UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST


PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION ON LABOUR

PERFORMANCE IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE IN THE TEMA

METROPOLIS


BY


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## DECLARATION

**Candidate's Declaration**

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of my own original work and that no part of it has been presented for another degree in this university or elsewhere.

Name: Emmanuel Gilbert Ohene

Candidate's Signature:…………..…………        Date:………..…………

**Supervisor's Declaration**

I hereby declare that the preparation and presentation of the dissertation were supervised in accordance with the guidelines on supervision of dissertation laid down by the University of Cape Coast.

Name: Justice Sakyi Anoff

Supervisor's Signature……………………        Date……………………

# ABSTRACT

The study sought to examine the general understanding of the concept of corruption, determine perception of prevalence of corruption in public institution, analyze the causes of corruption in public institutions, examine measures undertaken to curb corruption and provide recommendations on corruption to interested persons.

The study drew a cross section of the general population within the Tema metropolis. Members of the public were interviewed within the study area all with the aim of finding out their perception on corruption in the public service. It thus chose the survey. The study targeted a sample size of 126 which consisted of 96 adult population and 30 public officers from the Tema Metropolis. The accidental and purposive sampling procedures were used. Data collected was edited, coded and electronically inputted using the Statistical Product and Service Solutions (SPSS) software. Data was processed using the SPSS.

Majority of the respondents defined corruption simply as, part of human nature, extortion, activity that is contrary to laid down rules and norms and the abuse of office. The institution most widely perceived as corrupt was the Ghana Police Service, and the causes of corruption were low income and poverty.

It is recommended that the fight against corruption should be based on a moral campaign, an education drive and a disclosure requirement for public officers. Good remuneration and better conditions of service should be provided to public officers to reduce the influence of corruption on performance.

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## DEDICATION

To the memory of my late father, Emmanuel Charles Ohene.

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# LIST OF ACRONYMS

| | |
|---|---|
| Centre for Democratic Development | CDD |
| Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice | CHRAJ |
| Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition | GACC |
| Gross Domestic Product | GDP |
| Ghana Integrity Initiative | GII |
| Institute of Economic Affairs | IEA |
| Internal Revenue Service | IRS |
| National Liberation Council | NLC |
| Serious Fraud Office | SFO |
| Statistical Product and Service Solutions | SPSS |
| Social Security and National Investment Trust | SSNIT |
| Transparency International | TI |

# CHAPTER ONE

# INTRODUCTION

## Background to the study

Corruption has existed for as long as humans can possibly remember. According to Kaufman (1997:1), the chief minister to the king in ancient India, Kautilya, wrote a note concerning corruption circa 300 BC to 150 AD which states it. 'The king shall protect trade routes from harassment by courtiers, state officials, thieves and frontier guards.... [and] frontier officers shall make good what is lost..... just as it is impossible not to take honey or poison that one may find at the tip of one's tongue, so it is impossible for one dealing with government funds not to taste, at least a little bit, of the King's wealth'.  This citation proves not only that corruption is a very ancient activity, but also that it is a widespread, global affair that has rarely spared a ruling government at any point in historical times nor any areas of the world, be it known or not. The advisor to the king seems to understand the ill nature of corruption and the need for it to find solutions to combat such behaviours (Tanzi, 1998, pp. 559-560).

Historically, the mechanisms of corruption have always been similar to one another. According to Kautilya (300 BC to 150 AD), nepotism, bribery, graft, kickbacks, embezzlement, extortion, patronage, misappropriation, defalcation, favouritism, cronyism have been the order of the day in many governments around the world for many centuries; moreover these are accompanied by a severe lack of government transparency and public service accountability which have

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become major global issues, especially concerning developing countries such as Ghana.

The origins of Ghana's public service can be traced back to 1947 when the colonial government accepted the recommendations of the Haragin Committee for the establishment of public services commissions in the colonies, including the Gold Coast, Nigeria, the Gambia and Sierra Leone (Yawson, 2009) The objective for the establishment of the Commissions in the colonies was to effect a desirable consolidation and extension of existing arrangements regarding human resource and other associated matters in order to secure the confidence, fairness and impartiality of the general public and government appointees.

The Public Service of Ghana today derives its mandate from Chapter 14 of the 1992 Constitution. Institutions under the Public Service include the Civil Service, Judicial Service, Audit Service, Education Service, Prisons Service, Parliamentary Service, Health Service, Statistical Service, National Fire Service, Customs, Excise and Preventive Service, Internal Revenue Service, Police Service, the Immigration Service; and the Legal Service (Constitution of Ghana, 1992).

The Public Service Commission of Ghana is the constitutional body charged with the responsibility to supervise and regulate the operations of all public institutions. It offers advice and opinions which are respected and recognized as authoritative and indicative of best practices in human resource management and development. The Commission is also committed to promoting and safeguarding integrity, accountability and competence in public service

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organisations in Ghana, through its advisory, consultative, regulatory and supervisory role.

Corruption in public life has been a bane to the political and socio-economic progress of Ghana since time immemorial. It has been both a cause and a consequence of the structural decay bequeathed by decades of bad politics of the post colonial state of Ghana. As a phenomenon, it has defied years of economic and political reforms, has continued to grow, and has undermined efforts to improve the living standards of Ghanaians and foster good democratic governance.

Since the return to democratic rule in 1993, Ghana has experienced a consistent growth in the consolidation of its democracy. Additionally, governments that have taken office since then have also taken steps to tackle the corruption menace. The question however, is whether Ghana has evolved on the control of corruption and if not why and what could be done?

Public concern with the problem of corruption in Ghana has a long history. Apparently, there are no recordings or reports of allegations or accusations of corruption in the Gold Coast before the start of the 20th Century. It is only after 1966 and Nkrumah's fall that there was considerable literature on corruption because of the Commission of Inquiry appointed by the National Liberation Council (NLC), (Gyimah-Boadi, 2002). This shows that there is no evidence for possible corruption cases before World War II in the Gold Coast colony. The evidence of a historical and thus possibly cultural background for corruption is therefore hampered by the lack of information. However, during the

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period of the early 1960s attempts were made to combat the incidence of corruption in Ghana. Notable among them were when corruption became the main subject of the 'dawn broadcast" of President Nkrumah. Other official actions to combat corruption in post colonial Ghana include high profile judicial and extra judicial commission of enquiry followed sometimes by punishment. Perhaps the "housecleaning" exercise and enforcement of measures to promote "probity and accountability" associated with the "revolutions" of 1979 and the early 1980's (2013), "zero tolerance for corruption" by President Kuffuor during the 2000 presidential election campaign are recent attempts by government to stem the tide of corruption in Ghana's history.

Employee performance refers to the efficiency and effectiveness in achieving organisational objectives (Koontz, 1990). Employee performance can be evaluated by considering the level of absenteeism, quality of reports, and time of reporting for and leaving for duty. Also, it is important to note that after recruitment or engagement, most employees' subsequently expect or demand for other benefits as compensation for time and efforts towards achievement of organisation goals apart from the standard wage or salary (Miles, 2004). The organisation also looks at the employees by considering the placements of employees in the culture, work ethics, values, attitudes and performance in the organisation.

It has been well recognized, at least since Krueger (1974) and Rose-Ackerman (1978), that corruption may deteriorate the performance of economic

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activities. Previous studies have pointed out several channels through which corruption adversely affects economic performance.

First, corruption deteriorates the efficiency of the public sector, because corrupt public officials would choose private contractors who are willing to pay generous bribes instead of those who attain the highest efficiency, and would also misallocate public investments towards sectors where they expect to receive the largest amount of bribes, for instance, military expenditures and large-scale construction projects (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997, 2002a, 2002b; Gupta, De Mello, & Sharan, 2001). In addition, public officials may purposefully delay their processes in order to elicit bribe payments (Kaufmann, 1997). Second, corruption distorts the people's choice of occupation. If corruption provides public officials with lucrative opportunities for higher earnings, competent people may choose to become public officials rather than engage in some other value-creating business (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Acemoglu & Verdier, 1998, 2000). Third, corruption pushes business into unofficial sectors, where transactions are more costly and uncertain, which would induce inefficiency (Johnson, Kaufmann, & Shleifer, 1997) and some earlier studies claim that corruption has some desirable effects, namely, that corruption could speed up bureaucratic processes which would otherwise be very slow (Leff, 1964; Leys, 1970; Lui, 1985). Such arguments have been refuted by many scholars (Kaufmann, 1997), and have not been supported by later empirical studies. However, some recent studies show that in countries with inefficient bureaucracy, corruption offsets negative effects of entry

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regulation or has positive effects on entry of firms (Klapper, Laeven, & Rajan, 2006; Dreher & Gassebner, 2008).

In addition to the effect on economic performance, corruption has been shown to affect other social indicators such as literacy rates, elementary school dropout rates, infant mortality rates, and so forth (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido Lobaton, 1999; Gupta, Davoodi, & Tiongson, 2002). Jain (2001), Dreher and Herzfeld (2005), and Lambsdorff (2006) provide excellent surveys of the literature. There is also Aidt (2003) for a survey of the theoretical arguments. As the other side of the same coin, Mauro (1997, 1998), Gupta, Davoodi, and Tiongson (2002), Delavallade (2006), and de la Croix and Delavallade (2009) show that corruption reduces public expenditures on education or health.

Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton (1998), fourth, corruption deteriorates the performance of the corporate sectors. Corruption may reduce efforts and investments by entrepreneurs in productivity-enhancing technology and physical/human capital, because corruption raises the costs necessary for doing business and induces uncertainty with respect to future returns from investments (Brunetti & Weder, 1998; Brunetti, Kisunko, & Weder, 1998; Brunetti & Weder, 1998; Campos, Lien, & Pradhan, 1999; Wei, 2000).

The literature has consistently shown that corruption has detrimental effects on investment rates (Mauro, 1995; Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder, 1998; Campos et al., 1999; Gyimah-Brempong, 2002). Other scholars have, though less consistently, shown that economic growth rates are adversely affected by corruption (Ehrlich & Lui, 1999; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobaton, 1999;

Welsch, 2004). A few studies have related corruption to GDP per capita. Among others, Hall and Jones (1999) show in their cross-national analysis that the lower the measure of social infrastructure, which they construct by taking corruption into account, the lower the log output per worker. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) constructed indices of governance of countries, which were later developed into World Governance Indicators, and presented evidence that as their measure of corruption worsens, log GDP per capita declines. Output per worker or GDP per capita, however, could also influence the level of corruption of a country, and the endogeneity problem should thus be addressed by, for example, the instrumental variable estimation method. Hall and Jones (1999) and Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) both employ the fraction of the population speaking English and the fraction of the population speaking a major European language (English, French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish) as instrumental variables. However, some scholars have cast other channels pointed out in the literature include the following. Corruption lowers inward foreign direct investment, and shifts the ownership structures towards joint ventures (Wei, 2000; Smarzynska & Wei, 2000). Corruption is also shown to increase income inequality (Gupta, Davoodi, & Alonso-Terme, 2002), inflation rate (Al-Marhubi, 2000), political instability (Mo, 2001), restrictions on capital flows (Dreher & Siemers, 2009), and aid flows (Alesina & Weder, 2002). However, Rock and Bonnet (2004) show that in large East Asian countries, higher corruption is correlated with higher economic growth rates. The most recent studies on the consequences of corruption examine the conditions under which corruption exerts

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any influence on outcomes. Among others, de la Croix and Delavallade (2009) show that in developing countries with high predatory technology, corruption tends to lower public expenditures on education and health. Meon and Sekkat (2005) show that corruption has detrimental effects on economic growth and investment only in countries with a lower level of governance in terms of rule of law and government effectiveness. Haque and Kneller (2009) theoretically show that there exist thresholds in GDP per capita wherein the relationship between corruption and economic development differs, and present some empirical findings of such thresholds. Hall and Jones (1999) consider two elements in constructing the measure of social infrastructure. The first element includes five sub-elements, one of which is corruption. The other four sub elements are law and order, bureaucratic quality, risk of expropriation, and government repudiation of contracts. Wyatt (2002) also confirms that the measure of corruption in the governance indicators of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) significantly affects GDP per capita, while they also show that the measures of government effectiveness and rule of law in their governance indicators significantly influence the extent of corruption.

The Effect of Corruption on the Manufacturing Sectors in India doubt on the validity of these instrumental variables (Lamsdorff, 2006). While instrumental variables must be correlated with the extent of corruption, but not with GDP per capita, the fraction of the population speaking a major European language plausibly affects GDP per capita through other channels than corruption, such as political instability, inequality, unsecure property rights, human capital, and social

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capital, and so forth. Because of the difficulty of availing of appropriate instruments, studies concerning the impact of corruption on productivity measures such as GDP per capita or gross value added per worker are relatively scarce. However, these variables are closely related to the materialistic well-being of the people and also to social indicators such as life expectancy and infant mortality rates (Ray, 1998), and it is thus worthwhile investigating the effects of corruption on such productivity measures.

