UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST

THE ORIGINS, IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS OF GHANA’S 1969 ALIENS COMPLIANCE ORDER

BY

ADJEI ADJEPEONG

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MAY 2009
DECLARATION

Candidate’s Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my own original work and that no part of it has been presented for another degree in this university or elsewhere.

Candidate’s Signature: ……………………… Date: …………………

Name: ………………………………………………………………………

Supervisors’ Declaration

We hereby declare that the preparation and presentation of the thesis were supervised in accordance with the guidelines on supervision of thesis laid down by the University of Cape Coast.

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Name: ………………………………………………………………………

Co – Supervisor’s Signature: …………………… Date: ……………

Name: ………………………………………………………………………
ABSTRACT

This study situates the November 18, 1969 Aliens Compliance Order in a historical perspective and, with the employment of the internal-external approach, examines the context in which the expulsion order was enforced. Relying on both primary and secondary sources, the study reveals that various factors combined to make Ghana one of the preferred migrants’ destinations in West Africa, especially from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the 1960s. In the face of the growing immigrant population, the colonial, Nkrumah and NLC administrations all introduced immigration measures to control the influx of immigrants into Ghana. However, the colonial government and Nkrumah administration did not strictly enforce those regulations. The NLC attempted to remedy the situation, but it could not achieve much.

When the Busia government was inaugurated, it immediately issued the expulsion order which caused the deportation of many immigrants in a manner never before attempted. The study demonstrates how the interplay of factors, such as the government’s desire to reduce the rate of unemployment and remittances from Ghana, combat crime, guarantee the security of the country, compel immigrants to comply with the immigration laws of Ghana, control the growth of the country’s population, ensure cultural homogeneity, clear the streets of immigrant destitutes and beggars, continue the policies of the NLC, and xenophobia on the part of some Ghanaians, at least to some extent, influenced the government’s decision to issue the expulsion order.
The study observes that the decision was strictly enforced. Some of the immigrants who made efforts to secure permits were successful, but many were those who failed and, thus, had to leave Ghana, sometimes hastily. The study again shows that in some cases, the police and some ordinary citizens went to the extreme so that many of the expellees suffered in many ways, including loss of property and even death. The work indicates the economic, social and political repercussions of the expulsion on Ghana and the country’s foreign relations. In the end, the government did not fully realise the objectives for which it issued the Order, but some modest gains were made. The study finally appreciates the good intentions of the government in acting in the interest of Ghana, as was alleged, but frowns on the harsh manner in which the implementation was done. The study contends that if the government had been more cautious in executing the decision, it could have realised its objectives.
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Finally, I wish to emphasise that I carry the responsibility for any errors detected in the thesis. I also welcome comments and/or criticisms meant to generate further investigation as part of the learning process.
DEDICATION

This work is dedicated with renewed, but unrevised, love to my sweet wife, MRS. CONSTANCE ADJEI ADJEPONG.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Declaration</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgement</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>xii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms and Abbreviations</td>
<td>xiii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition of Terms</td>
<td>xv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background of the Study</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement of the Problem</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature Review</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose of the Study</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of the Study</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations of the Study</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation of the Study</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER ONE: CAUSES OF MIGRATION INTO GHANA</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER TWO: DEALING WITH IMMIGRANTS BEFORE THE 1969 EXPULSION ORDER

The Colonial Administration and Immigration Control 71
Nkrumah and Immigration Control 75
The NLC and Immigration Regulation 79

CHAPTER THREE: GET IT OR LEAVE: THE EXPULSION ORDER OF 1969

The Aliens Compliance Order 91
Reasons for Issuing the Expulsion Order 92
External Dimension 93
Domestic Dimension 114

CHAPTER FOUR: GO BACK HOME: THE EXPULSION ORDER IN OPERATION

The Search for Permits 131
Economic Policies 139
Social Policies 151
Political Measures 155
The Police and the Enforcement of the Order 160
The Unneighbourly Attitude of Some Ghanaians 165
Exemptions from Expulsion 168
Exemptions Abrogated 171
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Comparison of Age Distribution of Ghana-Origin Population and All Ghana (Both Sexes - %), 1960 96

Table 2: Distribution of Foreign-Origin and Ghana-Origin Population by Type of Occupation. (%), (1960) 97

Table 3: Proportion of Immigrants Aged 15 and Above Falling Within the Total Labour Force by Type of Industry, (1960) 99

Table 4: Industrial Distribution of Employed Immigrants and Ghanaians Aged 15 and Above by Sex, (1960) 101

Table 5.1: Proportion of Immigrant Workers Aged 15 Years and Above Within Various Craftsman Occupational Groups, (1960) 102

Table 5.2: Proportion of Immigrant Workers Aged 15 Years and Above Within Various Service Occupational Groups, (1960) 104

Table 6: Employment Status of Employed Ghanaians and Immigrants Aged 15 Years and Above, (1960) 105

Table 7: Estimates of Cocoa Production in Ghana, 1961/65 – 1972/73, (Thousand metric tons) 219
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

B: Bilateral
C: Continental
CE: Competing Elite
CFAO: Compagnie Française de l’Afrique Occidentale
CPP: Convention People’s Party
DB: Dominant Bilateral
EC: Economic Capability
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
EI: Executive Instrument
G: Global
IG: Interest Group
LI: Legislative Instrument
MC: Military Capability
MP: Member of Parliament
Nc: New Cedi
Np: New Pesewa
NAL: National Alliance of Liberals
NCBWA: National Congress of British West Africa
NLC: National Liberation Council
NLCD: National Liberation Council Decree
NRC: National Redemption Council
OAU: Organisation of African Unity
PM: Prime Minister

PP: Progress Party

PS: Political Structure

S: Subordinate

S.C.O.A.: Société Commerciale de l’Ouest Africain

SMC: Supreme Military Council

SO: Subordinate Other

UAC: United African Company

UTC: United Trading Company

UN: United Nations
DEFINITION OF TERMS

*Alien:* For the purpose of this study, the term *alien* is used to refer to non-citizen non-nationals in Ghana at the time of the 1969 – 1970 expulsion exercise. Since the term appears to be derogatory in certain contexts, its usage in the study is avoided. It is, however, maintained in instances where the researcher quotes directly from a source.

*Citizen:* The term *citizen*, as used in this study, refers to any person who was regarded as a national of Ghana by existing citizenship and nationality regulations of Ghana.

*Deportees:* The term *deportees* is used to describe people who were affected by the Aliens Compliance Order and were actually repatriated from Ghana. People who were affected but did not leave are not included. The term is sometimes used interchangeably with expellees.

*Emigrants:* The term *emigrants*, as used in this study, refers to Ghanaian citizens or nationals who moved from Ghana to settle outside the boundaries of the country.

*Expellees:* The term is used to describe people who were affected by the Aliens Compliance Order and were actually expelled from Ghana. People who were affected but did not leave are not included.

*Foreigner:* For the purpose of this study, the term *foreigner* refers to a person who was not an indigene.

*Immigrants:* The term *immigrants* refers to citizens of any country who entered Ghana from about the 1880s to the 1960s.
Illegal Immigrants: The term illegal immigrants refers officially to persons who entered Ghana illegally or were residing in the country illegally after entering legally, for example, using a transit or tourist visa and remaining after the visa had expired.

Local People: For the purpose of this study, the term local people refers to the indigenous people of Ghana, particularly those who were already established in the country before the official imposition of colonial rule.

Migrant: The term migrant refers to a person who moved from one country to another for any political, social or economic purposes.

Refugee: For the purpose of this study, the term refugee refers to any person given refugee status under the O.A.U and Geneva Conventions and asylum seekers granted exceptional leave to remain in Ghana due to civil wars or dangers in their home countries or for any other political reasons.

Returnees: With regard to this study, the term returnees refers to all people who were expelled and returned to their countries of origin as a result of the enforcement of the Aliens Compliance Order.

Smuggling: For this study, the term smuggling is used to describe the act of taking something, including cocoa and currency, across the borders of Ghana in an illegal or secret way.
INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

This study examines the context in which Ghana’s Aliens Compliance Order of November 18, 1969 was implemented. It examines the causes of migration into Ghana and earlier measures dealing with immigrants before the Aliens Compliance Order. The work reappraises the expulsion order and the reasons for which it was issued and implemented. The study also analyses the manner in which the expulsion order was enforced. Finally, it evaluates the economic, social and political effects of the expulsion on Ghana, and on relations between Ghana and the countries whose nationals were affected.

In dealing with the topic, the analytical framework adopted for the purpose of convenience is Michael Brecher’s ‘input-output’ approach which Olajide Aluko employed in his study of the 1983 and 1985 Nigerian expulsions of non-citizens. This analytical model sees foreign policy decision as a dynamic system. It sees the operational environment as operating at two main levels, external and internal. Brecher indicates that pressures from the external levels can originate from five levels: the Global (G); the Subordinate (S) or Continental (C); the Subordinate Other (SO), that is, the sub-regional level; the Dominant Bilateral (DB); and the Bilateral (B). Similarly, pressures from the internal region can
come from five levels, including: the Political Structure (PS); the Military Capability (MC); the Economic Capability (EC); Interest Group (IG); and the Competing Elite (CE). Only pressures from some of these quarters would be relevant to the study.

Generally, migration has been one of the most distinctive features of the African way of life, and movements of people from one locality to another have taken place since pre-historic times. In West Africa, long-distance ‘international’ migrations have occurred within the sub-region throughout its history. People moved to and settled wherever opportunities seemed promising. In many West African countries could, thus, be found large numbers of immigrants who settled down to live and work or who came periodically, resided temporarily, and returned to their home countries. The movement of people from one locality to another became more noticeable during the colonial era as by then international political boundaries had been drawn and arbitrarily imposed on Africa, separating one ‘nation-state’, though not in the deeper sense of the word, from others.

Cross-border migration continued after independence. In fact, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire and The Gambia were the three principal countries which were the destinations of migrants in West Africa in the 1960s. As more immigrants entered Ghana, they gradually came to dominate certain aspects, mainly the secondary or low-paid jobs’ sector, of the economy, though initially they could only find work as labourers or in trade. Nigerians built up a strong position in diamond digging and smuggling; yam selling at the Kumasi Central Market was a
monopoly of men from Gao in Mali; and three-fifths of the country’s butchers were immigrants, mostly Hausa.⁵

Previous governments did not sit idle in the face of the growing immigrant population and its accompanying economic implications. The colonial authorities devised many immigration measures to control immigration. While some of the laws defined Ghanaian citizenship, others specified the kind of persons who could enter Ghana, the requirements they needed before their entry, the length and conditions of their stay and the circumstances under which immigrants could be deported from Ghana. An example occurred in 1954 when some Nigerians were deported.⁶

Generally, however, immigration was not effectively controlled during the colonial period. The rate of expulsion of foreigners during that period was, therefore, not as frequent as it became in most African countries after independence. The fact is that the presence of migrants and their dependence on the economy had not become a major political issue at that time. The most important factor was, however, that the colonial authorities wanted cheap labour force and tax-payers. For this reason, migrants were protected by the colonial powers in whichever countries they found themselves, even when they were not directly brought by the colonial administrations.⁷

During the CPP administration, too, numerous immigration regulations were introduced. There were laws that reserved some aspects of the economy to Ghanaians and others meant to encourage the investment of foreign capital in
Ghana, specifying the obligations of investors, protection of investments, and the incentives for investors. In spite of all these measures, many immigrants entered Ghana illegally, did not bother to regularise their stay, and also entered certain fields of the economy where the laws of Ghana did not permit them to do so.

It is generally believed that the achievement of independence provided several countries the opportunity to get rid of ‘foreigners’ in their midst at a higher rate.\(^8\) Indeed, after independence, expulsion and deportation became, and still are, common policy measures directed at illegal migrants resident in African countries, especially when the economies of the host countries began to suffer setbacks. In 1958, for example, Ghana deported Amadu Baba and Alhaji Lalemi, two leading members of the opposition National Liberation Movement in Kumasi.\(^9\) Ghana, again, expelled some Burkinabes in 1961.\(^10\) However, the rate of expulsion of immigrants was not as frequent in Ghana as was believed. Even deportations that occurred during the Nkrumah administration were mainly for political reasons and not for immigrants’ contravention of immigration regulations.

The ‘immigrant-friendly’ environment created during the colonial and Nkrumah administrations encouraged many non-Ghanaians to enter Ghana and dominate the secondary sector of the economy. This, certainly, was a problem, but so long as there were no major setbacks in the economy and immigrants were doing jobs which local people did not want to do, the increasing number of immigrants did not matter very much.\(^11\) By the mid-1960s, however, the situation had changed. The Ghanaian economy and social conditions took a turn for the
worse. Ghana was hindered by a balance of payments deficit, rising unemployment, and increasing levels of crime and smuggling. Acute shortage of essential goods hit the country in 1964 and continued till the 1966 coup d’etat. Cocoa prices on the world market had also fallen. Dissatisfaction with the immigrant population, thus, began to spread.

The situation aroused the concern of the National Liberation Council regime (1966 – 1969), which replaced the Nkrumah government in February, 1966. In its time, the NLC devised a number of measures to help curb the problem of unemployment in Ghana and also to regulate the movement of immigrants and their economic activities in the country.

At the time the NLC was handing over power to the civilian Progress Party, however, the economy of the country had not improved significantly, in spite of the government’s efforts to salvage the situation. Moreover, the issue of many immigrants and their economic activities in the country had not been fully dealt with. Before leaving office, therefore, the NLC decided that citizenship regulations of the country should be amended so that to qualify as a Ghanaian, one would be required to have, at least, one Ghanaian parent. Further in July, 1969, the NLC issued a directive to all missions of countries with citizens in Ghana, requesting them to arrange for the proper registration and documentation of their citizens.

The various embassies and high commissions, reportedly, did not take the directive seriously. The Busia administration, thus, came to power to inherit the
problems of many illegal immigrants in the country and their domination of some aspects of the economy, unemployment among Ghanaians, a shortage of foreign exchange exacerbated by monies repatriated by immigrants and traders, large-scale smuggling, and an allegedly high percentage of foreigners among criminals in the country. In the face of these problems and other politically-oriented factors, the government decided to act firmly. This resulted in the issuing of the Aliens Compliance Order on 18th November, 1969, giving a two-week grace period for all immigrants without residence permits to get them or leave the country by December 2, 1969.

Basically, the Aliens Compliance Order, as its name implied, required all immigrants who did not have residence permits, be they non-Ghanaian Africans or non-Africans, to comply with Ghana’s immigration laws, especially the Aliens Act, 1963 (Act 160) and the Aliens (Amendment) Act (Act 265), which were both passed during Nkrumah’s era, as well as the directive issued by the NLC, requiring all illegal immigrants to regularise their stay, which they had, reportedly, failed to comply with. Though the Order had, technically, meant no harm to immigrants without residence permits, but only to compel them to acquire the necessary travel documents, it resulted in the mass expulsion of foreigners, mainly Africans, since they were mostly those who had not regularised their stay.

By the time the Order was issued, the immigrant population was estimated around two and a half million, and some immigrant groups, particularly the local-born immigrants, had become fully absorbed in the economic and social life
of the country and were contributing in various ways to the economic and social
development of Ghana. Since the 1969 Ghanaian mass expulsion of immigrants
was not far different from other expulsions in Africa and elsewhere, it has been
argued that the Busia government carried out that expulsion mainly in the
economic and security interests of Ghana. It is, however, observed that other
equally contending factors also came into play to combine and conspire with the
economic and security situations of Ghana, as happened in the case of other
countries, to influence the government’s decision in issuing the expulsion order.
The sudden mass departure of the immigrants, particularly those in the labour
force, also produced some impact on the economic, social and political life of
Ghana, and on relations between Ghana and the countries whose nationals were
affected by the expulsion order. The significance of the expulsion order and the
expulsion itself merits appreciation and documentation for clarity of
understanding for the present generation and posterity.

Statement of the Problem

The expulsion of nearly two million immigrants from Ghana, through the
issuance and enforcement of the 1969 Aliens Compliance Order, was a major
event in the history of the country. Nevertheless, no major work has been wholly
devoted to its examination and documentation. Some literature exist on the
subject, but they are scattered and fragmentary. Generally, the expulsion had three
parts to it: the circumstances leading to the issuing of the Aliens Compliance
Order or the reasons for which it was issued; the enforcement of the Order; and its
effects. Some works concentrate on only one or two aspects of the expulsion, usually its enforcement and effects, leaving its origins and purpose, due primarily to the perspectives from which they treat the subject. Even in their selectiveness, they present conflicting views owing to the apparent lack of detailed research into the expulsion. For instance, it is held in many circles that the Busia government issued the Aliens Compliance Order mainly with xenophobic tendencies or on the instigation of some international financial bodies. Some authors argue that most policies of the Busia administration were a continuation of the NLC policies and so there were some political reasons behind the expulsion; yet these reasons are not convincingly expounded for a clearer understanding. Other works hold the view that the government’s action was a continuation of a process started by the NLC or even the Nkrumah regime.

With regard to the manner in which the Order was implemented, some works agree that it was harsh, while others argue otherwise. Some studies contend that the expulsion led to the virtual collapse of the economy, but others argue it enabled Ghanaians to recover the economy from the hands of immigrants. In relation to other components of the expulsion, including its effects on relations between Ghana and the countries whose nationals were affected, yet equally compelling opposing views are advanced.

There is, thus, a conflict of opinions on matters relating to how immigrants had been dealt with before the Aliens Compliance Order, the objectives for which the Order was issued, how the implementation was done, and the effects on Ghana itself and on its foreign relations. The problem of the study, therefore, is
that the context in which the 1969 Aliens Compliance Order was enforced is not fully known. The different views expressed by the different writers and the fragmentary nature of available literature on the expulsion have left a significant gap in our knowledge and understanding of the context in which the Order was implemented. If the problem is left unresolved, the consequence of that incomplete knowledge would not only be a further ignorance or not knowing really what the Order was all about, but also the mindless acceptance of only the partial views and conclusions of works readers access. The researcher, therefore, decided to carry out a thorough inquiry into the Aliens Compliance Order and the expulsion of the illegal immigrants with the view to comprehending and accounting for the origins, implementation and effects of the 1969 Ghanaian expulsion order in order to help fill the vacuum.

**Literature Review**

This section presents a review of the literature related to the study. In “Immigration into Ghana: Some Social and Economic Implications of the Aliens Compliance Order of 18th November, 1969” in *Ghana Journal of Sociology*, N.O. Addo first examines the structure of immigration in the pre-Aliens Compliance Order era, including historical outline of immigration into the country. Addo shows that while no systematic form of immigration occurred into the country in the period before 1870/1880, Ghana witnessed a great influx of immigrants from 1870/1880 to about 1939. He further argues that immigration slackened during
World War II but picked up again in the post-World War II era till the attainment of independence in 1957. From independence to about 1961-1962, immigration accelerated due mainly to increased economic activity in Ghana.

Immigration into Ghana began to show some decline during the 1962-1966 period. Between 1966 and 1969, Addo reveals that some degree of refugee movement into Ghana occurred. He continues that the continuous influx of immigrants into Ghana produced a large immigrant population by the 1960s, accompanied by immigrants’ domination of certain aspects of the Ghanaian economy.

He states clearly that the Aliens Compliance Order was actually enacted by the CPP government in 1963 in the form of the Aliens Act, 1963, (Act 160). He stresses that the Aliens Act, 1963 (Act 160), which required non-citizens of Ghana not to enter the country except by one of the recognised points of entry into it, was meant to consolidate, with modifications, enactments relating to the immigration, residence, employment and deportation of immigrants. This Act, he states, was amended in 1965.

By the time Addo was writing, the expulsion order had been in operation for barely three months and so the effects of the expulsion on the economic, social and political life of Ghana had not become clear. The author could, therefore, only predict some of the possible changes the Order would bring. In his study, he argues that a vacuum would be created with respect to labour but that would not solve the unemployment problems facing Ghana at the time because most of the
deportees were self-employed but many Ghanaians did not have the capital to run the kind of businesses operated by the immigrants. Moreover, most Ghanaians were not prepared to work for the extremely low wages being offered at the time.

On the social front, Addo emphasises that since immigrants tended to congregate in certain physical areas, their departure would offer an opportunity for the City Councils to move into those areas to clear the slum in the houses, or to demolish the unauthorised housing structures in these areas. About smuggling and crime, Addo predicts that the exodus would produce little impact since some Ghanaians were also involved in them. He, however, opines that the mass disappearance of the immigrants would considerably reduce foreign exchange quotas in respect of personal remittances abroad.

_Africa Contempory Record, 1969 – 1970_, states clearly that the large immigrant population in Ghana in the 1960s was largely due to the encouragement of freedom of movement during both the colonial times and Nkrumah’s days. The work shows that the Busia government was faced with heavy unemployment among Ghanaians, shortage of foreign exchange worsened by monies repatriated by immigrants and traders, large-scale smuggling and an unacceptably high percentage of foreign criminals. The Order was, however, introduced mainly due to the refusal of the embassies with citizens in Ghana to respect the directive issued by the NLC, requiring them to ensure the proper registration and documentation of their citizens in Ghana. It also relates that the NLC, before leaving office, had suggested the 1963 Aliens Act, as amended in 1968, should be amended again so that to qualify as a Ghanaian, one would be
required to have at least one Ghanaian parent. The work shows that immigrants in gainful employment, other than in trade, were not threatened with deportation, but the main drive was against the unemployed, the criminal elements, and certain categories of traders. According to this work, the Order resulted in the mass expulsion of immigrants in a harsh manner which greatly antagonised Ghana’s neighbours, but less than half of Ghana’s immigrant problem was dealt with.

The 1970 – 1971 edition of the *Africa Contemporary Record* adds that as a result of many deaths, there was undisguised hostility in some countries, such as Nigeria and Niger, towards the Ghana government. The work reveals that Ghana’s relations with Nigeria did not quickly improve, but good relations were sealed between Ghana, on the one hand, and Togo, Ivory Coast and Upper Volta, on the other, after these countries had shown understanding of the Ghana government’s decision.

Margaret Peil, in two articles entitled “The Expulsion of West African Aliens” in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 1971, and “Ghana’s Aliens” in *The International Migration Review*, 1974, traces the influx of immigrants into Ghana to as far back as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries A.D. She shows that deportation of immigrants did not only occur in Ghana but also occurred in many West African countries, especially after independence, but the one which resulted as a result of the Aliens Compliance Order was the most publicised and the largest in scale. The author goes on to show the economic significance of the immigrants to the Ghanaian economy and points out that their dominance of aspects of the
Ghanaian economy by the 1960s caused a great deal of discontent among the local people in view of the unemployment rate at the time.

The writer observes that the Order was issued to create employment for Ghanaians, get rid of the unwanted elements among the immigrant group and ensure proper documentation of all immigrants in the country. She, further, reveals that it was the harsh manner in which the enforcement of the Order was carried out, causing great suffering to many deportees, which generated criticisms of the government. She points out that from the start, the government encouraged all immigrants working in central or local government, state or private corporations, the mines, docks, and cocoa farms, as well as watchmen, laundrymen, and domestic servants to stay. She relates again that not all immigrants left the country as some of them were able to secure permits and that after tension had died down, many of them returned to Ghana. She argues, therefore, that the presence of the exempted immigrants and the return of others did not lead to a considerable reduction in unemployment on the part of Ghanaians, although some Ghanaians gained jobs.

On the effects of the Order, she recounts that the economy suffered temporarily as a result of the expulsion. She further shows that the Aliens Compliance Order made everyone, Ghanaian and immigrant alike, more aware of their nationality unlike Nkrumah who made people think of themselves as Africans. On the crime rate, the author notes that there was a decline in December 1969, but the wave of crime resurfaced after six months.
David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock in their work, *The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana*, 1975, trace the origins of the Order to the Nkrumah regime. They indicate that the CPP government assumed a tolerant attitude towards the many non-Ghanaians who migrated into Ghana. They then state that it was to do something about the large immigrant population that the Progress Party government issued the Aliens Compliance Order, requiring immigrants without permits to obtain them or leave the country. In the view of these writers, the Order was an innocuous one, but it resulted in the expulsion of many immigrants.

The writers, after highlighting the link between the Aliens Compliance Order and the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act, observe that the latter was a continuation of the former. They emphasise that the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act reserved small and medium-sized enterprises for Ghanaians, and this reservation affected not only petty African traders, but also Lebanese and Indian businesses as well.

Dennis Austin in his work, *Ghana Observed*, 1976, also traces the origins of the Aliens Compliance Order to the NLC regime. He argues that the Order was meant to provide employment for Ghanaians, do away with the unwanted elements among the immigrant population, and reduce the flow of capital from the country. He shows that the Order was harshly and inefficiently enforced and led to a great deal of suffering on the part of the expellees. He emphasises that the Order offered opportunity to some Ghanaians to get jobs as a result of the mass
departure. He, however, concludes his work by stating that “the act [that is, the Aliens Compliance Order] was a poor testimony of the government.

In his *Ghana: A Political History*, 1990, Kofi Nyidevu Awoonor relates that the Aliens Compliance Order required all immigrants, including those whose parents were born in Ghana, to regularise their stay or leave Ghana, and that even those who had the proper papers and were to remain were banned from participating in certain businesses. He relates that some of the immigrants had lived in Ghana for many years, whiles others had been born in the country. Awoonor believes that the Order was issued on the instigation of international financial bodies that were bent on some form of population control as a precondition for lending more money to the government, but he gives no evidence to support this assertion. He does not accept the government’s claim that the expulsion was carried out to reduce crime. He again observes that the Order was harshly enforced, and that some Ghanaians, predominantly supporters of the Progress Party, seized the businesses, estates and cocoa farms of the deportees. He believes again that the expulsion of Ghanaians from Nigeria in 1983 and 1985 was a retaliation for the deportation of Nigerians from Ghana as a result of the Aliens Compliance Order.

Awoonor asserts that the expulsion led to the collapse of the cocoa industry because the expellees had contributed immensely to the country’s pre-independence prosperity. He further alleges that the businesses of Indians and Lebanese were not affected by the Order because they were the supporters of the Busia government.
*Africa Today*, 1991, reports that the Aliens Compliance Order was to enforce control of immigration never before attempted. It recounts that the immigrants had worked hard for the mainstay of Ghana’s economy and that their expulsion was detrimental to Ghanaians. It again shows that the Order required immigrants to obtain residence permits or leave the country. The work further points out that the authorities and some ordinary Ghanaians harassed the expellees. According to the work, the Order affected Lebanese and Indian businesses and that although the cocoa industry ran into problems, a world price rise led to the largest ever income from cocoa exports in 1970 (252 million Cedis). It also recounts that relations between Ghana and her neighbours were dented, but those with Nigeria were said to have been the worst.

In “Mass Expulsion in Modern International Law and Practice” in *International Studies in Human Rights*, Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louis B. Sohn show that immigrants started entering Ghana during the nineteenth century at the time of the establishment and consolidation of colonial rule. The reasons the authors assign to the influx of immigrants into Ghana are the introduction of new methods of raising cocoa and new mining methods. The work continues that initially no attempt was made to halt this process as immigrants were welcomed to perform manual labour which local residents scorned. Immigration, thus, continued and picked up momentum after 1945 leading to immigrants’ becoming engaged in more sophisticated areas of economic activity such as sales, construction and diamond mining.
The work posits that immigration laws were passed requiring all immigrants residing in Ghana to possess immigration documents, but the hospitable regime of Nkrumah did not effectively enforce them. After Nkrumah, the work recounts, the NLC passed decrees designed to restrict non-Ghanaian participation in the economy and to curtail immigration. The NLC could, however, not fully deal with illegal immigrants and their activities in Ghana and so the Busia government that took over from the NLC was compelled to issue the Aliens Compliance Order because the immigrants posed a threat to the economic survival of the country. Another justification advanced was that the country’s ailing balance of payment was worsened by the remittances of immigrants and that they engaged in smuggling minerals, especially diamonds. The work, however, argues that the government statistics could be very misleading.

The work states that the actual expulsion created scenes of panic and fear, but in the end Ghana’s unemployment problem was not fully solved by the mass exodus. The work does not say much about the impact of the Order on relations between Ghana and those countries whose nationals suffered expulsion. It, however, points out that except for Nigeria, which vigorously protested the manner of the expulsion, other affected countries acquiesced to the Ghanaian measure, and the matter was not taken to the OAU or the UN.

Kwaku Danso-Boafo’s work, *The Political Biography of Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia*, 1996, reveals that the Busia regime inherited numerous economic problems from the NLC, and it was in an attempt to deal with these crises that the government issued the Aliens Compliance Order. The work shows that the Order
required immigrants who had no valid residence permits to get them or leave the country. The author further relates that the Order was aimed at providing employment for Ghanaians and getting rid of criminals.

Danso-Boafo, moreover, states that the government introduced the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act of 1970 to back the expulsion order and ensure that the departure of the immigrants did not cause damage to the economy. The Act, the author observes, reserved for Ghanaians all kinds of retail and petty business whose turnover was below half a million cedis as of the 1967-1968 fiscal year. It also excluded immigrants from such fields as road transport, beauty culture, stationery, publicity, advertising and public relations, and cargo haulage business.

Danso-Boafo shows that the Aliens Compliance Order antagonised Ghana’s neighbouring countries whose nationals were affected. As a result, the author believes that the expulsion of Ghanaians from Nigeria in 1983 and 1985 was a reprisal for the expulsion of Nigerians from Ghana in 1969/1970. He states further that although government statistics showed that five thousand Ghanaians secured jobs after many of the immigrants had left, several economic fronts suffered because, for instance, there were fewer labourers in the cocoa farms and fewer sanitary workers to clean the streets and other sanitary needs. He again observes that commerce also suffered because in some towns, people did not have the capital to establish the kind of small shops operated by the immigrants, and items that were easily available became scarce.
It is observed from the above reviewed literature that a range of scattered secondary material exists on aspects of the expulsion order and the expulsion itself, but no elaborate and detailed written account has been given on the Aliens Compliance Order. In fact, many of the literature reviewed above do not treat all aspects of the Order. They concentrate on certain aspects of the Order to the neglect of others. These deficiencies show the imperative need to conduct an in-depth study and put all the fragments together and help present an objective and a comprehensive account of the context in which the Aliens Compliance Order was enforced.

**Purpose of the Study**

The course of a nation’s history is shaped by events that affect the country and the lives of its people in all sectors. Every significant event contributes in one way or the other towards the accelerated or slow, or positive or negative, socio-economic and political development of a country, its people, institutions, etc. In view of this, every event of importance, irrespective of the magnitude of the significance, merits appreciation and documentation for clarity of understanding of the contemporary generation and, especially, for the use and direction of future generations.

The 1969 mass expulsion of illegal immigrants from Ghana was a major event in the history of Ghana and on which detailed research and adequate information is lacking. What most people know about the expulsion order is that it
expelled immigrants from the country. Few people know about the circumstances leading to the issuance and enforcement of the Order, how the implementation was actually carried out, and the effects the Order had on the economic, social and political lives of Ghana. Some people are also ignorant about the fact that the Ghana government’s action affected the country’s relations with other countries, particularly those with whom common borders are shared and whose nationals were the most affected.

Only a comprehensive research would lead to a better understanding of the context in which the 1969 expulsion order was implemented. Thus, approaching the expulsion order from the historical perspective and with the employment of the internal-external approach, the study traces the origins of the November 18, 1969 Aliens Compliance Order, examine how it was enforced, and evaluate the effects of the expulsion on Ghana itself and on the nature of Ghana’s foreign relations during and after the expulsion exercise. The study, however, had the following specific objectives:

(a) to examine the factors responsible for the growth of the immigrant population;
(b) to identify and examine earlier measures dealing with immigration and the activities of immigrants in the country and evaluate the relative effectiveness of their enforcement before the issuance of the Aliens Compliance Order;
(c) to reappraise the possible reasons or objectives for which the Order was issued;
(d) to analyse the manner in which the decision was implemented;

(e) to assess the economic, social and political effects of the expulsion on Ghana and on relations between Ghana and her neighbours; and

(f) to contribute to knowledge in the field of the study by helping put the expulsion order in a historical perspective and presenting a well-researched work on the 1969/1970 Ghanaian mass expulsion.

Methodology

In order to present a quality work, the researcher used the accepted principles of the historical method. The qualitative method of the normal, analytical and critical examination and description of historical evidence was employed. The researcher began the study from the inspection and studying to an understanding of the facts in the available secondary materials, which were relevant to the problem of the study. In the course of gathering data for the work, notes were carefully taken to enable the researcher know the main ideas and important details of the materials gathered as well as the views and conclusions of authors whose works proved indispensable to the study.

Both secondary and primary sources were used in examining the study. As a historical requirement, the researcher began with an initial reading of the relevant secondary materials. Books, monographs and brochures on economics, sociology, migration, religion, and political science, which had bearing on the topic were obtained from the University of Cape Coast Central Library, Department of History Library, University of Cape Coast, Balme Library and
Institute of African Studies Library, both of the University of Ghana, Legon, Eastern Regional Library, Koforidua, Central Regional Library, Cape Coast, Greater Accra, Regional Library, Accra George Padmore’s Library for Research, Accra, and Martin Luther King Junior’s Library, Accra have also been used. The Graphic Communications, Accra, library was also used where the researcher read some articles from the Daily Graphic. Published articles in other contemporary newspapers, journals and magazines, and on the internet were also consulted.

The secondary materials have been supplemented with information collected from primary government records and interviews during field trips. The loss, or unavailability, of many archival documents did not allow the researcher to make use of archival information. Official documents could also not be accessed from government officials of the time because most of them reportedly had their documents burnt when the Busia government was overthrown in a military coup d’état. All the same, some government records were gathered as a replacement for those which could not be accessed elsewhere. Numerous acts of the Parliament of Ghana, parliamentary debates, decrees of the NLC and NRC governments, and other valuable official documents were collected from the Assembly Press, Accra, and the libraries of the Faculty of Law, University of Ghana, Parliament of Ghana, the Ghana News Agency, Ghana Law Reports, and the University of Cape Coast Library. These documents proved very useful for the examination of the study by providing information on immigration regulations during the colonial, Nkrumah and NLC administrations. They also equipped the researcher with facts on debates in Parliament concerning the expulsion. Population censuses
conducted in the country from about the beginning of the twentieth century to 1970 were also studied in order to get the numbers of foreigners in Ghana and the areas of economic activity in which they were engaged to support the study. The number of foreign businesses which suffered from the Order and those which were allowed to operate was collected.

During field trips, the researcher interviewed and held informal discussions with various categories of people who witnessed the expulsion exercise. In history, the nature of the problem of the investigation determines the methodology a researcher employs, though following the same scientific procedure. In the first place, the study is a retrospective one. It examines an event which, at the starting point of the data-collection period for its analysis, 2006 – 2008, had entered the annals of history for roughly 36 years. The researcher, therefore, made sure that the population for the study possessed the necessary features that adequately matched the nature of the topic. The most important of these features were that: (1) every member of the population was in Ghana prior to the launching of the Progress Party administration, or was in the country from, at least, the beginning of the Busia regime, to the time of its removal from office; and (2) every member of the population was aware of the event and was a first-hand observer or primary witness (eye-witness) of the event. Since premium was given to age, an arbitrary decision was taken to ensure that every member of the population was at least 18 years by January, 1970, so that by the beginning of 2006, the youngest respondent would not be less than 54 years if born before or in January, 1952.
A determined attempt was made to get some members of parliament and
government officials during the Busia administration for interview, but this
proved very difficult. Only one former MP and deputy minister in the Busia
government granted the researcher audience for interview. Other people targeted
for interviews could also not be accessed. This made the researcher to employ,
within the frame of the convenience sample, the probability sampling technique.
Probability sample is a sample selected in such a way that each item or person in
the population has a known (non-zero) likelihood to being included in the sample.
As a result, the researcher moved from the search for ‘specific’ people to
‘general’ people for interview. As already stated, all these witnesses were ‘adults’
during the time of the Busia administration, and could record events accurately.
These people provided the researcher with valuable information that either
substantiated or disproved some views and conclusions in some of the secondary
works. The researcher had the chance to interview some immigrants in Ghana
presently who were themselves affected by the expulsion but returned later to stay
and continue their economic activities in Ghana. These people provided first-hand
information on their own experiences and those of their fellow deportees.

The researcher was aware of the limitations of both oral history and
written documents. In fact, these limitations manifested themselves vividly.
Relating particularly to oral history, it was observed that though there was some
amount of coherence in the various accounts, there were differences and
omissions in the way and manner in which informants gave their accounts. By the
political nature of the study, there could have also been the witting instincts on the
part of some respondents to exaggerate, understate or even distort facts. It was, thus, deemed necessary to carefully scrutinise and internally and externally critique all the data gathered from respondents and written records in order to present only the accurate and reliable facts. In recording the facts, only information from people who were eye-witnesses was recorded. Unless substantiated by some eye-witnesses, information from interviewees whose data were second-hand, that is, they heard what they recounted from others, was not recorded, as the principle of corroboration is as important in history as it is in the law courts.

In relating the story, the researcher adopted the narrative, descriptive, argumentative, and explanatory or interpretative approaches. With the narrative, the study gives an accurate account of events by showing change through time and also in a thematic model. The study also describes the set of events within ‘the event’ itself by establishing relationships between them in both vertical and sequential patterns to enable readers get a fairly good picture of these events. The explanatory approach explains the identified relationships between the events and interprets the facts to make the work more intelligible.

**Significance of the Study**

The study is of an immense value to the individual, the people of Ghana as a whole, Africa, and, in fact, everyone who intends to acquire knowledge about the Aliens Compliance Order for a number of reasons. It is apparently the first known in-depth scholarly investigation and historical appraisal of the Aliens
Compliance Order. The study is primarily useful to historians, students, lecturers, researchers, and the ordinary reader. For these people, therefore, the study has provided a historical account of the 1969/1970 expulsion of illegal immigrants from Ghana. Policy makers and implementers would also find the study useful as a guide when formulating foreign policies. It would also serve as a guide to migrants to be cautious of and respect the immigration laws of whichever countries they find themselves in.

The study is, further, useful to immigration officers as to how to deal with immigrants and immigration issues. Since the police were bitterly accused of excesses in performing their duties in the wake of the Order, the study would be of immense importance to the police of today as regards how to handle such situations. Economic planners would also find the study beneficial because while showing the contribution of remittances to the countries of migrants’ origin to the disadvantage of the destination countries, the study has as well revealed immigrants’ contribution to the economy of the countries of their destination.

It is also hoped that the results of the study would instigate a deep and more scholarly examination of the formulation of government policies, both domestic and foreign. The findings of the study would also instigate a vigorous study of migrations and expulsions in Africa from the historical point of view.

