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Source: *The Journal of African History*, 1968, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1968), pp. 99-117

Published by: Cambridge University Press

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/179922>

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## THE EXTENSION OF BRITISH RULE TO ANLO (SOUTH-EAST GHANA), 1850-1890

BY D. E. K. AMENUMEY

WHEN Ghana attained her independence in March 1957, it was generally claimed that the event brought to an end 113 years of British rule over the country. However, not all parts of present-day Ghana came within the British colonial system at one and the same time. The extension of British rule to the various parts of modern Ghana—as elsewhere in West Africa—was slow, halting and piecemeal. Some areas, like Ashanti and the Northern Territories, actually came under British rule only in this century. In this paper it is intended to study the ways and means by which British rule was extended to one section of Ghana—the Anlo country—and to analyse the nature of this rule.

The Anlo people are perhaps the most widely known of the Ewe tribe that occupies the area roughly equivalent to the south-eastern quarter of Ghana and the southern half of the Republic of Togo. The Ewe people have a tradition of migration from the east, and more precisely from Ketu, a town lying to the west of the River Niger in modern Dahomey. Since about the middle of the seventeenth century the Ewe people have been living in their present habitat. This covers an area bounded by the rivers Mono and Volta and extending inland for about 75 miles from the Atlantic coast. In their new homeland the Ewe people did not form a single political entity but, like the Greeks of old, split into a number of subtribes, chiefdoms or paramountcies, each politically independent of the other, but all acknowledging that they were essentially one people.

Anlo is one of the Ewe subtribes. Anlo is a coastal country. Traditionally Anlo proper comprised only thirty-six towns dotted around the Keta lagoon. For the purpose of this paper, however, Anlo is greater Anlo. This covers the area roughly from east of the River Volta to Aflao, and extends inland to the southern boundary of the Adaklu country.

Anlo was a monarchy. At the head was the Awoamefia—paramount chief of all Anlo. He resided at Anloga, the capital. Immediately below him were the divisional chiefs. There were three divisional chiefs representing the three divisions into which Anlo was divided for purposes of war. The Awadada, the chief of the centre, was the senior, and the commander-in-chief in times of war. Below the divisional chiefs were the chiefs of the individual towns. The degree of centralization was rather slight. The individual towns and their chiefs enjoyed a good amount of autonomy as regards local administration. All the same the Awoamefia was recognized as the sovereign of all Anlo.

In the pre-colonial period Anlo had managed to make herself thoroughly

hated by her immediate neighbours—some of whom were fellow Ewe people. Anlo had fought many battles with the Gen, a fellow Ewe subtribe to the east. The causes were attempts by either side to engross as much of the slave-trade as possible to the exclusion of the other, and also barefaced




Fig. 1

slave-raiding. Again there had been many conflicts between Anlo on the one hand and the people of Accra and Ada on the other. These were mostly due to a clash of economic interests, namely salt and fishing rights in the lagoon and along the river Volta. In 1833 Anlo supported Akwamu in its bid to subjugate the Ewe people of Krepi. As a result of these conflicts a pattern of alliances grew up, which later assumed significance during the period of the establishment of colonial rule. Any European power engaged

in offensives against Anlo found willing support from among Anlo's inveterate enemies in the neighbourhood.

Britain acceded to the Anlo country on the failure of an earlier Danish attempt to exercise authority there. A brief résumé of the Danish phase should suffice here.

Europeans had been in the Guinea Coast from as early as the fifteenth century, but for a time, thanks to its 'burning surf', the Anlo and generally all the Ewe coast had escaped the establishment of European trading posts and settlements. The economic opportunities offered by the country were meagre. The little trade that was done by Europeans was transacted on board passing vessels. From about 1720, however, the Dutch, and later the Danes and English, began to establish trading-lodges at points on the Ewe coast. A Danish lodge was established at Keta, the commercial capital of the Anlo country. In 1783 the pillaging of the Danish Agent at Keta led to war between Anlo and the Danes.<sup>1</sup> The Danish governor of Christiansborg castle was able to raise a huge army from among Anlo's traditional enemies—the Ga, Ada, Krobo and Akwapim. Anlo was heavily defeated. Under the terms of the treaty signed in June 1784, Denmark erected Fort Princestein at Keta, and Anlo was required to give an undertaking to trade with only Denmark. This was the first time that the Anlo country came into political contact with a European power.

The political impact of the Danish presence was nugatory, however. Theoretically the Danish authority was supposed to extend to the country 'occupied by the Quittah (Keta) negroes under Fort Princestein and the Augnacers (Anlo) who inhabited the district between the Volta River and that Fort'. In practice however the authority of the commandant of the fort was limited merely to the immediate range of the fort's artillery. Any illusions Denmark might have entertained about exercising political authority were quickly given the lie. She could not maintain the trade monopoly stipulated in the 1784 peace.<sup>2</sup> When Denmark abolished the slave-trade in 1803, the commandant could not enforce the prohibition in Anlo. The chiefs and people openly defied him and gave every assistance to the Brazilian slave-dealers settled on the coast.<sup>3</sup>

Danish power, in the sense of exercising jurisdiction over the people, was nil. The garrison had neither a judicial nor an executive power. It required all the attention of the small and under-paid garrison merely to keep the fort running, and it was neglected for long periods.

In 1850 Denmark sold her West African possessions to Britain for £10,000. By virtue of this transaction Britain acquired Fort Princestein and all the 'rights' that went along with it.

<sup>1</sup> P. E. Isert, *Voyage en Guinée et dans les Isles Caraïbes en Amérique* (Paris 1793), p. 35.

<sup>2</sup> Public Record Office T.70/1563, letter from Governor and Council to Committee, 20 June 1791. P.R.O. T.70/1565 (1), letter from William Robert to John Gordon, 29 Mar. 1792.

<sup>3</sup> C. C. Reindorf, *The History of the Gold Coast and Asante* (Basel, 1951: 1st ed. 1889?), 146-51.

