UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST

CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS IN THE GA

CHIEFTAINCY CONFLICT

ABDUL WAHAB ATTA BASHIRU

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CHIEFTAINCY CONFLICT

BY

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DECLARATION

Candidate's Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my own original research and no part of it has been presented for another degree in this university or elsewhere.

Candidate's Signature ………………………... Date ……………………….

Name: …………………………………………………………………………..

Supervisor's Declaration

We hereby declare that the preparation and presentation of the thesis were supervised in accordance with the guidelines on supervision of thesis laid down by the University of Cape Coast.

Principal Supervisor's Signature …………………… Date …………………….

Name: …………………………………………………………………………

Co-supervisor's Signature…………………… Date …………………............

Name:…………………………………………………………………………

ABSTRACT

Many conflicts in Ghana have assumed protracted nature. State and civil society organizations have used a variety of conflict resolution mechanisms to tackle most of these conflicts. However, the reoccurrence of these conflicts over time have questioned the resolution mechanisms employed to resolve these conflicts. This study sought to assess the conflict resolution mechanisms used by institutions like National Peace Council (NPC), Greater Accra Regional House of Chiefs (GARHC) and Regional Security Councils (REGSEC) in resolving the Ga chieftaincy conflict. The study used eight key respondents who were purposively selected and 215 respondents who were conveniently selected. The mixed method approach was used for data collection and analysis. The study revealed that the root cause of the Ga Chieftaincy conflict is about who is the rightful successor to the Ga Mantse throne after the Ga Mantse Boni Nii Amugi II. It was also revealed that mediation, adjudication and police intervention are the most commonly used mechanisms by the conflict resolution institutions (NPC, GARHC and REGSEC). These institutions have not been able to resolve the conflict and in the process has rendered the mechanisms ineffective due to multiple challenges. Lastly, the study revealed that the approval of the Ga chieftaincy constitution by the relevant government institutions with the help of the four ruling houses and Ga Dsase to clearly state the succession line would go a long way to help resolve the Ga chieftaincy conflict. The study recommended the use of conciliation to support various indigenous resolution mechanisms to resolve the Ga Chieftaincy Conflicts.

KEY WORDS

Conflict

Chieftaincy

Mechanisms

Resolution

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

DEDICATION

To my deceased parents

Ahmed Atta Bashiru and Margaret Abu-Bonsrah

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ATR	African Traditional Region
BNI	Bureau of National Investigations
BoG	Boards of Governors
CBD	Central Business District
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CRT	Conflict Resolution Training
DISEC	District Security Committees
GARHC	Greater Accra Regional House of Chiefs
GSS	Ghana Statistical Service
GTC	Ga Traditional Council
HI	Historical Institutionalism
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NHC	National House of Chiefs
NI	New Institutionalism Approach
NPC	National Peace Council
NPP	New Patriotic Party
REGSEC	Regional Security Councils
RHC	Regional Houses of Chiefs
SPSS	Statistical Product and Service Solution
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNIFTPA	United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

Conflict is a global risk to peace and security and draws the attention of world leaders, international organisations and world governing bodies to take actions to resolve it. Conflict occurs in all aspects of human relationships and all social groupings. Due to the enormous potential differences among people, conflict will continue to exist in meaningful human interaction (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000; Fisher, 2000). Conflict is an unavoidable fact of human existence. The problem is not the existence of conflict, but how it is handled where it occur (Fisher, 2000; Mayer, 2000). At the global level, many countries have had conflicting situations and some continue to experience them.

Africa has had its share of conflicts since the end of the cold war, leaving behind serious consequences including political, social, economic and humanitarian problems. For instance, the conflicts in Nigeria (1967-1970), Liberia (1989-1997, 2000-2003), Sierra Leone (1992-2002) Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2010), Uganda (1979), Somalia (since 1991), Rwanda (1994), and Kenya (1963-1967) are evidence of conflicts in Africa (McGowan, 2005) which have an deleterious evection on these countries in terms of loss of human life and property, and the destruction of social infrastructure (Wanyande, 1997). For instance, in 2002, Liberia was the scene of more than 200,000 deaths and more than two million displaced and thousands maimed (UNEP, 2009). In addition, in the Sudanese region of Darfur alone, the continuous conflict has caused more 300,000 deaths and the

displacement of more than two million people since 2003 (UNEP, 2009). Although few of these conflicts have taken place between states, most of them are intra-state conflicts.

The West Africa Sub-region experienced many conflicts from 1980 to the 90s; conflict has engulf the region disrupting many previously stable countries (Tonah, 2007; Mahama, 2013). Most of these conflicts are violent conflict. The consequences of these conflicts are loss of lives, failed states, hunger and poverty. Because of these conflicts, many people have been displaced and others refugees in other countries. The effects of these conflicts are huge on civilians, mostly children and women (UNIFTPA, 2012). Some scholars like Annan (2014) have cited scarcity of resources, the fragility of the African states, bad governance, ethnicity, and colonialism as the fundamental causes of these conflicts.

Ghana has also witnessed violent conflicts at the national level as a country. There have been four successful coup d'états and several unsuccessful coup attempts since Ghana achieved independence in 1957. In addition to these coups, the country has witnessed various categorisation of conflicts over the years and these conflicts were in the form of inter/intra ethnic conflict, religious conflict, political violence, social conflict and chieftaincy conflict which are mostly protracted. Chieftaincy conflict can be either inter-ethnic or intra-ethnic. Notable among them are the protracted conflicts between Nkonya and Alavanyo; Peki and Tsito in the Volta Region; Konkomba and Nanumba; the Abudu and Andani conflict in Dagbon, in the Northern Region and Mamprusi and Kusasi in Bawku, in the Upper East Region of the country (Mahama, 2003). Others are the Anlo

chieftaincy conflict, the Adoagyiri crisis, Princess and Aketekyi towns' troubles, the eruption of the Tuobodom chieftaincy conflict and the Ga chieftaincy conflict, among others (Prah & Yeboah, 2011).

Among all the conflict taking place in Ghana, chieftaincy conflicts seem to be the most recurring and most violent. According to Anamzoya (2010), the total number of chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana is estimated to be 300. Chieftaincy conflict, which is the focus of this thesis, is characterised by disputed claims between rival claimants to the traditional political office of "chief" in a traditional area. It can be described as intra-ethnic because rival claimants to chiefly office come from different lineages within the same ethnic group. The causes of these conflicts are deeply rooted in historical, socio-economic and political conditions, which inspire the main factions in the early stages and later conflict escalation. Chieftaincy conflicts are often associated with ethnicity which plays a large role and sometimes becomes the main factor in these internal conflicts (Gati & Tal, 2008).

These chieftaincy conflicts caused a lot of havoc to life and property. For example, the Konkomba, and Nanumba/Dagomba chieftaincy conflict as the dominant ethnic group in 1994/95 resulted in the loss of 2000 human lives and 18,900 animals lives, 60,000 acres of crops set on fire, over 50,000 tubers of yam destroyed, 144 farming villages burnt, 78,000 people displaced and millions of properties belonging to the state and indigenes destroyed (Mahama, 2003). Likewise, in the Effutu chieftaincy conflict, the conflict has resulted in several anti-social conducts such as destruction of lives and property (Ayensah, 2013). The

Effutu chieftaincy conflict has also divided the Effutus and this could run through generations. This has a chance of affecting grassroots democracy and general development.

The Ga chieftaincy conflict is like all other chieftaincy conflicts. The conflict revolves around rival claimants in the selection of a king, which led to multiple claimants and destoolments in 1918, 1929, 1944, and 1961. According to Kilson (1983), Ga Kings were initially selected from three Royal Houses, among which the privilege rotates. The three original Royal Houses were under Tungma We dynasty namely: Teiko Tsuru We, Amugi We, and Tackie Kome We but they changed in 1964 after the destoolment of Nii Taki Kome II in 1962 because they wanted to explore the place of Akropong and Adzimankese within Tungma We dynasty. Because of that, a committee was set up by the Dsase (council of royals) to change the constitution for the ruling families.

Accordingly, Teiko Tsuru We, Amugi We, and Tackie Kome We were to be changed to Akropong and Adzimankese, respectively. Teiko Tsuru We members in finding their root within the royal gate argued that their House is Akropong, but some Teiko Tsuru We expressed the opinion that Amugi We are Akropong (Boakye, 2016). Amugi We members, nonetheless, claimed that they hailed from Adzimankese. Tackie Kome We members also proved with an evidential letter that Teiko Tsuru We and Tackie Kome We created Adzimankese, but Teiko Tsuru We insisted that they alone were from Akropong while Amugi We maintained their attachment to Adzimankese. During the discussion, a different House also came

about called Abola Piam We and its members argued that Abola Piam We are connected with Amugi We and are part of the Akropong.

Therefore, the ruling houses were Adzimankese comprising Teiko Tsuru We and Tackie Kome We; and Akropong consisting of Amugi We and Abola Piam We increasing the royal Houses from three to four, which could be termed as the origin of Ga chieftaincy succession conflicts today. Ga chieftaincy conflict can also be termed as an extended intra-ethnic lineage-based succession crisis. Kilson (1983, p. 411-421) argues that "this merger recognized the division within Amugi We that contributed to the stool conflict for nearly a half century". According to Kendie, Osei-Kufuor and Boakye (2014), the Ga chieftaincy conflict is centred on the legitimate successor to the late chief, Boni Nii Amugi II, who ruled for 40 years. The two protagonists are King Tackie Tawiah (now deceased) and King Adamu Latse, from the Teiko Tsuru We and Abola Piam We, respectively. These groups conflict with the ownership and administration of the Ga Traditional Area.

Now, the problem of the Ga chieftaincy conflict is more complicated at the family level as each of the two disputing ruling houses has its internal conflict as to who the rightful candidate should be. For example, within the Teiko Tsuru We ruling house, there were two claimants (Dr. Joe Blankson and Dr. Kelvin Tackie Abia) to the throne. The Acting President of the Ga Traditional Council installed Dr. Joe Blankson as Ga Manste under the stool name Nii Tackie Tawiah III in March 2006. Alternatively, the Dsasetse of the Ga State, Nii Dr. Tetteh Kwei II installed Dr. Kelvin Tackie Abia as the Ga Mantse under the stool name Nii Tackie Teiko Tsuru II in August 2015 (Boakye, 2016).

A similar situation exists in the Abola Paim We ruling house. There are two claimants to the throne (George Nii Adama Tackie Abia and Henry Nii Ayitey Aryeetey). The Dsasetse (head of the kingmakers) and Acting Asere Mantse of the Ga State Council, Nii Amarkai III, installed George Nii Adama Tackie Abia as Ga Mantse in June 2011 under the stool name Boni Nii Tackie Adama Latse II. He was subsequently gazetted in April 2015. Before this, Wulomo Akroshie, in-charge of the Sakumono Stool had installed Henry Aryeetey under the stool name Nii Tackie Oblie II in 2008 (Boakye, 2016).

Despite several measures being used including high court system and adjudication process of the Regional House of Chiefs employed by both parties to resolve the conflict, the conflict remains unresolved. The reoccurrences of the conflict seem to mean that there is no effective way of managing or resolving these long-standing conflicts. The Ga chieftaincy conflict is also allegedly influenced by successive governments (political parties), particularly the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC). While the NPP government is alleged to support King Tackie Tawiah, the NDC government is believed to be sympathetic to the rival King, Adama Latse (Kendie et al., 2014). Security agencies working to prevent conflict have been questioned about taking side or involving themselves in most chieftaincy cases. In the Ga Chieftaincy conflict, police inaction has also been blamed for the continued tensions. The Ga Traditional Council blamed the police for encouraging indiscipline and violence and failing to prevent the groups from forcefully breaking into the Ga Mantse's palace when the case was

in court. Such inaction of the police may be seen as complicity leading to comments that purport to bring government into the conflict (Kendie et al., 2014).

There is no doubt that numerous strategies and efforts that have been employed to resolve the conflicts have failed. Most of the efforts have contributed to re-orienting the parties involved in peaceful co-existence. However, the conflict remains unresolved and its recurrence suggests that the methods adopted for solving the conflicts may not be suitable, and therefore, not effective. The appropriateness is essential in the attainment of lasting peace, a resolution that deals with the causes (root and proximate causes) of the conflict. These conflicts have been recurring over the years with the same causes that sparked the violence.

Statement of the Problem

What has become a rising concern for researchers is the growing number of chieftaincy related conflicts witnessed in several regions of Ghana. These conflicts neither are current developments nor restricted to only one traditional area within Ghana. However, Bombande (2007), assumes that most violent chieftaincy conflicts occur in northern Ghana. As a result, research on chieftaincy conflicts focuses on northern Ghana to the neglect of other parts of the country particularly the Greater Accra Region. However, almost every traditional area has encountered a chieftaincy conflict in one way or the other (Prah & Yeboah, 2011; Kendie et al., 2014). There are hundreds of chieftaincy conflicts pending in law courts throughout the country.

The current Ga chieftaincy conflict which started in 2004 has not erupted into a serious violent conflict, even though there have been pockets of violence

7

whenever the opposing sides clashed. This is because of the heavy presence of the security agencies in the Greater Accra Region. Greater Accra Region is the administrative capital of Ghana. It must be noted, however, that the pockets of violence that have been recorded have led to the destruction of property in the area.

The Ga chieftaincy conflict posed some challenges to the people and the government. These clashes have the potential of disturbing the governance and peace of not only Accra but Ghana as a whole. As has been witnessed in recent times in Peki and Tsito; Yendi; Bimbilla and other parts of the country, violent clashes of any form usually lead to the declaration of a state of emergency and the subsequent imposition of curfews in the area. Such a situation in Accra will have dire consequences on the economic, social and political fortunes of the Ghanaian state, simply because Accra is the heartbeat of Ghana. It is the place where everything happens from business to pleasure, politics to governance and culture to education. The periodic violent clashes in Accra seem to mean that there is no effective way of managing or resolving these long-standing conflicts.

Many studies have been done in the area of conflict resolution strategies and each of the studies has been focused on different aspects of conflict resolution with a few focused on the effectiveness of resolution mechanisms. Midodzi and Imoro (2011) for example, looked at the advantages and disadvantages of alternative dispute resolution and how to resolve a conflict. Fleetwood (1987), also has investigated conflict management styles and strategies of educational managers. Also, Afful-Broni (2012) focused on the role of school heads in

managing conflict. Bukari (2013) examined the challenges and prospects of the peace process in the Bawku Traditional Area.

All of these studies, researchers did not assess the effectiveness of the resolution mechanisms employed but Anumel, (2017) assessed the effectiveness of conflict resolution mechanisms and focused on the role of the National Peace Council in resolving the Alavanyo/Nkonya and Hohoe conflicts. Thus, there is a dearth of literature in Ghana that assesses the effectiveness of conflict resolution mechanism especially those related to chieftaincy.

Objectives of the Study

The general objective of the study was to assess the conflict resolution mechanisms used in resolving the Ga chieftaincy conflict.

The specific objectives of the study were to:

1. Examine the factors causing the protraction of the Ga chieftaincy conflict.

2. Examine the various conflict resolution mechanisms/strategies that are used to resolve the Ga Chieftaincy Conflict.

3. Evaluate respondents' perception of the effectiveness of the conflict resolution mechanisms used.

4. Make recommendation for resolving the Ga Chieftaincy Conflict

Research Questions

This study sought to answer the following questions:

1. What factors accounted for the protraction of the Ga chieftaincy conflict?

2. What conflict resolution mechanisms/strategies have been used to resolve the Ga Chieftaincy Conflict?

3. What are the respondents' perceptions of the effectiveness of the conflict resolution mechanisms used?

Significance of the Study

Dealing with conflicts in Ghana has taken the prominent stage in the last decade with efforts geared towards developing alternative, acceptable and successful mechanisms for dealing with the country's numerous conflicts. The significance of the study is to add to the advocacy of the need to adopt appropriate mechanisms to resolve conflict. One of the main goals of this study is to contribute to the understanding of the use of conflict resolution mechanisms in protracted violent conflicts.

Again, this research is significant as it assesses the use of non-violent means in the resolution of conflicts in Ghana. The current situation of peace in the Ga Chieftaincy conflict is negative. This research would assess the effectiveness of the conflict resolution and emphasise the use of non-violent means in conflict resolution in Ghana. The study also adds to the scanty literature on the effectiveness of conflict resolution in Africa and Ghana.

Scope of the Study

Conflict is widespread in most parts of Ghana. The scope, however, will be limited to the Ga Traditional Area. The researcher specifically chooses the study area due to the protracted nature of conflicts in the area. This research is therefore, to provide realistic data to help manage the situation.

Many theories of conflict exist in explaining the nature of conflict in society, but this research will be based on three theories namely: Frustration-Aggression Theory of conflict, Relational Theory of conflict, Structural Theory of conflict. The theories are such that they help in the understanding of the causes of this conflict. To understand conflict resolution mechanisms, it is essential to look at the theories supporting the subject.

Organisation of the Study

The study is organised into five chapters. Chapter one focuses on the introductory aspects of the research topic, and it gives a general introduction to the research. This chapter is made up of the following; the background to the study, the statement of the problem, the objectives and research questions of the study, the significance of the study, and the scope of the study.

Chapter two reviews the related literature to the study. The researcher will consider theoretical and empirical literature available on the subject matter and a conceptual framework to guide the study.

Chapter three focuses on the research methods used for the research. This chapter includes the sources of the data, the sampling techniques that will be used and the reasons for employing such techniques.

The fourth chapter presents the analysis of data, interpretation of data and the discussing of the data collected. The last chapter for this study, chapter five, presents the summaries, conclusions, suggestions, and recommendations. This chapter summarises the findings, make conclusions from the findings of the study and its implication. Also, it considers recommendations and suggestions based on the findings of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Literature review is a very vital element in the conduct of research because it helps the researcher to understand and infer from basic concepts relating to the phenomenon being studied. Neuman (2003), defines literature review as a carefully crafted summary of recent studies conducted on a topic that includes key findings and methods researchers used while making sure to document the sources. This chapter reviews some theories of conflict, key concepts and ideas of chieftaincy conflict and resolution mechanisms. Also, this chapter discusses empirical studies in relation to this study and presents a conceptual framework.

Theoretical Framework

Many theories of conflict exist in explaining the nature of conflicts in society. Successful and effective conflict resolution requires a thorough and systematic understanding of the root or remote cause of the conflict which would therefore provide the fundamental ground for conflict resolution. To understand conflict resolution mechanisms, it is essential to look at the theories supporting the theme. The theories must be such that they aid in the understanding of the causes of conflicts. Frustration-Aggression Theory of conflict, Relational Theory of conflict, Structural Theory of conflict, Historical Institutionalism and are the theories that underpin the study.

Frustration-Aggression Conflict Theory

This theory says that frustration causes aggression, but when the source of the frustration cannot be challenged, the aggression gets displaced onto another target. When an individual is prevented from attaining his/her goal, he/she becomes frustrated. This frustration can then turn into aggression when something triggers it. The frustration-aggression theory is an attempt to state a relationship believed to be vital in many different areas of study. It is intended to propose to the individual of human nature that when he/she sees aggression he/she should turn a suspicious eye on possibilities that the organism or group is confronted with frustration; and that when he/she views interference with individual group habits, he/she should be on the look-out for, among other things, aggression (Miller, 1941).

The frustration-aggression theory which John Dollard and his research associates initially developed in 1939 and has been expanded and modified by Berkowitz (1962) and Yates (1962) appear to be the most common explanation to violent behaviour stemming from an inability to fulfil needs. Theorists who depend on this explanation use the psychological theories of motivation and behaviour as well as frustration and aggression in an attempt to explain aggression. Scholars point to the difference between what people feel, want, or deserve to what they get-the 'want-get-ration' and the difference between 'expected need satisfaction' and 'actual need satisfaction' (Pastore, 1952; Arthur, 1955; Kregaraman & Worchel, 1961; Arnold, 1963).

When expectation does not meet attainment, the tendency is for persons to confront those they hold for frustrating their ambitions. According to Gurr (2009),

the higher the discrepancy, however marginal, between what is sought and what seems attainable, the larger would be the chances that anger and violence will result. In the case of Ga chieftaincy conflict, after the demise of Ga Mantse (Nii Amugi in 2004), conflicting parties have been frustrating each other in appointing the right successor to the Ga Mantse throne which has led to the use of aggression. This aggressive use of power by conflicting parties has also led to the Ga chieftaincy conflict.

Relational Theory of Social Conflict

Relational theories attempt to explain violent conflicts between groups by exploring sociological, political, economic and historical relationships between such groups. There is the belief that value and cultural differences as well as group interests all influence relationships between individuals and groups in different ways (Faleti, 2006, cited in Best, 2006). Sociologically, differences between cultural values is a challenge to group or individual identity formation processes and create the tendency to see others as intruders who have to be prevented from prying into established cultural boundaries.

Political economy, for example, identifies power and other advantages that it confers as a key source of tension between different interest groups within a political system. In situations where multiple groups share a common resource that is fixed in nature, the chances that each will attempt to eliminate, neutralise or injure the other or monopolise such resources (Maoz, 1982) is as high as the tendency to enter into a negative relationship.

Faleti (2006) argues further that several conflicts grow out of a history of conflict between groups that have led to the development of negative stereotypes and discrimination. Such a history of negative exchanges makes it difficult for conflicting groups to trust one another. In the case of the Ga chieftaincy disturbances, the long-standing differences between the conflicting groups; Teiko Tsuru We, Taki Kome We, Amugi We and Abola Piam We have made it difficult for them to trust each other and therefore appear not to be ready for a dialogue. Each of these groups has taken an entrenched position that they are the rightful to the throne and this makes it difficult to resolve the dispute. To the relational theorists, the fact that others are perceived as different makes others feel they are entitled to less or are inferior because of culture. This situation disrupts the flow of communication between the groups and twists perceptions that the groups have about each other.

