

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST

TEACHERS' EQUITY SENSITIVITY TO AND CONCERNS ABOUT THE
SINGLE SPINE SALARY STRUCTURE

BY

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DECLARATION

Candidate's Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my own original research and that no part of it has been presented for another degree in this university or elsewhere.

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Supervisor's Declaration

I hereby declare that the preparation and presentation of this dissertation were supervised in accordance with the guidelines on supervision of dissertation laid down by the University of Cape Coast.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of the study was to investigate the equity sensitivity and concerns of teachers about the single spine salary. Questionnaires comprising the conventional Equity Sensitivity Instrument and some other typical items on teacher concerns about the single spine salary structure were administered to 129 basic school student teachers of the Institute of Educational Development and Extension (IEDE) at the Cape Coast study centre in the Cape Coast metropolis. Both descriptive and inferential statistics were used to analyse the data.

The study found that teachers were mainly equity sensitive and require fair and equitable treatment on the single spine salary structure. Yet their equity sensitivity was independent of their gender, qualification or rank. Teachers' concern was fundamentally three-fold: (i) the delay in getting their turn on the implementation of the single salary; (ii) their lack of knowledge of the amount they would receive and what other workers were collecting under the new salary scheme; and (iii) the feeling that GNAT failed to bargain well for them; and the ability of the new salary structure to motivate them to work better.

It has been, accordingly, recommended that the Fair Wages and Salaries Commission be actually *fair* in principle and in deed. The Commission should expedite the implementation of the salary such that teachers would see and experience the relative advantage the new salary scheme brings. The Ghana National Association of Teachers (GNAT) should give periodic report to teachers on the progress of the negotiation of the salary of teachers with the Fair Wages Commission.

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DEDICATION

To Sylvia, my wife, and AfiaNhyira, my daughter

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Since the announcement by the Government of Ghana of the single spine salary for public sector workers, concerns have been expressed about delays in its implementation. Recently, however, the salaries of some public sector workers have been adjusted in line with the single spine salary, while other workers still wait in expectation to be migrated to the single spine salary. Some public sector workers, particularly teachers have expressed profound anxieties about what level of salary adjustment they would receive. Some teachers, using the adjusted salaries of other public sector workers as a proxy, are beginning to predict their anticipated salaries. Others have gone ahead to predict that their salaries are likely to be higher than those of other workers. This study seeks to investigate what the possible expectation of teachers regarding their salary adjustments are, and using the equity theory of motivation, measures and conceptualizes teachers' equity sensitivity. This chapter presents the background to the research, the statement of the problem, purposes of the study, research questions, the significance of the study, delimitation and limitation of the study.

Background to the Study

Among the factors of production, labour is the single most important that combines and harmonises the others so as to get organisational goals

accomplished. The human capital of organisations is central to organisational success, health and wellbeing. Thus the condition of service which triggers worker morale is a crucial factor in determining the level of productivity.

The concept of employee valuing which largely determines employee morale has gone through rigorous orientations. Employees were once considered just another input into the production and assembly of goods and services (Dickson, 1973). However, the Hawthorne Studies found that employees are not motivated solely by physical and economic factors including money but, inter alia, meeting employee's social and psychological needs could be a stronger motivation for their commitment and productivity than mere economic rewards and improved physical working conditions. Social improvements from further research, particularly by the Tavistock Institute, on Hawthorne led to what is now referred to as the socio-technical tradition, which advocates the integration of social dimensions to the application of new technology to the workplace. Accordingly, Bedeian (1993) admonishes that the awareness of the needs and motivation of employees, created by the findings of the Hawthorne Studies, enjoins managers to devote enough resources, time and the needed attention to satisfy employees so as to motivate them to achieve desired targets.

In Ghana, it has always been debated whether improved conditions of service should precede increased productivity or the other way round. In other words, some uncertainty surrounds the direction of causality between increased productivity and worker morale. Whatever being the case there seems to be some relationship between worker morale, which is the consequence of conditions of service, and productivity. The average worker

will work harder when they anticipate some actual or perceived benefits to be derived from their efforts. Hence, humans' actions and inactions are contingent on the satisfaction or otherwise of their needs.

McGregor's Theories X and Y are snapshots, taken episodically, of diverse human behaviour. McGregor's theory Y suggests that what is needed is the wisdom, tact and ability of management to motivate workers so their natural disposition to work hard can be nurtured and realized. Although by this, McGregor's work makes some contribution to the development of the concept of worker motivation, to some extent, it fails to capture human behavior in its entirety. Work is not as natural as play as Theory Y postulates; neither does coercion in itself elicit increased productivity as Theory X contends. Rather motivation is pivotal in winning the sympathy of workers to work satisfactorily. The reward system in place is capable of driving the workforce to work their hearts out without having to coerce them. Employees will not work just because they itch for work. It is the reward attached to the efforts that drives them to do as much as to obtain that pleasurable gesture. Maslow (1970) found that human needs are developmental, which presupposes that people endeavor to get unmet needs satisfied and that once satisfied, a need no longer becomes a motivator, the next need in the hierarchy becomes a motivator in that order until the need at the highest level (self-actualization) is met. No one will work for no fee unless their physiological needs are met. Apparently, there will not be any intrinsic motivation where there is nil or insufficient extrinsic motivation. The propensity to work is usually triggered by the reception or experience of certain satisfaction that pleases the individual.

Financial compensation is one of the key elements of the reward system to appreciate and reinforce appropriate work conduct. Merit pay rewards employees financially for meeting established goals and standards. The extent of performance can be determined after the employee has been appraised. This has the tendency of propelling the employee to work assiduously towards the achievement of the stated goals in order to maximize income as justified by the expectancy theory. Even the most intrinsically motivated employee will become discouraged if the salary is incapable of *paying rent or buying bread*. Occasionally, salary adjustments are necessary to enable workers cope with economic pressures and also to motivate employees to work harder so as to collectively drive the nation to achieve its desired goals.

The economic wellbeing of Ghana just like any other nation is directly related to the skills of the population. And, it is becoming broadly recognized that quality teachers are the key ingredient of a successful educational system and a contributor to improved student achievement. Yet current rewards policies in the Ghana Education Service (GES) do not ensure that quality teachers are recruited and retained in the profession. Finding solutions to this problem is particularly important given the rate of expected teacher retirement is surely not the key here, as this is unavoidable. The key destabilizing issue is teacher attrition arising from factors other than retirement, resignations, vacation of post without notice, etc. Yet over the years, Ghana has been stuck with a compensation system that does not support improvements in the teaching force. Without some significant changes, the hope of systematically improving student outcomes is small. Of course, the teacher compensation

system works within the entire set of policies, including recruitment, certification, tenure, and retirement, that govern teachers. Things done in those areas interact with the compensation system and determine the educational outcomes such as who is in the classroom and how much students learn. Any coherent set of policy prescriptions aimed at improving the quality of the teachers in our classrooms must have multiple dimensions. An induction policy is obviously crucial. But an induction policy must be coordinated with policies that manage teachers and reward them according to their performance once they have been inducted (Hanushek, 2006).

The grotesque inequitably unsatisfactory compensation packages that bedeviled Ghana coupled with the outcry of the entire labour force in the country compelled the 5th government of the 4th republic to implement the single Spine salary scheme. Under this new salary structure, it is believed appropriate compensation that measures up to an individual's circumstance is awarded to deserving workers. This is deemed to ensure that workers are treated fairly and equitably. However, the lack of adequate consultation with the workers in the determination of the remuneration and the approach of the new salary scheme implementation might beget mistrust in the scheme. The result of this might be the feeling of inequity and unfairness among the workforce including teachers which may have negative impact on their productivity.

Statement of the Problem

Pay differentials always bring about unhealthy situations and conflictual and confrontational industrial relations. Such was the long-

standing state of affairs in Ghana. However, the quest of the Ghanaian government in addressing the unevenness in compensation packages among employees in public service in the country by introducing the single spine salary has brought about mixed feelings. Civil and public servants whose salaries are higher than what is equitably due them feared that the single spine salary would cause an erosion in their remuneration. However, the majority of the workforce (mostly teachers) who think they have been unfairly dealt with all this while insofar as the salaries are concerned are in expectancy of colossal upward adjustments. Since its introduction, the single spine salary has been fraught with implementation challenges. As a result, the committee charged with its implementation recommended a piecemeal implementation approach.

The inclusion of the personnel of the public service in the first batch of the implementation could heighten teachers' expectation. Using the Police as the reference point, teachers who form the greatest percentage of the government workforce might think that they have higher qualification than the Police and as such they deserve better treatment. Even though they are yet to see how much is due them when it gets to their turn of the implementation of the new salary scheme, some teachers are estimating how much they are likely to earn. In other words, some teachers are using the salaries of the Police as a benchmark in calculating their anticipated salary increment. This is a likely indication that if they are not given a better condition of service they might be disillusioned to work. Although their package under the new salary scheme is yet to come one may consider the extent to which teachers think the new salary scheme will be equitable. Therefore, it is prudent to know how sensitive

Ghanaian teachers are about pay differentials relative to other workers under the new scheme. Any such feeling of inequity among teachers could lead to reduced morale which could be translated into reduction in commitment to duty which might lead to turning out graduates who are not fully functional and educated with the desired attributes of the Ghanaian education system.