This was the beginning of political contact between Anlo and Britain. The acquisition of the fort purported to establish the same relationship between Anlo and Britain as existed between Britain and the states adjacent to the British forts and settlements. In 1843 the British government had resumed control of the Gold Coast forts and settlements. The famous Bond of 1844 formalized the informal jurisdiction that had been exercised over the countries adjacent to the forts during the rule of the Committee of London Merchants. In 1850 the first Legislative and Executive Councils for the Government were set up. Three years later the first Supreme Court Ordinance was passed. It provided for the administration of justice in civil and criminal cases by the government, and established courts under a chief justice. This 'jurisdiction' was later extended, to the 'protected' territories adjacent to the forts and settlements on the Gold Coast. The government was empowered to make regulations by ordinance with respect to the exercise of these powers and jurisdictions. This was the nature of the British administration *vis-à-vis* the countries adjacent to the forts and settlements on the Gold Coast.

This was the system into which Anlo—or more correctly Fort Princestein—was brought by virtue of the 1850 transaction. For the time being, Britain was interested in the fort only in so far as it helped to prevent other European nations from resorting there, and also to give substance to the abolition of the foreign slave-trade. All that was done was to station a civil commandant there. He was assigned the duty of seeing to it that the British orders concerning the slave-trade were obeyed. To support him, an officer and a detachment of Hausa police were stationed at Keta in 1852.<sup>4</sup> Kedzi, a village about four miles east of Keta, was recognized as the eastern boundary of the government's authority. It was equally admitted that the government possessed no jurisdiction in the waters or on the territory on that part of the coast beyond the range of the guns of the fort.<sup>5</sup> Clearly the government had no intention at this stage of claiming any territorial rights over Anlo. In 1852 Governor Hill was instructed by the Colonial Office that, whatever claims Denmark might have advanced in her time, these were not to be enforced, and that possession of the Danish forts and the ground actually occupied by her were all that was intended to acquire in 1850.<sup>6</sup>

Though the government claimed no jurisdiction over Anlo, it expected the people of Anlo to abide by certain laws, like the abolition of slavery which was promulgated in 1851,<sup>7</sup> and to stop smuggling and to pay the poll tax.<sup>8</sup> It was only to this limited extent that the government's authority could be given substance. However, even this limited 'jurisdiction' was resisted by Anlo. She had successfully defied the Danish bid to establish a

<sup>4</sup> Colonial Office 96/25, no. 3821 of Feb. 1852.

<sup>5</sup> C.O. 96/47, no. 18667 of 28 June 1860.

<sup>6</sup> C.O. 96/25, no. 11180 of 18 Oct. 1852.

<sup>7</sup> C.O. 96/25, no. 6319 of Apr. 1852.

<sup>8</sup> C.O. 96/25, no. 6320 of 23 Apr. 1852.

trade monopoly over her, and had continued to trade in slaves despite the prohibition. She was not prepared to yield to Britain either. The King of Anlo refused to regard the British government, as represented by the commandant, as superior to him and possessing the right and authority to prescribe rules for the state. He continued to exercise his wonted jurisdiction, and declined to hand over to the commandant criminals whom he had already tried himself.<sup>9</sup> Other acts of defiance included the refusal to allow a messenger of the Judicial Assessor to pass through Anlo,<sup>10</sup> the detention of government officials in retaliation for the sheltering of runaway slaves in the fort,<sup>11</sup> and the absolute refusal to pay the poll tax.<sup>12</sup> Anlo would not pay even indirect tax. The people prevented the collection of customs duties, which were imposed in 1855. As they explained, 'It was not their intention to pay government duties of any kind'.<sup>13</sup> The king declared that he was not aware that the government had any rights to levy duties in Anlo.<sup>14</sup>

When in 1858, after two or three years' neglect, the post of civil commandant was taken up once more, Governor Pine instructed the officer to confine himself to the suppression of the foreign slave-trade and the protection of legitimate trade. Since Anlo had never acknowledged British authority, he was not to assume any jurisdiction over her.<sup>15</sup> A year later the post was completely abandoned.<sup>16</sup>

Clearly the British government had a rather delicate problem to solve. It had to choose between total withdrawal and the enforcement of its authority. There was hardly any room for half measures. The abandonment of Keta was soon followed by the decision to withdraw jurisdiction from the whole area east of Accra.<sup>17</sup> In fact so desirous was the British government of avoiding entanglements and any increase in responsibility, that Lt.-Governor Conran was made to recall notices he had issued in October 1865 to the effect that all territory lying within five miles of the forts was British territory.<sup>18</sup>

With the withdrawal of the government from Keta in 1859, the only contact that it maintained with Anlo was the continued use of Dzelukofe, about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles west of Keta, as a victualling station for H.M. ships. In the first round of the Anlo-British government 'confrontation', Anlo had won and Britain had had to climb down. It was only in 1874 that Britain renewed the bid for jurisdiction over Anlo. This time it became a lasting affair. By this time, after years of hesitation and doubt, the government had

<sup>9</sup> C.O. 96/25, no. 11180 of 18 Oct. 1852.

<sup>10</sup> C.O. 96/27, no. 1800 of 19 Jan. 1853.

<sup>11</sup> C.O. 96/27, no. 291 of 30 Nov. 1853.

<sup>12</sup> C.O. 96/34, no. 8099 of 15 Aug. 1858.

<sup>13</sup> C.O. 96/47 no. 4883 of 9 Mar. 1858.

<sup>14</sup> G. Haertter, 'Einige Bausteine zur Geschichte der Evhe-Stämme'. In *Beiträge zur Kolonialpolitik und Kolonialwirtschaft*, III. (1901-2), 470.

<sup>15</sup> C.O. 96/43, no. 3979 of 9 Mar. 1858.

<sup>16</sup> C.O. 96/47, no. 6882 of 25 May 1860.

<sup>17</sup> C.O. 96/49 of 4 July 1860.

<sup>18</sup> C.O. 96/70, no. 1312 of 2 Jan. 1866.

decided to remain on the Gold Coast. It assumed full control over the coastal areas by erecting them into the 'Gold Coast Colony'. However, the years 1860-73 were not altogether uneventful as far as Anlo relations with the British government were concerned. The period witnessed two major government expeditions against Anlo. These expeditions initiated the series of events that ultimately led to the resumption of jurisdiction over Anlo in 1874.