Structural Theory of Conflict

The main argument of the structural theory of conflict is that conflict is built into the particular ways societies are structured and organised (Best, 2006). The structural theory looks at social problems like political and economic exclusion, injustice, poverty, exploitation and inequity as sources of conflict. Best (2006) argues that conflicts occur because of the exploitative and unjust nature of human societies and the domination of one class by another. Ross (2007) noted that in situations where economic and political discrimination and weak kinship ties are the defining characteristics of a society, the chances that conflict will result are

higher. According to Kothari (2006), the control and use of resources lie at the heart of the deepening crisis in the world today.

When social, economic, cultural or political change is externally driven, the assumption is that these institutions have problems that need to be dealt with by imposing new, radically different ones. The structural root of conflict focuses on the symbols, perceptions, identities and meanings that give rise to conflict. LeBaron (2002), explained the structural root as relating to the way we order and structure our thoughts and our feelings and the cultural message that shape our perceptions of the social phenomenon in society.

The Ga chieftaincy conflict is attributed to the changes in structural (constitution) in 1962 after the destoolment of Nii Taki Kome II by the Dsase to explore the place of Akropong and Adzimankese within Tunma We dynasty. Original, Ga Kings were selected from three Royal Houses, among which the privilege was rotating chieftaincy office amongst several gates. The constitutional change brought about an increase in the ruling houses from three to four which could be termed as the origin of Ga chieftaincy succession conflicts today.

Dual Concern Model

The dual concern model of conflict resolution is a conceptual perspective that assumes individuals' preferred method of dealing with conflict is based on two underlying themes or dimensions: concern for self (assertiveness) and concern for others (empathy) (Donelson, 2009).

Dual concern model conceptualizes five conflict styles for conflict resolution (these are responses or clusters of behavior that people use in conflict). These are competition (forcing or fighting), avoidance (passivity), compromise (conciliation), accommodation (yielding) and collaboration (problem solving) (Browaeys & Price, 2017). The model is based on balancing two dimensions: concern for self and concern for other (Figure 1). Various conflict styles evolve due to variation on scale between the concern of meeting one's own goals and the concern for other people in order to maintain relationship. According to the model, group members balance their concern for satisfying personal needs and interests with their concern for satisfying the needs and interests of others in different ways. The intersection of these two dimensions ultimately leads individuals towards exhibiting different styles of conflict resolution (Goldfien & Robbennolt, 2006).

Sometimes conflict styles are expressed in terms of goals. For example, "competition" is expressed as goal to win, or in other words, self wants to win without caring for others. In "accommodation" conflict style the goal is to yield, i.e., the person concerned does not care for self. In "compromising" conflict style, the goal is to reconcile. The goal in "collaboration" is to act in the best interests of each other. It is a problem solving approach. "Avoidance" or "inaction" is a case where self's outcomes and the other's outcomes are of no importance (Paakki, 2017).

High [   ] Accommodation   Collaboration

compromise

Low [   ]   Avoidance   Competition

            Low   High

Concern for Self

(left axis label, vertical: **Concern for Other**)

Figure 1: Dual Concern Model

Source: Pruitt and Carnevale (1993)

However, there is criticism of the Dual Concern Model. Some authors argued that a two-dimensional model is too simplistic to explain conflict styles. Sorenson, Morse and Savange (1999) suggested that motivation should be included as another dimension in the model. It was suggested that motives like concern for relationship and emotion should be included in the dual concern model (Sorenson et al, 1999).

Conflict theories underpinning this study has been summarised in Table 1.

Table 1: Conflict Theories

Conflict theories	Assumptions	Lead to	Result in
Frustration-Aggression	Denial of access to Ga Mantse throne	Aggression	Conflict
Relational	Differences in cultural values	Discrimination	Conflict
Structural	Constitutional change	Disagreement	Conflict
Dual Concern Model	Balance between concern of self and others	Agreement	Conflict resolution

Source: Author's Construct

Historical Institutionalism

The Historical Institutionalism (HI) approach provides useful insights into the Ga chieftaincy conflict. This theory is one of the three strands of the New Institutionalism approach (NI). The NI is a distinct theoretical approach that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s in reaction to the behavioural perspective explanation of social and political phenomena and outcomes. Behaviouralism sought to explain how and why different actors undertake particular courses of action (Lowndes, 2010). The New Institutionalism, on the other hand, moves beyond the logical study of formal structures of political institutions (organisations) that characterise traditional institutionalism to inductive research of impact of institutions (formal rules and informal conventions) on individuals as well as the interactions between them. In doing so, the new institutionalists seek to explain the effect of institutions on the determination of political and social outcomes

(Lowndes 2010; Hall & Taylor 1996). Accordingly, scholars have identified three distinct strands of the NI. They are the Historical, Rational Choice and Sociological Institutionalism (Steinmo, 2008; Immergut, 2006; Hall & Taylor 1996).

Rational Choice Institutionalism stresses individual material self-interest (utility maximisation) as the main factor that shapes political behaviour. Rational Choice sees politics as a series of collective action dilemmas and emphasises the role of strategic interaction, structured by institutions, in the determination of political outcomes (Lowndes 2010; Hall & Taylor, 1996). Sociological Institutionalism focuses on culture to explain why organisations take on specific sets of institutional forms, procedures or symbols that are diffused through organisational fields. It broadens institutions beyond formal rules, procedures and norms to include symbol systems, cognitive scripts and moral templates that provide the frame of meaning guiding human actions (Hall & Taylor, 1996).

Immergut (2006), on the other hand, sees Historical Institutionalism (HI) as a slightly loose collection of writings by authors that tend to mix elements of rationalistic and constructivist explanations - or the 'calculus' versus the 'cultural' approach. HI emphasises the constraint of group conflicts and institutional structures on social and political behaviours and outcomes (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Influenced by group theories of politics and structural functionalism, HI asserts that conflict among rival groups for scarce resources lies at the heart of politics and sees the polity as an overall system of interacting parts. They extend the meaning of institutions beyond organisations to include formal and informal rules, procedures, norms and conventions embedded in the organisational structure of the polity (Hall

& Taylor, 1996). The strategic interaction (calculus) approach suggests instrumental human behaviour based on a strategic calculation to maximise utility and that the preferences of actors are given through institutions exogenously (Hall & Taylor, 1996). To this end, choices made about the institutional design of government systems influence the future decision-making of individuals (Lowndes, 2010).

Conversely, the interpretive interaction (cultural) approach postulates that worldviews bound political actions. This is because the individual is an entity deeply embedded in a world of institutions, composed of symbols, scripts and routines, which provide the filters for interpretation of situations and oneself, out of which a course of action is constructed. Institutions, therefore, provide the moral/cognitive templates for understanding and action (Hall & Taylor, 1996). This approach further assumes asymmetrical relations of power in institutional operation and development; path-dependent social causation and diffusion of ideas (impact of integration of institutions with opinions or beliefs on political outcomes) (Hall & Taylor, 1996). HI is therefore distinguished from other social science approaches by its attention to real-world empirical questions, its historical orientation and its attention to how institutions structure and shape political behaviour and outcomes.

Historical Institutionalism provides a unique insight into how the formal and informal institutions of the Ghanaian state and that of the people of Ga Mashie continually shaped the chieftaincy conflicts before, during and after colonialism. HI helps to understand how the burden of colonial and post-colonial political structures (such as the Ga Traditional Council) with no roots in pre-colonial

political offices over traditional institutions with roots in pre-colonial traditional offices led to conflicting interpretations of who the rightful successor to the Ga Mashie throne should be. It also helps to explain the conflict resolution disagreements about the customs and traditions of the Ga people with particular reference to succession; and the contested versions of ancestral and hereditary rights to political office.

Concepts and Ideas

Conflict

The word "conflict" comes from the Latin word conflictus, which means collision or clash (Kaus, 2012). Nevertheless, many attempts to define conflict in a way that best sums up its major aspects have been made. Scholars who also work in the field continue to work on developing definitions of conflicts according to their various features. For example, definitions exist based on the major causes of conflict, such as material resources, power, values or feelings, these are sometimes called "causative agents" (Lyamouri-Bajja, Ohana, Markosyan, Abukatta, Dolejsiova, & Vidanovic, 2013). The traditional definition of conflict, says that conflict is a dynamic process in which structure, attitudes and behaviours are constantly changing and influencing one another (Galtung, 1969).

According to Coser (1998), conflict is a struggle between opponents over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources, in which the opponents aim to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals. Coser (1998) argues that the parties in conflict are in competition or struggle over power, resources or identity

in which the conflicting parties attempt to injure one another. One thing that is worth pointing out in Coser's definition is the fact that it identifies the causes of conflicts, which include struggles over people's identity, power and resources. Conflict, therefore, is a struggle, which is either positive or negative between two parties in pursuit of interests and goals on which they sharply disagree.

According to Lund (1996), conflict occurs when two or more parties pursue conflicting goals or interests through activities that the parties try to undo or damage each other. These parties could be individuals, groups or countries. The parties' interests can differ over access to resources, the control of political or traditional power, their identity and values or ideology (Maiese, 2003). The realization of these needs and interests by people can lead to conflict. When two groups or individuals such as ethnic groups pursue conflicting interests and needs which could either be political, economic, social or cultural, they can engage in a conflict which can be violent.

According to Mitchell (1989) conflict has three inter-related components namely, conflict situation, conflict behaviour and conflict attitudes. The author argues futher that conflict situation is about the incompatible goals of parties and mostly the realisation by the parties that they are deprived of achieving such goals, they become frustrated hence the tendency of generating conflict. The author argues further that conflict attitude has to do with the perceptions of parties. When parties perceive that they are being denied of what is due them, a negative attitude of, for instance, frustration or competition is reinforced. Conflict behaviour is the specific actions of parties directed against other parties, to stop them from achieving their

goals. Thus, the attitudes of conflict parties translate into their behaviour and these cause the conflict. If these attitudes are negative, the accompanying behaviour will be negative leading to a possible confrontational conflict situation. All these three reinforce each other and cause conflict.

Chieftaincy Conflicts in Ghana

Chieftaincy could be defined as the office and the institution of which the chief is the principal operator and stakeholder. It comprises among other things: the personnel holding offices such as chiefs, queen mothers, counsellors and staff; rituals, symbol and other paraphernalia (Awedoba, 2010). The 1992 constitution of Ghana defines a chief as a person, who, hailing from the appropriate family and lineage, has been validly nominated, elected or selected and enstooled, enskinned or installed as a chief or queen mother under the relevant customary law and usage. Chieftaincy is the oldest social and political system in Ghana (Republic of Ghana, 1992). Dankwa III (2004, p.1) argues that "chieftaincy in Ghana emerged from the social fabric of the land. It is no person's creation and cannot be easily destroyed." The institution has played and continues to play significant roles in the governance system in Ghana.

The institution of chieftaincy in Ghana existed long before the advent of colonialism and has survived through pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial regimes. As a centralised system of administration, the chieftaincy institution has been the embodiment of political power in these times. Some of the ethnic groups

in this kind of system are the Akan, Ga, the Guan, the Ewe and many others (Nukunya, 2003).

The importance of the chieftaincy institution cannot be overemphasised. In traditional Ghanaian societies, chiefs have multiple roles to play as military leaders, as a chief priest who performs rituals on behalf of their people, as agents of development, as symbols of identity, as change agents and also as custodians of stool lands. In performing these multiple roles, the Ghanaian chief is seen as an embodiment of the beliefs, hopes, fears and aspirations of the people (Abotchie, 2006).

As a result of modernity and change, there are new systems of administration and Ghanaian chiefs have lost most of their functions to the systems of the modern state. This notwithstanding, chiefs continue to play essential roles in Ghanaian societies. It is essential to recognise that their mandate is even enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana.

The chieftaincy institution has been bedevilled with numerous conflicts. These conflicts are experienced in almost all traditional areas in the country. Some of such conflicts recorded in recent times include the Peki and Tsito; Nkunya and Alavanyo in the Volta Region; Mamprusi and Kusasi conflict in Bawku, in the Upper East Region; Konkomba and Nanumba conflict; and the Abudu and Andani conflict in Dagbon, in the Northern Region of the country (Mahama, 2003). Others are the Anlo chieftaincy conflict, the Adoagyiri crisis, Princess and Aketekyi towns' troubles, the eruption of the Tuobodom chieftaincy conflict and the Ga chieftaincy conflict in 2004 among others (Prah & Yeboah, 2011). Although some

of these conflicts such as Konkomba and Nanumba and Abudu and Andani have been effectively resolved, others tend to be protracted.

Larbi (2009) posited that chieftaincy is associated with political power, which also translates into the control of economic wealth in the form of stool properties such as mineral deposits, land, regalia and servants who work for the chief. The pageantry and pomp that accompany the position of the chief make the institution so attractive that, both non-royals and royals desire to use every means to ascend the throne, thus leading to conflict. Larbi (2009) also cites misappropriation of public resources, such as royalties paid to the royal house, by incumbents as a cause of these chieftaincy disputes.

Again, in Ghana, most chieftaincy conflicts occur due to lack of codification of the mode of selection of chiefs. Carscious (2013), argues that the wealth and dignity that go with the chieftaincy institution in Ghana has attracted many young aspirants to contest the stool/skin. On the demise, abdication or destoolment of the incumbent, there emerge various competing groups with their candidates for the stool (Larbi, 2009).

Finally, Ashahadu (2018), contends that the appointment of non-royals to stools/skins in the country provide the grounds for chieftaincy conflicts. He observes that some for these people are non-royals who are recognised as a result of their immense contribution to the state in terms of infrastructural development. In the past, slaves who rendered dedicated services to their masters were sometimes incorporated into the family. Some of them were rewarded with women in the community with whom they had children. The descendants of these slaves who are

now part of the royal lineage could one day emerge as a candidate to contest the vacant position of the stool. Problems occur when some members of the royal family try to discriminate against this crop of people, sometimes referring to them as 'intruders' or 'foreigners.

Based on the literature reviewed above on the causes and protraction of conflicts, key among the causes of these conflicts include succession to skins or stools, control over stool lands and land litigation, political interference and the lack of accountability and transparency by some traditional rulers (Tsikata & Seini, 2004). Most of these protracted disputes have resulted in violent conflicts. Such conflicts have always led to undesirable developments in the affected areas and the nation at large. These devastating effects of conflict include loss of lives, loss of property, the displacement of people and lawlessness. These conditions create an atmosphere of anxiety, insecurity and distrust, thus posing a threat to the peace and stability of the entire nation. To control such conflicts, security personnel are deployed to the affected areas at a massive cost to the neglect of relevant national or local development issues.

Ga-Mashie Chieftaincy Conflict

The internal history of Ga is one of the never-ending political upheavals and well-calculated manoeuvres, which were contrived sometimes by different branches of the royal family and other times by people outside Tungma We dynasty. These disruptions were as a result of conflicting interpretations of who the right successor to a chieftaincy stool should be, disagreements about custom and

tradition, jurisdiction questions, and the contested versions of ancestral and hereditary rights to political office (Seckeyfio-Lenoch, 2014).

The Ga Kingship, like all other Kingships, has had its ups and downs. According to Ayee, Frempong, Asante and Boafo-Arthur (2007), most of the disputes involve the selection of a king, which leads to multiple claimants and destoolments. Ga kings were deposed in 1918, 1929, 1944, and 1961; in each case, the conflict between the king and the council of royals (Dsase) led to the destoolment (Kilson, 1983). According to Boakye and Béland (2018), the first Ga ruler to endure this punishment was Nii Taki Obili of the Abola Piam We ruling house in 1918 after a reign of fourteen years. The cause of the destoolment was attributed to his mortgaging of the Ga stool lands to a trading concession in 1918 with a view to shipping cocoa overseas. The second destoolment was Nii Taki Yaoboi (1919 - 1929) of the Amugi We ruling house. The Ga king who was in failing health refused the Council of Royals' request to appoint a regent. The third destoolment was Nii Taki Obili from the house of Abola Piam We who began his second reign in 1934. The Dsase destooled him for the second time in 1944 for showing gross disrespect to the Dsase and the Manbii. The fourth Ga Mantse to be destooled was Nii Taki Kome II from the Teiko Tsuru ruling house which ruled from 1948 to 1962. His destoolment was mainly due to how he was selected and enstooled as Ga Mantse in October 1948 (Boakye & Béland, 2018).

According to Kilson (1983), Ga Kings were initially selected from three Royal Houses, among which the privilege rotates. The three original Royal Houses were of Tungma We dynasty: Teiko Tsuru We, Amugi We, and Tackie Kome We.

However, it changed in 1964 after the destoolment of Nii Taki Kome II in 1962; the Dsase ordered a change in the constitution. In that year, the head of the Dsase succeeded in amalgamating the three into two royal houses: Adzimangkese and Akropong within Tunma We dynasty. This increased the royal Houses from three to four. Nobody seems to know the origin of Akropong, but it is considered the most senior house established in the reign of Ayikuma Teiku Bah (1700 -1733), thus, giving it a monarchical origin. Adzimankese, on the other hand, is argued to be priesthood in origin and that it originated after the defeat of Akwamu in 1733 with the name having been given to Naa Korkoi for her bravery in that war. The increase in rule house could be described as the exact origins of Ga Mashie chieftaincy succession conflicts today. Kilson (1983, p. 411-421) argues that "This amalgamation recognised the cleavage within Amugi We that contributed to the stool disputes for almost a half-century."

Thus, Ga Kingship process starts with the selection of a real blood royal from Teiko Tsuru We, Tackie Kome We, Amugi We and Abola Piam We. The selected candidates must enjoy unalloyed support from their own Royal House and other royal houses. After the elders of the appropriate house have selected a candidate, they inform the head of the council of royals (Dsase) who summons the royal councillors to "elect" the candidate. Following this confirmation of the candidate, the council of royals informs first the chief in whose division of Accra the king resides, then the chief who acts as royal regent, and finally the chiefs of other towns of its choice. In informing the chiefs of the candidate for the kingship, the council of royals is also seeking the chiefs' approval of its candidate.

The current Ga-Mashie chieftaincy conflict which started in 2004 centred on the legitimacy of a successor to the late chief, Nii Taki Amugi II, who ruled for almost 40 years. The two protagonists are Dr. Joe Blankson (Tackie Tawiah III who is now deceased) and Adama Latse from the Teiko Tsuru We and Abola Piam We respectively (Kendie el at, 2014).

The Teiko Tsuru We made two main arguments in support of their case. First, they argued that the traditional cloth that was sent from the house of the demised chief to the successor was forwarded to the Teiko Tsuru We. Second, they claimed that the Abola Piam We, where Adama Latse hails from were not royals in the real sense of the word but historically were slaves who were integrated into the Ga society. The Abola Piam We, on the other hand, made the argument that it was their turn and not the Teiko Tsuru We to install a Ga Mantse after the demise of Nii Amugi. They argued principally that the candidate of Teiko Tsuru, Dr. Joe Blankson, was not eligible owing to his maternal lineage. This is because the Ga people are patrilineal; hence, the approval and installation of Dr. Blankson will be against the customs and traditions of the people.

A memorandum of understanding was made and signed on March 23, 2005, in Accra by the four Ruling Houses (Teiko Tsuru We, Tackie Kome We, Amugi We and Abola Piam We) acknowledged the right of the Abola Piam We to appoint a person most suitable for the office of Ga Mantse. In furtherance of this, the memorandum stated:

> *That the customary Mantse (cloth) from the said Ruling*
> *House (Amugi We) shall be delivered to the elders and*
> *representatives of Abola Piam We – for the Ga Mantse*

elect according to the recognised customary rotating
succession (Boakye & Béland, 2018).

Consequently, four contenders (George Nii Adama Tackie-Abia, Henry Nii Ayitey Aryeetey, Kelvin Tackie Abia and Nii Kuja Okine) were shortlisted from the Akropong Division of Abola for the Ga Mantse throne with the odds favouring Kelvin Tackie (Boakye, 2016). Surprisingly, the Ga Traditional Council enstooled Dr. Joe Blankson as the new Ga Mantse under the stool name King Tackie Tawia III on June 11, 2006. The performance of certain rites at the Ga Mantse's Palace in Accra followed the induction ceremony, making him the King of the Ga State. The Nai Wulomo, Numo Tete III, performed the rites, which involved the pouring of libation and the slaughtering of a spotless white sheep whose blood he splashed on a shrine at the palace to signify his induction into the traditional council (Boakye & Béland, 2018).

According to the traditional authorities, the ritual signified that King Tackie Tawia III was the undisputed King of the Ga State and could now occupy the seat at the palace and assume the presidency of the traditional council. Some members of the traditional council witnessed the ceremony. Some sub-chiefs of the Ga State were also present (Boakye, 2016).

His installation sparked off the controversy as a section of the Teiko Tsuru Royal Family challenged his eligibility. They argued that the newly crowned Ga Mantse was not approved through broad consultation among the Dsase from the four royal houses. One of the litigants remarked:

> *Usually we will all have accepted the new Ga Mantse as*
> *the king of the Ga state had all the rules published by*

traditions been followed. But in this particular case, the rules were not followed. The system of succession and inheritance is mainly based on the patrilineal form and naming systems, which has been structured over 500 years. But throughout our history people have sought to undermine the system. Dr. Joe Blankson purported to have been installed as Ga Mantse, hails from the matrilineal side, and so he is called Lartey Sempe (Boakye & Béland, 2018).