The control of borders, more than representing the spatial integrity of the nation-state, is considered by some as a marker and arbiter of state sovereignty overall. Voicing a widely held belief regarding the priority of territorial control in the making of the modern nation-state, Steven Krasner suggests: "If a state cannot regulate what passes across its boundaries, it will not be able to control what happens within them" (1999:13). In Ghana, control of this strategic juncture lies with the Customs Service. Charged with policing the nation's borders and regulating the movement of people and goods in and out of the country, Customs is the most powerful 'front-line' agency. Regularly generating close to 70% of national revenue, Customs is deeply significant to the territorial integrity of the Ghanaian state as well as its fiscal security (Ceps, 2003). The critical role played by the Ghanaian Customs Service in revenue collection is in contrast to highly industrialized states such as the US, Canada and EU members where customs work is primarily about arresting the flow of restricted and prohibited items such as drugs and firearms and much less about taxation. However, the tremendous dependence of the state on customs revenue is common throughout the nations of

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Africa, as is true in less developed countries elsewhere in the world (World Customs Organisation, 2003).

**Statement of the problem**

According to Transparency International, 80% of humans live under corrupt government conditions. It is noteworthy that corruption is not a new phenomenon, and has been plaguing many developed and developing societies for a long time. Corruption hampers economic growth and development in a country through unfair allocation of resources, as observed in Meon and Sekkot (2005). Mauro (2002) and Rose-Ackerman (2004) show that corruption is especially prevalent in countries that have a large public sector and poorer governance systems, both of which are characteristics of developing countries. Corruption acts as a major growth inhibitor in developing economies, and in some cases, accounts for up to 16% of the country's total GDP, as is the case in Albania, calculated by Gokcekus and Muedin (2008). It is interesting to note that some of the fastest growing economies of the world, such as Indonesia, India, Brazil and China, are also the most corrupt in the world (Transparency International Corruption Index Rankings, 2009). The incremental growth potential of these already fast developing economies could probably be huge if corruption is suppressed. Myint (2000) states that there are many potential causes of corruption, including rent-seeking, cultural perceptions, low standards of living and higher expectations in terms of quality of life.

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One question that policy makers in such countries are asking is not whether corruption exists or not, but the extent and the causes of corruption. According to Lambsdorff (2003), administrative corruption (also referred to as public sector corruption) is a major contributor of the total corruption in developing countries. Abed and Gupta (2002) and N'Zue and N'Guessan (2006) say that a big reason that low literacy levels, high poverty and sub-optimal infrastructure in these countries still exists is public sector corruption at every level of the implementation and operation process. It is thus extremely relevant to understand the reasons for the existence of such kind of corruption.

The World Bank, in its 2010 Report, stated that corruption has a negative impact on economic performance, employment opportunities, poverty reduction, and access to public health and police services. Further, the Bank (2001: 102) observed in a report published in 2001 that corruption affects the lives of the poor through several channels, including the diverting of resources from vital social services that benefit the poor, such as education and health clinics. The nature and causes of poverty have also been examined. According to the World Bank, "poverty is an outcome not only of economic processes – it is an outcome of interacting economic, social, and political forces". In the Bank's view, it is also "an outcome of the accountability and responsiveness of state institutions".

Reducing trade costs has the potential to substantially increase income and improve welfare in trading countries, particularly in the developing world where these costs are highest (Frankel & Romer, 1999; Rodriguez & Rodrik, 2001; Obstfeld and Rogo, 2001).In recent years, a significant portion of aid efforts have

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been devoted to reducing trade costs and improving trade logistics, ranging from investments in physical transport infrastructure to the modernization of transport bureaucracies. And yet some categories of trade costs have proven more difficult to identify and reduce than others. Recent research has suggested that corruption at ports and border posts can significantly raise the cost of trade (Yang, 2008; Clark et. al, 2004) and yet the absence of data on actual bribe payments has made it difficult to measure the extent of corruption, to understand how it emerges and to identify how it can affect trade costs and the economy more broadly.

Corruption continues to be a global menace in spite of the many campaigns aimed at curbing it. Within the sub-Saharan African region, corruption has been considered as one of the key factors undermining development (Uneke, 2010). In the case of Ghana the situation is not any different; the political history of the country shows that corruption got rooted since the early days after independence or even before independence, and since then it has become systemically entrenched in the politics of Ghana. Virtually any government that takes office tends to use the system of patronage among other things as a way of rewarding its supporters. The situation unfortunately has not changed in spite of the use of several means both radical and civil to address it. The last two military interventions (in 1979 and 1981 by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council headed by the *Flight* – Lieutenant *Jerry* John *Rawlings*) in the politics of the country were all partly done to end corruption (Ayee, 2000). The Limann's government was for instance ousted in a coup two years after taking office due to allegations of corruption (Ayee, 2000:187). However due to the already

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entrenched nature of the phenomenon in the political system, the governments that took office after the coups ended up being corrupt themselves. The Provisional National Defense Council (whose leadership conducted both coups), which took over after the 1981 coup was later found not to have been corruption-free. In 2009, a British court found a UK civil engineering company, Maybey and Johnson, guilty of bribing a number of Ghanaian government officials in the 1990s to be awarded contracts. These officials were all members of the same PNDC/NDC government that ousted governments over corruption.

Concerns about corruption and the desire to curb it informed the establishment of an independent Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) under Article 216 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, Economic and Organised Crime office (EOCO), Serious Fraud Office (SFO) by an act of parliament, Act 466 of 1993. Civil society has also taken growing interest in the problem of corruption. The media and other institutions such as Transparency International, Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) are some of the non-governmental organisations that have been established to deal with the problem of corruption. Despite all these interventions Ghana continues to decline on the scale of world corruption index. In 2010, Ghana scored 3.9 on the scale of 1 – 10 according to Corruption Perception Index (Adjei, 2012). The questions that need to be addressed therefore are:

- What factors promote corrupt practices in public institutions?

- Why are many public institutions labelled as corrupt?

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- Why has Ghana continuously scored low marks on the world corruption index?

- What measures are taken to curb them?

- Is corruption in Ghana's public institutions just a perception or a reality?

- If it is a reality, what is the cost of corruption to government business?

- What should be done to reduce corruption?

## General objective

The general objective of the study is to examine public perception of corruption on labour performance in public institutions in the Tema Metropolis.

Specifically the study sought to:

- Assess the public understanding of the concept of corruption.

- Identify the causes of corruption in public institutions.

- Analyse public perception of corruption on labour performance

- Examine measures undertaken to curb corruption

- Provide recommendations on corruption to interested persons.

## Research questions

The research will be guided by the following research questions:-

- What is the general understanding of the public on the concept of corruption?

- What are the causes of corruption in public institutions?

- How does the public perceive corruption on labour performance?

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- What measures are being undertaken to curb corruption?

**Significance of the study**

The study will reveal the reality of the age old perception of Ghana's public institutions as corrupt and go a long way aiming at educating the public on the negative impact corruption has on the nation's growth. From a policy standpoint, the results will provide guidance to policy makers on what to consider in designing strategies to improve on anti-corruption practices in institutions. The study will also add to the growing literature on corruption and its eradication.

**Scope of the study**

The research focused on the perception of corruption in the public institutions by the general public conveniently found in the areas in Tema around the precincts of the Customs, Excise and Preventive Service and the Ghana Police Service.

**Limitations of the study**

Due to the limitations confronting the researcher regarding time, logistics, personnel, cost constraints and cooperation from the members of the public services research was limited to the Tema Metropolis. Bribery and corruption are quite well spread phenomenon in the country but for this study a limited number of adult population and public officials, households and institutions in the Tema Metropolis were studied.

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**Organisation of the study**

The study consisted of five chapters. Chapter one contains the background, statement of the problem, study objectives, scope, significance, research questions and Organisation of the study. Chapter two dealt with the review of related relevant literature and chapter three covered the methodology. The fourth chapter discusses and presents the results and the fifth chapter contains the summary, conclusions and recommendations of the study.

# CHAPTER TWO

# REVIEW OF LITERATURE

## Introduction

This chapter reviews the related literature on corruption and has three sections: the theoretical issues, the empirical evidence and conclusion. Under the theoretical issues an attempt is made to trace the theoretical foundations of corruption. The growth of corruption is also presented under the theoretical foundations. This offers the reader the opportunity to be familiar with corruption which is the major foundation of the study. Finally corruption and anti corruption institutions in Ghana are also discussed under the literature.

## Theoretical issues of corruption

This section of the study captures some key issues on corruption. It begins with a brief viewpoint on the concept of corruption and reviews the following: factors on the demand and supply sides of corruption; speed theory; endogenous harassment theory; and revisionist and systemic approach. It also focuses on the discussion of corruption in Africa including Ghana and highlights the discussion on curbing corruption in Ghana and its challenges.

## Perception of corruption

The meaning of the term 'corruption' is one of the most contested in the history of Western political thought (Philip, 1997). Scholars typically distinguish between 'classical' and 'modern' senses. Originally used to indicate the dangers

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to the polity of any behaviours that weakened political virtue of both rulers and subjects, in the late eighteenth century a more consistently narrow interpretation emerged, whereby corruption came to be associated with specific activities that threatened to subvert the integrity of public office most notably bribery, graft, and electoral fraud (Myrdal, 1968).

It is largely within British public and political discourse that understandings of corruption became narrowed partly due to Britain's early achievement of comparatively high levels of democratic, bureaucratic and economic development in which struggles over 'corruption' played a key role. In particular, 'corruption' became a crucial concept in public, political and scholarly debates demarcating the boundaries of appropriate government vis-à-vis commerce and the market. Corruption also featured heavily in debates over the appropriate mechanisms of imperial government and the regulation of commercial enterprise notably the East India Company with its powerful, state-protected monopoly of British/Asian commerce (Philip, 1997).

Corruption, we are usually told, is a term that has always denoted some kind of financial irregularity, typically committed by public officials, usually for private gain. One might argue, however, that corruption has a far more varied conceptual history. In the $18^{th}$ century, conceptions of corruption reveal a significant discursive shift effected, in part at least, by Adam Smith (1723-1790) and Edmund Burke (1729-1797) who were friends. In breaking away from an earlier Republican discourse of corruption that was associated with the work of Montesquieu (1689-1755) and Adam Ferguson (1723- 1816), the work of Smith

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and Burke suggests that corruption played a key role in the eighteenth century transition from what has variously been termed the neo-Roman, Civic Humanist, or Republican tradition of Western political thought to more modern, liberal thought.

Corruption is a term that has been perceived in various ways by various scholars. Its conceptualisation has attracted in recent past competing and numerous views and approaches in the attempt at conceptual clarification. It is therefore seen as a worldwide phenomenon which has long been with every society in the world. It has been identified as the bane of most political and economic problems in societies (Lawal & Tobi, 2001). Corruption is again considered as an enemy of economic development because of its various vices.

A nation that condones corruption is often besieged with a lot of economic, political and social vices. Khan (1996) defines corruption as an act which deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the actions of someone in a position of public authority because of private - regarding - motive such as wealth, power or status (Khan, 1996). "Corruption is the perversion of integrity or state of affairs through bribery, favour or moral depravity" ... It takes place when at least two parties have interacted to change the structure or processes of society or the behaviour of functionaries in order to produce dishonest, unfaithful or defiled situations" (Otite, 2000). In other words - corruption is a systematic vice in an individual, society or a nation which reflects favouritism, nepotism, tribalism, sectionalism, undue enrichment, amassing of wealth, abuse of office, power, position and derivation of undue gains and benefits.

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Cob and Gonzalez (2005:6 cited in McCusker, 2006:5) explains corruption as a system of interlocking vicious cycles: greater control over appointments by political parties; more payments to political parties by appointees; less effective judicial system; more jobs in the civil service; more civil servants are corrupt and/or incompetent; more organised crime and narcotrafficking; more regulations to justify more jobs in the civil service; lower salaries; less transparency in international negotiations; more businesses remain in the informal economy; lower revenues for the government; and less favourable international agreements.

Again according to Otite (2000), corruption transcends bribery but includes "treasury looting and also the deliberate bending of rules of the system to favour friends or hurt foes. It is clearly the evidence of absence of accountability, law and order". It can also be described as the conscious attempt or deliberate diversion of resources from the satisfaction of the general interest to that of self (personal) interest. The disdain for corruption is clearly felt mainly on ground of morality. There is no doubt that it inflicts some sorts of adverse effects on any society where it exists and persists until such society is purged of its immorality (Lawal & Tobi, 2001).

Among political thinkers of the 18th century, few expressed the Republican fears of corruption and empire more clearly than Montesquieu. He argued that all polities, whether democratic, aristocratic, monarchic or despotic, are prone to corruption. Corruption consisted in the decay of its original principles, the mores and values animating the regime and its people, and underpinning its laws, Montesquieu (1748). Above all, Montesquieu identified

conquests, military victories, and extent of territory as the chief sources of corruption. In a democracy, he argued that conquests gave rise to overweening pride among the people and a desire to assume the powers of magistrates.

In aristocracies, conquest led to greed and privilege among the ruling families, while in a monarchy, it led to the tyranny of the ruler and the slavery of the people. Only in a despotic government, described as 'corrupt by its nature' was corruption the normal state of affairs. Thus political greatness, and especially the extent of territory, were the chief causes of corruption. Of all types of regime, Montesquieu saw republics as most virtuous because of their small territory, and if they remained small the public good is better felt, better known, lies nearer to each citizen, abuses are less extensive and less protected. In conclusion Montesquieu's was of the view that if the natural property of small states is to be governed as republics, that of medium-sized ones, to be subject to a monarch, and that of large empires to be dominated by a despot, it follows that, in order to preserve the principles of the established government, the state must be maintained at the size it already has and that it will change its spirit to the degree to which its boundaries are narrowed or extended.