On both occasions the Gold Coast government sent an expedition against Anlo, largely under a misconception, and as a result of a smear campaign that had been successfully carried on by Anlo's enemies. In 1865-66 what was essentially a commercial war between Anlo and her rivals, Ada and Accra, was deliberately misrepresented to the government by the Ada and Accra chiefs and by the European merchants whose trade was hit. They painted a lurid picture of a wanton spoliation of the 'protectorate' by Anlo. As a result the government organized an expedition against Anlo in 1866. She was heavily defeated. Again in 1873-4, during the Ashanti campaign, Anlo was attacked by government forces. It was assumed in government circles that Anlo was in league with Ashanti, and therefore it was felt that an attack on Anlo was indispensable to the success of the expedition against Ashanti. Accordingly an unprovoked attack was mounted against Anlo late in 1873.<sup>19</sup> Once again Anlo was heavily defeated and many of her towns burnt. Under the terms of the peace treaty signed on 22 March 1874, Anlo acknowledged 'H.M.'s right to occupy such places in Anlo as may appear expedient in order to place the Anlo country or portions of it under the same jurisdiction as is exercised by H.M.'s Government on other portions of the Gold Coast'.<sup>20</sup>

This treaty revived British jurisdiction over Anlo, or, for the time being, over portions of it. This time British jurisdiction had come to stay. It has already been stated that by now Britain had decided to stay on the Gold Coast, and in this year, 1874, had annexed the forts and settlements as the Gold Coast 'Colony'. Over the years British jurisdiction over Anlo was to extend both in scope and intensity. As soon as the treaty was initialled, a military officer, Captain Baker, and a force of 100 Hausa police were stationed at Keta to garrison the fort.<sup>21</sup> At the same time Keta was erected into a magisterial and revenue station. Fiscal considerations underlay the decision to reoccupy Keta and to extend British jurisdiction along not only the Anlo but the entire Ewe coast. Kimble calls the process an illustration of the essential interaction between economic and political imperialism. 'Where British interests could not be protected by the informal methods of com-

<sup>19</sup> The general 'histories' of the Gold Coast have usually misrepresented Anlo's side of the picture in the recounting of these events. For an analysis of the economic and political background of these events. cf. D. E. K. Amenumey, 'The Ewe people and the coming of European rule 1850-1914', unpublished M.A. thesis (London, 1964).

<sup>20</sup> C.O. 96/112, no. 8105 of 23 June 1874.

<sup>21</sup> C.O. 96/112, no. 8607 of 26 June 1874.

mercial expansion, the local administration were only too eager to expand their formal sovereignty.<sup>22</sup>

The fact is that since the abandonment of the poll tax in the early 1860s, customs provided the sole revenue of the government apart from a parliamentary grant of £4,000 per annum. It was very difficult to make ends meet. In 1875, for example, expenditure exceeded revenue by £4,276. Throughout, therefore, the government was concerned with making it possible to gain revenue from the trade that was going on. It was felt that the revenue could be augmented considerably if smuggling from east of the Volta could be stopped. Hence the bid to control the coastline east of the Volta. As early as 1870 Governor Ussher had urged the occupation of Keta for customs reasons. He had estimated that duty leviable would amount to £5,000 p.a. and could be collected at a cost of £500.<sup>23</sup> Clearly therefore the occupation of Keta would be a valuable economic asset, and would go a long way to enabling the government to stand on its feet.

Captain Baker was instructed to act as a justice of the peace and exercise the functions of a civil commandant. A subcollector of revenues was appointed for Keta.<sup>24</sup> The Colonial Office instructions were that no attempt should be made to exercise authority over the entire Anlo territory, but only on the narrow strip of land dividing the lagoon from the sea.<sup>25</sup> The eastern boundary of British jurisdiction was mistakenly fixed at Adafienu, which meant that the coast of Somé, the Ewe subtribe to the east of Anlo, was included in the 'Protectorate' as part of Anlo.

Before jurisdiction was in any way consolidated over Anlo, the local administration had already begun to consider extending the frontier further east. As early as 1875 Governor Strahan urged the importance, from the revenue point of view,<sup>26</sup> of extending jurisdiction along the coastline both eastwards and westwards. On the eastern side of the Protectorate—that is, the Anlo side—he advised that negotiations should be entered into with the local chiefs so that the government could obtain control of customs from Adafienu to Cotonou in Dahomey—a distance of 80 miles.

Already the merchants at Keta had greeted the reimposition of British authority along the coast up to Adafienu by establishing posts at Denu, just outside British jurisdiction, so as to avoid duties.<sup>27</sup> Strahan pointed out that currently there were no less than five stations with European factories within a coastline of 45 miles eastward from Adafienu with large importations of articles which would be taxable if landed within the 'Protectorate'. The loss of revenue due to the tactics of the traders had been so great that the local administration at Keta had had to be subsidized from the central treasury at Accra. Extension of jurisdiction along the

<sup>22</sup> D. Kimble, *A Political History of Ghana 1850-1928* (Oxford, 1963), 12.

<sup>23</sup> C.O. 96/850, of 28 Dec. 1870.

<sup>24</sup> C.O. 96/112, no. 10245 of 5 Aug. 1874.

<sup>25</sup> Minutes on dispatch of C.O. 96/112, no. 8105 of 23 June 1874.

<sup>26</sup> C.O. 96/115, no. 4861 of 23 Mar. 1875.

<sup>27</sup> C.O. 96/123, no. 4159 of 9 Mar. 1878.



coast was therefore thought to be imperative. Government effort in the years immediately after 1874 was therefore directed more towards negotiating treaties of cession with the coastal Ewe subtribes to the east of Anlo than to actively substantiating the jurisdiction over Anlo itself.<sup>28</sup>

The 1874 treaty was supposed to have brought Anlo within the same jurisdiction as was exercised by the British government on the Gold Coast. To appreciate the nature of this jurisdiction supposedly inaugurated over Anlo, one must examine the pattern on the Gold Coast west of the Volta. On 24 July 1874 the Gold Coast and Lagos were separated from Sierra Leone, and the Gold Coast was erected into a colony. On the Gold Coast an Order-in-Council of 6 August 1874 gave the Legislative Council the authority to give effect by ordinances to the powers and jurisdiction acquired by the Crown, and these ordinances were to have effect throughout the entire protected area. Now, by the draft proclamation of 12 September 1874, these rights and jurisdictions were defined to include the preservation of public peace, protection of individuals and property, administration of civil and criminal justice, the enactment of laws, determination of appeals from the chiefs to the British courts, supervision and regulation of chiefs' courts, maintenance of an armed police force and settlement by the government of disputes between chiefs. Though the draft proclamation was never proclaimed on the Gold Coast, yet the Crown was held to be fully and legally entitled to exercise all these rights and jurisdictions.<sup>29</sup> In 1876 a supreme court was established, and all Her Majesty's civil and criminal jurisdiction was vested in it.

