

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST

PEACEBUILDING IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES: A STUDY OF NON-  
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN YENDI

BY

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**DECLARATION**

**Candidate's declaration**

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my own original work and that no part of it has been submitted for another degree in this University or elsewhere.

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**Supervisors' Declaration**

We hereby declare that the preparation and presentation of the thesis were supervised in accordance with the guidelines on supervision of thesis laid down by the University of Cape Coast.

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## ABSTRACT

Socio-economic development is viewed as a pre-requisite for improving the living standards of people in the developing world. Internal peace and stability are indeed indispensable conditions for any progress towards meeting the national development objectives of developing countries. However, violent intra-state conflicts since the 1980s have been major impediments to the development of many countries in continental Africa south of the Sahara. This has resulted in homelessness, economic stagnation, unemployment, widespread poverty and cycles of conflicts in affected societies.

Northern Ghana frequently experiences destructive conflicts relating to land and chieftaincy succession disputes which negatively affect the region's developmental advances. This study examines how non-governmental organisations (NGOs) contribute to building peace for broad-based development. The research reveals that peacebuilding NGOs, alongside the state agencies and international community, play important stabilisation role in post-conflict societies due to their neutral, non-profit and non-partisan status.

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**DEDICATION**

Dedicated to Rafiatu Alidu and Yennu-Lontim Konlan for their patience

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAG	Action Aid Ghana
ADR	Alternative Disputes Resolution
AEI	American Enterprise Institute
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BIRDS	Bangumanga Integrated Rural Development Society
BNI	Bureau of National Investigations
CBOs	Community-Based Organisations
CECs	Committee of Eminent Chiefs
CID	Criminal Investigations Department
CPJ	Catholic Center for Peace and Justice
CPP	Convention People's Party
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
DISEC	District Security Committee
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSC	Dagbon State Council
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group

ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FOMWAG	Federation of Muslim Women Association of Ghana
FOSDA	Foundation for Security and Development in Africa
G-8	Group of Eight Industrialised Countries
GAF	Ghana Armed Forces
GLR	Great Lakes Region
GONGOs	Government-Organised Non-Governmental Organisations
GPS	Ghana Police Service
GPPAC	Global Partnership for Prevention of Armed Conflicts
GSOs	Grassroots Support Organisations
GSS	Ghana Statistical Service
HoA	Horn of Africa
ICT	Information Communication Technology
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IPI	International Peace Institute
IISS	International Institute of Strategic Studies
MCD	Municipal Coordinating Director
MCE	Municipal Chief Executive
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MLGRD	Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development
MUSEC	Municipal Security Council

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCCE	National Commission for Civic Education
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NLC	National Liberation Council
NNGOs	Northern Non-Governmental Organisations
NPP	New Patriotic Party
NRC	National Redemption Council
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PHC	Population and Housing Census
PNDC	Provisional National Defense Council
PNP	People's National Party
PP	Progress Party
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PVAs	Private Voluntary Agencies
REGSEC	Regional Security Council
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SNGOs	Southern Non-Governmental Organisations
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa

UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UN-HSP	United Nations Human Security Programme
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UP	United Party
USA	United States of America
WANEP	West African Network for Peacebuilding
WHO	World Health Organisation
WIP	Women in Peace Building
YMA	Yendi Municipal Assembly
YPC	Yendi Peace Council

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### **Background to the study**

Since the Second World War ended, many armed conflicts have occurred around the world causing huge losses of human lives and destruction of social infrastructure. The two world wars (1914-1918) and (1939-1945) were followed by other significant inter-state and intra-state conflicts in the Korean Peninsula (1950-1953), Vietnam (1959-1975), Persian Gulf (1980-1988), and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1998-1999). During the 1990s, approximately 5.5 million people were killed in about 100 armed conflicts that also led to widespread devastation, regional instabilities and large swarms of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) around the world (Tonner, 2000).

The African Development Bank (2005) has revealed that many of the conflicts and the consequent losses of human lives occurred in Africa where in 1980s and 1990s, rebel organisations forcefully gained control over territories, markets and populations. The sub-regional hot spots of conflict zones on the continent have been the Horn of Africa (HoA), the Great Lakes Region (GLR) and West Africa (Debiel, 2006). Although violent conflict may have occurred in one particular location at any moment in time, an observation by Carment and Schnabel (2003) indicates that both internal and inter-state conflicts generate global insecurity.



War and violent conflict of any kind impose substantial human, social, economic and environmental costs as well as burden on the political development of the affected society (Chauvet & Collier, 2004; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). The developing countries have recognised conflict prevention and peacebuilding components as integral part of national policies for progress in their development agenda. This is because eruption of violent conflict disrupts economic development progress and drain resources into peacekeeping and reconstruction of afflicted communities. To ensure smooth progress in development agendas, prevention is preferred to reaction since many post-war environments continue to suffer violence and instability decades after the conflict (Oelbaum, 2010).

Some countries in Africa which have experienced conflict in the past include: Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and more recently, Sudan, Cote d'Ivoire, Somalia, Mali, Libya, South Sudan and Central African Republic. As pointed out by the African Development Bank (2005), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been the most affected in terms of frequency, duration and destructiveness of armed conflict. These violent conflicts have worsened the plight of many developing countries and vanquished the hopes and aspirations of their populations.