Objectives of the Study

The study sought to find out how workable and equitable teachers see the single spine salary structure as it is reflected in their concerns. The purpose of this study is to take a closer look at the efficacy of the applicability of the Equity Sensitivity Theory to teachers. More specifically this study focuses on the ability of Equity Sensitivity to discriminate between the responses of three different classifications of individuals posited by the theory (Benevolents, Equity Sensitives and Entitleds) in response to the single spine salary structure. The specific objectives were to:

1. find out how sensitive teachers are to the equitable nature of the single spine salary structure.
2. find out whether the following factors influence teachers' equity sensitivity to and concerns about the single spine salary structure:
 - a. sex
 - b. rank
 - c. qualification
3. find out teachers' concerns about the single spine salary structure;

Research Questions

To address the problem at hand, the following research questions and hypotheses were formulated to guide the study:

1. How sensitive are teachers to the equitable nature of the single spine salary structure?
2. What influence do the following factors have on teachers' equity sensitivity to and concerns about the single spine salary structure:
 - a. sex
 - b. rank
 - c. qualification
3. What are the concerns of teachers about the single spine salary structure?

Hypotheses

H₀: No relationship exists between equity sensitivity and teachers' concerns about the single spine salary structure.

H₁: There is a relationship between equity sensitivity and teachers' concerns about the single spine salary structure.

Significance of the Study

Considering that the reactions that teachers may have to under-payment would generally produce negative outcomes for the organization (e.g. reduced productivity, increased turnover), there is the need to attempt a prediction of such reactions. If, within the single spine salary structure, more significant differences exist between the differing groups (depending on the

degree of sensitivity) of teachers as regards the single spine salary structure it could have significant implications for teachers productivity. Thus, the research on the issue of equity sensitivity and concerns of teachers about the single spine salary structure would provide useful information for policy makers that will lead to reward policies that motivate teachers to improve productivity.

Stakeholders of education including the government, Ministry of Education (MoE), and Ghana Education Service (GES), would be informed about the influence the new salary scheme is having on teachers' productivity so as to enable them to make cases for the formulation of informed pay policies to get the best out of teachers output. The findings of the study would enable the Fair Wages and Salaries Commission to improve the salary structure and/ or the implementation approach.

Delimitations of the Study

The study is delimited to practicing teachers who are under the direct supervision of GES and for that matter, only teachers in public schools are covered in this research. It is further confined to teachers in public elementary schools. The equity sensitivity covers employee's inputs (hard work, skill level, tolerance, enthusiasm, etc.) and an employee's outputs (salary, benefits, intangibles such as recognition, etc.). The study, however, focused solely on a single outcome (pay) and the range of inputs (hard work, skill level, tolerance, enthusiasm, etc.).

Limitation of the Study

The piecemeal implementation of the single spine salary may distort a thorough appreciation of the state of affairs insofar as the single spine salary structure is concerned. The fact that teachers' new salaries have not been paid will not let them be in a better position to reliably and adequately comment on the new salary scheme. A shortcoming regarding this research is that it did not investigate the entire gamut of responses that individuals may have to under-reward situations but rather focused on a single outcome (pay) and the range of inputs (hard work, skill level, tolerance, enthusiasm, etc.). If a wider range of outcomes were considered a much different evidence could have surfaced.

Another shortcoming of the research that limits the valid generalisability of the findings is the fact that the sample chosen was not representative of the entire population of basic school student teachers of the Institute of Educational Development and Extension (IEDE) at the Cape Coast study centre in the Cape Coast metropolis.

Organisation of the Study

The study is composed of five chapters. Chapter One covers the introduction of the study that centres on the background to the study, problem statement, purpose, research questions, delimitation and limitations of the study. Chapter Two presents the review of related literature on theories of motivation, highlighting the theoretical frameworks as well as related empirical studies on the questions raised. Details of the method used in the investigation are presented in Chapter Three. This includes the research design employed, population, sample and sampling procedure, instrumentation, data

collection and data analysis. The fourth chapter presents the results of the data analysis. Also discussions on the resulting findings to answer the questions raised in Chapter One are covered. The final chapter, Chapter Five, summarises the study to draw conclusions. Based on the conclusions arrived at recommendations are made to help resolve the feelings of inequity and the concerns teachers harboured about the single spine salary structure.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

This chapter reviews studies conducted by other researchers considered relevant to this study. The review of related literature permits comparison of the findings of this study and similar pieces of research to provide a basis for confirming or refuting earlier conclusions, and for situating the current research. The theoretical framework for the study is discussed first. This is then followed by the discussion of equity theory of motivation, from which the theoretical framework was derived. Similar empirical studies considered necessary to putting the main and the sub-problems in perspective follow the theoretical review.

Theoretical Framework

Interest in organizational justice and equity has experienced resurgence over the past decade (Huseman & Hatfield, 1990; Sauley & Bedejan, 2000). This rekindling of interest in equity has been spurred in part by an extension of the original equity theory to include individual differences. This more recent approach has been spurred by the construct of equity sensitivity theory (Patrick and Jackson, 1991). Inasmuch as equity sensitivity theory is an offshoot of the equity theory, Adams (1965) attests that equity sensitivity theory has proven to be a refinement of the original equity theory. However, if

equity sensitivity is to prove more useful than the original equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965) it must be more predictive and discriminant with regard to how subjects respond to feelings of inequity. Without this ability, equity sensitivity theory risks the fate of being considered an interesting notion with little or no practical value and falling out of favour much as the original equity theory (Greenberg, 1990).

Huseman, Hatfield and Miles (1987) proposed that equity sensitivity is an individual difference variable that influences how individuals react to inequity. According to King, Miles and Day (1993, p.302), equity sensitivity is related to a “person’s perception of what is and what is not equity and then uses that information to make predictions about reactions to inequity”. This more recent extension of original equity theory runs the same risk of being deemed impractical if it also is not shown to be predictive. So, therefore, the justification of the adoption of the equity sensitivity lies in its ability to allow the prediction of the probable behaviour of employees in the light of a given situation. The lack of predictability of how people respond to feelings of inequity is due to individual differences. This is what underpins the basis of this study to examine the level of inequity with reference to gender, rank and qualification of teachers.

Differences in Equity Sensitivity

This construct, equity sensitivity, posits that individuals can be categorized into three groups. These are equity sensitives, benevolents and entitleds. Equity sensitivity is best understood conceptually by identifying characteristics of individuals along points of a continuum. On one end of the

continuum are the benevolents, otherwise known as “givers,” who express high satisfaction relative to others when their output/input ratios are less than the referent persons. Benevolents have higher tolerance for under-reward situations. At mid-range are the equity sensitives. These individuals most closely adhere to the traditional norm of equity – with the balance of inputs to outcomes (Allen & White, 2002). On the other end of the continuum are the entitled individuals or “takers,” who are most satisfied when they receive more outcomes than inputs (King *et al.*, 1993). Entitleds are most sensitive to perceived under-reward inequity (Sauley & Bedejan, 2000).

According to the latest view, equity sensitives fit the classic equity theory propositions. Equity sensitives prefer to be in a state of equity with regard to the outcomes they receive for the amount of inputs they expend when compared to someone doing similar work. The original propositions of equity theory apply to this group. If an equity sensitive’s ratio of outcomes to inputs is out of balance with their referent other, the person will be motivated to act in a way so as to get their ratio back into balance.

Benevolents are more tolerant of situations in which they are being under-rewarded. While they do not seek to be under-rewarded, they are assumed to be less likely to respond (at least overtly) when they are placed in an under-reward situation. Entitleds are posited to experience less dissonance when they are over-rewarded and more dissatisfaction when under-rewarded. As such, they are assumed to be more likely than the other groups to respond overtly to an over-reward situation.

Equity Theory

According to Adams (1963), equity theory calls for a fair balance to be struck between an employee's inputs (hard work, skill level, tolerance, enthusiasm, etc.) and their outcomes (salary, benefits, intangibles such as recognition, etc.). It is only prudent and fair to reward employees in commensuration with the amount of work done. Finding this fair balance serves to ensure that a strong and productive relationship is achieved with the employee. The overall result of this is the creation of contented, motivated employees. The theory focuses on people's feelings of how they have been treated in comparison with the treatment received by referent others. People compare their own position with that of others to determine their perceived equity position.

Much like many of the more prevalent theories of motivation (theories by Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, Herzberg's Theory, etc.), Equity theory acknowledges that delicate and erratic factors have an effect on an employee's assessment and perception of their relationship with their work and their employer. The theory is built on the belief that employees become de-motivated, both in relation to their job and their employer, if they feel as though their inputs are greater than the outcomes. Employees can be expected to respond to this in different ways, including de-motivation (generally to the extent the employee perceives the disparity between the inputs and the outputs exist), reduced effort, becoming disgruntled, or, in more extreme cases, perhaps even disruptive.

