st century has in particular witnessed more political violence than hitherto known to humankind.

For the purpose of this study, political violence is defined as the use of force to achieve a political outcome (Kirwin & Cho, 2009). Political violence may manifest in a number of ways: civil wars, armed rebellion, violent political rallies, coercion of voters, violent political conflicts, electoral violence, riots, genocide, terrorism, assassinations, political radicalisation and post-election demonstrations or crackdowns.

Political violence has emerged as one of Africa's most pressing security issues. Recent events in Kenya, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Egypt and Libya among others point to the salience of the phenomenon. Political violence in Africa has received much attention in academic as well as media

circles. It jeopardises political stability, democratic reform, the prospects of economic development, and creates human suffering and in some cases may degenerate into civil war.

Political violence is typically the penultimate event that precedes full-scale civil war. In Ivory Coast, where armed rebellions took over large areas of the country, there were instances of political violence that occurred before armed insurgencies broke out in 2002 (Kirwin & Cho, 2009). Additionally, on the Christmas Eve of 1989, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor incurred into Liberia with the avowed aim of ousting the then Samuel Doe from power. The incursion degenerated into a bloody civil war and lasted for seven years. It paralysed the socio-economic and political fabric of Liberia. The crisis, however, had its deep roots in a history of nearly one and half centuries of exclusive politics by the Americo-Liberians and the repressive rule of Samuel Doe (Frempong, 1999).

The post-election violence in 1993 to 1994 in the Republic of Congo laid the groundwork for its civil war in 1997. The result of the May 1993 legislative election, which gave President Pascal Lissouba's party a majority, was disputed by the other two contenders (Denis Sassou-Nguesso and Bernard Kolelas). Violence erupted between their militias and between November 1993 and January 1994 as many as 2,000 people were killed (Bekoe, 2010).

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been disproportionately impacted by civil war, which explains a substantial share of its economic decline, including the widening income gap relative to East Asia, Europe and North and South America. Civil wars have also been very costly for SSA. For the case of Sudan, a typical large African country experiencing a long-duration conflict,

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war cost amounted to $46 billion, which was roughly double of the country's stock of external debt (Bodea & Elbadawi, 2006).

Bekoe (2010) observed that violence affects between 19 and 25 percent of elections in Africa and stressed that in many countries where electoral violence is at risk, it tends to recur and may consequently lead to an unfavourable view of democratisation. Nzongola-Ntalaja (2004) posited that the denial of full citizenship rights to selected individuals and groups in Africa has triggered political violence. The disqualifications of former President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia in 1996 for contesting a presidential seat he occupied for 27 years (1964-1991) and the former Prime Minister of Ivory Coast, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, in 1996 and 2000 presidential elections, on the grounds of citizenship led to blood-shed violence in these two countries. State repression of Kaunda's supporters and the general climate of violence resulted in numerous deaths. In Ivory Coast, Ouattara's exclusion led to the boycott of presidential elections by his political party and to acts of ethnic cleansing on both sides of political and religious divide.

Leiden and Schmitt (1968) noted that no system could hope to survive unless it could live with and adjust itself to the multitudinous threats of violence which were the basis of social change. Violence and criminal acts that would never have occurred otherwise took place when the likelihood of apprehension and punishment diminished. A case in point is the Boston police strike in 1919. Leiden and Schmitt (1968) observed that maintenance of public order everywhere required constant intervention of law enforcement agencies; their absence or neutralisation even in the well-ordered society was conducive to violence and mob action.

The rate of political violence before, during and after presidential and parliamentary electioneering in Ghana has attracted much attention from both local civil society organisations and international organisations. This is due to the fact that Ghana is a member of United Nations (UN) and articles three and five of the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights respectively state that "everyone has right to life, liberty and security of person; and no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" (United Nations, 2002: 2). It is also due to the fact that Ghana has been described as an icon of democratic success in Africa (Graduate Students Association of Ghana [GRASAG] 2008). According to Tsen (2010), the President of Equatorial Guinea - Mbasogo Nguema - asserted that Ghana had chalked great strides in local government and democracy in general.

Violence has characterised Ghanaian politics (though not wide spread in relation to Sudan, Nigeria, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Togo, Sierra Leone and recently Ivory Coast among others in Africa) since the country was introduced to multi-party politics predating to the colonial era. Lives have been lost and others have been maimed through political violence.

The Minister of Interior, on the 16th of August 2009, imposed a curfew on Akwatia constituency to avert further clashes between supporters of National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP) during electioneering of electing a member of parliament (Ghana News Agency [GNA] 2009). Also, on the 3rd of September 2008, six people lost their lives and 19 houses were burned during a political violence at Gushiegu in the northern Ghana, 900 km away from the capital Accra and dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed on the town (Afrol news, 2008).

Moreover, according to Naatogmah (2011), the late Nang-Lana Abubakari Ziblim, a sub-chief in Gushegu, was murdered on September 1, 2008 during a political clash between NDC and NPP supporters in Gushegu. Again, on the 14th of November 2000, it was reported that there was a political violence in Berekum in the Brong-Ahafo region and in the Northern region of Ghana. In the case of the latter, a supporter of the People's National Convention (PNC) was stabbed to death allegedly by an NDC youth. The same source said at least eight people were seriously injured in Accra, following a violent clash between supporters of the governing NDC and the main opposition NPP, in which most of the injured received cutlass wounds during the attack, which took place at Alajo in the densely populated constituency of Ayawaso Central (Sakyi-Addo, 2000).

**Statement of the problem**

For any scientific research to be timely, relevant and useful, it must be informed by concrete problems on the ground. Consequently, the topic under investigation is informed by deepening intensity with which violence germinates and multiplies before, during and after presidential and parliamentary electioneering campaigns in Berekum Municipality.

Even though the police are mandated to ensure and maintain law and order, civil society groups such as the churches, mosques and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) as well as governmental institutions of horizontal accountability like National Commission on Civic Education (NCCE) have all preached "peace" but such efforts seem not to be successful in combating political violence. As an example, the Chairman of the

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Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) stated that more than 1,200 security personnel were deployed to Atiwa for the maintenance of law and order during a parliamentary bye-election in 2010, yet violence erupted resulting in injuries to several people (Dapatem, 2010).

Berekum Municipality has witnessed some incidents of political violence with the coming into being of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. In the afternoon of 5th March 2010, some irate youth of NDC entered the residence of the Municipal Chief Executive (MCE) with the intention of disrupting an NDC constituency executive meeting scheduled to be held there. The MCE got wind of their coming and left the residence. They therefore took away some turkeys and a sheep.

Besides, on the 30th of July 2008, a political argument which ensued among some members of New Patriotic Party (NPP) in Berekum caused the Constituency's first-vice chairman of NPP (Nnuro Bediako) to hit Wilson Gyamfi (a member of NPP) to death. Mr Bediako was arrested and charged for manslaughter. He was sent on remand in Sunyani. However, in 2009, he was released. Again, on the early hours of 15th September 2008, an unidentified group of people smeared the office of NDC with some substance believed to be human faeces. In addition, on 13th of October 2008, some supporters of the two major political parties in Ghana (NDC and NPP) clashed in the centre of Berekum resulting in injuries to persons and destruction of property. For example, a student of Berekum College of Education (BETCO) sustained severe injuries from a sharp instrument. In effect, the student has not been able to continue his education. Additionally, Mr Kyere Boateng of NPP had his saloon car damaged during the violence. Another violent scene occurred

during the electioneering campaign in 2000 at Senase junction. The supporters of NPP and NDC clashed resulting in stone wounds to the members of both political parties.

Moreover, on November 8, 2000, the then Member of Parliament - J. H. Owusu Acheampong - used some military personnel from Sunyani to close down a local radio station in Berekum, Chris F. M. (88.9MHz), for a purported statement made by a parliamentary aspirant, Capt. Nkrabea Effa Dartey (Rtd), on the 5th of November, 2000. The statement was deemed to have sparked violence between supporters of NDC and NPP. In the process, the personnel on duty at the radio station were mercilessly beaten by the military personnel. The radio station was, however, reopened on the 22nd of November, 2000.

Furthermore, during the 1996 electioneering campaign, six supporters of NPP were arrested and sent to Sunyani Military Barracks. They were alleged to have set fire to an NDC woman supporter's "Chop Bar" at Zongo electoral area near "Akpeteshie Office" in Berekum. Among the culprits are Kwame Appiah (alias Jonny), Kwame Anane and Kwaku Abrokwa. These incidents are repetitive before, during and after presidential and parliamentary elections in Berekum Municipality.

This violence, in its manifest character and potential dynamics, has challenged the very stability and future of the Municipality during presidential and parliamentary elections. Although some research on political violence has been done in Africa as a whole, academic research remains underdeveloped in Ghana in this area. So far nobody has carried out a study on the causes and effects of political violence in Berekum Municipality, hence the reason for carrying out the study.

The above problems therefore bring to mind the issue of what are the causes and effects of political violence in Berekum Municipality? Against this background, it is crucial that detailed scientific research be conducted to establish the reasons behind increasingly political violence as well as its effects on Berekum Municipality.

**Objective of the study**

The main objective of the study is to examine the causes and effects of political violence in Berekum Municipality. The specific objectives are to:

- assess the factors that spark political violence in Berekum Municipality;

- examine adverse effects of political violence on the people of Berekum Municipality;

- identify background characteristics of perpetrators of political violence in Berekum Municipality; and

- recommend solutions to the political violence.

**Research questions**

The questions below have been designed to identify the information needed for the study.

- What possible immediate identifiable factors trigger political violence in Berekum Municipality?

- What factors have remote influence on the people of Berekum Municipality to engage in political violence?

- How have the people of Berekum Municipality been adversely affected

by the political violence?

- What background characteristics are associated with people who engage in the political violence?

**Significance of the study**

The findings of the study would help to identify the causes and effects of political violence in Berekum Municipality.

Also, the study would inform government policy makers on matters relating to the Ministry of Interior about the necessary modifications in combating political violence.

Again, the study would assist the Police Administration to review the police training strategies where necessary.

Moreover, it has become imperative to carry out the study in Berekum Municipality because it is a cosmopolitan area and represents a volatile area on the quiet which has not visibly come to the notice of the government and the general public. It was reported that the police in Berekum said they could not provide security at the Berekum Golden City Park for the 2010/2011 Ghana Premier League season due to the irate behaviour of fans of the home team, Arsenals (Frimpong-Manso, 2010).

**Delimitation of the study**

The scope of the problem is limited to the causes and effects of political violence and it covers political conflicts, political radicalisation, riots and electoral violence as manifestations of political violence. Ideally, the

scope could have been widened to include management and resolution of political violence.

**Limitations of the study**

The study was confined to Berekum Municipality in the Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana. It also covered only four electoral areas in Berekum: Zongo, Kyiritwede, Ahenboboano North, and Atanotia. Ideally, the area should have been widened to cover all the electoral areas in the Municipality and the Districts in the Region. However, the constraint of time, material and finance could not allow the researcher to undertake such a broad venture.

**Organisation of the study**

The chapters of the rest of the study are configured in the following order. Chapter Two would be discussing the review of literature related to the study. Chapter Three would be describing the methodology used in the study, specifically the research design, population and sampling instrument, data collection procedure and data analysis.

In Chapter Four, the results and discussion of the study would be presented. Finally, the summary, conclusions and recommendations on the study and suggestions for further research would be presented in Chapter Five.

**CHAPTER TWO**

**REVIEW OF LITERATURE**

**Introduction**

This chapter focuses on the review of related literature on the causes and effects of political violence. For the purpose of the study, the review of the literature has been treated and discussed under the sub-headings of meaning of political violence, causes of political violence and effects of political violence. It also includes a conceptual framework for the study.