Finally, the study has contributed to knowledge in the field of migrations and expulsions in Africa. It is hoped that people who until now have had a flawed
understanding of the Aliens Compliance Order, from now, would have an open and a complete understanding of what the Order was all about.

**Limitations of the Study**

The researcher acknowledged the fact that like any study of this nature, certain problems were inevitable. A major problem was encountered in accessing a good number of materials and informants who witnessed the expulsion. This was partly due to the unavailability of financial support. The problem was, however, mainly due to the unpreparedness of people to grant interviews for political reasons and the destruction or loss of data or documents. The researcher discovered that many government institutions and private houses which could provide valuable information had reportedly lost many documents. No government office, including the Parliament and the Public Records and Archival Administration Department, could produce certain vital government documents, including the Aliens Compliance Order itself. This compelled the researcher to resort to the welding of pieces of information collected from different secondary sources, proven by primary sources, before drawing the necessary conclusions.

To supplement data obtained from secondary sources with primary data, the researcher resorted to the collection of oral information in the form of interviews with respondents. There might have been exaggerations, distortions, and the possibility of respondents giving wrong information, either wittingly or
unwittingly. Some respondents might have been emotionally influenced by their political affiliations to the Progress Party or their opposition to it.

Even though the researcher relied mainly on convenience sample, not everyone who was in Ghana at the time the Order was being enforced could be interviewed because it was very difficult to identify and locate all such people for interviews. Many people who were contemporaries to the expulsion and who could have provided essential information had also died. However, an attempt has been made to ensure that the outcome of the study reflects the true picture of the expulsion order and the expulsion exercise, although the magnitude of certain occurrences would differ from one part of the country to another.

The issue of international migration and expulsions has now become a major topic of discussion in both academic fields and in government circles. The topic, therefore, deserves a wider treatment than this. This would have been too difficult a task to accomplish within the relatively short period for the research.

The next limitation has to do with chronology. Though the NRC which replaced the Busia administration dropped the implementation after it had enforced the decision briefly, some of the effects were long-term, which are still being felt. However, the study ended at the year 2000.

The researcher had also wanted to go to some neighbouring countries to delve into the impact of the expulsion on the expellees themselves, but time constraints and financial difficulties did not allow that.
Organisation of the Study

For clearer and better analysis of information, the study has been divided into five main chapters with an introduction and conclusion. The chapters have been composed and arranged both chronologically and topically or thematically. The main idea was to produce a work that takes account of the chronology of events and interprets facts based on themes to make the work more interesting and comprehensible to readers.

The introductory section has been subdivided into background information, statement of the problem, literature review, purpose or objectives, methodology and data sources, significance, organisation and limitations of the study.

Chapter One examines the causes of migration into Ghana leading to the growth of the immigrant population. It explores both the internal and external dimensions of the causes of migration.

Chapter Two discusses earlier measures dealing with immigration and the activities of immigrants in Ghana before the issuing of the Aliens Compliance Order in 1969.

Chapter Three analyses the Aliens Compliance Order itself and the reasons for which it was issued.

Chapter Four deals with the implementation of the expulsion order. The research was carried out in many parts of the country and people who witnessed
the issuance of the Order and the departure of the affected immigrants were interviewed in an effort to examine the actual enforcement of the Order on the ground.

Chapter Five examines the economic, social and political effects of the expulsion in Ghana. The effects were looked at from 1969 to 2000, especially in the political arena since the consequences of the expulsion there are still felt in Ghanaian politics today to some extent. An attempt has been made to find out whether these effects were positive, negative or middling. An analysis of the impact of the Order on relations between Ghana and her neighbours has also been made.

The conclusion shows the findings of the study and the observations made during the study.
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CHAPTER ONE

CAUSES OF MIGRATION INTO GHANA

Migration refers to directed, regular, or systematic movement of a single or a group of objects, organisms, or people from one locality to another.\(^1\) Human migration denotes any movement of people from one place, region, or country to another, often over long distances or in large groups, within and beyond a place of normal residence, and with or without the intention of making a permanent settlement in the new location. Human migration is a natural experience, and it has extensively taken place in human history and in the greatest variety of circumstances. This phenomenon accounts for the existence of many multi-racial and ethnically pluralistic societies in many parts of the world today. Migration is of different types. These include emigration, immigration, temporary migration, permanent migration, seasonal migration, internal migration, international migration, labour migration, illegal migration, nomad migration, mass migration, forced migration, chain migration, free migration, rural-urban or urban – rural migration, political migration, etc.
The history of migration in Africa is as old as the history of the continent itself. Generally and historically, migration has been a facet embedded in the way of life in Africa. Population movement for political, economic, religious and security reasons, as well as in response to demographic factors, has been recorded from early times. Although the most prominent movement within the continent in historic times probably was that of the Bantu-speaking peoples, there had been many different movements of peoples from one region of the continent to another and over many centuries. These included those of the nomadic Bedouin Arab peoples, the Banu Hilal and the Banu Sulaym into the Maghreb starting from the second half of the eleventh century. In Southern Africa, the Khoikhoi, also called the Hottentots, and the Afrikaners, or Boers, are also known to have embarked on a series of migrations in the early nineteenth century.

In West Africa, intra-regional migration has taken place throughout the history of the sub-region. Hausaland, for example, was a major recipient of large-scale migration, with peoples and groups coming from the Sahel in the north, Bornu in the east, and the regions of the Mali and Songhay empires in the west. Other migrant groups included the Tuareg, who were mostly pastoralists and showed little interest in territorial occupation and settlement, the Wangara, the Songhay fishermen, who settled in the Lower Rima River Valley, and the Arab and Berber merchants and scholars who came from North Africa and the Timbuktu area and began entering Hausaland in the second half of the fifteenth century, about the same time as the Fulani.
In Ghana particularly, the influx of people into the country could be traced to as far back as the period before the imposition of colonial rule. Adu Boahen maintains, primarily on grounds of linguistics and culture, that since the Twi, Ga and Ewe languages spoken in Ghana are not spoken anywhere else in the world, they must have evolved in the country, but the traditions of origin of the various peoples indicate that they all migrated into the country from different regions at different periods. Later after their settlement, other peoples also entered Ghana. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Wangara traders, for instance, entered Ghana. After the arrival of the Portuguese in 1471, Ghana saw the continuous arrival of more Europeans. By the beginning of the colonial era, Hausa, Fulani, Arab and Mossi traders were also well established in the country.

Although the movement of people into Ghana started during the pre-colonial period, the influx of immigrants into the country became more noticeable during the colonial era, as international political boundaries had been drawn, separating one country from others. Even after independence, there was no change in the trend of migration into Ghana. Some Ghanaians also emigrated to other territories, but the rate of immigration into Ghana far exceeded that of emigration from the country. The reason is that Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire and The Gambia were the three preferred migrant destinations in West Africa because of the comparatively more favourable socio-economic and political conditions they offered. As a result, the immigrant population in Ghana kept growing to the extent that no policy, be it economic, social or political, could be made for the country without taking into consideration the immigrant population. Ghana’s total
population in 1931, for instance, was 3,163,464.\textsuperscript{7} Out of this figure, immigrants formed 292,294, with Africans of foreign-origin constituting 289,217; 70,536 came from the other British colonies while 218,681 came from the French colonies.\textsuperscript{8} In 1960, Ghana’s population was 6,726,800, with immigrants forming approximately 827,000.\textsuperscript{9} Within a space of only nine years, the immigrant population reportedly increased to about 2,500,000,\textsuperscript{10} constituting more than a quarter of Ghana’s national population of 8,420,000 in 1970.\textsuperscript{11}

This chapter examines the causes of migration into Ghana in an attempt to explain the growth of the immigrant population. It must be appreciated that for the non-existence of artificial boundaries, movements in Africa before the imposition of colonial rule were never regarded as international; nor were any travel documents required for those movements. The terms ‘immigrant’ and ‘emigrant’, indeed, did not exist in pre-colonial African philosophy, and, thus, do not have their exact equivalence in most African languages. Indeed, they were ‘alien’ to the African way of life. They only gained acceptance into African languages with the arrival of the Europeans. This study, therefore, considered the movement of people into Ghana beginning from the era of the European partition of Africa in the 1880s, and its accompanying splitting of people of the same ethnic stock into different groups under the sovereignty of different nation-states, to the 1960s. For purposes of convenience, the analytical framework adopted here is the ‘pull and push’ approach. This analytical model sees the causes of migration to be both external and internal.
Theories of migration that traditionally distinguish between push and pull factors assert that motives to migrate can be either incentives, attracting people away, known as ‘pull’ factors, or circumstances encouraging people to leave, known as ‘push’ factors. ‘Both the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors are economically, politically, culturally and environmentally based.

The push factors consist of war or other armed conflict, famine or drought, outbreak of diseases, poverty, political corruption, dictatorship, disagreement with politics, political fear – such as oppression, ethnic cleansing and even genocide – poor political prospects, evasion of criminal justice – such as avoiding arrest – primitive conditions, loss of wealth, religious intolerance, discontent with the local people in the form of frequent harassment, bullying and abuse, lack of employment opportunities, poor educational facilities, poor medical care, and natural disasters, such as changes in climate, stimulating a search for warmer or colder lands; volcanic eruptions or floods that render sizable areas uninhabitable; and periodic fluctuations in rainfall. Thus, a group of people may migrate in response to the lure of a more favourable region or because of some adverse conditions or combination of conditions in the home environment. Most historians believe that non-nomadic peoples are disinclined to leave the places to which they are accustomed and that most historic and prehistoric migrations were stimulated by a deterioration of home conditions.\textsuperscript{12} These factors, excepting disagreement with politics and discontent with natives, generally do not affect people in developed countries; even a natural disaster is unlikely to cause out-migration.
The pull factors, on the other hand, include higher incomes, lower taxes, better weather, availability of employment opportunities, better medical facilities, education or better educational facilities. Others are better behaviour among people, political stability, religious tolerance, security and family links or family reunification.

Whatever dimension these factors take, it must be noted that the causes of migrations have modified over the years. While some causes are constant, others do not carry the same weight today as years ago. For example, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, labour migration did not have the same character as they do today.

In Africa, movements occurred across frontiers to restore ecological balance, in search of greater security and in search of new land, safe for settlement and fertile for farming.\textsuperscript{13} Migration across frontiers to spread religion has also always been a normal feature of life within the West African sub-region.\textsuperscript{14} Migration between neighbouring countries with similar social and ethno-cultural features took place on a routine basis in the past and even continues today.\textsuperscript{15} Migrations in search of jobs and for trade purposes have also taken place. The introduction of certain harsh measures by the colonial authorities in the German colonies and the Federation of French West Africa caused the movement of people from these areas into neighbouring British territories. Factors such as changes in climate, floods and periodic variations in rainfall have all been causes of migration in Africa. Economic development and modern transport and communication systems have also influenced the rate of migration in Africa today.
as elsewhere. In the Ghana situation, factors of similar nature combined to cause the influx of migrants into the country, bringing about the growth of the immigrant population.

The absence of well-defined political boundaries during the pre-colonial era greatly influenced migration across borders in the colonial and post-colonial times. Members of different ethnic or tribal groups had lived across large areas without being divided by any formal artificial barriers. The colonial powers, however, imposed arbitrary borders that divided people belonging to the same tribal or ethnic group and put them under different European colonial powers. For instance, the Akan cut across modern Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, while the Ewe also inhabit a large stretch of land covering Ghana, Togo and Benin. The Hausa-Fulani are found mainly in Nigeria and Niger and in other parts West Africa, whereas the Lobi are found in both Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, and the Busanga and the Mossi in both Ghana and Burkina Faso. The Banyamulenge (Tutsi) cut across Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Other ethnically homogeneous groups split by artificial national boundaries include the Mande, the Vai and the Kru in Liberia and Sierra Leone; the Makande in Mozambique and Tanzania; the Yoruba in Nigeria and the Republic of Benin; the Banyarwanda in Rwanda and Uganda; the Kwakwa in Uganda, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo; and of course the Somali ethnic stock in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. Further, members of pastoralist and border populations around the continent, such as the Maasai of Kenya and Tanzania, and the Mandingo of West Africa all straddle the borders of multiple African countries.
Freedom of movement of persons across frontiers in Africa has, historically, been facilitated by the cultural affinity of communities divided by international boundaries. Thus, people did not recognise they were crossing boundaries for which they needed entry permits during the colonial and post-colonial eras because there were no artificial political boundaries that divided Africans during the pre-colonial period. Burkinabes, Ivoriens, and Togolese who had relatives in Ghana moved into the country without considering the existence of any artificial boundaries and vice versa.

The spread of religion was a significant factor in the movement of people across borders. As early as the eleventh century, there had been unimpeded movement of people within the West African sub-region to spread religion. While the spread of Christianity was mainly a European affair, Islam was spread mainly by Africans. Maitatsine, who lost his life in 1980 during the religious riots in the northern Nigerian city of Kano, for instance, had migrated from neighbouring Cameroun.

Ghana too received migrants who had entered the country with the view to spreading Islam. Hausa migrants to Ghana, who included mallams, iron smelters, musicians, craftsmen, soldiers of fortune, and merchants, acted as significant agents in the spread of Islam and literacy in Arabic. They succeeded in winning converts, especially among the northern tribes. Muslims were also found among groups of northern immigrants to the south. These were sometimes so numerous that the major Southern cities, Kumasi and Accra, came to contain Ghana’s largest Islamic communities. In the early 1960s, for example, Dr. Kwame
Nkrumah had among his personal consultants al-Hajj Sekou, popularly known as Kankan Nyame, from Kankan in Guinea.\textsuperscript{19} Not only did these Muslim immigrants come to spread Islam in Ghana but they also became involved in the country’s politics.\textsuperscript{20} One cannot lose sight of the fact that by the 1960s, the population of non-Ghanaian Muslims had obviously increased.

Trade and other economic activities also made people migrate across frontiers. Until the first half of the twentieth century, people did business freely outside their home areas. As Ghanaian traders such as Chief Biney and others did big-time business in Nigeria and elsewhere in the middle of the twentieth century, so did nationals of other countries, such as Dantata and Alhaji Coumassie of Nigeria, come to Ghana for purposes of trade.\textsuperscript{21} In fact, by 1959, there were over 200,000 Nigerians working in Ghana, mostly in trade or white-collar jobs.\textsuperscript{22} Later, diamond digging and smuggling became a monopoly of Nigerians; yam selling in the huge Kumasi Market came to be dominated by men from Gao in Mali; and three-fifth of the butchers in Ghana in the 1960s were foreigners, mostly Hausa.\textsuperscript{23}

Non-Ghanaian Africans were not the only people who entered Ghana for trade and other economic activities. Europeans, Syrians, Lebanese, Indians, and people of other continental origins all migrated to Ghana. Asians who arrived in West Africa at the end of the nineteenth century found life in West Africa far better as compared to that of their poverty stricken villages back home. The reason was that the large expatriate firms like the United Africa Company, in supplying Lebanese shops with goods, were very liberal in the credit they allowed their owners. The banks also gave credit to Lebanese to finance the purchase of
produce where they refused it to Africans, and eventually, they took over from African traders the import-export business, retail and middleman trade.\textsuperscript{24} They also became engaged in textile and grocery importing trades, money-lending, investment in houses and land, service and related activities.\textsuperscript{25} These favourable economic conditions enabled Asians to increase their population in Ghana. Successful Lebanese, for instance, tended to back up relatives during their pioneer days.\textsuperscript{26} In 1950, for example, the Asian community in Ghana alone numbered 1,370 (mainly Lebanese),\textsuperscript{27} and due to their commercial activities, 93 percent of the Lebanese population in Ghana was urban based, over 90 percent of whom lived in Kumasi, Accra, and Sekondi-Takoradi.\textsuperscript{28}

Growth in cocoa production in certain African countries attracted migrant labourers into those countries. In the 1970s, for example, Sahelian migrants poured into Cote d’Ivoire to provide labour in the cocoa farms. Cocoa was first introduced into Ghana by the Basel Missionaries in 1858 from Surinam, but it became more common in the country only after 1879, when Tetteh Quarshie returned from Fernando Po with five cocoa pods which he planted at Christiansborg, Accra, and Mampong, Akuapem.\textsuperscript{29} From 1900 onwards, cocoa cultivation spread from Akuapem to Akyem Abuakwa, Asante, Central and Brong-Ahafo Regions. By 1911, Ghana had become the world’s leading producer.\textsuperscript{30} Production of cocoa continued to increase and generated a boom, especially in the 1920s and 1940s. This boom attracted immigrants from neighbouring territories who found jobs in the cocoa-growing areas of the country.\textsuperscript{31} This development culminated in the establishment of settlements in
parts of the country wholly composed of African immigrants. By the 1940s and 1950s, there was hardly a village in Ghana without a Nigerian, and in Asante, for instance, there were whole villages of Nigerians throughout the cocoa-planting regions. The 1950s also saw marked seasonal labour migration from the neighbouring French territories to the cocoa-growing areas in Ghana, such that by 1951 the Mossi from Burkina Faso numbered approximately 130,000, and about 25,000 Songhai and Djerma migrants from Niger arrived in Ghana each year.

Certain harsh measures on the part of the colonial administrations in the German, Portuguese and French colonies in Africa before, during, and after the First and the Second World Wars also sent many Africans in those territories into the neighbouring British territories thereby increasing not only the immigrant population but also the total population of these areas. Such harsh measures introduced by the colonial administrations included forced labour, direct taxation, the ‘indigenat’, corporal punishment for offenders and conscription.

In constructing railways and roads in their African territories and in other fields, the British government had resorted to the use of compulsory paid labour, but this was subject to the approval of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. In 1930, the International Forced Labour Convention was issued, and the Convention defined forced labour as ‘work or service exacted from any person under the threat of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily’. Following the issuance of the Convention, and even before then, forced labour was prohibited in British Africa, although in some areas, such as Northern Ghana, the practice continued to some extent. In general, however,
the use of force to secure labour in the British territories was at a considerably reduced rate as compared to their French, Belgian, Portuguese, Spanish and German counterparts.

In the Federation of French West Africa, for instance, all Africans not born in any of the four communes of Senegal – Dakar, St. Louis, Goree and Rufisque, and for that matter were not regarded as citizens – were classified as ‘subjects’ and were obliged to undertake labour for the administration. The most common use of labour was for road and railway construction, bridges, and telegraph lines and for the cultivation of crops to increase agricultural production.\(^{35}\) An Act of 11th April, 1946 and the Labour Code of 15th December, 1952 prohibited compulsory labour in the French overseas territories, but in French West Africa and the Cameroons there existed various types of labour which contained elements of force.\(^{36}\) The same condition existed in the Belgian and Portuguese territories much to the annoyance of the local people.

Direct taxation, like forced labour, was seen not only as an instrument of servicing the administration but also as a means of forcing Africans to increase production of crops which were needed by Europe.\(^{37}\) Under the French colonial system, taxation was imposed at such a level that in many instances, the farmer had to grow cash crops in order to be able to pay his taxes. In areas that did not produce cash crops in great quantity, particularly in parts of Sudan and Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta), men had to sell their labour.\(^{38}\) The unpredictable result of forced labour, as well as forced and direct taxation, was the exodus of many able-bodied men of Niger, Sudan, Burkina Faso and Guinea over distances.
of up to 2,000 kilometres, to seek employment in the British territories. In these territories, pay was higher and generally more stable and labour conditions were better; unskilled labourers were normally paid at rates between three shillings and four shillings and six pence (3s. and 4s. 6d.) a day, while mining workers received 4s. to 4s. 6d. a day. Escape from forced labour, the hatred for direct taxation, the ‘indigenat’, corporal punishment for offenders and better conditions in British West Africa, particularly in Ghana, were strong determining factors in the migration of people from the German, Portuguese and French colonies to Ghana. In 1916 and 1917, more than 12,000 people left Cote d’Ivoire for Ghana. Large numbers of Togolese also left for Ghana, and in 1910, as many as 14,000 Togolese migrated from the Misahoehe district alone into Ghana. It was also estimated during the First World War that obligatory cultivation of cash crops in Burkina Faso was responsible for 100,000 Mossi leaving for Ghana, and in 1930, again, 160,000 labourers from Burkina Faso left for Ghana.

Conscription also helped increase the immigrant population in Ghana and other British West African colonies. The French use of African soldiers date back to 1828, when two companies of Ouolofs were sent to Madagascar, and 1838 another company from Senegal was sent to French Guiana. African soldiers fought in the Crimean War in 1853-1855, in Mexico, in the 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War, and Senegalese troops were utilised in the Morocco War of 1912. Most of these soldiers were, however, volunteers.

Recruiting local soldiers in West Africa was originally carried on under a decree of 1904, which sanctioned the use of conscription in case sufficient
volunteers could not be raised. The practice continued under other decrees passed in 1912 and 1918. These decrees authorised universal conscription of able-bodied men. Their implementation compelled the local people to organise several revolts against the practice.

To assuage the feelings of the people, the government issued a series of six decrees at the same time, giving native soldiers a number of privileges such as exempting them from the ‘indigenat’ and taxation, granting them the privilege of naturalization under certain circumstances, and providing for the payment of allowances to the families of soldiers. In addition, the government authorised the establishment of agricultural and medical schools in West Africa, a sanatorium for invalid soldiers in each colony, and a reservation of certain categories of employment in the government service for ex-soldiers.

These enticements were, however, no remedy for desertion of the French territories by able-bodied men who wanted to escape conscription. The safest resort for those who did not want to be conscripted into the army was flight across the border into a neighbouring non-French territory. In 1917, Joost Van Vollenhoven, the Governor-General of the Federation, reported that the neighbouring British colonies had gained some 61,500 able-bodied men from French West Africa as a result of the compulsory recruitment exercise. Even after the war, conscription continued on a regular basis under Governor-General Martial Merlin (1919-1923). From 1920 to 1922 alone, 48,000 men were conscripted and after 1922, the process continued at an average rate of 10,000 a year. Ghana became the refuge for escapees, individuals and, indeed, whole
villages, from Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso. The French authorities requested their British counterparts to repatriate the escapees, but the British authorities cooperated in a half-hearted manner. Only a few escapees were arrested and deported. The British were naturally glad to receive additional labour and taxpayers. Fearing that their return would end them up in the army, those who escaped deportation settled permanently and added to the existing immigrant population in Ghana.

Whilst most of the labour migration that took place in Africa was caused by harsh measures on the part of the colonial regimes, it soon became so entrenched in the lives of the people concerned that it became essentially a voluntary movement. Among some African peoples, migration was regarded as a form of initiation into manhood. Among the young men of Western Niger, the journey to Ghana became a tradition and the accomplishment added considerable prestige. Even when forced labour was abolished in Mossi in 1946, the economy of the land had become so inextricably involved in seasonal migration that the flow of young men to Ghana did not cease. Kumasi became a sort of Eldorado for the people of Western Niger, Burkina Faso and the Sudan, where the money they could not make on their own poor soil could be earned. When the Takoradi Harbour and the triangular railway lines linking Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi were under construction at the beginning of the twentieth century, and the gold and diamond mines were opened up, immigrant labour from Burkina Faso, Togo and Benin voluntarily moved into the country in search of jobs. Migrants from French West Africa were not the only people involved in this voluntary
movement to Ghana. There were voluntary migrants also from The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Liberia and other African countries. Voluntary movement, thus, contributed to Ghana having 289,216 Africans of foreign-origin in 1931.57

The discovery and exploitation of natural products or mineral resources also attracted immigrants into Ghana. The discovery of gold in Ghana touched off a gold rush and led to the formation of numerous companies. Most of them collapsed, but by 1882, as many as six mining companies were operating in the Wassa-Tarkwa districts.58 Mining actually gained footing in the country with the formation of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation in 1897 by E. A. Cade. The success of the company encouraged another gold rush in Asante and Akyem and by 1901 as many as 3,500 concessions had been taken up.59 Although some of them were abandoned, there were 114 still in operation by 1904.

The mining of manganese in the Nsuta area in 1910, the discovery of diamond deposits near Abomosu, and the discovery of bauxite at Mpraeso in 1914, at Nyenahin in Asante in 1920, and at Awaso near Sefwi Bekwai in 1921 all attracted several Europeans, Syrians, Lebanese and Indians.60 These apart, the Mossi of Burkina Faso, the Zaberma from Niger, the people from Sudan and other non-Ghanaian Africans also came to look for work in the mines in Ghana.61 A census taken in 1946 recorded an influx into Ghana of 52,000 Africans from British territories and 121,000 of foreign-origin who were working in the mines.62

As the British colonial administration sent some Ghanaians to form part of the nucleus of the Nigeria Civil Service, there were also civil servants from the
other British West African territories brought into Ghana by the British authorities. K. A. Gbedemah’s father, Awumee Gbedemah, a government dispenser, for instance, was posted to Nigeria in 1909 to serve for a period of six to seven years. This was mainly due to the creation of the West African Civil Service by the British colonial masters. Workers of numerous professions, such as book-keepers and artisans of various descriptions found themselves in Ghana in the employment of the colonial authorities while others were brought into the country by British and other European companies. Many of these workers returned home shortly after Ghana’s independence, but others had, by then, become well integrated into the Ghanaian society and made Ghana their base, only paying occasional visits home.

Nationalist activities and the formation of regional organisations in West Africa added to the other factors to increase the immigrant population in Ghana. The National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA), founded in 1920 by Joseph Casely Hayford, for example, believed that the educated people in the four British West African territories, The Gambia, Gold Coast (Ghana), Sierra Leone and Nigeria, should come together to fight for the rights of their people. In 1934, I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson, a Sierra Leonean, also founded the West African Youth League with branches in Ghana and Sierra Leone.

In attending their meetings, the members of these regional nationalist movements did not need to obtain any travelling documents nor any entry permits. The reason was that for years, the nationalists of the four British West African territories talked of British West Africa as one political entity. Some of
the educated Africans even sometimes changed locations. Wallace-Johnson, for example, stayed in Ghana from 1934, when he was deported from Nigeria, to 1938, when he was once again deported from the country by the colonial authorities for being too critical on them. Nnamdi Azikiwe, a Nigerian, also lived in Ghana until his deportation to Nigeria in 1938. The educated elite really did not see the four territories as distinct from each other since their problems were basically the same and more importantly they were all under British colonial rule. Joseph Casely-Hayford in 1925, at the third session of the NCBWA in Bathurst (Banjul), The Gambia, and Bankole Awooner Renner, a Ghanaian lawyer, in 1937, called for a federation of the West African colonies. The West African Students’ Union in London, in 1940 also made the same call. With this conception, political giants in the four British West African territories, such as Kwame Nkrumah, J. B. Danquah and Casely Hayford of Ghana, Wallace Johnson of Sierra Leone, and Herbert Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, all fought for the independence of one West Africa but not only for their individual countries.

Even in the late 1950s, by which time some African countries had regained their independence, the desire for the federation of the four British West African territories continued to appeal to several West African leaders. In 1958, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a Nigerian lawyer, and Gabriel d’Arbousier, a Senegalese politician, separately and on different occasions made statements in which they advocated the formation of a union or a federation of West African territories. This was probably the reason why Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and his
Convention People’s Party adopted liberal policies and attitude towards the many non-Ghanaian Africans who trooped to Ghana after the re-attainment of independence in 1957.

Politics apart, the four British West African countries were linked by such institutions as the West African Airways, the West African Currency Board, the West African Court of Appeal and the West African Cocoa Research Institute. The French West African countries made enormous efforts to maintain their pre-independence joint institutions and even established new ones after independence. The Anglophone countries disbanded theirs, leaving only the West African Examinations Council, but the formation of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963 and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 bonded these countries once again and such links, in no small way, also fostered free movement. The ECOWAS was formed in May, 1975 and Ghana’s mass expulsion of non-nationals occurred earlier in 1969/1970. In view of this, one may be tempted to argue that the emergence of the ECOWAS did not play any significant role in the influx of migrants into Ghana, as it later did to countries like Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire. However, the Articles of Association for the establishment of the ECOWAS were signed by 14 countries in Accra on May 4, 1967, over two years before the mass expulsion. These articles said nothing about freedom of mobility for the people of these countries; but the integration of the markets of those West African states, which was being canvassed at the time, had considerable implication for mobility in the region.
Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanist orientation, furthermore, encouraged many non-Ghanaians to move into and settle in Ghana without obtaining any valid documents. Nkrumah fanatically pursued the creation of a ‘United States of Africa’ under one government headed presumably by himself. He worked assiduously to bring into being the Organisation of African Unity in 1963 through a chain of political alliances. With the formation of the OAU in 1963, Nkrumah’s hopes in the eventual unity of all African states increased, although it never became a reality. He continued to hold till his death the philosophy that Africa belonged to all Africans. To Nkrumah, therefore, Africans, irrespective of their country of origin, could freely move to and inhabit any part of the continent in contravention of visa requirements without being regarded as an immigrant, let alone an ‘alien’. Commenting on Busia’s expulsion exercise in a letter to a Reba Lewis, dated January 5, 1970, Nkrumah, then resident in Guinea, stated “…. Now I hear they are driving out all so-called aliens. Imagine talking of African ‘aliens’ in Africa.” Moreover, in 1963, a decision was taken to allow all Lebanese born in the country before independence to apply for permission to remain in Ghana forever. This apart, Nkrumah’s government harboured political refugees from other African countries to the annoyance of most African countries.

Liberal political policies aside, Nkrumah’s government also adopted certain economic policies that favoured foreign businesses. Indeed, the CPP government inherited an economy virtually wholly dominated by expatriate firms and companies. The situation compelled Nkrumah to declare before parliament on March 5, 1957, that “one of the first things that must follow from independence
was that citizens of Ghana must play a considerable role in the commercial and industrial life of the country than they had been doing earlier”. In its period, the CPP government made substantial changes in the fields of cocoa buying and banking, and this forced most of the expatriate firms including UTC, UAC, GBO, SAT, and CFAO, to voluntarily withdraw.

Apart from these two areas, Nkrumah did not introduce any stringent measures to deal with the dominant position of expatriate institutions and enable Ghanaians to enter the retail trade, timber and mining fields; instead, Nkrumah’s government gave grants and interest-free loans to expatriate mining and other companies that were running into financial difficulties to continue in operation. The result was that by 1960, expatriate firms and companies controlled the manufacturing, mining, construction, and insurance fields. Nkrumah’s favourable economic policies towards expatriate institutions were, presumably, intended to prevent greater unemployment by the closure of those bodies or by the adoption of strict economic measures that would have adversely affected their operations. Nkrumah also, obviously, needed foreign investment and again, believed that Ghana could afford the free trade policy. Whatever Nkrumah’s intentions were, those tolerant economic policies encouraged the migration of other Africans and more Syrians, Lebanese, Indian, and Europeans into Ghana to participate in the economy of the country.

The availability of social amenities such as educational facilities, good infrastructure, hospitals, good drinking water, etc. played a role in attracting people from one location to another in Africa. The availability of these
in Ghana before her independence in 1957, and a couple of years after that, lured many migrants into Ghana. Proceeds from the booming cocoa industry, gold, diamond, timber and a host of other exports brought in a lot of foreign exchange for Ghana. The economy, thus, enabled the colonial power to undertake quite a few projects: the Takoradi Harbour, hospitals, motorable roads, railway lines and schools and colleges. In the 1940s and 1950s, Ghana’s educational system was more advanced than any other similar territory in Africa. \(^8\) In 1957, when the colonialists left the political scene, Ghana’s economy was still effervescent. The Nkrumah regime also made giant effort in educational and health development. More schools were built and hospitals and medical services were improved. In addition, the mileage of good roads was more than trebled. The Akosombo dam was built to produce enormous amount of electricity; sugar factories, breweries, distilleries, a steel mill at Tema, textile factories, cement works, and an oil refinery were set up. \(^8\) Canned meat, coca products, paints, nails, safety matches, roofing material and many other goods all came to be produced locally. Many nationals of Ghana’s neighbouring countries entered Ghana and enjoyed everything the country had on offer, including fee-free education up to the university level. A quarter of the 1957 entrants to the University of Ghana, for instance, were Nigerians. \(^8\)

Escape from poverty, or risk diversification at the family level, surplus labour and the dearth of employment opportunities are traditional push factors in the movement of people in Africa. Their related pull factors are the existence of jobs and the demand for labour in a particular area. Poor individuals from less
developed countries can have far higher standards of living in developed countries than in their countries of origin. Furthermore, the dual labour market theory suggests that indigenes of a ‘developed’ country are generally averse to jobs that involve lots of manual labor or drudgery. This aversion to secondary sector jobs often allows or even encourages immigration and makes it much easier for people from other countries to immigrate and find jobs.

In Ghana, the introduction of new methods of raising cocoa and new mining methods caused increasing demand for manual labourers on the farms and in the mines. After independence, the vibrancy of Ghana’s economy also made readily available numerous menial jobs. Ghanaians’ aversion to jobs that involved lots of manual labor or drudgery allowed immigrants to move to Ghana and swarm all fields of secondary sector jobs. An agency, Mines Transit Welfare Centre, was set up to recruit labour from the French territories for the mines in Ghana, and there was also a good deal of illicit recruitment under unsatisfactory conditions. For instance, labourers from the French territories who did not have money for their fare were ‘sold’ by lorry drivers to ‘labour collectors’, who in turn pass them on to employers (such as cocoa farmers) at a considerable profit. Initially no attempt was made to halt this process as immigrants were welcomed to perform manual labour the local people scorned.

Circumstances beyond human control, including desertification, drought or famine, and floods, also caused movement of people from one locality to another. In such circumstances, the affected areas suffer directly while places not hit by these occurrences become indirectly affected as they absorb waves of
people uprooted by these events. The 1969-1974 drought that hit the Sahel compelled large numbers of the Fulani to move from the Sahelian countries of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali to the coastal countries of West Africa, mainly Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Benin, Togo and Nigeria. In the 1950s, however, Ghana was the most ‘industrialised’ of all four English-speaking countries in West Africa, and, thus, absorbed the majority of migrants running away from famine and searching for jobs and food in an ‘industrialised’ area.

Political threats and armed conflicts were a major cause of migration in Africa, with political stability in an area being the related ‘incentive’ for migration. Just as the Preventive Detention Act of July 1958 sent many opposition members to the Nkrumah regime to other African and non-African countries, so did nationals of other African countries, under unfavourable political circumstances, troop to Ghana in search of refuge. Not feeling safe enough, during the 1967-1970 Biafran War in Nigeria, about 6,000 Ibo people flocked into Ghana for safety. Many of them refused to return home even after normalcy had been restored, either for fear of a revival of the wars or for other reasons, and settled permanently in Ghana.

Besides running away from unfavourable events, migration also occurred in Africa as a result of people’s attempt to escape from certain conditions and responsibilities such as domestic control or dispute, tribal obligation, court fines, punishment, maltreatment at the hands of an older relative or husband, etc. Boys who resented paternal interference and dictation, or who were denied the girls they wished to marry, usually migrated to seek freedom elsewhere. The
assumption of domestic control on the death of a father by an unsympathetic kinsman also forced people to emigrate. Occasionally also, people were punished for some wrongdoing by being dismissed from their home areas, and migration to another area offered the only possible means of surviving. Some migrants from the sister countries entered Ghana for these reasons, and such migrants normally settled in the big towns and cities for fear that settling in the rural areas would lead to their facing such molestations again from the chiefs in the rural areas. Economic reasons apart, some scholars in the field of migration have identified all these as causes of migration in Africa.

Running away from boredom and adventure were yet other factors leading to intra-regional and inter-regional movement of people in Africa. Africans have always been mobile with economic factors as the main basis of their movements. At the same time, however, some of them merely enjoyed the movement and for this reason often went further than it was strictly necessary. In relation to boredom, people normally compelled to migrate were the youth. The youth also wanted to experience life in the towns and cities and in other areas other than in their own localities for the sake of adventure. Some people yearned to meet and move among strangers and admired the structures and facilities in the urban centres in their home countries and in other countries. Adventure drove some Sierra Leonean migrants to Ghana, and their experiences were expressed in songs which conveyed very truly rustic reactions to the relative whirl and bustle of Kumasi.
Family links and reunion further greatly contributed, and still do, to migration in Africa. The presence of one or more family members in a country enables the rest of the family to move into that country as well. Indeed, migration in Africa is usually a household rather than an independent, individual decision, and the decision regarding where and when to move is largely affected by the experiences of, and information received from, members of the family who have already migrated. Some migrants seek to live with loved ones such as a spouse or other family members. Migrants in Africa took advantage of the network of relatives and friends in other countries to ease the migration and relocation process. Some migrants usually returned to their host countries from their periodic visits home with their relatives.

In Ghana, example could be made of successful Lebanese, Syrians and Indians. Other non-Ghanaian Africans also followed a similar trend, and in their case, people from specific areas from certain countries normally congregated at particular areas in Ghana. For example, 97% of the Yoruba in Prang were from Ogbomosho, while 69% of the Ilero Yoruba in Ghana lived in Accra. Again, in December, 1970, it was hotly debated in the Parliament of Ghana that almost all the inhabitants of Kabosrueso in the Jasikan District in the Volta Region were immigrants, and that part of the Akposo tribe in Togo, near the Ghana border, had migrated en masse into Ghana.

All these factors combined and created a situation which culminated in an annual immigration of 3500 by 1900, and after 1945, immigration picked momentum, thereby establishing a considerable immigrant population in Ghana.
In fact, so ubiquitous were immigrants in Ghana that Bob Cole, a Ghanaian musician from Tarkwa, sarcastically remarked: “If you enter a village or town in Ghana and you do not find a Yoruba, don’t reside in that town because the inhabitants may be cruel.” Immigrants, especially Nigerians, had taken advantage of Ghanaians’ hospitality and flocked into the country in considerably high numbers. Initially, they were involved in agricultural labour, but they later became engaged in more sophisticated areas of economic activity such as sales, construction, and diamond mining. So active were they in the economic life of Ghana that by the time of independence in 1957, they had become an important factor in the process of economic development.