The equity theory is based on exchange theory, where people evaluate their social relations the same way as buying and selling an item. This means that people expect certain outcomes in exchange for certain contributions or inputs. These exchanges involve a number of inputs and outcomes. According to this theory, people place a weighting on these various inputs and outcomes according to how they perceive their importance. When the ratio of a person's total outcomes to total inputs equals the perceived ratio of other people's total outcomes to total inputs, there is equity. When the comparison reveals unequal treatment, the underserved person experiences a feeling of inequity. Such an employee will act to correct the inequity by lowering productivity, reducing quality, increased absenteeism and/or voluntary resignation.

A feeling of inequity causes tension, which is unpleasant. The magnitude of perceived inequity determines the level of tension created. The level of tension, in turn, determines the strength of motivation. For instance, an employee may change his/her inputs by attempting to increase or decrease the level of his or her inputs; change his/her outcomes by attempting to change outcomes such as pay or working conditions without changes to inputs. There may be cognitive distortions of inputs and outcomes. Although it is difficult to distort facts about themselves, it is possible within limit to distort the utility of those facts, for example, how hard they are really working. Some may consider leaving the field. A person may try to find a new situation with more favorable balance such as absenteeism, asking for transfer and resignation.

It is important to consider the Equity theory factors when striving to improve an employee's job satisfaction, motivation level, and what can be done to promote higher levels of each. To do this, consider the balance or

imbalance that currently exists between employee's inputs and outputs. Inputs typically include effort, loyalty, hard work, commitment, skill, ability, adaptability, flexibility, tolerance, determination, enthusiasm, trust in superiors, support to colleagues, personal sacrifice, etc. Outputs typically include financial rewards (salary, benefits, perks, etc.) and intangibles that typically include recognition, reputation, responsibility, sense of achievement, praise, stimulus, sense of advancement or growth and job security.

While obviously many of these points cannot be quantified and perfectly compared, the theory argues that managers should seek to find a fair balance between the inputs that an employee gives, and the outputs received. According to the theory, employees should be content where they perceive these to be in balance. If the balance lies too far in favour of the employer, some employees may work to bring balance between inputs and outcomes on their own, by asking for more compensation or recognition. Others will be demotivated, and still others will seek alternative employment. Since its origins in the 1960s equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965) held forth the promise of helping to explain how employees respond to situations in which they perceive they are being rewarded more or less favourably in comparison to a referent doing similar work. Shortly after its inception, Weick (1966) deemed it to be one of the most useful existing organizational behaviour theories.

Equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965) proposed that subjects respond to under-reward situations in various ways in an attempt to bring their equity ratio back into balance. For example, subjects may choose a behavioural response to help reduce their feelings of inequity. They may respond in such ways as reducing their inputs (i.e., not put forth as much effort) or increasing

their outcomes (i.e., ask for a raise). Subjects may instead use a cognitive response to reduce feelings of inequity such as selecting another person to use as their referent. Ultimately, the subjects may choose to exit the situation by deciding to transfer or quit the organization.

Although previous Equity theory research has concluded that under-rewarded subjects generally respond in a manner that is consistent with classic Equity theory, it is not easy to predict which option they will select to bring their equity ratio into balance (Greenberg, 1990). This lack of specificity regarding what responses individuals experiencing inequity are likely to have is a serious shortcoming of the original equity theory (Furby, 1986). As such, the original equity theory eventually fell out of favour (Miner, 1984; Greenberg, 1987, 1990) due in part to this inability to predict exactly how individuals would respond to an under-reward situation (for example, lower their inputs, attempt to raise their outcomes, cognitively justifying the situation, decide to leave the organization).

Accordingly, research on the topic of Equity theory moved off in another direction. Inspired by legal research, the procedural justice stream of research (Thibaut & Walker, 1975, 1978) began to focus more on the processes and procedures of how pay and recognition are determined, rather than the reactions that individuals have to them (Greenberg, 1987). Equity theory research became less popular and eventually withered away (Greenberg, 1990).

Empirical Studies

The empirical review section looks at practical application of the equity sensitivity theory. It then explores the usefulness and validity of the theory to authenticate its replication. The first part of the empirical review, therefore, looks at the effectiveness of the theory and the second part analyses probable teacher behaviour, in the light of previous findings, triggered by their compensation packages.

Effectiveness of the Equity Sensitivity Theory

Ambrose and Kulik (1999, p. 243) concluded that "... to date there has been no research demonstrating that members of the three groups (Benevolents, Equity Sensitives, and Entitleds) respond differently to inequality situations in terms of motivation or behaviour." As such, the construct of equity sensitivity runs the risk of falling out of favour, just as original equity theory. In that case if equity sensitivity is to be considered more valid and useful than original equity theory, empirical research must demonstrate significant differences in the way the three groups (Benevolents, Equity Sensitives, and Entitleds) respond to inequitable situations.

Some initial studies have been done to attempt to validate significant differences between Benevolents, Equity Sensitives and Entitleds. For example, Huseman *et al.* (1985) examined job satisfaction as a dependent variable in the context of equity sensitivity. They found that in response to an under-reward situation, entitleds report significantly lower levels of satisfaction than equity sensitives or benevolents. Conversely, benevolents

report significantly higher levels of satisfaction than the other two groups. This confirmed the arguments set out in the equity theory.

Miles *et al.* (1989) tested for differences in the three groups with respect to inputs, outcomes and preferred outcome/input ratios. With regard to inputs they found that benevolent undergraduate students were willing to code more questionnaires or complete more interviews than equity sensitives or entitleds. Interestingly, they did not find significant differences between the three groups in terms of outcomes (what they perceived as a fair wage), although they did find that benevolents prefer lower outcome/input ratios than Equity sensitives or entitleds.

King *et al.* (1993) found that benevolent undergraduate students experience less distress than entitleds when facing either under-compensation or over-compensation scenarios. They also found that entitleds placed significantly more importance on pay and benevolents placed more importance on work characteristics when asked to distribute 100 points on the Job Descriptive Index. Furthermore, Miles *et al.* (1994) found that entitleds tend to place a greater emphasis on extrinsic tangible rewards (e.g., pay), whereas benevolents are more focused on intrinsic intangible rewards (e.g., a sense of accomplishment) when asked to rate the importance of twenty of the most common outcomes from work.

These findings are somewhat related to Herzberg's two-factor theory of motivation, which differentiates hygiene factors – related to the context of the work, and more of extrinsic aspect of motivation; and motivators, related to the content of the work and related more intrinsic motivation. It might then be plausible to argue that entitled are more disposed to paying attention to the

hygiene factors, while the benevolent are more oriented towards the motivators, which makes them more attracted to intrinsic and intangible rewards.

O'Neill and Mone (1998) examined equity sensitivity as a potential moderator in the relationship between self-efficacy and workplace attitudes including job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and intent to leave. They found that benevolents exhibit a negative relationship between self-efficacy and job satisfaction and a positive relationship between self-efficacy and intent to leave. Equity sensitives did not exhibit a moderating effect on the relationship between self-efficacy and organizational commitment.

Patrick and Jackson (1991) surveyed groups of undergraduate students and fast-food workers to see how the reactions of benevolents, equity sensitives, and entitleds differed after reading scenarios that put them in inequitable situations. Their results indicate that benevolents and equity sensitives are significantly more likely to alter their inputs and their outcomes than entitleds when facing an over-reward situation. Conversely, equity sensitives and entitleds are more likely than benevolents to act on their comparison other by telling them to put forth less effort in response to an over-reward situation. It was very difficult for Patrick and Jackson (1991) to find any differences in how the three groups responded to under-reward situations. They tested how subjects would respond to under-reward situations in which someone else was being paid more for doing the same amount of work. In fact, no statistically significant differences existed between the three groups in two of three under-reward scenarios they tested. In just one scenario and in only one specific type of response was a statistically significant

difference exhibited--the benevolent and equity sensitive groups were significantly more likely to change their comparison than were the entitleds in response to an under-reward, salary scenario. The results of this study are troubling with regards to the ability of equity sensitivity to discriminate between the three groups and their reactions to a condition of under-reward. No clear distinction between the three groups was evident.

Juxtaposing Teacher Behaviour with their Compensation

Salary structures are an important component of effective compensation programmes and help ensure that pay levels for groups of jobs are competitive externally and equitable internally. An effective salary structure allows management to reward performance and the development of skills while controlling overall base salary costs by providing a cap on the range paid for particular jobs or locations.

The most common measure used as a proxy for teacher's quality is the average salary paid to the teachers. Not only in Ghana are the salaries of teachers inferior to those in other sectors because Hanushek (2006) confirms that in the US "salaries of young female and male teachers have fallen relative to those of other occupations nationwide." Some have argued that the decline in the relative earnings of teachers has led to an obvious fall in the average teacher quality. The causes of decline in the number of teachers are unclear since it depends in large part on the correlation between the teaching skills and those rewarded in the non-teacher labour market.