**Meaning of political violence**

Whereas all forms of violence are said to relate to power, political violence has been defined as "commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, to obtain or maintain political power" (Moser & Clark, 2001: 36). It is, therefore, the pursuit of political objectives, and not the end result of gaining or not gaining political power, that is at the core of the notion. Political violence takes place in the collective sphere where acts of violence are typically committed by a multitude of individuals from one group against individuals from another group.

Cairns (1996: 11) defines political violence as "those acts of an intergroup nature that are seen by those on both sides, or on one side, to constitute violent behaviour carried out in order to influence power relations between the two sets of participants." Thus, when individuals or groups resort

to violence to attain change of a political nature, one speaks of political violence.

The term political violence ranges from terrorist attacks, armed revolution, violent demonstrations or attacks by citizens aimed at less than the overthrow of their government to humanitarian intervention and intra-state wars (Coady, 2007). Friedrich Ebert Stiftung [FES] and Centre for Conflict Research [CCR] (2001) found that the most common acts of political and electoral violence include abduction and kidnapping, assault, violent disruption of political meetings and rallies, murder attempts, murder, hooliganism, torture, arson, death threats and threats to violence. Political violence typically takes the form of murder, assaults, sexual abuse such as rape, forced pregnancy or sterilization (Hansen, 2009). For Sisk (2008: 5) election-related violence involves "acts or threats of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that arises in the context of electoral competition." In effect, political violence is the exercise of such force that is politically motivated and can be exercised by governmental or anti-governmental groups.


Political violence and power politics

Politics, according to Sodaro (2001), is the process by which communities pursue collective goals and deal with their conflicts authoritatively by means of government. Politics is a process because it is a continuing sequence of events and interactions among various actors: individuals, organisations and governments. The concept of process also implies that these political interactions generally take place within a structure

of rules, procedures and institutions. Politics is about how people organise their communities for the purpose of collectively tackling the problems they face. In the best of the circumstances, the members of a community are able to define and accomplish their goals on the basis of cooperation. But few communities are so fortunate as to be without conflict.

However, even if there is a wide consensus on what the community's goals should be, conflicts frequently arise over how to go about achieving them. Indeed, many political observers would assert that conflict is the driving force of politics. At times these conflicts are fairly mild and can be dealt with in a peaceful manner through negotiation, bargaining and compromise. But under less propitious circumstances political conflict may turn violent, exploding into bloody demonstrations, terrorism or outright warfare (Sodaro, 2001).

Afari-Gyan (1991: 15) defines politics as "activities ranging from persuasion to force, which the parties to a political situation may undertake in the desire to get their preferred course of action to prevail". Embodied in the definition is the capturing of power to make public decisions and to use that power to order the common affairs of the group. Politics is concerned with the seizure, consolidation or the redistribution of power to decide who gets what, when and how. If violence is resorted to in this perpetual struggle for power, it is labelled as political violence.

**Causes of political violence**

Lawal (2010) identified absence of good governance, low political culture, hunger, marginalisation, incapacitation, intolerance, domination,

apathy and cynicism as contributory factors to political violence. Esew (2003: 232) summarises the causes of political violence as follows:

> Domination and marginalization of sections and groups and persons in the acquisition and sharing of political positions; rigging of elections and manipulation of political process in favour or against certain groups, sections and persons; and falling apart of sponsors and those sponsored over contracts, appointments or methods of management of states.

For the purpose of this study, economic and land rights marginalization, socio-demographic factors, ethnic marginalization, desire to amass power and wealth, lack of trust in governance and inciting comments which contribute to political violence are discussed. In reality, these tensions intersect and are frequently manipulated by politicians.

Economic and land rights marginalisation

Politicians exploit sentiments of economic discrimination or dominance of one ethnic group by another. Boone (2009) argued that the tensions in Ivory Coast over economic crises, nationalism and the unclear rights between indigenous and non-indigenous inhabitants in the country's south and southwest regions, were exploited by politicians who fanned the fears of the indigenous. Consequently, the non-indigenous were often violently expelled from their lands and homes and were subjected to harassments. The transformation of this conflict into one of citizenship and identity lies at the root of the violence following the 2000 elections and the attempted coup in 2002 by the northern military personnel.

Ayai (2009) found that the mechanisms through which poor economic conditions could cause recurrence of conflict are many. Among them are general dissatisfaction, greed and grievance, and a breakdown of social contract. According to Ayai, when these circumstances pertain and bargaining options become less palatable to an aggrieved party, renewed violence becomes a viable option and the risk of it increases. Ayai (2009) also asserted that low quality of life and barriers to political participation could help in predicting which countries are more likely to experience conflict and which would not. In some societies, like those of Uganda and Burundi, public employment represents a major avenue for advancement. In such cases, this type of discrimination could fuel resentment as could intergroup transfers of resources when the government appeared to be involved. In one example, Ivory Coast became unstable when the late President Félix Houpouët-Boigny allocated public spending across the country based on political loyalty. A similar situation happened in northern Uganda, an opposition stronghold area was starved of public expenditure, thus threatening the social contract between the people and their government (Ayai, 2009).

In addition, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) noted that a low level of economic development is associated with dissatisfaction and countries with a high level of economic development have fewer tendencies toward conflict. Their study indicates that poverty is a breeding ground for political instability and conflict.

Fearon and Laitin (2003) found that lower income per capita increases the likelihood of conflict. They, however, pinpointed that lack of human rights and repression increase the risk of rebellion and that democracy has a

tendency to generate fewer grievances among the populace as people come to accept the democratic process.

Newbury (1998) identified two major and interrelated variables that contributed to political violence in Rwanda in 1994. The first is the drastic fall in the world market price of coffee - the country's main export - which deepened the economic crisis and increased the number of jobless. The second variable is the increasingly large number of unemployed young men in both the modern and the traditional economic sectors. In the modern sector, educational opportunities and jobs were limited. Also in the traditional sector, land scarcity and lack of money made it difficult for young men to establish themselves as landowning farmers. Newbury concluded that with nothing to do and no hope for the future, Tutsi youths joined the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) in Uganda while the Hutu youths joined the regime's death squads of the ruling government.

Moreover, Fox and Hoelscher (2010) found that poverty creates positive conditions for individuals to use any means necessary to acquire needed resources. They, however, concluded that theoretically, the relationships between poverty, inequality and economic opportunity and the propensity of individuals or groups to behave violently are intuitive.

Additionally, interviews conducted by Brett and Specht (2004) with young soldiers found strong micro-level support for the expectation that lack of schooling in addition to poverty and low alternative income opportunities are important reasons for joining a rebel group.

Socio-demographic factors

Population, age structure, urbanization and ethnic diversity influence political violence. Goldstone (2002) observed that historical episodes of political instability and violence have often been associated with the demographic phenomenon of an unusually high proportion of 15-24 year olds (youth bulges) relative to adults in a population. Ostby and Urdal (2010) also discovered that young men in their high teens or low twenties are the main protagonists of violence.

Other researchers such as Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000), Neapolitan (1997) and Neumayer (2003) have posited that young males in particular are the main protagonists in political and criminal violence. Theoretically, both opportunity and motive perspectives suggest youth bulges may increase risks of violence.

Again, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) pinpointed that large youth cohorts may reduce the opportunity costs of engaging in violence by making rebel or gang recruitment easier or more attractive as a livelihood strategy. Moreover, Cinotta, Engleman and Anastasion (2003) and Goldstone (1991) have observed that sizeable youth cohorts may lead to violence or aggression where access to education and job opportunities are scarce.

Ethnic marginalisation

The ordeal of disputed elections reduces trust across ethnic groups. International experience has shown that in situations where ethnic groups distrust each other and are afraid of being victimised, this fear might drive

them to resort to violence first in a preemptive move to minimise damage (Bardhan, 1997).

Hoglund (2009) found that in ethnically divided societies where ethnic identities have become politicised, getting electoral victory could be a matter of survival, particularly for ethnic parties. This is particularly true if the ruling ethnic-party is convinced that it would be ruined by an opposition victory. He posited that election-related violence could be severe in emerging democracies where patronage politics is the dominant form of politics.

Again, Nzongola-Ntalaja (2004) has observed that the denial of full citizenship rights to selected individuals and groups in Africa has triggered political violence. The best-known examples of the practice are the disqualifications of former President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and former Prime Minister, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, of Ivory Coast from presidential elections in 1996 and 2000 respectively. In the Zambian case, Kaunda's disqualification was on grounds that his parents had migrated from Malawi when both countries were British colonies. Because his parents were not indigenous to Zambia, he was prohibited from running for a presidential seat he had occupied for 27 years (1964-1991). In the case of Ouattara, he was disqualified by availing himself of a diplomatic passport from Burkina Faso and besides his mother came from Burkina Faso. He was also the Prime Minister of Ivory Coast from 1990-1993.

The remote cause of the Ivorian civil war in 2002 for example, was at the instance of the strategies adopted by Konan Bedie and General Robert Guei to deny Ouattara and others from contesting the 1995 and 2000 presidential elections. As an example, Guei got the Supreme Court to

disqualify candidates whose both parents were not Ivorians and had never held another country's nationality. This barred Ouattara from contesting the 2000 election after the court declared that his mother came from Burkina Faso. These politically motivated acts of exclusion led to violent repercussions and divided the nation along ethnic lines (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004).

Nzongola-Ntalaja (2004), again, noted that the denial of full citizenship rights to minority Tutsi in Rwanda and the denial of those in exile to return to Rwanda triggered the 1994 genocide. On April 6, 1994, the jet carrying Presidents Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi (all Hutus), was hit by surface-to-air missiles. Everyone aboard died. It was alleged that the Tutsi rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), ordered the missile attack.

Lund (2003) identified identity politics as a dominant characteristic of recurrent electoral violence. The chieftaincy dispute between Kusasis and Mamprusis in the Upper East region of Ghana, which predates Ghana's independence, serves as an example. In the past, the NDC and its political tradition were seen to side with the Kusasi's claims to chieftaincy and the traditional area, while the Mamprusis were validated by the NPP and its political tradition. Thus, violence between the two groups occurs with each political cycle as each tries to undermine the others' political aims by using violence to put their preferred political parties on top (Lund, 2003).

Desire to amass power and wealth

According to Lawal (2010) Sit-tight Syndrome, a situation in which an individual tries to hold on to power for personal aggrandisement contributes to

political violence. In an attempt to hang on to power, leaders often create a regime of violence, repression and bloodshed. They organise political thugs, hooligans and scavengers to sing their praises, intimidate opponents and kill them if they become intransigent.

Ivory Coast, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Togo, Egypt and Libya among other countries, the incumbents used undemocratic means to perpetuate themselves on power. In Kenya for example, the ruling party till December 2007 tried to suppress opposition political parties by recruiting and sponsoring tribal militias and gangs to terrorise and instigate ethnic violence in the same vein as other African countries have done such as Cameroon, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa and Sudan (Kagwanja, 2003).

Lawal (2010) observed that in Nigeria, politics is conceived as an investment-prebendal. The politicians, having invested colossally on campaigns and other political activities, coupled with the existing system of winner takes all, would want to win at all cost. Subsequently, the need to employ the use of thugs and touts to destabilise and rig elections becomes inevitable, especially when such politicians are not popular candidates.

Teshome (2009) found that the major cause of the 2005 post-election violence in Ethiopia was the defeat of the ruling party in the election and its attempt to reverse the poll results by force. The ruling party had direct control over the army and the police. In many African emerging democracies, election management bodies, courts, police and army are highly politicised and are the instruments of the ruling party. Therefore, "the perpetrators of the electoral violence (who usually are members of the ruling party) get away with it and the opposition party members and supporters who are the victims of the

violence end up in jail as the case of Ethiopia in the 2005 elections" (Teshome, 2009: 195).