Ferguson (1723-1816) was a disciple of Montesquieu and in his close study of the variables leading up to the decline of nations he agreed with his idol that overextension of territory of nations was a major cause. The growth of small-scale communities into impersonal and unwieldy empires inevitably led to bureaucratisation, over-centralisation, social disorientation and, worst of all, despotic or military rule, (Ferguson, 1767 & 1996; Forbes, 1967). Drawing

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inspiration from the 'Republican' or civic humanist tradition, Ferguson argued that militaristic imperialism in particular is the fastest and most destructive route to a nation's decline. Following Thucydides, he suggested that it is hubris that drives imperialism and since hubris results from overconfidence gained through past successes, it is successful, prosperous and technologically advanced nations like Britain that are most likely to propel themselves towards decay (de Romily, 1979).

**Factors on the demand and supply sides of corruption**

Demand-side corruption is often associated with public officials. The activities that provide opportunity for demand-side corrupt practices are manifold, but some of the more significant include administration of government regulations e.g. the issuance of licenses and permits, control over government procurement, control over hiring, promotion, and firing of civil servants, control over access to public services and resources, control over auditing and tax administration, poor supervision, over-politicization of the public service, and not least, poor remuneration and lack of incentives. It has been argued that if governments do not pay civil servants well, there will continue to be "power without pay" floating about desperately and dangerously in search of a living (The Economist, 2002). Delays in the delivery of public services have been noted to be a fundamental cause of demand-side corruption.

A recent study by Morisset and Lumenga (2002), on administrative costs faced by private investors in 32 developing countries reported that it takes up to

two or three years to establish a new business in many developing countries. The study found that most delays occurred in securing land access and obtaining building permits. The associated administrative costs were found to be positively correlated with estimates of the level of corruption and negatively correlated with the quality of governance, degree of openness, and public wages, among others, Morisset and Lumenga Neso (2002). The authors argue that the level of corruption or the lack of good governance is expected to influence administrative costs as bureaucrats and politicians are more likely to capture the extra rents.

Supply-side corruption, on the other hand, reflects the role of the private sector in corruption, and involves factors that facilitate the payment of bribes by the private sector. As The Economist (2002) puts it, companies are the "main conduits of bribery". Supply-side corruption is driven by rent-seeking entrepreneurs seeking to exploit political influence to their benefit. Business organisations and their officials influence public officials to make decisions that are more favourable to them than to the general body of the citizenry. Such influences may be monetary or non-monetary and can take the form of political campaign contributions, trips abroad, paying school fees for wards of public officials, or physical cash paid directly to the officials. In such instances, rent-seeking could be more profitable than productive activities. When rent-seeking is widespread, enterprising individuals realize that they could reap much higher profits by obtaining privileges in a system marked by continued government interventions than by setting up risky new ventures to restructure old inefficient

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industries or starting up new companies. Corruption and side payments become a natural outgrowth of the new rent-seeking system (Mensah, 2000).

Speed theory

Different theories have been advanced to explain the determinants of demand-side and supply-side corruption. The "speed money theory", the "queuing theory" or the "efficiency theory" of bribes, Barzel (1974), Lui (1985) Leff (1964) Huntington (1968) argue that assuming there is no stigma associated with bribery, or that the stigma associated with paying bribes does not depend on enterprise profitability, firms that benefit more from public services will generally offer larger bribe payments for reduced waiting periods for services. Allocation of public services therefore would be according to the value that different enterprises place on such services. Such services will be allocated efficiently with the bribe acting as a perfect price discriminating mechanism. Although the benefit that an individual firm gains from services is unobservable, it is reasonable to assume that more profitable firms will generally benefit more from the public service (Clarke & Xu, 2002).

Endogenous harassment theory

Under the "endogenous harassment theory" of corruption propounded by Myrdal (1968) and further elaborated by Kaufmann and Wei (1999), service providers use observable information such as industry, size, or profitability to guess each enterprise's maximum willingness-to-pay for public services and

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endogenously offer incentive compatible bribe levels that depend on such characteristics.

Under this hypothesis, the relationship between bribe payments and profitability would also be positive. Both the speed money and the endogenous harassment theories assume that the bribe amount paid by different firms increases with the willingness to pay for public services. The basic difference between these theories is that while in the case of the speed money theory the firm paying the bribe self-selects the amount of the bribe according to its cost of waiting, the endogenous harassment theory assumes that the bribe taker has information on characteristics of the firm which affects its willingness to pay bribes.

In their study of microeconomic factors that affect bribes paid in a single sector of the economy in 21 transition economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Clarke and Xu (2002) consider how characteristics of firms paying bribes (e.g. ownership, profitability, and size) and characteristics of the utilities taking bribes (e.g. competition and utility capacity) affect the equilibrium level of corruption in the sector. Using enterprise-level data on actual bribes that enterprise managers reported having paid to utilities, they report that on the demand-side bribes paid to utilities are higher in countries with greater constraints on utility capacity, lower levels of competition in the utility sector, and where utilities are state-owned. This is because where utilities are privatized, multiple utility service providers exist in a competitive environment, and utility customers can respond to demands for bribes by switching to other providers. Anticipating

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this, the service provider might be less likely to ask for bribes or to ask for lower bribe payments, Rose-Ackerman (1978); Shleifer and Vishny (1993); Ades and Di Tella (1999).

On the supply-side, Clarke and Xu (2002) report that more profitable enterprises pay higher bribes, which is consistent with both the queuing (Lui, 1985) and the endogenous harassment (Myrdal, 1968) theories of corruption. Also consistent with the endogenous harassment theory, firms with higher overdue payments to utilities pay higher bribes, perhaps because they have a weaker bargaining position vis-à-vis the employees of the utility company.

Clarke and Xu (2002) also report that the duration of the relationship between the enterprises paying and receiving the bribe and ownership structure of bribe-paying firms also appear to matter, as they found that *de novo(bigunning)* private firms paid higher bribes than established firms. They also found strong support for the complementarity of the overall level of corruption in a country and bribes in the utility sector. The study found that the most delays occurred in securing land access and obtaining building permits. The associated administrative costs were found to be positively correlated with estimates of the level of corruption and negatively correlated with the quality of governance, degree of openness, and public wages, among others, Morisset and Lumenga Neso (2002).

Morisset and Lumenga Neso (2002) argue that the level of corruption or the lack of good governance is expected to influence administrative costs as bureaucrats and politicians are more likely to capture the extra rents. Evidently,

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corruption thrives in environments where governance is weak. Indicators of weak governance in both the public and private sectors include an absence of laid-down procedures for procurement and tender, non-enforcement of laid-down control principles, abuse of managerial powers, lax supervision, non-existence of codes of conduct, and improper payments and accounting systems, to name a few. When key indicators of sound corporate governance are breached, opportunities are created for individuals in business to make personal gains.

For example, a weak internal control system within a company creates incentives for managers to make side deals with vendors or make side-payments to government officials to obtain contracts. Public sector corporations with internal management weaknesses and low remunerated officials will also provide receptacles for kickback payments from private sector institutions and other organisations that deal with them. In effect, weak corporate governance systems will provide various kinds of opportunities for corruption (Montesquieu, 1989).

Revisionist and systemic approach

To understand corruption as a social phenomenon, several theoretical approaches have been brought forward; one of them being the revisionist approach and another one the systemic approach. The revisionist approach consists of explaining corruption as a divergence of behaviour from accepted norms within a society; and its existence by 'reference to social norms and deficiencies in economic and political systems'. Non-revisionists accept the revisionist approach's explanations of what corruption is but believe that the

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revisionists' approach; even though it uses social variables such as social class, age, gender among others; lacks the understanding that corruption does not occur in an individual form, or within individual terms but occurs within a system; that is, it does not recognise the existence of systemic corruption (Remnick, 1994).

Corruption, under the revisionists' approach, would be simply uprooted by chasing the ones accused because of its incidental nature instead of it being a structural one. For revisionists, corruption is not the norm; it is by their own definition, exceptional. Once corruption is widespread enough not to be considered exceptional it ceases to exist because it has become the norm itself (Ellman, 1999). The inadequacy of public institutions brings corruption as an 'alternative means of allocation or of access to decision making.' Corruption comes about also possibly because of the too large influence a government can have on a society; coupled with excessive red tapeism and bureaucracy as well as a higher value placed on kinship and tribal attachments rather than a sense of nation.

Endemic or systemic corruption occurs when corruption is an integrated and essential aspect of the economic, social and political system. Systemic corruption is not a special category of corrupt practice, but rather a situation in which the major institutions and processes of the state are routinely dominated and used by corrupt individuals and groups, and in which most people have no alternatives to dealing with corrupt officials. The systemic approach brings to light the fact that one's deviant behavior cannot be blamed solely on him or her, but on the whole faulty organisation, which in turn actually protects the systemic

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corruption that is happening within that organisation; this time being the government. Two of the main points of the functioning of systemic corruption are that 'violators are protected, and when exposed, treated leniently; their accusers are victimized for exposing organisational hypocrisy, and are treated harshly. Collective guilt finds expression in rationalizations of the internal practices and without strong external supports there is no serious intention of ending them.'

All in all, the different concepts of corruption all come to the conclusion that corruption occurs more in a society or organisation that does base its belief in duties to the public but rather to private ends. Corruption seems to work better in a system where many engage in such activities, where corruption does not stem out as coming only from certain individuals but rather from many working within the same system. This is when corruption becomes of systemic nature; and it seems not unfair to describe Ghana's governmental system as being riddled from the interior because of systemic corruption.

Corruption reduction and prevention

According to McCusker (2006), there are (at least) three key schools of thought on corruption reduction and prevention. First is interventionism which refers to the situation whereby the "relevant authorities wait for the corrupt action to occur and then intervene to capture and punish the offender. This school stimulates retribution, rehabilitation and deterrence but there remain a number of obstructive variables including: the harm has already occurred and cannot be undone; the majority of crimes remain unreported; and the demand on finite

resources will inevitably be infinite given the degree of supervision necessary to ensure that the deterrence effect operates" (McCusker, 2006:8).

Second is managerialism and this is where "those individuals or agencies seeking to engage in corrupt behaviour can be discouraged or prevented from doing so by establishing appropriate systems, procedures and protocols" (McCusker, 2006:8). Managerialism, essentially, advocates the reduction or elimination of opportunities for corruption. One major limitation to this school of thought is the fact that individuals do not necessarily operate according to the predetermined principles of mangerialism. Such individuals fall into the following categories: category I – people who want to do the right thing and require guidance on how to achieve this; category II - people who are too timid to take the risk of operating outside set rules; and category III – people who are corrupt and will operate outside of the rules entirely.

Finally, organisational integrity requires the "integration of an organisation's operational systems, corruption control strategies and ethical standards so that a norm of ethical behaviour is created" (McCusker, 2006:9). The assumption is that deviance stems from the organisation rather than the individuals of which it is comprised.

According to Huberts (1998:7 cited in McCusker, 2006), the top three ranking of the importance of causes of public corruption and fraud in higher income country and lower income country are: norms and values of politicians and public servants; lack of control, supervision, auditing, and interrelationships - business, politics, state. Findings of the Transparency International's Global

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corruption barometer 2005 showed that political parties (4.0) were perceived as the most corrupt followed by parliament/legislature (3.7), police (3.6), and legal system/judiciary (3.5) (McCusker, 2006:6).

**Discussion of corruption in Africa and Ghana**

Since the post-colonial Africa, corruption has been a cause for concern because it diverts already limited funds, undermines economic progress and impedes policy changes required for development. Africa presents a typical case of the countries in the world whose development has been undermined and retarded by the menace of corrupt practices. A series of reforms have been carried out in all the African countries so as to make the system (African states) efficient and result oriented. However, the anticipated gains of such efforts or reforms have not been visible due to series of factors which include that of corruption. Without doubt, corruption has permeated the African society and anyone who can say that corruption in Africa has not yet become alarming is either a fool, a crook or else does not live in this continent (Achebe, 1988).

Corruption increases the costs of doing business, wastes resources, hence radically reduce revenues accruing to the state due to resources being used for personal gain rather than what it meant for. It also results in poor service delivery, "moonlighting" or multiple concurrent sources of employment and refusal to perform normal functions without additional payment. Moreover, corruption deepens poverty and makes it difficult for ordinary people to get ahead as the result of their own efforts. There is increasing evidence that the social and

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economic cost of corruption disproportionately affects the poor, who not only suffer from the lack of services and efficient government, but who are also powerless to resist the demands of corrupt officials. Different arguments have been put forward to explain the pervasiveness of corruption in Africa these include poverty, the personalization of public office, the political culture and the inability of leaders to overcome their colonial mentality in respect of their perception of public office  (Lawal & Tobi,2001). To these end the fortunes of some African heads of state were published by French weekly (May, 1997) as presented by (George Ayittey, 2002) are as follows:-.

- General Sani Abacha of Nigeria -- $20billion.

- President H.Boigny of Ivory Coast -- $6 billion.

- General Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria --$5billion.

- President Mobutu of Zaire -- $4billion.

- President Mouza Traore of Mali -- $2billion.

- President Henri Bedie of Ivory Coast - $300million.