In Ghana, the most commonly known protracted social conflicts include the Kusasi-Mamprusi (Bawku), Alavanyo-Nkonya, Peki-Tsito, Bimoba-Konkomba and the Abudu-Andani (Awedoba, 2009; Sulemana, 2009). Most of these conflicts are either inter-ethnic or intra-ethnic, occurring particularly in the Northern and Volta Regions. They include among others the Konkomba wars

against Nanumbas, Dagombas and Gonjas between 1981 and 1994 (Yakubu, 2005) and the Dagbon crisis in 2002 (Sulemana, 2009; Awedoba, 2009). Some of these conflicts resulted in high human casualties, destroyed infrastructure and quashed the socio-economic development prospects of people (Best, 2006). In addition, huge volumes of resources have gone into peacekeeping, maintenance of security, peacemaking, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction (Yakubu, 2005).

Experiences from around the globe confirm that the development process has often been disrupted or delayed in any society where armed conflict occurs. According to Ikejiaku (2009), most conflicts with devastating consequences on the development progress of African countries are caused by combination of factors including: poverty, youth unemployment, corruption, under-development and weak state institutions. Despite the negative consequences, Brabant (2010) argues that conflict is not all about destruction but also about struggles against forces of deprivation and oppression restricting equitable human and economic development. The proponents of Human Needs Theory argue that conflict and instability in developing countries occur because people feel deprived of their biological as well as psychological needs relating to progress and development (Burton, 1997).

According to Verma (1998), several theories have been propounded in attempt to adequately explain conflict, three of which are the most dominant. These are sociological theories, psychological perspectives, and philosophical school of thought. Sociological theories seek to justify conflict as a form of social

interaction necessary for increasing performance whereas a harmonious, peaceful, tranquil, and extremely cooperative society could become static, apathetic, stagnant, and irresponsive to change and innovation. The Psychological perspectives focus on human nature while the Philosophical scholarship considers conflict as an inevitable, incessant struggle between opposing interests (Verma, 1998). The latter share views with behavioural or contemporary perspectives arguing in favour of conflict being natural and inevitable in every society with possible consequences that are not predetermined but depend on its handling.

Okanya (1996) asserts that large population of relatively deprived people without hope or opportunity for a better future are predisposed to seek restitution through any means including violence. Economic theories of conflict associate violent conflict across Africa to valuable natural resources including minerals, oil, timber and agricultural lands, motivated by both grievance and greed (Collier, 2000). The unjust and inequitable distribution of economic resources and benefits, and crave for primary commodities of export value have often been some of the root causes of armed conflicts on the continent.

Societies that are suffering or emerging from armed conflicts usually face numerous challenges simultaneously. For instance, lack of security and weak state legitimacy, polarization, social distrust, enmity and acrimony are common indicators of post-conflict societies (UNDP, 2009). The kind of conditions and relationships that prevail in a post-conflict society usually leaves a legacy of more conflict, insecurity and violent crime.

The African continent has faced very difficult challenges to peace, stability and development which have deteriorated the socio-economic conditions of majority of its populations (Schaefer, 2005; Ikejiaku, 2009). Despite its vast geographical space and rich natural resources compared with other continents, most Africans experience extreme poverty and often struggle merely to survive (Seidman et al, 2006). For example, regional disputes, civil wars and secession conflicts have ravaged the economies of many SSA countries and majority of its populations cannot meet their basic needs. They are simply unable to provide for themselves adequate food and nutrition, shelter, clothing, healthcare, and education beyond elementary school level. Although the region has been a major destination of donor funds (Schaefer, 2005), the welfare of an average African remains unmet if not worsened as a result of conflicts.

Over 200 million people of SSA lack access to medical care; 47% lack access to portable water; and electricity supply in most parts is either non-existent or intermittent (Marke, 2007). The sub-region remains the poorest in the world, with about half of its estimated population subsisting on less than one dollar per day (World Bank, 2005). This results from widespread violent conflicts suffered by many countries across the sub-region. Ikejiaku (2009) observed that the sub-region's volatility and insecurity creates problems of peace and stability, and retards the socio-economic development of the continent. Territorial disputes, political power struggles, ethnic conflicts, chieftaincy and land disputes, and the damage to governments and traditional states pose significant challenges to peace, security and development. Besides loss of human lives and massive destruction of

the already existing social infrastructure, the occurrence of armed conflicts also disrupts society's political and economic development processes (Wanyande, 1997).

Against this background, peacebuilding have become important for creating more conducive atmosphere for socio-economic advancement in developing countries. According to Galtung (1967), the concept of *peace* covers intra-personal peace as well as “law and order” rather than the absence of organized group violence. The importance of peace and stability has been emphasised by the World Bank (2003) in its mission of mitigating the vicious circles in the world's poorest states where poverty and conflict reinforce each other. Thus, the culture of prevention is central to the concepts of conflict resolution and peacebuilding in the 21st century because it provokes a global understanding of the necessity and methods of avoiding violence.

Avoidance of violent conflict has been promoted by the former United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan (2001) in attempt to reform the UN from a “culture of reaction” to the culture of prevention. The preventability of conflict and its devastating social, political, economic and environmental consequences is no longer in doubt. This possibility has been acknowledged by the Human Security Center (2005) following increased activism of international institutions, governments and non-governmental actors towards lasting peace and development. Max van der Stoel (2005) asserts that conflict can indeed be prevented using the necessary methods and strategies to identify and analyse its potential sources and applying early resolution to forestall violent confrontation.

Therefore, peacebuilding have become official policy in the United Nations, the European Union, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Group of Eight Industrialised Nations (G-8) (Werker and Ahmed, 2007).