Clearly, the circumstances examined above in diverse ways encouraged the frequent influx of people into Ghana. It is highly contended, however, that irrespective of the nature of whatever factors that attracted migrants into Ghana, immigration could have been controlled if immigration regulations had been devised and effectively enforced. Paradoxically, the colonial authorities, Nkrumah’s government and the National Liberation Council (NLC) administration all made determined efforts to regulate immigration. Surprisingly, migrants never ceased to enter Ghana. It appears immigration was not effectively regulated during the pre – Aliens Compliance Order era. A careful and critical examination of the immigration measures devised by those governments and their enforcement would help explain the phenomenon.
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CHAPTER TWO

DEALING WITH IMMIGRANTS BEFORE THE 1969 EXPULSION ORDER

Until the imposition of colonial rule in Africa, there was, generally, freedom of movement. Movements of people from one place to another were not restricted by national or regional borders, visa systems, or national security fears. The modern idea of immigration is related to the development of nation-states and nationality laws. Citizenship of a nation-state confers on nationals an inalienable right of residence, employment and free movement in that state, but the residence, employment and movement of immigrants are subject to conditions set by immigration regulations. The British colonial authorities, the Nkrumah government and the National Liberation Council all devised numerous measures and policies to deal with immigration and other issues relating to immigrants in Ghana. This chapter examines immigration laws and other measures dealing with immigrants which were passed before the 1969 Aliens Compliance Order and evaluate the effectiveness of their enforcement.
The Colonial Administration and Immigration Control

The British colonial administration was the first to introduce immigration regulations into Ghana, thereby introducing Ghanaians, and for that matter Africans, to terminologies such as *citizen, alien, migrant, immigrant, emigrant*, etc. Some of the measures the colonial authorities devised dealt with citizenship and, thus, established the nationality of the inhabitants of Ghana as against those who were not indigenes of the land. Such measures comprised the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act of 1914, 1918, 1922 and 1933, the Aliens Ordinance of 1925 and 1935, the Naturalisation Regulations of 1933, the Statute Law Revision Act of 1933, and the British Nationality Act of 1948. These measures made a distinction between “natives” and “non-natives.” The latter supposedly comprised members of groups which territorially lay outside the boundaries of Ghana. However, the term “native” was legally defined as “British subjects or protected persons”, and by implication, they included any persons born in territories under the dominion of the British Crown.¹ The term ‘native’ was even given a broader connotation to refer to all persons ordinarily resident in any territory in West Africa under Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, and in the Belgian Congo, the Mandated Territories in West Africa, Liberia, Fernando Po and Sao Tome.² Obviously, Ghanaian citizenship was not clearly defined; therefore, any British subjects, irrespective of their race and country of origin, could freely and legally move to and reside as well as work in any territory under the British, including Ghana.
Other colonial devices, such as the Immigrant Paupers Ordinance of 1909, 1912 and 1919, the European and Asiatic Passengers Restriction Ordinance of 1912, the Regulation of Immigrants Ordinance of 1914, the Immigration of Labourers Restriction Ordinance of 1916 and 1917, the Immigration Restriction Ordinance of 1925, 1926 and 1927, the Immigration Restriction (Amendment) Ordinance of 1937, the Immigrant British Subjects (Deportation) Ordinance of 1945, and the Immigration Ordinance of 1947, imposed restrictions on immigration into Ghana. However, since peoples in non-British territories were also regarded as ‘natives’, the restrictions imposed on immigration, therefore, did not apply to such categories of people, and this armed them with the right of residence and work in Ghana.

Instances were also provided in which immigrants could be deported from Ghana. The 1916 Deportation of Suspects Ordinance, the Former Enemy Aliens (Restriction on Immigration) Ordinance of 1919, and the Repatriation of Convicted Persons Ordinance of 1945, for example, were some of the measures which empowered the colonial authorities to cause the repatriation from Ghana of enemies of the British in the First World War, and criminals of African descent. These apart, the colonial government passed several deportation orders against individual immigrants whose activities the government deemed subversive and dangerous to its survival. In this connection, I.T.A. Wallace-Johnson and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe were both expelled from Ghana in 1938 under the Sedition Act of 1934 for carrying out activities calculated to overthrow the colonial system. Again in 1954, the colonial administration deported some Nigerians from Ghana.
In the economic arena, too, the colonial administration passed a number of legislations to regulate the economic activities of both local and foreign businesses. The 1906 Companies Ordinance and the 1937 Registration of Business Names Ordinance, for instance, sought to provide protection for both local and foreign businessmen. These measures, nevertheless, eventually favoured the foreigner more than the local investor.

After carefully examining immigration control during the colonial era, it is observed that most of the immigration regulations the administration passed remained dormant in the statute books. The British colonial authorities failed to effectively apply those regulations because they needed more tax payers, to enable them get more revenue for their administration, and cheap labour force for the maximum exploitation of the resources of their colonial possessions in general and, in particular, to do the type of jobs Ghanaians despised. This apart, Europeans came to meet the principle of ‘freedom of movement’ well established in African culture which they were prepared to maintain for their ultimate benefit – for example, it would be easy for them to transport labourers from one region to another. The most important reason, it is argued, was that the original intention of the colonial powers in creating political boundaries in Africa was not to create political units that would determine the basis of future African nation-states. Neither did they have the idea of restricting the movement of Africans from one geographical area to another, nor protecting the resources of a territory for the sole enjoyment of the indigenous people. Those boundaries appear more to have
been imposed only for the European imperial powers to distinguish between their possessions and those of rival nations in order to prevent any clashes.

This apathetic attitude on the part of the British administration created discontent among sections of the local people such as the National Congress of British West Africa and the National Crusade for the Protection of Ghanaian Enterprises. At its first congress in Accra in 1920, for instance, the National Congress of British West Africa asked for stricter immigration controls to exclude ‘undesirable’ Syrians and other nationals of Asian origin. This request was inspired by their resentment at the overwhelming role these Asian immigrants had carved for themselves in the economy. The 1948 disturbances in Ghana also had as one of its causes the issue of unrestricted immigration. In fact, the Watson Commission instituted to inquire into the riots found that there was a marked hostility among all sections of the local people to the steady influx of both European, and Levantine and Asiatic peoples. The real complaint was, however, against the Levantine and Asiatic peoples whose economic successes attracted the envy of the local people. The Commission then recommended the adoption of measures that would strictly check immigration. In response to the peoples’ grievances and the Commission’s recommendations on unrestricted immigration, the British government promised to introduce more stricter regulations to control immigration, but nothing serious was really done.
Nkrumah and Immigration Control

The colonial authorities’ indifferent attitude towards immigration control was not peculiar to Ghana alone. The situation was generally the same everywhere in Africa during the era of colonial rule. The re-attainment of independence, nevertheless, changed the pattern of migration in Africa by reducing free international movements through elaborate development of visa and passport regulations, or customs and controls, of the need for foreign workers to obtain work permits, or restrictions on the repatriation of savings. As Mabogunje rightly indicates, African migrants came to perceive the real significance of national independence to be, for the first, governments’ definition of who were their citizens and who were not.

The newly independent countries were zealous to reserve available employment opportunities for their nationals and raise the standard of living of their citizens. Consequently, the various governments promulgated a series of regulations to generally regulate immigration of non-nationals but specifically to discourage the inflow of unskilled or unqualified persons into their territories for the purpose of taking up employment and to provide the independent nations the opportunity to get rid of illegal immigrants in their midst. Notable instances included the Passport and Immigration Act (1960) and Manpower Act of 1974 in Sudan; the Act of 1962 in Gabon to regulate the admission and stay of foreign nationals there; the Immigration Act (1963) in Nigeria; Immigration Act (1966) and Employment of Visitors Act (1968) in Botswana; the Immigration Quota

When it assumed power, Nkrumah’s government designed a number of immigration measures, some of which defined the legal status of immigrants and regulated their movement and economic undertakings in the country. The Ghana Nationality and Citizenship Act of 1957 and that of 1961 defined who were citizens of Ghana and, implicitly, who were not. The Deportation Act of 1957, and its amendment, the Deportation (Amendment) Act of 1959, empowered the government to deport from the country people suspected to be of dubious character, without being allowed to appeal to the courts. Non-Ghanaians were the only people to be affected, but several of those deported claimed to be Ghanaian citizens. For instances, in 1957, Alhaji Amadu Baba and Alhaji Othman Lalemi of the opposition National Liberation Movement were deported from Ghana. Although of Nigerian origin, both men and their parents had been born in Ghana.

Measures such as the 1957 Immigration Act, the 1959 Immigrants Employment Authorisation (Delegation of Special Powers) Order, the 1961 Immigrants Employment Authorisation (Delegation of Special Powers) (Revocation) Order, the Aliens Act of 1963, the Aliens Regulations of 1963, 1965 the Aliens (Amendment) Act of 1965 also required migrants who entered or left Ghana to possess the necessary travelling documents. Immigrants were required to enter Ghana through specified points of entry. The employment of immigrants also had to be authorised by the minister responsible for immigration. Two
Prohibited Immigrants (South Africans) Orders passed in 1960 and the Immigrants (Portuguese) Order also prohibited citizens of the Union of South Africa and of Portugal, respectively, from entering Ghana.

However, the Aliens Act of 1963, the Aliens Regulations of 1963 and the Aliens (Amendment) Act of 1965 were not particularly concerned about non-Ghanaian Africans. For, they exempted from their provisions “any person who belongs to an African tribe or is wholly descended from persons belonging to an African tribe, and any person born in any of the following countries or territories, that is to say, Nigeria, Benin, Mali, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Guinea, Niger, Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Mauritania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic, and Morocco.”¹² For this reason, Nkrumah’s government was more tolerant of all Africans in Ghana, irrespective of their country of origin.

In 1960, the Immigration Service was placed under the Ministry of Interior for the first time, and in December, 1963, the government passed the Foreign Travels (Exit Permits) Act, which required Ghanaians travelling outside the country to be issued with an exit permit.¹³ This was done with the view to controlling the movement of Ghanaians in order to curb the activities of local people who were also engaged in smuggling. In addition, the Minerals Control of Smuggling (Amendment) Act was passed in 1965. The introduction of the exit permit system in 1963 increased appreciably the duties and responsibilities of the Ghana Immigration Service. Consequently, in 1963 and 1965, the staff of the service was increased to be able to effectively handle immigration.¹⁴
attempts were also made, starting especially in 1965, to control the growth of the country’s population. This was to be done mainly through the strict implementation of immigration regulations already in force, including those requiring immigrants intending to stay in the country to have valid travel documents.\textsuperscript{15}

In the economic field, at the time of inaugurating the Nkrumah administration, the economy was heavily dominated by immigrants, particularly non-Africans, and so the government promised to rescue the economy from foreign domination by formulating policies that would allow more Ghanaians to participate in the economy.\textsuperscript{16} On the contrary, Nkrumah did nothing serious to touch the dominant position of the expatriate firms, leading to their growth during the 1957–1960 period.\textsuperscript{17}

The Incorporated Private Partnerships Act, 1962 (Act 152), and the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179), were later passed to regulate the establishment and administration of both local and foreign companies in Ghana. The Capital Investments Act of 1963 also aimed at encouraging investment in Ghana. Eventually, however, investment in Ghana came to be dominated by expatriate firms because at the time, Ghanaians did not have the capital to strongly compete with the foreign companies who enjoyed the favour of capitalist financial institutions whereas local businessmen were denied.\textsuperscript{18}

Obviously, Nkrumah made determined effort to regulate immigration; however, much could not be achieved. Like the colonial administration, the C.P.P.
also did not effectively enforce immigration regulations. Nkrumah must have thought of continuing the British policy of relaxing immigration in conformity with the African way of life before the European introduction of immigration measures. The most important reason, however, was Nkrumah’s pursuit of the concept of African brotherhood.

The NLC and Immigration Regulation

The National Liberation Council (NLC) inherited some political, social and economic problems when it assumed office in February, 1966. One of these was that though previous governments had allowed many non-Ghanaians, especially non-local Africans, to settle in Ghana, they had paid no serious attention to establishing their nationality. Thus, between 1957 and 1967, many second generation African immigrants in Ghana, with respect to the provisions of the Ghana Nationality and Citizenship Act of 1957 and that of 1961, were, therefore, without any African nationality, although legally those born in Ghana before independence remained British. What happened was that the embassies of Ghana’s neighbouring countries, as they too achieved independence, started issuing identity cards to the Ghanaian-born children immigrants from their countries. Many Russians, Chinese, East Germans and Asiatics had also been allowed to enter Ghana with much ease during Nkrumah’s administration.

The NLC decided to tackle the situation by, for example, expelling from Ghana immigrants to whom Nkrumah had provided sanctuary.
political and economic relationships with the Eastern bloc with which Nkrumah had allied. Following this, Russians in the country were expelled. So were the Chinese and the East Germans who were accused of aiding Nkrumah in the setting up of his regime. In 1968, the government rescinded the 1963 decision which permitted Lebanese born in the country before independence to remain in Ghana as citizens. At the same time, the NLC amended the Aliens Act of 1963, and its 1965 amendment, which then became the Aliens (Amendment) Decree, 1968 (N.L.C.D.259), to check the influx of immigrants into Ghana and to limit the chances of non-Ghanaians qualifying for Ghanaian citizenship by clearly defining Ghanaian citizenship through the Ghana Nationality Decree of 1967 (N.L.C.D. 191), the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree of 1969 (N.L.C.D. 333), and citizenship under the 1969 Republican Constitution. This was accompanied by the Aliens (Amendment) Decree of 1968, and the Aliens (Permits For Prohibited Areas) Regulations, 1969 (L.I.612), requiring immigrants to possess valid passports, visa or entry permits before entering Ghana and preventing non-Ghanaians from entering or remaining in certain areas unless permits were granted them.21

Citizenship laws passed by the NLC virtually made everyone born in Ghana a citizen by birth. Nevertheless, these measures, particularly the 1967 Nationality Decree, made the acquisition of citizenship by registration almost an impossibility since applicants were required to be able to speak and understand a Ghanaian language before their applications would be considered. Even more
serious was Article 10 (3) of the 1969 Constitution under which citizens “otherwise by birth” could be deprived of their citizenship.\(^\text{22}\)

In the economic front, the NLC, on January 6, 1968, announced the taking-over of the storage, supply and distribution of petroleum. Three foreign companies, Commonwealth Haulage Bulk Transport (British), Kalmoni and Co. Ltd. (Lebanese) and City Auto Parts Suppliers Ltd. (Lebanese), owners of 117 tankers, were taken over under the decree after they had withdrawn their tankers, causing a serious shortage of petroleum products in the country, particularly in Asante and the north.\(^\text{23}\) The NLC, again, in its industrial policy of 1968, gave incentives to Ghanaians to induce them to move into industrialisation. Small-scale enterprises were, moreover, reserved for Ghanaians. These enterprises were those which employed a hundred persons or less, which required unsophisticated production or operational techniques, or the value of whose fixed assets was \(\text{N}\$ 100,000.00\) or less.\(^\text{24}\) Ghanaian entrepreneurs were granted credit facilities and technical assistance, provided with funds from the government as well as financial and technical aid from international sources, accorded special tax treatment, and reduced ground-rent and lease of industrial estates on reasonable terms. The major idea was to push the economy gradually into the hands of Ghanaians.

An Immigration Quotas Review Committee was, further, set up, and, following two reports submitted by the Committee, immigrants whose business establishments were financed with capital raised locally were barred from repatriating their profits to their home countries.\(^\text{25}\) Affected expatriate employees were given between six and twelve months to leave the country, but expatriate
employees whose work was technical in nature were given sufficient time to enable qualified Ghanaians to be trained to replace them. Later, the government cancelled the total prohibition of expatriates sending money home, and, instead, reduced the percentage of remittances from fifty to forty percent.

Moreover, the government issued the Ghanaian Enterprises Decree (N.L.C.D. 323) on December 30, 1968 to give a legislative backing to its efforts to reserve certain aspects of the economy, such as, retail trade, taxi services, processing and extractive manufacturing business, etc, for Ghanaians. No new foreign enterprises were to be licensed in the protected fields. The government was also not to encourage new foreign capital and enterprises into trading activities even if they fell outside the limit specified. Non-Ghanaian business enterprises properly registered and operating in the protected fields were, nevertheless, to be permitted to continue operation if they immediately started training programmes to prepare Ghanaians to replace them, refrained from employing expatriates except working proprietors, and took steps to show that they were “Ghanaianising.” Here, non-Ghanaian Africans were to be given preference over non-Africans, but this would continue only if Ghanaians in other African countries were given the same treatment.

Immigrants mostly affected by the Ghanaian Enterprises Decree were Lebanese, Indians, Syrians and Nigerians. This attracted criticisms from Nigeria, but that could not deter the government. The NLC went ahead to hand over some 208 foreign firms to Ghanaians in accordance with Section Two of the Ghanaian Enterprises Decree. The affected companies included the Pioneer Shoe Factory,

Following Nkrumah’s failure to implement measures to control the growth of the population, in March, 1969, the NLC government adopted a definite policy on population, entitled “Population Planning for National Progress and Prosperity.” One major long-term objective of the 1969 population policy was to “reduce the population growth rate from nearly 3% in 1969 to 1.7% by the year 2000.” The reduction was to be achieved mainly through the reduction of fertility and birth rates and the enforcement of immigration and emigration regulations.

Comparatively, the NLC was more stringent in its enforcement of immigration regulations than the colonial authorities and Nkrumah’s government were. The NLC was, however, not wholly successful in its attempts to break the immigrants domination of certain sectors of the economy and to reduce the immigrant population. When leaving office, therefore, it suggested that the Aliens Act of 1963 and its 1965 amendment, as amended in 1968, be amended again so that to qualify for a Ghanaian citizenship, one would be required to have, at least, one Ghanaian parent as against the one Ghanaian grandparent it had granted in the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1969 (N.L.C.D. 333). Furthermore, in July 1969, the NLC ordered all embassies of countries with citizens in Ghana to
regularise the stay of their nationals in Ghana within a period of eight months.\textsuperscript{34} The various embassies did not, however, take this directive seriously. As a result, the NLC, in its handing-over notes, requested its successor to ensure that immigrants complied with the directive it had issued previously.\textsuperscript{35}

It is clear from the foregoing analysis that the British colonial authorities, the CPP government and the NLC regime all devised measures to control immigration and regulate the movement and activities of immigrants in Ghana. Yet, more migrants continued to enter Ghana. Various factors continued to attract migrants to Ghana, but if immigrants’ entry into Ghana and their movement and economic activities in the country had strictly and effectively been regulated in accordance with existing immigration measures, the frequent arrival of more migrants could have been discouraged or, at least, reduced to some manageable extent, and that, in turn, would have affected the size of the immigrant community in Ghana. This was, however, not done, especially during the colonial and CPP times. This continuity of policy led to an increase in both the number of migrants entering Ghana and the size of the stabilised population of immigrants in Ghana.\textsuperscript{36} As a result, the efforts of the NLC to reduce the immigrant population was, therefore, not wholly successful. It was to correct this situation that the Busia government felt that a firm action was needed, compelling the government to issue the Aliens Compliance Order.
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CHAPTER THREE

GET IT OR LEAVE: THE EXPULSION ORDER OF 1969

Expulsion, whether individual or collective, refers to an act by an authority of a state with the intention and with the effect of securing the removal of a person or persons against their will from the territory of that state. Mass expulsion refers to the expulsion of large groups of people. World history has recorded several occasions when migrant or expatriate communities were obliged to leave en masse the countries in which they had chosen to work or settle. Expulsion of non-nationals became more noticeable in Africa after independence when most African countries began to experience fast population growth, together with the protracted stagnation that characterised most of the African economies, and fluctuations in the prices of their commodities in the world markets. Examples of expulsions occurred in Ivory Coast (1958, 1964); Cameroon (1967); Senegal (1967); Guinea (1968); Sierra Leone (1968); Ghana (1969); Zaire (1970, 1973); Zambia (1971); Uganda (1972); Equatorial Guinea (1974); Kenya (1977, 1978-81); Chad (1979); Liberia (1983); and Nigeria (1983, 1985).
Ghana’s 1969 Aliens Compliance Order repatriated from the country many illegal immigrants, the majority of whom were non-Ghanaian Africans. This section examines the Aliens Compliance Order and discusses the reasons for which it was issued.

The Aliens Compliance Order

The Busia administration assumed office on September 30, 1969. Immediately the administration was sworn into office, it felt that the old habit of regarding Ghanaians as not meaning what they said needed to be corrected by a firm action. It was partly to do this that the Aliens Compliance Order was issued on 18th November, 1969.

What eventually came to be referred to as the Aliens Compliance Order was contained in a directive issued by the Ministry of Interior on November 18, 1969. It said:

It has come to the notice of the Government that several aliens, both African and non-African in Ghana, do not possess the requisite residence permits in conformity with the laws of Ghana. There are others, too, who are engaging in business of all kinds contrary to the terms of their visiting permits. The Government has accordingly directed all aliens in the first category, that is, those without residence permits, to leave Ghana within fourteen days, that is not later than December 2, 1969. Those in the second category should obey strictly the terms of their
entry permits, and if these have expired, they should leave Ghana forthwith. The Ministry of the Interior has been directed to comb the country thoroughly for defaulting aliens, and aliens arrested for contravening these orders will be dealt with according to law.¹

On December 1, 1969, Mr. Victor Owusu, the Minister of External Affairs, informed members of the diplomatic corps whose nationals were affected by the expulsion order that immigrants who had the proper papers and were to remain were banned from petty trading and elementary market selling and buying which required no special skills.² Mr. Owusu apprised the diplomats that the deadline would not be extended because the exercise was to be conducted without any delay. The Ministry of Interior indicated on November 21, 1969, that immigrants who refused to comply with the deadline would face court action, but people affected by the expulsion order could not appeal to the courts.³

**Reasons for Issuing the Expulsion Order**

As generally recognised, it is the sovereign right of all nations to control their borders for security and other purposes. Migration can be perceived as threatening by governments of either population-sending or population-receiving countries. There are several situations in which both refugees and voluntary migrants may be perceived as a threat to the political stability of both sending and receiving countries or to relations between sending and receiving countries. One is when refugees and migrants are opposed to the regime of their home country,
and are, therefore, regarded as a threat, or a thorn, in relations between sending and receiving countries; the second is when they are perceived as a political threat or security risk to the regime of the host country; the third is when immigrants are seen as a cultural threat; the fourth is when they pose social and economic problems to the host society; and the last is when the host society uses immigrants as an instrument of aggression against the country of origin.⁴

In the case of Ghana, the circumstances and pressures that influenced the government’s decision could best be explored by investigating the operational environment that shaped the decision. The analytical framework adopted for purposes of convenience is the ‘input-output’ or ‘external-internal’ approach.

**External Dimension**

At the external dimension, the relevant forces operated at the global level, the subordinate or continental, the subordinate other or the sub-regional level of West Africa, and at the bilateral level. In official circles, the most paramount reasons given for the expulsion were economic in nature. Certainly, the country faced grave economic recession resulting from the economic conditions at the global level which provided the uncompromising environment for all the difficulties of the Busia administration. First, by the time the Busia government came to power, Ghana’s foreign debt was over US $800,000,000.⁵ Secondly, the world economic recession of the 1960s affected Ghana’s economy in a number of ways. For instance, depression of prices of commodities in the world market
drastically reduced Ghana’s foreign exchange earnings and revenue from the marketing of her primary commodities such as cocoa, palm products, and timber. Reduction in the prices of cocoa was the more serious because since 1911, cocoa had become Ghana’s leading export crop and the main generator of Ghana’s foreign earnings. For example, the overseas price of cocoa dropped from £474 per ton in 1954 to £251 in 1957, 230 in 1960, and 142 in 1965. In this connection, it is pertinent to state that the global economic situation was such that most countries would want to protect the economic interests of their nationals first, and no country would allow large numbers of foreign nationals living illegally on its economy. As the Ministerial Secretary for the Interior, Mr. Kwaku Baah, put it: “We cannot afford to feed other mouths when ours are not fed. We cannot cater for the interest of those who do not help us to pay our debts.”

Still at the global level, achieving foreign policy objectives also influenced the government’s decision to expel the illegal immigrants, at least, to some extent. Kofi Nyidevu Awoonor, for example, believes that the expulsion order was issued on the instigation of international financial bodies which were bent on some form of population reduction as a guarantee for granting loan to the Busia government. Awoonor does not give any evidence to support this assertion, but it is known that the Busia government was typically pro-Western. In appealing for loans and other aid from the Western powers, the Busia government could be manipulated by the Western bloc to achieve its ends, such as mounting pressure on the Ghana government to flush out all immigrants in order to get rid of socialist and communist elements from the country. It is, therefore, not wrong to assert that the
Busia government, in its application for loans from capitalist financial institutions, was influenced in its policy formulation and implementation. In any case, this view was evident in a Nigerian radio commentary on May 3, 1970, thus: “At the peak of Nigerian civil war, the Busia government … took a most unfriendly action by ejecting thousands of Nigerians resident in Ghana in a most callous manner. … One is tempted to see the Ghana PM as having been manipulated from some foreign capitals.”

At the continental and the West African sub-regional levels, economic factors played yet another important role in the expulsion exercise. Due to the widespread laxity in the enforcement of immigration regulations, immigrants who poured into the country in great numbers neither had valid entry and residence documents, nor were they in possession of work permits as required by existing immigration regulations. Though many were without regular jobs, most of them were gainfully employed in different sectors of the Ghanaian economy.

The view that immigrants had dominated certain sectors of the economy only creates the impression, without any tangible justification, that a greater percentage of all economic activity in the country had been held by immigrants. To confirm or negate this claim, it is necessary to examine the role of immigrants in the economy of Ghana. In doing this, the researcher employed the 1960 Population Census as the source of his statistics.
### Table 1

Comparison of Age Distribution of Ghana-Origin Population and All Ghana (Both Sexes - %), 1960.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Group</th>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 – 4</td>
<td>5 – 14</td>
<td>15 – 44</td>
<td>45 – 64</td>
<td>65+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Ghana</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana-Origin</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-Origin</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** 1960 Population Census of Ghana, Vol. III.

Table I indicates that whereas about 54.1% of the Ghana-origin population fell into the economically active age group, that is, those aged 15 – 65+, 55.6% of the population of the country as a whole were within this age bracket. 65% of the immigrant population were found to be economically active. Due to their low education, however, they consisted mainly of illiterate labourers and contributed mainly to the lower sectors of the economy.
### Table 2

**Distribution of Foreign-origin and Ghana-origin Population by Type of Occupation. (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
<th>Population of Ghana-Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof./Admin./Exec.</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miners/Quarrymen</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** 1960 Population Census of Ghana, Vol. IV.

Table 2 shows the percentage of immigrants and population of Ghana-origin engaged in specific fields of employment. The table shows clearly that contrary to the accepted belief that immigrants dominated the agricultural sector, there were proportionately fewer immigrants involved in agriculture as compared with indigenous Ghanaians at the time of the 1960 census. This does not mean that immigrants were averse to jobs in the agricultural sector. As was pointed out
in the first chapter, most of the immigrants had entered Ghana as labourers in the agricultural sector, and indeed, they were welcome to do jobs that some Ghanaians were not prepared to do. Later, however, some of them managed to accumulate enough capital to move into other areas of the economy.

The table again indicates that most Ghanaians, apart from the Kwahu, considered trading, particularly retail and petty trade, as a less dignified occupation, especially for men. On the other hand, immigrants, especially women, dominated this field. There were proportionately more male immigrants in the field of craftwork than among the Ghana-origin male labour force. In the same vein, there were proportionately more service workers among the immigrant population than there were among the Ghana-origin labour force.
Table 3

**Proportion of Immigrants aged 15 and above falling within the Total Labour Force by Type of Industry, (1960)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Industry</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cocoa Growing</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caretakers in Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logging</td>
<td></td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacture of footwear, other apparel and made-up textile good</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacture of wearing apparel (except footwear)</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale Trade</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail Trade</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty Trading, Hawking and Peddling</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(Table 3 continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger Trucks and “mammy” lorries</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Service</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Service</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Service</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Service</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Key: F – Female

M – Male
Table 4

**Industrial Distribution of Employed Immigrants and Ghanaians Aged 15 and Above by Sex (%), (1960)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and Quarrying</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** 1960 Population Census of Ghana, Vol. IV.

Above, Tables 3 and 4 also show that immigrant labour in mining and quarrying was proportionately higher than that of Ghanaians. In mining, especially in the field of diamond mining, immigrant labour was significantly higher, and of all workers in the diamond field in 1960, one-third were Nigerians,
either as diggers or dealers. Similarly, the service sector was being maintained predominantly by immigrants.

Tables 5.1 and 5.2 below reveal clearly the proportion of immigrant workers falling within the country’s labour force, distributed according to the various occupational sectors.

Table 5.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proportion of Immigrant Workers Aged 15 Years and Above within Various Craftsmen Occupational Groups (%)</th>
<th>(1960)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. of 15+ Immigs.</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Craftsmen Occupations” (All Craftsmen)</td>
<td>M and F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailors</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toolmakers, Plumbers, Welders, Machinists</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenters, Joiners, Cabinetmakers</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(Table 5.1 *continued*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Prop. of 15+ Immigs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bricklayers and Plasters</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millers, Bakers and Brewmasters</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longshoremen and Freight handlers</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butchers and Meat cutters</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>59.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Labourers</td>
<td>M and F</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: 1960 Population Census of Ghana, Vol. IV.*

Key: F – Female

M – Male

Prop. of 15+ Immigs. – Proportion of Immigrant Population Aged 15 Years and above among the total Country’s Population Aged 15 Years and above.
Table 5.2
Proportion of Immigrant Workers Aged 15 Years and Above within Various Service Occupational Groups (%), (1960)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Service Occupations”</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Service Workers</td>
<td>M and F</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighters and Guard</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policemen and Detectives</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housekeepers, Cooks and Maids</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The last table for our discussion, Table 6 dealing with the employment statuses, also shows that compared with Ghanaians, proportionately few of the male immigrant labour force was self-employed, that is 41% as against 59% for Ghanaian male labour force. A considerable proportion of the immigrant labour force was engaged in the cocoa farming, mines, foreign and private companies, as labourers and watchmen, etc., that is, in the non-public sector of the economy. The number of Ghanaians working as family workers was comparatively higher.
than that of the immigrants, but generally, both population groups had very few persons as apprentices.

Table 6

Employment Status of Employed Ghanaians and Immigrants aged 15 and above, (1960)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Status</th>
<th>Ghanaians</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers and Self-employed</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>76.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees in Public Sector</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees in Non-Public Sector</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Workers</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caretakers in Agriculture</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apprentices</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The tables above show that truly some areas of economic activity were dominated by immigrants and, thus, contributed to unemployment among the local labour. It is partially correct to assume that some of the immigrant businesses kept out some of the indigenous people from being employed in their concerns. For example, fitting shops, vulcanizing workshops, fuel filling stations and other enterprises in which the proprietors or owners were immigrants worked largely in partnership with persons and apprentices of their own countries of origin. There were also known cases of lock-outs among immigrant workers in the mines and other departments; labourers who knew they were about to resign sent their relatives or friends to the supervisors of the sections under whom they worked to effect the replacement.10

Since the expulsion occurred about a decade after the collection of the statistics above, the immigrant population must have shown some changes by 1969. Some of them must have moved from the villages to the towns to work in the urban economy. Also, since some of the children of immigrants born in the country were receiving education in the same way as the children of the local people, most of these children, on completion of their education, would not go into farming or the other low-status jobs, but would enter into offices and other white collar jobs. Those already in petty trading and other economic ventures which Ghanaians scorned would also definitely seize the opportunity to consolidate their positions in such areas of economic activity. The position of the few European and Asian immigrants in the economy was, in addition, strong. It is, as a result, argued that to some degree, there was some amount of truth in the
government’s claim that certain aspects of the economy were dominated by immigrants.

Labour-market protectionists, often arguing from economic nationalism, are opposed to economic needs-driven immigration. The core of their arguments is that a nation’s jobs are the ‘property’ of that nation, and that allowing foreigners to take them is equivalent to a loss of that property. They also criticise immigration of this type as a form of corporate welfare, where business is indirectly subsidised by government expenditure to promote the immigration and the assimilation of the immigrants. They argue further that an influx of cheap labour could easily deflate wages for workers who are already established in particular jobs and have a negative impact on the standard of living for the more established workers. These aside, they stress that every country’s main concern is the welfare of its citizens. In December, 1968, for example, the Sierra Leonean government deported some Ghanaian fishermen, who reportedly excluded Sierra Leoneans from fishing. The Progress Party had also stated in its manifesto that it would undertake to provide maximum support for Ghanaian businessmen to ensure that Ghanaians acquired a greater stake in the economy.

In view of these arguments, illegal immigrants in Ghana were accused of posing a threat to the economic survival of the country by depriving Ghanaians of job opportunities. Indeed, the government’s economic survey for 1968 revealed that there were some 600,000 unregistered unemployed indigenous Ghanaians. Also, during the four-month period from October, 1969 to January, 1970, 137,009 unemployed people, comprising 119,349 males and 17,660 females, applied to the
Public Employment Centres for assistance in finding suitable jobs. In the face of all these, the government felt the need to see to the interests of its citizens first by expelling the illegal immigrants, and hoped that the expulsion would relieve the situation. Most importantly, the government feared that if the immigrants’ dominance of secondary sector jobs was not broken at that time, it would create a situation in which future generations would be competing on their own land with immigrants for survival.

Another economic factor which operated at both the continental and the West African sub-regional levels concerned repatriation of capital from Ghana. Immigrants were accused of remitting large sums of money from Ghana to their families in their home countries. Indeed, some migrant communities set up funds to which they contributed annually and sent the money so raised to help the development of their hometowns. In 1967, for example, 2,500 migrants, comprising 950 males, 1,050 females, and 500 servants and apprentices, from Shaki in Western Nigeria and resident in Ghana, made a contribution of £1,600 towards the development of their hometown, aside other special levies for specific projects. Such transfer of funds for public purpose took no account of remittances to meet personal obligations back home, such as children’s schooling.

In the 1950s, such transfers of money abroad did not raise any major foreign exchange problems for the country because the foreign exchange reserves held by Ghana were comparatively large (about £G70 million around 1955). In the 1960s, however, these remittances produced some economic drawbacks for Ghana due to a sharp fall of Ghana’s foreign exchange assets to about £G30
million in 1963.\textsuperscript{18} This was one reason why as from 1963, remittances of foreign nationals working in Ghana were limited to 50\% and further to 40\% in February, 1969.\textsuperscript{19} These reductions did not produce any significant results. When it came to power, therefore, the Progress Party government believed that the deportation of the illegal immigrants would considerably reduce remittances sent away from Ghana.

Another major objective at the continental or sub-regional level, explicit in the term \textit{compliance} in the name of the expulsion order, was to ensure that all immigrants in Ghana, who did not have the necessary permits, be they non-Ghanaian Africans or non-Africans, comply with Ghana’s immigration laws. Admittedly, on the eve of the Aliens Compliance Order, there were many illegal immigrants, especially Nigerians, in Ghana. A characteristic feature on their part, however, was that though they desired to remain in the country, they had flouted the numerous immigration regulations of the country. Many of them failed to show themselves to immigration officers for inspection on their arrival and be issued with permits, as required by law, because in the first place they had entered the country without entry permits and through unapproved points of entry. The Aliens Act of 1963, the Aliens Regulations of 1963, the Aliens (Amendment) Act of 1965, the Aliens (Amendment) Decree, 1968 (N.L.C.D.259), and the Aliens (Permits For Prohibited Areas) Regulations, 1969 (L.I.612) all prevented non-Ghanaians from entering or remaining in certain areas unless they were permitted to do so, but all these requirements had been contravened.
Immigrants could be exonerated from the accusation of non-compliance with immigration regulations during the colonial and Nkrumah’s period because these measures had remained dormant in the statute books. Moreover, considering the period in which some of them moved into Ghana and the circumstances under which they entered the country, it could be reasoned that it was not possible for immigration officers to examine and issue permits to every immigrant. During the administration of the NLC, however, things started changing in their dis-favour. The government started tightening its border controls and even expelled some illegal immigrants. Henceforth, the immigrants should have changed their attitude, but by then, they had become greatly influenced by the colonial situation and Nkrumah’s era that they did not even comply with the directive issued by the NLC in July 1969, requiring all illegal immigrants to regularise their stay. Due to the changing circumstances, immigrants could be blamed at this time, at least partly, for any action on the part of the government against them in relation to their refusal to abide by the requirements of immigration measures.

Immediately the Busia administration was sworn into office on September 30, 1969, it “felt that the old habit of regarding Ghanaians as not meaning what they said needed to be corrected by a firm action”; hence the issuance of the expulsion.\textsuperscript{20} In an interview in March, 1970, Busia further argued that his government “was trying to correct a situation which should have been put right ‘long ago’, and which would not have arisen if immigration regulations had been better and been enforced.”\textsuperscript{21} The expulsion order was, therefore, to compel
compliance with immigration regulations in an unprecedented style in the history of the country.

At the bilateral level, the pressures for the expulsion order originated from the involvement of foreign nationals in serious criminal activities and prostitution, the government’s desire to safeguard the security of the nation, and ensuring cultural homogeneity, or immigrants’ integration into the local population. Serious crimes like smuggling of minerals and cocoa, currency trafficking, robbery, and prostitution were very rampant in Ghana. Though these were social problems, they constituted a major danger to the Ghanaian economy as well. The Progress Party’s attention was drawn to the critical nature of smuggling so that even before coming to power, the party promised to take firm steps to check the smuggling of cocoa, diamonds and other minerals out of Ghana.\textsuperscript{22} Smuggling contributed significantly to a drop in both cocoa and diamond production. By early 1970, for instance, diamond production had allegedly dropped from 17,000,000 tons to 16,000 tons and in relation to cocoa, the average annual smuggling of cocoa to the neighbouring countries was between 6,000 and 10,000 tons, the value of which was estimated to be between $N\text{\textc{c}2,000,000}$ and $N\text{\textc{c}3,000,000}$\textsuperscript{23}

Surprisingly, almost all these criminal activities were blamed on immigrants, particularly Nigerians. It was also maintained that a high proportion of the prison population was immigrant.\textsuperscript{24} In October, 1969, for instance, a judge in Accra appealed to the government of Ghana to control the influx of unskilled immigrants because they were contributing to the high rate of burglary and
stealing. Newspaper articles and government officials estimated that between 75% and 90% of all prisoners in the country were non-Ghanaians. The Prime Minister, Kofi Abrefa Busia, himself indicated, both in an address to an International Labour Organisation conference and in an explanation of the expulsion order to Cameron Duodu, a Ghanaian correspondent of the *London Observer*, that sociological research conducted by himself and others revealed that immigrants were more prone to crime and that 90% of criminals in Ghana were foreigners. All these estimations and accusations created the impression that the deportation of the immigrants would considerably reduce the rate of crime in Ghana. Hence, the expulsion.

Another factor at the bilateral level which also influenced the government’s decision was guaranteeing the security of the nation. Fears of insecurity are sometimes exaggerated, and governments have gone to extreme lengths to protect themselves against low-level threats, but these fears are, nonetheless, not always without foundation. The presence of large numbers of immigrants can sometimes pose security problems for host countries, especially if some of them are from neighbouring countries. Apart from being involved in armed robbery and other criminal activities, some immigrants and refugees, sometimes in collaboration with some internal elements, surreptitiously spy on the security apparatus of the host country in order to overthrow the government, or, at least, sabotage the smooth administration of the state. One reason for the expulsion of Ghanaian fishermen from Sierra Leone was that they were seen as a security problem in the event of attempts to infiltrate Sierra Leone from the sea.
In September, 1968, the Inspector-General of Police, J.W.K. Harlley, described an illegal strike by the Waymen’s Association of the Ghana Railway and Ports Authority as a gigantic attempt to overthrow the NLC regime from outside Ghana.  