Research or studies on pay-for-performance programmes are scant (Dillon, 2008; Podgursky & Springer, 2007). There should be teacher

accountability for student achievement so that some form of compensation which goes above a teacher's base pay will be instituted to motivate teachers to meet and beat their targets. The merit pay plans which compensate teachers based on their performance have not been successful. The issue in the literature reviewed is how to put in place a fair system that increases student achievement.

A single salary schedule has been the norm to compensate teachers and is based on the number of years of service as well as the number and type of degrees held (Barnett & Ritter, 2008; Honawar & Olson, 2008; Odden & Kelley, 2002; Podgursky & Springer, 2007). Dillon (2008) quotes Wade Nelson, a professor of educational leadership, as saying that this practice has survived because it is so difficult to fairly gauge what a teacher brings to the classroom. This type of pay system came under scrutiny because of the desire for accountability for student achievement which became an important stimulus for experiments in performance-based pay (Odden & Kelley, 2002; Podgursky & Springer, 2007).

Merit pay rewards teachers financially for meeting established goals and standards. The extent of performance can be determined after the teacher has been evaluated. This condition might propel the teacher to work assiduously towards the achievement of or meeting the stated or desired goals in order to maximize income as justified by the expectancy and equity theories. Occasionally, such adjustments are necessary. However, there are some drawbacks that some researchers have identified with this incentive package. For example, Johnson (1986) warns that merit pay may change the relationships between teachers and students as poor student ratings are used as

a means of gathering evidence or information to judge teachers' effectiveness and subsequent reward. Also a student who has some hurt against or personal dislike for a teacher is not likely to provide unbiased evidence. This especially is the case where students' ratings are used as a means of gathering evidence or information to judge teachers' effectiveness.

Coltham (1972) also raises another concern that merit pay incentive may encourage teachers to adjust their teaching down to the programmes goals and not being encouraged to strive for anything beyond that. Thus, the business of teaching will be geared towards meeting the standards that will warrant the award of this incentive. Opportunities and initiatives to aspire to attain objectives beyond what has ordinarily been set will be killed. Not only these, but Lawler (1983) admits that merit pay often causes a division in faculties, setting teachers against administrators and is often characterized by insufficient evaluation methods.

Chait (2007) asserts that school districts spend more on teachers' salaries and benefits than any other expenditure, yet they frequently do not spend these funds in a way that would improve the performance, quality, or distribution of the teacher workforce. He contends that there is a growing recognition that the single salary schedule for compensating teachers is not helping to attract or retain the best teacher candidates, particularly in high-poverty schools.

The challenge, as stated in much of the literature reviewed, is how to develop a pay system that does not repeat the failures of merit pay. The preponderance of literature indicates that merit pay plans that tied teachers' salaries to evaluations of their performance were seen as being too subjective,

too controversial, and unsuccessful due to a variety of reasons. Some states and/or districts are now moving to pay teachers based on students' acquisition of knowledge and skills (Honawar & Olson, 2008; Sawchuck, 2008).

Chait and Miller (2009) in their summary of research defined pay-for-performance programs as:

“Pay-for-performance programs award teachers with differential compensation based on some combination of measurable outputs and observed teacher performance. Measurable outputs typically aim to capture student learning attributable to a teacher or a school, and can be derived from scores on standardized tests or other more complex assessments of student work.”

Increased student achievement is one of the cornerstones of pay-for-performance programs. The controversy shown in the research is how student achievement is measured in order to award performance pay bonuses. Some researchers contend that student achievement cannot be based on standardized test scores alone and that additional possibilities for measuring student achievement should include data from measures such as pre-and post-testing, state standards exams, frequent observations of teacher performance, and professional development for teachers (Chait, 2007; Dillon, 2008; Odden & Kelley, 2002; Podgursky & Springer, 2007).

In addition to increasing student achievement through a pay-for-performance programme, Barnett and Ritter (2008) addressed the issue of policies that are aimed at retaining effective teachers. They state that across-the-board raises for all teachers would not fix the problem of retaining quality teachers and that some type of salary structure that ties pay to increased

student achievement would motivate existing teachers to focus increased effort and innovation on student achievement. Additionally, Barnett and Ritter feel that pay-for-performance programmes would entice a better pool of teacher candidates because these individuals would feel that they could thrive under this type of salary structure. The third point made in their article is that under pay-for-performance the most effective teachers would consistently earn large bonuses and ineffective teachers would earn smaller bonuses. Through natural selection, more competent teachers would remain and the less effective ones leave.

How to compensate teachers in a pay-for-performance programme is another issue addressed in the literature, but there are differing views on how this can be accomplished. In most of the studies of either state or district programmes, pay is based on additional salary over and above salary tied to the single salary plan (Chait & Miller, 2009; Odden & Kelley, 2002). Payments may reflect individual performance, the collective performance of a group of teachers, or some combination of individual and collective performances. Many of the plans use a group performance component (Barnett & Ritter, 2008; Chait, 2007).

Odden and Kelley (2002) discussed several theories of motivation that explain how employees are motivated and the roles incentive plans play in their motivation. One of these is the “social dilemma theory” which proposes that some individuals in group incentive plans become free riders. Some may not participate fully yet still receive incentive pay based on the efforts of their co-workers. In an article (*Cooperative Performance Incentives in Education*) they reviewed, Richards, Fishbein, and Melville (in Hanushek,

2006) concluded that the free rider issue is more theoretical than actual. Odden and Kelly concluded that the work team has considerable influence on the work behavior of each member of the group. Free riding can largely be eliminated when individuals know what goals and objectives are expected and contribute according to those expectations.

According to Chait and Miller (2009), there is not a great deal of evidence about performance pay that attracts or retains teachers in high-poverty schools, but there is evidence that is “suggestive.” Programs in both Texas and North Carolina reflect that bonuses awarded to teachers in these schools showed that the turnover rate was reduced. Additionally, more experienced teachers were most responsive to programs that rewarded student achievement in these schools.

Slotnik (2009) suggests several recommendations:

1. Compensation reform must be done *with* teachers, not to them. This involves the intentional building of trust and collaboration. True partnership gives practitioners opportunities to have a broader district wide impact than is generally allowed by their job titles.
2. Compensation reform must be organizationally sustainable. The entire district must shift to the initiative.
3. Performance-based compensation must be financially sustainable. Teachers and taxpayers have seen promises come and go regarding compensation plans. Several states and districts have tried to implement, or are currently continuing to implement, pay-for-performance programmes.

Barnett and Ritter (2008) evaluated some projects in some states in the United States of America and explained how the pilot was structured. They found that teacher merit was determined exclusively by student achievement gains on the Stanford Achievement Test or the Iowa Test of Basic Skills with pre-testing and post-testing. The schools selected for the project had a high percentage of ethnic minority students and high percentage of students who qualified for free and reduced-price lunch. Merit bonuses for classroom teachers were based on the average learning gains for all students in the classrooms. An evaluation after the first two years of the project that schools implementing the programme achieved average gains of approximately seven percentile points for students in mathematics and reading. Scores of students in the pilot schools improved, whereas those of students in comparison schools decreased. This particular project clearly illustrates that pay-for-performance programmes can increase student achievement.

Summary

Equity sensitivity theory has the tendency of aiding pay policy formulators to predict the likely behavior of employees given a particular compensation packages. However, most of the pieces of researches (Patrick & Jackson, 1991; Miles *et al.*, 1989; King *et al.*, 1993) undertaken to test the applicability of the theory were not in simulated situations. In such artificial work situations, the equity sensitivity theory might not function potent enough to produce valid conclusions. This study, however, concentrates on applying the theory to find out teachers' reaction to the single spine salary. This attempt will further validate the theory as a tool in aiding predictions about probable

teacher behavior in a given circumstance. Thus, knowledge on real and concrete data on the effectiveness of the theory could be generated from this study to support or question the assumptions that undergird the theory.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

The methodology describes the research design, population, sample and sampling procedure, instruments for data collection, administration of instruments. It also describes how the data to gathered were analysed.

Research Design

The study was a descriptive survey. The study aimed at exploring and gathering information from teachers about the single spine salary scheme in order to gather their answers or responses; the ultimate goal of which is to make statements about how sensitive teachers were and their concerns about the single spine salary scheme. A more detailed study would need to be undertaken to obtain comprehensive results so as to generalise the findings to the entire population of teachers in Ghana. Responding teachers' responses to items were tabulated, summarized, graphed and analysed in order to make statements about what teachers might be thinking or how they are feeling about the equitable nature of the single spine salary.