Despite the general recognition and institutionalisation of peacebuilding, different agencies work with considerable differences of interpretation regarding the operationalization and practice of the concept (Barnett, Kim, O'Donnell and Sitea, 2007). These differences in conceptualization and operationalization are reflected in the terminologies used to describe their activities and correlate with varying core mandates, approaches and networks of interactions. The concept of post-conflict *peacebuilding* was unveiled in 1992 when the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, launched *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*. It was defined as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Peacebuilding at the UN was viewed as a supplement to peacekeeping and peacemaking missions however, differentiation over the years has clarified peacebuilding role from among the other strongly related concepts.

Whereas peacekeeping provides negative peace by ending physical violence, peacemaking eliminates tensions between adversaries and addresses the causes of violence. Peacebuilding on the other hand provides positive peace by establishing structures and institutions based on justice, equity and cooperation for permanently addressing underlying causes of the conflict (Gawerc, 2006). The Brahimi Report (2000) further refined the definition of peacebuilding as:

“activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war.”

According to the OECD (2005), “Peacebuilding encompasses broad range of measures implemented in the context of emerging, current or post-conflict situations, explicitly guided and motivated by a primary commitment to the prevention of violent conflict and the promotion of lasting and sustainable peace”. It includes political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms, and has three mutually reinforcing dimensions: security, governance and political, socio-economic and environmental aspects with a clearly shared goal of preventing lapse or relapse into conflict (OCHA, 2011).

In summary, peacebuilding involves operational, systemic and structural interventions that address holistically both the immediate, intermediate and long-term risk factors that may precipitate future violent conflict in an emerging society. Peacebuilders therefore often employ conflict resolution processes alongside supporting the socio-economic, political and transnational changes to secure and maintain lasting peace in the society concerned. Peacebuilding should normally lead to reconciliation, reintegration and self-sustaining communities in post-conflict environment.

Among the numerous actors in peacebuilding are non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with strong community links and significant contribution to welfare of communities. These organisations have been widely recognised important third sector actors in fields of development, human rights, humanitarian

work, environment, etc. Their activities are categorized into two: service delivery to the needy, and policy advocacy and public campaign for social transformation (Lewis, 2009). Generally, NGOs actively engage in a broad range of specialised roles including democracy promotion, conflict resolution, cultural preservation, policy analysis, research, and dissemination of information using resources received from aid, contracts and private donations (Riddell, 2007).

According to Lewis (2009), NGOs have long-term presence in societies afflicted with intractable conflicts which put them in an excellent position for carrying out peacebuilding activities. These include mediation, empowerment and capacity building of local population, and engagement of adversaries in joint activities. Their role has three major components: *implementers*, *catalyst*, and *partner*. First, as *implementers*, they mobilise resources, goods and services such as healthcare, microfinance, agricultural extension, emergency relief, and human rights for the less privileged. However, they have been accused of being not only opportunistic self-interested actors but also corrupt, wasteful and unaccountable (Walsh, 2005).

Second, NGOs as *catalyst* inspire, facilitate and contribute to forward thinking and action for the promotion of social transformation. These include grassroots and group formation, gender and empowerment, advocacy and lobbying, innovation and policy entrepreneurship which influence policy formulation processes. But they are not democratic and often accidentally overlook the interest of their intended beneficiaries (Mendelson and Glenn, 2002)



Third, as partners, NGOs collaborate with government, donors and private sector in providing specific inputs to multi-actor programmes such as conflict prevention, peacebuilding and development. For instance, capacity building initiatives aim at developing and strengthening capabilities of people for, e. g. resolving disputes and providing more conducive atmosphere for socio-economic advancement. Therefore, the policy rhetoric of “partnership” in the national and international realm aim at involving NGOs in mutually advantageous relationships with all other relevant actors in the scene. Some authors however claim the NGOs do not consult with their target beneficiaries, leading to less effective impact of programmes (Abiew and Keating, 2004).

Peacebuilding NGOs are viewed as champions of the prevailing relative stability in Dagbon, particularly Yendi. Regarded as neutral mediators, livelihoods support and economic development partners, some receive general endorsement of both factions of the chieftaincy conflict. However, others are suspects of double standard and amassing wealth at the expense of peacebuilding programmes in Yendi, a challenge they must overcome to remain relevant. The unintended consequences and problems associated with NGO actions have been acknowledged (Ahorsu and Gebe, 2011). The tendency of NGOs to guard their autonomy from donors, government and beneficiaries create problem of trust and suspicion about their real motives. Some NGOs also serve their fundraising constituencies and are rarely neutral as often portrayed to the world by their Executives and Managers. As valuable source of early warning information, NGOs are sometimes suspects as informants and security threats (Natsios, 1997).

### **Statement of the problem**

Although conflict could be expressed peacefully with possible constructive outcomes, the last century was dominated by violent conflicts causing millions of deaths, massive displacement of people and destruction of public and private properties (Mbalamy, 2012). Preventing and resolving conflicts peacefully are widely shared values and goals of good governance in every society (Wood, 2003). The important role of both the state and non-state actors in analysing durable peace strategies necessary to avoid occurrence, escalation, and resurgence of violence cannot be exaggerated (Awedoba, 2009).

Consequently, scholars and practitioners of peace, including the NGOs, have been engaged in seeking solutions to occurrences of destructive conflict in order to promote development. Peacebuilding NGOs are key actors but have not been carefully studied to understand their role in that multi-network of players. Their efforts in identifying early signs and fully participating in conflict prevention processes could be harnessed for breaking barriers to early warning and preventive actions (Bennett et al, 1995, as cited by Leatherman, 1999).