According to Mbugua (2006), elections are by their very nature full of uncertainties. He observed that election-related violence could be ignited when there is high uncertainty about the result of the election, particularly when the margins of electoral victory are very close. In such situations, Sisk (2008: 11) noted "the allegation of fraud would lead to frustrations and violent clashes would erupt." Again, in such circumstances, the incumbents could attempt to maintain their grip on power by resorting to violence, especially when they fear the possible majority support for opposition parties.

Lack of trust in governance

Das and Choudhury (1997) observed inefficiency of the governing elites as an important cause of conflict. When the governing elites are incapable of responding to the exigencies of life, the non-elites feel estranged from the ruler. Das and Choudhury (1997) asserted that the feeling of separation is an important precondition of conflict.

Again, Buthdy (2005) explained four main issues that generated violence in national and local elections in Cambodia. The first issue is the immunity of civil servants. This includes police officers and military personnel who are often implicated in political violence. The second issue is the lack of effective institutions to maintain law and order. Thirdly, the media seems to support lawlessness and acceptance of extrajudicial execution: newspapers always publish violence acts; the television always shows the police killing suspects and writing articles supporting the violent actions of the

police. The fourth issue is that political violence is portrayed as personal conflict.

According to Kirwin and Cho (2009) an effective state is an organisation which claims a monopoly over violence within its borders in order to maintain order. Kirwin and Cho argued that if the state is considered to be the set of institutions through which citizenry is governed, then when governance fails, conflict prevention is mismanaged and political violence emerges. However, Kirwin and Cho noted that in Africa much has been made of the predatory state. Their position is supported by Chabal and Jean-Pascal (1999: 77) who pinpointed that

> Since in most countries the state not only fails to protect the population from crime but is itself responsible for a high level of violence, both through the direct abuse of power and because of its predatory nature, it is not surprising that ordinary men and women will seek to device alternate strategies for coping with arbitrary force.

Kirwin and Cho (2009) concluded that weak states inability to adequately project power leads to violence.

Inciting comments

According to Dolan (2010: 2) Iraqi editors, managers and journalists, with the support of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World Service Trust and United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), developed a self-regulatory code of conduct to serve as a moral and professional guide for audio together with visual media in Iraq and the

code defines incitement as "broadcasting that incites imminent violence, ethnic or religious hatred, civil disorder or rioting among the people of Iraq and carries the clear and immediate risk of causing such incitement."

Benesch (2008) postulated that incitement operates by way of the exertion of influence and influence is a function of the processes of time. Benesch noted that incitement seems to play a critical role when intended victims live among the majority group, so that mass killings cannot take place without the participation or at least the tacit acceptance of many members of the majority group. According to Benesch (2008) in Turkey, there were plans to excite Muslim opinion by suitable and special means before the Armenian genocide.

Jean Kambanda, the Prime Minister, during the months of the Rwandan genocide confessed at his trial, four years later when he pleaded guilty to genocide that he had appeared on radio station "RTLMC" on 21st June 1994 to encourage the station to continue to incite the massacres of the Tutsi civilian population. The trial judges noted, he incited prefects and burgomasters to commit massacres and killing of civilians, and visited a number of prefectures to incite and encourage the population to commit those massacres, including congratulating the people who had committed those killings (Organisation of African Unity [OAU] 1998).

Mass killings of hundreds of thousands occurred in Rwanda, including women and children, old and young, who were pursued and killed at places where they sought refuge: prefectures, commune offices, schools, churches, and stadia (OAU, 1998).

In a speech given on 22nd November 1992 in Rwanda, Mugesera (an ethnic Hutu) allegedly told about 1,000 party members that the Hutus were obliged to take responsibility themselves and wipe out the scum by killing Tutsis and dumping their bodies into the rivers of Rwanda. He implored his listeners not to leave themselves open to invasion, and added that those people (Tutsis) called "Inyenzis" or cockroaches were now on their way to attack them (Benesch, 2008). The statement made by Mugesera contributed to the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

**Effects of political violence**

Political violence, particularly in Africa, has received much attention in academic as well as media circles. Political violence jeopardises political stability, democratic reform, prospects of economic development, and creates human suffering and in some cases degenerates into civil war (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).

The effects of political violence discussed are undermining election results, substitution and spillover effects, women participation in politics, underdevelopment, human rights violations and trauma on people.

Undermining election results

Teshome (2009) observed that threats of electoral violence affect the outcome of elections. He further posited that candidates sometimes campaign by making threats to return to war if they lose elections. Also, Teshome stated that in 1997 presidential elections in Liberia, voters were intimidated and forced to vote for the most dangerous candidate - Charles Taylor. He indicated

that similar threats were made in Ethiopia in the 2005 elections in favour of the ruling Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).

Hoglund (2009) postulated that political Violence can undermine elections. With the presence or threat of violence, voters may opt not to register or decide to stay away from the polls altogether, candidates may withdraw, or politicians may use it as a reason to cancel or postpone elections. As an example, Laurent Gbagbo of Ivory Coast cited political violence and postponed presidential elections six times between 2005 and 2010. When domestic and international observers judge that an election has been marred by violence, the legitimacy of the results is jeopardised, as is the legitimacy of the elected officials.

There are indications that elections with high degrees of conflict or continuous violence may slow the consolidation of democracy. An analysis by Logan, Bratton and Gyimah-Boadi (2006) on Africans' view of democracy suggests that poor elections are to be blamed for dissatisfaction with elections as means to attain political representation. Indeed, among the 18 countries surveyed by Logan, Bratton and Gyimah-Boadi, the three countries where elections have been relatively free of violence - Botswana, Namibia and Ghana - are the most satisfied with elections. On the other hand, Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Zambia, where elections have been more violent and controversial, elections are the least satisfied.

Substitution and spillover effects

Neumayer (2003) found that there have been spillover effects and substitution effects as a result of political violence. Neighbouring countries can actually benefit from substitution effect as long as they are not themselves seen as directly affected by the events of violence. Neumayer also stated that Cyprus, Greece and Turkey have benefited from conflicts in Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria as tourists in search of Middle Eastern flair and ancient sights, resort to destinations perceived as safe within the region. Supporting the substitution effect, Neumayer again posited that both Solomon Islands and North Queensland advertised themselves as safe regional alternatives in the face of a military coup in Fiji in December, 2006 following military unrest in 2000 and political crisis in 2005.

On the spillover effect, Teshome (2009) observed that in the presidential election held in Togo in April 2005, about 40,000 people fled to the neighouring countries. Again, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] (2010) asserted that at least 15,000 Ivoirians, mostly Children, fled to neighbouring Liberia, fearing Ivory Coast's violent post-electoral political stand-off in November, 2010 could spark Civil War.

According to World Food Programme [WFP] (2011) an estimated number of 1.06 million Libyans were expected to cross borders into Egypt and Tunisia as a result of the major protest that engulfed the country in February 2011. In the first week of March 2011, over 110,000 Libyans crossed into Tunisia alone. In addition, WFP launched a US$ 39.2 million emergency operation to provide food assistance for estimated 1.06 million Libyans over a three-month period. This clearly shows that political violence in a country

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affects other countries and institutions. Furthermore, the World Bank on April 14, 2011 warned that the Ivorian conflict had disrupted supplies and also pushed up prices for processed foods such as dried milk, sugar and vegetable oil in Burkina Faso and other landlocked countries in the region such as Mali and Niger (Bonkoungou, 2011).

Women participation in politics

Although there is some women representation in legislatures across the globe, the figure is insignificant as compared to that of men. Research indicates that less than 11 percent of party leaders worldwide are women (Dahlerup, 1991). The share of women among ministers also averages 17 percent. The highest positions are even more elusive. Only seven of 150 elected Heads of State in the world are women, and only 11 of 192 Heads of Government in the world are women. The situation is similar at the level of local government. Female elected councillors are underrepresented in all regions of the world and female mayors are even less (United Nations, 2010).

However, the importance of women's political empowerment has been recognised within the framework of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), with one of the indicators for monitoring Goal three (promote gender equality and empower women) being the proportion of seats held by women in lower or single houses of national parliaments (United Nations, 2010). Some authors attribute the low women representation in national parliaments to political violence associated with political elections. Kamau (2010) posited that insecurity is manifest in the manner men try to derail women from getting to political positions, especially through the use of violence targeting women

political aspirants. Also, Kamau (2010) revealed that women political leaders face challenges including competing family demands, inadequate resources, politics of exclusion in political parties, lack of security and lack of positive media coverage.

In Kenya's 10th parliament (2008-2012), out of the 222 parliamentarians only 22 are women, which is about 10 percent of women representation, trailing far behind the global average of 18.8 percent women representation in parliaments. Sixteen were, however, elected while the other six were nominated (Kamau, 2010).

Since Nigeria political terrain embraces violence, it has become difficult for women to compete favourably with men in such situation. In Nigeria, no woman emerged as governor in the 2011 gubernatorial elections and few women are members of state Houses of Assembly. As an example, presently, only eight women are in the 109-member Senate and 36 in the 360-member House of Representatives in Nigeria (Agina, 2011). Olugbemi (2004: 233) summed up the Nigerian situation and stated "as mothers, women cannot risk anybody's life for election victory which the men in Nigerian politics care less about".

In Ghana, the provisional results of the 2010 population and housing census show that males form 48.7 percent while females constitute 51.3 percent of the population (Ghana Statistical Service, 2011). Yet, in the fifth parliament of the fourth republican constitution of Ghana, 19 out of the 230 members are women. In the fourth parliament of the fourth republican constitution, the women's representation was 25 out of the 230 members (Ghana Statistical Service, 2009).

Underdevelopment

Bodea and Elbadawi (2006) discovered that organised political violence, especially civil war, significantly lowers long-term economic growth. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been disproportionately impacted by civil wars, which explains a substantial share of its economic decline, including the widening income gap relative to East Asia. Civil wars have also been very costly for SSA. For the case of Sudan, a typical large African country experiencing a long-duration conflict, war cost amounted to $46 billion, which was roughly twice of the country's stock of external debt (Bodea & Elbadawi, 2006). Neumayer (2003) observed that political violence is regarded as an essential ingredient of a broader notion of political instability. Clearly, when a government is toppled through violence, lives are lost and property is destroyed.

Neumayer (2003) asserted that events of violence are likely to impact on tourism. World Tourism Organisation [WTO] (2002) disclosed that tourism generated receipts of US$476 billion in 2002 and growth rates were above five percent per annum. As an example, Ghana earned US$1.8 billion from 950,000 tourists who visited the country in 2010 (Awuku, 2011). Also, Levantis and Gani (2000) found that developing country regions, in which tourism is growing faster, have much to benefit from providing low-skilled and labour-intensive tourism services that could provide an income stream which is more steadily than the volatile receipts from natural resource extraction. The political violence that hit Egypt on January 25, 2011, according to Reuters (2011), cost the country about US$310 million a day.

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The violence ended on February 11, 2011 when the former president Hosni Mubarak resigned.


Human rights violations

Teshome (2009) stated that the 2007 election in Kenya is the bloodiest in the history of Kenya, which led to ignited ethnic conflicts mainly between the Kikuyu and the Luo. He added that the 2005 post-election violence in Ethiopia led to the death of 193 protestors and the imprisonment of more than 40,000 people. Also, Gloor (2005) noted that in the 1999 Mozambique election, more than 100 people died when supporters of the RENAMO's candidate, Afonso Dhlakama, demonstrated against the declared election winner, Joaquim Chissano, the leader of FRELIMO.

The dispute over the November 28, 2010 presidential run-off in Ivory Coast also led to human rights violations. United Nations staff in Ivory Coast found 536 bodies in the west of the country from end of March 2011to April 12, 2011. The staff said at least 400 people died in the city of Abidjan before the capture of Gbagbo on April 12, 2011. Crimes committed such as the shelling of a market place in Abidjan's Abobo district and the murder of women peacefully protesting, as well as numerous other killings and abductions amounted to crimes against humanity (Reuters, 2011).