Again, in December, 1968, the NLC had information about an alleged coup d’etat planned outside Ghana by some Nkrumah favourites, including some members of the Ghana Armed Forces and some Soviet trawlers, to overthrow the NLC government and return Nkrumah to Ghana on December 24, 1968. These made the NLC become extremely sensitive to external threats.

By the time the Busia administration was inaugurated, such threats had not ceased altogether. Obviously, the Busia government did not feel secured enough in the face of Nkrumah’s residence in nearby Guinea and still recognised by some African states like Guinea and Zambia as Ghana’s head. Since the alleged plot to overthrow the NLC was planned from outside Ghana in collaboration with some internal elements, the Busia administration must have regarded the presence of many immigrants, many of whom had entered Ghana under Nkrumah’s auspices, as a potential force for its overthrow. Truly, the government cited security as one of its reasons for issuing the expulsion order with the view to “protecting both the nationals of the country and law-abiding aliens from the activities of undesirable aliens.”
Domestic Dimension

In the domestic sphere, forces that influenced the government’s decision were economic viability, the role of interest groups, the political structure and political loyalty. There were some serious domestic economic problems in the 1960s which made up a familiar and interconnected catalogue. Some of the economic measures of the NLC were very unpopular in some respects. The devaluation of the cedi in 1967 increased budget receipts more than expenditure rather than increase exports by making them more competitive and to decrease imports by making them more expensive. The volume of exports, in fact, declined in the following year by 1% and the volume of imports increased by 10%. This led to a great increase in the cost of imported goods. There was also lack of dynamism in the commercial sector; sluggishness and loss of confidence, compounded by rising taxation, in mining and manufacturing; and a stagnating agricultural output. Allied to these internal problems was that the producer price of cocoa in Ghana became unattractive in the 1960s and early 1970s compared with those across its borders thus giving rise to smuggling of cocoa to the neighbouring countries. The rate of unemployment also increased. The National Employment Service in 1968 received 423,115 applications, compared with 391,148 in 1967, an increase of 8.2%.

Being aware of all these problems in advance, the Progress Party promised in its manifesto towards the 1969 general elections to provide jobs and employment opportunities for Ghanaians. The party, again, promised to “ensure that control of the economy passed increasingly into the hands of the indigenous
people’ of Ghana.” The expulsion of the immigrants was, therefore, part of the measures to help the government fulfill those promises because it was believed the departure of the immigrants would provide more jobs for the local people.

Interest groups, who can be divided into institutional and non-institutional, also played some pivotal roles in the government’s decision to expel the illegal immigrants. The Progress Party wanted to prevent immigrants from participating in Ghanaian politics because it believed immigrants were the main supporters of the opposition and their votes could earn the opposition victory. While holding themselves apart from the immigrant population, some of the immigrants who had lived in the country for long participated in politics by supporting different political parties and voting during elections; but this was later to cause them trouble. Because they usually lived separately and were easily identified by their dress and other visible features, they easily became the target of political parties if those parties felt that their opponents had the support of the immigrants. The expulsion of Othman Larden and Amadu Baba in 1957 was a typical example.

The results of the 1969 general elections indicated that the Progress Party won 105 out of the 140 seats in the National Assembly. The party captured all the 22 seats in Ashanti Region, all the 13 in Brong-Ahafo, all the 15 in Central, 18 out of the 22 in Eastern, 3 out of the 9 in Greater-Accra, 9 out of the 14 in Northern, 13 out of the 16 in Upper, 2 out of 16 in Volta, and 10 out of the 13 in Western. In spite of its general landslide victory, the Progress Party, it is alleged, blamed its minor loses on the presence of immigrants in the country. To prevent a similar occurrence in the future, the government decided on outright expulsion of
all illegal immigrants as the only alternative. Even those of them who were allowed to stay were constitutionally not permitted to participate in the political life of the country if, according to existing laws, they were not regarded as citizens. Pursuant to this requirement, immigrants who served as members of local councils either resigned or were removed from all such institutions.

Another consideration in connection with interest groups is xenophobia. Some people believe that the Ghanaian expulsion Order, as is the case of all other expulsions in Africa, was issued on grounds of sheer xenophobia. The proponents of xenophobia as a major cause of expulsion argue that disputes over land ownership between local people and immigrants easily generate anti-foreigner sentiments which sometimes lead to bloodshed. In addition, when the economy is buoyant and immigrants are doing jobs that locals are averse to, such as collecting refuse, sweeping streets, or labouring on cocoa farms, the presence of immigrants, whatever the size of their population, does not really cause any problem, but as economic recession sets in, relations with immigrants deteriorate. The fear of competition, thus, generates tensions between locals and immigrants, especially in cases where the latter become more successful. Even in cases where immigrants have successfully become fully integrated into the host society, racial, ethnic, religious and other differences do occasionally spur tensions between the two communities.

Furthermore, in some cases, host communities become envious of refugees because of the latter’s receipt of assistance in the form of food, clothing and shelter. The guests are thus regarded as a burden on the scarce resources of
the receiving countries leading to full-scale xenophobia, which creates a desire to cause both physical and psychological mischief to immigrants and leads to the blatant violation of their rights. Since most of the expellees were farm labourers in the cocoa plantations and other labour-intensive jobs which Ghanaians were not prepared to take on, the claim that the order was issued to deal with unemployment should not be fully accepted. In fact, measuring the economic situation of many Ghanaians at the time against this theory, one would not be wrong in accepting xenophobia as a reason for issuing the order. Certainly, shortly after the deadline, some Ghanaians were insisting on strict treatment of immigrants without residence permits and warned of a strong action if officials did not seriously enforce the measure, that is, the Aliens Compliance Order.39 There were also numerous instances of clashes between some local people and some departing immigrants. Some local people, again, believed that some of the immigrants would go into hiding or bribe their way into staying and, thus, reported immigrants in their areas to the authorities for punitive action to be taken against them.40 Moreover, the association of immigrants with crime, like Dr. Busia’s 90% of the prison population and of known criminals being immigrants, was considered one of the main themes of xenophobic thought at the time.

The decision to expel the immigrants also derived from the Progress Party’s promise in the 1969 electioneering campaign to continue some policies initiated by the NLC administration as a sign of political loyalty. In fulfilling this promise when it came to office, the Busia government decided to continue the NLC efforts to ensure that immigrants strictly complied with existing immigration
regulations and give the previous government’s ‘mini-expulsions’ a new dimension. In line with this, immediately it came to power in 1969, the Busia administration introduced some changes into the immigration service. The NLC had already expelled some immigrants and had also amended nationality and other immigration acts, thereby redefining Ghanaian citizenship. As shown in chapter two, the government also took some economic measures that affected many immigrants by depriving them of their job holdings in Ghana. A directive was issued in July, 1969 to all embassies of countries with citizens in Ghana to provide proper travel and other documents for their citizens living in Ghana.

Reasoning along these lines, some writers have regarded the Aliens Compliance Order as nothing more than a mere enforcement of the Aliens Act, 1963 (Act 160). Commenting on the expulsion order, the Keesing’s Contemporary Archives states: “The decision to bring aliens under control had been taken in July, 1969 by Dr. Busia’s predecessors, the National Liberation Council, ….” N.O. Addo also remarks:

The Aliens Act [that is, the Aliens Compliance Order], which the present government has enforced, was enacted by the previous civilian C.P.P. government in 1963. The Aliens Act, 1963 … was meant to consolidate … enactments relating to the immigration, residence, employment and deportation of aliens. Section 2 of this Act was amended in 1965 …. The decree which the present government brought into effect on 18th November, 1969, was only meant to enforce the 1963 and 1965 (Amendment) Aliens Act. It is interesting that the
government which enacted this law, the former C.P.P. government, did not enforce it.\textsuperscript{44}

Population control undoubtedly played an important role in the expulsion of the immigrants. Here, the Busia administration was not the initiator of this decision; it was only continuing, or hastening, a policy that had already been set in motion. A conference held in 1965 recommended the strict implementation of immigration regulations as a means to control the growth of the country’s population.\textsuperscript{45} This was, however, not done. In March, 1969, the NLC also adopted a new policy to control population growth. Since the NLC government was replaced shortly afterwards, the enforcement of the policy to achieve the desired results obviously had to be the responsibility of the next administration, the Busia government. There is no doubt that the expulsion of the illegal immigrants from Ghana through the enforcement of the Aliens Compliance Order was partly to help realise the targets of the 1969 population policy.\textsuperscript{46}

Though not as important as other factors appeared, clearing the streets of immigrant destitutes and beggars and reducing stress on social services were some of the underlying reasons for the deportation of the illegal immigrants. In general, countries get increasingly tougher on unskilled and voluntary immigrants because the people entering are sometimes so numerous or so poor that they create a substantial socio-economic burden by imposing additional strains on housing, education, health, transportation, and other infrastructure. The presence of a large number of this group of immigrants contribute to the outbreak of diseases and environmental pollution due to the relatively unhygienic conditions
in the areas where they congregate. Ghanaians were deported from Sierra Leone in December, 1968 partly because “they made beaches unsightly and unhygienic with their settlements and that in so doing they damaged tourist prospects.”

Due to their inability to secure jobs, some of immigrants in Ghana took to the streets as beggars defying the destitute laws of Ghana as well as becoming a burden on the Ghanaian society. They were even alleged to have also been “big thieves and smugglers”, compelling some Ghanaians, including parliamentarians, to call on the Ministry of Interior to adopt effective and well-strategised plans to remove them from the streets by expelling them. No wonder that the Minister of External Affairs, Victor Owusu, on December 1, 1969, announced that “the exercise was aimed at reducing the number of undesirable aliens…” while Brodie-Mends, the Minister of Information, on January 22, 1970 in Accra remarked that the exercise would continue for a long time “until the last unwanted man is gone.”

The presence of many immigrants contributed to the rapid growth of the population leading to overcrowding in the rapidly growing towns. It would be wrong to accuse immigrants of solely being responsible for the creation of slums in towns and cities, but certainly the presence of large numbers of them accelerated the growth of slums. Immigrants, further, enjoyed, freely and equally with Ghanaians, all the benefits of social services. In relation to education, for example, Nigerians alone constituted a quarter of the 1957 entrants to the University of Ghana, and in 1967-1968, foreign students from Ghana’s neighbouring West African countries formed 2.8%, mostly Nigerians, of the
student population. They included some whose parents had settled in Ghana. Some Ghanaians questioned the rationale behind subsidising immigrants’ education since university education was a considerable burden on the government. Even more expensive was providing primary and secondary education to immigrant children. 11% of students and pupils in schools in Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi alone in 1960 were non-Ghanaian Africans. It seems more likely that by 1969, their population would have increased in view of the increasing emphasis on education as the means to good jobs. Even though immigrants did not form a large proportion of the student population, some Ghanaians did grumble about immigrants’ attendance at schools, especially where schools were overcrowded, and wished that their children were given preference over foreigners.

It is obvious at this point that it was the interplay of these economic, social and political forces, at both the external and internal levels, that led to the issuance on November 18, 1969 of the Aliens Compliance Order and the subsequent expulsion of the illegal immigrants from Ghana. In official and many circles, however, the economic factors, at both levels, were put in a preponderant position over the others. This factor has been confirmed to have been true in the face of the role of immigrants in the economic life of the country, but it is strongly maintained that politics played an equally important role. For one thing, many of the officials of the Second Republic, including Busia himself, had worked under the NLC administration and would be influenced by, at least, some of the policies of the previous government. For another, the Progress Party itself
confirmed its continuation of the policies of the NLC by promising in its manifesto that “the policy on Ghanaian enterprises which has been initiated by the NLC will be continued and aliens affected by the policy will be encouraged to apply their capital, experience and considerable managerial talents in other sectors of the economy.”

It is contended, therefore, that though much emphasis has been laid on economic considerations as the pushing forces behind the issuance and enforcement of the expulsion order on immigrants, political motivation, to a very large extent, played a domineering role in getting rid of illegal immigrants from the country. Whether the main objectives behind the expulsion were economic, social or political in nature, the fact still remains that the Aliens Compliance Order caused the mass deportation of illegal immigrants from the country. The most important issue that needs to be examined is the execution of the decision. The next chapter looks at the implementation of the decision.
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CHAPTER FOUR

GO BACK HOME: THE EXPULSION ORDER IN OPERATION

The government’s decision to expel the illegal immigrants from Ghana received the due approval of the opposition elements in government and Ghanaians in general. There were even instances when some members of the opposition directed the government’s attention to some villages and towns which they alleged were wholly inhabited by immigrants.\(^1\) All the major newspapers at the time, such as the *Daily Graphic*, *The Ghanaian Times*, the *Pioneer*, the *Echo*, and the *Star*, also gave the measure their backing.\(^2\) Some renowned individuals and associations like the National Crusade for the Protection of Ghanaian Businesses, moreover, conducted a fierce crusade in support of the legislation in a manner that exceeded even the government in zeal.\(^3\) Even some of the immigrants themselves conceded and defended the right of the government to enforce the expulsion order to safeguard the security of the state.\(^4\)

This chapter examines the manner in which the Aliens Compliance Order was implemented. Important issues considered include the immigrants’ efforts to secure permits and their success or otherwise; the various economic, social and
political policy measures the government adopted towards the ‘effective’ enforcement of the order; the role of the police in the execution of the order; the attitude of Ghanaians towards the deportees; exemptions from the expulsion and their later withdrawal; the departure of the immigrants; criticisms from abroad and within Ghana; government assistance and warnings against maltreatment of immigrants; and the NRC and SMC I and II continuation of the implementation. For purposes of convenience, the appraisal has been done thematically rather than chronologically.

The Search for Permits

Though some immigrants left hastily, from November 18, 1969, to December 2, 1969, they were not required to leave Ghana. The order gave them the opportunity to obtain the permits within that two-week grace period. It was only after the expiration of that period that they were obliged to leave the country. Accordingly, those who had the intention of staying made the effort to go to the Ministry of Interior or their embassies to seek permits.

As its responsibility, the Ministry of Interior, as from November 19, 1969, started issuing residence permits to immigrants in possession of valid passports and travel documents. Those employed in government departments, corporations and private firms were asked to apply through their heads of departments, while those who were self-employed were required to submit their passports and income tax clearance certificates together with an application to the Ministry of Interior
for permits. Biafran refugees also went to both the offices of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and the Ministry of Interior to obtain passports and residence permits. Others went to their embassies or high commissions for the permits.

Immigrants in distant places most often travelled to Accra for the permits in groups. The few who already had the permits sometimes accompanied their relatives to Accra to assist them to obtain the permits. Others organised themselves and gave their particulars and other necessary documents to some renowned immigrants who went to obtain the permits on their colleagues’ behalf. Some Ghanaian farmers and employers who badly needed the services of their immigrant employees on their farms and in their firms respectively made determined efforts to secure the permits for their employees.

People and cars usually crowded the permit issuing centres, particularly the Ministry of Interior in Accra as immigrants tried to obtain residence permits. In one particular case, the overcrowding coerced the Ministry to move to the vast Black Star Stadium, now Ohene Gyan Sports Stadium, to handle the flood of applicants. As thousands of Nigerians also invaded their High Commission in Accra, the staff were sometimes compelled to stay up late at night to give their nationals the required documents. Immigrants who rushed to the Ministry and their embassies for the necessary documents and permits were usually those who had lived in the country for many years and did not know their towns and villages of origin.
Due to misinformation by some members of the public that the order required all immigrants to leave the country even if they had the permits, coupled with misunderstanding on the part of some of the immigrants, especially the illiterate in the rural areas, the government came out from time to time to explain the purport of the measure to the general public. On one such occasion, Mr. Victor Owusu, the Minister for External Affairs, explained that the measure was not intended to take residence permits away from those who already had them but was to ensure that those who were in the country illegally possessed the necessary documents. However, immigrants who were employed or who were engaged in activities detrimental to the well-being of Ghanaians but did not have the valid residence permits would not be issued with residence permits if they had not already obtained them.

Although many immigrants made attempts to secure permits, only a few were successful; even most of the permits were said to have been issued for three months only, and it was not certain whether they would be extended beyond that period. In fact, different estimations were given for the number of permits issued. According to the June 18, 1970 Ghanaian Times report, between November, 1969 and June, 1970, only 40,000 residence permits were issued. On December 12, 1969, however, the government indicated that 20,000 residence permits had already been issued and permits continued to be issued at a rate of 2,000 daily. Also in an Africa Diary report, the Minister of External Affairs put the number of permits issued to Biafrans alone between November, 1969 and February, 1970 at 60,000.
Efforts to cross-check which of the sources was authentic proved futile due to loss or misplacement of records. Whatever be the case, the number of permits issued to immigrants was relatively very small. This is not surprising because looking at the requirements under which they were to be issued, it is obvious that only a few of the immigrants secured the permits. Many of them, especially the non-Ghanaian Africans, had entered the country under dubious circumstances, such as entering the country through unapproved points of entry, and were not in possession of passports and entry permits. Others had also migrated to Ghana under difficult situations such as conflicts in their countries of origin, for example, in the case of the Biafrans, and did not obtain passports before leaving for Ghana. Yet others had entered Ghana at a time when immigration regulations were either non-existent or were not known to them. Some had also been born in the country and for that matter did not possess passports or any other documents of any country. These aside, some of the immigrants did not make the attempt to obtain the permits early. Again, the NLC directive in July, 1969 to foreign missions to register their nationals gave them eight months to so. The November 18, 1969 deportation order rather shortened the duration for the registration and, therefore, came as a shock to the embassies because they had not made any prior arrangements. The authentic explanation, however, seems to lie in the failure to decentralise the process of issuing the permits to the immigrants. Permits were to be obtained only from the Ministry of Interior, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and the various embassies and high commissions in Accra and nowhere else. It meant that
immigrants in the north and other far away places had to travel long distances to Accra to obtain the permits. Even in Accra, some people found it difficult to contact the appropriate bodies. Those who were able to locate them had to join long queues and wait long hours, and sometimes returned home without being issued with the permits.

Predictably, it was highly impossible to arrange for over two million people to register within a fortnight at the few selected offices in Accra. The situation was compounded by the slow-moving bureaucracies which could not produce passports or travel documents, tax clearance certificates, residence and work permits in the numbers required. Given these reasons, it is plausible that permits issued did not constitute even a quarter of the number of immigrants who made the effort to obtain permits.

The circumstances compelled the embassies and high commissions of the countries of the affected immigrants and some newspapers, both local and foreign, to appeal to the government for an extension of about two or more months to enable more immigrants get the required papers and permits. The appeals from the Nigerian High Commissioner, Mr. Victor Adegoroye, the Nigerian community in Ghana, the ambassador of Burkina Faso, Mr. Victor Kabore, and the Benin government were based particularly on the great number of their nationals in the country. The seriousness of the Nigerians’ situation forced the Nigerian commissioner for external affairs, Dr. Okoi Arikpo, to fly to Ghana for talks on the expulsion with the Ghana government, while the Beninoise
government also sent representatives, led by Dr. Badarou, their Foreign Minister, to investigate the position of their nationals.  

At a press briefing on December 2, 1969, however, the Ghanaian External Affairs Minister apprised African ambassadors that the deadline would not be extended because the exercise was to be conducted without any delay and also to see to it that the nation’s laws were obeyed. Even a request for an extension of the deadline for immigrants to leave, put forward on December 2, 1969 by Mr. George Flamma Sherman, ambassador of Liberia and dean of the diplomatic corps in Accra, was rejected. The Minister, nevertheless, assured them that there would be less stringent resident qualifications and only ‘undesirable’ immigrants would be expelled. The Interior Minister, S.D. Dombo, added that the action was to last a few weeks, and people in valuable jobs, of good behaviour and long residence would be given individual consideration for a limited period. In spite of these, the government later allowed the application for permits to continue for a long time. Indeed, people kept applying for permits till the Busia administration came to an end. 

As some immigrants were making frantic efforts to obtain residence and work permits, others calculated that naturalisation would be the best way out for those who wanted to stay unperturbed in the country. During the National Liberation Council administration, this privilege was rarely given. Only three immigrants were naturalised during the two and three-quarter years’ rule by the NLC. It appears there had been no change in the situation during the Progress Party administration too. Of the 1,199 naturalisation applications made during the
first nine months after the expulsion order had been issued, only 13 were granted.\textsuperscript{23} Most of these applications were from Lebanese, Indians, and Nigerians who believed the country still offered some economic opportunities and thus wanted to continue doing business in Ghana. Generally, Ghanaians behaved unfavourably towards the grant of naturalisation certificates to immigrants, particularly Asians, and this attitude sometimes compelled the government to return some applications on the grounds that the applicants had not received presidential dispensation from their countries of origin.\textsuperscript{24} Even those who were granted citizenship were sometimes not given full rights. The Ministerial Secretary to the Ministry of Interior, Mr. Kwaku Baah, reportedly remarked on one occasion during the implementation of the expulsion order that any immigrant who hoped to get naturalised in order to get into retail trade again did so in vain.\textsuperscript{25} The newspapers also reported on the claims to citizenship of some immigrants with Ghanaian passports; but in no case was there any indication that those were accepted as Ghanaians.\textsuperscript{26}

Another means of evading deportation on the part of some immigrants was claiming immunity from expulsion under the 1969 Second Republican Constitution. For instance, a Mr. Omar Ibrahim Captan, a Lebanese businessman based in Accra, lodged a complaint with an Accra High Court, presided over by a Mr. Justice C.E.H. Coussey, and challenged the government for its decision to withdraw his residence permit.\textsuperscript{27} The reasons for the government’s decision were not clear. Whatever they were, Mr. Captan argued that he was a citizen by naturalisation and that he was entitled to be issued with a certificate of
naturalisation. For this reason, Captan argued that he was immune from expulsion from Ghana under the provisions of Article 106 of the 1969 Constitution.²⁸ Following different interpretations given to the Article by counsel, the case was transferred to the Supreme Court for hearing. Sitting in Accra on January 16, 1970, the Supreme Court, composed of Mr. Justice Edward Akufo-Addo, the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice P.D. Anin, Mr. Justice S. Azu–Crabbe, Mr. Justice J.B. Siriboe and Mr. Justice Philip Archer, all Appeal Court judges, ruled that Article 24 of the Constitution did not vest in an immigrant the right of immunity from expulsion from Ghana.²⁹

The fact that many immigrants could not obtain residence permits should not be interpreted to mean that no immigrant at all was able to secure residence permit. Though relatively few, some Biafrans were issued with the necessary documents which permitted them to remain in Ghana until the Biafran Civil War ended. Some Immigrant businessmen, traders, labourers and others who wanted to stay also made determined efforts to procure permits. Some Ghanaians, particularly farmers who depended on immigrant labour on their farms, were able to secure permits for their immigrant labourers. One Nana Yaw Baah Acquah, a cocoa farmer at Wassa-Akropong, recalled his success at securing a permit for about four of his immigrant labourers.³⁰ Nana Antobre Prempeh was also successful in securing permits for two immigrant tractor operators of his timber firm, Antobre Prempeh Timber Company Limited, in Kumasi.³¹
Economic Policies

Apart from requiring immigrants to either obtain residence permits or leave Ghana, the Aliens Compliance Order compelled those who were to stay to possess work permits before they would be allowed to participate in the economic life of the country. In spite of this, some of the immigrants continued to engage in petty trading and other economic activities even though they had not obtained the permission to do so. As a result, the Minister for Local Administration, Mr. K.K. Anti, warned them on January 10, 1970 that “residence permits did not confer the right to trade”; hence, immigrants engaged in petty trading without work permits were given up to January 20, 1970 to leave.32

This warning was not taken seriously as some illegal immigrants without work permits continued their business activities. It had also been discovered earlier that some of the immigrants who had obtained import licences for certain goods rather imported other goods with false labels to deceive the customs officers and evade the payment of tax.33 The government, therefore, cancelled all import licences issued to immigrants engaged in retail trade in the country with effect from March 21, 1970.34 To implement this decision effectively, telegrams and letters were sent to all branches of the Ministry of Trade throughout the country informing them of the government’s decision.35 The government’s decision affected all illegal immigrants engaged in retail trading, but Syrian, Lebanese and Indian traders in this sector were given up to the end of June, 1970 to wind up their businesses and leave the country.36
At the same time, the government entertained the fear that the banning of illegal immigrants from retail trade and their subsequent departure would have an adverse impact on the economy. To avoid such a catastrophe, in June, 1970, the government introduced the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act of 1970, (Act 334), ostensibly to give a legislative backing to the aspect of the expulsion order prohibiting immigrants from operating in certain areas of the economy. The Act barred immigrants from operating wholesale and retail businesses with an annual turnover of five hundred thousand new cedis or less. All affected expatriate businesses were to be in the hands of Ghanaians by August 1, 1970, unless the Ministry of Finance approved of their operations. The take-over also affected taxi and other small transport businesses.

Take-overs from August 1, 1970, were to form the first phase of the ‘squeezing out’ of foreign businessmen and women from medium-sized businesses. There was to be a second phase, in which commercial transport, advertising, publicity, beauty culture, cement block manufacture, and bakery businesses were to be ‘Ghanaianised’ by June 30, 1971. Immigrants were, moreover, not allowed to sell in any market in Ghana. No immigrant could engage in petty trading, hawking or selling from a kiosk. They were prohibited from operating in the reserved enterprises unless they instituted training schemes for Ghanaians. The government could extend the reserved areas but not in a manner that would damage the economy in the long run. It was expected that after both phases had been completed, several hundred businesses would be taken over, and a large section of commerce would be ‘Ghanaianised’.
A Credit Guarantee scheme was instituted which enabled the government to underwrite the lending operations of banking institutions assisting Ghanaian businessmen to purchase businesses owned by the immigrants. A Ghanaian Enterprises Advisory Committee was set up, with a Unit to help Ghanaians buy foreign-owned businesses and ensure a fair price. An office for Business Promotion was also established.

The Act, nevertheless, empowered the Ministry of Finance to allow certain foreign enterprises to operate in the reserved areas. Consequently, some enterprises were permitted to operate not long after the promulgation of the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act. By the end of August, 1970, a list of thirty-three foreign-owned enterprises were authorised by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning to carry out retail and wholesale trade in Ghana. This followed returns from the Commissioner of Income Tax that their turn-overs were above N¢500,000 as stated in the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act. The enterprises included Auto Parts Limited; K. Chellaram and Sons; El Nasr Export and Import Company; J.L Morrison, Son and Jones; City Paints; C.F.A.O; Multi Stores; International Traders; Lennards Shoes Limited; M. Captan Limited; Pharco; B.B.C. Trading Company; George Stores; T. Chandiram and Company; S.D. Karam and Sons; Peterson Simons Limited; S.C.O.A.; Assad Fakhry and Sons; Fattal Brothers; Jos Hansen and Soehne; the Union Trading Company Limited; Edward Nassar and Company; United Africa Company of Ghana; Swiss Trading Company; and Kingsway Stores.
Later, other lists of enterprises that were to be allowed to operate were to be published for the information of the public. In fulfillment of this, on September 10, 1970, the Ghana Business Promotion (Exemption) Instrument, (E.I. 49), was passed which allowed immigrants to sell goods in any market situated within ten miles of the landward boundary of Ghana, upon obtaining a licence. This was followed by the Ghana Business Promotion (Commercial Transportation by Land) Exemption Instrument, (E.I. 46), passed on July 1, 1971. This measure also exempted Mobil Oil Ghana Limited, Shell Oil Limited, Agip Oil Company Limited, B.P. Ghana Limited, Total Ghana Limited, Texaco Africa Limited, John Moukazel, Kumasi, and A.B. Hallabi, Kumasi.

The promulgation of the Ghana Business Promotion (Commercial Transportation by Land) Exemption Instrument, (E.I. 46), on July 1, 1971 coincided with the implementation of the second phase of the Ghana Business (Promotion) Act. While some immigrants took the government’s directive seriously, others appeared to drag their feet or were making no efforts to transfer their businesses to Ghanaians. Whether they made the attempt but were not getting interested buyers or were not seeking buyers at all, J.H. Mensah intimated at a press conference on June 22, 1971 that the government would not grant any exemptions if non-Ghanaian entrepreneurs affected failed to comply. True to its word, on July 2, 1971, a day after the effective date, the government published a gazette stating the take-over of two fuel companies, namely, Messrs M. Abicca and Sons, Takoradi, and Messrs G.B. Chioliak, Accra. Fifteen cargo enterprises were also taken over, and these included M. Tabbica and Sons, Takoradi; Unity
Transport, Kumasi; Starco Transport and Engineering Company, Accra; Kabara Transport, Accra; Shallaby Transport, Accra; City Auto Parts Supply Limited, Accra; John Mansour, Tema, Fattal Haulage, Accra; Chidiac Brothers, Accra; Transport Africana, Kumasi; Sonki Engineering and Transport, Kumasi; Pan-African Shipping, Tema; Hamoui Brothers, Accra; and Alraine, Accra/Akwatia.\(^4^9\)

With the simultaneous implementation of the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act and the expulsion order, in addition to the cancellation of import licences, many illegal immigrants were forced out of the economy. Immigrant petty traders, hawkers, kiosks operators, butchers and those engaged in other retail economic activities were forced to give way to Ghanaians. Some wept bitterly when the police asked them to close their kiosks and either sell them to Ghanaians or obtain work permits.\(^5^0\) Those who refused to vacate these fields of economic activity were subjected to severe beating by the police and some Ghanaian youth.\(^5^1\) Even before the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Bill fully became an Act of Parliament, about fifty firms, owned by immigrants in Accra, started winding up their businesses. Over ten trading companies believed to have been affected by the proposals in the Bill, withdrew their membership from the Ghana National Chamber of Commerce.\(^5^2\) Businesses affected by the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act were usually sold at considerably reduced prices to Ghanaians. In Accra and other big towns, there was hectic trading in certain commercial areas as some stores owned by Indians, Syrians and Lebanese sold their goods at reduced prices to enable them close down; other stores were virtually empty and were ready to be rented out to interested Ghanaian businessmen.\(^5^3\) Markets and
other places where immigrants were known to be transacting business, both in the urban and rural areas, became almost empty. What usually followed was the availability of stores and other spaces for business activities. Many stalls at the central markets of Sunyani, Tamale, Bolgatanga, Kumasi, Koforidua, Makola, Kantamanto and other markets, for instance, became vacant after the departure of many immigrants who sold at those markets.\textsuperscript{54} Some of the affected immigrants moved to other West African countries to continue their business operations while others went back home altogether.\textsuperscript{55}

Immigrants who were leaving usually invited the public and made arrangements for the sale of their business interests to Ghanaians. There were also keen efforts on the part of some Ghanaians themselves to buy up immigrants’ property at cheap prices. Other deportees who married local women or who had formed partnerships with some local people handed over their business set ups to their spouses or associates and left without taking anything.\textsuperscript{56} The big towns were plunged into a bustling life as people from neighbouring towns and villages thronged there and bargained with immigrant traders who sold their goods at low prices. In the first week of December, 1970, a tin of milk which previously sold at 10 np was sold at 4 np at the Kejetia central market, and about 10,000 immigrants in Brong-Ahafo reportedly arranged and sold their businesses to Ghanaians.\textsuperscript{57} This trend continued throughout the subsequent weeks. Some immigrants, in a panic rush to get out of the country, left without being able to take any of their belongings. At Oyoko in New Juaben, some of those engaged in the buying and
selling of kola nuts could not transport what they had already bought when they were hurriedly leaving and left them behind.\textsuperscript{58}

The government also assisted some Ghanaians to purchase businesses owned by the expellees. In relation to the institution of a credit guarantee scheme under the Business (Promotion) Act to enable Ghanaians buy businesses owned by non-Ghanaians, the banks in Ghana contributed millions of new cedis towards this venture.\textsuperscript{59} Parliament took a decision in July, 1970 which enabled commercial banks to call on a government guarantee of up to N\textcide{100,000} to support any transaction for the acquisition of non-Ghanaian businesses by Ghanaians, subject to a limit of 25\% on government’s guarantee of each individual operation.\textsuperscript{60}

Besides, the government, in its 1970 financial policy, instituted a credit system solely in favour of women engaged in trading in the market, men operating corn-mills in the villages, bakery and printing enterprises, small vehicle repair enterprises and other related businesses.\textsuperscript{61} To set this scheme off, N\textcide{1.5} million in cash resources was made available for the mentioned businesses.\textsuperscript{62} As a rule, however, borrowers were compelled to open current business accounts with the commercial banks; and arrangements were also made for the reinforcement of the loans-collecting mechanism and rigid rules were established for the treatment of defaulters.\textsuperscript{63} Financial assistance was, moreover, offered to local manufacturers or purchasers of locally-made or imported transport equipment and transport operators with the view to preparing them to assume a major role in the transport business which the government decided to reserve entirely for Ghanaian businesses as from 1st July, 1971.\textsuperscript{64}
As though the above were not enough, the government went further to grant import and export tax incentives to Ghanaian businesses. In the 1970 financial policy, the government relaxed the import licensing system as a means of inducing more Ghanaians to engage in the import of goods in commercial quantities.65 This decision was taken following the movement of some Ghanaians into the economy after the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act had come into full operation. To further facilitate the operations of the new Ghanaian enterprises, it was decided that Ghanaians who wished to qualify for the Open General Licence for the importation of general goods in commercial quantities for the first time needed to pay only N¢25.00 at any of the commercial banks.66

With specific reference to exports, in the 1969-1970 budget, Ghanaian exporters were offered a rebate on income tax which could go as high as 50% for firms which exported 25% of their total production.67 In the same budget, all enterprises in Ghana were also entitled to the refund of all indirect taxes whatsoever on that proportion of their production, including taxes on the raw materials used for that production, which went into export.

For the timber business, the government offered to pay one-third of all transport costs within Ghana for the movement of all secondary species of timber.68 As of the time the government was presenting its 1969-1970 budget, however, no scheme had been worked out. Pending the introduction of the necessary arrangements, it was agreed that the transport subsidy as from the 1970-1971 financial year be raised to 100%. Claims for refund of transport costs at the former rate of one-third which would have accrued during the 1969-70 financial
year following the undertaking given by the government in 1969 was also to be met under retroactive provisions when the administrative arrangements were finally put into place.  

It is needless to state that all these measures were taken to ensure that Ghanaians moved into the economy to replace the expelled immigrants and also to ensure that a greater portion of the economy would eventually be dominated by the local people. For, this was one of the major intentions of the government in issuing and enforcing the expulsion order. If really these intentions were to be realised, it meant that more immigrants had to be affected in order to create a larger space for Ghanaian businessmen and women to occupy. Thus, contrary to the view held by some writers, such as Awoonor, that the Aliens Compliance Order affected only non-Ghanaian Africans, particularly West Africans, Lebanese, Syrians and Indians as well as their businesses were also affected. If the expulsion order did not immediately affect Asians, it was because the Immigration Committee of the Ghana Immigration Service had granted them immigration quotas that allowed them to employ their own fellows to do all sort of jobs including serving as store assistants. In view of this, the Ministry of Interior could not use the Aliens Compliance Order to cancel permits issued to them.

Nevertheless, since the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act reserved retail business to Ghanaians, many Syrians, Indians and Lebanese were driven away when they tried to challenge the police in their duty of ensuring that all affected immigrants complied with the measure. According to official records, before the
expulsion order, there were 75 Syrians and 1,407 Lebanese in Ghana who had been issued with entry and residence permits.\textsuperscript{71} There were also others who did not have permits and whose exact population was not known. Due to the proportionately small size of their population, it should have been easy to keep records of those of them arrested for deportation. Unfortunately, no such records were found, but some official documents indicated that a number of those who did not have residence permits were arrested by the police and repatriated from the country.\textsuperscript{72} It was also reported that some of the rich Indian, Syrian and Lebanese businessmen, and even some wealthy non-Ghanaian Africans, mainly Nigerians, sold their houses cheaply to some Ghanaians. In Bolgatanga, for instance, at least about three houses sold by departing immigrants to Ghanaians could be counted.\textsuperscript{73} So it was in almost all parts of the country.

Hoping that the expulsion would relieve the country of the high unemployment rate, the government encouraged Ghanaians to take-over all jobs left behind by the departed immigrants. At the same time, the government foresaw that the exodus of the immigrants, some of whom worked in the rural areas as labourers and the rest, would tell heavily on work in the rural areas. Furthermore, the government seemed to have appreciated the fact that its promises of creating jobs for the unemployed would be questionable and remain partly unfulfilled if attention was focused only on jobs that would be left behind by the deportees in the towns and cities. In view of these considerations, the National Service Corps was set up on 15th December, 1970.\textsuperscript{74} It proposed to participate in the building of such community facilities as latrines, wells, school buildings, health posts, bath-
houses, markets, incinerators, minor feeder roads, town and village parks and gardens and community centres. These were to make a vital contribution towards improving social and living conditions in the communities in which they were situated. These conditions, in turn, were to attract the youth to stay in the rural areas so as to curtail migration into the cities and towns which created many social problems.

By February, 1970, about 300,000 people had volunteered to offer their services for the National Service Corps.\textsuperscript{75} Out of the 300,000 volunteers, about 50\% were unemployed, 20\% were student volunteers, and the remaining 30\% were persons in full employment who were willing to make a contribution over and above their services in their normal employment. It is obvious that by the time the bill became a law, more and more Ghanaians would have enlisted and continued to do so afterwards. The volunteers were not to be paid sufficiently apart from remuneration for clothing and food. Thus, for the 1970-71 financial year, \textnumero2.3 million was provided to feed the volunteers and also to provide them with tools and equipment.\textsuperscript{76} Later, however, some of the volunteers, particularly the unemployed, began to question the sense in working for no pay and then withdrew their services from the Corps so that it collapsed after existing for only two-and-half years.\textsuperscript{77}

It must be noted that the government did not state emphatically whether or not the National Service Corps was established to get people to do the types of jobs done by the expelled immigrants in the rural parts of the country. Nevertheless, looking at the reasons for which the Corps came into being and the
nature of jobs the volunteers were to do, it can be argued that the government’s
tention of creating that body was partly to get the youth engaged in something
as well as getting people to replace the immigrants who did such jobs but were
asked to leave.