The descriptive survey provides opportunities for researchers to gain valuable insight into the existing state of a phenomenon. The study to explored the teachers' feelings and concerns about the single spine salary scheme. According to Leedy and Ormrod (2005), survey research involves

studying and gathering information from or about groups of people in order to state their answers or responses; the ultimate goal of which is to make a generalization about the entire population. Therefore, employing descriptive survey enabled more insight to be gained into the extent to which the single spine salary scheme is believed to be equitably fair to teachers. This would be carried out by gathering information from teachers' feelings and their views, in the form of concerns, about the single spine salary scheme. The ultimate goal of this exercise is to base on the responses of the limited number of survey participants to make statements about the extent of teachers' equity sensitivity and concerns about the single spine salary scheme.

Population

The target population for the study consists of all basic school student teachers of the Institute of Educational Development and Extension (IEDE) at the Cape Coast study centre in the Cape Coast metropolis. This population was used because such student teachers are closer to student-teacher interface. For this reason they might have acquired ample information about the single spine salary structure. This knowledge might let them harbour some concerns which in effect might translate to their sensitivity to the single spine salary structure. Each of the teachers had some hope of migrating to the single spine salary and for that matter they might have some collective interest in the ability of the salary to motivate and satisfy their cravings.

Sample and Sampling Procedure

A sample of 150 basic school student teachers was selected from the Institute of Educational Development and Extension (IEDE) Cape Coast study centre of the University of Education, Winneba. Students who are at this study centre are predominantly from the Central and Western Regions.

Simple random sampling was used to select 150 respondent basic school practicing teachers. This method was adopted because each basic teacher at the centre was a potential candidate of giving the required pieces of information needed. Additionally, each of those teachers chosen expect their salaries to be migrated to the single spine salary structure.

Demography of Participants

A survey questionnaire was administered to a sample of 150 basic school student teachers from the Cape Coast study centre of the University of Education Institute of Educational Development and Extension (IEDE). Participation was voluntary and anonymity was promised. Out of the intended 150 basic school student teachers, 129 of them participated which brought the response rate to 86%. Yet only 128 of the participants completed the demographic information section of the survey instrument. Table 1 summarises the description of the sampled participants.

The sample was split unevenly between males (43.4%) and females (55.8%); one participant failed to complete the demographic information. Of this sample, 3.1% (N=3) of the participants were Cert “A” teachers, while the remaining 96.1% (N=124) were Diploma holding teachers. The majority (N=106) of the participating teachers were senior superintendent. The others

were distributed thinly across the range of other seven ranks from superintendent II through to deputy director.

Table 1

Demography of Participants

Variables	Subscales	N	%
Gender	Male	56	43.4
	Female	72	55.8
Qualification	Cert “A”	4	3.1
	Diploma	124	96.1
Rank	Superintendent II	5	3.9
	Superintendent I	1	0.8
	Senior superintendent II	106	82.2
	Senior superintendent I	9	7.0
	Principal superintendent	5	3.9
	Assistant director II	1	0.8
	Assistant director I	1	0.8

Source: Field Work

Research Instrument

A questionnaire which integrated Huseman, Hatfield and Miles’ (1987) Equity Sensitivity Instrument (ESI) with some demographic and other items related to typical teacher concerns about pay policy were administered to gather data on the issues of interest. The survey instrument, shown in Appendix B, was in three sections. The first section sought the demographic

information of the respondents. The second was the ESI and the last aimed at gathering the concerns that teachers had about the single spine salary structure.

Apart from the conventional ESI, the other two parts of the questionnaire were constructed by the researcher. ESI attempts to measure how individuals differ in their allocation of outcomes. The ESI is a five-item, forced-distribution measure on which the respondent allocates 10 points between a benevolent response and an entitled response for each of the five items. The standard conventional ESI was modified a bit to contextualise its usage. Wherever the term *organisation* is found in the ESI it is substituted with *government* for the purpose of this study. No other alterations were made to the instrument.

The demographic information consisted of three closed ended items which reflected teachers' biographic information. The other part of the questionnaire comprised 10 closed ended items on teachers concerns about the single spine salary structure. These were measured on a 4-point Likert scale as "Strongly Agree", "Agree", "Disagree" and "Strongly Disagree". This implies that each questionnaire comprised three parts. The first part covered the demographic items; the second was the ESI and the third and final part addressed teachers' concerns about the single spine salary.

Test for Validity and Reliability of Instrument

Although the ESI has established validity and reliability, in its edited form the entire questionnaire was tested to determine whether there has been a reduction or further strengthening in this wise. The adapted instrument was

piloted using 25 basic school teachers in the Techiman Municipality in the Brong Ahafo Region.

Previous research studies using the ESI have reported coefficient alphas ranging from .77 to .88 (King and Miles, 1994; Patrick and Jackson, 1991) and a test-retest reliability of .80 (Miles *et al.*, 1989). For this study, the Cronbach's alpha was .79, which is consistent with the values found in the other studies cited above.

Ethical Considerations

Before administering the instrument the researcher visited the IEDE Cape Coast study centre with a letter of introduction from the Head of Department of Accounting and Finance, School of Business, University of Cape Coast. A personal letter (see Appendix A) seeking permission to involve the student teachers in the study was attached and sent to the coordinator of the study centre.

Every participating teacher's written consent to participate was sought before they were engaged in the study. A consent form was attached to the questionnaire to be completed prior to participating in the survey. No pressure, intimidation or fear was put on any respondent just to elicit compliance. Voluntary participation was encouraged. For the sake of confidentiality and anonymity, respondents were prohibited to write their names or other personal contact details that may link the completed form to the responding teacher or their school.

Administration of Instrument

The questionnaire was administered personally. The advantage of this is summarized by Osuala (1982) as the researcher having the opportunity to brief respondents to understand exactly what the items mean so as to obtain the right responses. The letter accompanying the questionnaire indicated one week period within which respondents were requested to complete the questionnaire.

After the one week period the researcher went back to the respondents to collect the completed questionnaire. Respondents whose questionnaires were not ready at that time were given extra one week to fill them. There were some follow-ups to remind respondents to get the questionnaire ready. All these actions were directed towards increasing the return rate which was 86%.

Data Analysis

In order to address the research questions formulated, the data obtained from the respondents were filtered to remove any irrelevant responses, and then coded. After, they were analysed using Statistical Product for Service Solution (SPSS). A combination of descriptive and inferential statistics was used to analyse the data.

Research Question 1 which sought to determine teachers' equity sensitivity to the single spine salary structure was analysed after scoring the items and averaging the scores of respondents. A total ESI score is reached by adding the points allocated to each of the five benevolent statements. Equity sensitivity scores have a possible range of 0 to 50. In order to generate the 3 classes or sub-groups representing *benevolents*, *equity sensitives* and *entitleds*,

the conventional rule set by previous researchers (King *et al.*, 1993; Allen & White, 2002) was utilized. The decision rule of plus/minus one-half of the standard deviation from the ESI mean was adopted to define the breakpoints for each sub-group. King *et al.* (1993) suggest that “sample-specific breakpoints are necessary because of the unique characteristics on any particular sample that can influence response to the ESI” (p. 305). For example, differing levels of social desirability, varied organizational contexts, age homogeneity, and other variables may influence responses (King and Miles, 1994). The decision rule to trichotomize the sample into the three groups was adhered to. Using the aforementioned decision rule, teachers with an ESI score of 24 or less were classified as entitleds. Those with a score between 25 and 29 were considered equity sensitives. Benevolent teachers were those with an ESI score of 30 or greater.

The focus of Research Question 2 which measured the influence of gender, rank and qualification on teachers’ equity sensitivity of the single spine salary structure was measured by employing a one-way analysis of variances (ANOVA). The between-group ANOVA test at 5% significance level was conducted on each independent variable.

Research Question 3 was descriptive in nature. For that matter descriptive statistics such as measures of central tendency and measures of spread were adopted for the analysis. However, frequencies and percentages were used in organizing the data before the analysis. The dominant frequency or percentage and the reported mean of teachers’ concerns about the single spine salary structure with the accompanying standard deviation in concern were used to determine the dominant concern.

The final hypotheses which sought to investigate whether there is a relationship between equity sensitivity and teachers' concerns about the single spine salary structure was tested using correlation. The phi correlation was used to test the null hypothesis for any significant relationship between teacher concerns and equity sensitivity.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The chapter presents and discusses the findings of the study. The findings are presented according to the specific research questions raised. Detailed answers and discussion of each of the research questions and hypothesis has been presented.

Equity Sensitivity of Teachers about the Single Spine Salary

The expectation of taxpayers is to have a system of accountability of the stewardship they entrust in the hands of policymakers and specialists. Teachers by their professional training as specialists are expected to bring their expertise to bear to bring about desired learning in students. They are accountable to the various stakeholders of education since “they are well placed to observe the reaction of pupils to different instructional context” (Pratt, 1980, p. 82). Parents and other stakeholders of education repose faith, trust and confidence in teachers to deliver as expected of them, as they are considered competent. Yet, achieving any phenomenal results in teachers’ output depends greatly on their motivation and thus how sensitive they are to the single spine salary structure. Teachers’ equity sensitivity to the single spine salary have been gathered, analysed and synthesized.