Again, United Nations (2010) asserted that it received hundreds of reports of people being abducted from their homes at night by armed assailants in military uniform and that there was growing evidence of massive violations of human rights since Ivory Coast's November, 2010 disputed election. Moreover, in March 2011, there was a shocking footage which showed two

men being burned alive by a mob in Ivory Coast. The incident took place in the neighbourhood of Yopougon in Abidjan, the Ivory Coast's main commercial city (Observers, 2008).

The civil war of Sierra Leone between 1991 and 1999 saw boys as young as seven years old abducted into the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), supplied with weapons, trained to kill, shot up with cocaine and incited to raid villages throughout Sierra Leone. These raids targeted civilians, especially women and children. Their hallmark was crude amputations: feet, hands, ears, lips and noses. The war claimed over 75,000 lives, caused over 500,000 Sierra Leoneans to become refugees, and displaced over half of the country's four and half million people at that period (Smillie, Gberie & Hazlton, 2000).

Trauma on people

Trauma associated with political conflict is largely about the destruction of individual as well as social and political structures of a society (Hamber, 2004). Hamber noted that in an authoritarian regime, where violence is common, a range of controlling, rigid processes and structures are developed. According to Hamber, these can manifest in other diverse forms such as political opinions that preach violence or the exclusion of others, inter-personal aggression, demonisation of those perceived as other, discrimination, intolerance of the views of others, undemocratic forms of social control, together with psychological bullying in the work place or elsewhere. In addition to inflicting psychological and physical harm, political violence often aims to undermine social relationships between individuals, as well as between individuals and society at large. In Chile, for example, it has been

argued that political violence during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990), undermined individuals' sense of belonging to the society (Becker, 2001).

Simpson and Rauch (1991) observed that the culture of violence perpetuated by the Apartheid system quickly spread into all aspects of the social and civic arena of South African society as a result of enforced racial segregation. When violence seeps into everyday life, there is always the possibility that as a society comes out of the conflict the residue of violence will remain.

Weingarten (2004) asserted that most children therapists readily recognise children are at risk if they are exposed to political violence. Weingarten (2004) found that if one lives with a parent who has suffered from political trauma, one might acquire a deficiency one might not otherwise have acquired. Weingarten observed that children of a parent with chronic Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) due to political violence might be affected by their parents' experiences.

**Conceptual framework**

In figure 1, political violence arises out of economic and land rights marginalization which lead to unemployment and poverty. As a result of the poverty, politicians who want to perpetuate themselves in power take advantage of the situation and recruit mostly the youth who are most vulnerable to the self-inflicted poverty as their thugs and touts to perpetrate violence in order to win elections.

The framework also explains how the desire to have power at all cost, inspire some politicians to reverse poll results by force or to rig elections as it happened in Ivory Coast's presidential run-off held on November 28, 2010 - a development that triggered violence between the forces loyal to Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara.

From the figure, other compelling factors that cause political violence are lack of trust in governance and ethnic marginalization. While the former has the tendency to lead to agitations for transparency, inclusiveness, accountability and rule of law, the latter may lead to denial of full citizenship rights to some individuals as observed by Nzongola-Ntalaya (2004) in respect of Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia in 1996 and Alassane Quattara of Ivory Coast in 2000. All this has the tendency of Sparking Violence.

In the figure, the causes of political violence undermine election results, violate human rights, adversely affect development, culminate in substitution and Spillover effects, and degenerate into civil war with their attending problems on the national economy leading to general insecurity. Electorate sometimes vote for the most dangerous candidate through intimidation, as found by Teshome (2009) in the case of Charles Taylor. Also, some voters may decide to stay away from polls and some politicians may use the violence as a ploy to cancel or postpone elections as it did happen in Ivory Coast during Laurent Gbagbo's regime. All this undermine election results. Again, during political violence, many a person among others is either killed, taken hostage or raped. Political violence causes the nation in question and other regional bodies to incur cost in keeping security personnel to maintain peace and order at the affected areas at the expense of development.

In addition, countries and regions that experience political violence lose foreign investors and tourists. In contrast, safe countries attract foreign investments and revenue through the tourists for developments. Besides, the safe countries receive refugees from the violent countries.

Furthermore, the safe countries experience increase in prices of some goods as supplies disrupt in the violent regions. At worst, the violence in one country affects other countries as it occurred in Egypt and Libya among others as a result of the successful political protest that hit Tunisia on December 18, 2010. This explains the substitution and spillover effects in the figure. All this culminates in general insecurity as the figure shows.

**Figure 1: Causes and effects of political violence**

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Source:  Author's construct, 2011

## CHAPTER THREE

## METHODOLOGY

**Introduction**

The purpose of the study is to examine causes and effects of political violence in Berekum Municipality. The chapter is devoted to the description of the study area, research design, population and sampling procedure used to achieve the purpose of the study. In addition, it discusses the instruments used for data collection, data collection procedure and provides a description of the analysis of data.

**Description of the study area**

Location

Berekum Municipality was selected for the study. The area has 36 towns and villages. It is located in Brong-Ahafo Region and is one of the 170 districts in Ghana. The Municipality came into existence as a semi-autonomous spatial unit by virtue of the decentralization policy adopted by the government in 1988. The area started as a district and attained the municipal status in 2008. The Municipality is also one of the 230 constituencies in Ghana. It shares boundaries with Tain District and Jaman South District to the Northeast and Northwest respectively. It also shares boundaries with Dormaa East District to the South and Sunyani West District to the East. Berekum, the Municipal capital, is 32km North West of Sunyani. The Municipality's total

area constitutes about 0.7 (1,635km²) percent of the entire 233, 588km² of

Ghana as shown in Figure 2.



**Figure 2: Map of Berekum Municipality**

Source: Berekum Municipal Dept. of Town and Country Planning, 2011

Population

The 1984 population census put the area's population figure at 22,264. The area's population figure from the 2000 population and housing census was 39,649. The 2010 provisional population census, however, pegged the area's population figure at 120,354 (Berekum Municipal Statistical Office, 2011). The electoral population for the area on the other hand, was 59,753 in 1992; 50,177 in 1996; 61,401 in 2000; 57,550 in 2004; 71,957 in 2008 and 84,278 in 2010 (Sunyani Office of Electoral Commission, 2011).

Political administrative structure

The area has a Municipal Assembly with one Zonal Council, one Town Council and six Area Councils. The Municipal Assembly had had a membership of 52 for the first assembly, second assembly, third assembly, and fourth assembly under the fourth republican constitution of Ghana. Out of the 52 members, 36 were elected while 16 were government appointees. The fifth and the current assembly under the 1992 constitution, however, has a membership of 64 as a result of the creation of new electoral areas by the Electoral Commission in October 2010. The composition is made up of 45 elected members and 19 government appointees. Until October 2010, the Municipality had had 36 electoral areas. Currently, there are 45 electoral areas.

In addition, the Unit Committee membership in the Municipality which had been 97 since the advent of the 1992 constitution, has also been reduced to 45 by the Local Government (Establishment) Instrument 2010 to be in coterminous with the electoral areas (Republic of Ghana ,2010). Now, each electoral area has one Unit Committee member. Hitherto, some electoral areas

had more than two Unit Committee members. With the advent of the 1992 constitution of Ghana, three personalities from the area have served on ministerial and deputy ministerial positions in the Ministries of Agriculture, Education, Local Government and Rural Development as well as Interior.

Traditional administrative structure

The area has an 11-member traditional council headed by the paramount chief of Berekum and his queen mother as well as nine divisional chiefs who assist the paramount chief to administer the area. The paramountcy has given some titles to some sub-divisional chiefs.

Unfortunately, since the death of the late paramount chief - Nana Yiadom Boakye Owusu II - in 1999, Berekum has not had a recognised paramount chief. The development has also halted the sittings of the recognised members of the council. The position is an embattled one with various factions vying with it. As an example, three royal families of the Traditional Area, namely Abontema, Pepase and Babianiha on 13th September, 2002 petitioned President John Agyekum Kufuor to withdraw the appointment of the new IGP, Nana Owusu Nsiah, over the chieftaincy dispute (Kewura, 2002).

At the moment, the paramount chief's position is occupied by one of the factions who is not recognised by most of the chiefs and the Brong-Ahafo Regional House of Chiefs. The impasse has affected development in the Municipality. Among other things, the paramountcy does not receive royalties from the Regional House of Chiefs as a result of the unresolved chieftaincy dispute.

Pattern of voting since 1992

Whereas the parliamentary contest over the years has been primarily between NPP and NDC, in the years 2000 and 2008 general elections, other political party candidates joined the political electoral competition. Ironically, these years witnessed runoffs in the presidential elections. In the presidential election runoff held on December 28, 2000, NPP's candidate had 22,639 votes while the NDC's candidate had 12,698 votes of the valid votes cast. Also, in the 2008 presidential election runoff held on December 28, NPP's candidate had 26,314 while NDC's candidate had 22,008 of the valid votes cast.

Table 1 and Table 2 show results of the parliamentary and the presidential elections in Berekum constituency since 1992 respectively. From Table 1, in 1992, the electorate of Berekum constituency cast no vote for a parliamentary candidate. On the 29th of December 1992, the parliamentary candidate for NDC was declared unopposed as a result of a nationwide parliamentary election boycott embarked upon by NPP, PNC, NIP (National Independence Party) and PHP (People's Heritage Party). In 1996, however, NDC's candidate had 20,724 votes to beat the NPP's candidate who had 14,390 votes of the total valid votes of 35,114.

Table 1 indicates that in 2000 parliamentary election, in addition to NPP and NDC's parliamentary candidates, parliamentary candidates of Convention People's Party (CPP), National Reformed Party (NRP) and United Ghana Movement (UGM) contested the constituency's parliamentary seat. Also, in 2008, Democratic Freedom Party's (DFP) candidate contested the parliamentary election in the constituency.

**Table 1: Parliamentary election results in Berekum constituency since 1992**

| Year | Registered voters | Valid votes | Political parties | | | | | |
|------|-------------------|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | | | NDC | NPP | CPP | NRP | UGM | DFP |
| 1992 | 59,753 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 1996 | 50,177 | 35,114 | 20,724 | 14,390 | - | - | - | - |
| 2000 | 61,401 | 36,288 | 12,393 | 23,288 | 262 | 251 | 94 | - |
| 2004 | 57,550 | 47,608 | 19,047 | 28,561 | - | - | - | - |
| 2008 | 71,957 | 47,253 | 21,693 | 24,449 | 755 | - | - | 356 |

Source: Sunyani Office of Electoral Commission, 2011

From Table 2, in 1992, out of the total valid votes of the presidential election results in the constituency, NDC's candidate had 16,878, while NPP's candidate had 6,557. Also, PHP's candidate had 181 votes of the valid votes cast. Table 2 indicates that the presidential candidate of NPP in the 2000 election had 23,269 votes whilst NDC's candidate had 12,073 of the valid votes cast during the first run. Again, the presidential candidates of NRP, GCPP (Great Consolidated Popular Party), CPP, PNC and UGM contested the 2000 presidential election. Table 2 shows that in 2008, an independent candidate (ID) and other political parties such as Democratic People's Party (DPP) and Reformed Patriotic Democrats (RPD) contested the first run of the presidential election.