- President Denis N'guesso of Congo -- $200million

- President Omar Bongo of Gabon -- $80million.

- President Paul Biya of Cameroon -- $70million.

- President Haile Mariam of Ethiopia -- $30million.

- President Hissene Habre of Chad --$3million (Ayittey, 2002).

If corruption is relatively confined, growth will not be unduly affected. In other words, growth would be higher and more evenly distributed without corruption (Lawal, 2007).  Also, if the 'profits' from corrupt practices are re-

invested into the economy, the negative effects of corruption may be somewhat mitigated. According to a United Nations estimate in 1991 alone, more than $200billion in capital was siphoned out of Africa by the ruling elites. This amount was more than half of Africa's foreign debt of $300billion (Ayittey, 2002). This wealth resulting from corruption also forms part of capital flight and on an annual basis, exceeds what comes into Africa as foreign aid. Ayittey (2002) therefore argued that "the inviolate ethnic of the ruling elite in Africa is self-aggrandizement and self- perpetuation in power. To achieve those objectives, they take over and subvert every key institution of government to serve their needs and not that of the people: The Aid service, Judiciary, Military, Media and Banking. Even various commissions with lofty ideals that are supposed to be non-partisan and neutral are also taken over and debauched" (Ayittey, 2002).

According to Lawal (2007), corruption in Africa is both a development and social issue which impedes economic growth and poverty reduction. He stressed that corruption has become endemic such that it is found almost in all aspects of life. This endemic practice implies a breakdown of the rule of law and some cases a loss of state legitimacy. The effects of corruption in Africa can be analysed from three main perspectives - The political, economic and sociocultural. From the political view point, corruption has the capacity of engendering political instability, breakdown of law and order, brain drain, inefficiency of the public service among others.

Viewed from the economic perspective, corruption is no doubt an enemy of economic development in the international scene, as it gives the continent a

poor image in the international scene and it gives the continent poor image in interpersonal and business relationships (Ojaide, 2000). Moreso, a nation that condones corruption is often besieged with a lot of economic and social vices. Economic and social infrastructural facilities are vandalized to create room for unnecessary replacement and purchases or conversion to personal use. Trade and commerce cannot thrive, as investors will be unwilling to invest much trade or business in this part of the world, the overall resulting effects of all these malpractices will be increase in the rate of inflation, unemployment and decline in output, foreign reserves and deterioration in the standard of living of the people (Ojaide, 2000).

In the socio-cultural context, corruption apart from engendering poverty has the capacity of changing the social values of a good and progressive society dramatically to nothing else than the crazy pursuit of wealth affluences, power and society recognition. People no longer appreciate the virtues of good morale, conduct and practices. Without doubt corruption has eaten deep into the fabric of the African people and the African society and it continues with the people almost permanently. Africa presents a typical case whose development and the desired change have been undermined and retarded by the menace of corrupt practices.

The 2012 Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International which surveyed 176 countries worldwide put Ghana at 64th position with 3.9 points. This means that Ghana's position on the CPI has dropped implying that Ghana is still not winning the fight against corruption.

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Afro barometer survey conducted revealed that (81%) of the population perceive the Ghana Police to be corrupt, followed by Judges and Magistrates (72%), Tax officials (71%), Public Officials (67%), Members of Parliament (59%) and lastly the presidency had (56%). The results of the 2000 Ghana Governance and Corruption Survey conducted by the Centre of Democracy and Development (CDD, 2000) Ghana and commissioned by the World Bank present the strongest link yet between internal control and governance structures of business firms on the one hand and corruption of public officers on the other. The study sampled views of 1,500 households, 500 business enterprise and 1,000 public officials in all regions of Ghana. In its findings the study reported that corruption is a major problem in both public and private sector. About (86%) of households see corruption as a major problem in the public sector, whereas (59%) of household see corruption as a major problem in the private sector; many firms make unofficial payment of (44%) to public officials with over (27%) frequently or always making such payment.

All strata of Ghanaian society is replete with different levels of corruption. Politics, political parties, and structures of government are perceived and lumped together as the first level of corruption. Throughout the political history of Ghana, successive civilian governments have been forcibly overthrown for having allegedly been guilty of corruption, among other accusations. The substantive study on corruption in Ghana is largely an empirical survey of perceptions of the urban elite (Gyimah-Boadi, 2002). The importance of assessing what the public

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thinks about corruption was premised on the belief that public support for anti-corruption efforts is critical to their success.

The report captured the views of 900 residents of households on their perceptions of corruption, personal involvement as well as other people's involvement in bribery and corruption, underlying reasons for corruption, institutions and officials perceived to be affected by corruption and suggestions on how to deal with the problem of corruption.  It was believed that the findings of the survey, with all its limitations, provides the public and policy makers with some useful information on the perceived state of corruption in the country, and the expectations of the public in terms of dealing with the canker. Some of the findings are particularly interesting in that, they corroborate other findings of earlier research by Transparency International (TI (2000) and other organisations. This calls for serious reflection and considerate action to address the issues raised by respondents. The findings reveal a perception of high prevalence of corruption in Ghanaian society from the respondents in the three (3) urban areas surveyed. This could in part be attributed to the frequent reports of alleged bribery and corruption put out by the Media and the perception that nothing/not much is being done to disproof the allegations or investigate them. Since such reports are often not investigated and their findings made known to the public, people make their own judgments, adding to the perception of pervasive corruption. The findings included the following:

There is a perception of high administrative or bureaucratic corruption compared to political corruption. Three out of ten of the respondents said they

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'don't know' the number of MPs, Ministers, etc. involved in bribery and corruption, whereas the same (3 out of 10) of the respondents are certain that 'most' Civil/Public Servants and officials in the Metropolitan/Municipal Assemblies are involved in bribery and corruption. Again, respondents cited 'delay tactics' as a way by which the people are 'forced' to pay bribes for public services or indulge in other forms of bribery (Prempeh, 2003). This is a sure disincentive for investors in particular and a minus in terms of public trust in the efficient management of public resources.

The report GII (2005) indicates a high tolerance for corruption among Ghanaians. Most of the respondents interviewed said they looked on unconcerned when witnessing acts of bribery and corruption. Typically, persons who try to confront perpetrators of bribery and/or corruption are often labeled 'too know', or asked to 'mind your own businesses by their fellow citizens. Moreover, where reports are made to the Police and offenders are sometimes arrested, they (the offenders) still get off and nothing comes out of the investigations. For most people, therefore, reporting corruption is an exercise in futility. This is a particularly disturbing finding as it means that we are breeding a culture of impunity, in which those involved in corrupt acts get away with their destructive behaviour.

Some of the institutions perceived to be highly corrupt, such as the Police Service and the Judicial Service, are paradoxically also the ones expected to help control corruption. This clearly indicates that there is a serious need for institutional renewal and reforms that will reinvigorate these oversight institutions

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and enable them play their expected roles to help address the canker of corruption in the society.

Certain tendencies such as nepotism, cronyism and ethnicity, which are often inimical to development, appear to have eaten very deep into Ghanaian social fabric such that, nobody seems to see anything wrong with them. For example, when respondents were asked their perception on other means applied by the Government and the Metropolitan/Municipal Assemblies in the award of contracts, apart from tender, most of the respondents were quick to cite 'party faithfuls,' followed by 'nepotism', 'backdoor' and 'ethnicity,' in that order. The challenges of cronyism, nepotism and ethnicity therefore remain areas in urgent need of attention.

The GII (2005) made strong recommendations including the following:

- A strong code of conduct for civil/public servants as well as political appointees, especially those in positions to hire, fire, and influence resource allocation, is needed as a matter of urgency. Such a code of conduct must be systematically and rigorously enforced.

- Parliament should consider reforming and reviewing legislative instruments establishing the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) and the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) now Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO) to make them sufficiently independent as well as grant them powers of prosecution. This would go a long way to increase public confidence in such institutions, which have been established as instruments of accountability. More importantly,

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giving CHRAJ and SFO prosecutorial powers would help ensure that acts of corruption and abuse of office do not go unpunished. This will help check the creeping culture of impunity among those entrusted with elective and administrative power.

- Government should strengthen existing laws to include the imposition of stiffer punishment, such as longer prison terms for perpetrators of corruption. At the same time, the Public Service should institute a reward system for those who exhibit high standards of performance and commitment to duty in public office.

- Parliament should, as a matter of priority, enact the Whistleblowers Bill and the Freedom of Information Bill to encourage exposure of wrongdoing in the workplace as well as foster transparency in governance and public administration.

- Civic education should be increased to educate and sensitize Ghanaians on the deleterious effects of corruption. Ghanaians must learn to be loyal to the state rather than to friends, relatives and members of their ethnic groups. This calls for a change of attitude and a system of democratic practice where all citizens are equal before the law and where meritocracy rules over and above all other considerations.

- Government, Employers, Trade Unions and other Stakeholders should take steps to organise a national debate on income policy as a matter of urgency since research findings suggest that low income and poverty-related issues are among the root causes of bribery and corruption.

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- Finally, recognition should be given to people who risk their lives and/or livelihoods in order to champion the anti-corruption cause.

**Curbing corruption in Ghana**

Four broad themes can be identified in most anti-corruption strategies: regulation as a counter to corruption; provision of financial aid with conditions of non-corrupt behaviour attached; engaging the media as a means of investigating corruption and publicising its effects; and engaging the NGOs and allied sectors in pricking the consciences of governments and international organisations (Carr, 2006;McCusker, 2006). Lawal (2007) suggests that to prevent and combat corruption, there needs to be a consistent, coherent, broad-based approach and a long-term perspective. He further adds that leadership, political will and public support are essential to the success of any anti-corruption effort.

McCusker (2006) opines that anti-corruption strategies should be designed with longevity in mind which would essentially require a number of assessments. In this case, certain reforms should be assessed for potentially adverse and/or disproportionate consequences as well as being aware of the importance of the sequential nature of reform. Corruption involves choices and as such "[...] strategies to address corruption therefore have to address the element of choice as well as that of opportunity. They have to make corruption a high-risk and low-gain, as opposed to a low-risk and high-gain, endeavour. Such strategies have to be country-specific and what works in one country may not necessarily work in another" (Policy Forum, 1997 cited in Lawal, 2007:5).

To ensure that anti-corruption strategies are holistic in nature, certain policies which are related to a number of sectors vulnerable to corruption and amenable to change need to be incorporated. Hubers (1998 cited in McCusker, 2006:20) identifies six strategies in the following areas:

- economic – need for economic stimuli which may include higher civil service salaries;

- educational – aiming at altering the attitudes and values of the populace and civil servants via training and education campaigns and engagement of the media;

- cultural – ensuring that the behaviour and attitudes of those in power are subject to stringent codes of conduct and their behaviour filters down to civil servants;

- organisational or bureaucratic - strengthening internal control systems such as auditing to detect corrupt activity, and staff rotation to reduce the propensity for individuals to establish themselves in entrenched corruption;

- political – increasing in transparency, for example, of the monitoring of party finances and more broadly, a clearer and more definite separation of powers in terms of the judiciary and the state; and

- judicial or responsive measures – advocates harsher penalties for corrupt practices but also the creation of independent anti-corruption agencies.

If indeed, the entry point for curbing corruption is "an awareness of prevalence," recognition of its seriousness as a problem and the expressed

commitment to control it, then Ghana is on track. There have been mechanisms put in place to curb corruption in Ghana. Public institutions as well as civil society advocacy groups have been established purposely to combat the menace. For instance, Article 218(e) of the Constitution of Ghana mandates the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) to investigate all instances of alleged or suspected corruption and the misappropriation of public monies by officials. The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) Act was designed similarly to detect certain types of corruption and economic crime, such as procurement fraud. The SFO, now Economic Organised Crime Office (EOCO) is a specialized agency to monitor, investigate and, on the authority of the Attorney General, prosecute any offence involving serious financial loss to the state.

Indeed, the 1992 Constitution makes better management of the Ghanaian economy a political imperative. According to Article 36(1), the state must "take all necessary action to ensure that the national economy is managed in such a manner as to maximize the rate of economic development and to secure the maximum welfare" of the people. Perhaps, the key arrangement for fulfilling this directive is a national budget process that is participatory, transparent, and accountable and that would lead to effective management of resources and sustainable economic growth.

Several provisions (e.g., Chapter 13, Art. 178, 179, 181, 184, and 187) seek to impose fiscal discipline and accountability on the management of the economy. Additionally, new legislations have been introduced recently to

enhance transparency and accountability in the conduct of official financial transactions. From the constitutional and legal framework, therefore, the country seems primed to ensure good economic governance. Civil society advocacy groups including the Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII) have emerged in recent years to buttress the anti-corruption drive.

Under the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC), the GII, CHRAJ, SFO, Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) and the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) have coordinated and unified the campaign to curb corruption. The media in particular have assumed a major role in the anti-corruption drive. However, they, like other civil society institutions, are fraught with problems of capacity, professionalism and integrity. Media capacity for investigations is weak and suspicions are rife that media practitioners "are bought" to champion certain parochial interests and indulge in blackmail and extortion. Thus, media exposures often have huge credibility gaps.