Such NGOs have been acknowledged for their contributions to peace and conflict resolution in Dagbon (Sulemana, 2009; Mahama, 2009). However, their efforts at curbing upheavals and promoting peace in Yendi have not been studied in-depth enough to unravel the specific role, underlying challenges and remedies for improvement. The 4<sup>th</sup> Asia-Europe Roundtable (2005) asserts that NGOs have proven particularly effective in early warning monitoring of potential destabilization but can play more important role in building peace. This

proposition implies that, despite the volatility of peace in post-conflict Yendi, resurgence can be avoided to ensure serene atmosphere for people to engage in wealth-generation activities. Therefore, the study of NGOs and how they affect the Dagbon peace process became important for developing more appropriate strategies effective for building peace.

Therefore, an exploration of NGOs' peace interventions in Yendi was necessary to deepen understanding of their engagement with the local parties for improving and providing more effective peacebuilding. The study was further driven by the necessity to analyse the current peacebuilding measures, particularly NGOs' actions and strategies in maintaining peaceful environment for socio-economic advancement of Dagbon and the Northern Region as a whole.

### **Objectives of the study**

The main objective of this study is to explore peacebuilding operations of NGOs in post-conflict societies. The specific objectives are to:

- I. Assess the views of NGOs about conflict prevention in Yendi;
- II. Assess the role NGOs play in preventing conflict in Yendi;
- III. Examine the strategies NGOs employ for peacebuilding in Yendi;
- IV. Examine the challenges NGOs face in peacebuilding in Yendi; and
- V. Examine the successes achieved by NGOs in peacebuilding in Yendi.

### **Research questions**

The search for answers to the following questions could provide insight into the study topic:

- I. What are the views of NGOs about conflict prevention?

- II. What role do NGOs play in preventing conflict in Yendi?
- III. What strategies do NGOs employ for peacebuilding in Yendi?
- IV. What challenges do NGOs face in peacebuilding in Yendi?
- V. What successes are achieved by NGOs in peacebuilding in Yendi?

### **Significance of the study**

The relatively higher concentration of NGOs in the northern sector as compared to southern Ghana has been noted (Kendie, 2011). Since violent conflicts are also prevalent in the region (Oelbaum, 2010; Awedoba, 2009; Sulemana, 2009; Mahama, 2009; Yakubu, 2005), some of these entities perform critical tasks in resolving conflict and building peace for socio-economic development progress. The importance of understanding what and how exactly they contribute to peacebuilding initiatives forms the bases for this research. Obviously, in-depth analysis of NGOs in a post-conflict peacebuilding context has profound implications for peace practitioners, policy makers, the academic community and emerging societies.

Findings on the strategies employed and challenges faced expose lapses and provide deep insights to NGOs and other peace practitioners for improvement. The managers and implementers may revise their strategies and best practices for improved delivery of peace programmes to communities that have suffered armed conflict. The analyses generate useful lessons for policy and local government to address conflict risk factors in development policy objectives as proposed by the OECD (2008). The research results inform policy makers on

providing for conflict prevention with consideration of the roles played by the NGOs in ensuring peace.

The findings contribute modestly to a larger body of knowledge developed by the academic community through scientific research into post-conflict peacebuilding and NGOs' role in securing peace. This inquiry also catalyses the current discourse on peace and development in the academia and provides the basis for further evaluative studies on the effectiveness of intervention methods. The new methods and ideas explored and developed by this research contribute to peace and development reference sources for future research in this sphere.

The study also provides insights for the Dagbon traditional rulers to partner NGOs and other stakeholders in building a stable chieftaincy institution for a more peaceful Dagombaland kingdom. It contributes ideas and methods to the overall goal of resolving conflicts, maintaining peace, and providing stability in post-conflict societies with Yendi as a direct beneficiary. A very conducive atmosphere created could attract investment for socio-economic development that benefits communities and people who aspire to safety and security; improved economic conditions; and good standard of living.

### **Limitations and delimitations**

The study was conducted in Yendi, the traditional capital of the Dagomba Kingdom and epicenter of the Dagbon crisis, located in the Northern Region of Ghana. As the nerve center of Dagbon, any customary or traditional event of

significant proportion in Yendi is felt throughout Dagombaland. Several organisations operate in Yendi Municipality but focus remains exclusively on those that are engaged in the peacebuilding process aimed at mitigating risks and reducing the possibility of recourse to violence in the study area. Although the study focuses on one administrative region and Municipality, the analysis has general implications and could be relevant beyond the geographical scope of the study.

The major issue of importance to the study is peacebuilding in post-conflict society and how relevant stakeholders contribute to preventing conflicts. This exploratory research assesses the role NGOs play in the general effort of actors to reduce the risks of violent conflicts and maintain peace in Yendi. In particular, the study explores how practitioners' (NGOs) interventions possibly contribute to curbing and averting violent upheavals in the study area but it does not seek to determine the counterfactual situation. It analysed the views of NGOs about conflict prevention, role in peacebuilding, strategies used and how efficacious they are in peacefully resolving conflicts and preventing relapse. Although suggestions may be offered, the study does not claim to offer better and more effective strategies for building peace or preventing conflicts.

Attempt has been made to identify more effective and sustainable ways of attaining durable peace in emerging communities but the practical application of such proposals are beyond the scope of this study. Subsequently suggestions are offered for improving NGOs' involvement in peacebuilding in the study area and elsewhere. While conflict analysis tools are useful for explanations, peacebuilding

remains the focal key concept of this research and has been dealt with as deeply as possible. The research activity stretched over a period of two years, spanning from July 2013 to May 2015. Fieldwork was conducted towards the end of 2014 when a 2-week period was devoted to collecting primary data for the study.