This was followed by an announcement by Nii Teiko Tsuru We, just a day to the burial of the late Ga Mantse on January 27, 2006, that Kelvin Nii Tackie was the legitimate candidate for the stool. Blankson's coronation, however, survived threats of court injunction after the Greater Accra Regional House of Chiefs (RHCs) had dismissed an ex parte motion for an interim order by the acting Head of the Abola Piam We, Joseph Yahaya Addy (Boakye & Béland, 2018). Nii Owula Blofonyo consequently petitioned the Greater Accra Regional Houses of Chiefs on April 4, 2006, against Dr. Blankson seeking a declaration that his purported installation as Ga Mantse in March 2006 was contrary to Ga custom, and therefore, be null and void. Joined in that suit were; Nii Akropong III, Head of Teiko Tsuru We and Nuumo Tette, Ga Wulomo (Chief Priest), now deceased (Boakye, 2016).

According to Boakye and Béland (2018), matters became more complicated when, the leading contenders, the Abola Piam We, fed up with the slow pace at which the case was being handled by the Regional House of Chiefs (RHCs), also installed a rival chief, Boni Nii Tackie Adama Latse II, known in private life as Mr. George Tackie, on Sunday, June 12, 2011. The enstoolment of Nii Adama Latse II, therefore, brought to two (2) the number of occupants of the Ga Stool at the time.

While the chieftaincy dispute was (and is still) pending at the RHCs, King Tackie Tawia III passed away in December 2012.

Even though the case is still pending at the RHCs, the National House of Chiefs gazzeted the rival Ga Mantse, Boni Nii Tackie Adama Latse II on April 24, 2015, as a Paramount Chief and Ga Mantse in succession to the Late Ga Mantse Boni Nii Amugi II (Boakye & Béland, 2018).

However, in August 2015, the Ghanaian media reported that the Dsase of the Ga State, Nii Dr. Tetteh Kwei II and the accredited heads and elders of the Ga Paramount Stool, known as Dsase, have installed a new Ga Mantse, in the person of Dr. Kelvin Nii Tackie Abia Tackie, with the stool name King Dr. Tackie Teiko Tsuru II. They argued that by the Judicial Committee of the Greater Accra Regional House of Chiefs (GARHC) Ruling (Ruling, Suit No. GARHC/P4/2007), Nii Tetteh Kwei II is the recognised Dsasetse, vested with the authority to install a Ga Mantse (Boakye, 2016). In their view, King Tackie Tawiah III was never recognised as a Ga Mantse, hence their right to install a Ga Mantse.

In a sharp rebuttal, the Ga Traditional Council (GTC) held a press conference rejecting Dr. Kelvin Nii Tackie Abia Tackie as the new Ga Mantse, claiming that his installation was a sham. Speaking at a news conference in Accra on Tuesday, August 4, 2015, the Gbese Mantse, Nii Ayibonte II, said Nii Latse II had, since June 11, 2011, being the only Ga chief with his name gazetted in the RHC (Boakye & Béland, 2018). Similarly, government officials including then Minister for Chieftaincy and Traditional Affairs, Dr. Henry Seidu Daannaa and then Greater Accra Regional Minister, Nii Laryea Afotey Agbo denounced the

installation of a new Ga Mantse. In an interview granted to Accra-based Star FM on August 5, 2015, the Greater Accra Regional Minister, Nii Laryea Afotey Agbo, stated, the only recognised King of the Ga State is King Boni Nii Tackie Adama Latse II. Accordingly, to him, the recent installation of Dr. Kelvin Tackie Abia as the new Ga Mantse is illegal and must not be recognised by residents of the Ga State since the right process was not followed before the installation (Boakye, 2016).

As of today, there are two factions in the Ga State and each faction has its own Ga Mantse. The Ga Traditional Council has Nii Adama Latse II as Ga Mantse from the Abola Piam We; while the Dsase of the Ga State and the accredited heads and elders of the Ga Paramount Stool have Dr. Nii Tackie Abia Tackie as Ga Mantse from the Teiko Tsuru We (Boakye, 2016).

The problem is even more complicated at the family level as each of the two contesting ruling houses has its internal dispute as to who the rightful candidate should be. For example, within the Teiko Tsuru We ruling house, there were two claimants (Dr. Joe Blankson and Dr. Kelvin Tackie Abia) to the throne. The Acting President of the Ga Traditional Council installed Dr. Joe Blankson as Ga Manste under the stool name Nii Tackie Tawiah III in March 2006 (now deceased). On the other hand, the Dsasetse of the Ga State, Nii Tetteh Kwei II who according to report was suspended by Nii Adzemankese Shwilafo and later reinstated installed Dr. Kelvin Tackie Abia as the Ga Mantse under the stool name Nii Tackie Teiko Tsuru II in August 2015.

A similar situation exists in the Abola Paim We ruling house. There are two claimants to the throne (George Nii Adama Tackie Abia and Henry Nii Ayitey Aryeetey). The then Dsasetse of the Ga State Council, Nii Yaote Oto-Ga who was made to 'act' during the suspension of Nii Tetteh Kwei II had refused to step aside after Nii Tetteh Kwei II was reinstated and had also installed George Nii Adama Tackie Abia as Ga Mantse in June 2011 under the stool name Boni Nii Tackie Adama Latse II. He was subsequently gazetted in April 2015. Before this, Wulomo Akroshie, in-charge of the Sakumono Stool had installed Henry Aryeetey under the stool name Nii Tackie Oblie II in 2008.

Protraction of the Ga Chieftaincy Conflict

The over six decades old Ga Mashie chieftaincy disputes have lingered on for three principal reasons (Boakye, 2016). The first primary factor is the failure of the Ga state to differentiate between maternal and paternal succession. The available literature supports the argument that the Ga state is a patrilineal society; and hence succession is through the son and not nephew as pertains to the Akans. However, in situations where there are no credible successors from the male line, a female line of succession is allowed. The failure of Ga leadership to identify and document such exceptions has created the room for future claims to the throne by the matrilineal. This is the case with Dr. Joe Blankson, whose claim to the Ga Mantse throne is through the female line (Boakye, 2016). In this particular case, the grandmother of Dr. Blankson was the daughter of Tackie Tawia I of the Teiko Tsuru We. Base on the matrilineal nature of the throne, it disqualifies him from

ascending the throne, unless it is proven beyond all reasonable doubt that, there were no qualified candidates from the patrilineal side. Unfortunately, this was not the case, as Kelvin Tackie Abia, had been nominated by the kingmakers before Dr. Blankson's installment. The installation of Dr. Blankson challenges the customs and traditions of the Ga state and highlights the influence that foreign ethnic groups (particularly the Akans) have had on Ga succession.

Another major factor is the inability of the National House of Chiefs (NHC) and Ga Mashie kingmakers to clearly define and agree on the number of ruling houses from the Abola quarter among which the stool is to rotate as mandated in the 1992 Constitution of Ghana (Boakye, 2016). Article 272(b) of the constitution stipulates that the NHC shall undertake the progressive study, interpretation and codification of customary law to evolve, in appropriate cases, a unified system of rules of customary law, and compile the customary laws and lines of succession applicable to each stool or skin (Republic of Ghana, 1992). This has proven to be an intimidating task for both the NHC and Ga Mashie kingmakers. While some, particularly from the Teiko Tsuru We, argue that there are only three ruling houses (Teiko Tsuru We, Amugi We, and Tackie Kome We), others are of the view that there are four ruling houses (Teiko Tsuru We, Amugi We, Abola Piam and Tackie Kome We).

In 1964, the head of the Royal Council successfully amalgamated the three ruling houses into two ruling gates: Adzimangkese gate comprising Teiko Tsuru We and Tackie Kome We and Akropong gate consisting of Amugi We and Abola-Piam. There is, however, a considerable debate as to whether the Abola-Piam We

are from the Royal Tunma We Dynasty from where the other three originate. It is

argued that the Abola Piam We house was not royals but slaves or servants who

used to serve the King in the royal house (Boakye, 2016). This paints two situations

as to the succession to the Ga Mantse by the Abola quarter.

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            ▼                           ▼
   ┌──────────────────┐       ┌──────────────────┐
   │  Akropong Gate   │       │ Adzimankese Gate │
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  ┌────────┐ ┌────────┐     ┌────────┐ ┌────────┐
  │ Teiko  │ │  Taki  │     │ Amugi  │ │ Abola  │
  │Tsuru We│ │  Kome  │     │   We   │ │Piam We │
  │        │ │   We   │     │        │ │        │
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
Figure 2: Ga Mantse Succession for Four Ruling House

Source: Boakye, 2016 p. 106 (Chieftaincy Conflict in Ghana:

A Case Study of Ga Mashie Chieftaincy Conflict under the Fourth Republic)

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                    │   Tunma We Dynasty (Royal House)  │
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
Figure 3: Ga Mantse Succession for Three Ruling House

Source: Boakye, 2016 p. 106 (Chieftaincy Conflict in Ghana:

A Case Study of Ga Mashie Chieftaincy Conflict under the Fourth Republic)

If the Abola Piam is accepted as a ruling house, then Figure 2 holds. If that is the

case, then it is the turn of the Abola Piam to provide a Ga Mantse. Since the start

of the rotation policy in 1944, all the other three ruling houses have had a turn to

ascend the throne except the Abola Piam We as illustrated in Figure 4.

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│ Nii Taki     │    │ Nii Taki     │    │ Nii Amugi    │    │ ???????      │
│ Tawiah II    │───▶│ Kome II      │───▶│ II           │───▶│              │
│ (1944 -      │    │ (1948 - 1962)│    │ (1965 -      │    │ (Teiko Tsuru │
│ 1947)        │    │ Taki Kome    │    │ 2004)        │    │ We vs.       │
│ Teiko Tsuru  │    │ We           │    │  Amugi We    │    │ Abola Piam   │
│ We           │    │              │    │              │    │ We)          │
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
Figure 4: Ga Mantse Succession since 1944

Source: Boakye, 2016 p. 107

On the other hand, if there are three ruling houses as argued by Teiko Tsuru, then indeed it is the turn of Teiko Tsuru family to install a Ga Mantse as shown in Figure 3.

Conflict Resolution

According to Kriesberg (2008), conflict resolution can apply to all stages of conflicts and encompasses relatively constructive ways of conducting and transforming conflicts and then, maintaining secured and equitable relations. Also, conflict resolution relates to all domains of conflicts, whether within or between families, organisations, communities or countries (Kriesberg, 2008).

The word resolution means "the quality of being resolute, a firm decision, an expression of opinion or intentions agreed on by a legislative body, the action of solving a problem or dispute, the process of reducing or separating something into components" (Hornby & Omar, 2000, p.41). Thus, we can define conflict resolution as a situation where the conflicting parties enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accept each other's continued existence as parties and cease all violent action against each other (Wani, 2011). Conflict resolution refers to a range of processes aimed at easing or eliminating sources of conflict. Wani (2011) further argues that conflict resolution is an umbrella term for a whole variety of methods and approaches for dealing with conflict: from negotiation to diplomacy, from mediation to arbitration, from facilitation to adjudication, from conciliation to conflict prevention, from conflict management to conflict transformation, from restorative justice to peacekeeping.

Conflict resolution is a fast-rising academic field. Bercovitch, Kremenyuk and Zartman (2009) state that although it is a relatively new area of study and had emerged as a specialised field only in the 1950s when superpower conflict threatened the very existence of humankind, conflict resolution has rapidly grown into a self-contained, vibrant and interdisciplinary field. Most importantly, those who study conflict resolution focus on the phenomenon of conflict and analyse ways to bring it under control, bringing their insights and concepts to bear on actual conflicts either local or international to foster better and more effective relations among states and peoples.

Bercovitch et al. (2008) assert that conflict resolution concerns itself with ideas, theories and methods that can improve our understanding of conflict and our collective efforts to reduce violence and enhance the political process for the harmonisation of interest. To them, the field of conflict resolution emerged in an attempt to end the hostilities that characterised the Cold War. The end of the Cold War gave impetus to this new approach (conflict resolution). Therefore, they asked the following questions: is it worth destroying each other for the achievement of existing goals? Are there other more dignified means of solving existing problems? Are we doomed to fight each other forever? These questions needed answers and these questions are what conflict resolution sought to address (Bercovitch et al., 2008). It aims to resolve what already existed and to suggest ways to prevent new unnecessary conflicts in the future.

Conflict resolution, as a specialised field, became prominent during the post-Cold War era. It has also come face to face with the fundamental new

challenges. In its development, it is believed that the concept of conflict resolution began to make waves in the 1950s and 1960s when Cold War was at its peak and when the development of nuclear weapons and the conflict between the superpowers seemed to threaten human survival (Ramsbotham, Miall, & Woodhouse, 2011). According to Wani (2011), some pioneers from different disciplines realised the need to study conflict as some general phenomena, with similar properties whether it occurs in international relations, communities, families or between individuals. These scholars realised the potential of applying strategies that were evolving in industrial relations and community mediations settings. Wani (2011) continues that a handful of people in North America and Europe began to establish research groups for new ideas. Nevertheless, the new ideas attracted interest and the field started to grow. This led to the spread of scholarly journals in conflict resolution sometime in the 1980s.

Increasingly, conflict resolution ideas have made a difference in real conflicts due to the impressive results it has gained especially in South Africa during the apartheid regime. According to Osei-Hwedie and Rankopo (2012), conflict resolution deals with settlement of conflicts that may already exist. In South Africa, for example, the Centre for Inter-Group Studies was applying the approaches that had been developed in the field to the developing confrontation between apartheid and its challenges and that came with impressive results (Ramsbotham, Miall, & Woodhouse 2011). In our current contemporary world, conflict resolution has great relevance. This stems from the fact that it is only through conflict resolution mechanisms that conflicts, rivalries, disputes and

incompatibilities can be checked and minimised so that peace can be established (Deutsch, 1977). This is the reason why great leaders, distinguished academicians, stalwarts, think tanks, media and civil society have laid much thrust upon the concept of conflict resolution. It is noteworthy to mention that conflict resolution is a mechanism of peace-building and peace-making process. Kriesberg (2009) contends that conflict resolution, as a discipline of peace study, must emphasise that all conflicts of human society should have to be resolved by peaceful and non-violent methods such as diplomacy, communication, negotiation, summits conciliation, arbitration, mediation and through cooperative and confidence-building measures.

Effective conflict resolution in human society can be achieved when we give equal attention to the marginalised, minority and unrecognised groups in society. In some other societies, Wani (2011) states that there are different types of conflicts and for these conflicts to be resolved, different types of peaceful and non-violent methods and techniques need to be employed. Even though war is the last resort in political phenomenon as stipulated by the UN Charter, there is the tendency by some states to use war as a way of resolving conflict. The aim of methods and techniques of conflict resolution is not the elimination of conflicts, which is generally known to be impossible and undesirable. Instead, the primary objective of conflict resolution is to transform actual or a potentially violent situation into a peaceful one.

In Ghana, conflict resolution mechanisms fall into two broad categories: formal and informal resolution mechanisms. Consequently, it is the norms, cultural

values and nature or type of the conflict that usually dictates which mechanism will be most appropriate. However, regardless of the type or nature of conflict, the formal resolution mechanisms always prevail. Accordingly, the state's security agencies and services such as the Ghana Police, Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and the Bureau of National Investigations (BNI) have always played major roles in conflict situations. These agencies gather intelligence on (chieftaincy) disputes that are likely to degenerate into violent conflicts. This is the more reason why the Ga Mashie chieftaincy conflict has not become violent as witnessed especially in the northern part of Ghana. In cases of violent chieftaincy conflicts, the police and the military are deployed to protect lives and property. Their presence often brings a temporary end to violence in conflict areas. There are also Regional and District Security Committees (REGSEC and DISEC) headed by political appointees that focus on security matters that have the potential to disturb the peace and security within their jurisdictions (Awedoba, 2010).

Ghana's legal system is another essential formal mechanism for conflict resolution in the country. To this end, the government uses Executive/Legislative Instruments, Acts or Decrees to limit the movement of contestants through the imposition of a curfew. In the past, governments have given recognition to or withdrawn the same from, some chiefs in the bid to restore order and sanity (Awedoba, 2010). In recent times, litigants in a chieftaincy dispute are quick to head to the courts. Nonetheless, many of these litigants and their communities lack the understanding of the legal principles, hence their unwillingness to accept court rulings. This perhaps could be attributable to the perceived foreign principles that

apply to the law courts; unfamiliarity of customary laws of the various communities by court officials; lack of interest or bias on the part of some court officials; the frequent and long adjournments; fear and anxiety on the part of illiterate witnesses among others (Awedoba, 2010).

Other legal means of conflict resolution in Ghana are committees and commissions of inquiries set up by the government to take evidence and make recommendations for resolving a conflict. These committees/commissions are usually reactive in the sense that it is after the conflict has taken place and the damage has been caused that they are set up to do a postmortem. They rarely find the solutions to the problem; some never come out with any report and if they do, their report is never made public (Awedoba, 2010). It must be added that sometimes too the government chooses which recommendation(s) to accept or implement. In the case of the Dagbon conflict, several committees and commissions have been set up since independence with the most recent being the committee Eminent Chief which has successfully resolved the conflict.

More related to solving chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana are the traditional institutions outlined in the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. These institutions have been integrated into the state governance system and are particularly useful in matters of chieftaincy. For example, the Traditional Councils have the mandate under section 12 of the Chieftaincy Act 370 (1971) to settle chieftaincy disputes ranging from the positions of Headmen to Divisional chiefs. Above the Traditional Councils, are the ten (10) Regional Houses of Chiefs (RHCs). Disputants have sent several chieftaincy disputes to the RHCs for redress. While the RHCs have settled

some of the cases, others are still pending. At the apex of these traditional institutions in Ghana is the National House of Chiefs (NHC), which is charged to manage chieftaincy issues – including the resolution of disputes in the institution itself and allied domains. The NHC's judicial committee, comprising five members appointed by the House from among its members, exercises appellate jurisdiction over matters determined by RHC. The diverse nature of the composition of the judicial committee of the NHC might affect its effectiveness as a conflict resolution institution. This is because they may not be very conversant in the norms and procedures in other chiefdoms other than theirs, and thus, could affect the adjudication of chieftaincy matters. The sheer number of cases and the prolonged nature of these cases before the judicial committee of the National House Chiefs attest to this assertion. These members may have to refer to written documents and testimonies of contesting factions, which may not always be helpful, as each group tries to make their case look better than the other group. This is the case with the Ga Mashie chieftaincy dispute.

To promote peace in the country and to provide for related purposes, the Government of Ghana created the National Peace Council (NPC) in 2005. The Council began operations in the same year without the necessary legal backing, as has been the case with many councils and bodies in Ghana. The NPC got its legal support in March 2011, when Act 818 was passed that legally established the National Peace Council (NPC). The objective of the Council is, therefore, to facilitate and develop a mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution and to build sustainable peace in the country. Since its inception, the Council has

mediated several chieftaincy disputes, but they do not have any enforcement capacity. The implementation of the decisions of the Council thus rests on the willingness and voluntary compliance of feuding chieftaincy parties.

Non-formal conflict resolution mechanisms comprise social, economic, cultural and religious-spiritual dimensions under the entirety of traditions, customs and worldviews of society within the different spheres of societal life. The methods involve negotiations, mediations and reconciliation based on the knowledge, customs and history of the community. The process is led by leaders of the community such as chiefs, kings, priests, healers, elders and other tribal leaders and takes the forms of rituals in which the whole community takes part in it. In traditional African societies, conflict is often resolved using laid down traditions (Nwolise, 2005). This is because the restoration of peace, its maintenance and social harmony are prime for the welfare of the entire society. According to Pkalya, Adan and Masinde (2004), traditional social entities such as chiefs, elders of the community, extended families, lineages, clans, tribes, religious brotherhood, local institutions and ethnolinguistic groups remain essential in the resolution process of conflicts.

One of such non-formal institutions of conflict resolution mechanisms in Ghana is the use of traditional practices or systems. In many traditional areas, it is customary to put a disputed issue to the test by making contesting parties submit to supernatural arbitration through oracles (such as the popular river god deity 'antoa nyamaa' of the Asantes), sworn statements and oaths. The fear of the sanction that comes from the oracles and the oaths deters disputants who know their claim is

unjust and thus they abandon their assertions. Traditional festivals also provide the avenue for reconciliation among members of communities engaged in a feud.

Other non-formal conflict resolution mechanisms include the use of associations and prominent personalities within the Ghanaian society. These mechanisms have been applied to the Ga Mashie chieftaincy conflicts and other chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana. In the particular instance of the Ga Mashie chieftaincy conflict, there seems to be no end in sight. This is due to the failure of the state and the Ga Mashie people to harness the potentials of both the formal and non-formal conflict resolution mechanisms to find a lasting solution to the Ga Mashie chieftaincy conflict. The ad hoc resort to one of the two categories at any point in time, rather than creating a synergy between the two types of mechanisms, appears to be an exercise in futility. In the following sections, the various conflict resolution mechanisms (non-formal) will be discussed. This is because non-formal methods of conflict resolution encompass methods that combine several conflict resolution mechanisms including mediation, negotiation and reconciliation.

Differences between Formal and Informal Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

In distinguishing informal conflict resolution mechanisms from formal (western-style) methods of conflict resolution, Castro and Ettenger (2000) posit that informal conflict resolution mechanisms are not simply about the adjudication of who is right or wrong and the punishment of culprits, but the reconciliation of the parties to end conflict. The most important intention is the transformation of conflict in which both parties are satisfied and willing to "let go their pain and

forgive each other." Boege (2006) describes this as "restitutive reconciliation." Thus, causal methods to conflict resolution aimed at restorative justice, restoration of order, harmony and the maintenance of relationships within the community through reintegrating feuding parties for true reconciliation (Boege, 2006).