**Table 2: Presidential election results in Berekum constituency since 1992**

| Year | Registered voters | Valid votes | Political parties | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | NDC | NPP | NIP | PNC | PHP | NRP | GCPP | CPP | UGM | DFP | DPP | RPD | ID |
| 1992 | 59,753 | 24,801 | 16,878 | 6,557 | 790 | 395 | 181 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 1996 | 50,177 | 34,377 | 20,165 | 13,947 | | 265 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 2000 | 61,401 | 36,159 | 12,073 | 23,269 | | 149 | - | 235 | 221 | 162 | 50 | - | - | - | - |
| 2004 | 57,550 | 47,391 | 17,495 | 29,345 | | 222 | - | - | - | 329 | - | - | - | - | - |
| 2008 | 71,957 | 47,414 | 20,706 | 25,998 | | 272 | - | - | - | 260 | - | 100 | 27 | 10 | 41 |

Source: Sunyani Office of Electoral Commission, 2011

**Research design**

  The descriptive survey was used in this study. In a descriptive survey research, data specified in the problems are obtained from a sample selected from a clearly defined population to describe the population in terms of the variables studied. According to Gay (1987) descriptive survey specifies the nature of a given phenomena. It involves data collection in order to test hypothesis or answer research questions concerning current status of the subject under study. In the view of Osuala (1993) the descriptive research specifies the nature of a given phenomenon and gives a picture of a situation or a population. In view of the above and with regard to the purpose of the study, the descriptive survey was appropriate to come out with meaningful findings and conclusions. The design was therefore used to elicit information from the respondents on causes and effects of political violence in Berekum Municipality. However, much of the study would derive from perceptions of the target respondents.

  In spite of the appropriateness of the use of the descriptive survey for this study, it is criticised for its reduced ability to control important variables. Another weakness of the descriptive survey is its inability to prove causal relationship. Oppenheim (1966) therefore describes it as poor man's experiment.

**Population for the study**

  According to the provisional results of the 2010 population and housing census, the size of the study population is 120,354 (Berekum Municipal Statistical Office, 2011). The target population for the study was

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made up of electorate in Berekum Municipality. The voter population for the study area was also 84,278 in 2010 (Sunyani Office of Electoral Commission, 2011). The accessible population was, however, made up of the eligible voters in the electoral areas of Zongo, Kyiritwede, Ahenboboano North, and Atanotia.

The electoral areas were purposively selected because they have been the centre of and mostly prone to political violence. All major political rallies in the constituency are held in these areas. Again, the secretariats of the political parties in the constituency, the local media houses, the Municipality's Police and Fire Service stations, the court building, Berekum College of Education and Berekum Senior High School, a number of first cycle educational institutions, Berekum central market, the major financial institutions as well as the main station for the commercial motor vehicles were located in these electoral areas. These areas were therefore purposively selected due to their strategic positions and having traits valuable to the study. The voter population for the four selected electoral areas for the study was 14,492, representing 17.20 percent of the general voter population of 84,278 of the entire 45 electoral areas in the constituency.

**Sample and sampling procedure**

Kumar (2005) observes that a sample consists of a carefully selected subset of the units that constitute a population. In many cases, a complete coverage of the entire population in a study would make the findings command a lot of respect. However, ideal conditions are usually difficult to meet. In support of this view, Ary, Jacobs and Razavieh (2002) disclose that

sampling is indispensable in research. Usually, the time, money and effort involved do not permit a researcher to study all possible cases to understand the phenomenon under consideration. Sampling comes to our aid by enabling us to study a portion of a population rather than the entire population. For the purpose of this study, purposive sampling, proportional random sampling and quota sampling procedures were used to identify the sample.

In all, 226 respondents, made up of 84 political party card-bearing members and 142 respondents being a cross-section of the general public were selected for the study. Respondents were selected separately from both the political parties and the general public in order to obtain reflective, reliable and meaningful data to come out with useful findings and to draw meaningful conclusions from the study as well as providing representative of the target group. Purposive sampling and Proportional random Sampling techniques were used to identify 84 party members from a list of 803 names made available to the researcher by the political party offices in Berekum. The small sample size of 84 was used because of the homogeneous nature of party members in politics coupled with constraint of time, material and limited budget on the part of the researcher. Four chair persons of the political parties in the Municipality that had offices and contested for the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections were purposively selected because of their in-depth knowledge about the activities of political parties. The political parties were: NDC, NPP, CPP and DFP.

Proportional random Sampling was, however, used to select the other 80 party members. Forty-three respondents were selected from NPP while 32 respondents were selected from NDC. Also, three respondents and two

respondents were selected from CPP and DFP respectively. The selection was based on the size of a political party and sex of members. Proportional random Sampling procedure was used because it represented a fairly proportional number of size of a political party as well as size of male and female members of the political parties in the Municipality in the study. Each card-bearing member from a political party was given an equal opportunity to be selected for the study. This was to ensure fair selection of each card-bearing member as well as avoidance of biases. The political parties were divided proportionately based on size and each political party was further divided proportionately into males and females. The selection of the subjects was done by using the lotto method. The names of the party members were written on a piece of paper and folded. The folded papers were put in an enclosed bowl for random selection. When a name was picked that name was recorded and put back in the bowl. The process continued till the required subjects were selected. The proportional random sampling size of the political parties is shown in Table 1.

**Table 3: Proportional random sampling size of the political parties**

| Political party | Card-bearing members | | | Sample size | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No. | Male | Female | No. | Male | Female |
| NPP | 428 | 319 | 109 | 43 | 33 | 10 |
| NDC | 319 | 239 | 80 | 32 | 24 | 8 |
| CPP | 34 | 23 | 11 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| DFP | 22 | 13 | 9 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Total | 803 | 594 | 209 | 80 | 60 | 20 |

Source: Field data, 2011

In determining the sample size of 142 respondents for the general public, the Divisional Police Commander and the Electoral Officer in the Municipality were purposively selected due to their offices' unique role in combating violence and conducting political elections respectively. Quota sampling technique was, however, used to identify the other 140 respondents from the general public. The technique was used because it is the least expensive way of selecting a sample. Also, the researcher does not need any information such as a sampling frame, the total number of elements, or other information about the sampling population. Again, it guarantees the inclusion of the type of people the researcher needs (Kumar, 2005). Therefore, the researcher being constrained by time and limited budget deemed the quota sampling technique appropriate for the study. However, quota sampling is not without challenges. The most accessible individuals might have characteristics that are unique to them and hence might not be truly representative of the total sampling population (Kumar, 2005).

In selecting the other 140 respondents for the general public, the accessible population was further divided into exclusive subgroups. The bases of the quota were employment, education and socioeconomic status. The researcher then identified the proportions of the subgroups in the accessible population as Police Service (10), Fire Service (5), Health Service (10), Judicial Service (5), Banking (5), Water Company (5), craftsmanship (10), apprenticeship (10), farming (10), business (15), persons on the street (20) and Education Service – comprising teachers (15) and students (20). The researcher then took note of the proportions of these subgroups and sampled respondents based on the quota allotted to each institution from a convenient

location at each of the identifiable institution or subgroup till the final sample of 140 was got. This was done by asking respondents in a cordial manner to take part in the study.

The institutions or the subgroups were purposively selected in order to obtain reflective, reliable and meaningful data to generalise the results to the entire Berekum Municipality and to draw meaningful conclusions. This provided representative of the population to cover all of the characteristics of the target group.

**Research instruments**

According to Gay (1987) all research studies involve data collection. In a cross-sectional descriptive survey, data may be obtained through a variety of techniques or methods. These include observation, questionnaire administration and interview. For the purpose of this study, questionnaire and interview schedule were used. The same questionnaire was used as interview schedule to elicit information from illiterate respondents.

**Data collection procedure**

The researcher administered the questionnaires personally. This enabled him to establish a good rapport with all the selected respondents. It also afforded the researcher an opportunity to reach all the targeted respondents. Again, visits to the electoral areas gave him some firsthand information about things that were not covered by the questionnaire. The questionnaires were edited and tested with the Statistical Product and Service

Solution (SPSS) 16.0 format software to ensure consistency before they were administered.

To grant respondents the freedom to express their genuine view toward causes and effects of political violence in the Municipality, they were assured of confidentiality and anonymity. The purpose and the procedure for completing the questionnaires were explained to them. The administration and collection of the questionnaires covered a two-week period from 4th of April 2011 to 17th of April 2011. There was a 100 percent return rate.

**Data analysis**

The data analysed for the study were obtained from 226 respondents in the Berekum Municipality. The data were statistically analysed with SPSS 16.0 format software. Frequency distributions and percentages were used to analyse the data. The responses were grouped according to their various categories. Similar responses were put under one heading and therefore considered as belonging to same category.

The questionnaires returned from the field were first edited to ensure that they were properly completed. They were then numbered and coded with the guidance of a coding manual prepared for that purpose.

# CHAPTER FOUR

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

**Introduction**

This chapter presents the data collected from the field as well as the analysis done with respect to the existing literature. The presentation is done in the form of figures and tables.

**Background characteristics of respondents**

Sex distribution of respondents

Figure 3 presents the sex distribution of respondents. Out of the 226 respondents, 159 (70.4%) were males while 67 (29.6%) were females. Out of the 159, 64 were party members while 95 were members of the general public. Also, out of the 67 females, 20 were party members while 47 were members of the general public. It was necessary to capture the sex distribution of the respondents because it would assist in identifying peculiar background characteristics of respondents who might be perpetrators of the political violence.

**Figure 3: Sex distribution of respondents**

Source: Field data, 2011

Educational level of respondents

Figure 4 shows the educational level of the respondents. Out of the 226 respondents, 14 (6.2%) have no formal education, 58 (25.7%) have basic education, 76 (33.6%) have secondary education, 69 (30.5%) have tertiary education while nine (4%) have higher education. The educational level of respondents has been captured because it would assist in identifying peculiar background characteristics of respondents who might be perpetrators of the political violence.

**Figure 4: Educational level of respondents**

Source: Field data, 2011

Age of respondents in years

From Figure 5, 27 of the respondents were between 15 and 24 years while two of the respondents were between 65 and 74. About 64.2 percent of the respondents fell between 25 and 44 years. The 64.2 percent was made up of about 69 percent of the party members and about 61.3 percent of the members of the general public. It was believed that different categories of age groups might be influenced differently towards political violence.

Goldstone (2002) observed that historical episodes of political instability and violence have often been associated with the demographic phenomenon of an unusually high proportion of 15-24 year olds relative to adults in a population. Further, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) pinpointed that

large youth cohorts may reduce the opportunity costs of engaging in violence by making rebel or gang recruitment easier or more attractive as a livelihood strategy.



**Figure 5: Age distribution of respondents**

Source: Field data, 2011

Occupation of respondents

Table 4 indicates that 22 (9.7%) of the respondents were unemployed while 24 (10.6%) claimed they were underemployed. Out of the 22 unemployed respondents, 12 (14.3%) were members of the political parties while 10 (7.0%) belonged to the general public. Also, 17 (20.2%) of the underemployed were party members while the other seven (5.0%) were members of the general public. Again, Table 4 shows that six (2.7%) of the respondents were judicial officers and it is made up of one (1.2%) party member and five (3.5%) members of the general public. Only two (0.9%) respondents were mechanics and also doubled as members of a political party.

Newbury (1998) found that the youth in Rwanda mainly young men, joined militia groups as a result of job insecurity and unemployment in both modern and traditional sectors in 1994. Whereas educational opportunities were limited in the modern sector, world market prices of coffee fell drastically and also the youth could not establish themselves as landowning farmers due to land scarcity and lack of money in the traditional sector. Fox and Hoelscher (2010) postulated that poverty creates positive conditions for individuals to use any means necessary to acquire needed resources including political violence.

Again, Cinotta, Engleman and Anastasion (2003) and Goldstone (1991) have observed that sizeable youth cohorts may lead to violence or aggression where access to education and job opportunities are scarce. Brett and Specht (2004) noted that young soldiers join a rebel group as a result of poverty and low alternative income opportunities. Also, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) posited that poverty is a breeding ground for political instability and conflict.