**Challenges to controlling corruption in Ghana**

Corruption control in Ghana, despite receiving the notice and attention of government at the highest levels, has proven difficult for several reasons. A major source of the problem is the constitutional limitations on horizontal accountability in executive-legislative relations. Entrenched "executive dominance," as exemplified by the system of "executive-legislative fusion" where the President must appoint a majority of his cabinet from Parliament (Article 78) has rendered ineffectual Parliament's oversight of the executive.

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The problem is that parliamentarians who are also Ministers find it difficult to balance their loyalty to the Executive and to Parliament. As a result, such potentially powerful committees as Finance, Public Accounts and Government Assurances stay timid in their duty to scrutinize executive power, actions and assurances. In effect, the robustness normally expected of legislative oversight has been lost. Furthermore, Parliament and the independent anti-corruption institutions (CHRAJ and SFO) lack both human and material capacity, including adequate and competent personnel, research, and facilities.

The appointment of an in-house " corruption czar" with some close and familial ties with influential insiders obviously betrayed a lack of sensitivity to conflict of interest avoidance norms, and undermined the government' s credibility in its declared commitment to a policy of " zero tolerance for corruption." It thus came as no surprise to many Ghanaians when the 2003 " corruption perceptions index" of the Berlin-based Transparency International showed Ghana dropping from the fiftieth in 2002 to seventieth position as the most corrupt country among the 133 countries surveyed.

So far, efforts to curb corruption and improve economic governance in Ghana have been confined largely to the public sector, although, as the foregoing discussion also shows, these efforts have proved to be more superficial and impressionistic than substantial. Scant recognition has been given to the private sector where a weak regulatory framework and the absence of good corporate governance practices and norms could combine to unleash the worst forms of corruption in financial transactions. Among the effects of systematic corporate

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corruption are: loss of tax revenues, poor quality infrastructure; it could also affect the national treasury by precipitating government bailouts, loan guarantees, debt write-offs and subsidies. Already, the private sector in Ghana is believed to suffer serious deficits in financial management, accountability and integrity.

A UNECA commissioned study in 2002 established that corporate governance in the country was afflicted by weak and incompetent governing boards; weak ministerial and parliamentary and public oversight; excessive presidential and other kinds of political interference in the running of public boards; and the absence of a directors' liability law. According to the study, a solid 96% of Ghanaian experts regarded corruption, evasions, abuse and misapplication of exemption laws as the bane of the tax collection system. It seems imperative, therefore, that an appropriate legal and regulatory framework be established for economic governance to forestall graft and corruption and ensure the sustainable development of the private sector. An effective enforcement mechanism should promote transparency, integrity, diligence and accountability in the corporate sector and, as Prempeh cautions, to be effective the mechanism should be "impartial, and not a political tool with a partisan agenda."

**Summary**

This chapter focused on the theoretical issues on corruption and narrowed it discussion of corruption in Africa and Ghana. It traced the meaning of the term corruption from viewpoints of scholars. It was originally used to refer to the dangers that weakened political virtue of both rulers and subjects and by the late

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18<sup>th</sup> century, a narrow interpretation which emerged related corruption to specific activities that threatened to subvert the integrity of public officers.

The factors of demand and supply sides of corruption were also reviewed. The activities that provide opportunity for demand-side corrupt practices are manifold, but some of the more significant include administration of government regulations e.g. the issuance of licenses and permits, control over government procurement, control over hiring, promotion, and firing of civil servants, control over access to public services and resources, control over auditing and tax administration, poor supervision, over-politicization of the public service, and not least, poor remuneration and lack of incentives. Supply-side corruption, on the other hand, reflects the role of the private sector in corruption, and involves factors that facilitate the payment of bribes by the private sector. Supply-side corruption is driven by rent-seeking entrepreneurs seeking to exploit political influence to their benefit. Business organisations and their officials influence public officials to make decisions that are more favourable to them than to the general body of the citizenry.

The revisionist approach consists of explaining corruption as a divergence of behaviour from accepted norms within a society; and its existence by 'reference to social norms and deficiencies in economic and political systems'. Non-revisionists accept the revisionist approach's explanations of what corruption is but believe that the revisionists' approach; even though it uses social variables such as social class, age, gender among others; lacks the understanding that corruption does not occur in an individual form, or within individual terms but

occurs within a system; that is, it does not recognise the existence of systemic corruption (Remnick, 1994).

Endemic or systemic corruption occurs when corruption is an integrated and essential aspect of the economic, social and political system. Systemic corruption is not a special category of corrupt practice, but rather a situation in which the major institutions and processes of the state are routinely dominated and used by corrupt individuals and groups, and in which most people have no alternatives to dealing with corrupt officials.

The different concepts of corruption all come to the conclusion that corruption occurs more in a society or organisation that does base its belief in duties to the public but rather to private ends.

Different arguments have been put forward to explain the pervasiveness of corruption in Africa these include poverty, the personalization of public office, the political culture and the inability of leaders to overcome their colonial mentality in respect of their perception of public office (Lawal & Tobi,2001). If corruption is relatively confined, growth will not be unduly affected. In other words, growth would be higher and more evenly distributed without corruption (Lawal, 2007).

The effects of corruption in Africa can be analysed from three main perspectives - The political, economic and sociocultural. From the political view point, corruption has the capacity of engendering political instability, breakdown of law and order, brain drain, inefficiency of the public service among others. Viewed from the economic perspective, corruption is no doubt an enemy of

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economic development in the international scene, as it gives the continent a poor image in the international scene and it gives the continent poor image in interpersonal and business relationships (Ojaide, 2000). In the socio-cultural context, corruption apart from engendering poverty has the capacity of changing the social values of a good and progressive society dramatically to nothing else than the crazy pursuit of wealth affluences, power and society recognition.

Some of the institutions perceived to be highly corrupt, such as the Police Service and the Judicial Service, are paradoxically also the ones expected to help control corruption. This clearly indicates that there is a serious need for institutional renewal and reforms that will reinvigorate these oversight institutions and enable them play their expected roles to help address the canker of corruption in the society.

There have been mechanisms put in place to curb corruption in Ghana. Public institutions as well as civil society advocacy groups have been established purposely to combat the menace. The Constitution of Ghana allows for some institutions such as CHRAJ to investigate issues pertaining to suspected corruption and the misappropriated of public monies likewise EOCO.

A major source of the problem is the constitutional limitations on horizontal accountability in executive-legislative relations. Entrenched "executive dominance," as exemplified by the system of "executive-legislative fusion" where the President must appoint a majority of his cabinet from Parliament (Article 78) has rendered ineffectual Parliament's oversight of the executive.

Efforts to curb corruption and improve economic governance in Ghana have been confined largely to the public sector, although, as the foregoing discussion also shows, these efforts have proved to be more superficial and impressionistic than substantial. Scant recognition has been given to the private sector where a weak regulatory framework and the absence of good corporate governance practices and norms could combine to unleash the worst forms of corruption in financial transactions.

In short it can be said that, corruption remains a huge canker that need to be delved deep in due to its negative impact on the nation and countries all around the world.

# CHAPTER THREE

# METHODOLOGY

## Introduction

This chapter explains how the study was undertaken. It focuses on the study area, study design, the population of the study, the sampling and sampling procedure and how data was collected and instrumentation and procedures for data analysis and presentation.

## Study area

Tema Metropolis is a coastal area situated about 30 kilometres east of Accra, the capital city of Ghana. The Metropolis covers an area of about 396km square and lies within the coastal savannah zone. According to the Ghana Population Census conducted in 2000 the total population of the Metropolis was 298, 432 with males and females forming 49 percent and 51 percent of the population respectively. With a growth rate of 2.6 percent the population as at 2000 was estimated at 348,815. The current population size could be estimated at 387,045 and expected to reach 418,444 by 2013 (Tema Metropolitan Assembly, 2009).

The local economy of the Tema Metropolis is made up of agriculture, industries and commerce/service but the backbone of the local economy is the industrial and service sectors as it employs majority of the labour force. With agriculture, a significant number of the people are into fishing while the industries are manufacturing firms producing chemicals, clothing, electrical equipments,

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furniture, machinery, refined petroleum products, steel and tools. The service sector in the metropolis covers a wide range of activities. A large number of service companies such as shipping agents, freight forwarders, customs, transport haulers, banks, hotels and restaurants operate there (Tema Metropolitan Assembly, 2009).

Once a small fishing village called Torman, the Port of Tema was established in 1962 with the construction of its deepwater harbour (the largest man-made harbour in Africa). Only 29 kilometers from Ghana's capital city of Accra, rail and road links made it Ghana's biggest and most important Port.

By 1950, Ghana's only existing Port at Takoradi did not have the capacity to handle the country's increased international trade. Tema was therefore chosen in 1951 for a new port because of its location and deep water offshore. Displaced residents moved some miles away and named their new village Newtown; it was chosen closer to the coast and was a rich fishing site.

The harbour, township, and several industrial facilities were completed in 1962, when the Port of Tema became Ghana's 'Harbour City' and industrial hub. The Government acquired over 16 hectares of land, giving the Tema Development Corporation (TDC) responsibility for development. Being a planned city, Tema benefitted from an efficient network of roads and carefully placed social amenities and recreational centres. The new village of Newtown, with about 120,000 people (Population and Housing Census, 2010) was not developed because, the sudden influx of people overwhelmed planners. With a number of industries and institutions present in Tema and coupled with the fact that it is the

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gateway of Africa; there is the tendency for corrupt practices to be present. According to Otitie (2000) who postulated that corruption takes place when at least two parties have interacted to change the structure or process of society or a nation which reflects favouritism, nepotism, tribalism, sectionalism in line with undue enrichment, amassing of wealth, abuse of office, power, position and derivation of undue gains and benefits.

**Study design**

The study adopted the survey and descriptive design. According to Sproull (1988) research designs can be categorized into experimental design and non-experimental design. Non-experimental designs include survey design. Survey designs are appropriate when a researcher wants to know what people are thinking, feeling or doing (Mitchell & Jolley, 1995: Miller & Brewer, 2003).

Descriptive research design is a scientific method which involves observing and describing the situation of a subject without influencing it in anyway. Newman (2003) views descriptive design as representing "a picture of the specific details of a situation, social setting or relationship". Descriptive designs are designed to gain more information about a particular characteristic within a particular field of study. Descriptive research involves gathering data that describe events and then organises, tabulates, depicts and describes the data collected.

Creswell (2003) support the use of descriptive design because it helps to describe, explain, and validate findings of studies. This is done by merging

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creative exploration and organising the findings in order to fit them with explanation, and then test or validate those explanations.

The description design has been criticized for being narrow in scope and limiting analysis of events, concepts and theories to only what they are without exploring the in-depth components of such concepts (Creswell, 2003). Notwithstanding the criticism labeled against descriptive design, the method is found to be most appropriate for the study. This is largely due to the fact that the design is considered to be relatively easy to conduct because data are fairly easy to obtain and interpret by the use of sample descriptive statistics (Sarantakos, 2006).

**Population**

According to the Ghana Population Census conducted in 2010 the total population of the Tema Metropolis was 402,637 with males and females forming 48 percent and 52 percent of the population respectively. With a growth rate of 2.6 percent the population as at 2012 was estimated at 423,846. The current population size could be estimated at 387,045 and expected to reach 446172 by 2014 (Tema Metropolitan Assembly, 2012). The Tema Metropolitan Assembly was chosen because according the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA) the Tema and Takoradi ports generates the highest revenue a day for the country whilst Tema is the highest and the police service which is an anti-corruption are found in the port. According to Rose-Ackerman (2002) corruption occurs at the interface of public and private sectors. Whenever a public official has discretionary power

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over distribution to the private sector of a benefit or cost, incentives for bribery are created. Thus corruption depends upon the magnitude of the benefits and costs under the control of public officials. Private individuals and firms are willing to pay to obtain the benefits and avoid costs. Every state must decide when to legalise such payments and when to label them illegal corruption. The proper link between money and politics is a deep one and will be resolved differently by different countries. Nevertheless economic analysis can isolate incentives for payoffs to government agents evaluate their consequences and suggest reform.

My research on the Ghana Customs Service focuses on Tema Harbour, Ghana's main port of entry and exit located twenty kilometers to the east of the nation's capital, Accra.

**Sampling and sampling procedure**

Sampling Procedure

The study employed both the random and non-random sampling procedures. The study adopted the stratified random sampling method. With the non-random sampling procedure the accidental or hapzard and purposive methods was used. The accidental sampling of the general adult population was adopted to study the perception on corruption. This was supplemented with data from purposively sampled officials from TMA, the Police, customs and anti-corruption institutions.

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Sample size determination

In order to have a meaningful analysis of data, sampling method was determined using the formula provided by Dillman (2007).

$$N_S = \frac{(N_P)(_p)(1-p)}{(N_p - 1)\,(B/C)^2 + (p)p\,(1-p)}$$

$N_S$ = Completed sample size needed (notation often used is n)

$N_p$ = Size of population (notation often used is N)

P = Proportion expected to answer a certain way (50% or 0.5 is most

   conservative)

B = Acceptable level of sampling error (0.05 = ±5%;)

C = Z statistics associate with confidence interval

   960 = 95% confidence level;

To illustrate, for a question with a 50/50 split in a population that consisted of 129 people, a sample size of 127 is needed to be 95% confidence that the sample estimated is within ±5 of the true population value. The formula for this example is:

$$N_2 = \frac{(129)\,(0.5)\,(1-0.5)}{(129-1)\,(0.05/1.96)^2 + (0.5)(1-0.5)} = 126.9$$

The choice of a sample was to help achieve maximum statistical precision in the estimates and secondly, to avoid bias in the selection of the sample (Kumar, 2005). The sample size chosen by the study was a rounded up to one – hundred and twenty six (126) respondent which was to help ensure linearity of the sample

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and cater of non-response rate. The calculated sample size (n) of 126 respondents was contacted for the study. The sample was equally distributed among the twenty-five communities in the Tema Metropolis.