Also, informal strategies are universal and consensus-based and regularly contain the participation of all parties in addition to the entire community (Bukari, 2013 p. 80). For instance, Tonah (2007) used chieftaincy conflict that happened in the Wungu Province of the Mamprungu Kingdom in Ghana to depicts how indigenous strategies of conflict resolution helped to end the chieftaincy conflict in the Province. Stalement arose in 1996/97 following the rejection of the Nayiri's choice of Wunaba (chief of Wungu) by a section of the people of Wungu. The rejection brought about the anger of the Nayiri and for four years (1997-2001), the Nayir's preference was never allowed to rule in Wungu. In 2002, the people who rejected the Nayiri's preference begged for forgiveness of the Nayiri and a process of reconciliation started that involved the sacrifice of animals and merry-making. A new chief was chosen by the Nayiri which brought about peace and an end to the conflict.

Formal techniques of conflict resolution together with the usage of the court system and the use of foreign NGOs do not lead to proper conflict resolution. The court system often leads to blame and punishment of some factions which tend to aggravate hostility among the opposing factions and lead to the escalation of violence. Similarly, Agyeman (2008) keeps that the involvement of foreign and international NGOs in conflict resolution does not regularly result to real conflict

resolution at the local level. This is because most of the oversees NGOs do not understand the local roots and dynamics in these conflicts and are not therefore in a position to prescribe local solutions to the real termination of conflicts (Agyeman, 2008). He, therefore, requires using local entities such as the houses of chiefs and community-based organisations in resolving local conflicts.

Also, Kirby (2006) believes that western-conventional strategies of conflict resolution in Ghana have failed in resolving conflicts. Many of the parties in these conflicts have resorted to the court system of resolution and use of overseas NGOs which has not helped to cope with the root causes underlying them. Kirby (2006) posits that conflicts need to be understood within the milieu of cultural context instead of adopting western methods which are not culturally sensitive and contextual to many of the conflicts around us. The key to excellent conflict resolution requires entering deeply into cultural issues at all levels and also considering the ritual dimensions to the issues at conflict (Kirby, 2006). Kirby (2006) observes further that conflict resolution in Ghana and elsewhere in Africa is not a two-dimensional "negotiation" between the combatants but involves a three-dimensional "reconciliation" between the combatants and more importantly for all others suffering the negative effects of the conflict though not directly involved, and reconciliation with the "Earth".

Kirby (2006), states that addressing ethnic conflicts in Ghana and elsewhere demands using ideas, values and attitudes as well as local contexts, approaches, actors and practices. These beliefs, values and practices must engage an understanding of local cultures of reconciliation based on African Traditional

Region (ATR). The rituals concerning the earth cult in most tribes in Northern Ghana, for instance, play essential roles in conflict resolution and reconciliation and these rituals of the earth cult involve sacrifices, prayers and appeasing the spirits for proper reconciliation to take place (Kirby, 2006). This is unlike western-style resolution of conflicts which impose "foreign" methods and practices into conflicts making it difficult for true reconciliation to take place (Kirby, 2006). In all, indigenous ways of conflict resolution are all-encompassing methods that combine several conflict resolution mechanisms including mediation, negotiation and reconciliation.

Rationale for the Selection of Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

The conditions under which conflict resolution mechanisms are chosen as a means of resolving conflicts have been less studied. Previous research has tended to focus on the motivations and rational calculations of the parties involved. Little attention has been given to examining the effect of the context on which a choice was made (Moore, 2012). A significant amount of research on conflict has emphasised the processes of conflict resolution and the general effectiveness of those processes. The question one keeps asking is before a mechanism becomes effective, how does conflict resolution begin and why do parties choose one method or the other? These questions have been relatively ignored. While institutionalised mechanisms exist for dealing with some types of conflict, giving directions about the process and how to initiate it (e.g., arbitration for labour-management disputes), conflicts in the international arena generally lack such procedural guidelines

(Kriesberg, 1998). Moore (2012) maintains that very often, states apply conflict resolution procedures on an ad hoc basis only, choosing (implicitly or explicitly) from a broad range of techniques, including among others negotiation, mediation, arbitration, inquiry, conciliation, or referral to international organisations.

It is also essential to state that before one uses conflict resolution mechanisms, certain preconditions must exist for conflict resolution even to be considered and these preconditions often form part of the context of the selection. According to Bercovitch and Jackson (2001), mediation is likely to be used when a dispute is long, drawn out or complex. It presupposes that for a mediation to be used as a resolution mechanism, the conflict must have assumed a complex nature. Second, mediation often comes into play when the parties' conflict resolution efforts have reached an impasse (Bercovitch, 1992; Kleiboer & T'Hart, 1995) or antagonism prevents conflict management from even getting underway. Touval and Zartman (1989), for example, argue that once the parties have reached a hurting stalemate, they are apt to call for mediation.

Third, a mediator must be available and willing to intervene (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2001) and there must exist some opportunity for the mediator to intervene (Rubin, 1992). If the parties wish to avoid any outside intervention, then mediation will not take place. Fourth, mediation is likely to be used when the parties calculate that it will help them reach a better settlement than they can achieve on their own; that the mediator will provide them with a face-saving way out of the conflict or a means of influencing their opponent or when rejecting mediation will result in greater harm than accepting it (Bercovitch, 1992; Kleiboer, 1996; Zartman

& Touval, 1996). Lastly, intangible issues involving ideology, security or ethnic identities, on the other hand, is less likely to be effectively dealt with by bilateral negotiations. When such intangible problems are at the heart of a dispute, mediation is the preferred method of conflict resolution (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2001).

On the contrary, disputing parties choose negotiation or any other method because of their levels of concern for their own and their opponent's outcomes (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2001). This is what is called the Dual Concern Model. At the level of international politics, this is expressed in terms of competitive versus cooperative orientations (Fisher, 2007). Second, Moore (2012) posit that disputing parties will choose a mechanism (negotiation) if it is feasible and will in all likelihood allow them to realise their conflict goals (the Perceived Feasibility Model). Negotiating actors thus, undertake a cost-benefit analysis of the viability of negotiations and unilateral actions. Third, the data in the study of Bercovitch and Jackson, (2001) revealed that when parties are contesting relatively straightforward tangible issues (e.g., terms of independence for former colonies, access to or control over resources), negotiation is the primary procedural choice.

After identifying the preconditions that necessitate the use of a particular mechanism, Bercovitch and Jackson (2001) argue that it is also significant to understand the nature of the dispute so that it can inform you when selecting a resolution mechanism to resolve a conflict. In their empirical study, the study examined conflict intensity using the number of fatalities in a conflict and the relationship between conflict management and the number of fatalities. The study posited that one of the most important factors determining the choice of a conflict

resolution mechanism is the level of conflict intensity. The data supported the notion that in conflicts that are not too intense, parties prefer to resolve their differences through negotiation. When disputants can sort out their differences bilaterally without interference from outside parties, they usually do that (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2001).

However, when the level of hostility between the parties is so high that they cannot negotiate face-to-face, mediation becomes necessary. A lot of studies have revealed that when a conflict is not too intense, disputants will prefer to resolve their conflict without third-party assistance (Bercovitch & Houston, 1996; Bercovitch & Jackson, 2001; Moore, 2012). In other words, when a conflict is of low intensity or is narrow in scope, the parties feel they can manage the conflict nicely by themselves and do not seek assistance from a mediator (Wall & Lynn, 1993). Realistically, in such circumstances, many parties perceive third-party intervention as an unwanted intrusion (Pruitt & Kim, 2004). High levels of fatalities are indicative of high levels of hostility. In such cases, a mediator may have to shuttle between the parties as a go-between or communicator to achieve any amelioration in the conflict.

There is some suggestion in the literature that the choice of a strategy is affected by the nature or identity of parties. It is generally agreed that when parties to a conflict are different in terms of their identity and power capabilities, direct negotiations may not be possible (Bercovitch & Houston, 1996; Kleiboer, 1996; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). More specifically, when parties to a conflict do not share either the same political system or the same set of cultural norms and values,

negotiation becomes very difficult. This is because "shared norms and socio-political similarity minimise misperception and facilitate a successful conclusion to the conflict" (Bercovitch & Houston, 1996 p.11-35).

Effectiveness of Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

In an attempt to examine the effectiveness of conflict resolution mechanisms, Deutsch (2001) posited that there are many ways to assess the effectiveness of conflict resolution training (CRT) programs. Some methods require extensive resources while the practitioners themselves may conduct others.

To be able to assess conflict resolution mechanism being used, the conflict resolution framework requires a look at the objectives of institutions and parties involved in the conflict. According to Deutsch (2001), to determine the effectiveness of the conflict resolution programme, practitioners need to answer the following questions:

- What are the objectives of the conflict resolution institution? (That is, to be able to maintain a peaceful, orderly society where actors of the various parties will be tolerating each other, improvement in the relationship that exists among the parties, finding a solution to the cause of conflict).

- What determines the achievement of these objectives (that is, decrease in violence, decrease in victimisations, a decrease in discriminations and decrease in disorder as well as an increase in the willingness of society members to face problems openly, resolve conflicts cooperatively and better working and social relations).

The study contends that a successful conflict resolution can happen when there is a real improvement in the actor's relationship with each other. However, the study stipulates also that if the resolution is not effective, then it may be due to inadequacies in the conflict resolution mechanism. The next section focused on the empirical review.

Empirical Review

The world has experienced the consequences of the First and Second World Wars and would not want to experience another war which would be more dangerous in terms of disaster. Therefore, conflict resolution mechanisms can be adopted as checks or preventive measures of conflicts and peace could be maintained without resorting to violence.

According to Behfar, Peterson, Mannix and Trochim (2008), conflict resolution is the best instrument that can be used to minimise and lessen conflictual situations. It can be said that conflict resolution is the best mechanism towards social justice, peace, harmony, cooperation and world brotherhood. It is the best slogan for peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-building among conflicted parties and war zones. Conflict resolution, as a discipline, hinges on the assumption that conflicts ought to be resolved only through peaceful means and not through violent means of destruction (Behfar et al., 2008). The following paragraphs will review some empirical works that have been done in the area of conflict resolution.

Fleetwood (1987) in examining the conflict management styles described and analysed the conflict management behaviours of secondary school

administrators. Specifically, the study examined conflict management styles and strategies used by educational administrators. Five secondary school administrators were interviewed and observed by the researcher over more than a year. Their responses to the interview questions served as a guideline to determine personal perceptions of conflict management styles and strategies used. The study confirmed the assertions by Pace (1983) that individuals develop a single conflict management style and use this style without regard to the specific situation. The study also agreed with the Hocker and Wilmot's (1985) view that individuals vary their conflict management styles dependent upon the particular conflict interaction. The research also found that the use of conflict management styles and strategies depended upon a variety of variables such as sex, race and student's prior record.

Regan (1996) assessed the historical patterns of intervention strategies and their relative success rates. Relying on an intra-state conflict between 1944 to 1994, 138 intra-state conflicts were identified of which 85 had at least one third party intervention. Regan (1996) asserted in his study that the characteristics of conflict do not largely determine the success of third-party intervention. Instead, the aspects of an intervention strategy largely determine the success of an intervention. The study found that nearly 40 percent (76 cases) of all interventions within that period were carried out by a major power, while 5 percent (10 cases) of the interventions were under the auspices of the United Nations. The study also revealed that economic intervention strategy is rarely undertaken, but a strict strategy is the most common form of intervention (military 70%, economical 7%). However, the

success rates of each type of intervention, regardless of the target, are a mixed strategy being the most successful (35% of the time).

In sum, the study suggests that a mixed strategy would be more likely to succeed than either a military or economic intervention alone. In designing a strategy to intervene in civil conflict, the study postulates that policymakers would be well advised to weigh in on behalf of the government rather than the opposition. From the study, it can be said that the suitable intervention strategy and the factors associated with the strategy will contribute to the success of the intervention.

Bukari (2013) examined the peace process in the Bawku conflict in Ghana, the challenges and prospects. The study employed mixed methods (quantitative and qualitative), a descriptive case study and a purposive sampling technique for 220 respondents. The study revealed that various approaches had been used to resolve the conflict including peacekeeping (which involves deploying security agencies), the imposition of curfews to mitigate the effects of the conflict, the use of mediation (which includes civil society organisation), opinion leaders and traditional leaders and the use of arbitration. The study also suggested that going forward; the Bawku conflict needs to be approached with a more participatory approach to resolve it. In spite of these approaches aimed at addressing the conflict, the Bawku conflict remains unresolved. The study attempts to account for the reason why the conflict persists noting that the mechanisms that have employed in dealing with the conflict have not considered the root cause of the conflict, which is the Bawku Skin. It could be deduced from the analysis that the mechanism has attempted to reduce the spate of the escalation and violence and not to resolve the conflict entirely.

Also, according to Midodzi and Imoro (2011), conflict resolution in Ghana has taken centre-stage in the last decade with efforts geared towards developing alternative and acceptable mechanisms for dealing with the country's numerous conflicts. Therefore, one of the mechanisms that have been given prominence is the alternative dispute resolution mechanism. The study shows that Alternative Dispute Resolution programs can play a positive role in resolving the conflicts in Africa, particularly Ghana since it provides alternatives to traditional processes such as grievances and complaints. The study, therefore, set out to add its voice to this advocacy by investigating the effectiveness of alternative dispute resolution in Ghana using the Alavanyo-Nkonya peace mediation as a case study. Specifically, the research aimed to ascertain reasons for the use of alternative disputes resolution in the Alavanyo-Nkonya protracted conflict and also to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the method.

Finally, Anumel (2017) also conducted a study to assess the effectiveness of conflict resolution mechanisms used by the National Peace Council in resolving the Alavanyo/Nkonya and the Hohoe conflicts. The study used 15 respondents who were purposively selected. Using the exploratory design, the study revealed that the National Peace Council mostly used mediation in attempts to resolve the conflicts. Mediation was chosen because the conflicting parties had reached stalemates over the issues. Mediation also enabled opposing parties to own the decision-making process. Lastly, the mediation mechanism has not been effective because the mediators failed to identify the needs of the parties who were not represented in the mediation. The mediation committee was unable to consider the structure of

society. The study recommended that the mediation committee (NPC) should consider the structure of the society when using mediation to enable them to know the individuals involved in the conflict so that they can contribute to the selection of the representatives to represent their interest on the committee.

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┌─────────────────────────┐        ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
│ Needs, Interests and    │───────▶│ Preconditional factors of Actors: │
│ Perceptions of Conflict │        │   • Historical relationship       │
│ Actors                  │        │   • Structural change             │
└─────────────────────────┘        │   • Deprivation of needs          │
                                    └──────────────────────────────────┘
                                                    │
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                              ┌───────────────────────────────────┐
                              │                                   │
                              │             Conflict              │
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                              └───────────────────────────────────┘
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                              ┌───────────────────────────────────┐
                              │ Choice of Conflict Resolution      │
                              │ Mechanism                          │
                              └───────────────────────────────────┘
                                        │       │       │
                           ┌────────────┘       │       └────────────┐
                           ▼                    ▼                    ▼
                  ┌─────────────────┐  ┌─────────────────┐  ┌─────────────────┐
                  │ Adjudication    │  │ Peace keeping   │  │ Mediation       │
                  │ Negotiation     │  │                 │  │                 │
                  │                 │  │                 │  │                 │
                  │ Win-Lose        │  │ Negative Peace  │  │ Win-Win         │
                  └─────────────────┘  └─────────────────┘  └─────────────────┘
                           └────────────┐   │   ┌────────────┘
                                        ▼   ▼   ▼
              ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐
              │ Effective Conflict Resolution Mechanism       │
              │                                               │
              │                  Indicators                   │
              │  • Maintain peace and orderly society         │
              │  • Improvement in the relationship            │
              │  • Finding solution to the cause of conflict  │
              │  • Decrease in Violence, Victimizations,      │
              │    Discriminations and Disorder               │
              └──────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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
Figure 5: Conceptual Framework

This conceptual framework (seen in Fig. 5) was designed to assess the effectiveness of the various conflict resolution mechanisms employed in the Ga chieftaincy conflict. It includes the historical relationship, structural change and deprivation of needs of the actors in the conflicts. However, for one to be able to select a conflict resolution mechanism for conflict, there must be in existence certain pre-conditions that will necessitate the use of a conflict resolution mechanism. These pre-conditional factors influence the choice of a resolution mechanism. In simple terms, it is the pre-conditional factors coupled with the needs, interests and perceptions of the parties in the conflicts will significantly inform the actors or institutions when selecting a conflict resolution mechanism to resolve the conflict. For instance, according to Bercovitch and Jackson (2001), one of the pre-conditions that will necessitate mediation is when the parties' conflict resolution efforts do not work or when the conflict is complex.

In this study, both the formal and informal resolution mechanisms will be used for the analysis. For instance, selecting mediation as a strategy requires the presence of specific indicators for effective conflict resolution to be achieved. Even though particular indicators and factors must be evident for effective resolution of a conflict, the ability to identify the needs of the actors is a key parameter on which an amicable conflict resolution is dependent. In the same vein, the negotiation indicators are also dependent on these parameters.

According to Deutsch's (2001), Conflict Resolution Training (CRT) program, suggests that assessment should be done using objectives of the conflict resolution program and indicators for measuring their achievement to examine the

effectiveness of the resolution mechanism. In the assessment, Deutsch (2001) proposes that the criteria should include the intervention objectives set to be achieved at the end of the resolution. As seen in Figure 5, objectives include: maintaining a peaceful, stable society which allows parties of the conflicts to tolerate each other, improving the relationship that exists among parties and finding a solution to the structural cause of the conflict. These objectives are then assessed using determinants to evaluate the achievement. In other words, the determinants will be used to assess or monitor if the objectives set have been fulfilled in dealing with the causes of the conflict. In this framework, the determinants include a decrease in violence, victimisation and discriminations as well as an increase in the willingness of the parties to engage each other on the matter.

Chapter Summary

This chapter reviewed related literature on conflict resolution mechanisms and their effectiveness. Both theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of the concepts were discussed. Specifically, theories covered were the Frustration-Aggression conflict theory, Relational theory of social conflict, Structural theory of conflict, dual concern model, some concepts and ideas of conflict resolution and empirical review. Finally, a composite conceptual framework was designed from the theories reviewed to guide the study. Overall, the literature review provided an adequate review of the literature, showed the importance of the current study and raised questions for further research. The empirical review revealed that

effectiveness of the various conflict resolution mechanisms employed in the Ga

Chieftaincy conflict have not been examined.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODS

Introduction

This chapter discusses the methods and procedures utilised in the study. These included the description of the study area, study design, population, sample and sampling procedure, sources of data, data collection instruments, data collection procedure, data analysis and ethical issues.

Study Area

The study was conducted in Accra. Accra is the capital and largest city of Ghana covering about an area of 225.67 km^2 with an estimated urban population of 2.87 million. It hosts a number of administrative regions and functions such as 12 local government districts, 11 municipal districts and the Accra Metropolitan Assembly. The Ga people were organized into six independent towns (Accra (Ga Mashie), Tema, Osu, Nungua, La and Teshie). However, the focus of this study limit the study to Accra (Ga Mashie) which is the study area. Ga Mashie also referred to as Ga and Old Accra, is part of indigenous Accra, consisting of James Town and Ussher Town and covering an area of almost 100 hectares of land along Ghana's southwest coast. Ga Mashie is home to the Ga people, the original settlers of Ghana's capital city who speak the Ga language. Ga Mashie, or "Old Accra," has been in the past a dynamic, well-planned and very lively area, due in large measure to the colonial presence in the community. Ironically, this part of Accra has not seen any form of modern development since independence, although it

borders the main Central Business District (CBD). It is now one of the most deprived and neglected urban areas in Accra with housing and other infrastructure in deteriorating state. Despite the intense level of deterioration and deprivation in "Old Accra", it still has the potential to attract economic growth and tourism.

Figure 6: Map of Accra Metro

Source: Carthography Unit (2018), Department of Geography and Regional Planning, University of Cape Coast.

According to the Ghana Statistical Service, the 2010 Population and Housing census recorded a population of 1,665,086 in Accra (GSS, 2012). Ga Mashie has a population of about 45,900 people. The population of Ga Mashie is very young: 56% are below the age of 24. It is one of the most densely populated areas in Accra with a population density of 250 persons per hectare. GSS also has

projected the population of Accra to be 2,036,889 as of September 2018 (Ghana Statistical Service (web) 2018). Notwithstanding of the specific number, it is clear that Ga Mashie's population has grown steadily, ranking currently as one of the most densely populated communities in Greater Accra Region (Mahama, Acheampong, Peprah, & Boafo, 2011). The Ga people were initially farmers, but today fishing, fish mongering, kenkey production and petty trading are the principal occupations.

The Ga people celebrate the Homowo Festival, which means "hooting at hunger". This festival originated several centuries ago. It is celebrated in remembrance of a great famine that hit the Ga people in the sixteenth century. It is mainly a food festival which celebrates the passing of that terrible period in Ga history. It takes place in August every year and is celebrated by all the Ga clans.

Ga Mashie comprises some of the oldest neighbourhoods in Accra: Ussher Town and James Town. Ussher Town is made up of four quarters: Asere, Abola, Gbese and Otublohum; the other quarters, Akanmaadzen, Ngleshie Alata and Sempe, make up James Town. Ga Mashie is principally inhabited by the Gas, of the Ga-Adangbe tribe, although a considerable number of non-Gas reside in the community, including Akans, Ewes, Guans and Mossi-Dagomba, as well as other foreign groups. Ga Mashie's steady increase in population can be attributed both to natural growth and in-migration (Quartey-Papafio, 2006).

Research Design

      In understanding the conflict resolution mechanisms and its effectiveness on Ga chieftaincy conflict, the study employed both quantitative and qualitative research methods. The mixed methods approach, therefore, was used as the underlying pragmatism, guiding principle and structure for collecting and analysing data. This approach was used to facilitate a deeper appreciation of the conflict resolution mechanisms used and their effectiveness from all the different perspectives of stakeholders involved directly or indirectly in the conflict.