It would appear from the foregoing that the British regime had assumed practically every attribute of government. In Anlo, however, these powers were claimed only on paper. Anlo was inclined to ignore the 1874 treaty and its implications. She was unwilling to submit to the abolition of slavery and the imposition of duties on imports. From the late 1860s a number of merchants had been settling on the Anlo coast. Now that it was apparent that legitimate trade had come to stay, the chiefs began to levy duties on palm oil and kernels.<sup>30</sup> The merchants currently trading along the Anlo coast included the agents of F. and A. Swanzy, G. B. Williams, S. B. Cole, J. H. Welbeck, Chief Akolatse, B. P. Johnson, Ledlum, and C. Rottman for the Bremen Company. The imposition of customs dues by the government transferred the dues hitherto paid to the chiefs into the coffers of the government. It also meant a rise in prices. The extent of this rise is illustrated by the fact that merchants who avoided paying customs dues could sell rum at a price below 2s.6d. gallon, which was the current customs duty on that quantity of rum.

In 1874 Captain Baker, temporarily in charge of the detachment of the

<sup>28</sup> Amenumey, *op. cit.* 90–5. The seaboard of Somé, Aflao, was ceded in 1879. Attempts to acquire cessions further east failed.

<sup>29</sup> Kimble, *op. cit.* 304.

<sup>30</sup> C.O. 879/4, section 32, no. 100 of 14 July 1873, Enclosure—Kendall's report of 11 June 1873.

constabulary at Keta, was instructed to exercise the functions of a civil commandant,<sup>31</sup> and a revenue collector was also assigned to Keta. The function of the district commissioner at Keta—the title ‘civil commandant’ was changed in 1875 to ‘district commissioner’ in view of the judicial functions the official was expected to perform<sup>32</sup>—appears to have been limited to undertaking measures to stop smuggling and prosecuting any culprit arrested by the constabulary. This in turn provided his sole judicial activity. As late as 1882 the legal work done by the D.C. comprised a monthly average of 10–12 criminal cases and 4–5 civil actions for the recovery of small arms. The average for other sections of the Gold Coast was 18–20.<sup>33</sup> Jurisdiction and administration remained very much in the hands of the king and chiefs. Essentially, the presence of the D.C. at Keta did not impinge on the *status quo ante* 1874, except in so far as slavery and smuggling could be checked. The choice of men was not particularly fortunate. They were usually young constabulary officers, who were often not suited to the role they were expected to play. They were expected to keep law and order, to act partly as administrators, partly as treasurers, and partly as magistrates. Despite the insistence of Governor Griffith, that the commissioners of the important districts should be selected with an eye on the civil functions they were expected to perform, the men sent to Keta were always constabulary officers. Their administration of justice was at times rough and ready. In 1875, for example, Captain Williams illegally meted out over fifty sentences of flogging. Official comment at the Colonial Office was that ‘Capt. Williams occupies a position where some sense of tact is required, if not a slight rudimentary knowledge of the business which unfortunately he is called to perform—namely the administration of justice. The Commandantship of Quittah (Keta) is one of the most important of the minor posts on the Gold Coast and I think if possible someone ought to be sent to relieve Captain Williams. It is deplorable to think that the administration of justice has to be entrusted to men like Capt. Williams who inflict flogging irrespective of the law.’<sup>34</sup>

Again the Accra Divisional Court had to award damages against the D.C. of Keta, who had arrested and detained a man without charge, and then reprimanded him in court for saluting the queen’s representative in a manner which was considered disrespectful, ‘though whether the disrespect consisted in the mere touching of his hat instead of raising it, or touching it with a hand in which he carried a stick, or in the expression of his countenance is not clear’.<sup>35</sup>

It is no wonder therefore that even the limited, mainly magisterial exercise of authority by the D.C. was not readily tolerated by the Anlo,

<sup>31</sup> C.O. 96/112, no. 10245 of 5 Aug. 1874.

<sup>32</sup> C.O. 96/115, no. 8277 of 24 June 1875.

<sup>33</sup> C.O. 96/141, no. 15046 of 24 July 1882.

<sup>34</sup> C.O. 96/115, despatch of 10 July 1875.

<sup>35</sup> Redwar Hayes, *Comments on Some Ordinances of the Gold Coast Colony* (London, 1909), pp. 146–147.

who continually defied and challenged the government. As early as May 1875 the people of Atoko, which had lately been occupied as a revenue post, assaulted the Hausa policemen there.<sup>36</sup> Again in 1879 it was reported that Atoko committed an 'outrage' on the D.C. when he tried to seize contraband goods there.<sup>37</sup> The attempt to check smuggling of goods into the 'protectorate' was always a source of irritation. All the more galling was the arrest and imprisonment of smugglers, because in effect this meant that they were punished twice over. To understand this, it is necessary to understand the system of smuggling employed. The merchants established stores just beyond the frontier, where goods were landed duty-free. These goods were later smuggled over the Keta lagoon, not by the merchants themselves nor by paid professional smugglers, but by *bona fide* local traders who did business with the foreign merchants. It is obvious that goods that paid no customs duties would sell cheaper than those that did. The merchants, when buying produce at Keta, made payment in the form of orders for goods landed beyond the frontier. The local petty trader therefore had to smuggle these goods into the 'Protectorate' to realize his payment.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, when he was apprehended and his goods confiscated, it meant that he not only earned a term of imprisonment but also lost the payment for his produce. Besides, with the encouragement of commissioners like Ellis, the Hausa Constabulary seized goods and apprehended people outside the boundary of the government's jurisdiction, and Ellis himself often confiscated goods on which duty had already been duly paid.

The attempt to check smuggling was therefore strenuously resisted, and many a Hausa policemen fell victim to the clash of Anlo and government interests. The police, quite apart from the laws they were expected to enforce, laws which were resisted anyway, also made themselves objectionable by their behaviour. The Hausa constabulary raided villages, beat the people up and plundered markets. Barely thirty months after their stationing at Keta, Chief Tamakloe complained that they obtained provisions from the people at prices they fixed themselves, and interfered with the women. The allegations, at least on the score of extortion, appear to be well-founded, because Governor Freeling found manifestations of it: 'I fear that there is some ground for the charge and some extortion may still be going on.'<sup>39</sup> In December 1879 Aholu, the Anlo war-leader, petitioned Governor Ussher on behalf of the king that no Hausa policeman should be stationed in their towns. The petition concluded that the cause of the disputes between Anlo and the government was the latter's attempt to suppress smuggling.<sup>40</sup> This was an accurate assessment of the situation.