**Sources of data**

The administration of questionnaires and interview schedule formed the basis of the primary data collection. The questionnaire and interview schedule focused on generating data on the background characteristics of the respondents, understanding of corruption, perception on corruption and measures to calculate corruption in institutions.

In addition, secondary information from published and unpublished sources including academic journals, textbooks, periodicals, the internet as well as reports and official documents were used to support the primary data.

**Data collection instruments**

The questionnaire was used to collect data for the study. The reason for using the questionnaire is that it affords respondents to opportunity to express their views and opinions regarding corruption in instruction in writing. Besides, questionnaires are also known to be quite valid and reliable if well constructed (Sarantakos, 2006). Since the respondents were all literate, they can express their opinions in the English language, hence the use of the questionnaires.

The instruments comprised a mix of open-ended, close ended and likert scale questions. With respect to questions that require a 'yes' or 'no' response, the

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instrument provided an opportunity for the respondents explain the response they chose. The questionnaires administered by the study on the respondents. Office bound respondents were given a week to complete the questionnaires.

**Field problems**

Respondents were reluctant to cooperate in the disclosure of accurate information needed for the study. This can be attributed to the sensitive nature of the topic.

**Methods of data analysis**

The data collected from the field were cross-checked and edited to ensure that there are no mistakes in the responses, the information given were relevant and consistent, the data were then coded and fed into the computer using the Statistical Product for Service Solution (SPSS version 16.0) software. The SPSS was employed to process and analyze the instruments. Specifically, it was used to obtain the means, cross tabulations, frequencies and percentages of the variables used in the study. The data were then presented in the form of frequencies and percentages, using tables and figures.

## Introduction

This chapter presents the findings, analysis and discussion of the data that emerged from the field. It focuses on the background characteristics of the respondents and the specific objectives of understanding respondents use of the concept of corruption, the prevalence of corruption, experience of corruption, its causes, perception on labour performance and perception on dealing with it.

## Background of respondents

This part summarizes the demographic characteristics of the respondents. They include sex, age, marital status, education, annual salary and distribution of respondents. The results are presented using presented using tables, percentages, frequencies and figures.

Out of the 126 respondents, (58.5%) consisted of males and (41.5%) were females. The mean age for the respondents was about 30 years. Information on total annual salary of respondents was gathered. The least annual salary was GH¢1200. Since workers are not comfortable in disclosing their salaries, the researcher categorized the responses on salaries into 6 groups.

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**Table 1: Annual income for respondents**

| income (GH¢) | Frequency | Percent |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1200 – 2399 | 14 | 11.0 |
| 2400 – 3599 | 9 | 7.3 |
| 3600 – 4799 | 11 | 8.5 |
| 4800 – 5999 | 14 | 11.0 |
| 6000 – 7199 | 54 | 42.7 |
| Over 7200 | 25 | 19.5 |
| Total | 126 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data, 2013

Majority (42.7%) of the respondents indicated that they were earning between GH¢600 and GH¢7200. The next highest (19.5%) earning was with earning over GH¢7200 as depicted in Table 1.

Length of stay in the metropolis

The next issue looked at was length of stay in the metropolis and this is shown in Table 2. This specifically looked at the number of years respondents had stayed in the metropolis. Full responses were recorded on this variable of interest. The results showed that respondents have generally stayed between one and fifteen years in the metropolis.

**Table 2: Years of stay in the Metropolis**

| Year | Frequency | Percent |
|------|-----------|---------|
| 1-5 | 22 | 17.1 |
| 6-10 | 43 | 34.1 |
| 11-15 | 41 | 32.9 |
| More than 15 years | 20 | 15.9 |
| Total | 126 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data, 2013

A shown in Table 2, a little above majority (51.2%) of the respondents had been stayed for less than four years. About 49% of the respondents had been there for more than fifteen years with (15.9%) having stayed at the metropolis for more than fifteen years. This is an indication that the respondents can give a very good picture of the situation on the ground and highlight the perception on corruption in the institutions and metropolis.

Education level

The next issue discusses in the educational level of respondents. The responses showed that the minimum educational level was WASSCE and the highest was a post-graduate degree. The results are presented in Table 3.

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**Table 3: Highest level of education/qualification of respondents**

| Level | Frequency | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Secondary school (WASSCE) | 22 | 17.1 |
| Secondary school (O/A Level) | 26 | 20.7 |
| Polytechnic Diploma or equivalent | 36 | 29.3 |
| University degree | 33 | 25.6 |
| Post - Graduate Degree | 9 | 7.3 |
| Total | 126 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data, 2013

From Table 3, specifically most (29.3%) of the respondent had attained polytechnic diploma or equivalent followed by university degree (25.6%). The general overview is that secondary school education (37.8%) is very common among the respondents while about 7 percent had a post-graduate degree. With this literate population the respondents can throw more light on the situation.

**The concept of corruption**

People's understanding of corruption is captured in their definitional choices with respect to the term. These definitional choices viewed the phenomenon as either a moral failure, an instrumental vehicle for wealth or simply as an opportunity to abuse one's office for personal gain. Table 4 captures the opinion on corruption.

**Table 4: Opinion on corruption**

| Response | Frequency | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Extending favour or service in return for money or items | 22 | 17.1 |
| Abuse of office for selfish reasons | 18 | 14.6 |
| An activity that is contrary to laid down rules/norm | 26 | 20.7 |
| Poor stewardship and embezzlement | 6 | 4.9 |
| Extortion of money/gift to render service/favour | 28 | 22.0 |
| It is part of human nature | 8 | 6.1 |
| Provision of enticement for rendering of service | 18 | 14.6 |
| Total | 126 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data, 2013

From Table 4, it is found that the four most common opinions on corruption were: extortion of money/gift to render service/favour (22%); an activity that is contrary to laid-down rules/norm (20.7%); extending favour or service in return for money or items (17.1%); and abuse of office for selfish reasons. This finding is consistent with Khan's (1996) view of corruption as act of deviation from the formal rules of conduct governing the actions of someone in a position of public authority for private gains likewise Otite's (2000) view of corruption as the deliberate bending of rules of the system. Few of the respondents opined that corruption is part of human nature (6.1%) and poor stewardship and embezzlement (4.9%).

**Prevalence of corruption**

Prevalence was perceived through several lenses including the institution most regarded as corrupt, the nature of interactions that occurred there, and the extent of corrupt practices there compared to five years previously. The results can be found in Table 5.

**Table 5: Institutions perceived to be most corrupt**

| Response | Frequency | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA)/ Customs | | |
| Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS) | 17 | 13.4 |
| Ghana Police Service | 31 | 24.4 |
| Tema Oil Refinery | 3 | 2.4 |
| Parliament/ Political parties | 11 | 8.5 |
| Ministries/Government institutions (others) | 29 | 23.2 |
| Judicial Service | 9 | 7.3 |
| Don't know | 11 | 8.5 |
| All institutions (both government and private) | 11 | 8.8 |
| Hospital (Ministry of Health) | 5 | 3.9 |
| Total | 126 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data, 2013

From Table 5, out of 126 respondents about 24 percent cited the Ghana Police service as the most corrupt institution followed by ministries/government institutions (23.2%), GRA/CEPS (13.4%). It is also interesting to note that 8.5

percent of the respondents indicated that they did not know of any institution perceived to be most corrupt. Again 8.5 percent of the respondents indicated Parliament/Political parties as well as all institutions (both government and private) as being most corrupt institutions. Hospital (Ministry of Health) was perceived to be among the least corrupt institutions (3.9%). The least corrupt institution was Tema Oil Refinery (2.4%). hospital (Ministry of Health) and Government Institutions generally. Ghana Revenue Authority placed third (13.4%), keeping company with "all institutions (both Government and private) and Don't Knows' all at (8.5%).

According to the voice of the people survey of the Ghana Integrity Initiative of July 2005, the top 10 institutions mentioned were: the Police Service (76.8%), Ministry of Education (31.5%), Customs-CEPS (31.1%), the Judicial Service (16.4%), Civil/Public Service (16.4%), Ministry of Health (15.6%), Politicians- (MP's, Ministers, etc) (8.7%), Electricity Company (5.5%), Internal Revenue (5.2%), and Ghana Immigration Service (4.3%). There appears no reason for any change as the specifics were hidden under Government generally.

Some (50.0%) of respondents had interacted with these institutions recently and (47.4%) had not. The nature of the interaction was usually business (27.3%) or road checks/ driving offences as shown in Table 6.

From the definitions given in Table 1 and from the nature of interactions with institutions in Table 6 which was a ranking of those perceived as most corrupt, it would be clear here that the interactions involved necessitated an urgent need for service from an institutional officer and the equally, probably

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compulsive need to get the exchange right. The fact that there is only one arrest attests to the efficacy of the exchange relationship.

**Table 6: Nature of the interaction with institutions**

| Response | Frequency | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Business | 23 | 18.3 |
| Bad | 9 | 7.3 |
| Elicit information | 12 | 9.8 |
| Taking money before offering assistance | 17 | 13.4 |
| Road checks/Driving offense | 17 | 13.4 |
| Release of consignment | 11 | 8.5 |
| Filing lawsuit/Court proceeding | 17 | 13.4 |
| Arrest | 9 | 7.3 |
| Medical check-up | 11 | 8.5 |
| Total | 126 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data, 2013

The even more marked mention of a medical checkup shows that there are no bounds in the exchange market. After these interactions, that of business deals, release of consignment and the filing of lawsuits and court proceedings seem ordinary grist for the corruption market especially where illegality is present as would be present in matters involving the police such as driving offenses (13.4%).

**Identification on the causes of corruption**

Respondents were asked to state their opinion, the real causes of corruption in Ghana today. Their many and varied responses are depicted in Table 7.

**Table 7: Causes of corruption in Ghana**

| Response | Frequency | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Low income/Inadequate remuneration | 124 | 55.3 |
| High duty rate and taxes/ High cost of living | 12 | 5.4 |
| Unemployment | 18 | 8.0 |
| To speed processing/prompt action | 2 | 0.9 |
| Lack of accountability and discipline/ Ineffective systems | 24 | 10.8 |
| Greed and selfishness | 36 | 16.1 |
| Nepotism | 6 | 2.7 |
| Ignorance | 2 | 0.9 |
| Total | 224* | 100.0 |

*Multiple responses

Source: Field Data, 2013

Low income and inadequate remuneration issues came to the fore. From Table 7 it was apparent that (55.5%) of respondents were of the view that it was the cause of corruption. While no doubt, a hungry person would reach for the till,

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not all low income persons are corrupt. For instance there was the (16.1%) group of respondents who attribute corruption to greed and selfishness and the (8.0 %) who are unemployed and are thus in serious need but have no means to effect corruption. It is the suggestion of the researcher to look beyond the figures and interrogate the causes. Now, here is a case for one to be corrupt. Between low income and greed lie a whole area of ineffective systems (10.8%) thus providing no checks, high cost of living as well as heavy duty rate and taxation (5.4%)  and thus stimulating the inducement to suborn officials lack of accountability and discipline (5.4%). Nepotism (2.7%) raises the issue of who perpetrates the crime on whose behalf and why or how? In the GII survey of 2005 the following responses emerged to similar issues.

**Underlying reasons for corruption by individuals**

Respondents were asked to mention some of the underlying causes of bribery and corruption. Out of 126 respondents who answered the question, (76.5%) cited 'low income' as the leading cause of bribery and corruption in the country, (67.3%) said 'greed/get rich quick' (55.6%), said 'high cost of living' (45.6%) cited 'poverty' and (38.2%) said 'making ends meet (survival)'. Apart from greed/get rich quick, almost all the causes are poverty related. The above is a multiple response question where respondents were given the opportunity to select more than one answer.

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**Public perception of corruption on labour performance**

When respondents were asked whether corruption has contributed to the cost doing business in the Tema metropolis, the majority (65.0%) of the total respondents indicated that they agree that it has it increases the cost of transacting business, whilst (35.0%) disagree with the notion that corruption increases the cost of doing business and cost of work output in the metropolis. However, this is in line with the (Economist, 2002, Morisset & Neso, 2002, Mensah, 2002, Clark & Xu, 2002, & Kaufman & Wei, 1999).

**Table 8: Perception of corruption on work output**

| Response | Frequency | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Strongly agree | 50 | 40 |
| Agree | 32 | 25 |
| Neutral | 19 | 15 |
| Disagree | 15 | 12 |
| Strongly disagree | 10 | 8 |
| Total | 126 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data, 2013

**Public perception of the level of corruption**

Respondents were asked to indicate the level of corruption prevalence in Government and in specific organisations, five years previously to which no general conclusions could be reached.