      Chenail, St. George, Wulff, Duffy and Charles (2008) observed that human experiences are transformed into numbers through quantitative research. Since a detailed description of a phenomenon cannot be quantified arithmetically but verbally, the qualitative research method was used to complement the quantitative approach to provide a bigger picture of the issue under study. The study adopted this mixed approach because it is more appropriate to explore the different conditions and factors which contribute to the resolution of the Ga chieftaincy conflict.

      The study also adopted a case study approach. Accordingly, Stakes (1995) identifies three types of case studies namely: intrinsic, instrumental and collective case studies. Regardless of these types, Stake (1995) points out that a case study is expected to catch the complexity of a single case. Therefore, in a case study, as Creswell (2013) rightly points out, the researcher explores a real-life, contemporary bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving various sources of information (e.g.

observations, interviews, audiovisual material, documents and reports), and reports a case description and case themes.

Case studies are very good at developing and evaluating theories, as well as formulating hypotheses or explaining particular phenomena by using theories and causal mechanisms (Vennesson, 2008). Given this, a chieftaincy conflict such as that of the Ga Chieftaincy conflict, which is very complex involving different levels of competition; conflicting interpretations of customs and traditions; sentiments; and opinions, a case study approach, will enable the researcher to make an in-depth inquiry.

Population

This study targeted three categories of respondents. The first category included the actors in the conflict (Teiko Tsuru We, Tackie Kome We, Amugi We, Abola Piam We and the Dsase (kingmakers) of the Ga people); the second category included representatives from National Peace Council (NPC), Greater Accra Regional House of Chiefs (RHC) and Greater Accra Regional Security Council (REGSEC) and; the third category of respondents focused on the residents (including Ga and non-Gas) within the Ga Traditional Area who are affected by the Ga chieftaincy conflict, which provides a cross-section population of the elderly, women and the youth.

Sources of Data

Data for the study were derived from both primary and secondary sources. The primary data for the study were gathered from the main actors of the conflict namely: the Teiko Tsuru We, the Tackie Kome We, the Amugi We and the Abola Piam We; the Council of royals (Dsase /Kingmakers). And also, representatives from National Peace Council (NPC); Greater Accra Regional House of Chiefs (RHC), Greater Accra Regional Security Council (REGSEC) and some residents of the traditional area. These primary data were obtained mainly from the use of interview guides and interview schedules. On the other hand, relevant secondary data were obtained from the published articles, journals, newspapers, and reports.

Sampling Procedure

The purposive and systematic sampling methods were used for the study. The key respondents were purposively selected in line with the knowledge and information they had about the Ga chieftaincy and the conflict resolution mechanisms which is the aim of the study. Purposive sampling is selecting a sample "on the basis of your own knowledge of the target group, its elements and the nature of your research aims" (Babbie, 2010, p.23). That is, the targeted group is "non-randomly selected based on a particular characteristic" (Frey, Botan & Kreps, 2000). Also, the choice of this technique was guided by the fact that each respondent having afore knowledge about the Ga chieftaincy conflict and had been involved in the conflict resolution process at some point.

Purposive sampling was used for selecting eight (8) key respondents. These included an official each from the National Peace Council, Regional House of

Chiefs, Greater Accra Regional Security Council, one council of royal member (Dsase or kingmakers) and one respondent from each of Ruling Houses namely Teiko Tsuru We, Tackie Kome We, Amugi We and Abola Piam We. This was done with the interest of having in-depth discussions about their views on the mechanisms used to resolve the conflicts.

The systematic sampling procedure was employed to select a suitable sample size of the residents under the traditional area namely: Sempe, Otublonhum, Abola, Asere, Akugmaje, Gbese and Ngleshie Alata. The researcher and field assistants to get a suitable sample size of respondents (cross-section of the population) under on their knowledge of the Ga Chieftaincy conflict data was collected concurrently. The systematic sampling techniques was used because researcher wanted to draw from all part of the population that is close to hand. The Krejcie and Morgan (1970) sample size estimation table was adopted (Appendix D). With regards to appendix D, a sample size of 384 was derived from a population of 2, 036, 889. This table was deemed relevant because it offers a statistical estimation of the sample size and hence makes the estimated sample size more reliable.

Table 2: Categories of Respondents

Category of respondents	Sample size
Registrar, RHC	1
Director of Conflict, NPC	1
Greater Accra Regional Security Council, REGSEC	1
Council of Royals, Dsase (Kingmakers)	1
Head of Teiko Tsuru We	1
Head of Tackie Kome We	1
Head of Amugi We	1

Head of Abola Piam We	1
Residents	384
Total	393

Data Collection Methods and Instruments

The primary data for the study was collected using the following research instruments; interview guide and interview schedule (questionnaire) which consisted of both open and close-ended questions. The interview guide, which was semi-structured, was used to collect in-depth responses from the eight (8) key respondents. This involved a one-on-one discussion on the topic. Interviews provide greater detail and depth than the standard survey, allowing insights into how individuals understand and narrate aspects of their lives (Walliman, 2006). When using semi-structured interviews, the researcher encouraged an informal conversation covering specific themes and questions.

In the process of conducting the interview, note taking was done to capture information that was provided by the respondents. However, since all the information was captured through the note-taking, a tape recorder was used with permission from the interviewees. The interview guide was in two forms for the various respondents to seek responses for both formal and informal mechanisms that have been used in resolving the conflicts and whether they had been effective or not. The interviews were mostly conducted in the English language and averagely lasted from 45 to 90 minutes. Data were also gathered from a cross-section of the residents in either Ga or English with the help of field assistants within the communities in the traditional area through the use of interview schedules (questionnaires).

Data Processing and Analysis

The purpose of data analysis is to obtain meaning from the collected data. Creswell (2003) has stated that data analysis requires that the researcher be comfortable with developing categories and making comparisons and contrasts. The data obtained from the field were edited for consistency of the set of interview schedules and guides. Each of the interview schedules was given a serial number and a code for easy identification before entering the responses into a computerized software (Statistical Product and Service Solutions (SPSS) version software 21.1) for processing and analysis. The results were then presented in the form of tables. Descriptive statistics (mainly frequencies and percentages) was employed to describe patterns of variables in the study.

Concerning the interview guides, respondents recorded voices were transcribed verbatim from the tape recordings onto a computer for analysis of data with the aid of the Nvivo qualitative data analysis software version 12. According to Smith (1995), there is no one correct way to employ qualitative analysis thematically. He also asserts that each project creates the appropriate manner for the employment of thematic analysis. Thematic analysis involves critically examining a text or documents in order to identify common themes that occurs repeatedly. The researcher analysed data using a coding process. The researcher used coding to generate several themes. These themes were the ones that appeared as major findings in the study and appeared under separate headings in the findings section.

Ethical Issues

Ethics means conforming to accepted standards and being consistent with agreed principles of moral conduct (Strydom, 2005). The study complied with the ethical concerns and code of ethics of the University of Cape Coast. The research topic was sent to the supervisors to approve the topic as researchable that could cause no harm to the respondents involved.

To ensure this, an introductory letter was sought from the School for Development Studies of the University of Cape Coast before data was collected to introduce the researcher and the field assistants, as well as the nature and essence of the study. Informed consent was sought from the respondents. This was achieved by informing them about the nature and the objectives of the research upon which they willingly accepted to participate by providing relevant information. Respondents were also given their right to privacy by respecting their views in situations where respondents were unwilling to respond to some questions. Moreover, the study observed the respondents' rights of anonymity. It was further explained that names were withheld and were not attached to any report from the study. Finally, respondents were accorded their right to confidentiality. Information disclosed by respondents were used by the research for academic work only and not for any other purposes.

Chapter Summary

This chapter discussed the methods used in carrying out the study. It dealt with issues such as the description of the study area and research design. The target population, data sources, sample size, sampling procedure, and research data collection instruments were also discussed. Lastly, the chapter described the data processing and analytical techniques used, and ethical issues considered. The next chapter is the presentation of results and discussion.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the presentation and discussion of the results of the study. There are five sections in this chapter. First, the demographic characteristics of the respondents were captured. The second aspect considered the causes of the Ga chieftaincy conflict. Third, the various resolution mechanisms that have been used and the rationale behind the selection of those specific resolution mechanisms were discussed. Fourth, the study assesses perceptions of the respondents on the effectiveness of the various conflict mechanisms being used and the challenges associated with their effectiveness. Finally, the study examines possible conflict resolution mechanisms that can be used in resolving the Ga chieftaincy conflict.

Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

This section describes the demographic characteristics of the respondents' that is, sex, level of education, ethnicity, gate and occupation. The demographic characteristics of respondents were necessary to offer an in-depth description of the background of each respondent. Table 3 gives the outcomes.

From Table 3, out of 215 respondents, 67.9 percent were males while 32.1 percent were females. This means that males dominated the study. This also means that male within the traditional area have more knowledge about the resolution process than female. On the level of education, 45.1 percent had no formal education, 21.9 percent had basic education, 17.7 percent had second cycle education while 15.3 percent of the respondents had tertiary education. This means that majority of the respondents had no formal education.

On ethnicity of the respondents, majority of the respondents were Ga representing 81.9 percent while 18.1 percent of the respondents were Non-Ga. Therefore, majority of the respondents were aware of issues concerning Ga chieftaincy and its resolution process. This study also involved Non-Ga because the researcher wanted to get the diverse view for the study.

Concerning the gate respondents were associated with, Teiko Tsuru We were 14.4 percent, Amugi We were 13 percent, Tackie Kome We were 11.2 percent and Abola Piam We were 11.6 percent. The rest of the respondents who were not associated with any of the four ruling houses were 50.2 percent. From Table 3, 50.7 percent of the respondents were unemployed, followed by 40 percent of respondents who were employed, 6.5 percent of the respondents were students while 2.8 percent of respondents were retired. This means that a little above one-half of the respondents had no jobs.

Eight key stakeholders were interviewed. These were the Director of Conflict of the National Peace Council, the Registrar of Greater Accra Regional House of Chiefs and the Security Coordinator of Greater Accra Regional Security

Council. Besides, family heads of the four ruling houses (Teiko Tsuru We, Amugi We, Tackie Kome We and Abola Piam We) and a representative of Dsase in the person of the chief priest of the Ga state and also head of the Nae We were also interviewed. All these participants were males who were above 40 years old. All these participants were highly educated with at least a first degree in various fields of study.

Table 3: Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

Variable	Category	Frequency	Percentage
Sex	Male	146	67.9
	Female	69	32.1
	Total	215	100
Level of Education	No Formal Education	97	45.1
	Basic	47	21.9
	Second cycle	38	17.7
	Tertiary	33	15.3
	Total	215	100
Ethnicity	Ga	176	81.9
	Non-Ga	39	18.1
	Total	215	100
Gate associated with	Teiko Tsuru We	31	14.4
	Amugi We	28	13
	Tackie Kome We	24	11.2
	Abola Piam We	25	11.6
	None	107	49.8
	Total	215	100
Occupation	Employed	86	40
	Unemployed	109	50.7
	Retired	6	2.8
	Student	14	6.5
	Total	215	100

Source: Field Survey (2018)

Actors in the Conflict

This section considered the main parties involved in the conflict. This captured the various types of actors: primary, secondary and tertiary party.

According to Wehr (1979), parties in a conflict differ in the directness of their involvement and the importance of its outcome for them. Primary parties are those who oppose one another, are using fighting behaviour, and have a direct stake in the outcome of the conflict. Secondary parties are people who have an indirect stake in the outcome of the dispute but who do not find themselves to be directly involved while tertiary party are institutions or individuals who have an interest in the successful resolution of the conflict. Data were gathered from respondents on the primary actors of the conflict and the results are shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Primary Actors in the Conflict

Primary Actors	Frequency	Percentage
Teiko Tsuru We Gate	215	23.6
Amugi We Gate	143	15.7
Tackie Kome We Gate	143	15.7
Abola Piam We Gate	215	23.6
Dsase Gate	196	21.5
Total	912*	100

*multiple responses

Source: Field Survey (2018)

Table 4 depicts the primary actors in Ga chieftaincy conflict as indicated by the respondents. Namely, Teiko Tsuru We Gate, Amugi We Gate, Tackie Kome We Gate and Abola Piam We Gate which are the four main ruling houses in which the Ga people select the Ga Mantse. Also, the Dsase (kingmakers) was considered

as primary actors in the conflict by respondents. The Dsase is the legal body within the Ga Traditional Council responsible for the installation of the Ga Mantse. The table shows that most of the responses (23.6%) were of the view that Teiko Tsuru We and Abola Piam We are the main conflict actors because they are the two main ruling houses (gates) contesting the installation of the Ga Mantse. This was confirmed by Kendie et al. (2014), that the two protagonists are King Tackie Tawiah (now deceased) and King Adamu Latse are from the Teiko Tsuru We and Abola Piam We, respectively making them the primary actors.

These were followed by 21.5 percent of responses also showing that Dsase was one of the primary actors in the Ga chieftaincy conflict. The Dsase was considered as a primary actor because the Dsase had been engulfed with conflict as well. Then Dsasetse (head of the kingmakers), Nii Yaote Oto-Ga who was made to 'act' during the suspension of Nii Tetteh Kwei II had refused to step aside after Nii Tetteh Kwei II was reinstated. As a result, the Dsase has been divided into two groups with both contesting to be the rightful Dsasetse (head of the kingmakers) of the Ga State Council. Also, 15.7 percent of the responses picked Amugi We and Tackie Kome We also as primary actors in the conflict. Both Amugi We and Tackie Kome We have a strong stake in conflict as a result of how the Ga Mantse succession is rotated among these four ruling houses which these ruling houses are part. Hence, if the conflict is not resolved for one of these two ruling factions (Teiko Tsuru We and Abola Piam We) to install in Ga Mantse, it will never get to their turn as a ruling house.

Similarly, all the eight (8) key participants interviewed agreed that the primary actors of the Ga chieftaincy conflict were Teiko Tsuru We and Abola Piam We. Also, the Dsase of the Ga Traditional Council was confirmed by key participants as one of the primary actors of the Ga chieftaincy conflict. The Dsase which is the legal body within the Ga Traditional Council responsible for the installation of the Ga Mantse has been divided into two and has been engulfed with conflict as well. The respondent from NPC in an interview revealed that:

> *"You can think of the Dsase (kingmakers) from which the Ga Mantse is selected as one of the actors. You can also think of other quarters in the Ga state that play major roles in the installation of the Ga Mantse as also actors in the conflict. Youth in the area, police, government officials and other opinion leaders within the area can be classified as actors"* (respondent from NPC, 23/7/18).

In that regard, the above section gives a clear understanding of the background of the actors of the Ga chieftaincy conflict, thus primary actors of the conflict consisting of Teiko Tsuru We, Amugi We, Tackie Kome We, Abola Piam We and Dsase. The individuals living within the Ga Traditional Area became the secondary parties while the state institutions (NPC, RHC and REGSEC) represented the third parties trying to resolve the conflict.

Causes of Ga Chieftaincy Conflict

The section to examine the causes of the conflict from the views of all the respondents. Conflict theorists point out that there are objective reasons that usually

serve as a motivation for two or more groups to get into a conflict. Therefore, this section attempts to answer the question "what are the causes of the Ga chieftaincy conflict as perceived by the various respondents and stakeholders in the study area?" This section presents the main causes of Ga conflict as shown in Table 5.

Table 5: Causes of Ga Chieftaincy Conflict

Causes	Frequency	Percentage
Ascending the throne	199	36.9
Traditions of the Ga people	129	23.9
Politics	160	29.6
Poverty	32	5.9
Money influence	12	2.2
Control of Stool Lands	8	1.5
Total	540*	100

*multiple responses
Source: Field Survey (2018)

Respondents were made to indicate the causes of the Ga chieftaincy conflict. The study revealed that majority of the responses perceived that ascending the throne is a cause of the conflict. From the literature, legitimate successor to the Ga Mantse throne between Teiko Tsuru We and Abola Piam We after the demise of Chief Boni Nii Amugi II undoubtedly is one of the main cause of the conflict. Also, 29.6 percent of responses believe that politicians and their activities between the two main political parties (NPP and NDC) within the traditional area have also

contributed to the intractability of the conflict. Another reason for the involvement of political parties and politicians in the Ga Mashie chieftaincy dispute is the grabbing of Ga State lands. Accra is the most developed part of Ghana and houses all the important offices of the State including the seat of government. On a scale of measure, the element of politics in the conflict is as almost significant as that of chieftaincy. Some responses (23.9%) indicated that traditions of the Ga people such as the selection of a successor and the enstoolment process of a Ga Mantse had been one of the leading cause of the conflict. Another tradition leading to Ga conflict is the family lineage thus the Abola Piam We argued that the candidate of Teiko Tsuru We, was not eligible due to his maternal lineage. This is because the Ga people are patrilineal. On the other hand, Teiko Tsuru We claimed that the Abola Piam We were not royals in the true sense of the word but historically were slaves who were integrated into the Ga society. Hence in both cases, it is against the customs and traditions of the people to install Ga Mantse from both families. Also, a few of the responses (5.9%) suggested that poverty within the traditional area contribute to the Ga conflict. Lastly, only 3.7 percent of the responses suggested that the influence of money and control of stool lands had also been the cause of the Ga conflict.

These causes were confirmed by the eight key participants who were interviewed. It was revealed that the major causes of the conflict were division in Dsase rule (kingmakers) and succession to the Ga Mantse stool. An interview with one family head confirmed that:

> *"the causes of this conflict are due to power and greed for Ga lands and properties"* (respondent from Teiko Tsuru We, 26/7/18).

82

The other three family heads asserted that the Ga Mantse conflict was as a result of rightful successor to the throne. For example, the respondent associated with the Amugi We gave an account that:

> *"after the demise of Ga Mantse (Boni Nii Amugi II) in 2004, there has not been peace considering the rightful successor to the Ga Mantse throne"* (respondent from Amugi We, 24/7/18).

These were also confirmed in an interview with stakeholder institutions (RHC, NPC and REGSEC) who are in charge of resolving the conflict. For instance, on the causes of the conflict, the respondent from REGSEC in an interview identified the causes of the Ga chieftaincy conflict as:

> - *"the rightful successor of the Ga Mantse stool."*
> - *"who are the proper kingmakers (Dsase) of the Ga Mantse?"* (respondent from REGSEC, 23/7/18).

According to the respondent from the RHC, two different groups are posing as the rightful Dsase who have all enstooled two different Kings (Nii Adamu Latse and Nii Tackie Teiko Tsuru II also known as Dr Kelvin Tackie Abia). The respondent from the RHC further revealed that:

> *"The Dsase who enstooled Nii Tackie Teiko Tsuru II is saying the Dsase (kingmakers) who enstooled Nii Adamu Latse, (who is gazetted at NHC) is not the rightful Dsase"* (respondent from RHC, 30/7/18)

83

Thus, the Dsase who enstooled Nii Tackie Teiko Tsuru II says Nii Adamu Latse was not rightfully nominated, selected and installed as the Ga Mantse. The respondent from the REGSEC also gave his account of the causes of the conflict which was in line with that of the other participants. He revealed that:

> *"The rightful person to ascend the stool of Ga Mantse, following the death of Nii Amugi II has been a key underlining factor to the conflict"* (respondent from REGSEC, 23/7/18).

The respondent allied to the NPC responded as follows:

> *"The conflict is about the succession to the Ga Mantse stool and the lack of a clear succession line to the throne."*

This means that the REGSEC and NPC were of the same view that the rightful person to ascend the stool of Ga Mantse is the cause of Ga chieftaincy conflict. However, the RHC combined the views of NPC, REGSEC and that of the four ruling families and referred to the causes of conflict as the rightful Dsase (two different groups posing as the Dsase) and succession to the Ga Mantse stool.

In conflict analysis, conflict theorists postulate that certain factors serve as motivation for two or more groups to contend against the other. As discussed earlier in Chapter Two, Frustration-Aggression Theory of conflict, Relational Theory of conflict and Structural Theory of conflict were theories underpinnings the causes of the Ga chieftaincy conflict. It also serves as a potential cause of social movement and deviance leading to political violence such as rioting, terrorism and civil wars. According to Larbi (2009), chieftaincy conflict is associated with political power,

which also translates into the control of economic wealth in the form of stool properties and prestige making both royals and non-royals desire to use every means to ascend to the throne. He also cites misappropriation of communal resources and lack of documentation on the mode of selection of chiefs.

Protraction of the Conflict

Objective one sought to examine the factors that account for the emergence, escalation and protracted nature of Ga chieftaincy conflict. Protraction conflicts are hostile interactions which extend over long periods with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity (Azar, Jureidini & McLaurin 1978). Social-ethnic conflict tends to be protracted conflicts which exhibit a strong capacity to grow in terms of the number of actors and sub-actors involved and in terms of goals, objective and types of grievances that sustain the conflict setting. In spite of all the resolution mechanisms being used by various state institutions, the Ga chieftaincy conflict continues to persist making it a protracted conflict. Protracted social conflicts such as the Ga chieftaincy conflict are in most cases sustained by one or more factors. The Ga chieftaincy conflict continues to exist; hence data were gathered from the respondents on factors that were sustaining the conflict till date and as presented in Table 6.

Table 6: Protraction of Conflict

Reasons	Frequency	Percentage
Due to traditions	134	29.9
Institutional Failure	28	6.3
Weak resolution mechanisms	58	12.9

Warring nature of the people	28	6.3
Politicization of the issues involved	129	28.8
Money influence	39	8.7
Ownership and control of stool lands	32	7.1
Total	448*	100

*multiple responses

Source: Field Survey (2018)

Table 6 presents the various reasons why the Ga chieftaincy conflict continues to persist despite the various mechanisms. Majority of the responses (29.9%) revealed that it was difficult dealing with traditions or in other words promoting and protecting the traditions of the people of Ga when it comes to the selection of a successor and the enstoolment process of a Ga Mantse had been one of the reasons why the Ga chieftaincy conflict is still ongoing. Again, the Dsase which have been divided and engulfed with conflict had all install Chiefs as Ga Mantse, but as to which one is the legal and using the right traditions is unknown. This was followed by 28.8 percent of the responses which were of the view that politicization of the conflict by the two main political parties and their activities had been a major factor as to why the conflict persists. The two main political parties (NDC and NPP) having taken sides in the Ga chieftaincy conflict, support and motivate one gate against the other. And also political parties and their candidates align to different groups in chieftaincy conflicts during elections with the hope of receiving the support and votes of these groups.