Along the coast, to the east of Keta, the picture was the same. Exercise of jurisdiction by the government was limited there as well. In 1879 following

<sup>36</sup> C.O. 96/115, dispatch of 10 July 1875.

<sup>37</sup> C.O. 96/127, no. 1887 of 22 Oct. 1879.

<sup>38</sup> C.O. 96/127, no. 711 of 18 Dec. 1879.

<sup>39</sup> C.O. 96/120, no. 3740 of 20 Feb. 1877.

<sup>40</sup> C.O. 96/128, no. 1394 of 6 Dec. 1879.

the treaties with Somé and Aflao, policemen were stationed at Adafienu, Denu and Aflao 'to protect British territory from violation and to check smuggling'.<sup>41</sup> This was as far as the substantiation of the newly acquired jurisdiction went. In the case of Kliko, which is not a coastal country, no action was taken at all.

The government was not very happy about the nature of its relations with the chiefs and people. It tried ways and means by which the chiefs could be made more tractable. In 1880 Governor Ussher recommended that stipends should be paid to the Anlo king and chiefs, and that the payment should be made conditional on 'good behaviour'. This was to bring Anlo in line with Somé and Aflao, which had been awarded stipends under the 1879 treaties. The idea was that by virtue of the stipends and the mere fact of bringing the chiefs or their representatives face to face with the government officials regularly to receive their pay, the chiefs would become more and more amenable to the exercise of jurisdiction by the government. The scheme did not succeed. After the first payment of the stipend, Somé declared that it would have nothing more to do with the government and would not collect any further stipends. In 1881 the D.C. suspended the stipends due to the Aflao chiefs because smuggling was still going on there.<sup>42</sup> The Anlo stipends also fell into abeyance.<sup>43</sup>

Despite the treaties and the rights claimed under them, the general picture is that the country behind the creeks and the Keta lagoon remained singularly free of British control. Elsewhere, even along the coast, the D.C.'s authority was limited to the points where Hausa constabulary were stationed, namely (from west to east) Atoko, Keta, Adafienu, Denu and Aflao, and generally along the coast where a man-of-war could be effective.<sup>44</sup> As late as 1887 the D.C. confessed that 'the country behind the lagoon is in the Protectorate, but any real control over these places has never been attempted'.<sup>45</sup>

In view of the limited extent to which the government exercised jurisdiction, it is surprising that there should have been any armed resistance to it at all. It is nevertheless true that there were 'revolts'. Whenever resistance was organized against the government, it was spearheaded by that portion of the country behind the lagoon, usually by Anyako. The irony is that this was precisely the area over which no jurisdiction of any kind was exercised at all. However, it was because this area lay beyond the apparent accessibility of the D.C.'s military power that the chiefs of these towns considered it feasible to organize resistance. All along the coast opposition was limited to resisting the policemen when they seized smugglers, and to fighting them at times. For example, in March 1881 one Hausa man was killed by smugglers at Denu. In June another was wounded while on patrol at Adafienu, and in

<sup>41</sup> C.O. 96/19603 of 11 Nov. 1879; C.O. 96/128, no. 393 of 3 Dec. 1879.

<sup>42</sup> C.O. 96/130, no. 5318 of 12 Mar. 1880.

<sup>43</sup> C.O. 96/134, no. 2153 of 4 Jan. 1881.

<sup>44</sup> C.O. 96/157, no. 9162 of 29 Apr. 1884.

<sup>45</sup> C.O. 96/182, no. 19145 of 22 Aug. 1887.

November two were killed and another wounded when the people of Aflao fought the policemen after they had forced smugglers to abandon their goods.<sup>46</sup> The coastal towns appreciated that they lay within easy reach of the government's military power. They therefore did not go beyond these attacks on the Hausa policemen—even these attacks could be represented as merely the desperate action of individual smugglers rather than an opposition specifically organized by the chiefs.

In 1878 occurred what has generally been regarded as the first Anlo 'revolt' against the government.<sup>47</sup> In fact there was no revolt as such. The episode showed the D.C.'s position *vis-à-vis* the chiefs and peoples and the D.C.'s appreciation of the precariousness of this position. A vainglorious or frightened man, Captain A. B. Ellis, magnified the episode into a 'revolt' against the government and an attack on his person because of his exertions against smuggling.<sup>48</sup> On 19 and 20 October 1878 there was a huge meeting of almost the whole Anlo nation at Anloga to enstool a new king. Ellis, without ascertaining what had happened there, concluded that there was an intention to attack the government station at Keta. On the 23rd, while deer-hunting on the other side of the lagoon, he claimed he was attacked by a party of men at Abolove. He and his party fired on the men, who were armed with cutlasses, i.e. matchets, which were an everyday farm implement. The people denied that they attacked Ellis first. Ellis concluded that the attack was due to an intention to make war on the government. He accordingly asked for reinforcements of the constabulary,<sup>49</sup> and made feverish attempts to defend Keta. He posted policemen for night and day duty in the town, imposed a 7 o'clock curfew, threw up shelter trenches around the town, and withdrew the constabulary men from the out-stations of Atoko and Adafienu.<sup>50</sup> On the night of 26 October, Ellis and the constabulary men threw rockets into a party of canoes on the Keta lagoon. It was alleged the party had attempted to surprise Keta. Ellis himself admitted that he did not know whether they were armed or not.<sup>51</sup> It was significant that the party was reported to have been drumming, which would hardly have been the case if it was going to surprise the fort. This was obviously a party of men travelling to Anloga in connexion with the enstoolment ceremonies. Ellis may have genuinely, though mistakenly, believed that

<sup>46</sup> C.O. 96/135, no. 21995 of 17 Nov. 1881.