Obviously, the government alone could not provide employment for all
unemployed Ghanaians. For one thing, many of the deportees were self-employed
and so their leaving would benefit only those who were prepared to enter into
their own businesses; however, many Ghanaians at that time did not have the
capital to begin on their own. To find an antidote to this situation, the government
set up a Tax Review Commission which was to establish a scheme under which,
as an incentive, the government sought to grant proportionately high tax
concessions to enterprises that employed more people.78

The government was also aware of the fact that the office and other high-
status jobs that would be available after the departure of the immigrants would not
be enough to absorb all the unemployed Ghanaians. With this awareness and to
successfully implement its policy of allowing Ghanaians to take over the
economy from immigrants, the government encouraged the youth to go into cocoa
farming, while urging cocoa farmers to employ Ghanaian labourers. The Minister
of Agriculture, Dr. K. Safo-Adu, for example, asked cocoa farmers not to rely on
immigrant farm labourers because, even though they were being allowed to stay
to help the 1969/1970 cocoa harvest, they would go home eventually, so that it
was better to employ Ghanaians.79
In relation to petty trading and selling at markets, the government authorised the various city councils to allocate vacated stalls and selling sites to interested Ghanaians. Special application forms designed for the allocation purposes were distributed to interested Ghanaians to complete and return to the Market Allocation Committees, created by the councils, which interviewed the applicants and made the allocations after successful applicants had paid a fee of N¢3.50, made up of N¢2.00 as allocation fee, and N¢1.50 as amount for rent per month.  

**Social Policies**

In the social sphere, too, significant policy measures were adopted toward enforcing the deportation order. In enforcing the order, the police were ordered to remove all immigrant destituates and beggars from wherever they were found. The city councils also always moved into the slum areas occupied mostly by the immigrants to demolish unauthorised housing structures in those areas. Some immigrants sometimes returned home from work or wherever to find their houses razed to the ground. The Inspectorate Staff was alerted to take immediate action to demolish all remaining structures to prevent new occupants from moving in to perpetuate the slums in the towns and cities.

The police and all security agencies were asked to intensify their ‘war’ on smugglers and currency traffickers to reduce the rate of crime in the country. This sometimes led to the arrest of some culprits, both foreign and Ghanaian. In the

The same edition of the same newspaper contained a publication concerning the arrest of a farmer and a labourer caught in the act of smuggling cocoa and coffee and currency trafficking. Instead of the “not less than five years imprisonment” prescribed by Ghana’s criminal code at the time for such offences, the labourer was incarcerated for only a day and fined N¢200 for importing 31,900 French currency into Ghana. The farmer was also fined N¢200, in default of which he would go to prison for nine months for smuggling cocoa and coffee. A week earlier, the police arrested an immigrant at Aflao who was carrying in his sandals a quantity of diamonds valued at N¢30,000.00.⁸⁴

Whilst encouraging the police to intensify their search for and arrest of smugglers, the government was contemplating other measures that would help abate smuggling. So concerned was the government with the issue of smuggling that on February 27, 1970 a motion was proposed in parliament for the discussion of the topic and the measures to adopt to curb it. The motion was “That in view of the harmful effect of increasing smuggling activities on the economy of this country [that is, Ghana], this House is of the opinion that the law relating to smuggling, especially of cocoa and diamonds and consumer goods, be amended to make such offences punishable by heavier penalties.”⁸⁵
In its search for a solution to the problem, the Busia government, in the first place, set up an inter-ministerial committee charged specifically with working out a system by which smuggling could be effectively checked. This committee made some recommendations which were accepted and implemented by the government, and these, reportedly, yielded dividends. The government, again, educated Ghanaians on the fact that it was their civic responsibility to participate in the ‘war’ on smuggling. Thus, when addressing a durbar of chiefs and people of the Brong-Ahafo Region at the Sunyani Coronation Park on 23rd November, 1969, Dr. Busia called on people living along the Ghana-Cote d’Ivoire border to assist the government in its battle against smuggling by reporting all cases of smuggling that came to their knowledge. At another time, the government asked chiefs to beat gong-gongs to warn people not to molest immigrant farm workers because it was feared the departing cocoa farmers and labourers would smuggle cocoa away into their countries. The Prime Minister, moreover, announced the government’s preparedness to arrange legitimate trade with Cote d’Ivoire to ensure that smuggling became a non-profitable concern.

In furtherance, the government adopted the strategy of offering incentives to Ghanaians who fed the police with information on the activities of smugglers. An action was instituted under which anyone who gave information on smuggling to the police leading to the arrest of the offender(s) was entitled to one-quarter (25%) of the value of the confiscated goods. The government did really go by its promise, and on one occasion, an informant made as much as £15,000 or
N¢30,000. Serious reorganisation of border guards was, in addition, agreed as one useful mechanism to reduce smuggling to manageable proportions.

Additionally, the government decided to perfect already existing immigration regulations and beef up the number of border guards, barriers and police stations at the borders. Border guards and police personnel were to be appropriately resourced to enable them handle smuggling cases perfectly. The government and local councils undertook to build new offices for border guards, whilst old ones were to be renovated. With an amount of N¢220.00, the Bongo Local Council, for example, at a meeting on 13th March, 1970, undertook to put up an office for the Bongo border guards. Border guards without enough or the required training background were to be trained in a way to equip them with all the necessary arms to deal with smuggling. Border demarcations and barriers were also to be carefully re-examined; for it was acknowledged that the way by which some of the borders had been demarcated and where barriers had been placed contributed to enhancing the activities of smugglers. For instance, instead of stationing barriers close to the borders, the Ghana-Cote d’Ivoire border in the Mim environs was placed rather at Bediako, a village 50 miles inside Ghana. This meant that there was no check-point at the actual border so that it enabled smugglers to dispose of their goods even before reaching the barrier. The government, again, established a special deterrent force within the police service. This body was organised on an ad hoc basis and operated confidentially in order to prevent the leakage of information concerning the strategies of the government in fighting smuggling.
Apart from these measures, it was agreed that if people were still engaged in smuggling, then they should be punished severely when arrested. But realising that it was of no use spending the tax-payer’s money on immigrant prisoners and wait till they served their prison terms before deporting them, it was deemed rather better to deport them immediately they were found guilty by the courts.\(^9\)

In reference to armed robbery, the Ghana Army was given police powers in September, 1970, in an attempt to stamp out the large number of robberies with violence which had been occurring in the larger towns. The Prevention of Crime Bill conferred on the armed forces ‘power of arrest and search of any person at any place, premises, or in vehicles, to take possession of any property’. Later it was announced that soldiers could shoot armed robbers in any confrontation.\(^9\)

**Political Measures**

In the political arena, certain actions were also taken to ensure the effective enforcement of the expulsion order in that field. In order to destroy the political power of immigrants in the country, the government took steps to remove immigrants, including even those who had the necessary papers to stay, from serving as members of local government bodies.\(^9\) Mr. Yakubu Abdulai, an N.A.L. MP for Savelugu, on two occasions in parliament, asked Mr. Kwabena Kwakye Anti, the Minister for Local Administration, on May 29, 1970, and the Ministerial Secretary for Internal Affairs, Mr. Kwaku Baah, on February 25, 1971, to remove an Amadu Bukari and a Mahama Iddrisu, both immigrant
employees of the Savelugu Local Council, serving on the council’s management committee. Eventually, Mahama Iddrisu resigned from the council’s employment while steps were taken to replace Amadu Bukari. 99

Knowing that the expulsion order did not affect all immigrants in the country and for that matter some of them would remain after the mass immigrant exodus, the government felt that the remaining immigrants and those who might come in the future would still find ways of evading the immigration laws of Ghana if the immigration department of the country itself was not in a good shape. With this conception, and the fact that earlier measures adopted to control smuggling had failed to achieve the desired results, the need was felt to expand and upgrade the Ghana Immigration Service. The immigration service was duly overhauled. This was done not only for the proper handling of immigration issues and ensuring the security of the nation but also “for the comfort of the visitor …” 100 Henceforth, the service was to take proper documentation of all immigrants in respect of their points of entry, the date of entry, their home address, and addresses of residence in Ghana. 101 It was also to provide, on request, information on the day-to-day activities of immigrants with regard to their movements within Ghana and changes in address and employment. These details were to enable the service trace all questionable immigrants and identify any irregularities in their activities.

Forty-six operational or immigration posts were to be opened at various points, namely, Accra Airport, Takoradi, Tema, Aflao, Kumasi, Dormaa Ahenkro, Half Assini, Tamale Yakese, Omape, New Town, Alenda, Sewum, Jema, Elubo,
Shia, Nyive, Manuse, Mpeye, Kadjebi, Wati, Batume, Baglo, Kpetoe, Ahamansu, Afegame, Leklebi Dafo, Honuta, Akanu, Ave Afiadenyigba, Dadieso, Ahiaakro, Kwamwseikrom, Krokosue, Paga, Yawgu, Hamile, Chereponi, Tumu, Bawku, Pulimakom, Bole, Tatali, and Cape Coast. Though all these units were already in existence before the restructuring, only those at Accra Airport, Takoradi, Tema, Aflao, Kumasi, Dormaa Ahenkro, Half Assini and Tamale were manned by properly-trained immigration personnel; all the others were manned by policemen and border guards with only one week in-service training.

At the same time, the government reasoned that the nationality laws of the country needed to be re-examined. This step was long overdue in view of the fact that almost immediately the expulsion order was issued, some of the immigrants who were made to leave the country were, according to existing laws, citizens of Ghana by birth or descent or registration or naturalisation. Families had been disintegrated as a result of lack of understanding on the part of some of the immigrants as to the citizenship status of couples in a marriage in which one partner was a Ghanaian and the other not. Others had also been chased away by some Ghanaian youth. The need was, thus, felt to clarify certain anomalies inherent in existing nationality laws, especially citizenship as provided by the 1969 Constitution.

Previous nationality measures had made a distinction between citizenship by birth and by descent. This was found to be anomalous particularly in the light of Article 10 (3) of the 1969 Constitution under which citizens by naturalisation or registration could be deprived of their citizenship. As a result, Clause 1 of
the Ghana Nationality Bill, 1971, made distinct provisions governing the acquisition of citizenship by birth by persons born before, on, and after 6th March, 1957, and before and after the coming into force of the 1969 Constitution. Henceforth, a person born in or outside Ghana could claim Ghanaian citizenship if either of his parents or grandparents or great grandparents, was born in Ghana, or if his parents were citizens of Ghana by registration or naturalisation. Spouses of Ghanaian citizens were also regarded as citizens until the marriage was annulled.

The new law required that in addition to being of a good character and in possession of other qualities, people who applied for citizenship by naturalisation must have made or were capable of making substantial contribution to the well-being and progress of Ghanaian life, and must have also been assimilated or could easily be assimilated into the Ghanaian way of life. These requirements were strictly looked for when considering the applications of immigrants for registration and naturalisation when the expulsion order was being enforced.

The new nationality law was necessary because it clarified certain inconsistencies in existing citizenship and nationality laws. It must, nonetheless, be emphasised that the law did not achieve much for all citizens of Ghana in the sense that clause 10 of the law conferred on the High Court of Justice the responsibility to deprive people who were citizens by registration and naturalisation of their citizenship under certain circumstances and for that matter be treated as non-citizens. It has been pointed out above that earlier in January, 1970, Mr. Captan, a Ghanaian citizen by naturalisation, was deprived of his
citizenship and deported from Ghana. It is possible that other citizens of Ghana by registration and naturalisation must have also lost their citizenship this way.

With regard to other objectives such as reducing the population of the country and achieving foreign policy objectives, it must be emphasised that no specific measures were adopted and implemented towards the realisation of those aims. It is, however, easy to discern that the execution of some of the measures adopted in relation to certain objectives was to achieve multiple results, meaning that the implementation of some policies could help actualise more than one objective. Take, for instance, the issue of reducing the population, it is clear that the expulsion of the illegal immigrants was the first major step towards realising that. In addition, the government intentionally refused permits to some of the immigrants. For example, certain categories of immigrants who had not already obtained permits before the issuance of the expulsion order were disqualified from even making the attempt to secure permits. The departure of all these people would obviously help reduce the population. It needs to be emphasised that the departure of the illegal immigrants alone could not help reduce the population significantly. In the first place, some of them went into hiding till the situation had calmed down. Others returned later after some categories of immigrants had been exempted. Even after the mass exodus, other migrants would move into the country in the future. If, therefore, the expulsion alone was adopted as the mechanism for achieving that objective, without the adoption of any improved family planning methods, then the government was bound to fail in the long run.
Concerning achieving foreign policy objectives, it has already been established that reducing the population must have been a requirement for the lending of a loan to the Ghana government by international financial institutions. Here, again, the exodus of the expelled immigrants would clearly affect the size of the population, and thereby enable the government to access whatever loans it hoped to secure.

**The Police and the Enforcement of the Order**

The most interesting aspect of the whole enforcement of the expulsion order was in connection with the activities of the police. The police went round all towns and villages to ensure that immigrants without the necessary papers either made preparations to get them or left Ghana. The police performed this function simultaneously with that of protecting the departing immigrants from being maltreated by some Ghanaians and to prevent immigrants’ properties from being looted as some immigrants packed their belongings into trucks to begin their journey home. The police, on some occasions, escorted some departing immigrants to the borders for safety. This happened mainly before the deadline for immigrants without residence permits to leave Ghana.

After the deadline, however, the police was more concerned with the arrest of immigrants who had no permits. In the Volta Region, for example, the police launched an operation to find immigrants who did not have the permits but were still in the country after December 2, 1969. In some of the major towns
such as Accra, Kumasi, Takoradi, Tamale, Koforidua, Bolgatanga, etc., some immigrants were physically removed from their houses by the police and sent to the police station.\textsuperscript{109} Policemen carrying batons and truncheons questioned any person who resembled an immigrant. The police normally rounded up immigrants without permits at dawn, moving from house to house to ensure that no illegal immigrant was hidden by any citizen. The police also combed all markets, lorry parks and other areas known to be mostly populated by immigrants to inspect their documents.

On some occasions, some zealous Ghanaians informed the police about the hiding places of some of the defaulting immigrants. Following one such tip off by the Ghana National Crusade for the Protection of Ghanaian Enterprises, the police in Kumasi arrested several immigrants, including butchers, mostly Nigerians, along with a Ghanaian woman who reportedly acted as a “cover” during a surprise swoop at the Kumasi Central Market.\textsuperscript{110} Those who possessed residence permits but had no permission to trade were left free afterwards but had their shops closed down.\textsuperscript{111} Those who had no residence permits but still remained and sold at the markets usually took to their heels on seeing the police and never returned. Others returned only to be arrested. Arrested immigrants were taken to the police stations for checking, and then hurried aboard chartered buses for transport to the borders, often without being allowed to gather their things or contact relatives.\textsuperscript{112} Sometimes some of the arrested immigrants were detained for a number of days until they were deported. During this period, their embassies and high commissions would be notified and arrangements made for their
repatriation. The unpleasant conditions in which some of the immigrants found themselves made them think of committing suicide. There were, at least, two attempted suicides by men being deported who had no knowledge of their supposed homes, and one Burkinabe returned to Ghana because he could find no relatives, work, or food, only to be jailed and deported again.

The constant police patrols succeeded in driving many immigrants from some areas of economic activity in which they had been prohibited from participating. These areas soon fell into the hands of the local people. Even the buying and export of kola, a business which hitherto had been dominated by immigrants, soon saw some local people entering into it. The police search for non-complying immigrants was so intensive that some of the immigrants who heard of the police activities came out from their hiding places themselves, and hurriedly packed and left. Sometimes, husbands returned from work and found their wives missing and vice versa. Children also sometimes returned home from school or elsewhere to find their parents missing.

Some police personnel sometimes subjected immigrants to severe beating when they arrested them. In one particular instance at Odumasua in the Afram Plains, an eye-witness related that:

a Mossi farming couple had just returned from the farm when about four policemen and a police-woman suddenly appeared in their house and arrested them. This event occurred in or about January, 1970. The couple pleaded with them but the police would not compromise. In the circumstance, the man bolted towards the bush, leaving
the wife. The police woman seized and slapped the woman, while the men gave the husband a very hot chase. They easily captured him because he was very much worn out from the work on the farm. One after the other, all the four policemen reportedly gave the man a slap each, and afterwards pounced on him on the ground. Even so, the police did not leave them! They arrested the couple and took them away, and they were never again heard of.\textsuperscript{117}

In another instance at the Koforidua Central Market around mid-March, 1970, some policemen abused three butchers whom they arrested.\textsuperscript{118} Some zealous Ghanaians had informed the police that the butchers had neither residence nor work permits and yet had not vacated the market. The police, on one afternoon, went to the market to arrest the alleged defaulting butchers. Immediately they arrived at the market, the police ordered the three butchers to stop selling their meat and follow them to the police station. The butchers immediately took to their heels and sought refuge in the house of another immigrant who allegedly had obtained permit.\textsuperscript{119} The police followed them there. Without uttering a word, the police pounced on the three butchers and the one who offered them sanctuary and beat them mercilessly, after which the three butchers were sent to the police station to join others who had been sent there earlier and were waiting to be deported.

Apart from being brutal sometimes towards some immigrants, some of the police personnel deliberately took advantage of the implementation of the expulsion order to perturb immigrants with whom they had personal squabbles. Around February, 1970 in Kumasi, a Mossi farmer and Chain Saw machine
operator from Burkina Faso, called Abulai, was constantly harassed and threatened with deportation by a Constable Adams, who allegedly owed Abulai and had refused to pay him the money. Threatening and harassment of immigrants were rampant, especially in the hinterland.

Sometimes, however, the immigrants were to blame for the attitude of the police. Some of them tried to defy the order by either hiding or resisting arrest. Sometimes, they engaged the police in a tussle in order to avoid being arrested for deportation. Examples of such events occurred mostly in the rural areas. For instance, in some villages in the Afram Plains, including Kwaekese, the police commander of the Kwahu District and resident at Nkawkaw, a Mr. Afful, was compelled to go and assess the situation in those areas due to reports of several incidents of engagements between some of the police personnel and some immigrants there. Not satisfied with the strength of the police force in the area, Mr. Afful called for reinforcement from Nkawkaw to boost the force in the Afram Plains area in its activities.

In some instances, the police were completely beaten up by the immigrants. The February 21, 1970 edition of the Daily Graphic reported a case in which two policemen and a Social Welfare officer were assaulted during a swoop on immigrants. The police had gone to the Zongo Lane in Accra to arrest some Nigerians who had smuggled into Ghana Nigerian currency, which they were passing to those Nigerians leaving for their home, and were also exchanging the currency to buy diamond and smuggle them away. The Nigerians started running away when the police brought out the search warrant, but they
were able to arrest some of them and retrieve some of the currency. The report continues that:

Before they left the place, an attempt was made at some sort of compromise, but the policemen refused and insisted upon taking these men away. Just as they left the house, somebody, a cattle dealer, made what was a clarion call for a fight and challenged those people around why they had allowed just two or three policemen to take away all their money. After this clarion call, the people around set upon the policemen and started beating them up.\textsuperscript{123}

Cases of this nature must have encouraged the police to conclude that brutality was the best method to adopt against the defaulting immigrants in order to be able to subjugate them. On the other hand, the police brutality towards immigrants could have been a revenge on the part of the police on the immigrants for their beating of some of the police personnel. In the meantime, cases of immigrants attacking the police and personnel of other security agencies involved in the implementation of the order made some Ghanaians endorse the unacceptable police brutality towards immigrants.\textsuperscript{124}

**The Unneighbourly Attitude of Some Ghanaians**

Apart from the police who sometimes maltreated immigrants, some ordinary Ghanaians also subjected some of them to torture.\textsuperscript{125} There were numerous occasions of clashes between some Ghanaians and some of the immigrants; these incidents were widespread in the countryside, but some also
occurred in the big towns and cities. Allusion has already been made to the physical removal of some Nigerians from their houses. Besides physical maltreatment, there was taunting and officious questioning of immigrants by zealous citizens to see if they had permits. Some people moved from house to house, asking immigrants to show them their residence permits. There were also instances when some Ghanaians seized properties belonging to immigrants and threatened to report them to the police if they dared raise alarm. Victims of this vice sometimes included even immigrants who had obtained the necessary papers. Immigrants normally threatened were those whom the citizens thought were impeding their access to jobs and those who had thrown their weight behind factions in local politics. In the rural areas, some youth moved from one village to another, warning immigrant cocoa farm labourers to leave the country. Sometimes so stern were the warnings that some of the immigrants became frightened to go to their farms even when they had the required papers to stay. In the face of this roaring atmosphere, some of them concluded that their presence was unwelcome and that their lives were not safe. The obvious consequence was that many cocoa farm labourers were compelled to get out of the country.

Some Ghanaian food sellers also inflated the prices of their food to the stranded immigrants whilst they were waiting for days before leaving Ghana. Moreover, in some cases, some of the immigrants had to sell their property previously acquired in Ghana in order to get money to pay for food. Furthermore, given the number of immigrants who had to
gather in a few open centres for about a week and more, there was deterioration of sanitation, and health problems.\textsuperscript{131}

Some government officials, for whatever reasons, were also active participants in the maltreatment of the expellees. In a parliamentary debate on August 4, 1970, the Member of Parliament for Gomoa Assin-Ajumako, Mr. Frank Abores Essel-Cobbah of the Progress Party, brought to the attention of parliament his active involvement in the harassment of immigrants. He reportedly stated that he had impounded a residence permit from an immigrant which he was prepared to show to members of the House after the House had adjourned.\textsuperscript{132}

The hostile attitude on the part of some Ghanaians might have derived from an alleged government spokesman’s statement that it was a national duty for Ghanaians to help enforce the measures against immigrants to double the number of those who left everyday. The spokesman reportedly asked chiefs to “beat the gong-gong all over Ghana by asking aliens without residence permits to leave”, but warned that “aliens should not be maltreated.”\textsuperscript{133} The name of the alleged government spokesman was not given. It is, therefore, difficult to confirm the veracity of the report. It should, nonetheless, be mentioned that the molestation of immigrants by Ghanaians started long before the alleged statement was made and it continued afterwards. It is argued that the perpetuation of the maltreatment of immigrants must have been due to the government’s non-serious attitude towards the various warnings it issued and which Ghanaians were aware of. In fact, there is no evidence indicating that any Ghanaian was punished for manhandling any immigrants.
Exemptions from Expulsion

When at a point many areas of the economy started suffering from lack of labour supply, some Ghanaians appealed to the government to do something about the situation. Cocoa farmers and some firms, whose successful operations depended mainly on immigrant labour, were prominent among those who made the appeals. The Public Works Department, for instance, was among the public departments that spearheaded the appeals to the government to ease the measures against immigrants to avoid slowing down of works which were yet uncompleted.  

In this wise, the department was particularly concerned about construction.

In relation to the docks, the Cargo Handling Corporation dismissed 2,000 Tema dockworkers in early 1969 and replaced them all. It is, however, difficult to state whether all those dismissed were immigrants or those employed later were all Ghanaian citizens. It is certain, on the other hand, that before the deportation order was issued, there were 5,413 immigrants working at the ports of Tema and Takoradi for the Railway and Ports Administration and the Ghana Cargo Handling Company. By May 18, 1970, 1,074 of them had left, while 4,339 were still working for those institutions. Some people wondered whether there would be such a ready supply of labour for the docks or building sites and other sectors affected by the immigrants’ departure if many of them were made to leave the cities and big towns.
The government itself was surprised by the magnitude of the problems caused in certain areas of the economy by the expulsion order. In view of this, it was only logical for the government to allow some of the immigrants to stay to carry on their work. It seems, however, that even before these appeals were made, the government had already exempted some categories of immigrants from the expulsion. The External Affairs Minister reportedly said on December 2, 1969 that immigrants without permits but were engaged in jobs that were valuable to Ghana would be given permits. These exemptions were to cover employees of the government, city, municipal and local authorities, employees of various state corporations and universities, domestic servants, watchmen, sanitary and conservancy labourers, farm labourers, laundrymen, and employees of companies in the private sector. Immigrant soldiers in the Ghana army were also to be given permits to remain in Ghana. However, this was to be for limited periods and subject to periodic reviews.

The Ministerial Secretary for External Affairs, Mr. John Agyekum Kuffour (who was later to become the President of Ghana, 2000-2008) also allegedly said on January 3, 1970 that immigrants born in Ghana who seemed to have nowhere else to go would receive special consideration. Immigrants who returned after being expelled were also considered and allowed to stay if their papers were in order. This might have been the reaction of the government to the many complaints made by some immigrants, especially Nigerians, that some of them had lived in Ghana for so long, whereas others had been born in the country and did not even know their places of origin. At a meeting with the Kumasi City
Council Management Committee, Mr. K.K. Anti, the Minister of Local Administration, also reportedly said that any adult person of mixed Ghanaian and immigrant parentage might choose Ghanaian citizenship and engage in petty trading.\textsuperscript{142}

In certain economic fields, the government reasoned that it would not be convenient to take any drastic action against immigrants because of their skills. In such areas, therefore, the government decided to enforce the order in a gradual manner to enable Ghanaians acquire the skills possessed by the immigrants before taking up those jobs. Following this, immigrant farm labourers, mainly Mossi and Atakpami cocoa farm labourers, were allowed to stay as from February, 1970 in order to help the cocoa harvest of 1970 and also due to farmers’ complaints of lack of labour on their farms and the fear that the cocoa industry would be threatened.\textsuperscript{143} This exemption was made after a petition by farmers to the Ministry of Agriculture, but it was already estimated that half of the immigrant labourers had already left the cocoa farms, sped on their way by Ghanaians in the rural areas. Engulfed by fear of the collapse of the cocoa industry, the government appealed to chiefs to sound “gong-gong” to stop Ghanaians from maltreating immigrants to allow them to stay. In mining, where immigrant labourers were prominent, Ashanti Goldfields’ immigrant workers were completely exempted from the order. With regard to the ports and railways, the Ministry of Transport and Communications put in place a plan by which immigrant workers like technicians, technologists, and tug masters among the 4,339 immigrants who were still working in those fields as of May, 1970 were allowed to stay till a later date.
to be replaced by Ghanaians. A Mr. F. Fattal, a Lebanese national who naturalised as a citizen of Ghana, was also allowed to keep all his taxis on the road until a time that Ghanaians would be able to take over the taxi business.

In the same way, as immigrant butchers deserted almost all markets in Ghana, the government allowed the remaining butchers in the country to stay as from May, 1970. However, in June 1970, the police were called to the Koforidua market because the Ghana Cattle Dealers’ Association claimed that non-butchers had taken the law into their hands and were forcing all immigrants to leave without checking their residence permits. It was, further, reported that though the National Crusade demanded that all immigrant butchers should leave, the Koforidua authorities divided the market in half and gave the immigrants up to November, 1970 to leave their stalls. Ghanaian butchers in the Greater Accra area also felt that the remaining immigrant butchers were a threat to their continued existence; for, they were confident that they could take full control and manage the meat market well. Additionally, Biafrans were excluded from the expulsion exercise until the Nigerian civil war ended; at the end of the war, however, Eastern Nigerians without residence permits would be deported.

Exemptions Abrogated

It is important to reveal, however, that as the government made clear, some of those who were exempted were allowed to stay for only limited periods. The permission granted butchers to stay, for instance, was very transitory. On
August 4, 1970, a hot debate generated in the Parliament of Ghana in which the National Alliance of Liberals MP for Gushiegu, Mr. Ziblim Seth Adam, requested that a statement be issued requiring all immigrant butchers to vacate all markets and give way to Ghanaian butchers. This request was necessitated by the frequent clashes between immigrant butchers and indigenous Ghanaian butchers which sometimes resulted in serious assault.\textsuperscript{150} Even at the time of the debate, there was a clash at the Accra slaughter house between immigrant butchers and indigenous Ghanaian butchers.\textsuperscript{151} By this time, the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act had come into full operation and so some Ghanaians felt it was illegal for immigrants to operate in the areas reserved for Ghanaians.

As was mentioned in relation to Biafrans, the government withdrew the refugee status granted to Eastern Nigerians who applied for residence permits. Addressing a news conference held by three cabinet ministers, Mr. Victor Owusu, Minister of External Affairs, Mr. S.D. Dombo, Minister of Interior, and Mr. T.D. Brodie-Mends, Minister of Information, in Accra on January 22, 1970, Mr. Owusu declared that with the war in Nigeria over, the government had decided that applications for residence permits by all Nigerian citizens would be treated on the same basis. He added that Nigerians applying for permits should submit documents issued from Nigeria or from the Nigerian High Commission in Accra before such applications would be considered. He advised those in possession of permits without the necessary documents that renewals would be considered only upon presentation of the valid papers.\textsuperscript{152} Consequently, the Nigerian High Commission started issuing passports and other travel documents to those who
wanted to return home after the war had ended on January 15th 1970. By March, 1970, over 60,000 of such passports and travel documents had been issued. The Nigerian High Commissioner, Mr. V.A. Adegoroye, announced this while addressing a press conference at the offices of the Commission in Accra on March 6, 1970.

**Immigrants Departing**

The expulsion order did not require the immediate departure of the immigrants. It rather required them to leave after December 2, 1969 if they failed to procure the necessary documents. However, the activities of some fanatical Ghanaians and the police’s search frightened some of the immigrants so much that they hastily left Ghana for their home countries even before the deadline without knowing that they could stay and work if they obtained residence and work permits. Within the first week after the order had been issued, there were numerous reports of immigrants without the requisite permits making hasty preparations for departure. The period after December 2, 1969, also saw a continuous efflux of immigrants from Ghana. Those who left after the deadline were usually those arrested by the police. These were those who thought they were Ghanaians and, therefore, could stay. Some were those who relied on the assurances of protection given them by some citizens. Others were those who hoped to get permits but were not successful, while the rest were people who moved into other villages and towns with the intention of hiding.
Returnees included all categories of expellees. Immigrant farm labourers, taxi runners, hawkers, petty traders, and road-side filling station operators all began preparations to leave. Even some of them who had the proper documents to stay left hurriedly without knowing that the order exempted them. Some of them were so much afraid that they usually left in the night. They feared they would be apprehended if they went to the Ministry of Interior for residence permits. Some normally arranged and left in groups in big trucks, some of which were owned by the immigrants. This category of persons encountered comparatively less difficulty in leaving, unlike their colleagues who found themselves stranded at some lorry parks and other open places without enough shelter.

The returnees mostly left in big lorries. They packed their belongings, such as mattresses and other personal properties, in them and sat on them. Others stood in the lorries due to overcrowding. Mothers with children had to cope with standing in the lorries in addition to carrying their children at their backs.

Some local people assisted their loved ones among the deportees in packing their belongings into waiting vehicles; others, especially those close to the borders, sometimes escorted some returnees as far as the borders amid weeping, as they imagined that they would never meet anywhere again. The situation was very pathetic as some of the deportees confided in some of their local friends that their families would reject them because they usually grumbled that those who came to Ghana had abandoned them altogether when conditions became better for them. Some local people wept and sympathised with the
deportees the more as they revealed to the local people that they had nothing to live on back home on their arrival since no prior preparations had been made for such a sudden return. In fact, at certain villages, such as Kwaekese, Odumasua and Forifori in the Afram Plains, the situation could be likened to funerals as large groups of local Ghanaians usually gathered to discuss the sufferings and departure of their acquaintances and the problems they imagined the returnees would face in terms of beginning life all over again back home.

The total number of immigrants expelled was never properly calculated. The estimates of the newspapers and other reports showed considerable variation. The January 23, 1970, edition of the *Daily Graphic* reported that 170,000 immigrants had been repatriated to Nigeria, Togo, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The *Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*, on the other hand, showed that by the end of January, 1970, 200,000 African migrants were reckoned to have left Ghana. Later, however, the August 5, 1970 edition of the *Ghanaian Times* reported that between December 2, 1969 and April 20, 1970, 155,424 West Africans without residence permits left the country. In official circles, too, different estimations were offered at different points in time. In February, 1970, a government spokesman gave 100,000 returnees while another spoke of 300,000 in October, 1970. In an interview with the London-based newspaper, *The Times*, on March 4, 1970, Prime Minister Busia reportedly said that immigrants were still leaving at a rate of ‘several hundred’ a week. These figures show the inaccurate nature of what is known on the volume of the exodus and the wide exaggeration on the expected departure.
Whatever the number of immigrants who left, Nigerian expellees were in the majority. By December, 20, 1969, about 30,000 Nigerians were thought to have left. On June 9, 1970, the Nigerian High Commissioner in Accra also stated that 140,000 Nigerians had left Ghana since December, 1969. Departures continued, though at a slower pace, as the ban on immigrant trading brought hardship to families who might have stayed, while others chose to leave because they could see that things were not going to get any better for them.

Whereas immigrants who had not yet left Ghana were suffering at the hands of some Ghanaians, those leaving were facing diverse forms of hardships on their journey home. There were reports of frantic scenes along all roads leading to the frontiers. The situation at some lorry parks was the more serious as many immigrants were stranded because there were not enough vehicles to take them to the borders. Many were those who slept at the lorry parks for a number of days. Some of them also became stranded at ports. In the circumstances, some lost their belongings, while others died both at the parks and on their way home due to the outbreak of diseases and fatigue. Accidents also killed some of them as a result of having to travel in heavily-overloaded lorries. Over 100 Nigerian nationals reportedly died in accidents as a result of the poor nature of the roads. There were also reports of epidemic among immigrants camping on the Lomé beach, and of a few people, including children, dying on the journey.

The situation was exacerbated by the closure of borders by Ghana’s neighbouring countries on a number of occasions. After receiving about 40,000 refugees from Ghana, the Togo government, for instance, temporarily closed its
border with Ghana to non-Togolese on December 6, 1969 because it feared epidemics and starvation if too many refugees were allowed in.\textsuperscript{174} Even after opening the border later, the Togolese authorities escorted refugees as far as the Togo-Benin border to ensure that non-Togolese expellees did not settle in the country.\textsuperscript{175} Burkina Faso and Cote d’ Ivoire were also wary of letting in refugees who were not their own nationals. Cote d’Ivoire particularly turned back more immigrants from the border when they tried to enter that country because they had no vaccination certificates; they were later allowed to enter but not until they had spent some days waiting at the border and the Ivorien authorities had become convinced that they would quickly pass through their territory and move on without settling in the country.\textsuperscript{176} For if the deportees settled in these countries, their precarious economies would have been devastated; their governments would incur the extra burden of taking care of the immigrants, which they were not prepared to accept, in addition to the responsibility of catering for the needs of their own nationals.

The inevitable result of the frequent closure of the borders was that queues of trucks miles long clustered at exit points. Newspaper reporters sometimes counted over 250 lorries.\textsuperscript{177} On the Togolese border, many lorries sometimes converged on frontier authorities begging to be let in, but they would only allow those they could identify as Togolese nationals by their tongue or appearance since most of the immigrants did not possess, nor had ever heard of, travel documents in their life.\textsuperscript{178} Their conditions were worsened by the N\textcurren{20} limit on the amount of money that could be legally taken out of Ghana.\textsuperscript{179} As a result,
many of them became destitutes at the borders and ports where they became stranded.

Some of the immigrants who had lost contact with their families or did not even know where their grandparents and parents had come from found it extremely difficult to leave Ghana. They were forced to join some of the departing groups for wherever they were heading towards.\textsuperscript{180} They must have considered that permission to settle at places with less economic opportunities was preferable to enjoying economic ‘prosperity’ with life in danger in Ghana.

\textbf{Criticisms from Abroad and Within}

The treatment meted out to immigrants was so harsh that it attracted criticisms not only from the governments and press houses of the countries of the affected returnees but also from countries whose nationals were not directly affected. Nigeria, for example, recognised Ghana’s right to take measures against immigrants without residence permits but criticised the method used.\textsuperscript{181} Nigeria was particularly concerned about property some of her citizens were forced to leave behind and the various ways in which some suffered. The Federal government strongly denied that it had dragged its feet over getting its citizens registered in Ghana following the NLC directive of July, 1969. It criticised the Ghanaian government for its failure to respond positively to attempts by the Nigerian High Commissioner in Accra to get approval for his proposals to deal with the registration exercise.\textsuperscript{182} Nigeria, further, criticised the expulsion as
nothing but a “vicious political antagonism towards Nigeria”, and accused the Ghana government of backing the Biafran secessionists for having exempted them from the expulsion. Appeals to Gen. Gowon for help from thousands of Nigerians waiting in Ghana for transport at one point and stories of hardship suffered by expelled Nigerians and published by the Nigerian press made most Nigerians become very critical of the Ghana government. The Nigerian press became rampantly anti-Ghanaian. Two Nigerian newspapers, the *Daily Express* and the *New Nigerian*, criticised the expulsion as not being in accord with the spirit of African unity. A Liberian government spokesman was also reported to have said that “he did not expect stern action against his people, as there were ten times as many Ghanaians in Liberia as Liberians in Ghana.”

Some concerned Ghanaians also joined the crusade against the unfortunate behaviour on the part of their fellow Ghanaians. While those who were emotional wept for and sympathised with the departing immigrants on seeing their sufferings, others pleaded for leniency to be shown to them. They were shocked at the harshness shown to immigrants forced to leave at short notice and unable to obtain documents. Even the Ghanaian press could not remain indifferent. The press had been unanimous in their support for the order partly out of patriotism, but a number of articles appeared in Ghanaian newspapers condemning the expulsion order. The Kumasi *Pioneer*, for example, criticised the “unneighbourly” behaviour on the part of Ghanaians towards Nigerians in Kumasi, while the *Daily Graphic*, on its part, advised the government to “handle the situation in a way to avoid any charges of discrimination being levelled,” and cautioned against
inciting people against immigrants. An article in the Kumasi Echo, by a Yaw Kurankyi, blamed the immigrants’ lack of permits on Ghana’s immigration officers and argued that the expulsion order was not consistent with the OAU Charter; at the same time, the paper pleaded for those who had lived in Ghana for many years and those who had been born in Ghana to be considered on merit and allowed to stay. By the close of 1970, there were as many critics inside the Cabinet itself, as well as in the upper reaches of the civil service, over the way the expulsion had been handled.