### **Organization of the study**

This thesis is organized under five main chapters. Chapter One introduces the study and focuses mainly on the relevant background issues, statement of the problem, research objectives and study questions. It also explains the significance of the study, limitations and delimitations as well as organisation of the study. Chapter Two presents the review of related literature on issues of great importance to the study. Literature on conflicts in Africa, causes, and effects as well as the concepts of conflict prevention and peacebuilding has been reviewed. It also reviewed peacebuilding approaches, key actors and role of NGOs in preventing conflict. The challenges faced in peacebuilding; theoretical and empirical issues; as well as the conceptual framework have all been explained in this chapter.

Chapter Three introduces the reader to the study area and explains vividly the methodology used and how the research was conducted. The research approach, study design and population have all been described with distinct clarity. It further explains the sample and sampling procedures, sources and method of data collection, instruments of data collection and methods of data

processing and analysis. The chapter closes by providing information on important ethical issues observed during the research.

Chapter Four is about results and discussion. It provides information relating to the objectives of the study, and presents findings in narrative form with analysis under broad themes and sub-themes. Particularly, it explains the respondents' background and proceeds with NGO's view of conflict prevention and their role in peacebuilding. The NGOs' peace interventions strategies, successes achieved and challenges faced and possible remedies as shared by respondents have also been presented here.

Chapter Five is on summary, conclusion and recommendations. Brief explanations of the purpose, methodology used and key findings of the study are presented in the summary. Conclusions are drawn in relation to the specific objectives and finally recommendations are based on the findings of the study.



## CHAPTER TWO

### REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

#### Overview of conflicts in Africa

The history of conflict began with that of human existence. Competition for dominance and control over territories and resources inevitably caused conflicts between individuals and groups. Although violent conflict has devastating consequences, it unavoidably continues to occur. Since World War II ended in 1945, the global stage has been dominated by large scale armed conflicts (IPI, 2009). Africa was the most susceptible, recording several interstate conflicts between 1961 and 1983. These included: the Eritrea-Ethiopia war between 1962 and 1979; Algeria-Morocco conflict over the Atlas Mountains in 1963; and Kenya-Somalia border war of 1963-67. Others were the Nigeria-Cameroun standoff over the Bakassi Peninsular in 1970s; the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict between 1964 and 1978 over the Ugandan desert region; Uganda-Tanzania crisis of 1978-79; and Libya-Chad crisis of 1980-82 (Aremu, 2010; IPI, 2009).

The nature of conflict however changed, since the late 1980s, from inter-states to intra-state wars. In particular, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) witnessed wars in Liberia (1989), Sierra Leone (1991), Rwanda (1994), Guinea Bissau (2002), Kenya (2007/8), and Cote d'Ivoire (2002) (IPI, 2009). In Asia (Iraq, Cambodia and Burma), South America (Columbia, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru), and

Europe (Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Serbia and Turkey), conflicts have also occurred in the past (Adedeji, 1999).

After gaining independence in 1957 and Republican status in 1960, Ghana went through military coup d'état and regimes from 1966 until 1992 when constitutional democracy was restored (Draman, Mohammed and Woodrow, 2009). Ghana's relative stability in the sub-region is not without development challenges including poverty, high illiteracy rates, youth unemployment and communal conflicts (UNDP, 2009). Particularly, its volatile guinea savannah zone experiences frequent ethnic warfare (Oelbaum, 2010). The widespread occurrences of conflict around the world have influenced the sociological thought about the phenomenon being natural and inevitable part of the society where people pursue incompatible interests and goals (Azar, 1990).

Majority of the internal wars fought during the post-World War era of the twentieth century were based on ethno-national autonomy (Scherrer, 1994) which surged from 1950s and peaked between 1993 and 1995. These ethno-nationalist politics brought catastrophe in Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Myanmar's hinterland, Burundi and Southern Sudan. Intra-state turbulence posed major threat to peace and security during the late twentieth century, causing states collapse, regional instabilities, civilian deaths, refugee flows and IDPs (Wallenstein and Sollenberg, 1995). Against this background, understanding and preventing violent conflicts became increasingly important to the international community, governments and non-governmental organisations. Moreover, the protection of peace, stability and

human rights also became moral norms against ethnic conflicts around the world (Wimmer, Goldstone, Horowitz, Juras, & Schetter, 2004).

The perspectives of scholars and authors differ in their definition of conflict. Holsti (1983) described conflict as a particular relationship between or within states which manifests subjective economic or military hostilities. Conflicting parties struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which they aim to injure or eliminate their rivals (Coser, 1956). Others like Sulemana (2009) views conflict as a situation in which disagreement of groups or individuals escalates into violence. Violence may not always be inherent in conflict but historical events often suggest that most conflicts involved manifestation of violence (Omosho, 2004). From the various perspectives, conflict can be defined as a form of antagonism between groups or individuals over divergent interests, opinions, values and claims in a society.

Besides intra-state and inter-states conflicts, Africa has also experienced internationalised internal conflicts with external involvement as was the case in Angola, Sierra Leone and DRC (Aremu, 2010). There has been a general consensus within and outside Africa that conflicts are major impediments to economic growth and sustainable development (Mohiddin, 2000). Therefore, the need to maintain peace for societal development cannot be overemphasized, a formidable challenge for many African countries already burdened with poor socio-economic conditions and lack of security. Nevertheless, historical experience and academic research show that broad-based development enhances education, economic conditions and social justice, ultimately promoting peace in

the society (Wood, 2003). According to Annan (2012), the international community, inter-governmental bodies, government agencies and civil society organisations (CSOs) are major stakeholders in resolving conflicts and maintaining peace.