According to some responses, weak resolution mechanisms and the warring nature of the people of Ga were also outlined as reasons why the conflict persists till date. Because of the politicization of the Ga chieftaincy conflict,

political parties turn to influence resolution mechanisms being applied making the mechanisms weak. Also, 6.3 percent responses were of the view that failure on the part of government institutions such as NPC and RHC are other reasons for the protraction of the conflict. These institutions are not able to resolve the conflict due to challenges play a role in the persistence of the conflicts. The rest of the responses thought other factors such as money influence, ownership of stool lands and the control of the capital of the nation and the benefit which comes from it as some of the reasons why the Ga chieftaincy conflict continue to persist despite the various conflict resolution been implemented.

With regard to the interviews conducted among the key stakeholders, the selfish interest of some people, money influence, power and politics were seen as the reasons for the persistence of conflicts. The respondent from the REGSEC added that:

> *"the Ga chieftaincy conflict continues to persist because there is no permanent solution to it yet"* (respondent from REGSEC, 23/7/18).

The respondent from the RHC also noted that politicians should be blamed for the persistence of conflicts. He further revealed that:

> *"these politicians for their selfish interest (power) act as conflict entrepreneurs (supporting with their resources). Also, the practice where the two main political parties always try to install their preferred candidates as chiefs when they are in power has resulted in the unending nature of the conflict"* (respondent from RHC, 30/7/18).

87

The respondent from the NPC was of the view that the persistence of the Ga chieftaincy conflict has been a huge problem for NPC. He shared his view on what has resulted in the persistent nature of the conflict by saying that:

> *"The mechanisms come with laid down procedures and sanctions, but people pay their way through to avert the right means from being followed to suit their interests at the expense of others and the Ga community as a whole"* (respondent from NPC, 23/7/18).

The respondent associated with the Teiko Tsuru We also disclosed that the conflict continues to persist in the area because there has been political influence. He added that:

> *"The political interference in the Ga chieftaincy conflict began right from the onset of the conflict; we are expecting that the political parties would no more be seen dabbling with the factions to allow traditions to take its course"* (respondent from Teiko Tsuru We, 26/7/18).

This is supported by Azar's (1990) protracted social conflict theory and Coleman's (2000) description of protracted social conflict which identifies a plethora of structural, cultural, ethnic, political, economic, religious and human needs as well as social factors which hinder conflict resolution.

Resolution Mechanisms/Strategies used to resolve the Ga chieftaincy conflict

Conflict resolution involves a range of processes aimed at easing or eliminating sources of conflict. Conflict resolution can be applied to all stages of

88

conflicts and encompasses relatively constructive ways of conducting and transforming conflicts and then, maintaining secured and equitable relations (Kriesberg, 2008). Conflict resolution relates to all domains of conflicts, whether within or between families, organizations, communities or countries. The second objective of the study was to identify the various conflict mechanisms employed in the Ga Chieftaincy Conflict, the rationale for the selection and how each mechanism has been implemented.

Table 7: Mechanisms Used

	Frequency	Percentage
Adjudication (Court)	196	47.8
Police Intervention	151	36.8
Meditation	63	15.4
Total	410*	100

*multiple responses

Source: Field Survey (2018)

From Table 7, almost half of the responses (47.8%) indicated that adjudication (court) is the conflict resolution mechanism being used in resolving the Ga chieftaincy conflict. Also, about 37 percent of the responses suggested that police intervention is the conflict resolution mechanism being used. The rest of the responses (15.4%) mentioned mediation as a resolution mechanism being used in resolving the Ga chieftaincy conflict.

The key participants interviewed were mostly familiar with the court being used as a resolution tool. Also, others mentioned strategies such as adjudication, internal resolution system, police, chieftaincy tribunal, arbitration, ADR as well as mediation. One participant made mention of the V.C.R.A.C Crabbe Committee which is a fact-finding and advisory committee set up by Nuumo Wor-Lumor Borketey Laweh Tsuru XXXIII, Gborbu Wulomo Shitse, the Traditional Spiritual Head of the Ga-Dangbes, on 24th February, 2018, and led by Justice V.C.R.A.C Crabbe (of blessed memory) to ascertain the customary rites for the nomination, selection, election and installation of a person of Ga Mantse. On 7th September 2018, Justice Julia Naa-Yarley Sarkodie-Mensah took over the mantle due to the demise of V.C.R.A.C Crabbe. When the respondent from the NPC was asked of the mechanisms being used by NPC in resolving the Ga chieftaincy conflict, he stated that:

> *"Basically, in a conflict of this nature, we engage in mediation. We even have a mediation manual that regulates our functions. However, we have not been directly involved in the resolution of this Ga chieftaincy conflict, the reason being that Ga chieftaincy conflict has been in the hands of the Greater Accra Regional House of Chiefs"* (Respondent from NPC, 23/7/18).

The Ga-Mashie chieftaincy conflict resurfaced in 2004, as such the resolution processes began at a time when the National Peace Council and the Greater Accra Regional Peace Council had not been established. The National Peace Council became fully operational in 2011 whereas the Greater Accra

Regional Peace Council was established in 2018. They Greater Accra Regional Peace Council is yet even to receive its functional rights. The National Peace Council has therefore only engaged the parties involved and created an avenue for dialogue.

One key informant said in an interview that the RHC as an institution uses three main resolution mechanisms namely: chieftaincy tribunal, arbitration and ADR. He stated:

> *"As an institution handling this conflict, the institution uses chieftaincy tribunal which is statutory and like the regular courts. We also talk about the arbitration which has its own rules and the use of ADR which is also statutory"* (Respondent from the RHC, 30/7/18).

The respondent from the REGSEC noted that the council engages in two main resolution mechanisms: police interventions and mediation. He further explained that:

> *"The police intervene to prevent conflicting parties from rioting and also to maintain peace and order in the Ga State."*

All the five main actors in the conflict (Teiko Tsuru We, Amugi We Tackie Kome We, Abola Piam We and Dsase) confirmed the use of mediation, adjudication (court) and police intervention (peacekeeping) as the resolution mechanisms for resolving the Ga chieftaincy conflict. Also, the respondent associated with the Teiko Tsuru We revealed that a fact-finding committee known

as the Justice V.C.R.A.C. Crabbe Committee was set up to help resolve the conflict. He noted that:

> *"An official invitation was given to the respective parties involved in the conflict by the V.C.R.A.C Crabbe Committee to hear their side of the issue. Afterwards, each of the parties presented their documents to support their case to the mediation committee"* (Respondent from Teiko Tsuru We, 26/7/18).

The Chief Priest of Ga State, who represented Dsase also confirmed the use of mediators as a resolution mechanism to the Ga chieftaincy conflict. He stated:

> *"We had people like K. B Asante, Y. N. Amin, Ato Clottey, Oko Nii Gyame, and Archbishop Palmer-Buckle. All these people have been mediators to resolve the conflict"* (Respondent from Dsase, 20/7/18).

According to the respondent from the Abola Piam We, they resorted to the use of adjudication process in resolving the conflict. He noted the adjudication process was in two folds namely: the case of the rightful successor to the Ga Mantse throne and the case of who is the legal Dsase to install a Ga Mantse. Both of these cases are being handled by the Accra High Court, the Judicial Committee of the Greater Accra Regional House of Chiefs and the Judicial Committee of the Ga Traditional Council.

The respondent allied with Tackie Kome We confirmed the use of police intervention as a conflict resolution mechanism. He revealed that:

"the police or the fire services are the first institutions to be called when there is any dispute in the Ga State. They have become the institution within the Ga State which helps restore law and order to make room for the other institutions to resolve the chieftaincy conflict" (Respondent from Abola Piam We, 25/7/18).

The respondent from the Amugi We confirmed the involvement of the Greater Accra Regional Security Council as an institution in the resolution process of the conflict. He also established the fact that the REGSEC is an institution in charge of security within the Greater Accra Region. He further revealed that:

"the REGSEC intervene whenever there is tension between the conflicting parties within the Ga conflict and any other conflict within the entire region." (Respondent from Amugi, 24/7/18).

In summary from the views of the respondents and participants, it can be deduced that the main conflict mechanisms used in the Ga chieftaincy conflict were adjudication (court), police intervention and mediation. This finding affirms the study of Wani (2011). Wani (2011) argued that conflict resolution is an umbrella term for a whole range of methods and approaches for dealing with conflict: from negotiation to diplomacy, from mediation to arbitration, from facilitation to adjudication, from conciliation to conflict prevention, from conflict management to conflict transformation, from restorative justice to peacekeeping.

The rationale for the Selection of Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

In conflict resolution, there may be several factors which account for the choice of a resolution mechanism in the harmonious settling of conflicts particularly factors prevalent at the time of the resolution. The section, therefore, sought to investigate the rationale for selecting a particular conflict resolution mechanism in the Ga chieftaincy conflict. The respondent from the NPC revealed that the Council had been using mediation as a mechanism for conflict resolution. He explained the rationale behind the selection of mediation as follows:

> *"I think it is how the Act is phrased (the wisdom of the Act). It is our mandate to execute mediation. Another rationale behind the use of mediation is because it is realised that mediation is a way to allow conflicting parties to express their opinions freely"* (Respondent from NPC, 23/7/18).

From the viewpoint of the respondent from the NPC, it can be seen that the rationale behind the use of mediation as a conflict resolution mechanism is to ensure that the people who are involved in the conflict and affected by it take an active part in the resolution process. This helps them to own the decision-making process and to accept the outcome of the process, thereby ensuring lasting peace. This finding supports the argument put forward by Folberg and Taylor (1984) and Moore (1996) that mediation is distinct from the more binding forms of third-party intervention, such as arbitration and adjudication in that mediation is initiated upon request and it leaves the ultimate decision-making power with the disputants.

The respondent from the REGSEC revealed the use of police intervention and mediation as conflict resolution mechanisms by clarifying the rationale behind the selection by the Council as follows:

> *"It depends on the situation at hand. For example, police intervention is used when there are riots involving the crowd. The security agents (police and fire services) are called in to prevent or control riots likely to occur and also reduce the damages to be caused by or among conflicting parties"* (Respondent from REGSEC, 23/7/18).

This shows that police intervention served as a rapid mechanism to calm the conflict in the short term. Police intervention seeks to keep a cease-fire and prevent conflicts from reoccurring. These operations are used to monitor and facilitate the execution of a peace agreement. It is under these terms that police force is employed, with the primary goal of facilitating diplomatic action, conflict mediation, and ensuring basic security conditions to reach a political solution (Oliveira, 2010).

The respondent from the RHC in an interview explained that before any resolution mechanism is applied, the institution considers the level of escalation of the conflict. He stated that:

> *"when the escalation of the conflict is higher (level 3), we use the chieftaincy tribunal (adjudication), but when the level of escalation is low (levels 1 or level 2), we use the ADR or the Arbitration process respectively"* (respondent from RHC, 30/7/18).

It is always important to state the rationale for the selection of mechanisms before one uses that conflict resolution mechanism because certain preconditions must exist for conflict resolution even to be considered and these preconditions often form part of the context of the selection. For instance, according to Bercovitch and Jackson (2001), mediation is likely to be used when a dispute is long, drawn out or complex.

Implementation of Mechanisms

In analyzing how the conflict resolution mechanisms have been implemented, the researcher, first of all, attempted to understand the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms in Ghana. The researcher then probed the extent to which traditional conflict resolution mechanisms were applied in the Ga chieftaincy conflict. This was followed by an examination of the various conflict resolution mechanisms employed in the bid to resolve the conflict.

Table 8: Implementation of Mechanisms

	Frequency	Percentage
Early warning signals	49	22.8
Going to court	123	57.2
Enforcing law and order	20	9.3
No feedback	23	10.7
Total	215	100

Source: Field Survey (2018)

From Table 8, more than half of the respondents (57.2%) indicated that adjudication (going to court) had been employed as a resolution technique because they had seen conflicting factions go to court (the high court and chieftaincy tribunal). Also, a sizeable proportion of the respondents (22.8%) said there had been early warning signal by the security agencies (standby police) indicating the implementation of police intervention. Thus, police intervention served as a rapid mechanism to calm and pick early warning signal which will lead to the conflict in the short term. These measures are mostly used to monitor and promote peace with the tradition area before any other mechanism is employed. Some respondents (10.7%) identified that there is no feedback indicating that the resolution mechanisms were being implemented. In this contest, respondents are not in the know of any mechanism being employed. The rest of the respondents (9.3%) were of the view that enforcing law and order is another approach in which conflict resolution mechanism was implemented.

With regard to the interviews with the key stakeholders about how various mechanisms has been implement by their respective institutions, the respondent from the RHC posited that:

> *"Chieftaincy tribunal (adjudication) as a mechanism is implemented just like the regular court. That is the filing of a suit by one party, serving of the suit to the other party and both come with their lawyers to argue. For ADR, parties choose the mediator and the RHC will add its mediator making three mediators for the ADR process. For the arbitration process, the RHC has an arbitration committee which is voluntary and members of this committee must be*

paramount chiefs in the region. But after the arbitration process starts, they must be undertaken by both conflicting parties" (Respondent from RHC, 30/7/18).

In an interview with the respondent from the REGSEC, it was discovered that the police and the military had been involved in conflict management and resolution efforts in Ghana, over the years. They are deployed to protect lives and property whenever conflicts escalate into violence or threaten to explode over entrenched positions. The respondent from the REGSEC, talking about how the REGSEC implements its conflict resolution mechanisms in the Ga chieftaincy conflict revealed that:

> *"the Council uses a standby police force to prevent riots likely to occur. It also uses the security agencies to intervene when there are riots where they are deployed to control the crowd and reduce the damages"* (Respondent from REGSEC, 23/7/18).

The security agencies (police and military) are therefore positioned to pick up early warning signs of an imminent clash between the opposing chieftaincy groups and act swiftly to forestall the eruption of any such clashes into major violence in the capital. In the situation where violence has broken out, the security agencies have been quick to deal with it to forestall order and discipline.The respondent from the NPC also disclosed that:

> *"The mediation process by* NPC *is undertaken by the governing board consisting of 13 eminent persons. The*

implementation of the process is made possible by ensuring that all parties accept and uphold trust in the mediation body" (Respondent from NPC, 23/7/18).

A mediator must be someone who is respected in the society. Also, the mediator must identify the problems and bring conflicting parties together as one. The mediators must be persons with integrity, independent and other criteria. The mediators must always understand and compensate diversities of culture and must have the mediation skills to execute certain functions very well and must be transparent and fair. Hence, by ensuring transparency and fairness in dealing with the conflicting parties, mediation helps to get to the source of the issue and to resolve it agreeably. Bercovitch (2007) supports this argument that transparency in mediation enables the mediators to influence and gain the trust of the conflicting parties thereby helping to resolve the conflicts. The respondent from the NPC revealed that for effective mediation, there must be resources to support and hold the mediation.

> *"for instance, conflict actors were transported from the north to settle the Bimbilla Conflict in the south."* (Respondent from NPC, 23/7/18).

The Mechanisms that conform with the Ga Tradition

Different approaches and mechanisms are used to manage and resolve the Ga chieftaincy conflict. However, all these have proved futile in resolving some of these conflicts. This is because these organizations or institutions have not yielded their minds to the Ga traditions. According to Deutsch, Coleman and Marcus

(2011), the process of conflict management and resolution is subject to traditions and cultural diversity in Africa. Each of the major ethnic groups has rules and procedures of conflict resolution. The procedures and rules to settle a conflict may, nevertheless, differ according to traditions, culture and customs (Wassara, 2007).

Therefore, data gathered from the respondents on whether conflict resolution mechanisms used conform to the Ga traditions or not, revealed that 27 percent of the respondents thought the conflict resolution mechanisms used conform to the traditions of the people of Ga. This means that majority of the respondents were of the view that the mechanisms used did not conform to the traditions of the Ga people.

Respondents gave various reasons why the mechanisms used by the institutions did not fit into the Ga Traditions. One of the reasons identified by respondents was that the needs and interests of the indigenous Ga people were not considered. Some of the respondents also stated that chiefs were installed based on political machinations instead of resorting to the existing patterned traditions for the selection and installation of chiefs.

Traditionally, depending on which family's turn it is, per the rotational nature of the Ga Kingship the process begins with the selection of some rightful royals either from Teiko Tsuru We, Tackie Kome We, Amugi We or Abola Piam We; usually with such individuals having full backing from their own Royal House and from other royal houses as well. The elders of the family in question then present these selected candidates and then inform the head of the council of royals (Dsase), who calls the royal councillors to "elect" one out of the lot presented.

According to Boakye (2016), certain rites are performed at the Ga Mantse's Palace after the selection process. The Nai Wulomo performs these rites, which involves the pouring of libation and the slaughtering of a spotless white sheep whose blood is splashed on a shrine at the palace to signify his induction. This is followed by induction of the selected person as the new Ga Mantse where he is given a stool name, making him the King of the Ga State. Others thought the protractedness of the conflict alone was an indication that the mechanisms are not in tandem with the Ga traditions.

In contrast, a proportion of the respondents were of the view that the mechanisms fit into the Ga traditions since the chiefs installed following the demise of Ga Mantse Boni Nii Amugi II in 2004 were all selected blood royals from Teiko Tsuru We and Abola Piam We in spite of the political infiltrations in their selections. They also argued that the V.C.R.A.C Crabbe Committee was made up of indigenous people and the process in itself made use of the Ga language which complies with the Ga traditions. The rest of the respondents (18.6 precent) failed to give reasons on whether the mechanisms fit into Ga traditions or not.

The Effectiveness of the Conflict Resolution Mechanisms applied

The third objective was to find out whether the mechanisms employed by the NPC, RHC and REGSEC had been effective. In other words, this section sought to establish whether the mechanisms achieved its objectives. Secondly, it sought to establish the reasons for the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the mechanism. In responding to the effectiveness of the mechanism, the study relied on Deutsch's

(2001) model on ways of assessing the effectiveness of conflict resolution mechanisms. According to the model, to determine the effectiveness of the conflict resolution mechanism, practitioners or mediators need to respond to some questions which serve as a benchmark to assess the mechanism. The following are the questions:

1. What are the objectives of the conflict resolution institution in their bid to resolve the conflict?

2. What determines the achievement of these objectives set by these institutions (NPC, REGSEC and RHC)?

An interview with key respondents from NPC, REGSEC and RHC revealed that these institutions had objectives that guided their activities in resolving the Ga chieftaincy conflict. These institutions had plans of resolving the conflict while ensuring the objectives they had set for themselves came to fruition. The key respondents from NPC, REGSEC and RHC were asked about the objectives of their respective institutions in resolving the Ga chieftaincy conflicts. The interviewee from REGSEC revealed that:

> *"Our main objective is to maintain peace and order in this Ga chieftaincy conflict when the need arises"* (Respondent from REGSEC, 23/7/18).

It is clear that the objective for which the police intervene was to bring peace among members from the conflicting parties. The police continually resist periodic violent clashes and threats likely to escalate the conflict as a way of ensuring peace prevails. The respondents from RHC also in an interview indicated that:

> *"RHC play a role as the sole arbiter with an objective of resolving the Ga chieftaincy conflict"* (Respondent from RHC, 30/7/18).

The respondents from NPC also stated in an interview that the NPC had not been directly involved in the resolution of this Ga chieftaincy conflict. As stated earlier, moves aimed at resolving the Ga chieftaincy conflict began at a time when the National Peace Council and the Greater Accra Regional Peace Council had not been established. It was also affirmed by the respondents from NPC that:

> *"the objective of the NPC was to facilitate and develop mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, conflict resolution as well as to build sustainable peace in the country as enshrined in the National Peace Council Act (Act 818)"* (Respondent from NPC, 23/7/18).

One could deduce that these institutions had objectives which served as guides to them in resolving the conflicts. These objectives were: to be able to maintain a peaceful, orderly society where actors of the various factions will tolerate each other and also enhance the relationship that exists among them. Lastly, they were to find a solution to the cause of conflict.

However, these institutions had not fully achieved the objectives set by themselves. For instance, according to the respondents from RHC, the RHC as an institution had not achieved the objective. Speaking on the objective of maintaining a peaceful and orderly society where actors of the various parties will tolerate each other, the interviewee from RHC said:

> *"This objective has not been fully achieved because orders given binds like that of a tribunal such that people are left with no option than to obey or they are faced with contempt of court. Individuals, therefore, comply even if they hold opposing views to the commands"* (Respondent from RHC, 30/7/18).

Also, on improvement in the relationship that exists among the parties as an objective, the respondent from the RHC explained that out of the three main mechanisms (ADR, Arbitration and Chieftaincy Tribunal), two of them (ADR and Arbitration) which had not been employed in the case of the Ga Chieftaincy Conflict, helps improve the relationship existing among conflict parties. However, the chieftaincy tribunal which is being used to resolve the Ga chieftaincy conflict does not improve the relationship among conflicting parties.

> *"With regards to the chieftaincy tribunal, conflict actors tolerate each other by acting under strict instructions and conditions, but not necessarily because they are willing to tolerate one another, hence it has not helped to improve relations fully. Arbitration and ADR help improve relationships genuinely"* (Respondent from RHC, 30/7/18).