**Government Warnings**

The government on many occasions gave firm orders against maltreatment of immigrants. For example, in reaction to the confiscation of residence permits, Mr. Kwaku Baah quickly corrected Mr. Essel-Cobbah and informed him that he, like any other person, had no right to impound residence permits from any immigrant. For, as the Ministry of Interior emphasised, ensuring that illegal immigrants in the country left was the responsibility of only the police, the immigration service and other security agencies; it was not an opportunity for unauthorised persons to harass immigrants. The government, further, warned that it would deal seriously with people who molested them and demanded to see their residence permits. In addition, an appeal was made to chiefs to sound “gong-gong” to stop the ill-treatment of immigrants. Measuring these reports against that of February 7, 1970, in which a government’s spokesman urged Ghanaians to
participate in the drive against immigrants, it is difficult to reconcile that the same government would issue a warming to citizens to desist from molesting them and later encourage them to do so. At any rate, some Ghanaians continued to maltreat them in spite of the government’s warning against such behaviour.192

**Government Assistance**

The government rendered some assistance to the departing immigrants to ease their suffering. As the scenes of refugees in the streets of Accra and on the exit roads became intolerable, and when it became evident that many of the expellees were stranded without food or money awaiting transport to their countries, the Ghana government set up camps at various centres and at terminals on the borders with neighbouring countries where stranded immigrants were provided with food, housing, and medical care.193 The Ghana Army also provided meals and shelter at the Afienya camp near Tema and at other points for expellees on their way to Togo, and made efforts to stave off epidemics.194

The governments of the returnees also came in to help their nationals. In this regard, the Nigerian government was more active than the others. This might have been due to the large number of Nigerians affected by the deportation order. Dr. Arikpo, Nigeria’s External Affairs Commissioner, visited the people gathering at the Togo border. Buses were sent to Idiroko on the Benin-Nigeria border to pick up the expelled people, mostly reported to be Yoruba traders, while passports were flown in and ships diverted to Tema to carry Nigerians to Lagos.195 The
Western State of Nigeria launched a £500,000 relief fund, and the people of Ogbomosho gave 300 acres of farm land for the returnees. The Nigerian government initially provided £1,000,000 to take care of 80,000 returnees temporarily settled at Ogbomosho, while the Nigerian Red Cross provided food and shelter to another 20,000 Nigerian refugees from Ghana in transit camps in Lagos.\textsuperscript{196} The Nigerien government was only able to set up a committee and appealed for outside aid to resettle their returning citizens.\textsuperscript{197}

In September, 1970, Dr. Busia and General Gowon met in Addis Ababa during an OAU summit conference and agreed on the setting up of a joint Ghana-Nigeria committee to evaluate the property and assets left behind by Nigerians affected by the expulsion order, and in October, 1970, the conclusions of the committee were submitted to the two governments for consideration.\textsuperscript{198}

**Execution Relaxed**

Due, may be, to satisfaction with what had already been achieved, or the numerous internal and external criticisms, or the losses suffered in certain sectors, or whatever, by mid-1971, the expulsion order was not being applied with the same force with which it had previously been done.\textsuperscript{199} This, in addition to other considerations, led to the return of many immigrants to Ghana. Enforcement, however, did not cease altogether. The Progress Party government continued to enforce the expulsion order till when it was removed from power in a military coup d’état on January 13, 1972. By this date, most of the immigrants had left but
some still remained. For instance, those who believed Ghana still held some economic opportunities for them and for that matter were not prepared to leave bribed their way into staying. Others did lie low until the excitement had blown over. Some moved from their normal areas of residence to nearby or far away places. The Muslims among them changed their robes and other features that made them easily identifiable, and spoke Akan in public to create the impression that they were Ghanaians and thus clear all suspicions about their nationality and immigrant status. Those who had not made local enemies behaved as though nothing had happened and were truly protected by some citizens, and, as a result, escaped expulsion.

**Acheampong and Akuffo Continue Implementation**

The enforcement of the deportation order continued even after the exit of the Busia government. To win back the confidence of the countries whose nationals were affected, the National Redemption Council (NRC), which replaced the Busia administration, made several attempts to attract Sahelian migrant labour back to Ghana. At the same time, the NRC government made determined efforts to nationalise some foreign-owned businesses. For instance, with effect from October 1, 1973, the NRC took controlling interest in two foreign mining firms, namely, Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, which operated the gold mine at Obuasi and owned by Lonrho, a British company, and Consolidated African Selection Trust, a diamond mine in south-eastern Ghana owned by another
London-based finance company. A decree issued by the NRC enabled the government to have 55% of the equity of the companies, with the foreign concerns retaining 45%. Following the government’s decision, two new companies, Ashanti Goldfield (Ghana) Corporation Ltd. and the Ghana Consolidated Diamonds Ltd., were established to take over the business of Ashanti Goldfields Corporation and Consolidated African Selection Trust respectively.

Later, the Loyalty Garment Factory (Ghana) Ltd., Garmenco Textile Industries (Ghana) Ltd., Garmenco Knitting Industries (Ghana) Ltd., Loyalty Enterprises and Garmenco Industries, all of which formed part of the Indian-owned Loyalty Group of Companies, were also taken over. The companies, set up by two Indian brothers, A.K. Mirchandani and K.B. Mirchandani, had been involved in a series of frauds in February, 1972 by a systematic scheme of false customs declarations, and, thus, evaded the payment of customs duties totalling over 1.151 million cedis. After the take-over, the two brothers were imprisoned for attempting to bribe an army officer with 10,000 cedis, and were to be deported after serving their prison sentences.

The NRC administration enjoyed support from Ghanaians in its nationalisation enterprise. University students and Ghana’s newspapers welcomed the government’s decision. The Daily Graphic, for example, called on the government to extend its participation in other foreign-owned major companies in the country, such as British Aluminium, which produced bauxite, and African Manganese, both of which were owned by the United States of America.
Apart from taking over some foreign-owned companies, the NRC also executed some political policies which were part and parcel of the Aliens Compliance Order. When the Progress Party administration expelled illegal immigrants from the country, a decision was taken to issue citizenship identity cards to Ghanaians. This must have been geared towards the easy identification of Ghanaian citizens as distinct from foreigners. Since the Busia government’s stay in office was terminated before the actual expiry of its tenure of office, it did not have the chance to realise this objective. In 1974, however, the decision of issuing citizenship identity cards to Ghanaians was practicalised by the NRC. The Ghanaweb, for example, states: “The whole personal ID system was part and parcel of Prof. Busia’s so-called Aliens Compliance Order, which continued to be implemented for a while under Acheampong, and then dropped.”206

Akuffo’s administration also continued with the enforcement of the expulsion order in the same manner as Acheampong’s government had done. Mention has already been made to the effect that a Mr. M.F. Fattal was allowed to continue running his taxi business until later when some Ghanaians had entered the industry. During the time of Akuffo’s government, however, this man and his brother, Mahmoud, also a naturalised Ghanaian, were found to owe Ghana the sum of 4 million US dollars in tax arrears, while another Lebanese national, a Mr. Jamil Ashkar, was also found guilty of tax evasion.207 Fattal and Mahmoud, as well as Ashkar were ordered to pay over ¢6 million and ¢1.1 million respectively for evasion of import duty; they, also, had their assets frozen, their citizenship
revoked and then deported from Ghana. Other immigrants were treated the same way after irregularities in their economic activities had been revealed.

The above examination shows that the Busia government continued enforcing the expulsion order till the end of its administration. It has also been pointed out that the manner in which the order was enforced was rather harsh, causing physical and emotional pain to the expellees. After the exit of the Progress Party administration, the NRC, also continued with the implementation for sometime and later dropped it. In whatever manner the order was enforced, or whatever the length of the period of its implementation, there is no doubt that the mass expulsion exercise affected Ghana in various ways. Whether the effects were positive, negative or middling can best be answered after a critical assessment is made of the effects of the enforcement of the expulsion order in Ghana and the impact of the order on relations between Ghana and the countries whose nationals were affected, as would be done in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE

EFFECTS OF THE EXPULSION ORDER

The enforcement of the Aliens Compliance Order had effects on the society, economy and politics of Ghana. It also affected relations between Ghana and the countries whose nationals were affected. This section examines the economic, social and political effects of the Aliens Compliance Order in Ghana and on relations between Ghana and the countries whose nationals were repatriated. This is in an attempt to ascertain whether the ramifications were good, bad or middling.

Economic Effects

The economic arena witnessed the greatest impact of the issuance and implementation of the Aliens Compliance Order and the subsequent departure of many immigrants. The departure of the immigrants, for instance, contributed to reducing the number of unemployed people in Ghana. The exodus of most of the immigrants soon after the expulsion order came into force created a vacuum with
respect to labour within some sectors of the economy, particularly in the cocoa farms, in the mines, in the retail and petty trading, and in certain areas of the service sector, where the immigrants were mainly engaged and, hence, provided jobs for some Ghanaians. The government’s economic survey for 1968 revealed some 600,000 registered unemployed indigenous Ghanaians. From October, 1969 to January, 1970, also, 137,009 unemployed people applied for jobs.\(^1\) Out of the stipulated figure, 22,703 persons were assisted by the employment service in securing jobs.\(^2\) The passing of the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act later in June, 1970 also knocked many immigrants out of the economy and paved the way for interested Ghanaians to occupy the vacancies. The gradual departure of immigrant employees whose residence permits expired and were not renewed also certainly provided more jobs for Ghanaians.

Some local people, mainly women who were married to Lebanese, Syrian and Indian husbands, became the sole owners of enterprises formerly run by their deported husbands and associates. In Cape Coast, for example, an interviewee, who once married a Lebanese naturalized-Ghanaian citizens, revealed that the husband bequeathed paint and soap shops he run to her, while a friend of hers, also once married to a Lebanese naturalized-Ghanaian citizen, became the sole owner of textile shops the husband run in Takoradi and Accra after these men had left as a result of their inability to procure work permits.\(^3\) The women run those businesses for sometime until one travelled abroad and the other decided to go into something else.\(^4\)
Further, the government’s encouragement to Ghanaians to move into agriculture and other areas of the economy yielded some positive results in certain areas. There was some evidence which showed that some of the youth, who abhorred manual labour, were working in certain fields as charcoal burners and distributors, water carriers, porters at the markets, railway and motor transport stations, yam distributors, house boys, ice-cream sellers, labourers in the Department of Agriculture, etc., which formerly were almost wholly dominated by immigrants.⁵ Some young men at Oyoko, Akwadum and the other parts of the New Juaben District in the Eastern Region, for example, found themselves working on large cocoa and kola farms, although most were initially reluctant to do the job.⁶ In the markets and on the streets, Ghanaians began pushing trucks, carrying loads and selling bottles. The buying and export of kola, for instance, was no more a monopoly of immigrants. Ghanaian butchers were also willing to take over the meat market in the towns.

The city councils also allocated vacated stalls and selling sites to interested Ghanaians who wanted to go into petty trading upon the payment of a fee of N$3.50, made up of N$2.00 as allocation fee, and N$1.50 as the amount for rent per month.⁷ Hawking, selling from kiosks and many other jobs came to be in the hands of the citizenry. Some of them do exist today, but because they have passed through many hands, the present owners may not be aware of their original owners; others are still being operated by those who bought them but they might not admit the truth for political, or whatever, reasons.⁸

208
Apart from those who, on their own, established themselves in petty trading, agriculture and other sectors of the economy, some private enterprises also employed some Ghanaians after the departure of their immigrant employees. Antobre Prempeh Timber Company Limited, a private timber firm in Kumasi, for instance, employed about five local people to replace some expellees in the firm.\footnote{9} Ashanti Goldfields Corporation was one mining firm whose immigrant workers were completely exempted from the expulsion exercise. However, by the time it became known that these workers were exempted some of them had hastily left for fear of being arrested. The departure of these immigrant workers enabled a group of about six men from Bantama in Kumasi, and others, to be employed as labourers and some as drivers in the company.\footnote{10} This was in response to the government’s incentive of granting higher tax concessions to enterprises that would employ more local people.\footnote{11} For the media, there is no doubt that the events of the expulsion provided then with a mine of stories and, for that matter, of wealth.

It must, nonetheless, be appreciated that on the whole, the repatriation exercise had little profound influence on the unemployment situation among the indigenous population in the short-run. The unemployment situation could have been significantly influenced if most of the immigrants were employees in the economy, but the majority of them were running their own businesses. Others were family workers, caretakers, and apprentices. Immigrants working as employees in public institutions, such as the armed forces, government, city, municipal and local authorities, and universities were allowed to stay for
sometime, while some private institutions, including Antobre Prempeh Timber Company Limited, were able to procure permits for some of their valued employees to enable them continue in employment for some time.\textsuperscript{12} By the end of August, 1970, a list of thirty-three foreign-owned enterprises were also authorised by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning to carry out retail and wholesale trade in Ghana following returns from the Commissioner of Income Tax that their turn-overs were above N\textcelsius{}500,000, and these firms also maintained some of their immigrant employees after obtaining permits for them.\textsuperscript{13} Moreover, though some left, labourers and caretakers working on cocoa farms and in the mines were allowed by the government to stay, even though they were still required to possess valid residence and work permits. In addition, the Lebanese, Syrians, Indians and other foreign businessmen who were mostly affected by the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act found it relatively easy to evade the act by using ‘improper means.’ These improper means included marrying a local girl in whose name the business continued to run, or forming a ‘sleeping partnership’ with a Ghanaian national.\textsuperscript{14} Thus, in these sectors, Ghanaians stayed outside in the short-run.

Even large numbers of stalls in the towns and cities were said to have been closed for some time.\textsuperscript{15} Many Ghanaians who bought stalls did not have enough capital to maintain the stocks. The Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act, as already stated, provided for a credit guarantee scheme by which Ghanaian businessmen and women were assisted to purchase and operate the kind of businesses owned by the immigrants.\textsuperscript{16} However, many Ghanaians who purchased those businesses
could not operate them well due to their lack of experience, skill and the connections to be able to reconstruct trade in the manner in which the expelled immigrants had managed those businesses. The inevitable result was the collapse of those ventures. In Cape Coast, for example, many stalls purchased from departing immigrants did not survive due mainly to lack of the requisite skills to manage them.\(^{17}\)

In the petty and retail trade sector, Ghanaians could not move in very rapidly. Though many had wished to enter, they were not able to do so early enough for a number of reasons. In the first place, many Ghanaians did not have the necessary capital to start the trade. Secondly, some of them did not have enough confidence in themselves to start the business.\(^{18}\) Thirdly, some were doubtful whether the businesses which they were about to start would succeed. They, thus, waited for sometime to see how the market situation would develop before deciding to go in.\(^{19}\) Fourthly, some Ghanaians believed they would not obtain space in the market to spread their goods and sell. This fear was genuine in view of the fact that some Ghanaians complained of discrimination in favour of Progress Party supporters in the allocation of market stalls and other selling places.\(^{20}\) Finally, as a feature of some Ghanaians at the time, they still felt that petty and retail trade was not dignified enough for them, and that they could not, as a result, improve their status within the society.\(^{21}\)

During the period when the expellees were leaving, essential goods became abundant in supply and cheap as, for example, a tin of milk which initially sold at about 10np was later sold at about 4np when the expellees were
departing. However, since fewer people entered the economy as retail traders, vulcanisers, second-hand car spare parts dealers, charcoal burners and distributors and sellers, than was required by the market, prices of these commodities or the cost of those services to the general public, services formerly provided in large quantities and cheaply by the immigrants, expectedly, increased soon after most deportees had left. One reason for price increase was that the Ghanaian traders who took over tried to get rich quickly. For example, the Kwahu, who are referred to as the ‘traditional traders of Ghana’, took over the vehicle spare parts business in Accra from Nigerians and laughed at anyone who grumbled over the new prices.

The price of meat also almost doubled and the cost of a cow trebled at the Koforidua market soon after the Aliens Compliance Order came into force. Most butchers in the country were immigrants and, because they left suddenly, there was a temporary shortage of meat in the market. Two months after the Aliens Compliance Order had come into force, the press reported that many Northern Ghanaian butchers had arrived in Accra to fill the vacuum created by immigrant butchers who had left the country, but this could not immediately help do something about the situation.

The price rises resulted in part from shortage of vehicles to carry goods to the markets as a direct consequence of the exodus. The Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act reserved taxi business for Ghanaians, but in order not to upset business in the country, the government allowed immigrants to operate taxi businesses until Ghanaians took full control. Yet there were not enough vehicles
to transport people and goods from one area to another within the country. The reason was that lorries and taxis were needed to transport the returnees. The police issued more international licences to drivers to allow them carry their passengers beyond the borders, and, as many of the drivers were themselves immigrants affected by the mass deportation, they did not bring their vehicles back to Ghana.\textsuperscript{30}

The National Service Corps established on December 15, 1969, was also a fiasco. The Corps was set up mainly to carry out development projects in the rural areas; but it also had the aim of engaging the youth in activities in the rural areas so that they would remain there to fill the gap created by way of doing the kind of jobs done by the departed immigrants. However, the issue of inadequate payment, coupled with poor management and the estimated amount of N\textcide{46,800,000} spent on it per year, made the Corps exist for only two and a half years.\textsuperscript{31} It therefore, meant that the government’s aim of getting the youth engaged in some enterprises in the rural areas, which in a way would have served as jobs for them and reduce unemployment, did not fully materialise.

The departure of the illegal immigrants contributed to a reduction in remittances in the short-term. The percentage or the extent of the reduction was impossible to be calculated, but since some businesses formerly owned by immigrants, who sent the profit that accrued to their home countries, now came to be owned by local Ghanaians, their owners had nowhere to send their profits to and so such money remained in Ghana. In the long-run, this reduction was not all that significant. In the first place, departing immigrants took capital away. Since
the exchange control procedure was both slow and cumbersome, immigrants who owned lorries and taxis took their capital out of the country by obtaining international licences to take expellees across the border and never returned.\(^{32}\) The less fortunate depended on the black market at the border, where the unofficial rate for the New Cedis dropped severely.\(^{33}\) The Bank of Ghana announced, soon after the mass exodus began, that not a single departing immigrant had applied for transfer facilities; even after this announcement, only a few did so.\(^{34}\) Moreover, it was not every immigrant who left the country. Some remained, and others returned later, and such immigrants continued the practice of sending capital home. More importantly, some Ghanaians were also engaged in currency trafficking which meant that the sending away of Ghana’s currency to other countries was not a practice engaged in by only immigrants, although they alone were blamed for it.\(^{35}\) As a result, the reduction in remittances was very marginal and very transitory.

In another respect, the requirement that immigrants who wished to remain in their businesses were to show their tax clearance certificates in order to obtain residence permits resulted in a great rush to pay taxes.\(^{36}\) The sum of N\(\sigma\)300,000 was collected by the end of January, 1970, including some from immigrants who, it was alleged, had been declared dead twenty or so years earlier.\(^{37}\)

The mass exodus also dealt a big blow to the finances of some landlords and landladies. Some of the deportees were tenants and the rent they paid constituted a major source of revenue for some local families. When they left, “because the indigenes lived in their own houses, we did not get people to rent
those rooms immediately. In the same way, the mass repatriation exercise deprived some Ghanaian traders, whose businesses were patronised by immigrants, a regular source of revenue. People who had sold on credit to immigrants lost their money. Some banks and other credit institutions, both formal and informal, as well as private individuals also lost loans they had given out to their immigrant debtors. Most of the returnees, on the other hand, lost considerably more in terms of money and properties they left behind. Some of the immigrant petty traders had given loans to some local people but could not claim them in the panic rush to leave the country.

Cocoa farm labourers were among the groups of people the government exempted from expulsion immediately. Thus, though farmers, for example, initially faced problems of labour, some immigrant farm labourers remained and carried on their job. Some of the immigrants who were banned from certain trades but were not prepared to leave also moved into the cocoa industry. Moreover, although most were initially reluctant to do the job, some local people also moved into the cocoa industry.

However, by the time the exemptions were made, some of the immigrants had already left since it was not readily clear in the early stages of the expulsion whether they were exempted or not. They included some cocoa farm labourers. For example, foreign employed labour which prior to the repatriation exercise represented 47% of the total employment on the farms of Cooperative Societies in the six cocoa-growing regions of Ghana declined in proportion by nearly half by October, 1970. Even though they were not interested in cocoa farming, some
local youth, especially in the cocoa-growing areas, also objected to the government’s decision to exempt cocoa farm labourers from deportation and subjected these immigrant farm labourers to intimidation. In the face of this situation, migrant labourers became more attracted to Cote d’Ivoire and other cocoa-growing areas in the West African sub-region.

Labour supply, thus, became a major problem for some cocoa farmers during the 1970s. This compelled some of them to complain bitterly to government officials. Even where local labour was available, it was far more expensive and less assiduous than that of immigrants. Some farmers complained that one immigrant had been worth six Ghanaians. Weeds swallowed some cocoa farms because there were not enough labourers to weed the farms, and this led to the disappearance of a significant part of newly planted cocoa under bush re-growth.

Similarly, there were few labourers to harvest the ripened cocoa pods, prepare them for fermentation, take care of them till the beans were dried and pack them in sacks and carry them to the towns and cities for sale. In those days, ‘Agege’ lorries and ‘Wato Nkyene’ lorries were the vehicles usually used to transport cocoa from the farms to the towns and cities for sale. Most of these lorries were used in transporting the expellees to their countries, thereby creating transportation problems for the cocoa farmers. In areas where roads were not motorable, cocoa was head-loaded and carried to the buying centres. The Hausa from Nigeria, Mossi from Burkina Faso and the Gao from Niger were mainly responsible for this job; they were hard-headed, muscular fellows who for the
sake of extra remuneration normally carried double loads. The departure of most of them left few carriers available to do such jobs.

Awoonor asserts that the problem of labour led to a collapse of the cocoa industry. Some people who witnessed the trend of cocoa production before, during and after the Busia administration were also of the view that the cocoa industry almost collapsed following the expulsion of illegal immigrants from Ghana. Indeed, *Africa Today*, while revealing that a world price rise led to the largest ever income from cocoa exports in 1970 (252 million cedis), concedes that the cocoa industry was running into ever worse problems as local young men deserted it. At the Ninth International Cocoa Day celebrations on June 8, 1970 in Accra, Dr. K. Safo-Adu, the Minister of Agriculture, also informed guests present that Ghana’s cocoa production had fallen from 50% to 30% of the world production in spite of the government’s efforts to help farmers.

Others argue that in the midst of the myriad of problems which engulfed the cocoa industry, it was not unfavourably affected in the long run. This group of people argue that the cocoa industry was already bedeviled with some problems even before the Busia government came to power, and which, obviously, contributed to the problems the industry faced in the future. For instance, in March-April, 1969, that is, about five months before the inauguration of the Progress Party government, a downward trend was reported in cocoa production in Ghana. At that time, the fall in production was blamed on low prices and the absence of other economic incentives to cocoa farmers and the resort to old agricultural practices. Government subsidies on spray chemicals and
sprayers were, again, not enough. In government corridors, bad weather conditions were added to the myriad of factors responsible for the fall in cocoa output. Consequently, they considered the problems in the cocoa industry during and after the Busia administration as merely a continuation of a trend that started before the government assumed power.

They further argued that the problems in the industry did not adversely affect output. This argument is proven by increases in production during the time of Busia’s administration. For example, there was a rise in production in the 1969-70 crop year over that of 1968-69. The 1969-70 main crop cocoa recorded an estimated 370,000 tons as against 297,908 tons for 1968-69. There was also a rise in cocoa output in the 1970-71 crop year over that of 1969-70. The following table shows the estimates for cocoa production in Ghana as recorded by the 1974 Statistical Yearbook also recorded the following estimates for cocoa production in Ghana:
### Table 7

Estimates of Cocoa Production in Ghana, 1961/65 – 1972/73, (Thousand metric tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cocoa Year</th>
<th>Estimated tons Produced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961/65</td>
<td>4537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966/67</td>
<td>423.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967/68</td>
<td>327.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968/69</td>
<td>414.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>406.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970/71</td>
<td>470.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971/72</td>
<td>420.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972/1973</td>
<td>352.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** 1974 Statistical Yearbook.

The Busia administration came to an end on January 13, 1972. Thus, the fall in cocoa production, as recorded from the above estimates, was rather during the administration of the National Redemption Council but not during the time of
the Busia government. In view of this, it is logical to contend that there were problems in the industry, but these did not significantly affect production during the time of the Progress Party government. What was considerably affected was labour supply as a direct sequel of the expulsion of immigrant farm labourers, and this problem compelled some cocoa farmers to convert their farms from cocoa into food crops.\textsuperscript{56} Thus, it must be accepted that the 1969 Aliens Compliance Order contributed significantly to labour shortage in the cocoa farms which, partly, led to low production in the future which, in turn, led to the loss of Ghana’s leadership position in cocoa production worldwide. With the movement of migrant cocoa farm labourers from Ghana to Cote d’Ivoire, where the government introduced new policies to give migrants access to land on favourable terms, Cote d’Ivoire replaced Ghana as the largest cocoa producer in the world.

**Social Consequences**

The social sector witnessed equally significant effects as did the economic field. One important social consequence of the repatriation exercise was the disintegration of families, in which one spouse was an immigrant, and other social links, such as long-standing friendships. Sometimes husbands returned home from work to find their wives missing, and vice versa.\textsuperscript{57} Spouses in mixed marriages were faced with the problem of who should keep the children. Some immigrants also left hastily without contacting relatives. Some of the expellees left their children in the care of some Ghanaian friends with the excuse of returning later
for their children but never did so. These children grew up under the tutelage of their new ‘Ghanaian parents’ and remained in the country. When they grew up, some were told about their real parents and why and how they left Ghana. With the origins and particulars of their parents given them, some went to Nigeria and elsewhere to look for their real parents and succeeded in locating them. Others returned without being able to locate their parents. Some even returned once again to Ghana with their parents and other relatives who are now well established in Ghana. At Kwahu-Nkwatia, for example, a Maame Ajara left for Nigeria during the expulsion and left her three children behind. When they grew up, these children went to Nigeria to look for their parents and returned with their mother.

The impromptu contraction of marriages between some Ghanaian women and rich immigrant businessmen was another significant social consequence of the mass expulsion. An example occurred at Nkoranza in the Brong-Ahafo Region where a Nigerian employee of a mine in the Oda environs, probably the Consolidated African Selection Trust, hastily married a local woman he had a child with but had earlier declined to marry her. Such marriages were contracted usually with the view to enable immigrants married to Ghanaians evade deportation. This, however, was no remedy as many of them were still arrested and deported.

The various police stations in the country, especially those in the big towns and cities, also became almost always congested as the police intensified their search for and arrest of immigrants who defied the Order. Often in predawn exercises, the police raided residential areas and market places for non-
complying immigrants. Policemen carrying batons and truncheons questioned any person who resembled an immigrant to display their permits. This development, unfortunately, sometimes led to the arrest and detention of some citizens who were released only after they had been confirmed to be genuine citizens by other local people who knew them. Arrested immigrants were first taken to police stations for checking, and due mainly to the problem of inadequate lorries to take returnees to the border, some of them were detained for some days before being deported. The question that boggled the minds of some people was where would such people eventually settle and how were they to fend for themselves in their new habitats?

Ghanaians, generally, appeared to be excessively euphoric at the ‘nationalistic’ stance adopted by the Busia administration in deporting the illegal immigrants. Numerous letters to the newspapers commented on the general pleasure at the government’s action and commended it for helping to solve their outstanding economic and social problems and getting rid of diamond smugglers, currency traffickers, profiteers, criminals, destitutes, etc. Others poured scorn on the efforts of some private firms and even government corporations spending time to procure residence and work permits for their immigrant workers as carpenters, fitters, messengers, store-keepers and clerks, whereas some Ghanaians in these fields crowded at employment centres begging for jobs. Such Ghanaians wanted the Order to be used to get rid of all immigrants rather than only the illegal ones. In connection with this, some young men also attacked immigrants in the markets and looted shops. Other citizens, including government officials, took it upon
themselves to move from house to house to demand to see the residence permits of immigrants. Some of the immigrants also retaliated by jeering at or attacking those identified as oppressors. Sometimes they even engaged the police in a tussle in an attempt to resist deportation. 

Some Ghanaians and immigrants as well indulged in corrupt practices to make money out of the plight of the deportees. They volunteered to get frightened immigrants the papers they so much needed in return for payment. In some parts of the country, the fee charged normally ranged between N¢15 and N¢20. In some cases, those who volunteered to get immigrants the papers failed to do so or were never seen again anywhere by the unsuspecting victims. Around early January, 1970 in Kumasi, for instance, a man who claimed to know some workers at the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Accra collected an unspecified amount of money from about six immigrants and took down their particulars with the promise of obtaining permits for them but never fulfilled the promise; neither did he return the money he collected nor was he ever seen again. There were also occasions where people were arrested for forging of permits and passports, and in one such occasion, a man was arrested with a stamp from the Ministry of Internal Affairs issuing unauthorised permits to desirous immigrants.

In addition, there were disagreements among citizens regarding who should take over the stalls left behind by the expellees. About 4,000 market stalls were vacated in Accra, Kumasi, Koforidua, Sekondi-Takoradi, Tamale, and Sunyani, and about 24,000 women, with 10,000 in Kumasi alone, applied for them. The problem of allocation gave rise to many accusations of foot-dragging
and corruption on the part of city council officials as some officials demanded or accepted bribes before allocating stalls. An interviewee who personally began selling cloths at the Makola market in Accra after the mass exodus recalled having to ‘tip’ an allocation officer before obtaining a stall.\textsuperscript{73}

Even in the allocation of market stalls, there were complaints of gross discrimination in some markets. Members and supporters of the Progress Party were more favoured than those of other political parties. On November 24, 1971, the Leader of the Opposition and MP for Manya, Mr. E.R.T. Madjitey, alleged in parliament that members of the Justice Party, the offshoot of a merger in October, 1970 of the National Alliance of Liberals, the United Nationalists Party, and the All People’s Republican Party, were being forced to take Progress Party membership cards at a cost of N\textcelsius{}3.50 before they were considered for the allocation of stalls at the Makola market.\textsuperscript{74} To prove his point, Mr. Madjitey handed over to the clerk of parliament a Progress Party membership card he had collected from a Justice Party woman before she was considered for the allocation of a stall at the Makola market.\textsuperscript{75}

Indeed, the amount Mr. Madjitey referred to was exactly what was collected from people before they were allocated stalls at markets. This amount was, however, not for the purchase of membership cards of any political party. People of different political affiliations also transacted business at all markets, but there is no doubt that Progress Party members and supporters were more favoured in the allocation of stalls. It might not have been a general phenomenon, but there was evidence of some people being asked to produce their Progress Party
membership cards before being considered and issued ‘Accra-Tema City Council Market Identification Cards’ to enable them sell in some markets, like the Makola market and other markets in the urban areas.\textsuperscript{76}

In addition, it was very difficult getting sanitary labourers to do sanitary works at the initial stages. However, as the government later exempted some categories of immigrants from the expulsion, including sanitary workers, and as some Ghanaians later found themselves in such jobs, the problem was dealt with, though not in the manner as it had been before the expulsion exercise.\textsuperscript{77}

In relation to reduction in the size of the country’s population, there were mixed stances. Generally, it was agreed that there was some form of reduction, but the extent of the reduction remained an issue of debate. Overall, the immigrant population declined from 12.3 percent in 1960 to 6.6 in 1970.\textsuperscript{78} Reduction in the immigrant population was true because many places usually known to have been predominantly occupied by immigrants soon became deserted. Some of them who had permits left hurriedly for fear of being arrested. Some of those who had residence permits but did not have work permits also left, as residence permits did not bestow the right to work. The Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act also forced many immigrants out of the country since they had to give way to the local people.

Nevertheless, immigrants who had permits were not required to leave Ghana, while others hid and escaped deportation. Also due to shortage of labour, the government excluded some groups of immigrants from the expulsion, and
some were later reported to have returned after the government had allowed some of them to stay. Due to these developments, although elaborate training was given to a vast army of enumerators and supervisors and the most modern control techniques were used at all stages in the March 1, 1970 Census, some people doubted the accuracy of the figures obtained.  

Whatever the extent of reduction in the immigrant population, it, in turn, resulted in a reduction in pressure on social amenities. Some people observed a fall in the number of patients who visited hospitals and clinics. In some parts of the country, the number of primary school pupils and secondary school students decreased. For this reason, during the 1970 Population Census, pupils and students of some schools in the Afram Plains area and other parts of the country had to be merged for checking.

Yet another social effect was that the society, as one interviewee put it, was “cleared of bad and unwanted immigrants”. Some of the immigrants were diseased and unemployed and, as a result, took to begging and, thus, became a burden on the Ghanaian society. As the Order was mainly targeted at the unemployed and those who were labelled as ‘undesirable’ immigrants, the police and the other security agents involved in its enforcement ensured that such elements were removed from the streets. Consequently, most streets were soon almost empty of such elements.

It must equally be noted that not all immigrant beggars and destitutes were removed from the streets. By August, 1970, some of them were still found
roaming and sitting by the roadside going about their routine activities. Moreover, as was the case in other sectors, there were some Ghanaian destitutes and beggars who also roamed the streets in the cities and towns in the same manner as did some of the immigrants, thereby contravening the destitute laws of Ghana. Such Ghanaian destitutes and beggars included some youth who, after completing school, had migrated from the rural areas to the cities and towns in search of jobs but had become greatly disappointed. In enforcing the expulsion order, the police were ordered to remove all immigrant beggars and destitutes from wherever they were found, but nothing was said about Ghanaian beggars and destitutes. This discrimination in favour of Ghanaian destitutes and beggars aroused a bombardment of accusations on the Ministry of Interior in parliament. Yet, since the government’s attention was focused solely on immigrants, it had drawn up no plan for the removal of Ghanaian beggars and destitutes from the streets. Consequently, it can be argued that the streets were not fully cleared of beggars and destitutes.

In the towns and villages, the immigrants were often congregated in certain physical areas: that is, spatially, they were often identified with certain areas of the towns and villages. For example, in Accra, most of the immigrants were concentrated in Nima, Sukura, Kotobaabi, Zabon Zongo and Accra New Town, and in Kumasi, the immigrants were normally found in places like Suame Kotoko and Mossi Zongo. These quarters were among the most crowded areas in the cities. The departure of the immigrants offered an opportunity for the City Councils to move into these areas to clear the slum in the houses, or to demolish
the unauthorised housing structures in the areas. By May 28, 1970, 174
unauthorised structures formerly occupied by immigrants in the Accra-Tema City
area alone had been demolished, and the Inspectorate Staff was alerted to take
immediate action to demolish all remaining structures to prevent new occupants
from moving in to perpetuate the slum in the cities.\(^8^6\)

What retarded progress in this direction was that the resources of the city
councils did not permit them to carry out this task immediately. The Aliens
Compliance Order came out suddenly and the city councils had not thought of
such a strategic plan that would enable them to take action quickly. As a result,
with the passage of time, other young Ghanaians, mainly school leavers
numbering about 60,000 annually, who moved to the cities and towns in search of
jobs or for whatever purposes, quickly occupied the slum areas from where many
immigrants had left.\(^8^7\) Some of the immigrants who remained also continued to
live in such places, while those who either hid and evaded expulsion or left and
returned later erected, once again, the old structures that the city councils had
pulled down. Overcrowding in certain areas in the towns and cities, thus,
continued, not because there were no rooms available for rent, but because rents
were high and the average family, Ghanaian and immigrant alike, could not afford
more than one room at the time.\(^8^8\) In this way, the government’s objective of
clearing the slum areas was not fully realised in the long-run.

Further, the large exodus of immigrant craftsmen, such as the Atakpame
from Benin, affected the building programme in the rural areas. This particular
immigrant group had been very instrumental in the house building programme in
a number of villages throughout southern Ghana and Ashanti since the post-Second World War period.\textsuperscript{89} These craftsmen previously built with mud, but some of them later learnt how to mix concrete blocks to build, which, in effect, meant that they improved their technique of building. It was known that the quality of the building put up by these craftsmen was not very high, but they often built to the required standards of the owners. Moreover, they built very cheaply and speedily. A number of school classrooms, teachers’ quarters, and private houses in the rural areas had been built this way by this particular group of immigrants.\textsuperscript{90}

With the mass departure of these people, some Ghanaian contractors decided to expand quickly into the rural areas to avert the considerable suffering of the building programme in these areas. Lack of adequate capital, bad transportation system in the form of poor roads and inefficient trucks, difficulty of moving construction workers and other important factors, however, hindered progress among Ghanaian contractors.\textsuperscript{91}

In relation to crime, some of the immigrants, especially the unemployed, were blamed for a larger part of all crimes. The immigrants’ exodus was certainly accompanied by some reduction in crime, and there was, thus, certainly much less fear of theft in Ghana. In Ashaiman, for instance, it was evident that crime was less of a problem in 1970 than in 1968.\textsuperscript{92} Prostitution also saw some reduction. In a survey conducted by Margaret Peil following the departure of the immigrants in July and August, 1970, a man remarked, “Our girls may now consider marrying.”\textsuperscript{93} This implied that male immigrants’ patronage of prostitution
deterred young Ghanaian female prostitutes from marrying, and so the immigrants’ exodus was seen as paving the way for young Ghanaian girls to enter into marriage. Teenage and pre-marital pregnancies also decreased in some areas as a result of the expulsion exercise because in the Ajumako-Bisease area, for example, male immigrants were, allegedly, fond of impregnating young Ghanaian girls and women without necessarily performing the customary rites.94

Smuggling also witnessed some reduction. This was due mainly to the fact that some of the measures the government adopted yielded positive results. Ghanaians were influenced by the incentive of 25% share of whatever would be confiscated from smugglers to report smuggling cases that came to their knowledge to the appropriate quarters for the necessary action to be taken. Some of the border guards who were reportedly corrupt by way of taking bribes from the smugglers and allowing them to go away free now put up an uncompromising attitude towards the smugglers and reported them. Apart from this, the intensification of the efforts of the police in fighting smuggling sometimes successfully led to the arrest of more smugglers, both Ghanaian and immigrant. The Immigration Service itself was reorganised and its personnel increased. Already existing immigration regulations were also perfected, and border guards and police personnel were resourced and given enough training to enable them handle smuggling cases well. The Prevention of Crime Bill, which conferred police powers on the army, also enabled the army to assist the police in fighting armed robbery. The departure of the immigrants and the activities of the police caused such a great disorganisation among the smugglers that some government
institutions reportedly were able to record the highest sales ever during the late 1969 and early 1970 period.\textsuperscript{95}

These instances really prove that the mass exodus of the immigrants and the various arrests of smugglers and currency traffickers contributed to some reduction in the rate of crime. The reduction in crime was, nevertheless, temporary and marginal. Some Syrians and Lebanese businessmen who remained continued to obtain import licences for certain goods, but rather took to the importation of contrabands into the country.\textsuperscript{96} There were cases in which returnees also smuggled consumer goods on the lorries on which they travelled, covering them up with mattresses on which they packed their bicycles and other things.\textsuperscript{97} When they reached the borders, most of the lorries managed to get across without declaring these goods, thanks to the abetment of the Ghanaian border guards and the police force. In one particular instance, a truck bound for one of the West African sister countries, with some immigrants, mainly Nigerians, on board, was found to contain some quantities of flour, sardines, sugar, and other consumer items.\textsuperscript{98}

Nonetheless, the perpetuation and continuous increase in smuggling was largely due to the involvement of Ghanaians themselves in it. Undisputedly, some Ghanaians were already involved in smuggling long before immigrants were solely blamed for it. Some guards at the borders of Ghana continued to be promoters of this heinous crime, and some of them even went to the extent of threatening their colleagues who showed much interest in reporting the activities of smugglers.\textsuperscript{99} The wives of the border guards, people in high positions of
government, including customs officials, their wives and relatives, were parties to the perpetuation of smuggling. In the morning of February 27, 1970, for instance, some people from the Wenchi constituency in the Eastern Region reported to Mr. Kwaku Bugyei Ntim, the Progress Party MP for Kade, that some Ghanaians were lending support to some Nigerians in their smuggling activities. From their base in the Wenchi constituency, the Ghanaian accomplices would go to Accra, take money from the Nigerians, return to their area and buy the diamonds, and smuggle them to Accra to the Nigerians who sent them away from Ghana. This is indicative of the fact that even the Nigerians and other Immigrants who remained after the expulsion and continued their smuggling activities could not have successfully executed their operations without the assistance of Ghanaians.