In Ghana, most protracted conflicts are recorded in the northern region with chieftaincy and land disputes, political machinations and power struggle being the main sources (Draman, Mohammed & Woodrow, 2009). The inability of people and institutions to resolve disagreements amicably often lead to open hostilities both within and between ethnic groups with its attendant negative consequences. The Guinea Fowl War, labeled the most violent episode of ethnic conflict in Ghana between Konkombas on one hand and Nanumbas, Dagombas and Gonjas on the other hand, led to about 15,000-25,000 deaths. Other ethnic conflicts include: the Mossi-Konkomba (1993) Gonja-Konkomba, Nawuri, Basare and Nchumuru (1992), Nawuri-Gonja (1991), Konkomba-Nanumba (1981), and Gonja-Vagalla in 1980 (Oelbaum, 2010; Awedoba, 2009; Sulemana, 2009; Yakubu, 2005).

The 2002 Dagbon chieftaincy succession conflict in which the Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II, king of Dagbon, and about 40 others died in Yendi (Awedoba, 2009) is attributable to prevention failures. Similarly, about 20 deaths were recorded and several houses touched in 2008 during the re-emergence of the longstanding Mamprusi-Kusasi conflict in Bawku (Oelbaum, 2010). Since the past conflicts have not been fully resolved, people stockpile sophisticated weapons and ammunitions in anticipation of a possible relapse. This proliferation

of small arms increases the level of insecurity and predisposes those in possession of such arms to violent acts at the least misunderstanding (Awedoba, 2009).

### **Causes of violent conflict**

Various studies agree that the sources of conflict in Africa tend to reflect the complexity and diversity of national histories, geographical conditions, stages of economic development, public policies and patterns of internal and external interactions (Annan, 2012; Adedeji, 1999). However, commonalities exist in the sources which may be profound, intermediate, or superficial (Martin, 2011). Max Weber views conflict as a result of antagonism between values, while Karl Marx blamed injustice and the consequent economic inequality. To Emile Durkheim, the anomaly arises from struggle for order and progress. Since the late nineteenth century, these and other prominent sociologists agree that conflict and consensus are inherent features of society (Martin, 2011).

Indeed, conflicts in Africa are caused by a combination of factors, including the arbitrary borders drawn by the colonial powers, dividing ethnic groups and also combining rival groups in some cases (Aremu, 2010). For instance, the Akan and Ewe ethnic groups were split between Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire and between Ghana and Togo respectively. These boundaries were the main sources of inter-states conflict when African countries began gaining independence in the 1950s (Alabi, 2006; Cammack et al, 1988). The most prominent ethnic identity conflicts are the Balkans and Rwandan ethnic cleansing and genocide respectively (Ryan, 1995). However, ethnic rivalries and struggle

for dominance have also been major causes of armed conflict in Nigeria, Burundi, Liberia, Uganda, Somalia, Sudan and DRC (Aremu, 2010). Ethnic conflict also occurred in Kenya (2008) and South Sudan (2013) as a continuation of political power struggle. These conflicts seem to confirm the observation of Lederach (1997) that ethnic identity and scarce resource allocation are the major sources of conflict currently and no longer ideological differences.

The failure of some African leaders to achieve national integration and socio-economic transformation (Aremu, 2010) has created poor economic conditions that provoke militancy and political instability in fragile states (Adedeji, 1999). The widening socio-economic differences, marginalization of vulnerable groups or geographical areas, and relative deprivation have also been cited (OECD, 2005). Natural resources for basic livelihoods, including water and arable land become possible triggering factors. Peacebuilding focus on addressing these fundamental causes and triggering factors to provide a more conducive atmosphere for sustainable socio-economic and political development.

Chieftaincy succession and struggle over land have been identified as major causes of conflict in Ghana. For example, the 1994 Guinea Fowl War, the Dagbon crisis, and the Buipe conflicts are all related to chieftaincy succession or autonomy (Awedoba, 2009). Land disputes relate to access, ownership, control and use of land which remains a delicate social, political and economic resource in the society. Land was the contention of pan-ethnic warfare involving the Konkomba-Bimoba, Nkonya-Alavanyo, Peki-Tsito, Konkomba-Dagomba,

Konkomba-Nanumba, Konkomba-Gonja, Gonja-Nawuri, and Konkomba-Nawuri (Sulemana, 2009).

Underdevelopment and poverty are also considered both causes and consequences of violent upheavals in Africa (UNSC, 2011; Collier 1997). Although some authors blame ethnicity, Bassey and Oshita (2007) associate ethnic conflict to consequences of failed economic policies and inappropriate development programmes that exacerbate ethnic differences. For example, the donor-sponsored reforms of 1980s and 1990s inflicted economic hardship on the most vulnerable in society and contributed to the northern conflicts (Nnoli, 2001; Van der Linde and Naylor, 1999). According to Elbadawi and Sambanis (2006) and Collier (1997), African conflicts are not attributable to ethno-linguistic diversities, but rather to extreme poverty, failed political institutions and economic dependence on natural resources. The argument that persistent political and economic failures not tribalism or pan-ethnicity are the root causes of destabilisation in Africa has not been disproved.

For instance, according to Draman, Mohammed and Woodrow (2009), Ghana's natural resources of export value and institutions of power that allocate and distribute them are located in the southern sector. The northern parts therefore, have experienced relative deprivation for decades and remains among the poorest in the country following long periods of unbalanced development. Actually, one argument of the current "*economics of conflict*" literature posits that widening economic inequalities between distinct groups can cause conflict. In contrast, Oelbaum (2010) views the northern conflicts as reflecting development

and poverty reduction successes rather than failures since turbulence has been inevitable in the historical development process.