This was also evident in the words of the respondent from the REGSEC when he touched on whether the objective that concerns itself with improvement in the relationship that exists among the parties has been achieved or not. He revealed that:

> *"They usually violate the laws and fight each other which depicts that relations have not been improved. In some few*

cases that conflicting families come to report to us, so we assist in maintaining law and order among the conflicting parties" (Respondent from REGSEC, 23/7/18).

Lastly, the interviewee from the RHC speaking on the objective to find a solution to the cause of the conflict believed the RHC and the chieftaincy ministry are the only institutions which can solve the conflict. He went on to say that:

"the objective has not been fully achieved because the issue is still pending in court."

Also, the respondent from the NPC made it clear in his responses that the tussle among the ruling families is intensified annually, particularly during the celebration of the Homowo Festival. It is also salient from his responses that the failure on the part of the NPC to attain their set goals in the resolution process should be attributed to the fact that the Ga Chieftaincy Conflict had existed before the establishment of the NPC and GARC. The more reason why the NPC and GARC are unable to fully discharge their roles in the resolution of the Ga chieftaincy conflict.

Using the quantitative research methods, data were also gathered and analyzed from the 215 respondents on the effectiveness specifically on the three main conflict resolution mechanisms (adjudication, meditation and police intervention) used in resolving the Ga chieftaincy conflict are presented in Table 9.

Table 9: Effectiveness of the Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Were these mechanisms geared toward the needs of actors	23(10.7)	93(43.3)	73(34)	26(12.1)
Maintenance of peace and orderly society in Ga Traditional Area	22(10.2)	137(63.7)	51(23.7)	5(2.3)
Improvement in the relationship that exists among the parties	25(11.6)	143(66.5)	42(19.5)	5(2.3)
Finding a solution to the cause of the conflict	20(9.3)	135(62.8)	60(27.9)	0(0)
Decrease in violence	33(15.3)	143(66.5)	39(18.1)	0(0)
Decrease in victimization	25(11.6)	151(70.2)	39(18.1)	0(0)
Decrease in discrimination	24(11.2)	143(66.5)	48(22.3)	0(0)
Decrease in disorder	29(13.5)	132(61.4)	49(22.8)	5(2.3)
The willingness of society to face problems	31(14.4)	107(49.8)	70(32.6)	7(3.3)
Resolve conflict cooperatively, better working and social relations	30(14)	107(49.8)	61(28.4)	17(7.8)

Source: Field Survey (2018)

The results show that 54 percent of the respondents disagreed that the conflict resolution mechanisms used were geared towards the needs of the actors thus the needs of the actors and the community at large were not met while 46.1 percent of the respondents agreed that the conflict resolution mechanisms being used were geared towards the needs of the actors. Thus, more than half of the respondents believed that various mechanisms used had not been effective because the needs of the actors and mostly the residents were not met. For instance, the

needs of the residents are to see the conflict resolved so that there can be a Ga Mantse to steer the affairs of the people and promote development among others.

With the maintenance of peace and order in the Ga Traditional Area, 73.9 percent of the respondents disagreed that the resolution mechanisms being employed have helped maintain peace and order in the Ga Traditional Area; meaning there is no peace and order within the traditional area while the rest of the respondents agreed. The legion of violence which have led to the destruction of property and human lives within the Ga traditional area mostly during the annual Homowo Festivities had distracted peace and order in the area. This confirms what Nii Otu Blafo, the spokesperson for the Ga Traditional Council said that since the death of Mantse Nii Amugi, they have struggled to find a replacement causing multi claimant to the stool which only threatens the peace and stability of the Ga state (Abubakar, 2019).

Also, a greater number of respondents; thus 78.1 percent disagreed that the conflict resolution mechanisms used had improved the relationship that exists among the parties; hence there exist an unfriendly relationship between the conflicting parties. This is evidenced because whenever the opposing sides meet violent clashes occur among them. In finding a solution to the cause of the conflict, 15.5 percent of the respondents disagreed to the fact that the various conflict resolution mechanisms being used had arrived at a permanent solution to the Ga chieftaincy conflict; thus, the conflict had not been resolved till date. This is because there have been multi claimants from different ruling gates to the stool and increase the problem now is more complex at the family level as each of the two

contesting ruling houses (Teiko Tsuru We and Teiko Tsuru We) has its own intra conflicts as to who the rightful candidate should be. This has exacerbated the quest for a permanent solution to the Ga chieftaincy conflict.

For the decrease in violence, a decrease in victimization, a decrease in discrimination, a decrease in disorder and the willingness of society to face problems, the majority of the respondents disagreed as seen in Table 9. Meanwhile, fewer of the respondents agreed to the fact that there had been a decrease in violence, decrease in victimization, a decrease in discrimination, a decrease in disorder and the willingness of society to face problems. Moreover, it was realized from the study that on the resolution of the conflict cooperatively, better working and social relations, the majority of the respondents (63.8%) disagreed while 35.8 percent of the respondents agreed (Table 9). The frequent adjournments and absenteeism of the lawyers and some key members of the conflicting parties during adjudication (court) process have also made it difficult for the conflict to be resolved cooperatively neither have they given room for better working among RHC and social relations of conflicting parties.

In this case, it has been realized that the various mechanisms (adjudication, police intervention and mediation) employed by RHC, REGSEC and NPC had not helped to achieve the set objectives by these institutions involved in resolving the Ga chieftaincy conflict. These mechanisms had therefore not been effective in resolving the Ga chieftaincy conflict. Deutsch (2001) posited that effective conflict resolution could happen when one has achieved the objectives that were set. In relation to this, since the objectives of the various institutions had not been

achieved, there was an indication the conflict resolution mechanisms had been ineffective.

In addition, data were collected from respondents to indicate whether the various conflict resolution mechanisms used are not effective, averagely effective or very effective and the results are presented in Table 10.

Table 10: Effectiveness of the Mechanisms Used

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Not Effective	119	55.3
Average effective	66	30.7
Very effective	30	13.9
Total	215	100

Source: Filed Survey (2018)

From Table 10, more than half of the respondents (55.3%) rated the mechanisms used by the various institutions as not effective. This was mainly because the Ga chieftaincy had to been fully resolved. Thirty percent of the respondents valued the mechanisms employed as averagely effective because of the efforts made by the resolution institutions in try to resolve the Ga Chieftaincy Conflict. A substantial number of the respondents (13.9 percent) esteemed the mechanisms applied by the various institutions as very effective. Thus, most of the respondents rated the mechanisms as not effective.

All efforts by NPC, RHC, REGSEC and other resolution mechanisms have proved futile in resolving this conflict. This is because these institutions have not

yielded their minds to the fact that the causes of these conflicts are embedded in historical, socio-economic and political conditions, which motivate the protagonists in the early phases and in later conflict escalation. In addition, due to political maneuverings, Ga Chieftaincy Conflicts have become more complicated than ever. It is against this background that this research seeks to explore the over six-decades of Ga Mashie chieftaincy conflict (succession dispute) in the Greater Accra region.

Challenges of Resolution Mechanisms being employed

This section looks at the challenges of these conflict resolution mechanisms used. After a discussion of the effectiveness of the mechanisms, it would be worthwhile to look at the challenges of the various mechanisms being applied. Some factors served as setbacks to the objectives set by the institutions engaged in the conflict resolution thereby rendering the mechanisms ineffective. Although various mechanisms are being used in attempt to resolve the conflict, there have been some challenges. Some major challenges that were gathered as a result of the study are shown in Table 11.

From Table 11, a higher proportion of the respondents (19.1%) indicated that politics is a major challenge to the resolution process. Thus, politicians and their activities turn to influence various resolution mechanisms being employed in their favour. It is also alleged that both NPP and NDC had all installed chiefs in the persons of King Tackie Tawiah and King Adama Latse respectively (Kendie et al., 2014) which is one of the major challenges of the Ga chieftaincy conflict. In the same way, a substantial proportion of the respondents (14.9%) suggested that the

long duration of the resolution mechanisms like adjudication is also a challenge. The adjudication of cases bring with it many bureaucracies and processes that take longer periods notable among them are the countersuits filed by both parties day in day out. There is also difficulty in getting the two parties and their lawyers to represent at court sittings concerning the conflict regularly.

Table 11: Challenges of Resolution Mechanisms being employed

Challenges	Frequency	Percentage
Unseen actors	14	6.5
Unemployed youth in the locality	11	5.1
Funding	25	11.6
Corruption	15	7.0
Politics	41	19.1
Duration of process	32	14.9
Institutions do not consider Ga Traditions	18	8.4
Warring nature of the people	14	6.5
Taking of side/entrenched position in the conflict	26	12.1
Getting both parties in court always	17	7.9
No response	2	0.9
Total	215	100

Source: Field Survey (2018)

Other challenges that were glaring included unseen actors, unemployed youth, funding and time for the various institutions. Some respondents (14.9%) were of the view that the mechanisms used by the institutions failed to acknowledge

the Ga Traditions. In addition, the rest of the respondents believed that successive governments took sides/entrenched positions in the resolution of the conflict for their political motives.

According to the respondents from the various institutions (NPC, RHC and REGSEC), they viewed funding/resources, availability of a lawyer, invisible actors and lack of capacity for people to mediate as the challenges they were confronted with in trying to resolve the Ga chieftaincy conflict. The respondents from the NPC in an interview revealed that:

> *"I think it is about the resource and lack of capacity on the part of people to mediate. That is why since 2013 the National Peace Council has been building the capacity of various actors. Specifically that of women, youth and political parties"* (Respondent from the NPC, 23/7/18)

Similar views were expressed by the respondent from REGSEC:

> *"Invisible actors of the conflict and people who throw stones and other objects when there are riots are hindrances to the conflict resolution"* (respondent from the REGSEC, 23/7/18).

Also, the respondent from the RHC noted that:

> *"Unlike the regular court where the sole judge who is a trained lawyer takes decisions by himself and understands all the system, the tribunal has three laymen (paramount chiefs) who are not lawyers and a judge who is paid by the state. The paramount chiefs (laymen) are given allowances to cover their transportation, accommodation and lunch when they come for sittings, all of which come at a very high*

cost. The frequent adjournments and absenteeism on the part of the lawyers are also challenging to the process. An adjournment by the lawyers comes with a cost since the paramount chiefs take their full allowances for fuel and accommodation so long as they are present at court. Regardless of whether the case is heard or not, they are paid for showing up" (Respondent from the RHC, 23/7/18).

On the other hand, the factions in the conflict also had certain challenges borne out of the employment of the conflict resolution mechanisms by the institutions (NPC, RHC and REGSEC). Among them, the major challenges were logistics for mediation, cost of legal representation and long delays in judgment. Some believed that state resources are wasted during police intervention. For example, the respondent associated with Teiko Tsuru We gave an account that:

"long delay by the Ga Traditional Council, the RHC and the High Court in adjudicating on the matter pending before them is challenging" (Respondent from Teiko Tsuru We, 26/7/18).

One other challenge revealed by the Chief Priest of Ga State was that: the court does not understand the tradition of the people. Also, he revealed that conflict entrepreneurs (rich, politicians, government officials and some non-royals) were influencing the police in the discharge of their duties by abetting them in taking advantage of the Ga people. He stated in furtherance that:

"Most affluent people in the society (rich, politicians, government officials and some non-royals) influence the

police in a corrupt manner to take advantage of the people." (Respondent from Dsase, 20/7/18).

The respondent from the Aumgi We also added his voice by saying:

> *"Unseen actors in any conflict speak and influence the outcomes of the conflict. You can't locate and find their whereabouts. It is sometimes difficult to reach the unseen actors; it is so challenging."*

The Possibility of Resolving the Ga Chieftaincy Conflict

The last objective of the study was to examine possible conflict resolution mechanisms that can be used in resolving the Ga chieftaincy conflict. Therefore, data were gathered on the possibility of resolving the conflict and it was revealed that all the respondents thought that the Ga chieftaincy conflict could be resolved. This means that all of the respondents agreed to the fact that the conflict could be resolved. For example, an interview with some key stakeholders showed that:

> *"It can be resolved; this conflict is surmountable. However, if the politicians fail to back off, it would take a very long-term"* (Respondent from the REGSEC, 23/7/18).

> *"It can be resolved. Let me state that the new Chieftaincy Minister and his Chief Director are very keen and willing to get this resolved. So, they have even provided extra funding and have directed that not Ga Mashie alone but wherever there are chieftaincy conflicts (hot spots), we should prepare a special budget and send to them"* (Respondent from the RHC, 30/7/18).

Respondents' Suggestions to Improve these Mechanisms

It was also the objective of this study to ascertain how the mechanisms in use can be improved. This is necessitated by the fact that the conflict had not been permanently resolved despite the various conflict resolution mechanisms employed. In line with this, respondents were allowed to suggest possible measures to improve the mechanisms in use. The results are presented in Table 12.

Table 12: Respondents' suggestions to improve the existing mechanisms

	Frequency	Percentage
Approval of the Ga constitution by the NPC	35	16.3
Peace education	36	16.7
The government should stay out	39	18.1
Formation of a local peace committee	58	27
Dialogue among actors	26	12.1
Prosecution offenders	21	9.8
Total	215	100

Source: Field Survey (2018)

Table 12 shows that a larger proportion of the respondents (27%) prefer the use of indigenous Ga Traditions and the formation of a local peace committee. This was followed by respondents (18.1%) who suggested the government should stay out of the resolution process. Other respondents were of the view that the use of peace education, the approval of the Ga Constitution by the National House of Chiefs, proper dialoguing among conflict actors and prosecution of offenders who

engage in the violence if caught can also help to improve on the resolution mechanisms already in usage.

The responses from key stakeholders were not completely different from the views expressed earlier by other respondents. In an interview, these were some of the revelations some key stakeholder had to say.

> *"The major problem faced by the institution is mainly finance and even with that the Chieftaincy Minister and Chief Director have asked us to provide a special budget for special financing. If this is done, the mechanism can be improved which will resolve the conflict easily"* (Respondent from RHC, 30/7/18).

> *"The mechanisms existing already can be enhanced when the installation of the legitimate Ga Mantse is from the appropriate Royal Ruling House within the Ga State. Traditionally no one would raise any issues against his reign and his authorities in ruling the Ga State"* (Respondent representing the Dsase, 20/7/18).

> "*All the said institutions can improve the resolution mechanisms used by helping to a*pprove *all written and unwritten constitution of the Ga State. If all the four ruling houses and Ga Dsase body abode by the constitution, there would be peace at all times within the Ga State"* (Respondent from the Teiko Tsuru We, 26/7/18).

> *"The mechanisms already employed can be improved when the government stays away from the process and the conflict itself to allow the Traditional Council to resolve the matter*

with the help of the security agencies (police) because no
government institutions can resolve the conflict"
(Respondent associated with the REGSEC, 23/7/18).

"I think it is about the National House of Chiefs working
with other traditional authorities to document and have a
chieftaincy succession plan" (Respondent from the NPC,
23/7/18).

"The mechanisms can be improved if there is a well-
structured mechanism at the traditional level" (Respondent
from the Abola Piam We, 25/7/18).

Alternative Mechanisms that can be used to Resolve/Manage the Conflict

According to Enu-Kwesi and Tuffour (2010), conflict management and
peace-building are two essential approaches to sustainable peace and development
in Africa. Explaining further, they describe conflict management as an attempt to
control conflict by acting to help discontinue violence. Despite the various
mechanisms being used, Ga chieftaincy conflict had not been resolved to make
these mechanisms not effective therefore, respondents were given a chance to
propose alternative mechanisms that could be used to resolve the Ga chieftaincy
conflict and their responses are shown in Table 13.

Table 13: Alternative Mechanisms that can be used to resolve the Conflict

Mechanisms	Frequency	Percentage
Mediation by Traditional Leaders or Respectable Person	58	27
Formation of local peace committee	44	20.5
Peace Education	48	22.3
Mediation	44	20.5
No response	21	9.8
Total	215	100

Source: Field Survey (2018)

Table 13 was to find out respondents' opinion on other conflict resolution mechanisms that could be used to resolve the conflict. A section of the respondents (27%) chose mediation by a traditional leader or respectable person as the best alternative mechanism to resolve the conflict. Followed by (22.3%) respondents who thought the use of peace education where conflicting parties would be made aware of the danger and consequence of conflicts could also be used to resolve the conflict. Lastly, both the use of local peace committee and mediation had 20.5 percent respondents each. Comparatively, these key stakeholders were of the view that:

> *"We cannot use any mechanism. The only option we have for now is the tribunal because there is no middle point where we can converge. The division among the parties is so alarming that there is no middle point or common grounds. Using the arbitration or ADR, there should be a common*

ground which serves as the commencement stage. We can commence but, nothing to roll on to" (Respondent from the RHC, 30/7/18).

Similarly, the respondent from Teiko Tsuru We noted that:

*"The Ga Dsase has a constitution which for all these years has not been gazetted for all ruling houses to abide by the Ga Dsase's code of conduct. The conflict can be resolved if the right Dsase is gazetted" (*Respondent from the Teiko Tsuru We, 26/7/18).

The interviewee from Abola Piam We added:

"*The original structures, constituting the functions and duties of the Ga Paramount Stool, Dsase should always be strong and maintained. No one should ever claim to have established any other Dsase body because the original Dsase is from time immemorial."*

The respondent from the NPC expressed similar views:

"Blending of the past with modernization can help solve the problem. Before you could resolve the issue, you need to know the history behind the issue. Have similar resolutions on board and apply the modern system of resolution. It will become a working constitution and one documented. Nobody should be underrated in the resolution process since every stakeholder in the Ga State matters a lot." (Respondent from the NPC)

Rightful Royal gate to enstool the new Ga Mantse

The Ga chieftaincy conflict was mainly caused by the rightful successor to ascend the Ga Mantse throne and other factors. The study found out from respondents the rightful royal gate to enstool the new Ga Mantse since it was identified as the root cause of the conflict and their responses are shown in Table 14.

Table 14: Rightful Royal gate to enstool the new Ga Mantse

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Teiko Tsuru We	107	49.8
Tackie Kome We	1	0.5
Abola Piam We	65	30.2
Agumi We	0	0
No response	42	19.5
Total	215	100

Source: Field Survey (2018)

Table 14 shows that out of the 215 respondents involved in the study, 80.2 percent of the respondents had an idea about the royal gate which must install the new Ga Mantse. Among these respondents, most of them (49.8%) thought Teiko Tsuru We should be the family to install the new Ga Mantse, followed by 30.2 percent of the respondents who had the idea that the Abola Piam We should be the royal house to install the Mantse.

The respondents came out with their views concerning which of the royal gates was the rightful family to enstool the new Ga Mantse. Out of 215 respondents, 80.9 percent of the respondents gave the reason for their selection and majority of the respondents (82.4 %) out of the 107 respondents who indicated Teiko Tsuru We ruling house as the next ruling house supported their claim with the fact that the Abola Piam We ruling house did not have a rightful successor; therefore, the Teiko Tsuru We should install the next Ga Mantse. Also, 86.1 percent out of 65 respondents who thought Abola Piam We ruling house should be the ruling house to install the new Ga Mantse provided reasons that all the three ruling houses out of the four ruling houses had installed a Ga Mantse before. Again, some respondents also referred to the succession chart (Figure 4) which shows that after Amugi We installed Ga Mantse, Abola Piam We should be the next ruling house to install Ga Mantse.

Lastly, 69 percent out of 42 respondents who did not respond to that question gave reasons that the chieftaincy conflict/issue was complex and that the matter was still in court. Therefore, they could not determine the specific ruling house which was to install the Ga Mantse. The respondents who shared the view that the Tackie Kome We ruling house should be the ruling house to select the Ga Mantse due to the unending nature of the disagreement between the Teiko Tsuru We and Abola Piam We, were of the assertion that the Tackie Kome ruling house should install the Ga Mantse so that the two conflicting ruling houses would wait for their turn while they settled their differences.

Chapter Summary

The Ga chieftaincy conflict (conflict over Ga Mantse throne) started after the demise of the Ga Mantse Boni Nii Amugi II in 2004. The main cause of this conflict is the search for the rightful heir to the Ga Mantse throne. The conflict is in two folds; the first is between the Teiko Tsuru We and Abola Piam We and the second is between the two groups posing as the rightful Dsase to install the Ga Mantse.

From the study, it was clear that mediation, adjudication (court) and police intervention have been the most frequently used resolution mechanisms employed by the Council in resolving the Ga chieftaincy conflict. Also, it became evident through the study that the rationale for the selection of these resolution mechanisms was based on the institutional mandate of the various institutions (NPC, RHC and REGSEC) and by considering the advantages associated with the usage of each of the techniques. NPC used meditation because it helps conflicting parties to own the decision-making process and accept the outcome of the process to ensure lasting peace. RHC also considered the level of escalation of the conflict before any mechanism is used. Lastly, REGSEC used police intervention because it helps to control riots or reduce the damages caused by or among conflicting parties.

A relevant point to be made from the study is that the institutions have not been able to resolve the Ga chieftaincy conflict. The mechanisms employed in the resolution have not been effective. This stems from the fact that institutions have not been able to achieve the objectives they set for themselves (to resolve the root causes of the conflicts and ensure lasting peace in the affected areas). Other

contributing factors to the unsuccessful resolution of the conflict were unseen actors, corruption and politicization of the conflict. Finally, inadequate funds and logistics for institutions to work were challenges that hindered the effectiveness of the mechanism.

The study revealed that the Ga chieftaincy conflict could be resolved. Findings gathered from respondents depicted that an improvement in some of the factors could help resolve the conflict. The major factors include approving the already existing written Ga constitution by the NPC, RHC and REGSEC with the help of the four ruling houses and Ga Dsase so as to clearly state the succession line. This constitution must be agreed upon and be abided by all parties to maintain peace at all times within the traditional area. The study also pointed out that the government should stay out of the Ga chieftaincy conflict and allow the conflict resolution mechanism institutions work independently in finding a lasting resolution of the conflict.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

This final chapter seeks to present a summary of the research process as well as the key findings that emerged from the research. The chapter also contains the conclusions and recommendations that were made based on the findings of the study. Regarding the findings of the study, suggestion was made for further research studies to be carried out.