The mean equity sensitivity score of the total study sample was 25.9, with a standard deviation of 5.66 and a range of 8 to 45. Using the plus and minus one-half standard deviation decision rule, participants who had a benevolent score of at most 23 were classified as entitleds; those with scores between 24 and 28 inclusive were labeled equity sensitives; and others with a score of at least 29 were categorized as benevolent.

Thus the total study sample was split into 40 entitleds, 51 equity sensitives and 38 benevolents. Table 2 presents the descriptive data of the classes of teachers' equity sensitivity.

Table 2

Teachers' Equity Sensitivity to the Single Spine salary

Equity sensitivity	N	%
Entitleds	40	31
Equity sensitives	51	39.5
Benevolents	38	29.5
Total	129	100

Source: Field Work

There was almost an even distribution of teachers across the categories of equity sensitivity. Apart from the equity sensitive teachers who were the simple majority (39.5%) of the teachers surveyed, the entitled and benevolent teachers almost tied with 31 per cent and 29.5 percent respectively of the total study sample. This means that 31 per cent of the teachers surveyed are interested in receiving a relatively higher amount of pay under the single spine salary scheme than their input may warrant. Approximately 40 per cent of the basic school teachers surveyed are just interested in receiving an equitably

equivalent output in the form of pay that their input may allow. However, another 29.5 percent of them were ready to receive some amount of pay less than what would have otherwise been provided. The results suggest that basic school teachers are not indifferent to differences in compensation packages. Rather they are mindful of the extent to which their treatment compares with other workers.

According to King *et al.* (1993), benevolent employees experience less distress than entitlements when facing either under-compensation or over-compensation scenarios. They found further that entitlements placed significantly more importance on pay whilst benevolents placed more importance on work characteristics. Furthermore, Miles *et al.* (1994) found that entitlements tend to place a greater emphasis on extrinsic tangible rewards (e.g., pay), whereas benevolents are more focused on intrinsic intangible rewards. Therefore, since majority of teachers are equity sensitives, they are likely to demand a fairer compensation. However, since teachers who are benevolent form only a minority of teachers surveyed, it could be concluded that the teachers are less concerned about the intrinsic intangible rewards and tending instead to be concerned about what is due them in a tangible form.

Since the equity sensitive and entitled teachers outnumber the benevolent teachers. The implication is that teachers are responsive to the smallest pay differentials which they will always struggle to level out. This revelation tends to exemplify the description so often given about teachers as being *economic vampires*. Teachers are perceived to agitate every now and then to get higher rewards without recourse to recent or current attempts made by government to improve their conditions of service.

However, one cannot blame teachers for the insistence in striving for fairer and equitable treatment. At least a majority of teachers, as equity sensitives, are just interested in receiving the fair compensation under the new salary scheme. It therefore could be predicted that teachers, in general, might resist the single spine salary scheme if the scheme fails to demonstrate equity in rewarding the various categories of workers captured under the pay policy.

The ability of the single spine salary structure to respond positively to teachers' needs might propel the teacher to work assiduously towards the achievement of or meeting the stated or desired goals in order to maximize income as justified by the expectancy and equity theories. Occasionally, such adjustments in salary are necessary for improved teacher motivation. This could only happen if the adjustment is favourable to teachers. In any case, because teachers do not turnout physical products if they lift up their performance it would be a bit difficult to measure the resulting productivity. Even where it is possible to do so, Johnson (1986) warns that such a practice might change the relationships between teachers and students as poor student ratings are used as a means of gathering evidence or information to judge teachers' effectiveness and subsequent reward.

Influence of Teacher Characteristics on Teacher Equity Sensitivity

In spite of these results, it was prudent to analyse the phenomenon in detail to find out whether certain characteristics of the basic school teachers influence their equity sensitivity. Tests were run to determine whether teachers' gender, qualification and rank influence their equity sensitivity. To determine whether basic school teachers' equity sensitivity about the single

spine salary structure was tied to these characteristics, a between-group Analysis of Variances (ANOVA) was conducted in search for significant differences at 5% significant level. The results of the test are shown in Tables 3, 4 and 5 which reflect the test for significant equity sensitivity on basic school teachers' gender, qualification and rank respectively.

Table 3

Influence of Gender on Teacher Equity Sensitivity

Variable	Sum of squares	Mean square	F	Sig
Gender	.208	.208	.342	.560
Residual	76.784	.609		

Source: Field Work

On the basis of Tables 3, 4 and 5, none of the results indicated significant differences between teacher equity sensitivity and teacher characteristics. Thus basic school teachers' equity sensitivity is independent of their gender, qualification and rank.

Yet in a typical Ghanaian setting where the man is considered bread winner, it is expected that he demands more so as to distribute such resources to benefit the household. The finding may be authenticated by the recent shift from traditional view of the control and management of households where women are now empowered to contribute. Although not necessarily so in the majority of the cases, the quest of generating enough to support the family, therefore, is not the preserve of the man. This might account for the lack of any apparent differences between the equity sensitivity of male and female basic school teachers about the single spine salary.

Table 4

Influence of Qualification on Teacher Equity Sensitivity

Variable	Sum of squares	Mean square	F	Sig
Qualification	.242	.242	.398	.529
Residual	76.750	.609		

Source: Field Work

The differing qualifications of the basic school teachers are said not to make any difference in their equity sensitivity. Possibly, basic school teachers have just settled with a tradition that has been with the Ghana Education Service which does not value qualification that much. Basic school teachers most of whom have virtually the same qualification (Diploma in Education) might not be perturbed about how their salary compares with other workers.

Table 5

Influence of Rank on Teacher Equity Sensitivity

Variable	Sum of squares	Mean square	F	Sig
Rank	3.030	.505	.826	.552
Residual	73.962	.611		

Source: Field Work

Teachers' Concerns about the Single Spine Salary

Concern here is interpreted to imply perception other than worry. Therefore, the concern that teachers have about the new salary scheme might affect the extent to which they will embrace the scheme. The aftermath of this is the potential effect on teacher output and productivity. Therefore, the study sought to find such teacher concerns about the single spine salary scheme. The

extent to which teachers were concerned were rated from as low as 1, signifying strong disagreement to the statement, through 2 (disagreement), 3 (agreement) to 4 (strong agreement). The results are summarised in Table 6.

Table 6

Concerns about the Single Spine Salary

Concerns	Mean	SD
The implementation of single spine salary has delayed	3.58	0.88
The government cannot sustain the scheme	2.05	0.92
My expectation may not be met	2.71	0.99
I am not aware how much I will receive	3.42	0.74
GNAT failed to bargain well for teachers	3.38	0.95
The new salary will motivate me to teach better	3.09	1.03
We should know what other workers are collecting under the scheme	3.27	0.92
My current salary discourages me to teach wholeheartedly	2.52	1.13
The single spine salary scheme will not boost my morale to teach better once it is implemented	1.71	0.97
I will adjust my output to suit the salary level	2.85	1.03
Mean of means/Average standard deviation	2.86	0.96

Source: Field Work

The most intense concern (mean=3.58) is the delay in the implementation of the scheme. There seems to be the highest congruence in teacher concern at this point where teachers' convergence on responses was highest (standard deviation=0.88). The piecemeal approach to implementing the single spine salary is not responding to the needs of teachers. Most

teachers might feel it is long overdue for it to reach their turn. Their claim might be right since the piecemeal implementation approach discriminates negatively against some groups of workers. As it was found earlier that a majority of teachers are at least equity sensitives, it explains the reason for teachers' concern about the time lag between the migration dates of the various categories of public sector workers due to the piecemeal implementation approach of the scheme.

Teachers were in expectancy as they believed that the new salary scheme would boost their morale to increase output and delivery. From this indication, teachers expect so much from the scheme to improve their conditions of service to enable them improve their current performance in the classroom. Added to this, teachers perceive (mean=3.09, standard deviation=1.03) that the new salary would motivate them to teach better. Thus teachers needed a fair exchange as they would be ready to adjust their output to commensurate the measure of salary that would be awarded them. Therefore, majority of the teachers might be classified as Indian-givers rather than Economic vampires as was said about them some time ago. Therefore, teachers could be described as Indian-givers, who are merely equity sensitive. They are just mindful of a fair and equitable treatment. Hanushek (2006) might be right by pointing the argument of some people that the decline in the relative earnings of teachers has led to an obvious fall in the average teacher quality. Such is the likely occurrence should the single spine salary fail to meet teachers' expectations.

Teachers seem not to be bothered about the government's ability to sustain the new salary over time. They apparently disagreed (mean=2.05,

standard deviation=0.92) to the doubts in the amount and management of the nation's resources to sustainably support the quest it had begun. It is just ordinary for one to put on such an attitude when there has been a long-standing inequity in the system. Slotnik (2009) admonishes that pay systems must be sustainable. Then, if teachers have doubt about the government's capacity to support such a venture, it is only apparent that teachers might entertain fears about the regularity of their new salaries. Accordingly, there is heightened anxiety among teachers about the survival of the salary scheme.