Van der Linde and Naylor (1999) on their part suggest that the Ghanaian core is too distant from the North leading to limited penetration of central government and security agencies compared to other regions. This remoteness of the region coupled with lack of communication infrastructure, obstructs state agencies from responding rapidly to emerging conflicts. The same situation encourages rational actors to engage in aggression based on uncertainty, insecurity and suspicion about how 'the others' might act, increasing the region's susceptibility to armed violence.

### **Effects of violent conflict**

Armed conflicts, whether interstate or intrastate such as civil wars, ethnic or communal warfare have devastating effects on humanity. The disruption or stagnation of economic development agenda; environmental pollution and destruction; and social and political instability are common manifestations (Sola & Gmur, 2013; UNDP, 2009). Conflicts impose major developmental challenges, destroying communities, infrastructure, and economic prospects of people in affected areas. In post-conflict societies, the legacy of violence remains noticeable even decades after peace. The social and economic legacies usually last almost endlessly after the end of open armed hostilities (World Bank, 2011).

The human costs, including deaths of combatants and civilians in battle hostilities and fatalities from diseases, starvation, malnutrition and crime tend to



be permanent (African Development Bank, 2009). The report estimates about 6.6 million battle-related deaths between 1960 and 2005 with 24% or 1.6 million occurring in Africa. Disability due to injury or diseases, broken social networks, human rights abuses like sexual violence, and trauma resulting from killings, rape, abductions and torture of relatives are neither quantifiable nor recoverable. The OHCHR reported about 800,000 deaths in the 1994 Rwandan genocide; 200,000 in Burundi by the year 2000; over 250,000 in Liberia between 1990 and 2004; and about 200,000 in Sierra Leone between 1991 and 2001. The loss of lives and displacement of people rob Africa of the much needed human resources for development (OHCHR, 2004).

The African Development Bank (2009) has observed that the already existing infrastructure and mechanisms for social services delivery are often destroyed by conflict. Furthermore, the OECD (2010) has suggested that conflict-affected countries face major hindrances that make them unlikely to achieve the MDGs by 2015. The negative effects of conflicts on socio-economic development have been the principal cause of misery, penury and hunger in most developing countries, particularly in Africa (Lewis, 2005).

Violence, instability and insecurity have created hostile environment that impedes economic growth and sustainable development of many African countries (Mohiddin, 2000; Conteh, 1998). The causal relationship between conflict and failures in economic development is reciprocal: conflict retards development and lack of development increases the risk of conflict (Collier, 1997). The loss of tax revenues, termination of foreign aid and low credit rating

usually lead to high inflation and low confidence in the local currency of post-conflict economies. A contraction of economic activity, and an increase or shifts to military expenditures become perpetual and difficult to reverse in an unstable situation (African Development Bank, 2009). The relationship between poor economic conditions and incidence of violence in post-conflict context is often a legacy of poverty and more violence (Collier, 2004).

All countries emerging from conflict face common challenges of reconstruction and peacebuilding to prevent relapse into violence. Armed conflict usually destroys infrastructural facilities, social networks and creates animosities between hitherto affectionate peoples, communities and states. Mending these broken relationships and rebuilding the infrastructure often require resources and expertise that are unavailable in post-conflict society (Global Coalition, 2004). This is because insecurity, lack of investment and opportunities lead to human and financial capital flight, depriving the affected area of the necessary skills and resources for development (African Development Bank, 2009). Therefore, countries emerging from conflict are unable to provide employment, quality education, good healthcare and economic empowerment for their populations especially the youth. This situation often frustrates the ex-combatants and may lead them back into arms and criminal activities for survival unless effective peacebuilding measures are implemented to avert relapse.

### **The concept of peacebuilding**

The first clause of the preamble of the United Nations Charter (1945) states clearly that “*we the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war .....*” This objective of building a peaceful world has yet to be achieved as nations continue to experience instability and wars. The International Peace Institute (IPI) (2009) observed that the concept of peacebuilding gained momentum in 1992 when the then UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali launched *An Agenda for Peace*. The main focus then was on ‘Preventive Diplomacy’, referring to actions taken to prevent the eruption, escalation, and spread of the conflict when it occurs (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

In conventional UN usage, peacebuilding implies post-conflict actions following peacekeeping operations, undertaken to reduce the risks of renewed hostilities in a society that has in the recent past, experienced such conflict. It involves wide range of approaches, processes and stages necessary for structural transformation toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships and governance modes and structures (OECD, 2005). Bearing the major aim of preventing the outbreak, continuation or recurrence of violent conflict, it encompasses long-term political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms.

Peacebuilding employs approaches, methods and mechanisms to prevent re-emergence of potential upheavals in post-conflict context (Human Security Center, 2005). This is deemed crucial for avoiding the devastating human

suffering associated with armed violence. Franche et al (2004) defined conflict prevention as a range of interventions, programmes, activities, mechanisms and procedures that address structural threats, prevent escalation of tensions in addition to preventing the continuation or reoccurrence of violent conflict. According to Lewis (2005), it involves a set of instruments and measures designed to resolve disputes before they escalate into violence.

Since the early 1990s, conflict prevention has grown as a field of study and practice in international affairs, and has often been categorised into two classes: direct or operational prevention, and structural or deep prevention (Lund, 2009; Lewis, 2005). The Carnegie Commission on “preventing deadly conflict” (1997) has distinguished between the operational and structural prevention. The latter involves tackling the underlying causes such as poverty and injustice using diplomatic, developmental and humanitarian interventions. Structural prevention entails long-term measures focused on transforming key socio-economic, political and institutional factors that unaddressed could lead to conflict in the future.