Apart from the deliberate involvement of Ghanaians in smuggling, some factors also hindered the efforts of the government to control the spate of smuggling. Whilst trying to stop it, the government did not consider increasing the prices of cocoa and diamonds to discourage Ghanaian cocoa farmers and diamond prospectors who were attracted by the comparatively high prices of cocoa and diamonds in the neighbouring countries to send their produce there for sale. Also, since the early 1960s, there had been a tremendous increase in the movement of people and goods between Ghana and her sister countries. Since essential goods like wax prints, cooking oil and other goods could easily be obtained from the areas across the borders, some Ghanaians managed to smuggle other goods, essentially cocoa, for sale and bought these essential commodities on
their return. This was facilitated by the fact that the cedi and the franc, for example, were accepted at the borders. Even though these items could be obtained in the large towns of Ghana, the prohibitive transportation costs discouraged the village dwellers from purchasing such goods from Ghana. Being aware of this, traders along the Cote d’Ivoire and Togo borders made available such goods at reasonable prices to Ghanaians along the borders so as to entice them to patronise them.

Poor road network in the rural areas in the border areas, again, encouraged cocoa farmers to sell their cocoa in the neighbouring countries rather than bringing their produce all the way to the main centres of commercial activity in Ghana for sale. Apart from this, there were only a few commercial centres along the borders, especially in the Brong-Ahafo and Volta Regions, where Ghanaians living in those areas could easily transact business and get the goods they badly needed.

Added to these was the undeniable contribution of the network of social relationships which cut across geographical boundaries. Quite a number of people living along the borders were separated by artificial political boundaries, and yet there existed among them social relations which demanded periodical exchange of gifts. People, particularly farmers, along the borders took advantage of this and smuggled cocoa and other goods to their relatives on the other side of the borders to sell and buy what they also needed in return. Further, there were instances where Togolese and Ivorien farmers had cocoa farms on Ghana soil in the border areas and vice versa. In such cases, it was obvious that owners of such cocoa
farms would like to sell the produce of their farms in Togo and Cote d’Ivoire, more so when the price of cocoa there was far better than it was in Ghana. Even if the price for a load of cocoa was better in Ghana, they would still want to sell it there due to foreign exchange difficulties. The government’s attitude also greatly facilitated the smuggling of cocoa across the borders. By March, 1970, the government had not paid farmers for the cocoa it bought from them in January that year. Relatively, the rate of illiteracy at that time was higher than it is today, but many people, including the farmers, were not ignorant of their undeniable right to life, a reason for which they had taken on agricultural activities in order to survive. Consequently, some farmers thought it wise to send their cocoa to the nearby countries that were prepared to pay them for their cocoa produce when purchased.

As a result of the participation of Ghanaians themselves in criminal activities and the other factors enumerated above, smuggling, for example, continued to increase even after most of the immigrants had left Ghana. Cocoa, diamonds, gold, and even consumer goods continued to be smuggled into and outside Ghana. The importation of wigs was prohibited, but they continued to be imported clandestinely into the country. Smuggling of cigarette into the country was also taken over by Ghanaians so that a sales increase of N¢76 million made by the Pioneer Tobacco Company in December, 1969 dropped to N¢36 million in January, 1970. The fall in sales was attributed to the smuggling of Rothmans cigarettes, State Express, popularly known as 555, and other brands of cigarettes, the value of which was estimated to be N¢40 million in January, 1970.
Increases in smuggling and currency trafficking aside, other forms of crime, such as armed robbery, stealing and other anti-social practices like prostitution, also increased appreciably after a short period of slump. By the time this increase was recorded, most of the immigrants had left. In view of this, the increase was said to have been caused mainly by some Ghanaian youth who thronged the cities and the big towns in search of jobs but could find none.\textsuperscript{111} Therefore, the government’s aim of reducing crime of whatever form by expelling the immigrants was, to a considerable extent, not fully achieved.

**Political Effects**

Politically, the results were mixed, as they were in the economic and social sectors. The expulsion weakened the political power of immigrants in Ghana. Their removal from local politics meant a loss of their political power. This, nevertheless, paved the way for indigenous Ghanaians to bring their experience to bear when they filled the vacancies left behind by the deportees. Apart from serving as a form of employment, membership of local government bodies, again, provided a platform for local Ghanaians to address the concerns of their own fellow Ghanaians rather than the immigrants who sought to redress issues affecting their fellow immigrants more.\textsuperscript{112} It, moreover, provided new entrants into politics the necessary political education and training for future national politics.
The expulsion also indirectly affected the Ghana Immigration Service by way of causing reorganisation in the service with the view to making it more effective for the proper handling of immigration matters and keeping records of the activities of immigrants in Ghana with regard to their entry and residence in the country. The various immigration posts were also to be effectively managed by properly-trained immigration personnel. It is argued, however, that nothing much was achieved considering the fact that personnel of the service continued to engage in smuggling and abet smugglers in their activities.

The government’s action impacted on the administration and on the fortunes of the Progress Party. The move was generally popular because of the opportunity it offered local traders and businessmen to take over the position hitherto occupied by immigrants. It was also widely believed that the expulsion would lower the crime rate in the urban areas and diminish the illegal flow of capital from the country. However, the government lost sympathy because of the disorganisation which resulted, the rise in prices, the negligible effects on unemployment, and the continued presence of immigrants, especially in the towns. By the end of 1970, the Cabinet itself and the top levels of the civil service had become divided over the way the exercise had been handled.\textsuperscript{113}

The opposition parties had also agreed with the principles of the measure, but the rather poor manner in which the Order was implemented offered them ammunition to criticise the government mercilessly.\textsuperscript{114} Neighbouring governments also became critical of the Busia government, and even those of them who showed considerable understanding did so because, perhaps, they
wanted to improve the position of those of their nationals who managed to stay in Ghana. Finally, the Order was one of the many factors responsible for the overthrow of the Busia administration on January 13, 1972 in a coup d’etat led by Lt. Col. (later General) Ignatius Kutu Acheampong.\textsuperscript{115}

The Order made people come to regard themselves as either a national or an immigrant. The political status of citizens as well as that of immigrants was now clearly defined. According to existing nationality laws, any person who was not a citizen, either by birth or descent or registration or naturalisation, by the time the expulsion order was issued was an ‘alien’. For this reason, they could reside and work in the country only if they possessed residence and work permits. The passage of the 1971 Nationality Act also clarified who were recognised as citizens and who were not and for which reasons they could or could not exercise and enjoy certain rights and privileges respectively. The status of couples in ‘citizen-and-non-citizen’ marriages was also clearly specified. Moreover, the Act made distinct provisions governing the acquisition of citizenship by birth as well as by descent, naturalisation and registration.\textsuperscript{116} Immigrants who remained, thus, became more cautious of their dealings and movements. As an aim of the Order, therefore, immigrants who remained now respected the nationality laws and immigration regulations of Ghana as a failure to comply with them was likely to culminate in deportation.\textsuperscript{117}

Some Ghanaians also behaved towards immigrants in a way that offended even some Ghanaian citizens. The May 9, 1956 plebiscite brought the people of the former Trans-Volta Togoland under the jurisdiction of Ghana; they, thus,
became citizens of Ghana henceforth. The government duly appreciated this fact and even informed Ghanaians, in the wake of enforcing the expulsion order, not to mistake them for immigrants; however, some people referred to them as ‘aliens’ and asked them to leave Ghana. This was the price they paid for sympathising with the opposition National Alliance of Liberals. The reason was that in the 1969 election campaign, both the Progress Party and the National Alliance of Liberals sponsored candidates of diverse tribal origins in all parts of the country, but the actual voting produced a situation in which the labels ‘Government’ and ‘Opposition’ effectively denoted the major tribal groupings, Akan and Ewe. Even some of the chiefs there, reportedly, extorted money from the so-called ‘aliens’. The unexpected result was that many of the Ewe migrated to the urban areas in order to be free from the molestation and extortions they suffered. This harassment derived from the view that the Ewe were thought of as supporters of the National Alliance of Liberals because the Progress Party won only 2 out of the 16 seats in the Volta Region, while the remaining 14 were all swept by the National Alliance of Liberals.

Northerners were also subjected to harassment because they could not always be distinguished from inhabitants of Burkina Faso. Interestingly, the wearing of robes had become associated with non-Ghanaians. People who wore robes were, thus, usually mistaken for immigrants and chased away by some Ghanaian youth, but some of those people were really Ghanaians. The result was that some of the minority groups in Ghana became unsettled. They feared that if
conditions did not improve and there were no more immigrants to expel, they would be the next target.\textsuperscript{122}

Tribalism was, thus, much more evident than it was some years back. This phenomenon has undisputedly continued to be a major factor in Ghanaian politics to the present time. The Danquah-Busia line has been accused as ‘anti-alien’ and pro-Akan, an issue that works against the fortunes of the Danquah-Busia tradition during elections in Ghana. This factor contributed significantly to the loss of some NPP Parliamentary candidates, such as Professor Robert Addo-Fenin, in the 1996 general elections, especially, and subsequent ones.\textsuperscript{123} Their opponents normally ask the electorate to reject them because when they are voted into power, they would reactivate the Aliens Compliance Order to get many people out of Ghana.

**The National versus International: Effects on Ghana’s Foreign Relations**

The expulsion of the illegal immigrants created the worst international crisis for Ghana since the overthrow of Nkrumah in February, 1966.\textsuperscript{124} Various forms of criticism from around the world were heaped on the Ghanaian government. In Europe, America and elsewhere, the action of the Ghanaian government was seen as inhumane and lacking neighbourly feelings. The London-based *Observer* and *Financial Times* reportedly lashed at the Busia government severely, and all these had inevitable repercussions on Ghana’s relations with her neighbours well into 1970 and beyond.\textsuperscript{125}
There was evidence of undisguised hostility in all the countries of the affected immigrants, including Cote d'Ivoire whose leader was a close friend of Busia's. This was evident in the occasional subjection of Ghanaians abroad, especially those in Yoruba areas in Nigeria, to petty harassment. In Niger Republic, the press became extremely critical of the Ghana government as a result of the death of over 100 Niger nationals in accidents on the poor roads connecting the two countries, while Liberia threatened a reciprocal action against Ghanaians in Liberia if its nationals were molested. The major cause of the discontent appears to be the extra financial constraints imposed on the budgets of the receiving governments in view of the number of their nationals returning home. Because the governments of the affected immigrants had not been appropriately informed of any date for such a large-scale expulsion, they had not made any provision for the returnees in their budgets.

However, except for Nigeria, which vigorously protested the manner of the expulsion, other affected countries acquiesced to the Ghanaian measure, and the matter was not taken to the OAU or the UN for discussion. In an interview with the Financial Times on March 4, 1970, Busia reportedly intimated that the countries closest to Ghana had shown most understanding of the Ghana government’s decision. He cited Togo, Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire as examples of the acquiescing countries. Good relations with those three countries were firmly sealed in 1970. Relations with Cote d'Ivoire and Togo really continued to remain cordial. This was evident in the signing of a treaty of friendship and the establishment of a commission for mutual co-operation.
between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire following Busia’s visit to the Ivorien President, Houphouët-Boigny, in May, 1970. The two countries, moreover, agreed to promote youth and student exchanges and reinforce at all levels the political, economic and social co-operation that already existed. Further, in July, 1970, a joint Ghana-Côte d’Ivoire border commission adopted a ten-point programme for ending border disputes, generally the result of cocoa and coffee smuggling activities, between the two countries. \(^\text{130}\) Earlier in February, 1970, Ghana and Burkina Faso peacefully finalised the demarcation of the Ghana-Burkina Faso border near Bolgatanga without any scuffles, irrespective of the effects of the expulsion on hundreds of Burkinabès.

Ghana’s relations with Togo were also strengthened by an agreement in April, 1970 to exchange information concerning subversive elements, prohibited immigrants, and access routes used for smuggling. \(^\text{131}\) These relations were cemented with the deportation in May, 1970 of Benito Herbert Olympio, son of the former President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo, after investigations had revealed that he was in league with a Togolese national with the purpose of overthrowing the military government in Togo. This was followed by Busia’s visit to Togo in July, 1970 for a discussion on closer trade relations and border security as well as a project under which Ghana would provide Togo with hydro-electricity from the Akosombo dam. \(^\text{132}\)

The so-called good relations with Togo, Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, however, appeared not to be real. The governments of these three countries must have agreed to the Ghana government’s action ostensibly to protect those
nationals of theirs who still remained in Ghana. Even if their ‘friendly’ relations with Ghana were real, they were so only at the governmental level, but at the local level, their citizens harboured some form of hatred towards the Ghana government and Ghanaians in their midst. In Cote d’Ivoire, for example, some aggrieved youth harassed Ghanaians and asked them to leave the country because they were also “facing some economic difficulties.”

In relation to Nigeria, mention has been made of a meeting between Busia and General Gowon in Addis Ababa during the OAU summit conference in September, 1970, following which a joint committee was established to evaluate property and assets left behind by Nigerians affected by the Aliens Compliance Order, and the committee’s conclusions were submitted to the two governments for consideration in October, 1970. However, of all Ghana’s neighbours whose nationals were affected by the repatriation order, Nigeria was the most antagonised. The bitterness expressed in the Nigerian press, and tacitly by the Nigerian government, dented relations between the two countries. Reports of several deaths of Nigerians in refugee camps in Ghana, in road accidents, as a result of having to travel in heavily-overloaded lorries, and from exposure, caused a great deal of concern. The Nigerian government was forced to spend heavily on rehabilitation of refugees at a time when every available resource should have been used to set the country on its feet after its civil war.

The result of all this was that relations with Nigeria were slow to improve. For this reason, some people have regarded the expulsion of over three million illegal migrants from Nigeria, of which Ghanaians alone constituted about two
million, in both 1983 and 1985, as a retaliation against Ghana for her mass deportation of fellow Africans from Ghana in 1969. There is no doubt that the 1969 expulsion of non-Ghanaians from Ghana played a role in the Nigerian expulsions, but there were other more pressing factors in the 1983 and 1985 deportations from Nigeria. If, indeed, the Nigerian expulsions were a retaliation against Ghana, they would have been targeted at Ghanaians alone. Moreover, at the time of the expulsion, Nigeria’s economy was not in a good position, and that influenced the government more than any other factor.

Thus the mass expulsion exercise affected Ghana in diverse ways: its economy, society and politics, as well as its relations with her neighbouring countries. Some gains were made in all those sectors, but these were short-lived and far outweighed by the losses. Some people secured jobs, but in the long-run, there was very little reduction in unemployment. In some cases like the crime wave, smuggling, and congestion in slum areas, there appeared to have been no significant change after the mass departure of the deportees. The immigrant population reduced, but that had little impact on the country’s population growth. While the cocoa industry was not adversely affected, in terms of production, it suffered from shortage of labour as a result of the expulsion, and Ghana ‘sold’ her leadership role in worldwide production to Cote d’Ivoire. Relations between Ghana and her sister nations also deteriorated. It is, thus, clear that the results of the expulsion exercise were mixed. The government did not fully realise its objectives, but it would be unfair to deny it of any gains at all.
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CONCLUSION

This work has, broadly, examined the context in which the 1969 Aliens Compliance Order of Ghana was implemented. The study was divided into five main chapters in addition to an introduction and a conclusion. This section summarises the main issues discussed in the work.

The first chapter has dealt, mainly, with an examination of the factors accounting for the migration of people from near and far into Ghana. The study discovered both ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors as being responsible for the influx of immigrants into Ghana. The ‘push’ factors related to the countries of migrants’ origin, whereas the ‘pull’ factors related to Ghana which attracted migrants into the country. These factors contributed in diverse forms and degrees to make Ghana one of the three preferred migrants’ destinations in West Africa up to the late 1960s, with the others being Cote d’Ivoire and The Gambia.

Chapter two has analysed immigration regulations and other measures dealing with immigrants in Ghana during the periods of the colonial, Nkrumah and NLC administrations. The study found that the British colonial administration was the first to introduce immigration regulations into Ghana, thereby introducing Ghanaians, and for that matter Africans, to terminologies such as ‘citizen’ ‘alien’,

258
‘migrant’, etc. During the administrations of all the three, various measures were devised, some of which dealt with citizenship and, thus, established the nationality of the inhabitants of Ghana as against those who were not indigenes of the land. Some of the regulations concerned the requirements immigrants needed to satisfy before their entry into Ghana. Others specified the approved points of entry into the country, the types of economic activities that immigrants could engage in and those from which they were prohibited. While measures were taken to control population growth, instances were also provided in which immigrants could be deported from Ghana.

After carefully examining immigration control, the study found that most of the immigration regulations designed by the colonial administration and Nkrumah’s government remained dormant in the statute books. The British colonial authorities failed to effectively apply those regulations because they needed more tax payers, to enable them get more revenue for their administration, and cheap labour force. On the part of Nkrumah, it was observed that his pursuit of the policy of “African brotherhood” was the major factor that influenced his liberal attitude towards the many immigrants in the country. For this, people usually expelled by the Nkrumah administration were those considered to be political opponents to the regime. The NLC, on the other hand, was comparatively more strict in its enforcement of immigration regulations. It requested all embassies in Ghana to ensure that their citizens in the country were registered, but the various embassies did not take this directive seriously. Moreover, some of the immigrants were found doing jobs which they were not legally permitted to do so.
As a result, the NLC, when leaving office, suggested that existing immigration measures, especially the Aliens Act of 1963 and its 1965 amendment, as amended in 1968, be amended again to tighten the process of acquiring Ghanaian citizenship and be effectively enforced. It, further, requested its successor to ensure that immigrants complied with the directive it had issued previously.

Looking at the unsuccessful efforts of earlier governments to control immigration and reduce the immigrant population, it was obvious that only a firm action could help if really the immigrant population was a threat to the economic survival of Ghanaians and, for that matter, had to be removed from the country. In examining the Aliens Compliance Order and the reasons for which it was issued in the third chapter, the study found that the Order required all immigrants in Ghana who did not have residence and work permits to get them by December 2, 1969 or leave the country. Those who already had the permits and those who succeeded in obtaining them were not required to leave. In essence, the Order was only targeted at those who, statutorily, were not required to reside and work in the country.

With regard to the decision-making process, the study discovered that in official circles, the main reasons offered were reducing the rate of unemployment on the part of Ghanaians and remittances from Ghana, combating crime, guaranteeing the security of the country, and requiring immigrants to respect the immigration laws of the country. Truly by the 1960s, the presence of the immigrants posed an economic challenge to Ghanaians in some sectors of economic activity; however, these areas were mainly secondary sector jobs which
Ghanaians at the time usually did not like to do. It is true, again, that immigrants’ remittances from Ghana produced some serious economic snag for Ghana. Some immigrants were also involved in criminal activities of diverse forms, which the government wanted to curb. Many immigrants had, additionally, flouted Ghana’s immigration laws. The activities of some of the immigrants, moreover, were politically threatening. This, coupled with the fact that Nkrumah was by then living in Guinea and was still regarded by some African countries as the president of Ghana, alarmed the administration.

Looking at the expulsion order from both internal and external perspectives, however, the study observed that apart from the above indicators, other equally contending factors also influenced the government’s decision in diverse ways to issue the expulsion order. Based on the contextual framework employed, the study identified xenophobia on the part of some Ghanaians; the need to control the growth of the country’s population; clearing the streets of immigrant destitutes and beggars; and reducing stress on social services as part of the factors that influenced the government’s decision. Attempt at achieving foreign policy objectives, and fulfilling the promise of continuing the policies of the NLC regime also played major roles in the decision taking.

Chapter four examined the manner in which the decision to expel the illegal immigrants was enforced. Non-Ghanaians who were affected by the Order but wanted to continue their stay in Ghana made attempts to obtain permits from the Ministry of Interior, their embassies and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. Some were able to obtain the permits, but many of them were
unsuccessful in their efforts. This was the result of a combination of certain circumstances which embraced the following: many of the immigrants did not possess the documents required to obtain the permits; the number of affected immigrants was larger than expected; and some of the immigrants dragged their feet in making preparations to go for the permits and, eventually, made attempts to secure permits rather lately. Other factors were that the Order was issued without much preparation on the part of the embassies and high commissions, who were then taken unawares, and, most importantly, the fact that permits were to be obtained only in Accra from the Ministry of Interior, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and the various embassies and high commissions in Accra and nowhere else.

The study also discovered that the government implemented the decision strictly. To help realise the objectives for which the Order was issued, the government adopted a myriad of policy measures, which were economic, social and political in nature. The police, who were the main agents of the enforcement, performed their duty very strictly, moving from house to house, village to village, to arrest the illegal immigrants.

When many areas of the economy started suffering from lack of labour supply, some Ghanaians appealed to the government to rescue the situation. These appeals, coupled with the government itself stunned by the magnitude of the people affected, led to the exemption of some categories of immigrants. These, exemptions were, however, short-lived as after a short while, they were revoked. Many deportees suffered diverse forms of harsh treatment, including physical
assault, loss of property, sleeping in the open for some days due to shortage of vehicles to transport them, and deaths as a result of accidents. The plight of the immigrants was worsened by the closure of the borders by Ghana’s neighbours. The diverse sufferings of the illegal immigrants attracted sharp criticisms from both within Ghana and the international community, especially from those countries whose nationals were the most affected, such as Nigeria. The government issued firm warnings to all such unneighbourly behaviours and threatened to deal with people who maltreated immigrants. As a way of assuaging their suffering and assisting them in their home-return, the Ghana government put up camps at the borders where the stranded were provided with meals and medicine. Those countries whose nationals were affected also provided transportation and financial assistance to their nationals to ease their return home.

The Busia government continued to enforce the order till it was removed from power in a military coup d’etat on January 13, 1972 by the National Redemption Council. Rather ironically, the NRC continued the execution of certain aspects of the expulsion order, especially the aspect allowing Ghanaians to recover the economy from the control of foreigners, although it justified its overthrow of the Progress Party administration by arguing that Busia’s expulsion of the illegal immigrants had dented Ghana’s relations with the international community, particularly the neighbouring countries.

In the fifth chapter, the work has shown that the expulsion exercise affected the country both positively and negatively in the economic, social and political arenas. For example, the departure of the immigrants enabled some
Ghanaians to get jobs; this appears to justify the government’s view that immigrants were impeding Ghanaians’ access to jobs. Other Ghanaians were financially and technically assisted by the government to establish their own businesses. However, since immigrants who were not affected stayed and others returned soon after the situation had cooled down, the expulsion had little impact on the unemployment situation in Ghana. In the short-run, there was evidence of some reduction in the population size, stress on social services, remittances, congestion in the towns, roaming of beggars and destitutes on the streets, the rate of crimes, such as prostitution, armed robbery, smuggling, and currency-trafficking. The involvement of Ghanaians themselves in the enumerated crimes, nonetheless, led to a resurgence of the phenomena, thereby making the recorded reductions only peripheral.

The expulsion exercise negatively affected the fortunes of the government, such as, for example, leading to its exit from office. The exercise also did some incalculable damage to Ghana’s reputation and standing among fellow African countries. Some people, therefore, contend that the Nigerian expulsions of Ghanaians in particular and Africans, mainly form the West, in general in 1983 and 1985 were partly a reaction to the Ghanaian expulsion of illegal immigrants from the country in 1969-1970. In the end, therefore, the government realised part of its objectives, while it failed to achieve others. In the end, it can be argued that the decision as a whole was not a bad idea, but the suffering it wrought on the immigrants was what generated criticisms against Ghana.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

GHANA NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP ACT, 1957 (ACT 1)
PART III
ACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP OR CONSENT TO ACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP

4. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section every person born in Ghana, whether before or after the commencement of the Ghana Independence Act, 1957, who immediately before the date of commencement of this Act was a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or a British protected person shall be a citizen of Ghana:

Provided that a person shall not be such a citizen by virtue of this section if one of his parents or grandparents was born in Ghana.

(2) A person who becomes a citizen of Ghana by virtue of the provisions of this section shall be deemed for the purposes of section 8 of this Act to be a citizen of Ghana by birth.

(3) Every person born outside Ghana who, immediately before the commencement of this Act, was a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or a British protected person shall, if at least one of his parents was born in Ghana and was immediately before the date of commencement of this Act or at his death if occurring prior to that date, be a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or a British protected person, be a citizen of Ghana.

(4) A person who becomes a citizen of Ghana by virtue of the provisions of this section shall be deemed for the purposes of sections 8 and 11 of this Act to be a citizen of Ghana by descent.

PART IV
CITIZENSHIP BY BIRTH OR DESCENT

7. Subject to the provisions of this section, every person born in Ghana after the commencement of this Act shall be a citizen of Ghana by birth:

Provided that a person shall not be such a citizen by virtue of this section if at the time of his birth:

(a) neither of his parents is a citizen of Ghana and his father possesses or possessed: immunity from suit and legal process as is accorded to an officer of a foreign sovereign, power or authority;

(b) his father is an enemy alien and the birth occurs in a place then under occupation by the enemy.
The Ghana Nationality and Citizenship Act

2. Subject to the provisions of subsection (4) of this section, any person of full age and capacity born outside Ghana of whose parents was at the time of its birth a citizen or a person of Ghana by descent may with the approval of the Governor-General, in making application therefore to the Minister in the prescribed manner, be registered as a citizen of Ghana.

3. Subject to the provisions of subsection (4) of this section, a woman who has been married to a citizen of Ghana may, by the approval of the Governor-General, in making application therefor to the Minister in the prescribed manner, be registered as a citizen of Ghana whether or not she is of full age and capacity.

4. A person shall not be registered as a citizen of Ghana under this section unless and until he has, in writing, given his willingness to renounce any other nationality or citizenship he may possess and has taken an oath of allegiance in the form specified in the First Schedule to this Act.

12. (1) The Minister may with the approval of the Governor-General cause the minor child of any citizen of Ghana to be registered as a citizen of Ghana upon application made in the prescribed manner by a parent or guardian of the child.

(2) The Minister, in such special circumstances as he thinks fit, may with the approval of the Governor-General cause any minor to be registered as a citizen of Ghana.

13. A person registered under any of the last two foregoing subsections shall be a citizen of Ghana by registration as from the date on which he is registered.

14. The Minister, if application thereto is made to him in the prescribed manner by any alien of full age and capacity who resides in Ghana, and if he is satisfied that the person is qualified under the provisions of the Second Schedule to this Act for naturalisation, may, with the approval of the Governor-General grant to him a certificate of naturalisation, and the person shall, to whom the certificate is granted, on taking an oath of allegiance in the form specified in the First Schedule to this Act, and on making a declaration as to writing of his willingness to renounce any other nationality and any claim to the protection of any other country, be a citizen of Ghana by naturalisation as from the date on which that certificate is granted.

PART VII

ACQUISITION AND DECLARATION OF CITIZENSHIP

15. (1) If any citizen of Ghana of full age and capacity who is a citizen of any country mentioned in subsection (2) of section 9 of this Act, or
(a) a citizen of any country mentioned in subsection (2) of section 9 of this Act, or
(b) a national of a foreign country, makes a declaration in the prescribed manner of renunciation of citizenship of Ghana, the Minister, if he is satisfied that that person is not ordinarily resident in Ghana, shall, and in all other cases, may cause the declaration to be registered; and upon the registration, that person shall cease to be a citizen of Ghana.

Provided that the Minister may withhold registration of any such declaration if in his opinion it is contrary to public policy.

(2) For the purposes of this section any woman who has been married shall be deemed to be of full age.

16. (1) The Minister may, by order, deprive any person of his Ghana citizenship at the Minister's discretion and shall not be limited to any voluntary or formal act otherwise than marriage; but that is not conclusive to the public good that he should continue to be a citizen of Ghana.

(2) The Minister may require any such citizen of Ghana as is referred to in the last foregoing section of this Act to renounce his nationality or citizenship of any other country within such period as the Minister may specify and in the event of any such person failing to renounce such nationality or citizenship within the time specified the Minister may, by order, deprive that person of his citizenship.

(3) Upon an order being made under this section in respect of any person, he shall cease to be a citizen of Ghana.

17. (1) A citizen of Ghana who is such by registration or naturalisation shall cease to be a citizen of Ghana if he is deprived of that citizenship by an order of the Minister made under this or the next following section.

(2) Subject to the provisions of this section, the Minister may, by order, deprive any citizen of his citizenship if he is satisfied that the registration or certificate of naturalisation was obtained by means of fraud, false representation or the concealment of any material fact.

(3) Subject to the provisions of this section, the Minister may, by order, deprive any citizen of Ghana if it is satisfied that that citizen—
(a) has, for the purposes of the Republic or any country of which he is a citizen, been a resident or resident for a period of less than ten months;
(b) has, during any war in which Ghana was engaged, or in which Ghana was involved in any manner whatever as an enemy or an ally, or been engaged in or associated with any business or activity in any such a manner as to assist or aid an enemy in that war;
(c) has, within five years after becoming a citizen, been sentenced in any country to imprisonment for a term of not less than twelve months.

(4) The Minister may, by order, deprive any citizen by naturalisation of his citizenship if he is satisfied that that person has been ordinarily resident in foreign countries for a continuous period of seven years and during that period has not been registered annually in the prescribed manner at a Ghana consulate or by notice in writing to the Minister his intention to retain his citizenship of Ghana.
(3) The Minister shall not deprive a person of citizenship under this section unless he is satisfied that it is not conducive to the public good that that person should continue to be a citizen of Ghana.

18. When a naturalised person who was a citizen of any country mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 9 of this Act has been deprived of that citizenship on grounds which, in the opinion of the Minister, are substantially similar to any of the grounds specified in sub-sections (2), (3), and (4) of the last foregoing section, then, if that person is a citizen of Ghana, the Minister may by an order under this section deprive him of that citizenship, if the Minister is satisfied that it is not conducive to the public good that that person should continue to be a citizen of Ghana.

19. Any reference in this Act to the status or description of either parent of a person at the time of that person’s birth shall, in relation to a person born after the death of that parent, be construed as a reference to the status or description of that parent at the time of the parent’s death, and where that death occurred before, and the birth occurs after, the commencement of this Act, the status or description which would have been applicable to such parent had he or she died after the commencement of this Act shall be deemed to be the status or description applicable to him or her at the time at which he or her death.

20. The Governor-General or the Minister as the case may be, shall not be required to make any order for the grant or refusal of any application under this Act, and the decision of the Governor-General or the Minister on any such application shall not be subject to appeal to or review in any court.

21. The Minister may in such cases as he thinks fit, or on the application of any person with respect to whose citizenship of Ghana he doubt exists, whether on a question of fact or law, certify that such person is a citizen of Ghana; and a certificate issued under this section shall, unless it is proved that it was obtained by means of fraud, false representation or concealment of any material fact, be conclusive evidence that that person was such a citizen on the date thereof, but without prejudice to any evidence that he was such a citizen at an earlier date.

22. (1) Every document purporting to be a notice, certificate, declaration, or an entry in a register, or a subscription of an oath of allegiance, given, granted or made under this Act, shall be received in evidence, and shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to have been given, granted or made by or on behalf of the person by whom or on whose behalf it purports to have been given, granted or made.

(2) Prima facie evidence of any such document as aforesaid may be given by production of a document purporting to be certified as a true copy thereof by such person and in such manner as may be prescribed.

23. Any entry in a register made under this Act, shall be received as evidence of the matter stated in the entry.

24. (1) Any person who for the purpose of procuring anything to be done or not to be done under this Act makes any statement which he knows to be false in a material particular, or recklessly makes any statement which is false in a material particular, shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds.

(2) Any person who fails to comply with any requirement imposed on him by regulations made under this Act with respect to the delivering up of certificates of naturalisation shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds.
The Ghana Nationality and Citizenship Act

making of any declaration, or the grant of any certificate, or the taking of any oath of allegiance, authorized to be made, granted or taken by it or under this Act, and in respect of supplying a certified or other copy of any notice, certificate, order, declaration or entry, given, granted or made or addressed, and for the application of any such fees.

25. The British Nationality (Fees) Ordinance, 1956, are hereby repealed.

SCHEDULES

FIRST SCHEDULE

(Sections 3, 16 and 17)

1. A.B. swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, Her Heirs and Successors, according to law and that I will support and uphold the Constitution of Ghana as by law established. So help me God.

SECOND SCHEDULE

(Section 18)

QUALIFICATIONS FOR NATURALISATION

3. Subject to the provisions of the next following paragraph, the qualifications for naturalisation of an alien who applies therefor are:

(a) that he has resided in Ghana throughout the period of twelve months immediately preceding the date of the application; and

(b) that during the seven years immediately preceding the said period of twelve months he has resided in Ghana for periods amounting in the aggregate to not less than five years; and

(c) that he is of good character; and

(d) that he has sufficient knowledge of a language indigenous to and in current use in Ghana; and

(e) that he intends at the event of a certificate being granted to him to reside in Ghana.

2. The Minister, if in the special circumstances of any particular case he thinks fit, may with the approval of the Governor-General—

(a) allow a continuous period of twelve months ending not more than six months before the date of application to be reckoned for the purpose of sub-paragraph (e) of the last foregoing paragraph; and

(b) allow for the purposes of sub-paragraph (d) of the last foregoing paragraph as though it had immediately preceded that date.

This printed impression has been carefully compared by me with the Bill which has passed the National Assembly, and found by me to be a true and current printed copy of the said Bill.

K. B. AYENSU

Clerk of the National Assembly.
APPENDIX II

DEPORTATION ACT, 1957 (ACT 14)

255

The Deportation Act, 1957

GHANA

1957 No. 14.

Assented to in Her Majesty’s Name and on Her
Majesty’s behalf this 25th day of July, 1957.

K. A. KORSAH
Acting Governor-General

AN ACT to consolidate and amend the law relating to the
deportation of undesirable persons from Ghana.

[25th July, 1957.] Deed of

Be it enacted by the Queen’s Most Excellent Majesty,
by and with the advice and consent of the National
Assembly of Ghana in this present Parliament assembled,
and by the authority of the same as follows:

1. This Act may be cited as the Deportation Act, 1957, and shall
come into operation on a date to be appointed by the Governor-
General by Order.

2. (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires—
“citizen of Ghana” means a person who under any law
relating to Ghana citizenship in force in Ghana is a citizen
of Ghana:
“Court” includes any court other than a Native Court;
“Minister” means the Minister responsible for deportation;
“person to be deported” means any person in respect of whom
a deportation order is made; and
“supervision order” means an order under Section 10(1) with
effect from the date it is made.
(2) The Interpretation Ordinance shall apply for the interpre-
tation of this Act as it applies for the interpretation of an Ordinance.
258

The Deportation Act, 1957

1. (1) Without lawful excuse knowingly harbouring a person to be deported elsewhere than at the time being the person to be deported;

(2) Releasing or assisting the escape from any[...

12. Provided no person is arrested for entering Ghana or residing in Ghana during the period of his residence or a period of deportation order made against him under the provisions of this Act, without his being on summary conviction for any offence punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.

(No. 49 of 1955)

11. (1) Every document purporting to be an order, notice or notice made or issued under the authority of this Act and signed by the Minister shall be received in evidence and until the contrary is proved it shall be deemed to be a document properly made or issued.

(2) The production of any document bearing a certificate purporting to be signed by the Minister shall be accepted by all Courts and persons as sufficient evidence of its contents without proof of signature of the Minister.

14. Any police officer not below the rank of General Police Corporate may, where a person to be deported is in custody, do all things reasonably necessary for the identification of such person by means of photography, measurement, and the taking of finger prints.

15. The Governor-General may by regulations make provision generally for carrying into effect the purposes of this Act.

16. The Governor-General may by regulations make provision generally for carrying into effect the purposes of this Act.

17. (1) The Ordinances specified in the Schedule to this Act are hereby repealed:

Provided that such repeal shall not affect the validity of any Act or Act made under the provisions of the Ordinances hereby repealed or of either of them.

(2) Any proceedings or other matters commenced or in progress under the provision of the Ordinances hereby repealed or any Act or Act made under the corresponding provisions of this Act, and where there is no corresponding provision in this Act, may be completed as if such proceedings or other matters had been commenced or were in progress under the corresponding provisions of this Act.
APPENDIX III

THE ALIENS ACT, 1963 (ACT 160)
Provided that a person who is not a citizen of Ghana shall in addition to complying with the provisions of this Act report his presence in Ghana to the nearest police station not later than twenty-four hours after entry.

(2) The immigration officer may dispense with the personal attendance of any person if he is satisfied by documentary or other evidence of his identity and his right to enter Ghana.

(3) The foregoing provisions of this section do not apply to any person who enters Ghana by sea or air in direct transit to a place outside Ghana, that is to say—
   (a) where he arrives in a vessel which is proceeding to a place outside Ghana, if he does not disembark from the vessel;
   (b) where he arrives in an aircraft, if he does not leave the premises of the airport, and leaves Ghana within 24 hours on the same or another aircraft.

(4) Subject to subsection (3), regulations may provide for the entry into Ghana of passengers in transit without an entry permit for the purpose of seeing places of interest on such conditions as may be specified.

2A. (1) A person other than a citizen of Ghana shall not enter Ghana except by one of the recognised or normal places of entry into Ghana.

(2) Without prejudice to any other penalty imposed by or under this Act, any person who contravenes the provisions of this section shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on summary conviction thereof to a term of imprisonment of not less than two years.

(3) For the purposes of this section recognised or normal places of entry are—
   (a) air or sea ports in respect of which landing or disembarking rights have been granted to an aircraft or ship, as the case may be, in Ghana;
   (b) places specified in the Schedule to this Act.

(4) The Minister may by legislative instrument amend the Schedule to this Act.

(5) No proceeding shall be instituted for an offence under this section without the consent in writing of the Attorney General.

3. (1) On the appearance of any person before an immigration officer as required by section 2 of this Act, the immigration officer may examine him in such manner as may be prescribed and the person shall complete such form as may be prescribed.