The mean of means (2.86) and the average standard deviation (0.96) imply a general concern about the workability of the single spine salary. Teachers were optimistic that the scheme would impact positively upon their economic wellbeing so as to motivate them to improve output. Summarily, teachers were found to be more concerned about the delay in the implementation of the new salary. Their inability to know how much they were likely to receive limited their perception of the scheme. Added to this was their desire to know what other workers were collecting under the scheme. This could enable them to compare their input and output ratios with those of relevant referent others and draw conclusions on the equitability of their conditions of service. However, Myers and Myers (1995) observe that incentives for teachers should be tied to school wide student performance. Teachers are therefore expected to be rewarded according as they perform in aiding students pass examinations. This concept is closely linked to the piece rate system of accounting for wages where employees are paid in commensuration with the number of units they produce. Thus teachers' salaries are adjusted as they put up a remarkable performance. Yet, by using

job specific rather than results oriented approach to fixing compensation packages, the single spine salary scheme defies such a system. This could let teachers malingering once they know their salary is not dependent on their output and also because they are unaware of the compensation paid to some typical referent groups.

Teachers were, however, resentful that GNAT failed to bargain well for them; which could imply that they anticipate that their expectations might not be met under the scheme. But at least they were hopeful that the new salary would motivate them to teach better. This is one of the occasions where Johnson (1986) might be vindicated in remarking teacher motivation is, in part, based on their expectation because as individuals teachers are more likely to strive in their work if there is an anticipated reward that they value, such as a bonus or promotion, than if there is none. Individuals are dissatisfied if there is no just compensation for their efforts and accomplishments. If teachers' expectations are met by the new salary then the propensity of predicting a higher productivity could readily be inferred to be phenomenal. Should teachers be disappointed, however, there is the possibility of other resultant behaviours from teachers, among which could be indignation and mistrust for the policy pay formulators and the GES. The eventual outcome could be the reduction in teacher commitment to duty which might begat poor students' quality turnout.

Influence of Teacher Characteristics on Teacher Concerns about the Single Spine Salary Structure

It was prudent to analyse the phenomenon in detail to find out whether certain characteristics of the basic school teachers influence their concerns about the single spine salary structure. The independent variables, including teachers' sex, qualification and their rank, were subjected to a test to find out whether they influenced teachers' equity sensitivity. To determine whether basic school teachers' concerns about the single spine salary structure was tied to these characteristics, a between-group Analysis of Variances (ANOVA) was conducted in search for significant differences at 5% significant level. The results of the test are shown in Tables 7, 8 and 9 which reflect the test for significant concerns on basic school teachers' rank, gender and qualification respectively.

Table 7

Influence of Rank on Teacher Concerns

Variable	Sum of squares	Mean square	F	Sig
Rank	159.943	26.657	1.372	.231
Residual	2350.932	19.429		

Source: Field Work

The result showed that there was no significant difference among the concerns of teachers with differing degrees of ranks in the teaching service ($F=1.372$, $p>.05$). No significant differences were found among the seven categories of rank possessed by the teachers surveyed on their concern about the single spine salary structure. Accordingly, the concerns of teachers about the single spine salary structure are independent of teachers' ranks.

Although willing to alter my beliefs, it was surprising to have found such a result. Since the average employees' desire to have improved conditions of service is dependent on their rank or position, it was prudent to hypothesize that way until proven otherwise. Contrary to this, regardless of teachers' ranks they were concerned about the timing, size and the sustainability of the single spine salary.

Table 8 shows the result for establishing whether or not there were any significant differences between the concerns about the single spine salary structure on the two gender groups of teachers. The result indicates that there is no significant difference ($F=2.312$, $p>.05$) between teachers' gender and their concerns about the single spine salary.

Table 8

Influence of Gender on Teacher Concerns

Variable	Sum of squares	Mean square	F	Sig
Sex	45.240	45.240	2.312	.131
Residual	2465.635	19.569		

Source: Field Work

The null hypothesis which states that the gender of teachers is independent of their concerns about the single spine salary is accepted.

Sex differences of teachers, which in a traditional African country like Ghana, determine gender roles were not related to the concerns of a teacher regarding the timing, size and sustainability of the single spine salary structure. This might be due to the influence of Western culture which has weakened the way of life of the traditional African. Ordinarily, the African man is expected to be providing money for housekeeping. Thus the man's

cravings for resources are primarily more profound than that of the woman. Therefore, it was expected of the average male Ghanaian teacher to have raised more concerns on the single spine salary structure than their female counterparts. However, once there is no difference in the concerns of male and female teachers about the single spine salary structure, one could rule out the infiltrating and adulterating effects of western culture on traditional African culture as a possible factor.

It was only teachers' qualification that was found to have influenced teachers' concerns about the single spine salary structure. The result of the test as indicated in Table 9 shows significant differences ($F=5.056$, $p<.05$) between teachers' qualification and their concerns about the single spine salary. The level, extent or degree of teachers' concerns about the new salary scheme is a function of their qualification. Thus, teachers' professional qualification is a major determinant of their concerns about the single spine salary structure.

Table 9

Influence of Qualification on Teacher Concerns

Variable	Sum of squares	Mean square	F	Sig
Qualification	96.875	96.875	5.056	.026
Residual	2414	19.159		

Source: Field Work

To thoroughly appreciate and understand how the teachers' qualification influences their concerns about the single spine salary structure, a further analysis was undertaken to obtain some descriptive statistics for further scrutiny. The result of the quest is presented in Table 10.

As could be seen from Table 10, a majority (N=124) with diploma in education were seen to be more concerned about the new salary than their counterparts with a relatively lower qualification.

Table 10

Mean Concern Differences Influenced by Teachers' Qualification

Source	N	M	SD
Cert "A"	4	23.75	7.27
Diploma in education	124	28.75	4.28

Source: Field Work

The differences in the magnitude (Mean=28.75) of concern of the teachers with diploma in education compared with that (Mean=23.75) of those with Cert "A" is indicative that teachers with higher qualification have higher expectation from the new salary scheme. What strengthens the case is the relatively limited variation (standard deviation=4.28) in the concerns of teachers with diploma in education. Even as much as they were relaxed in harbouring concerns about the new salary scheme, Cert "A" teachers differed in their perception about the single spine salary almost twice (standard deviation=7.27) as much as the teachers with diploma in education. Thus the level of teachers' qualification determines the level of their concern about the new salary scheme.

This finding has been grounded in theory already as many writers (Barnett & Ritter, 2008; Honawar & Olson, 2008; Odden & Kelley, 2002; Podgursky & Springer, 2007) contend that a single salary schedule has been the norm to compensate teachers and is based on the number of years of service as well as the number and type of degrees held. Wade Nelson, a

professor of educational leadership, adds by saying that this practice has survived because it is so difficult to fairly gauge what a teacher brings to the classroom (Dillon, 2008). No wonder teachers with higher degrees or qualifications seem to crave more and thus are more concerned about the single spine salary structure. The teachers with higher qualification have intense concerns probably because the single spine salary, to such teachers' understanding, promises to reward employees according to their qualification. As a result, such teachers use their qualification as a proxy to determine how much they should get judging from the salary of some civil servants who have started benefiting from the new salary.

The single spine salary scheme does not mean that all teachers earn the same salary. Individual teacher salaries vary according to specific attributes of individual teachers. Teachers with more years of experience have higher salaries, as do teachers with more education attainment. Yet teachers would not be paid more for additional jobs. But critical to the success of the single spine salary schedule is that the basis for paying teachers different amounts, i.e., years of experience, education units and different jobs, are objective, measurable, and not subject to administrative discretion. This might be the likely inducement for teachers to be assured of some fairness within their service. The objective discrimination among teachers with different academic background should be sharp to create a sense of value and worth.

**Relationship between Teacher Equity Sensitivity and Teacher Concerns
about the Single Spine Salary**

The study set out to determine whether the concerns of teachers about the single spine salary structure are in anyway related to the equity sensitivity of teachers. The results of the data gathered have been assembled in Table 11.

Table 11

Teacher Equity Sensitivity and Concerns about the Single Spine Salary

	N	Sig	R
Correlation	129	.045	-.177

Source: Field Work

The Phi correlation test revealed a significant relationship between the concerns of teachers about the single spine salary structure and the equity sensitivity of teachers about the new salary. Therefore, there is association between the responsiveness of teachers in accepting the new salary and their current perception about it. As a result, the null hypothesis which stated that there is no relationship between teachers' equity sensitivity to and their concerns about the single spine salary is accordingly rejected. Only that the relationship between teachers' concerns and their equity sensitivity was negative. This indicates further that the higher the agitation of teachers the higher the possibility that they are likely to demand more under the single spine salary structure.

This, therefore, makes the prediction of teacher reaction more possible, because teachers' concerns can be used as a proxy in predicting teacher probable equity sensitivity. Hence, greater reliance will have to be placed

onboth teachers' concerns and equity sensitivity in making predictions about their probable reactions towards the single spine salary structure.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This is the last chapter of the study. It summarises the study to highlight the methodology adopted in collecting and analyzing data so as come out with the main findings. Based on the main findings, conclusions are reached to permit the provision of appropriate recommendations.