<sup>47</sup> The idea has gained currency thanks to the fact that A. B. Ellis, under whose commissionerhip the incident occurred, wrote an 'account' of it in his *West African Sketches* (London, 1881), 272–89. His account is incorrect. His general thesis that there was a revolt by Anlo and an attack on the government because of his zeal in preventing smuggling is not quite true. His thesis has been repeated by Claridge, *op. cit.* II, 204 ff., and has been accepted hitherto as 'fact'. Ellis's account is quite different from the picture that emerges from the Colonial Office documents.

<sup>48</sup> Ellis, *op. cit.* 255. He claimed he had increased the revenue from £200 to £1,200 p.a. and was consequently cordially hated. Even the missionaries offered daily prayers for his removal.

<sup>49</sup> C.O. 96/124, no. 15179 of 28 Oct. 1878.

<sup>50</sup> C.O. 96/124, no. 15181 of 30 Oct. 1878.

<sup>51</sup> C.O. 96/127, no. 16369 of 18 Apr. 1878. Enclosure Ellis to Hay 9 Nov. 1879.

there was going to be an attack on the fort, and accordingly interpreted every movement of the people as an execution of this plan, but this is quite different from claiming that there was really an insurrection. Enquiries by both Captain Hay and the Acting Chief Justice (Jackson) revealed that there was no truth in Ellis's allegations. It was established that the Anloga gathering which Ellis had suspected to be a threat of this attack was an innocent enstoolment meeting.<sup>52</sup>

Obviously Ellis did not even know about such an important event as the enstoolment of a new Anlo king. This by itself is an interesting commentary on the pretentiousness of the claim by the government to exercise political authority in Anlo. The chiefs denied that there was ever any attack on Keta. In fact they claimed that if there were any attack it was rather one by Ellis. They demanded that Captain Hay should deliver him up as a murderer, for shooting the people at Abolove and allowing the police to burn part of Kedzie: 'There should not be a different law for the Anlos and another for Europeans.'<sup>53</sup> It is significant that rather than punish Anlo (which later instances in Anlo, and other parts of the Gold Coast, prove would have been the case if there had really been an uprising) the government instead awarded compensation to the people of Kedzi<sup>54</sup> whose houses had been destroyed, and transferred Ellis from Keta.

In 1878 the government had cried 'wolf'. It was, however, in January 1885 that the first real armed resistance to the government took place. The immediate occasion was rather unusual. In August 1884 the Anlo king Amedor Kpegla requested the D.C., Captain Campbell, to enter negotiations with the Krepi chiefs to reopen the roads between Anlo and Krepi,<sup>55</sup> which had been closed since the 1860s following the hostilities between the two peoples. In the middle of September messengers arrived from Ho, and on the 15th a meeting took place between the Anlo chiefs and the Ho delegates, which was attended by the D.C. Both parties swore oaths to make peace and to reopen the roads. The D.C. followed this up with a visit to Ho and Taviefe (in Krepi) to secure the agreement of the chiefs there too. The roads between Ho and Keta became safe once more.<sup>56</sup>

Now this episode should not have provided the occasion for an uprising, but it happened that the transaction aroused and accentuated local enmities which were to draw the government into their vortex. Chief Tenge of Anyako on the Keta Lagoon felt slighted that the Ho delegates did not call on him on their way to Keta, but rather went to another chief, who was a client of Chief Tamakloe of Whuti, now resident at Keta, who directed them to the latter to be presented to the D.C. Anyako was the important half-way house between Anlo and inland Eweland, whence traders from the interior ferried their goods to Keta. There existed an enmity between

<sup>52</sup> C.O. 96/125, no. 15594 of 5 Nov. 1878, Hay's report, also C.O. 96/127, no. 16309 of 18 Nov. 1878, Justice Jackson's report.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, Hay's report.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> C.O. 879/22, section 283, no. 107 A of 3 Oct. 1884.

<sup>56</sup> C.O. 879/22, section 296, no 24 of 31 Dec. 1884.

Chiefs Tenge and Tamakloe, because the latter had succeeded the former's father, Chief Dzokoto, as the divisional chief of the left division of the Anlo army, while the former chief had had to content himself with the position of Chief of Anyako. Now the divisional chiefship had not then become hereditary as it was later to be, after the period of the serious Anlo wars. All the same Chief Tenge was acutely disappointed. The fact that he was not called upon to play any part in the whole business of establishing peace and opening the roads aroused the old animosities. The fact that the British government, which saw eye to eye with Chief Tamakloe, endorsed the reopening of the roads, was sufficient to rouse Tenge's opposition. He kicked against the peace, organized a boycott of the Keta market—which normally obtained its supply of provisions from across the lagoon—and established a rival market at Sadame, to which he directed all supplies which would otherwise have gone to Keta. His idea was to starve Keta, where Chief Tamakloe was residing, and which was also the seat of the government. He made common cause with one Geraldo de Lima, an old foe of the Gold Coast government, who since 1871 had been residing across the lagoon and trading in contraband goods, and who also had reason to be displeased with the government for demolishing his residence at Vodza and putting a price on his head. Lima also detested chiefs Tamakloe and Akolatse, his trade rivals and both resident at Keta, because he suspected they were in league with the government officials to discomfit him.

It was alleged that Lima had arranged with the Germans in Togoland for the cession of the Anlo country behind the lagoon. Captain Dudley's investigations later demonstrated there was no truth in the allegation, but at the time it was believed by government officials, particularly as the German missionaries had attested that Lima had once remarked to the people of Anyako that, like their brothers in German Togo, they could also avoid the obligation of duties if they got rid of the British government.

News of Lima's activities reached the D.C. It was even alleged that he had instigated some chiefs to intercept the D.C. on his journey to Ho in November. On 9 January he was lured to Vodza and there arrested.<sup>57</sup> The D.C. then despatched him by land to Accra with an escort of four policemen, but not before Lima had succeeded in sending word to Anyako of his arrest, and accusing Chiefs Tamakloe and Akolatse of responsibility for it. At Anloga a party of Lima's sympathizers stopped the escort. When news of this reached Keta, the D.C. dashed to the scene with a force of thirty-eight men of the constabulary and chiefs Tamakloe and Akolatse. Chief Tenge and Tsigui together with their adherents also converged on Anloga. When the D.C. learnt that they were in town, he invited them to a parley and then arrested them. On the return march to Keta on the 17th, Tenge's men, estimated to be as many as 30,000,<sup>58</sup> attacked the D.C.'s party, which

<sup>57</sup> Ellis and Claridge gloss over the fact that it was necessary to lure Lima to the coast from Anyako, where he had been residing.