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Field data indicates that corruption is extremely prevalent at (39%) now but was pegged at (24%) five years ago. Corruption was perceived in Government institutions at minimal (13.7%) five years ago but is now pegged at (15.9%). The implication is that corruption is growing in government organisations. The reverse perception feeds responses on respondents own organisations. Five years ago it was bad, now it's getting better. Tables 9-13 illustrate this phenomenon which suggests' a good old days 'factor at work'.

**Table 9: Prevalence  now in government**

| Response | Frequency | Percent |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Extremely non- prevalent | 9 | 7.3 |
| Non- prevalent | 20 | 15.9 |
| Neutral | 28 | 22.0 |
| Prevalent | 20 | 15.9 |
| Extremely prevalent | 49 | 39.0 |
| Total | 126 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data, 2013

Table 9 indicated that majority of the respondents were of the view that corruption was prevalent at (54.9%), whilst others responded with neutral prevalence at (22.0%), however non-prevalent was at (23.2%).

**Table 10: Prevalence five years ago in government**

| Response | Frequency | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Extremely non-prevalent | 12 | 9.8 |
| Non- prevalent | 18 | 14.6 |
| Neutral | 25 | 19.5 |
| Prevalent | 40 | 31.7 |
| Extremely prevalent | 31 | 24.4 |
| Total | 126 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data, 2013

In Table 10 it was revealed by majority of the respondents that corruption was prevalent at (56.1%), with neutral at (19.5%) whilst non-prevalent was at (24.4%).

**Table 11: Prevalence five years ago in organisations**

| Response | Frequency | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Extremely non-prevalent | 18 | 14.6 |
| Non-prevalent | 20 | 15.9 |
| Neutral | 34 | 26.8 |
| Prevalent | 38 | 30.5 |
| Extremely prevalent | 15 | 12.2 |
| Total | 126 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data, 2013

From Table 12 it was apparent from respondents that corruption was prevalent at (42.7%), whilst neutral was at (26.8%), however non-prevalent was at (30.5%).

**Table 12: Prevalence   now in organisations**

| Response | Frequency | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Extremely non-prevalent | 14 | 10.9 |
| non-prevalent | 34 | 26.8 |
| Neutral | 38 | 30.5 |
| Prevalent | 28 | 21.9 |
| Extremely prevalent | 12 | 9.8 |
| Total | 126 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data, 2013

It was depicted in Table 12 that corruption was prevalent at (31.7%), with neutral at (30.0%) whilst non-prevalent stood at (37.7%). In the GII (2005) similar questions were put to a larger sample and the responses are reproduced for comparative analysis. Respondents were asked whether corruption is getting 'better' or 'much better' 'worse' or 'much worse' in Ghana today. Out of 900 respondents interviewed, (61%) representing responses for 'worse' and 'much worse' said corruption has worsened whilst (36.4%) said corruption is getting 'better' and 'much better' in Ghana today. Specifically from the survey it was revealed by (38.7%) of the respondents that corruption was getting 'worse',

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(22.3%) said 'much worse' whereas (32.4%) said corruption is getting 'better', (4.0%) said 'much better'.

**Table 13: CEPS Plays critical role in the economy**

| Response | Frequency | Percent |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Strongly agree | 42 | 33.3 |
| Agree | 40 | 31.7 |
| Neutral | 15 | 11.9 |
| Disagree | 19 | 15.1 |
| Strongly disagree | 10 | 7.9 |
| Total | 126 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data, 2013

Table 13 throws the searchlight on the critical role of CEPS in the Ghanaian economy. From Table 13 42(33.3%) strongly agree with the statement whilst 40(31.7%) agree, 19(15.1%) disagree, and 15(11.9%) were neutral but 10(7.9%) strongly disagree with the statement. This agrees with the notion that regularly generating close to 70% of national revenue, Customs is deeply significant to the territorial integrity of the Ghanaian state as well as its fiscal security (CEPS, 2003). The critical role played by the Ghanaian Customs Service in revenue collection is in contrast to highly industrialized states such as the US, Canada and EU members where customs work is primarily about arresting the flow of restricted and prohibited items such as drugs and firearms and much less about taxation. However, the tremendous dependence of the state on customs

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revenue is common throughout the nations of Africa, as is true in less developed countries elsewhere in the world (World Customs Organisation, 2003).

**Table 14: Working norms affect labour performance**

| Response | Frequency | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Strongly agree | 48 | 38.1 |
| Agree | 28 | 22.0 |
| Neutral | 20 | 15.9 |
| Disagree | 20 | 15.9 |
| Strongly disagree | 10 | 7.9 |
| Total | 126 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data, 2013

Table 14 indicated that the norms of work particularly ethics, attitudes and values affect labour performance in an organisation. In the table 49(39.0%) strongly agree with that notion, 28(22.0%) agree, whilst neutral and disagree each had 20(15.9%) and strongly disagree had 9(7.1%). This is in line with McCusker (2006:9) who postulated that integration of an organisation's operational systems, corruption control strategies and ethical standards so that a norm of ethical behavior is created.

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**Table 15: Accountability, unethical and corruption practices at port**

| Response | Frequency | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Strongly agree | 40 | 31.7 |
| Agree | 31 | 24.4 |
| Neutral | 18 | 14.6 |
| Disagree | 25 | 19.5 |
| Strongly disagree | 12 | 9.8 |
| Total | 126 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data, 2013

As depicted in Table 15, accountability, unethical and corruption practices occur at the port of Tema. In the table 40(31.7%) strongly agree, whilst 31(24.4%) agree, 25(19.5%) disagree, 18(14.6%) were neutral and 12(9.8%) strongly disagree. This confirms the findings of Transparency International's Global corruption barometer (2010).

**Table 16: Corruption practices at the port affect GDP of the country**

| Response | Frequency | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Strongly agree | 40 | 31.7 |
| Agree | 32 | 25.4 |
| Neutral | 20 | 15.9 |
| Disagree | 18 | 14.6 |
| Strongly disagree | 15 | 12.2 |
| Total | 126 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data, 2013

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Table 16 accounted for Corruption practices at the port affect GDP of the country the nation negatively in terms the provision of total well-being of the citizenry of the country. From the table 40(31.7%) strongly agree, whilst 32(25.4%) agree, 20(15.9%) were neutral, 18(14.6%) disagree, and 15(12.2%) strongly disagree. According to Lawal (2007) growth would be higher and more evenly distributed without corruption. Wyatt (2002) also confirms that the measure of corruption in the governance indicators of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) significantly affects GDP per capita, while they also show that the measures of government effectiveness and rule of law in their governance indicators significantly influence the extent of corruption.

**Table 17: Country loses foreign currency due to corrupt malpractice at port**

| Response | Frequency | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Strongly agree | 38 | 30.2 |
| Agree | 34 | 27.0 |
| Neutral | 28 | 22.2 |
| Disagree | 14 | 11.1 |
| Strongly disagree | 12 | 9.5 |
| Total | 126 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data, 2013

Table 17 indicated that Ghana loses a lot of foreign currency due to corrupt and malpractices at the port that could have used infrastructural

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development and balance of payment issues. In this regard 38(30.2%) strongly agree, whilst 34(27.0%) agree, 28(22.2%) were neutral, 14(11.1%) disagree and 12(9.5%) strongly disagree. As the Economist (2000) puts it, companies are the "main conduits of bribery' Business organisations and their officials influence public officials to make decisions that are favourable to them than to the general body of the citizenry.

**Table 18: Corruption at port affect the per capita income of the country**

| Response | Frequency | Percent |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Strongly agree | 50 | 40.0 |
| Agree | 32 | 25.0 |
| Neutral | 19 | 15.0 |
| Disagree | 15 | 12.0 |
| Strongly disagree | 10 | 8.0 |
| Total | 126 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data, 2013

In Table 18 the search light was thrown on the issue of corruption and malpractices at the port affect the per capita income of country negatively in terms inadequate provision of developmental projects. In this regard 50(40.0%) strongly agree, whilst 32(25.0%) agree, 19(15.0%) were neutral, 15(12.0%) disagree and 10(8.0%) strongly disagree. In this pursuit, Lawal(2007) postulated that corruption in Africa is both a development and social issue which impedes economic growth and poverty reduction.

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**Table 19: Police and anti-corruption institutions to reduce eradicate corruption at port**

| Response | Frequency | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Strongly agree | 32 | 25.0 |
| Agree | 50 | 40.0 |
| Neutral | 15 | 12.0 |
| Disagree | 19 | 15.0 |
| Strongly disagree | 10 | 8.0 |
| Total | 126 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data, 2013

Table 19 accounted for the duty of the police service and anti-corruption institutions to reduce and eradicate corruption at the port. In this regard 50(40.0%) agree with the notion, whilst 32(25.0%) strongly agree, whilst19 (15.0%) disagree 15(12.0%) were neutral, and 10(8.0%) strongly disagree. This scenario compare with the World Bank (2010) and corruption perception index of Transparency International (2010).

Table 20 indicated that the police anti-corruption institutions are not fighting to win the war against corruption at the port in their duty performance. The table depicted that they are rather in bed with the CEPS officials. To this statement 45(35.7%) strongly agree, 37(29.4%) agree, whilst 18(14.3%) were neutral, and 16(12.7%) disagree with10 (7.9%) strongly agree.

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**Table 20: Police and anti-corruption institutions not fighting corruption at port**

| Response | Frequency | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Strongly agree | 45 | 35.7 |
| Agree | 37 | 29.4 |
| Neutral | 18 | 14.3 |
| Disagree | 16 | 12.7 |
| Strongly disagree | 10 | 7.9 |
| Total | 126 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data, 2013

This statement tally with the corruption perception index of Transparency International (2010). According to GNA(2013) an undercover investigation revealed that the country was losing more than $150 million every month to individuals, foreigners and private companies in tax evasion, import levies and excise duties at the Tema Port. The investigation was conducted by the Centre for Freedom and Accuracy in partnership with Tiger Eye PI, promoters of the National Anti-Corruption campaign.

The investigations showed that scores of containers of imported goods escape the tax net daily under the watch of the security agents and custom officials at the Tema Port. The investigation discovered that two retired service officials who operate their own clearing agencies are at the centre of a massive tax evasion syndicate at the Tema Port. Their mode of operation is that, they connive with some serving officers at the port to ignore the inspection process and give

their own description to containers on custom documentation to attract very little or no tax at all.

The nation's trusted farmhands at the Harbour have appropriated the farmland and its produce and denied their landlord (Ghana) the benefits due him. The Tema Harbour has been turned into a goldmine for some greedy security officials who are threatening to strip the mine facility to satisfy their selfish ends. Many officers from CEPS, the Ghana Police Service, National Security and the Ghana Ports and Habours Authority would do all it takes in the scramble to possess a piece of the prize.

It is a dark and murky world at the Tema Harbour, as these security officials collaborate with some clearing agents to steal money belonging to the state through tax evasion, bribery and personal greed, thereby defeating the nation's revenue mobilization efforts. Invariably, potential investors, importers and ordinary Ghanaians are made to bear the brunt of the selfishness and greed exhibited by these officers and agents because prices are passed over (GNA, 2011).

**Types of bribery and corruption experienced**

In the survey of the voice of people (2005) out of 443 respondents who experienced bribery and corruption, 393 representing (88.7%), said the most common type of bribery and corruption experienced is 'demand for money before rendering of service' whilst 191 representing (43.1%), said 'taking money without issuing receipts'.

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**Anti-corruption in Ghana**

In the survey respondents were asked if the disclosure requirement established by law should be enforced. (Disclosure - declaration of personal assets, financial interests - by public officials), over (60.0%) of respondents agreed while (24.7%) disagreed. Some (7.0%) had no idea. Disclosure requirements are a form of asset declaration that could be matched with post-office assets and verified. Respondents were asked if such disclosure would have an impact on the level of corruption. Table 21 indicates that the majority believed this could only have moderate impact.

**Table 21: Impact for disclosure requirement**

| Response | Frequency | Percent |
|----------|-----------|---------|
| Extremely strong | 29 | 23.2 |
| Very strong | 68 | 53.7 |
| Little | 29 | 23.2 |
| Total | 126 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data, 2013

Despite the scepticism evident in Table 21, respondents were emphatic that they support the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Coalition which comprises of Government(Executive, Judiciary, legislative); Public Sector Institutions; Private Sector Institutions and Civil Society Groups which are all united in the object of fighting corruption(fraud, bribery ,extortion, abuse of

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office, conflict of interest ,etc) in Ghanaian particular and world-wide generally (World Bank, 2000) as shown in Table 22.

**Table 22: Need for a corruption prevention plan**

| Response | Frequency | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Yes | 108 | 86.6 |
| No | 10 | 7.6 |
| Don't know | 8 | 6.1 |
| Total | 126 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data, 2013

**Government's commitment towards the fight against bribery and corruption**

Out of 126 respondents interviewed (51.1%) said the government is committed to the fight against bribery and corruption as against (48.4%) who said government is not.

In response to the question, 'How well is the government handling bribery and corruption in the country?' Out of 126 respondents (40.3%) claimed government is handling bribery and corruption 'fairly well' followed by (29.7%) who said 'not very well' and (19.3%) who said 'not at all'. Only (10%) said government was handling bribery and corruption 'very well'

Respondents were asked to mention key institutions or organisations fighting bribery and corruption in the country. Ironically, most respondents mentioned the Ghana Police Service. Other institutions/organisations mentioned

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included: Serious Fraud Office (SFO), Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), the Judicial Service, the Media, the Christian Council of Ghana (e.g. Catholic Secretariat) and Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII). Paradoxically, in spite of the fact that the Ghana Police Service and the Judicial Service were mentioned as being in the forefront in the fight against bribery and corruption, they were rated high as perpetrators.