**Table 4: Occupational distribution of respondents**

| Occupation | Party members | | General public | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent |
| Unemployed | 12 | 14.3 | 10 | 7.0 | 22 | 9.7 |
| Apprentice | - | - | 10 | 7.0 | 10 | 4.4 |
| Civil Servant | 11 | 13.0 | 4 | 2.8 | 15 | 6.6 |
| Underemployed | 17 | 20.2 | 7 | 5.0 | 24 | 10.6 |
| Artisan | 6 | 7.1 | 10 | 7.0 | 16 | 7.0 |
| Driving | 2 | 2.4 | 1 | 0.7 | 3 | 1.3 |
| Engineer | 3 | 3.6 | 2 | 1.4 | 5 | 2.2 |
| Student | 5 | 6.0 | 20 | 14.1 | 25 | 11.1 |
| Medical Practitioner | 1 | 1.2 | 3 | 2.1 | 4 | 1.8 |
| Judicial officer | 1 | 1.2 | 5 | 3.5 | 6 | 2.7 |
| Public security | - | - | 16 | 11.3 | 16 | 7.1 |
| Teaching | 11 | 13.1 | 15 | 10.6 | 26 | 11.5 |
| Business | 6 | 7.1 | 15 | 10.6 | 21 | 9.3 |
| Banker | 1 | 1.2 | 5 | 3.5 | 6 | 2.7 |
| Nurse | 2 | 2.4 | 7 | 5.0 | 9 | 4.0 |
| Mechanic | - | - | 2 | 1.4 | 2 | 0.9 |
| Social worker | 3 | 3.6 | - | - | 3 | 1.3 |
| Farming | 3 | 3.6 | 10 | 7.0 | 13 | 5.8 |
| Total | 84 | 100.0 | 142 | 100.0 | 226 | 100.0 |

Source: Field data, 2011

**Causes of political violence**

This section deals with the immediate and remote causes of political violence in Berekum Municipality. In assessing the causes of political violence in Berekum Municipality, the questions under Section B of the questionnaire (Appendix) were designed to elicit information from the respondents.

Immediate causes of political violence

From Table 5, both party members and the general public ultimately recognised that the main causes of political violence include accusations of rigging (12.3%), inciting comments (12.0%), throwing of stones against opponents (11.7%), and collision of opposing members during rallies and processions (10.5%).

With regard to inciting comments, the results in Table 5 are in accordance with the Organisation of African Union's (1998) report that Jean Kambanda, the Prime Minister during the months of the Rwandan genocide, encouraged the radio station "RTLMC" on June 21st 1994 to incite the massacres of the Tutsi civilian population and also congratulated the people who committed those killings. Benesch (2008) also found that Mugesera (an ethnic Hutu) implored his listeners not to leave themselves open to invasion, adding that Tutsis (the "Inyenzis" or cockroaches) were on their way to attack them. This statement encouraged the Hutus to massacre the Tutsis.

**Table 5: Immediate causes of political violence**

| Immediate causes | Party members | | General public | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent |
| Material reward | 34 | 5.0 | 59 | 5.2 | 93 | 5.1 |
| Drugs | 61 | 8.9 | 115 | 10.2 | 126 | 9.7 |
| Attempt to snatch a ballot box | 38 | 5.5 | 49 | 4.3 | 87 | 4.8 |
| Inciting comments | 82 | 12.0 | 136 | 12.0 | 218 | 12.0 |
| Political group discussions with disagreement | 47 | 6.9 | 67 | 5.9 | 114 | 6.3 |
| Money | 67 | 9.8 | 111 | 9.8 | 178 | 9.8 |
| Accusations of rigging | 84 | 12.2 | 138 | 12.3 | 222 | 12.3 |
| Alcoholic drinks | 60 | 8.7 | 98 | 8.7 | 158 | 8.7 |
| Verbal exchanges among political opponents | 59 | 8.6 | 106 | 9.4 | 165 | 9.1 |
| Throwing of stones against opponents | 81 | 11.8 | 132 | 11.7 | 213 | 11.7 |
| Collision of opposing members during processions | 73 | 10.6 | 118 | 10.5 | 191 | 10.5 |
| Total | *686 | 100.0 | *1129 | 100.0 | *1815 | 100.0 |

*Total number of responses exceeds the number of respondents because

 of multiple responses

  Source: Field data, 2011

Remote causes of political violence

Table 6 shows that both party members and the general public indicated that unemployment (13.0%), desire to retain political power (16.5%), desire to capture political power (16.2%), when foot soldiers of a ruling political party are dissatisfied (14.2%) and poverty (12.4%) were some of the causes of political violence in Berekum Municipality as they jointly accounted for over 72 percent of all the causes of the violence.

The results of unemployment and poverty shown in Table 6 are similar to the findings of Brett and Specht (2004) that young soldiers join a rebel group as a result of poverty and low alternative income opportunities. Also, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) posited that poverty is a breeding ground for political instability and conflict. Moreover, Fox and Hoelscher (2010) postulated that poverty creates positive conditions for individuals to use any means necessary to acquire needed resources including political violence. The results on unemployment in Table 6 are also in agreement with Newbury's (1998) assertion that increasingly large number of unemployed young men contributed to the political violence in Rwanda in 1994.

The outcome of this study as regards the desire to retain and capture political power is in line with observations made by Lawal (2010) that in an attempt to hang on to power, leaders often create a regime of violence, repression and bloodshed. Lawal (2010) observed that the Nigerian politicians, having invested colossally on campaigns and other political activities, coupled with the existing system of winner takes all would want to win at all cost. Subsequently, the need to employ the use of thugs and touts to destabilise and rig elections becomes inevitable.

**Table 6: Remote causes of political violence**

| Remote causes | Party members | | General public | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent |
| Unemployment | 56 | 13.6 | 96 | 12.7 | 152 | 13.0 |
| Desire to retain political power | 73 | 17.7 | 119 | 15.8 | 192 | 16.5 |
| Poverty | 55 | 13.3 | 90 | 11.9 | 145 | 12.4 |
| When foot soldiers of a ruling party are dissatisfied | 59 | 14.3 | 107 | 14.2 | 166 | 14.2 |
| Sanctioning of violence by the society | 22 | 5.3 | 42 | 5.6 | 64 | 5.5 |
| Perpetrators of the violence are not arrested and punished | 35 | 8.5 | 72 | 9.5 | 107 | 9.2 |
| Perpetrators are hopeful of release by a politician if arrested. | 41 | 10.1 | 77 | 10.2 | 118 | 10.1 |
| Desire to capture political power | 71 | 17.2 | 118 | 15.6 | 189 | 16.2 |
| The influence of electronic and print media | - | - | 28 | 3.7 | 29 | 2.4 |
| When party financiers are ignored | - | - | 6 | 0.8 | 6 | 0.5 |
| Total | *412 | 100.0 | *755 | 100.0 | *1167 | 100.0 |

*Total number of responses exceeds the number of respondents because of multiple responses

Source: Field data, 2011

**Effects of political violence**

This section presents the findings on the effects of political violence. In exploring the possible effects of the political violence to the people of Berekum, six questions were designed under Section C of the questionnaire (Appendix).

Destruction of property

Table 7 shows that out of the 226 respondents, 121 indicated that they had had their property destroyed through the violence. One hundred and five respondents, however, indicated that their property was not destroyed. Out of the 121 respondents who had their property destroyed, 58 were party members while 63 were members of the public. Thirty-seven (30.6%) of the respondents claimed they had their bicycles destroyed. This was made up of 16 (27.6%) of the party members and 21 (33.3%) of the general public. Additionally, 26 (21.5%) of the respondents claimed their kiosks were destroyed. Out of the 26 respondents, 11 (19.0%) were party members while 15 (23.9%) were members of the public. Again, eight (13.8%) respondents from the political parties and 12 (19.0%) respondents from the general public indicated that their cars were destroyed.

The results of Table 7 show that in the course of the violence everybody is at risk, in that both party members and the general public had their property destroyed as a result of the political violence.

**Table 7: Types of property destroyed**

| Responses | Property destroyed | Party members | | General public | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent |
| Yes | Motor bike | 10 | 17.2 | 4 | 6.3 | 14 | 11.6 |
| | Car | 8 | 13.8 | 12 | 19.0 | 20 | 16.5 |
| | House | 6 | 10.3 | 4 | 6.3 | 10 | 8.3 |
| | Computer | 1 | 1.7 | 3 | 4.8 | 4 | 3.3 |
| | Kiosk | 11 | 19.0 | 15 | 23.9 | 26 | 21.5 |
| | Garden | 4 | 6.9 | 1 | 1.6 | 5 | 4.1 |
| | Bicycle | 16 | 27.6 | 21 | 33.3 | 37 | 30.6 |
| | Drinking bar | 2 | 3.5 | 3 | 4.8 | 5 | 4.1 |
| Total | | 58 | 100.0 | 63 | 100.0 | 121 | 100.0 |

Source: Field data, 2011

Injuries sustained

Table 8 indicates that 97 of the respondents had experienced personal injuries. Out of the 97 respondents, 44 were party members while 53 were members of the public. The results of Table 8 reveal that in the course of the violence everybody is at risk in that the injuries sustained as a result of the political violence were not limited to party members alone but extended to the general public at large.

**Table 8: Injuries sustained**

| Responses | Party members | | General public | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent |
| Yes | 44 | 100.0 | 53 | 100.0 | 97 | 100.0 |
| Total | 44 | 100.0 | 53 | 100.0 | 97 | 100.0 |

Source: Field data, 2011

Respondents hospitalised

The results shown in Table 9 indicate that 52 of the respondents were admitted to a hospital and spent some number of days while 174 respondents indicated they were not admitted to a hospital. The 52 respondents hospitalised were made up of 23 party members and 29 members of the general public. Also, the results shown in Table 9 reveal that six (11.5%) of the respondents, representing two (8.8%) respondents of the party members and four (13.8%) respondents of the general public, spent seven days on hospital admission. Again, Table 9 shows that one (4.3%) respondent from a political party and one (3.4%) respondent from the general public were hospitalised for 90 days each.

**Table 9:  Respondents hospitalised**

| Responses | No. of Days | Party members Freq | Party members Percent | General public Freq | General public Percent | Total Freq | Total Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yes | 7 | 2 | 8.8 | 4 | 13.8 | 6 | 11.5 |
| | 14 | 2 | 8.8 | 2 | 7.0 | 4 | 7.7 |
| | 15 | - | - | 1 | 3.4 | 1 | 1.9 |
| | 20 | 3 | 13.0 | - | - | 3 | 5.8 |
| | 21 | 4 | 17.5 | 9 | 31.0 | 13 | 25.0 |
| | 27 | 1 | 4.3 | - | - | 1 | 1.9 |
| | 28 | 1 | 4.3 | 4 | 13.8 | 5 | 9.6 |
| | 30 | 1 | 4.3 | - | - | 1 | 1.9 |
| | 40 | 1 | 4.3 | - | - | 1 | 1.9 |
| | 56 | 1 | 4.3 | 7 | 24.2 | 8 | 15.4 |
| | 60 | 6 | 26.1 | 1 | 3.4 | 7 | 13.5 |
| | 90 | 1 | 4.3 | 1 | 3.4 | 2 | 3.9 |
| Total | | 23 | 100.0 | 29 | 100.0 | 52 | 100.0 |

Source: Field data, 2011

Losses suffered

Table 10 presents the losses suffered by respondents. The Table shows that 192 of the respondents suffered losses such as money and death of a relation while 34 respondents indicated that they had not suffered any loss through the political violence.  Out of the 192 respondents, 80 were party members while 112 were members of the public.

The results of Table 10 reveal that 76 (39.6%) of the respondents indicated that they lost some money while one respondent (0.6%) indicated a loss of a motor bike through the political violence. Out of the 76 respondents who claimed they lost some money through the violence, 34 (42.5%) were party members while 42 (37.5%) were members of the public. The respondent who lost the motor bike was, however, a member of the general public. Again, 28 (14.6%) of the respondents, representing 10 (12.5%) of the party members and 18 (16.1%) of the general public indicated that they lost relatives through the violence.