<sup>58</sup> C.O. 879/21, section 280, no. 82 of 19 Jan. 1885.

returned the fire.<sup>59</sup> This was the Taleto war. During the fighting Tenge and Tsigui escaped. Lima, however was sent on to Accra.<sup>60</sup>

By now defiance of the government had obviously become an 'armed resistance'. It was limited in scope however. Only the trans-lagoon towns, and particularly Anyako, were involved. It was not a national uprising by all Anlo. The government decided to punish Anyako and the other towns responsible for the attack on the D.C.'s party. The plan of reprisal, however, indirectly included all Anlo in its scope. The governor's suggestion was that the matter should be settled by the surrender of the chiefs responsible and the payment of a heavy fine by Anyako, but that the obligation to collect the fine should be placed on all Anlo.

The strength of the constabulary was increased to 400 and an officer was sent down to lead them. His instructions were that 'the rebellious chiefs should be given up and a fine of £1,000 imposed'. If these demands were not met, the offending towns should be utterly destroyed.<sup>61</sup> The officers implemented both alternatives. Before Anlo could meet the stipulations—by 3 February the king could collect only four head of cattle, and he begged for time to find the men and the money to pay the fine—the punitive force went into action.

On 31 January the reinforcements left Keta for Anyako. The force crossed the lagoon in twelve boats heavily armed with guns and rockets. At first the people of Anyako derided the idea of attempting to dislodge them; this had never been done before, and Anyako did not believe it was possible to move government forces and ammunition across the lagoon in an attack. The people later abandoned the town, when they saw the forces advancing. The town was shelled and fired by the forces.<sup>62</sup> On 2 February the coastal towns of Dzita, Whuti and Anloga were shelled by the ships that conveyed the forces to Keta. On 4 February a double attack by land and sea was launched on the Anlo capital. While the gunboat shelled it from the sea, a force of 140 men armed with rockets took it and Whuti and reduced them to flames.<sup>63</sup> There was no justification for this attack on Anloga. On 30 January the king had sent messengers to the D.C. to plead for time to collect the fine and to arrest the culprits as demanded.

As has been indicated already, the uprising was limited to only a few towns and did not enjoy national backing. From the start Anlo strove to impress this on the government. The towns along the coast from Woe to Kedzi dissociated themselves from it. Far from joining the uprising, Somé rather wanted to exploit the opportunity to settle old scores with Anlo. Of the trans-lagoon towns, Afiadenyigba, Alakple and Kodzi had declared their 'submission'. Chief Attipoe, one of the Anyako chiefs, removed to Keta during the entire period, while the people of Seva removed to Kedzi.

<sup>59</sup> C.O. 90/180, no. 9903 of 11 Apr. 1887.

<sup>60</sup> On failing to collect any positive evidence to convict Lima, he was detained as a political prisoner till 1893.

<sup>61</sup> C.O. 872/21, section 280, no. 87 of 14 Dec. 1885: Dudley's report.

<sup>62</sup> C.O. 879/21, section 28, no. 84 of 1 Feb. 1885: Parr's report.



Throughout the engagement, Chiefs Akolatse and Tamakloe identified themselves with the government and supported the D.C.<sup>63</sup> Most of the neighbouring towns which at one time appeared likely to make common cause with Anyako were cowed by the repression of that place. They hastened to send messages of submission to the government.<sup>64</sup> On 12 February, delegates from almost all the Anlo towns, both coastal and trans-lagoon, together with Chiefs Akolatse, Tamakloe and Antonio (the last two divisional chiefs of the left and right divisions respectively) and Chief Attipoe of Anyako, met the D.C. at Keta and declared their feeling of friendliness to the government.<sup>65</sup> Delegates from the towns of Fiaxy, Atito and Kodzi handed in a written acknowledgement of submission. On the 15th, more delegates from part of Anyako, Konu and Sadome—all beyond the lagoon—went to declare to the D.C. that they did not wish to be considered as hostile to the government. On the 18th, King Amedor Kpegla paid £250 of the £1,000 fine. The D.C. considered this amount a fair guarantee of his peaceful intentions. As a further proof of the stoppage of hostilities, on the last day of March the people of Dzita released ninety-five of Tamakloe's men who had been detained. Abolove also released a number of Keta women she had detained.<sup>66</sup>

Despite the apparent success of the expedition, Tenge and his lieutenants Tsigui, Adzaho and Kpogo, had not been captured. This meant that the aim of the government had not been achieved in its entirety and that opposition had not been completely silenced. That very year Tenge began to acquire Snider rifles from Anecho.<sup>67</sup> He and his party established themselves at a village behind Anyako where they commanded the roads leading into the interior, and threatened the towns that did not join them. An attempt by the D.C. to capture them on 5 October failed because they got wind of it and fled.<sup>68</sup> Their camp was razed to the ground, but this proved ineffective because they returned and once more settled on the trade routes leading inland from across the lagoon, thus stopping the supply of provisions to Keta. This time they were joined by other neighbouring trans-lagoon towns like Atiave, Sadame and Tsiamé. They wrote threatening and insulting letters to Chiefs Tamakloe and Akolatse, and repudiated their allegiance to the Anlo king, because he declined to support them.<sup>69</sup> As the report of the Inspector of Police complained in 1887: 'For some time past it has not been practicable to exercise the authority of the government on a large portion of the Awuna (Anlo) country north of the Kwitta Lagoon in consequence of the disaffection of a considerable section of the people. The action of the chief named Tenge, who, having placed himself in opposition

<sup>63</sup> C.O. 879/21, section 280, no. 87 of 14 Feb. 1885: Dudley's report.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.* <sup>65</sup> C.O. 879/21, section 280, no. 86 of 6 Feb. 1885.

<sup>66</sup> C.O. 879/22, section 294, no. 76 of 10 Mar. 1885.

<sup>67</sup> C.O. 96/166, no. 12307 of 6 May 1885.

<sup>68</sup> It was alleged that he had acquired 100 rifles and ammunition from pro-German elements in Little Popo.