**Key suggestions by respondents**

The following are some of the suggestions (in order of importance) given by respondents to mitigate or minimize bribery and corruption:

**Table 23: Suggestion on curbing corruption in Ghana**

| Response | Frequency | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Government/political leaders should set leadership examples | 15 | 12.2 |
| Strengthening of institutions for effectiveness and efficiency | 34 | 26.8 |
| Non interference in public institutions | 6 | 4.9 |
| Public education | 23 | 18.2 |
| Reduce the tarnishes on the image of the country/It is widespread | 33 | 26.1 |
| Improved conditions of service | 8 | 6.1 |
| Creation of jobs | 6 | 4.9 |
| Total | 126 | 100.0 |

Source: Field Data, 2013

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The findings in Table 23 may be contrasted with some of those given by GII (2005) respondents to mitigate or minimize bribery and corruption:

- Government/Employers should pay workers realistic salaries and living wages coupled with good working conditions.

- Government should strengthen existing laws and impose stiffer and longer prison terms on perpetrators to serve as a deterrent to others.

- Ghanaians should be educated to eschew greed and be loyal to the state.

- Poverty-reduction strategies should be enhanced to improve on the living conditions of the people.

- The need to create more employment opportunities for the youth as the devil provides work for the idle hand.

# CHAPTER FIVE

## SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

**Introduction**

This chapter provides a summary of the study and its key findings. It draws conclusions based on the findings and makes recommendations based on the specific objectives of the study.

**Summary**

The study set out to examine public perception of corruption in public institutions. This will inform institutions working to reduce the incidence of corruption in the public sector.

Specifically the research sought to:

- Assess the general understanding of the concept of corruption.

- identify the causes of corruption in public institutions

- Analyse public perception of corruption on labour performance.

- Examine measures undertaken to curb corruption.

- Provide recommendations on corruption to interested persons.

A cross-sectional study design was adopted due to the fact the study intends to draw a cross section of its population from public officers within the Tema metropolis. Members of the public were also interviewed within the study area all with the aim of finding out their perception on corruption in the public service. The idea informing this approach is to have a one-shot contact with the respondents in order to obtain an overall picture at the time of the study.

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Additionally, the cross-sectional approach is considered to be time saving as contact with respondents was on one time basis.

Definition of corruption

Over (6.1%) saw the phenomena as a simple part of human nature and thus man, a fallen angel was duty bound to take advantage of it.

However the majority correctly associated the right terms with corruption: extortion (22.0%); extending favour in return (17.1%) and provision of enticement (14.6%); these opinions show that people associate the term corruption as an exchange situation.

Some (20.7%), the second largest majority after extortion of money, suggested an activity that is contrary to laid down rules and norms. This definition is at the heart of the social canker that is corruption and that is that it is wrong not to do your duty regardless of the circumstances.

Some (14.6%) cited the abuse of office for selfish reasons.

Prevalence of corruption

Prevalence was perceived through several lenses including the institution most regarded as corrupt, the nature of interactions that occurred there. And the extent of corrupt practices there compared to five years previously.

The institution most widely perceived as corrupt was the Ghana Police Service as well as other Government institutions (not specifically named).

Out of 126 respondents who answered this question, 20 representing (24.4 %) cited the Ghana Police while (21.7%) mentioned Government Institutions generally. Ghana Revenue Authority came in third at (13.4 %), keeping company with "all institutions (both Government and private) and Don't Knows' all at (8.5%). In order of merit were Customs, Excise and Preventive Service and Judicial Service at (8.5%) followed closely by political parties and parliament (4.3%) and obscure places such as Hospitals and Tema Oil Refinery (3.7 %) and (2.4%) respectively.

Respondents were asked to indicate the level of corruption prevalence in Government and in their specific organisations, five years previously to which no general conclusions could be reached.

Field data indicates that corruption is extremely prevalent at (39%) now but was pegged at (24%) five years ago. Corruption was perceived in Government institutions at minimal (13.7%) five years ago but is now pegged at (15.9%). the implication is that corruption is growing in government organisations. The reverse perception feeds responses on respondents own organisations. Five years ago it was bad, now it's getting better.

Identification of the causes of corruption

Respondents were asked to state their opinion, the real causes of corruption in Ghana today. Low income or poverty issues come to the fore. Over (47%) of respondents cited this as the cause of corruption.

Some (8%) also of respondents attribute corruption to inadequate remuneration. Between low income and greed lie a whole area of ineffective systems (5.4%) thus providing no checks, high cost of living as well as heavy duty rate and taxation (5.4%) and thus stimulating the inducement to suborn officials lack of accountability and discipline (5.4%). Nepotism (2.7%) raises the issue of who perpetrates the crime on whose behalf and why or how? In the GII survey of 2005 the following responses emerged to similar issues.

**Public perception of corruption on labour performance**

On the critical role of CEPS in the Ghanaian economy, the respondents responded by majority saying that 82(65.0%) agree with the statement whilst 29(23.0%) disagree, and 15(11.9%) were neutral.

The respondents were of the opinion that the norms of work particularly ethics, attitudes and values affect labour performance in an organisation. In this vain 78(61.0%) agree with that notion, whilst 29(23.0%) agree and neutral had 20(15.9%).

Lack of accountability, unethical and corruption practices occur at the port of Tema. The respondents did not hesitate to support that notion. In this regard 71(56.1%) agree, whilst 37(29.3%) disagree, and 18(14.6%) were neutral.

Corruption practices at the port affect GDP of the country the nation negatively in terms the provision of total well-being of the citizenry of the country. The respondents responded b with the majority 72(57.1%) agree, whilst 33(26.8%) disagree, and 20(15.9%) were neutral.

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Ghana loses a lot of foreign currency due to corrupt and malpractices at the port that could have used infrastructural development and balance of payment issues. In this regard majority of respondents 72(57.2%) agree, whilst 26(20.6%) disagree, and 28(22.2%) were neutral.

On the issue of corruption and malpractices at the port affect the per capita income of country negatively in terms inadequate provision of developmental projects. In this regard the respondents responded by majority 82(65.0%) agree, whilst 25(20.0%) disagree, and 19(15.0%) were neutral.

The police service, Ghana Ports and harbor Authority (GPHA) and anti-corruption institutions to reduce and eradicate corruption at the port. On this statement majority 82(65.0%) agree with the notion, whilst 29(23.0%) disagree and 15(12.0%) were neutral.

On the statement that the police service, GHPA and anti-corruption institutions are not fighting to win the war against corruption at the port in their duty performance are rather in bed with the CEPS officials. To this statement majority of the respondents 82(65.0%) agree, whilst 26(20.6%)disagree and 18(14.3%) were neutral.

Measures to curb corruption by respondents

The following are some of the suggestions (in order of importance) given by respondents to mitigate or minimize bribery and corruption:

- Government/Employers should pay workers realistic salaries and living wages coupled with good working conditions.

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- Government should strengthen existing laws and impose stiffer and longer prison terms on perpetrators to serve as a deterrent to others.

- Ghanaians should be educated to eschew greed and be loyal to the state.

- Poverty-reduction strategies should be enhanced to improve on the living conditions of the people.

- The need to create more employment opportunities for the youth as the devil provides work for the idle hand.

**Conclusions**

The following conclusions may be tentatively be made:

- The respondents appear to know and understand corruption in its various forms. They however, were sometimes mixed up confusing symptoms with scientific definitions that needed little clarification. Almost all respondents had had some form of interaction with state /government institutions which could be called corrupt but was considered necessary for the advancement of personal interests on both sides.

- The most valid causes of corruption according to the respondents had to do with low incomes or poverty, high duty rates and taxes which forced business persons to try to reach an accommodation with the officials well-placed to dispense discretion in the matter. Inadequate remuneration and high cost of living had the same effect. These causes were also mixed up with selfish interests.

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## Recommendations

Based on the above it is the recommendation that the fight against corruption should be based on a moral campaign, an education drive and a disclosure requirement for public officers. Good remuneration and better conditions of service should be provided to the public officers.

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**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS**

**Introduction**

      This is an academic project in Governance, Democracy, Law and Development that seeks to understand the nature of corruption in government service with a view of discovering the best ways of tackling it. Please provide us with your perspective/opinions with the questions that follow. Your confidentiality is assured and no name is required.

**Section A: Background characteristics**

1. Sex?

    a. Male………..

    b. Female……..

 2. What is your age?

a. 20 -29 years

b. 30 -39 years

c. 40 - 49 years

d. 50 - 59 years

3. What is your annual salary for 2011 in GHC?

a. 100 - 200

b. 201 - 300

c. 301 - 400

d. 401 - 500

e. 501 – 1000

f. Over 1000


4. For how many years have held your present position?

a. Less than 1 year

b. 1-3 years

c. 4 - 6 years

d. more than 6 years


5. What is the total number of years you served in the government?

a. less than 1 year

b. 1 to 5 years

c. 6 to  10 years

d. more than 10 years


6. Please indicate the highest level of education/qualification you have attained

(check one)

a. Secondary school (WASSCE)

b. Secondary school (O/A Level)

c. Polytechnic Diploma or equivalent

d. University Degree level


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e. Post-Graduate degree

6. Did you receive any training/education outside your country?

a. Yes

b. No

7. In your opinion what is corruption?....................................................................

8. Which institution would you describe as most corrupt?........................................

9. Have you had an interaction with this institution?………………………………

10. What was the nature of the interaction?..............................................................

11. In your opinion what are the causes of corruption in Ghana?............................

12. Please evaluate the pervasiveness of corruption in your country as well as in your respective organisation on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 corresponds to non-existent, and 5 corresponds to extremely prevalent.

| Prevalence | Extremely Non-prevalent | Non-prevalent | Neutral | Prevalent | Extremely prevalent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A    Now   in government | | | | | |
| B  5 years ago in Government | | | | | |

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| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| C  Now in your organisation | | | | | |
| D  5 years ago in your organisation | | | | | |

**Section B**

13. How important are the following as causes for corruption in your country?

Please answer on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 corresponds to .very unimportant, 2 unimportant 3, neutral, 4 important causes and 5 corresponds to very important cause.

| Cause | Level of importance/unimportance | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Low salary of public officials | | | | | |
| 2 Lack of independent/free media | | | | | |
| 3  Lack  of  effective  corruption reporting system | | | | | |
| 4  Lack  of  transparent/accountable political process | | | | | |
| 5 Lack of independent/free judiciary | | | | | |
| 6 Lack of meritocracy | | | | | |
| 7 Poor economic policies | | | | | |
| 8  Customs  that  encourage  corrupt | | | | | |

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| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| behavior | | | | | |
| 9 Overloaded administrative agencies | | | | | |
| 10 Foreign interests seeking favorable interests | | | | | |
| 11 Self serving attitudes of public officials | | | | | |

**Section C:**

**Public perception of corruption on labour performance**

| Prevalence | Strongly agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly disagree |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A CEPS Plays critical role in the economy | | | | | |
| B Working norms affect labour performance | | | | | |
| C Accountability, | | | | | |

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| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| unethical and corruption practices at port | | | | | |
| D Corruption practices at the port affect GDP of the country | | | | | |
| Country loses foreign currency due to corrupt malpractice at port | | | | | |
| Corruption at port affect the per capita income of the country | | | | | |
| Police and anti-corruption institutions | | | | | |

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| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| to reduce eradicate corruption at port | | | | |
| Police and anti-corruption institutions not fighting corruption at port | | | | |

**Section D:**

Please evaluate the effectiveness of the reforms listed below.

14. A national corruption prevention plan/strategy

a. Should a corruption prevention plan be developed?

Yes _____ No_____ Don.t Know _____

b. Would it have impact on the level of corruption?

Very strong impact _____ Moderate impact _____ little impact

15. Disclosure (declaration of personal assets, financial interests) by public officials

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a. Should disclosure requirements be established?

Yes _____ No _____ Don.t know _____

b. Would disclosure requirements have impact on the level of corruption

Very strong impact _____ Moderate impact _____ Little impact _____


16. Procedures and obligations for public servants to report misconduct/suspected corruption committed by other public servants)

a. Should such procedures and obligations be introduced?

Yes _____ No _____ Don't know _____

b. Would such practice have impact on the level of corruption

Very strong impact _____ Moderate impact _____ Little impact

17. **Statement (s) on the standards of behavior expected of public servants?**
**(e.g. code of conduct, code of ethics)**

a. Should such statements on the standards of behavior expected of public servants be established?

Yes_____ No _____ Don't know _____

b. Would such practice have impact o the level of corruption?

Very strong impact_____ Moderate impact _____ Little impact _____


18. Minimum standards of behavior for the public service stated in legislation.

a. Should the minimum standards of behavior of the public service be stated in legislation?

Yes _____ No _____ Don't know _____

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b. Would such legislation have impact on the level of corruption?

Very strong impact _____ Moderate impact _____ Little impact_____


19. Pl in your opinion are corruption studies worthwhile?......................................

20. Any comments on corruption in Ghana?.............................................................