**Table 10: Losses suffered**

| Responses | Loss suffered | Party members | | General public | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent |
| Yes | Money | 34 | 42.5 | 42 | 37.5 | 76 | 39.6 |
| | Death of relation | 10 | 12.5 | 18 | 16.1 | 28 | 14.6 |
| | Bicycle | 13 | 16.3 | 22 | 19.6 | 35 | 18.2 |
| | Formal education | 4 | 5.0 | 6 | 5.4 | 10 | 5.2 |
| | Employment | 3 | 3.7 | 1 | 0.9 | 4 | 2.1 |
| | Business | 13 | 16.3 | 18 | 16.1 | 31 | 16.1 |
| | Apprenticeship | 3 | 3.7 | 4 | 3.5 | 7 | 3.6 |
| | Motor bike | - | - | 1 | 0.9 | 1 | 0.6 |
| Total | | 80 | 100.0 | 112 | 100.0 | 192 | 100.0 |

Source: Field data, 2011

As an example, a student from Berekum College of Education sustained severe injuries from a sharp instrument on 13th October 2008, during a political violence in the centre of the town. In effect, the student has

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not been able to continue his education. Also, in 1996, a woman who operated "chop bar" at Zongo electoral area near "Akpeteshie office" in Berekum lost her business because her "chop bar" was set on fire. The incident was attributed to political violence.

Other sufferings endured

Table 11 indicates that 271 respondents, made up of 131 party members and 140 members of the public endured various degree of suffering while 74 of the respondents endured no suffering. The results of Table 11 show that both party members and the general public recognised that the first three most predominant suffering encountered by the respondents are assault (57.6%), intimidation (29.2%) and smearing of faeces (7.7%). As an example, on the early hours of 15th September 2008, an unidentified group of people smeared the office of NDC in Berekum with some substance believed to be human faeces.

The outcome of the study affirms Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) observations that political violence creates human suffering. The results also support the findings of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Centre for Conflict Research (2001) that assault is one of the most common acts of political and electoral violence.

The results of Table 11 are, again, in accordance with the assertion of Lawal (2010) that politicians who are desirous of amassing power organise political thugs, hooligans and scavengers to sing their praises, intimidate opponents and kill them if they become intransigent.

Additionally, the results shown in Table 11 corroborate observations made by Sisk (2008: 5) that election-related violence involves "acts or threats of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that arises in the context of electoral competition."

**Table 11: Other sufferings endured**

| Responses | Nature of suffering | Party members | | General public | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent |
| Yes | Smearing of faeces | 13 | 9.9 | 8 | 5.7 | 21 | 7.7 |
| | Assaults | 74 | 56.5 | 82 | 58.6 | 156 | 57.6 |
| | Character assassination | 2 | 1.5 | 2 | 1.4 | 4 | 1.5 |
| | Intimidation | 34 | 26.0 | 45 | 32.1 | 79 | 29.2 |
| | Throwing of acid | 8 | 6.1 | 3 | 2.3 | 11 | 4.0 |
| Total | | *131 | 100.0 | 140 | 100.0 | *271 | 100.0 |

*Total number of responses exceeds the number of respondents because of
   multiple responses

Source: Field data, 2011

General effects of political violence

Table 12 shows that all the respondents agreed that the political violence had had some adverse effects on the Municipality. The results of Table 12 indicate that both party members and general public ultimately

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recognised that destruction of public as well as private property (20.0%), voter apathy (18.4%), loss of human resource (17.1%) and trauma on people (16.8%) were the most predominant effects of the political violence on the Municipality.

Table 12 also reveals that 19 (2.7%) of the respondents from the general public indicated that the political violence breached public order and safety. The outcome of Table 12 is in line with what was observed by Hoglund (2009) that with the presence or threat of violence, voters may opt not to register or decide to stay away from the polls altogether. Also, the results from Table 12 are in agreement with Olugbemi (2004: 233) assertion that "as mothers, women cannot risk anybody's life for election victory which the men in Nigerian politics care less about". Additionally, the results are in accordance with the assertion of Hamber (2004) that trauma is associated with political conflict and that it tells victims how others value or devalue them as human beings and it communicates to them their place in society.

**Table 12: General effects of political violence**

| Responses | Effects | Party members | | General public | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent |
| Yes | It leads to voter apathy | 81 | 20.6 | 120 | 17.1 | 201 | 18.4 |
| | It affects women's participation in politics | 39 | 9.9 | 72 | 10.3 | 111 | 10.1 |
| | Destruction of both public and private property | 82 | 20.9 | 136 | 19.4 | 218 | 20.0 |
| | Loss of property through stealing | 49 | 12.5 | 88 | 12.6 | 137 | 12.5 |
| | Loss of human resource through deaths | 74 | 18.8 | 113 | 16.1 | 187 | 17.1 |
| | It brings trauma on people | 61 | 15.5 | 123 | 17.5 | 184 | 16.8 |
| | It unduly increases the workload of hospital personnel | 4 | 1.0 | 18 | 2.6 | 22 | 2.0 |
| | Diversion of hospital resources towards political violence casualties | 3 | 0.8 | 12 | 1.7 | 15 | 1.4 |
| | It breaches public order and safety | - | - | 19 | 2.7 | 19 | 1.7 |
| Total | | *393 | 100.0 | *701 | 100.0 | *1094 | 100.0 |

*Total number of responses exceeds the number of respondents because of multiple responses

Source: Field data, 2011

**Background characteristics of perpetrators of political violence**

This section deals with sex, level of education, age and occupation as well as general characteristics of perpetrators of political violence in Berekum Municipality. The questionnaire was designed to identify respondents who might have perpetuated political violence in the Municipality and their background characteristics. Seventy three of the respondents did indicate that they had engaged in the political violence before.

The questions under Section A of the questionnaire, question 1 under Section C and the question under Section D of the questionnaire (Appendix) were designed to identify perpetrators of political violence and their background characteristics.

Sex distribution of perpetrators of political violence

Table 13 shows that 73 (32.3%) of the respondents indicated that they had engaged in the political violence. Out of the 73, 33 (39.3%) were party members while 40 (27.5%) were members of the general public. The results shown in Table 13 indicate that only one female respondent (0.4%) engaged in the violence. The results of Table 13 thus far indicate that the violence is perpetrated largely by men (31.9%).

The outcome of the study supports the findings of Ostby and Urdal (2010) that young men in their high teens are the main protagonists of violence. Further, the results of the study are in agreement with observations made by other researchers such as Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000), Neapolitan (1997) and Neumayer (2003) that young males in particular are the main protagonists in political and criminal violence.

**Table 13: Sex distribution of perpetrators of political violence**

| Responses | Sex | Party members | | General public | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent |
| Yes | Male | 33 | 100.0 | 39 | 97.5 | 72 | 98.6 |
| | Female | - | - | 1 | 2.5 | 1 | 1.4 |
| Total | | 33 | 100.0 | 40 | 100.0 | 73 | 100.0 |

Source: Field data, 2011

Educational level of perpetrators of political violence

Table 14 reveals that out of the 73 respondents who claimed that they had engaged in the political violence before, nine (12.3%) had no formal education while 15 (20.5%) had tertiary education. The results in Table 14 also show that the most predominant levels of education attained by the perpetrators of the political violence were basic education (39.7%), secondary education (27.4%) and tertiary education (20.6%).

The results on educational level of perpetrators of political violence in Table 14 do not affirm the observations made by Cinotta, Engleman and Anastasion (2003) and Goldstone (1991) that sizeable youth cohorts may lead to violence or aggression where access to education is scarce. Further, the outcome of the results in Table 14 do not support Brett and Specht's (2004) findings that lack of schooling accounts for joining a rebel group.

The results are indication that formal education is not a panacea to political violence as the various levels of education holders were involved in the violence. The observations suggest that if people are educated but are unemployed for example, they may be influenced by a material reward to engage in political violence.

**Table 14: Educational level of perpetrators of political violence**

| Educational Level | Party members | | General public | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent |
| None | 2 | 6.1 | 7 | 17.5 | 9 | 12.3 |
| Basic | 13 | 39.4 | 16 | 40.0 | 29 | 39.7 |
| Secondary | 14 | 42.4 | 6 | 15.0 | 20 | 27.4 |
| Tertiary | 4 | 12.1 | 11 | 27.5 | 15 | 20.6 |
| Total | 33 | 100.0 | 40 | 100.0 | 73 | 100.0 |

Source: Field data, 2011

Age distribution of perpetrators of political violence

Table 15 indicates that out of 73 perpetrators of political violence, 13 (17.8%) were between the ages of 15 and 24, 46 (63.0%) were between the ages of 25 and 34 whilst 14 (19.2%) were between the ages of 35 and 44. The results from Table 15 reveal that those who were within the age bracket of 25 and 34 (63.0%) were the main protagonists in the political violence while those who were more than 44 years were not engaged in the political violence.

The outcome of the study supports Goldstone's (2002) assertion that historical episodes of political instability and violence have often been associated with the demographic phenomenon of youth bulges. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) pinpointed that large youth cohorts may reduce the opportunity costs of engaging in violence by making rebel or gang recruitment easier or more attractive as a livelihood strategy.

**Table 15: Age distribution of perpetrators of political violence**

| Age | Party members | | General public | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent |
| 15 – 24 | 2 | 6.1 | 11 | 27.5 | 13 | 17.8 |
| 25 – 34 | 22 | 66.7 | 24 | 60.0 | 46 | 63.0 |
| 35 – 44 | 9 | 27.2 | 5 | 12.5 | 14 | 19.2 |
| Total | 33 | 100.0 | 40 | 100.0 | 73 | 100.0 |

Source: Field data, 2011

Occupational distribution of perpetrators of political violence

Table 16 shows occupational distribution of perpetrators of political violence. Out of the 73 respondents involved in the violence, 20 (27.4%) had no employment while 22 (30.1%) claimed they were underemployed. Additionally, 13 (18.0%) were students. The results from Table 16 reveal that the party members who claimed to be unemployed (33.4%) and underemployed (45.5%) are more than the members of the public who claimed to be unemployed (22.5%) and underemployed (17.5%).

The results of the unemployed and underemployed shown in Table 16 are similar to the findings of Brett and Specht (2004) that young soldiers join a rebel group as a result of poverty and low alternative income opportunities. Also, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) posited that poverty is a breeding ground for political instability and thus conflict. Moreover, Fox and Hoelscher (2010) postulated that poverty creates positive conditions for individuals to use any means necessary to acquire needed resources including political violence.

**Table 16: Occupational distribution of perpetrators of political violence**

| Occupation | Party members | | General public | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent |
| Unemployed | 11 | 33.4 | 9 | 22.5 | 20 | 27.4 |
| Apprentice | - | - | 9 | 22.5 | 9 | 12.3 |
| Underemployed | 15 | 45.5 | 7 | 17.5 | 22 | 30.1 |
| Artisan | 1 | 3.0 | 1 | 2.5 | 2 | 2.7 |
| Driving | 1 | 3.0 | 1 | 2.5 | 2 | 2.7 |
| Student | 3 | 9.1 | 10 | 25.0 | 13 | 18.0 |
| Teaching | 1 | 3.0 | 1 | 2.5 | 2 | 2.7 |
| Trading | 1 | 3.0 | 1 | 2.5 | 2 | 2.7 |
| Mechanic | - | - | 1 | 2.5 | 1 | 1.4 |
| Total | 33 | 100.0 | 40 | 100.0 | 73 | 100.0 |

Source: Field data, 2011

General background characteristics of perpetrators of political violence

Table 17 presents results on the general background characteristics of perpetrators of the political violence. Both party members and the general public indicated that the main characteristics of perpetrators of political violence include those who are unemployed (22.4%), those who have been living in violent prone areas (20.5%), young men (17.1%) and those who felt cheated by a political party or a key person within a political party (14.3%).