4. Regulations may provide that any person or class of persons shall be excepted either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as may be prescribed from all or any of the provisions of this Act.

5. (1) Where the immigration officer satisfied that a person entering Ghana—
   (a) is not a prohibited immigrant;
   (b) is in possession of a valid passport; and
   (c) so far as may be required by regulations, is in possession of a visa or an entry permit to enter Ghana;

then, subject to the provisions of this Act, he may be permitted to enter Ghana and may be granted permit in the prescribed form entitling him to remain in Ghana for such period as may be specified therein.

(2) Where a person appearing before the immigration officer does not have such a visa or entry permit as may be required, the officer may grant him such a visa or permit.

(3) A permit granted under subsection (2) shall be subject to such conditions (if any) as may be prescribed by regulations, and to such further conditions (if any) as the immigration officer may impose. Regulations may prescribe an abbreviated form in which conditions imposed by the immigration officer may be stamped on a passport.

(4) Conditions prescribed for the purpose of this section may relate to—
   (a) security to be furnished, whether by bond, deposit or otherwise, and the realisation and application of the proceeds thereof, and the liability of any person furnishing the security;
   (b) place of residence in Ghana;
   (c) occupation or business to be followed or undertaken;
   (d) any activities which might offend the religious beliefs of any section of the community;
   (e) in the case of any permit being for the purpose of passing through Ghana, route to be followed;
   (f) in the case of any condition or permit taking the form of a pass, return of the pass.
6. (1) A person (other than a citizen of Ghana) is in this Act referred to as a prohibited immigrant if and so long as any of the following conditions apply—
(a) there is a deportation order in force against him made under Part III of this Act or any enactment previously in force;
(b) he is destitute or has no visible means of support;
(c) he is of unsound mind;
(d) a Health Officer certifies that it is medically undesirable that he should be permitted to enter Ghana;
(e) he has been declared by the Minister, by executive instrument to be a person whose entry into Ghana would not be conducive to the public good;
(f) he has been sentenced in a foreign country for any extradition crime within the meaning of the Extradition Act, 1960 (Act 22).

(2) A person who enters Ghana while he is a prohibited immigrant is guilty of an offence.

(3) An immigration officer or a police officer may—
(a) prevent a prohibited immigrant, by force if necessary, from entering Ghana, or if he has already entered Ghana, may direct him to depart from Ghana by the first available means, and may use all necessary force to ensure compliance with his directions;
(b) direct a prohibited immigrant not to disembark from any vessel on which he may be, or not to depart from any place where he may be, except to go to some other place approved by the immigration officer or police officer;
(c) arrest a prohibited immigrant without warrant and take him before a District Court with a view to charging him with an offence against this Act or Regulations made under this Act.

(4) Where an immigration officer or police officer directs a prohibited immigrant to depart from Ghana by the first available means under paragraph (a) of subsection (3) he may at the same time direct the person in charge or the owner or agent of any vessel or aircraft from which the prohibited immigrant disembarked to remove him from Ghana by the first available means. A failure to comply with any such direction shall be an offence.

(5) Where a direction has been given under paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (3) the person to whom it has been given shall be deemed to be in lawful custody.
(2) A licence granted by the Minister shall specify the number of persons of a specified description authorised to be employed thereby, and may specify different numbers for different classes of employees.

(3) When an alien commences to work for an employer in Ghana—
   (a) the employer shall, not later than seven days thereafter, give notice thereof to the Minister in the prescribed form, and shall at the same time, if he has not already done so, furnish the Minister with a letter of guarantee in the prescribed form in respect of the repatriation expenses of the alien;
   (b) the employee shall, not later than seven days thereafter, give notice thereof to the Minister, in the prescribed form.

(4) When an alien ceases, for any reason, to work for an employer in Ghana—
   (a) the employer shall, not later than seven days thereafter, give notice thereof to the Minister in the prescribed form and shall comply with the directions of the Minister as to the arrangements for the repatriation of the alien and his dependants;
   (b) the employee shall, not later than seven days thereafter, give notice thereof to the Minister in the prescribed form.

(5) An alien engaged in any trade, business or profession in Ghana who is not employed by any other person shall, if—
   (i) he engages in another trade, business or profession; or
   (ii) he ceases for any reason to exercise his trade, business or profession,

   not later than seven days thereafter give notice thereof in the prescribed form to the Minister.

(6) Not later than fourteen days after the first day of January in every year every person to whom a licence has been granted under subsection (4) shall send to the Minister an annual return in the prescribed form giving the names and addresses of all aliens employed by him in Ghana on the first day of January, and any other particulars which may be prescribed.

(7) Any body corporate which is guilty of a breach of the provisions of this section shall be liable to a fine not exceeding £1,000, and any individual who is so guilty shall be liable to a fine not exceeding £100 and to imprisonment not exceeding six months or both.

11. Where an employer furnishes to the Minister a letter of guarantee in the prescribed form in respect of the repatriation of an alien—

   (a) the employer shall be liable to pay under the guarantee the repatriation expenses if the alien ceases for any reason to be employed by the employer;
   (b) the employer shall be liable to pay under the guarantee the repatriation expenses of the alien's dependants in the event of the alien's death;
   (c) the employer may be released from his guarantee if the Minister is satisfied that alternative security for the repatriation of the alien and his dependants has been supplied or if the Minister is satisfied that the alien and his dependants have left Ghana.

PART III—DEPORTATION

12. (1) An alien is liable to deportation—

    (a) if a Court recommendation for his deportation is effective under the following subclauses; or
    (b) if he has been found by a Court to be destitute or without visible means of support, or to be of unsound mind or mentally defective; or
    (c) if, being a female, the alien has been found by a Court to be a prostitute; or
    (d) if he is a prohibited immigrant; or
    (e) if he is in Ghana without a valid permit, or any of the conditions on which his permit was granted have been broken; or
    (f) if his presence in Ghana is, in the opinion of the Minister, not conducive to the public good.

(2) A court recommendation for the deportation of an alien shall be effective for the purposes of paragraph (a) of the preceding subclause if it was made by a court on conviction of an offence for which the court had power to impose a sentence of imprisonment without the option of a fine, and—

    (a) on appeal against conviction or sentence the appellate court concurred in the recommendation, or
    (b) no such appeal was brought within the time allowed for appeal, but—

    (i) the recommendation was made by the High Court, or
    (ii) the recommendation was made by an inferior court and was concurred in by the Chief Justice.
13. (1) The Minister may by executive instrument order the deportation of any person liable to deportation.

(2) The order may be made subject to such conditions as the Minister may impose.

14. (1) A person to be deported shall leave Ghana in accordance with the requirements of the deportation order and shall thereafter and so long as the deportation order is in force remain out of Ghana.

(2) A person who enters Ghana during the continuance in force of a deportation order made against him shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, and may be deported without any further deportation order being made.

15. Where a person to be deported is serving a sentence of imprisonment or is sentenced to imprisonment he shall, unless the Minister otherwise directs, complete the sentence for the offence of which he was convicted.

16. The powers conferred by this Part shall not cease to be exercisable by reason only that the person in respect of whom the powers are exercisable is proceeded against for an offence under this or any other Act.

17. The master of a vessel or the person in charge of an aircraft in Ghana shall, where required by the Minister or by a police officer not below the rank of Assistant Superintendent, receive any person to be deported and his dependants on board the vessel or aircraft and afford him and them proper accommodation and maintenance on the voyage from Ghana.

18. (1) The person in charge of any vehicle proceeding beyond the border of Ghana shall, where required by the Minister or a police officer, not below the rank of Assistant Superintendent, convey in the vehicle any person to be deported and his dependants.

(2) A person to be deported may be conducted in custody to and placed across the border of Ghana.

19. (1) Any person (not being a person with respect to whom a supervision order has affected) who is to be deported or who is liable to deportation may be arrested without warrant and be detained in legal custody under the authority of the Minister until he is dealt with under section 17 or 18 of this Act.

(2) A person shall whilst so detained be remanded from time to time in custody at intervals of not more than twenty-eight days.

(3) Any person to be deported may be conducted in custody to or from any consulate or other place in Ghana if the attendance of that person is required for the purposes of ascertaining his nationality or of making arrangements for his admission to another country.

20. Any police officer not below the rank of general police corporal may, where a person to be deported is in custody, do all things reasonably necessary for the identification of that person by means of photography, measurement, and the taking of fingerprints.

21. (1) If, on the expiration of six months from the making of a deportation order, deportation has not been effected, or if, at any time before the expiration of that period the Minister is satisfied that deportation is for any reason impracticable, or undesirable he may by executive instrument make a further order (to be known as a supervision order) with respect to the person to be deported requiring him, while he is in Ghana, to observe any conditions specified in the order as to—

(a) the area in which he is to reside;

(b) the carrying on by him of political activities including attendance at political meetings, and the undertaking of political affiliations;

(c) reporting to the police from time to time;

(d) the means by which he may gain a livelihood;

(e) his association with persons of bad character.
2. Where the person to be deported is required under section 15 of this Act to complete a sentence of imprisonment, subsection (1) shall have effect as if for the reference to the making of the deportation order there were substituted a reference to the completion of the sentence.

3. If a person in respect of whom a supervision order is in force fails to comply with any requirement of that order he shall be liable to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds or to imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both.

4. The operation of a deportation order made in respect of any person shall be in suspense while a supervision order has effect in relation to that person, but shall revive if the Minister so directs, whereupon the supervision order shall cease to have effect.

5. Subject to subsection (4) a supervision order made in respect of any person shall continue in force for a period of five years from the making thereof and shall then expire; and on the expiration of the supervision order the deportation order made in respect of that person, if it has not previously expired, shall also expire.

22. (1) The Minister may, if he thinks fit, apply any money or property belonging to any person to be deported in payment of the deportation expenses.

(2) The person in charge and the owner and the agent of any vessel or aircraft from which any person deserts in Ghana shall be jointly and severally liable to pay the deportation expenses of that person to the Minister if—
   (a) that person was a member of a crew of the vessel or aircraft and was discharged or left behind in Ghana in contravention of section 23 of this Act; or
   (b) that person is a prohibited immigrant and the Minister makes a deportation order in respect of him, or he is directed to leave Ghana under section 6 (3) of this Act.

23. (1) The members of the crew of a sea-going vessel or aircraft arriving in Ghana from abroad may be permitted to enter Ghana on satisfactory proof of their identity notwithstanding that they may not have passports, visas or permits.
(i) by false declaration obtains or attempts to obtain for himself or any other person any certificate, passport, pass, permit or visa;

(ii) without lawful authority uses or has in his possession any forged, unlawfully altered, or irregular certificate, passport, pass or other document or any passport or document on which any visa or endorsement has been forged or unlawfully altered;

(k) being the master of a vessel, knowingly permits any person to disembark from such vessel in contravention of any of the provisions of this Act, or refuses to receive on board any prohibited immigrant who has disembarked from such vessel, or neglects to take reasonable measures to keep on board any prohibited immigrant who has disembarked from such vessel and been replaced on board;

(l) being the person in charge of an aircraft, aids or abets any person to leave the precincts of the airfield or airport in contravention of any of the provisions of this Act;

shall be guilty of an offence; and when a master of a sea-going vessel is charged with any such offence, the clearance outwards of the vessel may be refused until the charge has been heard and the fine, if any, imposed has been paid.

(j) Save where some other penalty is expressly provided for, any person guilty of an offence against this Act shall be liable to a fine of fifty pounds or to imprisonment for six months, or to both.

26. A person leaving Ghana shall at the place where he leaves or at the office of the nearest immigration officer or if there is no immigration officer in the vicinity at the nearest police station complete a prescribed form giving such information as may be required therein.

27. Whenever in any proceedings under the provisions of, or for any of the purposes of this Act or Regulations made under this Act, or on examination by an immigration officer, any of the following questions is in issue—

(a) whether any particular person is in possession of a passport, visa or permit;

(b) whether any particular person is a citizen of Ghana;

the burden of proof that such person is in possession of passport, visa or permit or that he is a citizen of Ghana, as the case may be, shall lie on such person.

28. The Minister may, by legislative instrument, make Regulations for all or any of the following purposes—

(a) requiring the person in charge of any vessel or aircraft which carries any passenger other than a citizen of Ghana from any place in Ghana to any place outside Ghana to furnish to such person and in such manner as may be prescribed such particulars with respect to such passenger as may be prescribed;

(b) requiring the person in charge of any vessel or aircraft which carries any passenger from any place outside Ghana to any place in Ghana to furnish to such person and in such manner as may be prescribed a return giving such particulars in respect to such passenger as may be prescribed;

(c) requiring the person in charge of any vessel or any aircraft calling at any port or airfield in Ghana to furnish to such person and in such manner as may be prescribed a return giving the name and nationality of any member of the vessel's or aircraft's crew;

(d) prescribing anything which under the provisions of this Act requires or is authorised to be prescribed, and immigration procedure, whether in respect of matters set out in this Act or otherwise, and procedure relating to the grant of fresh or renewed permission to be or remain in Ghana and to leave Ghana, in either case whether in respect of matters set out in this Act or otherwise, requiring the production to any officer of permits, passports or other documents for inspection, and prescribing the manner in which anything required or authorised by this Act to be done shall be done;

(e) prescribing the fees to be paid and the forms to be used under the provisions of this Act; and

(f) generally for carrying out and giving effect to the provisions and purposes of this Act.
from Ghana by the Government otherwise than under a deportation order, the amount of all expenses incurred in the repatriation:

“immigration officer” means the Principal Immigration Officer or any assistant immigration officer, and “the immigration officer” in relation to a person entering Ghana means an immigration officer assigned to act on behalf of the port or place in Ghana at which the person arrives, or if he does not arrive at a port or place to which an immigration officer is so assigned, at the nearest place in respect of which an immigration officer is so assigned, or the police officer at the relevant time in charge of any police station;

“the Minister” means the Minister responsible for the Interior;

“passport” means a valid passport which was issued to the person producing it by or on behalf of the country of which he is a subject or a citizen for a period which, according to the laws of that country, has not expired, which refers to the person, and is furnished with a photograph of him; and includes any other document issued by or on behalf of the country of origin and identity of the person to whom it relates, which is satisfied by the satisfaction of the immigration officer;

“person entering Ghana” includes a person who has entered Ghana but has not complied with the provisions of sections 2 and 3 of this Act;

“person to be deported” means any person in respect of whom a deportation order is made, not being a person in respect of whom a supervision order has effect;

“prescribed” means prescribed by Regulations made under this Act;

“port” means seaport or airport;

“repatriation expenses” has the same meaning as deportation expenses.

30. (1) Each of the following enactments is repealed—

The Deportation Act, 1957 (No. 14)
The Immigration Act, 1957 (No. 15)
The Deportation (Amendment) Act, 1958 (No. 49)
The Deportation (Amendment) Act, 1959 (No. 65).

(2) Any Regulations made under any enactment hereby repealed and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall remain in force and be deemed to have been made under the corresponding provisions of this Act.

(3) Any act, permission or conditions issued or imposed by an immigration officer and any deportation or supervision order made by the Minister under any enactment repealed by this Act and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall remain in force as though the enactment under which it was made had not been repealed.

31. This Act shall come into operation on such day as the Minister may, by legislative instrument, appoint.

SCHEDULE

Section 21 (3) (b)

RECOGNISED OR NORMAL PLACES OF ENTRY INTO GHANA

Afiafo
Akama
Akomen Wharf
Banim
Bawku
Chotech-Bokoe
Dumasi
Dormaa Atiemo-Gomo
Dormaa
Ehbo
Half Assini
Hamile
Homina

Kroglo
Kwanansi Krom
Leklehi Dawo
Mentse
Nyinie
Paga
Puriamankon
Sanpah
Sewu
Tabele
Turmi
Wasu.
APPENDIX IV

THE GHANAIAN ENTERPRISES DECREE, 1968 (N.L.C.D. 323)

GHANAIAN ENTERPRISES DECREE, 1968

In pursuance of the Proclamation entitled “Proclamation for the
Constitution of a National Liberation Council for the administration
of Ghana and for other matters connected therewith”, published
in Gazette No. 11 of 28th February, 1966, this Decree is hereby
made:

PART I—GHANAIAN ENTERPRISES COMMITTEE

1. There is hereby established a Committee to be known as the
Ghanaian Enterprises Committee (hereinafter referred to as “the
Committee”).

2. The Committee shall consist of a Chairman who shall be the
Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the
following other members:—
(a) the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Industries or his
representative;
(b) the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Trade or his
representative;
(c) a representative of the Attorney-General’s Office;
(d) a representative of the Bank of Ghana;
(e) a representative of the National Investment Bank;
(f) a representative of the Capital Investment Board;
(g) the Registrar-General or his representative;
(h) the Director of the Management Development and
Productivity Institute or his representative;
(i) the Principal Immigration Officer or his representative;
and
(j) six Ghanaian private businessmen appointed by the
Government.

There shall be a Secretary who shall be appointed by the
Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Economic Affairs.

The Committee’s functions under this Decree are:—
(a) to advise the Government on appropriate policies for
promoting Ghanaian enterprises;
(b) to ensure the efficient implementation of any such
policies;
(c) to examine any questions concerning commerce or
industry which the Government may refer to the
Committee and to report to the Government on
questions so referred;
(d) to receive and examine complaints and petitions
arising from the implementation of Government
GHANAIAN ENTERPRISES DECREE, 1968

5. (1) A member of the Committee other than an ex-officio member shall hold office for a period not exceeding three years and shall be eligible for re-appointment.

(2) A member other than an ex-officio member may at any time by a notice in writing addressed to the Government resign his office.

6. There shall be paid to members of the Committee and other persons attending meetings of the Committee such allowances as the Government may determine.

7. (1) The Committee shall ordinarily meet at such times and places as the Committee may determine but shall meet at least once every three months.

(2) The Chairman may, and shall on the request of any two members of the Committee, call an extraordinary meeting of the Committee at such time and place as the Committee may determine.

(3) The Chairman, if present, shall preside at every meeting of the Committee, and in his absence any member of the Committee elected by the members present shall preside at the meeting.

(4) The quorum at every meeting of the Committee shall be such number of members of the Committee as the Committee shall determine.

(5) All questions proposed at a meeting of the Committee shall be determined by a simple majority of the members present and voting where the votes are equal the Chairman or the person presiding shall have a second or a casting vote.

(6) The Committee may request the attendance of any person to act as advisor at any meeting of the Committee and that person, while so attending shall have all the powers of a member except that he is not to vote on any question and his presence at the meeting is not to count towards the constitution of a quorum.

(7) The validity of any act or proceedings of the Committee shall not be affected by any vacancy among its members or any defect in the appointment of a member thereof.

(8) The Committee may, subject to any other provision of this Decree, regulate its own procedure.

8. The Committee may appoint such sub-committees consisting of such number of persons (whether members of the Committee or not) as the Committee thinks fit to exercise, or advise the Committee on the exercise of, any functions of the Committee.

The Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Administration shall be responsible for all administrative and staff matters connected with the Committee.

The expenses incurred by the Committee in the exercise of its functions under this Decree shall be paid out of moneys provided for the Committee by the Government.

PART II—PROMOTION OF GHANAIAN ENTERPRISES

II. With effect from the date of the commencement of this Decree (hereinafter referred to as the "operative date") no person other than a Ghanaian shall operate or be concerned in the operation of any of the following enterprises (hereinafter referred to as "the named enterprises")—

(a) retail trade with an annual sales volume of five hundred thousand new cedis or less;

(b) wholesale trade with an annual sales volume of one million new cedis or less;

(c) any taxi service;

(d) any business for the sole under hire-purchase contract of taxis or vehicles to be used in the operation of a taxi service;

(e) any enterprise (hereinafter referred to as a "small-scale enterprise") employing thirty persons or less which in the opinion of the Committee requires simple production or operational techniques or any enterprise with a capital of one hundred thousand new cedis or less, being—

(i) an extracting, processing or manufacturing enterprise, or

(ii) an enterprise concerned with transportation of persons or goods, or

(iii) an enterprise specified in an executive instrument by the Government as being a small-scale enterprise; and

(f) any enterprise concerned with the representation in Ghana of overseas manufacturers.
GHANAIAN ENTERPRISES DECREE, 1968

12. An alien may notwithstanding paragraph 11 of this Decree operate any reserved enterprise after the operative date if, and only if—

(a) immediately before the operative date he was operating a reserved enterprise; and

(b) he complies fully with all the provisions applicable to him of paragraphs 13 to 17 of this Decree.

13. Notwithstanding the last preceding paragraph no alien shall operate or be concerned in the operation of—

(a) any tax service or any business for the sale under hire purchase contract of goods or any business connected with the representation in Ghana of overseas manufacturers, two years after the operative date; or

(b) any other reserved enterprise, five years after the operative date.

14. (1) Every alien who operates any reserved enterprise in virtue of paragraph 12 of this Decree (hereinafter referred to as “foreign operator”) shall, not later than three months after the date of the publication of this Decree, institute a training scheme for Ghanaians which is designed to equip them with all the skills required for the operation of the reserved enterprise concerned.

(2) The foreign operator shall, not later than three months after the institution of such training scheme, notify the Committee in writing of the full details of the training scheme.

15. Every foreign operator shall with respect to any reserved enterprise operated by him ensure that not later than three years after the operative date—

(a) sixty per cent. of the capital in the case of a wholesale trader;

(b) fifty per cent. of the capital in the case of a small-scale enterprise with fixed assets of less than fifty thousand new cedis; and

(c) seventy-five per cent. of the capital in the case of a small-scale enterprise with fixed assets of fifty thousand new cedis or more but less than one hundred thousand new cedis,

shall be owned by Ghanaians.

16. Every foreign operator shall ensure that not later than three years after the operative date all employees (other than the former operator) of any reserved enterprise operated by him shall be Ghanaians.

17. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, no Ghanaian shall enter into partnership with a foreign operator with respect to a reserved enterprise operated by such foreign operator unless such Ghanaian owns not less than seventy-five per cent. of the capital in the reserved enterprise.

PART III—SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS

18. Every person who contravenes or fails to comply with any provision of this Decree commits an offence and is liable on conviction therefor to a fine of two thousand new cedis or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to both such fine and imprisonment.

19. Every Ghanaian who allows himself to be used by any alien in such a way that he, that is to say, operates any reserved enterprise for or on behalf of any alien whom he knows is not permitted or is not qualified under the provisions of this Decree to operate such reserved enterprise commits an offence and is liable on conviction without option of a fine to a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years.

20. Every alien who is convicted of an offence under this Decree in addition to any other penalty prescribed under this Decree for any immigration quota granted him in relation to the employment of aliens immediately withdrawn, including any such quota vested in respect of himself.

21. (1) The Committee may, by summons require any person to attend the Committee such committee to return or other information or evidence as may be specified or described in the summons and specify the time, the manner and the form in which any such estimates, facts or information are to be furnished.

(2) No person shall be compelled to produce for the purpose of either of the purposes of subparagraph (1) hereof any document which he could not compel to produce in proceedings before the High Court or, in complying with any requirement for the furnishing of information, facts or evidence which he could not give in evidence in such proceedings.

22. Every person who refuses or willfully neglects to furnish any such return or other information or evidence required of him by such a committee an offence and is liable on conviction thereof to a fine of one thousand new cedis and one hundred new cedis for each day that the offence continues or in imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or to both such fine and imprisonment.

23. Every person who, in furnishing any such return or other information required of him under this Decree, makes any statement which he knows to be false in a material particular or recklessly makes any statement which is false in a material particular commits an
Ghanaian Enterprises Decree, 1968

23. (1) The Government shall have power by virtue of this paragraph to take such measures and make such arrangements as it considers necessary with respect to any reserved enterprise as regards the property or management of such enterprise to such persons and for such periods as it thinks fit.

(2) The Government may pay such reasonable compensation as it considers just or necessary with respect to anything done by the Government under this paragraph.

24. It shall be the duty of every foreign operator with respect to any reserved enterprise operated by him, to submit in writing to the Ministry of Economic Affairs a report on the operations of such enterprise during the year immediately preceding the date on which he is required under this paragraph to submit the report.

25. The Commissioner responsible for Economic Affairs may take such regulations as he considers necessary or expedient to give effect to the provisions and objects of this Decree.

26. In this Decree unless the context otherwise requires—

(a) "capital" means equity shares, capital contributions or stated capital of a reserved enterprise;

(b) "Ghanaian" means—

(i) any citizen of Ghana engaged in a commercial or industrial enterprise as an employer or principal, or

(ii) any company, partnership or association (whether limited or incorporated) formed, registered or operating under laws of Ghana, being a company, partnership or association which is controlled by citizens of Ghana and whose capital is solely owned by citizens of Ghana; and

(c) "persons" include a company, partnership or association whether corporate or incorporate and any officer thereof.

27. The provisions of the Criminal Code, 1940 (Act 29) relating to the attempt of an offence and to conspiracy to commit such an offence shall apply mutatis mutandis to every offence under this Decree as they apply to offences under the said Criminal Code.
APPENDIX V

THE GHANAIAN BUSINESS (PROMOTION) ACT, 1970 (ACT 334)
Part II—Power to issue of Consular Certificates

1. The question of the issuance of Consular Certificates shall be decided by a Committee appointed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade.

2. The Committee shall consist of the following:
   (a) the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade
   (b) the Attorney-General
   (c) the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
   (d) a representative of the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science
   (e) a representative of the Department of Immigration, Citizenship, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

3. The Committee shall meet at least once in every three months to consider applications for the issuance of Consular Certificates.

4. The Committee may, in its discretion, issue Consular Certificates to individuals who meet the conditions set out in section 3 of the Act.

5. The issuance of Consular Certificates shall be subject to the conditions set out in section 3 of the Act.

6. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade may, in accordance with the provisions of the Act, issue Consular Certificates to individuals who meet the conditions set out in section 3 of the Act.

7. The issuance of Consular Certificates shall not be considered to be a licence to travel or to reside in any country outside of Australia.

8. The issuance of Consular Certificates shall be subject to the conditions set out in section 3 of the Act.

9. The issuance of Consular Certificates shall be subject to the conditions set out in section 3 of the Act.

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14. The issuance of Consular Certificates shall be subject to the conditions set out in section 3 of the Act.

15. The issuance of Consular Certificates shall be subject to the conditions set out in section 3 of the Act.
18. (i) The Minister may, by writing, appoint persons to be known as "business inspectors" who shall carry out such functions for the purposes of giving effect to this Act, as the Minister may impose on them.

(2) A business inspector may at all reasonable times enter any premises which he reasonably suspects to be used for any purpose to which this Act applies for the purposes of inspection, or generally for carrying out any function imposed upon him under this Act or for the purpose of ensuring that the provisions of this Act are complied with.

(3) Any person who—

(a) without lawful excuse proof of which shall be on him,—
(i) refuses to give any information which a business inspector may reasonably request from him for the purposes of this Act, or
(ii) refuses to admit into his premises any business inspector, or

(b) in response to any request for information from a business inspector as aforesaid, makes any statement which he knows to be false or which he has no reason to believe to be true, or
(c) obstructs a business inspector in the discharge of his functions under this Act, shall be guilty of an offence.

PART III—SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS

19. (i) Any Ghanaian who allows himself to be used as a front man by any alien for the purpose of defrauding the object of this Act, that is to say, who operates any enterprise for or on behalf of any alien who is under this Act not permitted to operate or disqualified from operating or is not permitted to own or be part owner of any such enterprise shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding one thousand new cedis or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years without option of a fine.

(2) It shall be unlawful for any Ghanaian to employ whether full time or part time, any alien in the operation, of any enterprise previously owned by that alien which the alien has disposed of or has purported to have disposed of.

20. The Minister may request any person to furnish such estimates, returns or other information as may be specified or described and may specify the time, the manner and form in which any such estimates, returns or information are to be furnished and it shall be the duty of any such person to comply with the request.

21. Any person who refuse or neglects to furnish any estimate, returns or other information requested from him by the Minister under section 20 of this Act, shall be guilty of an offence and shall, in addition to any penalty that may be imposed on him by virtue of subsection (1) of section 27 of this Act, be liable to a fine of one hundred new cedis in respect of each day on which the offence continues.

22. Any person who in furnishing any estimates, returns or other information requested from him under section 20 of this Act makes any statement which he knows to be false in any material particular or recklessly makes any statement which is false in a material particular shall be guilty of an offence.

23. (i) Notwithstanding any provision of the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179) a person who is not a Ghanaian shall not, without the prior consent in writing of the Minister, be concerned in a merger or take-over of any enterprise the owning or part owning of which by a person not being a Ghanaian is prohibited or the operation of which by an alien enterprise is prohibited by any of the provisions of sections 12, 13 and 14 of this Act.

(2) Any person who contravenes the provisions of subsection (i) of this section shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding one thousand new cedis or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding one year or to both.

24. (i) With effect from the commencement of this Act no taxi car used before such commencement in the business of transporting persons or goods shall be sold or disposed of by an alien to a Ghanaian, without such taxi car or vehicle being first valued by two or more persons appointed by the Minister.

(2) No such taxi car or vehicle shall be sold by an alien to a Ghanaian at a price higher than that assessed by the persons appointed under subsection (i) of this section.

(3) Every person who contravenes any provision of this section shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding five hundred new cedis or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding nine months or to both.

25. Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Minister under this Act may appeal to the Government, and the Government, notwithstanding anything in this Act, may review or confirm the decision of the Minister and may take such further measures, in relation to the petition as it thinks fit.
26. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the Minister may by legislative instrument make regulations as he considers necessary or expedient to give full effect to the provisions and objects of this Act.

(2) The Minister shall cause to be laid before the National Assembly during each session of Parliament a full report, with respect to the enterprises to which sections 11, 12, 13 and 31 of this Act apply, of the effect and the results of the measures provided in this Act.

27. (1) Any person who is guilty of an offence under any provision of this Act in respect of which no penalty has been prescribed shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding two thousand new cedis or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or to both.

(2) Any person who contravenes any provision of this Act in respect of which an offence has not been prescribed shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding two thousand new cedis or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years, or to both.

28. Where any alien is convicted of an offence under this Act, in addition to any other penalty prescribed by or under this Act in relation to that offence any immigration quota granted to him for the employment of aliens, including a quota in respect of himself, shall be withdrawn or cancelled by the authority responsible for granting any such quota.

29. The provisions of the Criminal Code relating to abstention from an offence and to conspiracy to commit orabet an offence shall apply mutatis mutandis to any offence under this Act as they apply to offences under that Code.

30. Where an offence is committed by a body of persons then—

(a) in the case of a body corporate (other than a partnership) every director or officer of the body shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence, and

(b) in the case of a partnership every partner or officer of the body shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence:

Provided that no person shall be deemed to be guilty of an offence by virtue of this section if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or connivance and that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence having regard to all the circumstances.

31. (1) The Minister may with the prior approval of the Cabinet by executive instrument exempt any person or enterprise from all or any of the provisions of this Act and may impose in relation to such exemption such conditions as he may think fit.

(2) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prohibit the sale whether by retail or wholesale by a manufacturer of anything manufactured by him in Ghana if he is licensed by the Minister in that behalf; and subsections (1) and (2) of section 17 of this Act shall apply to an application for a licence under this subsection as they apply to an application for a licence under subsection (1) of the said section 17.

32. In this Act unless the context otherwise requires—

"alien" means a person other than a Ghanaian,

"alien enterprise" has the meaning assigned to it in subsection (1) of section 11 of this Act,

"capital" means equity shares, capital contributions or capital of an enterprise,

"Ghanaian" means—

(a) any citizen of Ghana, or

(b) any company, partnership or association or body (whether corporate or unincorporate) the entire capital of which is owned by citizens of Ghana, or which is controlled by citizens of Ghana,

"market" means a public or open place established by local custom or by the appropriate local authority for the purposes of buying and selling and any other public place used substantially for the said purposes,

"Minister" means the Minister responsible for Economic Planning or a person designated by him to act on his behalf,

"overseas business representation" means the carrying on of business in Ghana by any person as sole agent for the sale or promotion of the sale of a product or group of products of a principal not resident in Ghana, in consideration for remuneration or other financial reward from the principal,

"own" in relation to any enterprise includes the holding of any proprietary interest in the enterprise beneficially.

33. The Ghanaian Enterprises Decree, 1968 (N.L.C.D. 313) is hereby repealed.
APPENDIX VI

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON MARCH 3, 1970 IN RELATION TO UNEMPLOYED PERSON ON MARCH 3, 1970 AND UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM
Mr. Dombo: This is an entirely new question. The substantive question is about Syrian and Lebanese nationals and if the Minister will put a substantive question on residence permits for alien farmers, I will give him an answer.

Mr. Quaidoo: Since the Minister has assured this House that the Immigration Committee in approving expatriate quotas for companies takes into account the type of job that the expatriate is going to do in this country, why will the Minister not take steps to revoke the residence permits of those who are in this country to do jobs for which even the unskilled Ghanaian cannot do?

Mr. Dombo: I have already said that the Minister cannot cancel their permits until the company comes to exist in Ghana. If the company is granted expatriate quota, the Minister cannot dictate whom the company should employ.

Mr. Quaidoo: I am not suggesting that the Minister must cancel the number allowed. If any particular individual who has an immigration quota cannot be made to fill that quota, can the Minister not say that no one should be brought in to do this or that type of job?

Mr. Dombo: The Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Bill that is before this House will take care of that.

Mr. E. R. T. Medjflye: Is the Minister aware that since the coming into force of the compliance order a number of aliens come into this country ostensibly on a visit and while here they negotiate for residence permits?

Mr. Dombo: This is normal immigration practice. Whether African or Asian, aliens are allowed in on 14 days visiting permit. One can get an extension of this visiting permit to at least three months, and thereafter if he makes a good case, he can be given another extension. So this is nothing abnormal.

Mr. Medjflye: Does the Minister not consider that this defeats the very purpose of the compliance order?

Mr. Dombo: The compliance order does not mean that nobody should visit Ghana; it does not mean that. It means that while you are in Ghana, you should not engage in trade if you have not got a residence permit, but if you come as a visitor you are welcome. You are not sacked because you are an alien.

Mr. I. L. K. Mensah: I want to know from the Minister whether since the compliance order was made any residence permit has been issued to any alien who escaped at the time of the order.

Mr. Dombo: This is a new question and need notice of it.

381 Oral Answers to

25 MAY 1970

Mr. S. Ayewa: I want to ask the Minister if special consideration is given to aliens who are married to Ghanaians and have children by them?

Mr. Dombo: This also is outside the substantive question and I need notice of it.

Mr. B. K. Owusu: In his answer to the substantive question, the Minister said 1,607 Chinese and 75 Syrians are in this country, and in one of his supplementary answers he said some of the aliens have been in the country for the past forty years. In view of the number of years these people have been in the country and in view of the fact that the figures are based on the permits issued on entry, does the Minister not consider these figures to be completely out of date?

Mr. Speaker: I rule this question out of order. The Minister has dealt with this already.

Miss Toyana: May I know from the Minister whether he is aware that some of the aliens in the rural areas without residence permits still go on trading and doing business and work? If he is aware, I may know what he is doing about that?

Mr. Dombo: Before this House is the question: "how many Syrians and Lebanese nationals are resident in Ghana?" If the hon. Member puts a supplementary question based on this, I will answer her. This is not a supplementary question arising out of the main question.

Mr. Speaker: The Minister is right to say that this is not a supplementary question arising out of the substantive question before the House. So I rule that this question is out of order.

Police Stations (Awaso, etc.)

102. Mr. I. L. K. Mensah asked the Minister of the Interior if he has any plans to build police stations at Awaso, Ashaiman, and Sekyi Bekwai.

Mr. Dombo: My Ministry has plans to provide the Police at Awaso, Ashaiman and Sekyi Bekwai with new accommodation and these building plans will be implemented as soon as funds become available.

Mr. I. L. K. Mensah: Will the Minister tell the House when he will be able to visit the police station in question?

Mr. Dombo: At the moment, I have no plans yet to visit them but I will do so in the course of the year.

10.30 AM.

YOUTH AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Akuapem-Afrodisia-Ashanti Road

111. Mr. R. K. Mensah [On behalf of Mr. R. K. Mensah] asked the Minister of Youth
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON AUGUST 19, 1970 WITH REGARD TO
THE CLEARANCE OF IMMIGRANT AND GHANAIAN BEGGARS AND
DESTITUTES FROM THE STREETS

APPENDIX VII
APPENDIX VIII

AUGUST 20, 1970 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON CLASHES BETWEEN IMMIGRANT BUTCHERS AND INDIGENOUS BUTCHERS

LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

Alien butchers

Mr. S. A. Ziblim asked the Minister of Local Administration if he will consider, as a matter of urgency, issuing a statement ordering all alien butchers to vacate our markets and give way to the indigenous Ghanaian butchers who now clash with the alien butchers, resulting in some cases in serious assault.

Ministerial Secretary (Dr. J. K. Fynn): My Ministry appreciates the seriousness of the situation, and in fact we are taking steps to ensure that the alien butchers are out.

Mr. D. A. Ayewa: How soon will these steps be implemented?

Dr. Fynn: As soon as practicable.

Dr. T. K. Abossey: May I know from the Minister under what authority the alien butchers are being driven away from the market.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I think this is a substantive question.

Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs (Mr. B. K. Adama): May I explain this. The implementation of the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act is a very important exercise, and it should not be toyed with. The Government has made it clear to the public that we intend to implement this Act to the latter. The Government has said that in order not to disrupt normal business in this country, it might become necessary to arrange a smooth take-over. I think this is one of the reasons why the Government has allowed Fasul to keep all his taxes on the road until such time that somebody has taken them over. In the same way there is an arrangement to allow the alien butchers to stay on, but not for a day longer than is necessary. They will have to go.

Mr. K. A. Boaitey: Is the Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs not aware that the presence of alien butchers in the market as from the 1st of August, 1970 constitutes a crime under the Act?

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I do not consider this a logical supplementary question.

Nana Tob-Akwatia II: Is the Minister aware that there is at the moment a pandemonium at the Accra slaughter house? If he is, what is he doing to stop it?

Dr. Fynn: My Ministry is not aware.

Nana Tob-Akwatia II: If the Minister is not aware, may I ask him to run down to see what is happening there?

Dr. Fynn: We will send our subordinates at the Accra-Tema City Council to see to that.
APPENDIX IX

LONG QUEUE AT THE BENIN – NIGERIA BORDER OF LORRIES CARRYING DEPORTEES
APPENDIX X

GHANA CITIZENSHIP ID CARD ISSUED IN 1974

The left lower photograph is the back of the actual ID card.
The right lower photo is a folded card with handwritten personal information, height, etc.
The red, plastic folder is, of course, what is supposed to hold and protect everything.
The purple ticket in the middle is the receipt.