Summary

This part is divided into two sections. The first section summarizes the process of the research, and the second presents summarized findings of the study.

Summary of Research Process

The research was undertaken to explore teachers' equity sensitivity of and concerns about the single spine salary structure. Other subsidiary objectives included finding out whether gender, rank and qualification influence teachers' equity sensitivity of and concern about the single spine salary structure. Also, it aimed at ascertaining whether there is any relationship between equity sensitivity and teachers' concerns about the single spine salary structure. The following research questions and hypothesis guided the study:

1. How sensitive are teachers about the equitable nature of the single spine salary structure?
2. What influence do the following factors have on teachers' equity sensitivity to and concerns about the single spine salary structure:
 - d. sex
 - e. rank
 - f. qualification
3. What are the concerns of teachers about the single spine salary structure?
4. H_0 : No relationship exists between equity sensitivity and teachers' concerns about the single spine salary structure.

H_1 : There is a relationship between equity sensitivity and teachers' concerns about the single spine salary structure.

Using descriptive sample survey, the Equity Sensitivity Instrument was adapted and used to collect the relevant data. Additional items were designed to gather demographic data and respondents' concerns about the single spine salary. The two separate set of items were integrated to form the entire questionnaire for the data collection. The instrument was administered to 150 basic teachers on the IEDE, University of Education, distance education programme, but the return rate was 86%. The respondents were selected based on convenience. The resulting data were analysed using both descriptive and inferential statistics.

Summary of Key Findings

The following key findings were obtained after a thorough discussion of the results:

1. Teachers are equity sensitives. They require a fair and equitable treatment from the single spine salary structure.
2. Teachers' equity sensitivity is independent of their sex, qualification and rank. Also, sex and rank of teachers are not factors of teachers' concerns about the single spine salary structure; however, the qualification of teachers influences the probable concerns of teachers.
3. Teachers were concerned about the delay in getting their turn on the implementation of the single spine salary structure; their unawareness of the amount they would receive and what other workers were collecting under the new salary scheme; the apparent failure of GNAT to bargain well for them; and the ability of the new salary structure to motivate them work better.
4. There is a negative relationship between teachers' equity sensitivity and their concerns about single spine salary structure.

Conclusions

The fact that teachers are mostly equity sensitives and thus they requiring a fair and equitable treatment from the single spine salary is indicative of the fact that they might act in ways that commensurate with of the compensation given them. Should the single spine salary structure fail to meet their expectation, teachers might give a work output of the same measure suiting the salary level. This implies reduced productivity. Although found to

be mainly equity sensitives, teachers' equity sensitivity is independent of their sex, qualification, and rank. Hence, such teacher characteristics are not predictors of teacher equity sensitivity about the single spine salary structure. Teachers' equity sensitivity about the new salary is therefore generally arbitrarily predictable based on their general quest for salary adjustment.

Teachers' equity sensitivity about the single spine salary was found not to be related to their concerns about single spine salary structure. Therefore, teacher concerns give no clue as to how equitably sensitive teachers were about the single spine salary structure. It is, therefore, unilaterally conclusive to use only teachers' equity sensitivity to predict teachers' behavior about the single spine salary. Therefore, based on the equity sensitivity, teachers as equity sensitives are interested in fairer compensation that matches input/output ratio. Hence, if the new salary scheme fails to achieve equity and results in under-reward situation, teachers might reduce their output. The results of which is poor quality graduate.

The major concerns of teachers were the delay in getting their turn on the implementation of the single-salary; their unawareness of the amount they would receive and what other workers were collecting under the new scheme; the feeling that GNAT failed to bargain well for them; and the ability of the new salary to motivate them work better. There was a limited representation of teachers in ascertaining their salary in the new salary scheme. Such has the capability to cause some fear and anxiety in teachers about the responsiveness of the salary to meet their needs. Inasmuch as teachers had some intense concerns about the appropriateness of the single spine salary, the revelation that gender and rank of teachers were independent of their concerns about the

single spine salary showed a massive shift from the general belief. It was not, however, surprising that the qualification of teachers determine their probable concerns. Therefore, if the salary does not discriminate based on increasing qualification of teachers, there is likely to be a feeling of inequity.

Recommendations

The findings obtained suggest some remediation if any mark is to be made by the single spine salary structure. Therefore, in the light of such findings, the following recommendations are made.

Because teachers are mainly equity sensitive, there is need for the Fair Wages and Salaries Commission to be actually *fair* in principle and in deed. If the Commission fails to design an equitable salary that teachers would be comfortable with, this pay structure might fail just like the old pay policy. It is prudent for the Commission to consider the major concerns of teachers by:

1. expediting the implementation of the salary such that teachers would see and experience the relative advantage the new salary scheme brings. The Commission should note that the delay in implementation of the new pay policy reduces the potential impact the scheme would otherwise have made due to the lapse of time.
2. in consultation with the Accountant General, making explicit the amount of salary the various categories of teachers would receive as well as what other workers are receiving under the new scheme. Such transparency is necessary to avoid mistrust as it is said secrecy begets mistrusts.

3. reaching a compromise with the teachers in fixing the level of salary. If the salary fails to bring any difference in teachers' standard of living, they might not feel the utility of the new salary to motivate them to work better.

The Ghana National Association of Teachers (GNAT) should give a periodic report to teachers on the progress of the negotiation of the salary of teachers with the Fair Wages Commission. Because most teachers do not know the efforts GNAT is making for and on behalf of teachers insofar as the single spine salary structure is concerned, most teachers felt GNAT failed to bargain well for them.

Basic school teachers also have the responsibility to seek knowledge of the new salary scheme. This will enable them to make the decisions about the expectations of the single spine salary structure.

Areas for Further Research

The study explored the equity sensitivity to and concerns about the single spine salary structure among basic school student teachers of the Institute of Educational Development and Extension (IEDE) at the Cape Coast study centre in the Cape Coast metropolis. The study dealt with only basic school teachers. It is therefore recommended that future research efforts be concentrated on:

1. the assessment of equity sensitivity to and concerns about the single spine salary structure among basic school teachers in the whole of Ghana; and
2. employing that same topic but studying all teachers in Ghana to have

a more comprehensive evidence to make a valid generalization.

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Appendix A
Consent Letter

Dear Respondent,

I am conducting a research study and would like to ask for your help. If you are willing to participate, it should take about 10-15 minutes of your time. I would be most grateful if you could complete the attached questionnaire which seeks to measure your concerns and equity sensitivity to the extent to which you think the single spine salary is better to teachers, compared with other public sector workers.

You are assured of the anonymity of the response you give and that no personal information about you is sought for any use whatsoever.

Please sign the space provided below if you agree to participate in the study.

Thank you

Iagree to participate in the study.

Appendix B

Questionnaire on the Single Spine Salary Scheme

Part I: Background Information

1. What is your sex?

Male { }

Female { }

2. What is your highest teaching qualification?

None { }

Cert "B" { }

Cert "A" { }

Diploma in Education { }

3. What is your rank?

Superintendent II { }

Superintendent I { }

Senior Superintendent II { }

Senior Superintendent I { }

Principal Superintendent { }

Assistant director II { }

Assistant director I { }

Deputy Director { }

Part II: Equity Sensitivity

The next five items ask you what you would like your relationship to be with any organization for which you might work. On each question, divide 10 points between two choices (Choice A and Choice B) by giving the most

points to the choice that is most like you and the fewest to the choice that is least like you. You can give the same number of points to both choices and you can also use zeros if you like. Please be sure to allocate 10 points per question between each pair of possible responses.

1. It would be more important to me to:

_____ A. Get from the organization

_____ B. Give to the organization

2. It would be more important for me to:

_____ A. Help others

_____ B. Watch out for my own good

3. I would be more concerned about:

_____ A. What I received from the organization

_____ B. What I contributed to the organization

4. The hard work I would do should:

_____ A. Benefit the organization

_____ B. Benefit me

5. My personal philosophy in dealing with the organization would be:

_____ A. If I do not look out for myself, nobody else will

_____ B. It is better for me to give than receive

Part III: Concerns of Teachers

The items in the **second part** are developed around typical concerns that teachers might have about the single spine salary structure. Please mark the

appropriate column to indicate whether or not you agree and the extent to which you agree or disagree.

Key: SA: Strongly Agree

A: Agree

D: Disagree

SD: Strongly Disagree”

Item	SD	D	A	SA
1. The implementation of single spine salary has delayed				
2. The government cannot sustain the scheme				
3. My expectation may not be met				
4. I am not aware how much I will receive				
5. GNAT failed to bargain well for teachers				
6. The new salary will motivate me to teach better				
7. We should know what other workers are collecting under the scheme				
8. My current salary discourages me to teach wholeheartedly				
9. The single spine salary scheme will not boost my morale to teach better once it is implemented				
10. I will adjust my output to suit the salary level				