The outcome of the study is in line with the findings of Weingarten (2004) that if one lives with a parent who has suffered from political trauma, one might acquire a deficiency one might not otherwise have acquired. It is

also in accordance with the assertion of Hamber (2004) that in an authoritarian regime, where violence is common, a range of controlling, rigid processes and structures are developed which can manifest in other diverse forms such as political opinions that preach violence or the exclusion of others and even psychological bullying in the work place or elsewhere.

Further, the results of the study are in agreement with observations made by other researchers such as Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000), Neapolitan (1997) and Neumayer (2003) that young males in particular are the main protagonists in political and criminal violence. Newbury (1998) indicated that the increasingly large number of unemployed young men in both the modern and the traditional economic sectors contributed to the political violence in Rwanda in 1994. Finally, Ostby and Urdal (2010) observed that young men in their high teens or low twenties are the main protagonists of violence.

**Table 17: General background characteristics of perpetrators of political violence**

| Characteristics | Party members | | General public | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent | Freq | Percent |
| Those felt cheated by a political party or a key person within a political party | 52 | 15.7 | 86 | 13.6 | 138 | 14.3 |
| Unemployed | 80 | 24.1 | 136 | 21.4 | 216 | 22.4 |
| Desperate people | 22 | 6.6 | 56 | 8.8 | 78 | 8.1 |
| People who use drugs | 27 | 8.1 | 61 | 9.6 | 88 | 9.1 |
| Those who have been living in violent prone areas | 74 | 22.3 | 124 | 19.6 | 198 | 20.5 |
| People who get drunk | 12 | 3.6 | 32 | 5.0 | 44 | 4.6 |
| People easily provoked | 9 | 2.7 | 29 | 4.6 | 38 | 3.9 |
| Young men | 56 | 16.9 | 110 | 17.4 | 166 | 17.1 |
| Total | *332 | 100.0 | *634 | 100.0 | *966 | 100.0 |

*Total number of responses exceeds the number of respondents because of multiple responses

Source: Field data, 2011

# CHAPTER FIVE

## SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

**Introduction**

This chapter presents the summary of the study, conclusions drawn from the findings and recommendations made for application. Suggestions on areas for further research are also presented.

**Summary**

The consequences of political violence on any society have several implications for its development. In view of this the study investigated the causes and effects of political violence in Berekum Municipality.

Essentially, the study assessed the factors that spark political violence in the Berekum Municipality, examined the effects of political violence on the people of Berekum and identified peculiar background characteristics of perpetrators of political violence.

In examining the foregoing dissertation, a cross-sectional descriptive survey was used. The target population for the study was made up of electorate in the Berekum municipality. The accessible population was, however, made up of the electorate in the electoral areas of Zongo, Kyiritwede, Ahenboboano North, and Atanotia. These areas were purposively selected due to their strategic positions and having traits valuable to the study. Also, purposive sampling, proportional random sampling and quota sampling

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procedures were used to identify the sample. A final sample of 226 respondents had their responses used for the analysis.

Data were collected with a questionnaire developed by the researcher and hand-delivered to the respondents personally. The questionnaires administered yielded 100 percent return rate. The data collected were analysed statistically with the SPSS 16.0 format. Frequency distributions and percentages were used to analyse the data.

The findings below among others were revealed by the study.

- The main immediate causes of political violence in Berekum Municipality are inciting comments from politicians, throwing of stones against political opponents, collision of opposing political members during political rallies and processions, the use of drugs and alcoholic drinks among others.

- The predominant remote causes of political violence in the Municipality include unemployment, desire to retain political power, when foot soldiers of a ruling political party are dissatisfied, poverty and desire to capture political power.

- Property such as bicycles, kiosks, motor bikes and cars were destroyed in the course of the political violence in Berekum Municipality.

- The people of Berekum suffered losses such as money, business, employment, apprenticeship and formal education through the political violence.

- The people of Berekum have endured sufferings including assault, intimidation, physical injuries, smearing of faeces and throwing of acid as a result of the political violence.

- The people of Berekum have developed trauma and women participation in politics have been reduced as a result of the political violence.

- The political violence in the Municipality was perpetrated largely by men.

- With the exception of the holders of higher education, the holders of the other levels of education were engaged in the political violence.

- The political violence was perpetrated mainly by those within the age bracket of 15 and 44. However, the majority of the perpetrators fell within 25 and 34 (63.0%) age bracket.

- The unemployed, underemployed, young men, those felt cheated by a political party or a key person in a political party and those who had been living in violent prone areas were also some background characteristics of the perpetrators of the political violence.

**Conclusions**

The research was a survey study conducted with the use of questionnaire and statistical analysis. Like all other researches, it may not be completely devoid of errors and these may have influenced the foregoing findings of the study. Notwithstanding these observations, the following tentative conclusions, which are of much relevance and implications for sustainable development as well as public order and safety of Berekum Municipality and Ghana at large, could be drawn from the empirical evidence available from the study.

Firstly, there is a growing concern that democratic governance is the most important tool for achieving development, particularly in a developing economy of which political election is an integral and the most single source of political participation. Besides, political election is the only source of legitimate power in democracies. However, inciting comments, accusations of rigging of elections, snatching of ballot boxes as well as throwing of stones against political opponents before, during and after presidential and parliamentary electioneering campaigns in Berekum Municipality, have challenged political elections as the truly and genuinely source of political participation in giving legitimate power to political leaders in democracies.

Again, politics, according to Sodaro (2001) is how people organise their communities for the purpose of collectively tackling problems confronting them and also how in the best of the circumstances, members of a community are able to define and accomplish their goals on the basis of co-operation. However, as a result of the spoilt system (winner takes all syndrome) mostly associated with Ghanaian politics, the electorate of Berekum are not able to collectively define their problems and accomplish their goals on the basis of co-operation. They are more concerned with individualism than collectivism and therefore resort to the use of force to achieve a political outcome. This development has culminated in unemployment, desire to retain political power, desire to recapture political power as well as desire to capture political power. These compelling factors have made political violence a vicious cycle in Berekum Municipality.

Finally, the desired objective of political elections being development at its core has rather been the bane of underemployment and poverty in the

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Municipality. Many a person is either killed or maimed culminating in loss of human resources as a result of the political violence. Also, property worth millions of Ghana Cedis is destroyed through political violence in Berekum. In effect, the violence associated with political elections has rather retarded development in Berekum Municipality.

**Recommendations**

In the light of the findings and the conclusions of this study as outlined above, the following recommendations are made.

- The study revealed that throwing of stones against political opponents by other political party members and collision of opposing political party members during political rallies and processions are among the predominant and possible immediate factors that trigger political violence in Berekum Municipality. To forestall these immediate factors that trigger political violence in Berekum Municipality, it is recommended that the various political parties: NPP, NDC, CPP and DFP should form local Inter Political Advisory Committee (IPAC) together with the Municipal Security Council to formulate time table for political rallies and processions so that not more than one political party activity would be organised at a time.

- The study identified unemployment, poverty and when foot soldiers of a ruling political party are dissatisfied as the most compelling remote factors that influence the people of Berekum Municipality to engage in political violence. In the light of the above observations, the Municipal Assembly should identify the unemployed in the Municipality and

assist those with employable skills to find employment while those with no employable skills should be trained by the Assembly in collaboration with the central government to get some employable skills.

- One of the important findings from the study is the influence of the use of drugs and alcoholic drinks on people in the Municipality to engage in political violence.  In the light of this, the political parties should implore their members not to use drugs and take in alcoholic drinks. Additionally, the parties themselves should not buy alcoholic drinks for their members.

- The study further revealed that inciting comments from politicians, verbal exchanges among opposing political parties, desire to retain political power and desire to capture political power contribute to the political violence in Berekum Municipality. The study revealed that in an attempt to retain or recapture power, political activists use anything including violence. It is recommended that the National Commission for Civic Education and the Information Service Department in the Municipality should intensify campaign on political tolerance.

- The study pointed out that the perpetrators of the violence were not arrested and punished, and those who were arrested had "political release".  It is therefore recommended that the political parties should desist from interfering in the work of the police and the judiciary and that the law should apply squarely to the perpetrators of the political violence if arrested by the police.

**Areas for further research**

To supplement the findings of this study the following studies could be considered.

- There is the need to study the public perception of the Electoral Commission toward political violence.

- There is also the need to extend the sample to cover all the electoral areas in Berekum Municipality to assess the causes and effects of political violence.

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## QUESTIONNAIRE

The purpose of this questionnaire is to examine the causes and effects of political violence in Berekum Municipality. It is hoped that the results will help in policy decisions concerning political violence in Berekum Municipality and Ghana in general. Kindly complete it anonymously. All information will be kept confidential.

**Section A: Background characteristics of respondent**

<u>Directions</u>:  Please tick (√) where appropriate.

1.      Your sex:

☐ Male

☐  Female

2.      Your level of education:

☐ No formal education

☐ Basic education

☐ Secondary education

☐ Tertiary

☐   Higher education

3.      Please indicate your age by placing a tick in the appropriate category.

☐ 15-24

☐ 25-34

☐ 35-44

☐ 45-54

☐ 55-64

☐  65-74

4.      Please state your occupation……………………………………

**Section B: Causes of political violence in Berekum Municipality**

<u>Directions</u>: Please write the requested information concerning each statement below.

1.  Which factors have immediate influence on the people in the Municipality to engage in political violence?

………………………………………………………………………………..

………………………………………………………………………………..

………………………………………………………………………………..


2.  In your opinion, what factors have remote influence on the people in the Municipality to engage in political violence?

………………………………………………………………………………..

………………………………………………………………………………..

………………………………………………………………………………..


**Section C: Effects of political violence on the people of Berekum**

<u>Directions</u>: Please tick (√) the box corresponding to your choice(s) or write the requested information concerning each statement below.

1.  Have you ever engaged in a political violence in the Municipality?

☐ Yes
☐ No

2.  (a) Have you had any of your property damaged or destroyed through the violence?

☐ Yes
☐ No

(b) If yes, please state the name(s) of the property below.

…………………………………………………………………………………..

…………………………………………………………………………………..

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3. Have you ever sustained any injuries in the course of the violence?

☐ Yes

☐ No

4. (a) Have you ever been hospitalised as a result of the violence?

☐ Yes

☐ No

(b) If yes, how many days were you hospitalised?

…………………………………………………………………………………..

………………………………………………………………………….......

5. (a) Have you suffered any loss as a result of the political violence?

☐ Yes

☐ No

(b) If yes, please state the type of loss suffered below.

…………………………………………………………………………………..

…………………………………………………………………………………..

…………………………………………………………………………………..

6. (a) Have you encountered any suffering as a result of the violence?

☐ Yes

☐ No

(b) If yes, please state the nature of suffering below.

…………………………………………………………………………………..

…………………………………………………………………………………..

7.     (a)   Does the violence have any effect on Berekum Municipality?

☐   Yes

☐    No

(b)  If yes, please identify the effect(s) of the violence below.

…………………………………………………………………………..

…………………………………………………………………………..

…………………………………………………………………………..

…………………………………………………………………………..


**Section D: Background characteristics of perpetrators of political violence**

<u>Directions</u>:  Please write the requested information concerning the statement below.

1.     How will you describe those who get engaged in the political violence?

…………………………………………………………………………..

…………………………………………………………………………..

…………………………………………………………………………..

…………………………………………………………………………..

**Note:**  If you have any additional comments concerning causes and effects of political violence in the Municipality, please note them below.

…………………………………………………………………………..

…………………………………………………………………………..

…………………………………………………………………………..

THANK YOU