<sup>69</sup> C.O. 96/174, no. 13018 of 14 June 1880.

to the government, has, in conjunction with other men of whom the principal appear to be Chichi and Pogo, set the law at defiance.<sup>70</sup>

Matters remained in this disturbed state till 1889, when the government decided to settle with Tenge. The immediate occasion was that in September 1888 Tenge and Tsigui kidnapped a daughter of Tamakloe at Adzato and also confiscated his land there. Tenge's party deployed at Tsrekume in the creeks due west of Atiteti on the Anlo-Volta boundary and east of Agave. They dared the government to arrest them, and boasted they were as good as the constabulary. They drove a number of people away from Adzato for declining to join them. Further attempts to win other towns failed.<sup>71</sup> In April 1889 a three-sided attack by well-armed contingents of the constabulary destroyed Tenge's fortified strongholds in the teeth of warm resistance. Tenge lost many killed, including his lieutenants Tsigui and Adzaho, but he himself escaped once more.<sup>72</sup>

Essentially, the 1889 uprising was not a new outbreak but a recrudescence of the 1885 one. It was equally limited in scope. Once again it was only the trans-lagoon towns of Anyako, Atsiave and Tsrekume that were involved. At the beginning of the punitive expedition, on 21 April, King Amedor Kpegla and the chiefs of the coastal towns of Atiteti, Dzita, Srogbee and Whuti, which had suffered alongside Anyako in 1885, sent a note to the D.C. dissociating themselves from the rebel group. On the 23rd Governor Griffiths ordered the D.C. to summon the doubtfully disposed towns, especially those lying on the trade routes to Ho, to hold a 'palaver' at Keta to ask the chiefs to enter bonds of £300 and £500 severally and jointly to be of good behaviour to open the roads and check smuggling. On 6 March this mammoth gathering was held and was attended by all the Anlo Chiefs. Aveno was bound over in the sum of £300 to keep the peace and open the roads, while Khavi pledged £100 and Sadame £50. On 9 May the king and chiefs followed up with a declaration of loyalty to the government. Associated with this declaration were the king, the chiefs of the coastal towns from Woe to Kedzi, and the trans-lagoon towns of Anyako, Fiaxo, Asiave and Abolove. In July the fugitives from the rebel towns submitted, asked permission to settle in their old homes and gave up their guns.<sup>73</sup> It has already been indicated that, before the outbreak of the Tenge uprising in 1885, the extent of British jurisdiction in Eweland had been extremely limited. Even in Anlo it had been restricted only to the coastal stretch. The trans-lagoon country had remained singularly untouched. One thing the Tenge episode did was that it helped strengthen the hands of the government. It jolted the government into awakening from its policy of disinterest in the bulk of the Anlo country. It made it decide to take an active policy to substantiate the claim to jurisdic-

<sup>70</sup> Confidential dispatch, Colonial Secretary to Inspector General, no. 108/89 of 12 Apr. 1889.

<sup>71</sup> C.O. 96/174, no. 13018 of 14 June 1880.

<sup>72</sup> C.O. 96/202, no. 14724 of 15 June 1889.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*

tion. The measures undertaken to repress Tenge increased the government's prestige and consequently the people's regard for it. The existence of the government began to be recognized as an actuality by the people as a whole. The meetings held between the chiefs and the D.C. on the termination of hostilities brought most of the chiefs, especially the trans-lagoon ones, for the first time face to face with the representative of the government. This was something the policy of awarding stipends to the chiefs had never achieved. The trans-lagoon towns began to appreciate that they were also within the same jurisdiction as the coastal towns. The heavy bonds into which the chiefs entered also ensured that the existence of the government could no longer be ignored.

Added to this change of attitude on the part of the chiefs, dating from this period, the D.C. seized the opportunity to continue the policy of keeping the actuality of the government's existence continually before the eyes of the people by organizing patrols through the length and breadth of Anlo-Somé. The policy of patrolling the country was conceived as the only means of breaking down the reserve which the inland chiefs had hitherto entertained towards the government, and at the same time of checking smuggling and keeping the trade routes open. The strength of the constabulary at Keta was not increased. It was only a question of making a better and fuller use of the police than had hitherto been made.

In November and December 1889, for example, a patrol of about 130 men of the constabulary went through the length and breadth of Anlo, Somé and Aflao, both by land and by lagoon.<sup>74</sup> As a result of this new forward policy, the D.C. was able to say in 1889: 'In the last two years there had been a great increase in the power of the government. The old system of leaving the interior people to do as they pleased has been abandoned and now they are recognizing that they are under the same law as those on the coast.'<sup>75</sup> No doubt this was an exaggeration, but it is nevertheless true that from about this time the existence of the government began to be brought more and more to the notice of the trans-lagoon towns than had hitherto been the case. Besides, after about fifteen years co-existence, the people were becoming more and more amenable to the exercise of jurisdiction by the government.

The significant point about the repression of resistance and the increased patrolling by the D.C. is that the government now showed its ability to enforce obedience. When British jurisdiction was established in Anlo in 1874 it came as a result of war. Anlo had been defeated and the acceptance of British rule was the condition of peace. To obtain compliance with this stipulation, the government needed to enforce obedience to its legislation. As is usually the case in ruling a defeated people, the government had to maintain a physical superiority to the governed, and to command obedience which would not be voluntarily given. By 1890 the government had dis-

<sup>74</sup> C.O. 96/202, no. 11885 of 23 Apr. 1889.

<sup>75</sup> C.O. 96/203, no. 17041 of 29 July 1889.

played its superior strength and its ability to enforce obedience. Henceforth Anlo became a regular part of the Gold Coast under British colonial rule.

#### SUMMARY

Anlo is in South-East Ghana. During the pre-colonial period she made herself thoroughly hated by her neighbours. Thanks to this unpopularity, when Denmark and later Britain decided to subdue Anlo, each found ready allies amongst Anlo's neighbours.

In 1850 Britain 'acquired' jurisdiction over Anlo from Denmark. This proved a false start. Britain withdrew in 1859. In 1874, however, jurisdiction was resumed. Even now the extension of jurisdiction was piecemeal. Initially only the coastal area within the range of the artillery of the fort at Keta was under any semblance of jurisdiction. Anlo tended to ignore the colonial administration. In 1885 and 1889 there was armed resistance which took some time to crush.

Nevertheless, this time British jurisdiction had come to stay. Over the years it extended in scope and intensity. By 1890 when Britain had demonstrated her ability to enforce compliance with her laws, Anlo became a regular part of Britain's colony of the Gold Coast.