Summary of the Study

The primary aim of this study was to assess the effectiveness of the Ga chieftaincy conflicts. Emphasis was placed on the identification of the causes of the conflict. Further, the study also analysed the various resolution mechanisms that have been used by the National Peace Council (NPC), Regional House of Chiefs (RHC) and Greater Accra Regional Security Council (REGSEC) to resolve the Ga chieftaincy conflicts and the rationale for the selection of the conflict resolution mechanisms. Again, the study was set to assess the perception of the respondents on the effectiveness of the various conflict mechanisms that have been used and the challenges associated with their effectiveness. Finally, the study sought to examine possible conflict resolution mechanisms that can be used to resolve the Ga chieftaincy conflict.

The study used 223 respondents who comprised the family heads of Teiko Tsuru We, Tackie Kome We, Amugi We, Abola Piam We and a member of Dsase

(kingmakers) of the Ga people. It also included the Director of Conflict at NPC, the Regional Security Coordinator for REGSEC, the Registrar of RHC and the general public which entailed a cross-section population of the elderly (men), women and the youth within the Ga Traditional Area. The study used purposive and simple random sampling methods in selecting the respondents for the study. Semi-structured interviews and structured interview schedules (questionnaires) were used to gather information from the respondents. The data processing and analysis for this study was done using both quantitative (frequencies and percentages) and qualitative (thematic analysis) analytical techniques.

Major Findings

Based on the analysis presented in this research and the use of Deutsch's (2001) work as a model, the following findings were established:

RQ 1: What factors accounted for the emergence, escalation and protracted nature of the Ga chieftaincy conflict?

- The first findings drawn from the Ga chieftaincy conflict is that the conflict (over Ga Mantse throne) raged after the demise of Ga Mantse Boni Nii Amugi II in 2004. It was found from the study that the nature of the conflict is intractable. The conflict has existed for more than 10 years and despite the mechanisms put in place, it still recurs. This was seen in the continuous interference from people within and outside the traditional area who kept supporting the two factions.

- Also, the root cause of the Ga chieftaincy conflict is dynamic in nature. The historical account shows that the root cause of the conflict is the rightful

successor to the Ga Mantse throne. From the study, it was realised that besides the conflict being as a result of the rightful successor to the throne, it has with time become a struggle for the use of the right traditions of the people of Ga. Politics and poverty (money influence) also serve as sources of the Ga chieftaincy conflict.

- Lastly, the Ga chieftaincy conflict which is now a protracted social conflict is sustained due to the need to preserve Ga customs and traditions. Also, the warring nature of the people is identified as one of the factors that have accounted for the unending Ga chieftaincy conflict for the past years. The politicization of the issues involved and the influence of money cannot be taken out as factors sustaining the Ga chieftaincy conflict and making it protracted social conflict in nature.

RQ 2: What efforts have been made to resolve the conflict and how have they been implemented?

- The most used mechanisms by the Councils (NPC, RHC and REGSEC) were mediation, adjudication (court) and police intervention. It was observed that the Councils have a role in creating and facilitating the platform for the parties to resolve their conflict. This, therefore, makes it very suitable for the various Councils to use the above mechanisms for conflict resolution.
- It also became evident from the study that the rationale for the selection of various conflict resolution mechanisms was due to many reasons:

- NPC: mediation helps them (conflicting parties) to own the decision-making process and accept the outcome of the process to ensure lasting peace. Another rationale behind the use of mediation is because it is realised that mediation allows the parties to express their opinions.

- RHC: the level of escalation of the conflict is considered. When the escalation of the conflict is higher (level 3) the chieftaincy tribunal (adjudication) is used but when the escalation of the conflict is lower (levels 1 or 2) the ADR or the Arbitration process is used by the council.

- REGSEC: police intervention helps to control riots or reduce the damages caused by or among conflicting parties. These interventions are done by security agents like the Police and Fire Services. The police intervention is also used because of the crowd involved in riots which mostly occur in the traditional area.

RQ 3: What is the respondent's perception of the effectiveness of the conflict resolution mechanisms used?

- The various Councils have not been able to resolve the Ga chieftaincy conflict. The mechanisms used in the resolution have not achieved its maximum effectiveness. The following are the reasons:

- The Councils have not been able to achieve the objectives they set for themselves (to resolve the root causes of the conflicts and ensure lasting peace in the affected areas). Therefore, the root causes are still linger on and the parties in the Ga chieftaincy conflict are still locked up in conflict.

- Other factors that contributed to the ineffectiveness of the objectives set were due to various challenges. Some of the challenges the respondents revealed were:

127

unseen actors and unemployed youth; funding and time; corruption and politics and getting the two parties to go to court always. The delay in adjudicating on the matter pending before Greater Accra Regional House Chiefs and the High Court were also seen as challenges to the resolution process. Also, the institutions involved in the resolution were posed with issues of inadequate logistics and the fact that they did not understand the traditions of the people.

RQ 4: How can the conflict be settled?

- The study revealed that the Ga chieftaincy conflict could be resolved. Findings gathered from respondents made it clear that if the factors are improved upon it can help resolve the conflict. The major factor included the approval of the Ga written constitution by the NPC, RHC and REGSEC with the help of the four ruling houses and Ga Dsase so that it will clearly spell out the succession line. This constitution must be agreed upon and bind all parties in the maintenance of peace at all times within the traditional area.

- The study also found out that the government should stay out of the Ga chieftaincy conflict and allow the conflict resolution mechanism institutions work independently in resolving the conflict. This means that, there should not be any government or political influence in the conflict resolution process.

- Moreover, other mechanisms that can be used in resolving the Ga chieftaincy conflict include mediation by traditional leaders or respectable persons (eminent person approach) and the use of a local peace committee and traditional system in resolving the conflict.

Conclusions

The following conclusions were drawn based on the findings of the study: The Ga chieftaincy conflict started after the demise of Ga Mantse Boni Nii Amugi II in 2004. The main cause of the conflict was and remained the selection of the rightful successor to the Ga Mantse throne. The Ga chieftaincy conflict has existed for more than 10 years and it is now a protracted social conflict. The NPC, RHC and REGSEC used conflict resolution mechanisms such as mediation, adjudication (court) and police intervention to resolve Ga chieftaincy conflict. The resolution institutions have varied reasons for selecting each resolution mechanisms in resolving the conflict. From the findings, it can be concluded that various mechanisms were chosen because the various mechanisms were backed by law.

The various mechanisms have not been effective because the objectives the various institutions had were not achieved (to find lasting solutions to the conflict and to bring the parties to the negotiation tables). The reason is that the institutions failed to identify the needs of the conflicting parties in the conflict. Also, an institution such as NPC was not fully engaged in the Ga chieftaincy conflict. Finally, inadequate available documents for scrutiny and inadequate logistics and funds contributed enormously to the ineffectiveness of the mechanism.

Recommendations

Based on the findings and conclusions of the study, these recommendations are made:

In addition to mediation, police intervention and adjudication (court), the various state institutions (NPC, RHC and REGSEC) involved in this conflict resolution should use conciliation to support the resolution mechanisms. Conciliation places much emphasis on the relationship between the conflicting parties by restoring the previous relationship that existed among the parties. The NPC, RHC and REGSEC should also try to use the various indigenous resolution mechanisms such as local peace committees to resolve conflicts. The researcher is therefore of the opinion that methods of conflict resolution that are originated within the people themselves and fit the circumstances of the conflict must be considered and traditional approaches of conflict resolution that takes care of the core values and traditions as well as customs of the people is the sure panacea to Africa and particularly Ghana's numerous conflicts situations.

NPC: the NPC should play an active role in the conflict since they are not seen more in the Ga chieftaincy. The NPC in collaboration with the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) should engage in peace education to help educate and advice the conflicting parties about the negative effects of conflict human security.

RHC: they should use the traditions of the Ga people in speeding up the hearing process by the chieftaincy tribunal to arrive at the rightful family to install

the Ga Mantse. The RHC should also consider the needs and interests of the people in the hearing process.

REGSEC as an institution should not take sides in the Ga chieftaincy conflict. They should also arrest and punish violent people and protect the right of the people.

The government should not politicise issues and also stay away from the Ga chieftaincy conflict. The Ministry of Chieftaincy and Religious Affairs should make available adequate funds and logistics for the NPC, RHC and REGSEC to be able to carry out their mandate and enable them to approve the Ga constitution. Again, the government should empower the local institutions such as local peace committees and respectable individuals in the Ga Traditional Area to help resolve the Ga chieftaincy conflict.

Suggestions for Further Research

Further studies can be carried out to find out on the effects of the Ga chieftaincy conflict on local development. Secondly, further studies can be done on the effect of politics on the Ga chieftaincy conflict in Ghana.

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133

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APPENDIX A

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST

In-depth interview guide for conflict actors

Introduction

This research is being undertaken as part of the requirements for a Master of Philosophy in Peace and Development Studies at the University of Cape Coast, Ghana. The study assess the conflict resolution mechanisms used in resolving the Ga chieftaincy conflict. The purpose of this interview is to collect data for an academic exercise. The responses would be used strictly for that purpose only and the identity of respondents would be confidential.

Thank you for accepting to participate in this research.

BioData

1. Sex of respondent: a. Male [ ] b. Female [ ]

2. Educational level of respondent: a. No formal education [ ] b. Basic [ ]

   c. Second cycle [ ] d. Tertiary [ ]

3. 'Gate' associated with: a. Teiko Tsuru We [ ]b. Amugi We [ ] c. Tackie Kome We [ ] d. Abola Piam We [ ] e. Council of Royal(Dsase) [ ]

4. Occupational Status of respondent:

   …………………………………………………………………………

   Emergence, Escalation and the Protracted Nature of the Conflict.

5. Account for the history of the conflict?

6. Who are the main actors in the conflict?

7. What are the interests and needs of the actors?

8. What is the current state of the conflict?

9. What are the causes (root and proximate) of the conflict?

10. What is fueling/sustaining the conflict?

11. How does it fuel the conflict?

    a. Who are those behind this situation?

12. Who are the other parties involved in this conflict?

13. What are some effects of the conflict on your people and the nation?

        In the area of development, social, Economic, religious, political.

    Efforts to Resolve the Conflict and its effectiveness.

    What conflict resolution mechanisms have been used for the conflict?

    For Mediation

14. Who are the parties involved in the mediation process?

15. How is the mediation being done?

16. Is there a third(3rd) party

17. Who is the third(3rd) party

18. Are you confident in the third (3rd) party?

19. What are the outcomes of the meditation process?

20. How long has the mediation been going on?

21. Has the meditation improved the relationships with conflict actors?

22. Are you satisfied with the outcomes?

23. What have been the outcomes of these mechanisms?

24. Has the process been effective?

a. If no, what can be done to make it more effective?

25. What were the challenges of this process?

   For Adjudication (Court)

26. Which party took the case to court and when was it sent there?

27. Which court is in charge of the case?

28. What was the outcome of the case (results)?

29. Were you satisfied with the outcome or not?

a. If not, was it followed up (appeal)?

30. What was the outcome of the appeals?

31. Were you satisfied with the appeals?

32. Has the process been effective?

a. If no, what can be done to make it more effective?

33. What is the time period of the case and resources used in the process?

34. At what point will you go for an appeal again? Explain

35. At what point will you discontinue the adjudication process? Explain

36. What were the challenges of this process?

   For Peace Keeping

37. Which institution(s) or person(s) is in charge of the peacekeeping process?

38. Why are they in charge of this process?

39. At what point does this process occur?

40. When was the last time this process occurred?

41. Were you satisfied with the outcome of the process?

42. Was it geared towards the interest of the actors?

43. Has the process been effective?

a.   If no, what can be done to make it more effective?

44. What were the challenges of this process?

Effectiveness of the conflict resolution mechanisms

45. Were these mechanism(s) geared toward your needs in the conflict?

46. How effective was each conflict resolution mechanism employed in terms of?

a.   To maintain peace and orderly society where actors of the various parties will be
     tolerating each other.

b.   Improvement in the relationship that exists among the parties.

c.   Finding a solution to the cause of conflict.

d.   Decrease in violence, victimizations, discriminations, disorder.

e.   An increase in the willingness of society members to face problems openly.

f.   Resolve conflicts cooperatively and better working and social relations.

How can the Conflict be resolved?

47. Can the chieftaincy conflict in Ga traditional area be resolved?

48. How do the mechanisms put in place to resolve the conflict fit into the Ga tradition?

49. Where do you think the new Ga Mantse should come from?

a. Teiko Tsuru We [ ] b. Amugi We [ ] c. Tackie Kome We [ ]

d. Abola Piam We [ ] and Why?

50. Apart from the conflict resolution mechanisms used which mechanism do you think
    can resolve the conflict? Why?

51. What role can each institution (NPC, RHC and REGSEC) play to help resolve the
    conflict?

52. How should the government handle the conflict to ensure a lasting resolution?

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST

In-depth interview guide for RHC, NPC and REGSEC

Introduction

This research is being undertaken as part of the requirements for a Master of Philosophy in Peace and Development Studies at the University of Cape Coast, Ghana. The study assess the conflict resolution mechanisms used in resolving the Ga chieftaincy conflict. The purpose of this interview is to collect data for an academic exercise. The responses would be used strictly for that purpose only and the identity of respondents would be confidential.

Thank you for accepting to participate in this research.

Bio Data

1. Sex of respondent: a. Male [ ] b. Female [ ]

2. Educational level of respondent: a. No formal education [ ] b. Basic [ ]

   c. Second cycle [ ] d. Tertiary [ ]

3. Are you a Ga? a. Yes [ ] b. No [ ]

4. Institution: a. RHC [ ] b. RHC [ ] c. REGSEC [ ]

5. Institutional status of respondent:

   ……………………………………………………………………

   Emergence, Escalation and the Protracted Nature of the Conflict.

6. Who are the actors of the conflict?

7. What are the causes of the conflict? (root and proximate)

8. What is fueling/sustaining the conflict?

9. How does it fuel the conflict?

10. Who are those behind this situation?

11. In your view, what are the interests and needs of the actors in the conflict?

12. Have there been any common grounds for agreement?

13. During your tenure of office, has there been any conflict?

14. At what time do you hear of the conflict?

15. What are some effects of the conflict on people and the nation?

    In the area of Development, Social, Economic, Religious, Political.

    Efforts to Resolve the Conflict and its effectiveness.

16. What is your understanding of resolution mechanism?

17. Does the institution take part in conflict resolution in this area?

18. What role do you play as an institution?

19. What are some of the various resolution mechanisms used by the council?

20. What do you consider when selecting each conflict resolution mechanism?

21. What are the indicators that must be present in each mechanism to ensure effective resolution?

22. What are the strategies involved in the use of each mechanism?

23. At what point in time do you intervene? (as what and what role(s) to the institution play?)

24. What challenges do you face when using each mechanism?

25. What outcomes(results) have you had so far with each process?

26. Are the parties of the conflict satisfied with your conflict resolution mechanism employed?

27. How efficient have the mechanisms been used?

28. Why do these conflicts persist in spite of all the mechanisms?

29. What challenges do you face in implementing the conflict resolution mechanisms?

30. How long has each process been used?

31. Are there any other institutions involved in conflict resolution? If yes, who are they?

Effectiveness of the conflict resolution mechanisms

32. Were these mechanism(s) geared toward the needs of actors in the conflict?

33. How effective was each conflict resolution mechanism employed in terms of?

a. To maintain peace and orderly society where actors of the various parties will be tolerating each other.

b. Improvement in the relationship that exists among the parties.

c. Finding a solution to the cause of conflict.

d. Decrease in violence, victimizations, discriminations, disorder.

e. An increase in the willingness of society members to face problems openly.

f. Resolve conflicts cooperatively and better working and social relations.

How can the Conflict be resolved?

34. Can the chieftaincy conflict in Ga traditional area be resolved?

35. How do the mechanisms put in place to resolve the conflict fit into the Ga tradition?

36. Where do you think the new Ga Mantse should come from? a. Teiko Tsuru We [ ] b. Amugi We [ ] c. Tackie Kome We [ ] d. Abola Piam We [ ]   and Why?

37. Apart from the conflict resolution mechanisms used which mechanism do you think can resolve the conflict? Why?

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Introduction

Dear sir/madam,

This research is being undertaken as part of the requirements for a Master of Philosophy in Peace and Development Studies at the University of Cape Coast, Ghana. The study assess the conflict resolution mechanisms used in resolving the Ga chieftaincy conflict. The purpose of this interview is to collect data for an academic exercise. The responses would be used strictly for that purpose only and the identity of respondents would be confidential.

Thank you for accepting to participate in this research.

1. Have you heard about Ga chieftaincy conflict? a. Yes [ ] b. No [ ]

   Bio Data

2. Sex of respondent: a. Male [ ] b. Female [ ]

3. Educational level of respondent: a. No formal education [ ] b. Basic [ ] c. Second cycle [ ] d. Tertiary [ ]

4. Are you a Ga? a. Yes [ ] b. No [ ]

5. 'Gate' belong/associated with: a. Teiko Tsuru We [ ] b. Amugi We [ ] c. Tackie Kome We [ ] d. Abola Piam We [ ] e. None [ ]

6. Occupational Status of respondent: …………………………………………

Emergence, Escalation and the Protracted Nature of the Conflict.

7. Who are the actors in the conflict?

   a…………………………………….b…………………………………

   c………………………………….e…………………………………

8. What in your opinion is/are the cause(s) of the chieftaincy conflict in Ga?

   a. becoming Ga Mantse(chief) [ ] b. traditions of the Ga people [ ]

   c. Politics [ ] d. Poverty [ ] e. Others (please specify)

   ……………………………………………………………………

9. What is fuelling/sustaining the conflict? a. The need to preserve Ga custom and

   tradition [ ] b. Warring nature of the people [ ]

   c. Politicisation of the issues involved [ ] d. Others (please specify)

   ……………………………………………………...……………………

   Effects of the conflict

10. How frequently do you experience chieftaincy conflict cases in the traditional area?

    a. often [ ] b. sometimes [ ] c. never [ ]

11. How does the conflict affect your life in the traditional area?

    a. social [ ] b. economic [ ] c. religious [ ] d. political [ ] e. development [ ]

    f. Others (please specify)

    ………...…………………………………………………………………………….

    Efforts to Resolve the Conflict and their Implementation

12. What mechanisms were used to resolve the conflict?

a. Mediation [ ] b. military intervention [ ] c. Adjudication (Court) [ ] d. Others

(please specify)

…………………………………………………………………………..

13. How have the mechanisms employed to resolve the conflict been implemented?

……………………………………………………………………………………

14. Have the mechanisms put in place to fit into the Ga tradition? a. Yes [ ] b. No [ ]

Why?…………………………………………………………………………

15. How would you rate the responses of state institutions in solving the conflict?

a. very bad [ ] b. bad [ ] c. average [ ] d. good [ ] e. very good [ ]

16. What are the challenges these state institutions face when employing conflicts

resolution mechanisms?

……………………………………………………………………………………

17. How efficient have been the mechanisms used? a. very bad [ ] b. bad [ ]

c. average [ ] d. good [ ] e. very good [ ]

18. Why do these conflicts persist in spite of all the mechanisms?

a. deal to traditions [ ] b. poor institutions [ ] c. weak resolution mechanisms [ ]

d. warring nature of the people [ ] e. Politicisation of the issues involved [ ]

f. Others (please specify)…………………………………………………..

19. What is your suggestion for improving conflicts resolution mechanisms for

effective conflict resolution in the area?

……………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………

Effectiveness of the conflict resolution mechanisms

This section seeks to assess the effectiveness of the conflict resolution mechanisms used in resolving the Ga chieftaincy conflict. The examination is based on a scale of 1 – 4 with 1 representing Strongly Disagree, SD. 2 representing Disagree, D. 3 representing Agree, A and 4 representing Strongly Agree, SA. Please indicate your level of agreement with the statements below by ticking the appropriate column. Please tick only ONCE.

How effective was each conflict resolution mechanism employed?	SD	D	A	SA
20. Were these mechanism(s) geared toward the needs of actors in the conflict?				
21. To maintain peace and orderly society where actors of the various parties will be tolerating each other				
22. Improvement in the relationship that exists among the parties				
23. Finding a solution to the cause of the conflict				
24. Decrease in violence				
25. Decrease in victimizations				
26. Decrease in discriminations				
27. Decrease in disorder				
28. An increase in the willingness of society members to face problems openly.				
29. Resolve conflicts cooperatively, better working and social relations.				

How can the Conflict be resolved?

30. Can the chieftaincy conflict in the Ga traditional area be resolved?

   a. Yes [ ] b. No [ ]

31. Which family do you think the new Ga Mantse should come from?

   a. Teiko Tsuru We [ ] b. Amugi We [ ] c. Tackie Kome We [ ]

   d. Abola Piam We [ ]   and Why?

   …………………………………………………………………………………

   …………………………………………………………………………………

32. Apart from the conflict resolution mechanisms used which mechanism do you think

   can resolve the conflict? Why?

   …………………………………………………………………………………

33. What role can each institution (NPC, RHC and REGSEC) play to help resolve the

   conflict?

   NPC:………………………………………………………………………………

   ………………………………………………………………………………….

   RHC:………………………………………………………………………………

   …………………………………………………………………….............................

   REGSEC:…………………………………………………………………………

   ………………………………………………………………………………….

34. How should the government handle the conflict to ensure a lasting resolution?

   ……………………………………………………………………………………

   ……………………………………………………………………………………

Thank You.