These long term preventive mechanisms may overlap with the approaches adopted in post-conflict peacebuilding against resurgence of armed confrontation (Human Security Center, 2005). Operational prevention engages short-term specific actions in confronting imminent relapse of conflict. Often, Alternative Disputes Resolution (ADR) using mediation and negotiation or preventive deployment of armed personnel directly forestall escalation or continuation of the conflict. Structural prevention however, focuses on long-term measures that address underlying causes along with potentially escalating and triggering factors.

Economic development assistance, reduction of poverty and illiteracy, and increased political participation are forms of structural actions.

Scholars in the field of peace and conflict studies hold different perspectives and schools of thought on the definition of conflict prevention. For some, it means the application of non-constraining, non-coercive diplomatic measures and depends on the conflicting parties' goodwill to resolve their conflict peacefully (Munuera, 1994). This definition excludes the use of threat, force or even the application of sanctions in bringing disputing parties into compliance with peace efforts. The Carnegie Commission (1997) argues that the preventive action often curbs the emergence, spreading or re-emergence of violence. In this case, adequate provision has been made to cover the related concept of peacebuilding often used in the post-conflict context by the United Nations.

Wallensteen (1998) views conflict prevention as constructive actions undertaken to avoid the likely threat, use or diffusion of armed force by parties in a political disputes. The focus by this definition on "political disputes" renders it too narrow to cover other forms of conflicts such as ethnic, religious, land and chieftaincy disputes. The use of 'constructive actions' also makes the definition quiet problematic since operational prevention may be partly destructive especially where the use of force becomes necessary for protection of civilians. Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999) on their part see conflict prevention as measures and actions which are taken to prevent armed conflicts and mass violence from breaking out.

Another perspective championed by Lund (2002) defines conflict prevention as structural or intercessory means for keeping tension and disputes from escalating into significant violence while strengthening the capabilities of disputants to resolve their disagreements peacefully. Lund's view takes into consideration both measures that prevent crisis and those that strengthen the capacity of concerned parties to reduce the possibility of conflict by structural actions. Yet another broad perspective espoused by Carment and Schnabel (2003) view conflict prevention as short, medium and long-term proactive operational or structural measures undertaken by a variety of actors to identify and create the enabling conditions for stable and more predictable international security environment.

The urgency of the need for prioritising peacebuilding has been discussed widely and documented on several platforms but the will and resources required to bridge the gap between rhetoric and action are lacking (IPI, 2009). Reduction in the incidence, duration and destructiveness of conflict has been proven possible and a pre-condition for development (Human Security Center, 2005; Mohiddin, 2000). The multilateral system has made efforts to address the dynamic nature of conflict and its negative effects on the society through peacebuilding actions. The OECD (2008) observes that policy instruments are already available for donors and partner countries to design and deploy strategies that address threats and insecurity, and contribute to conflict prevention, peacebuilding and development. Werker and Ahmed (2007) have also noted that conflict prevention is now official policy in the United Nations, European Union, G-8, and many sovereign states.

The OECD DAC (2007) now includes conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes in its international relations and development cooperation. Annan (2012) agrees and has added his voice to the views that support development as an integral part of any successful strategy for peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Appropriate policies that address economic deprivation, improve education and stimulate equitable economic growth may raise incomes and make violence less attractive for the youth (African Development Bank, 2005).

It is worth noting that without early warning of an impending escalation, the relevant authorities are unable to detect, anticipate and find a peaceful settlement to conflict. Any effective early warning initiatives must be sustainable to meet both short-term and long-term objectives. Short-term actions aim at containing and reversing escalation in which the primary responsibility rest on the local parties. Long-term measures on the other hand target to address underlying causes such as development aid that address structural issues to stabilize the society, but can also exacerbate the existing differences and become a source of conflict (Leatherman, 1999).

### **Approaches to peacebuilding**

The inadequacy of short-term humanitarian relief and crisis management in post-conflict context requires structural, cultural and relational transformation for preventing re-emergence, sustainable reconciliation and peace (Lederach, 1997). Peacebuilding has actually been operating for decades despite having been

introduced recently as a subject of debate in the academic spheres. Lund (1996a) argues that many structural, direct and generic prevention instruments were perhaps not recognized explicitly because they operated under different labels instead. For instance, the Congress of Vienna, League of Nations, Marshall Plan, EU and NATO were all historically fundamental preventive mechanisms established to reduce risks of conflict. Many other initiatives and institutions have an ultimate goal of preventing conflict and promoting peaceful societies through consensus building. For example, democracy-building institutions, non-proliferation treaties, rule of law programmes and other policies encourage peaceful management of disputes and are violence prevention under other terms.

The question of when is appropriate for intervention has been tackled by Swanstrom and Weissmann (2005) who argue for the perception of threats or actual occurrence of conflict before the initiation of peacebuilding action. On the other hand, the OECD (2010) favours a collective action that develops capable, accountable and responsive states to meet the needs of their populations. Sustained efforts are required for strengthening governance, social and economic development institutions, and promoting peace and security in fragile societies. In the view of OECD (2008), conflict prevention seeks to build the capacities of societies to deal with their incompatible interests without resorting to arms and violence. The development of social capacities for reconciliation and peaceful co-existence has become a very important pre-requisite for ensuring sustainable peace. According to the UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee (2007), building capacities for conflict management, and laying foundations for



sustainable peace and development reduce risks of lapsing or relapsing into conflict.

Conscious attempts have been made in the academic circles to develop peacebuilding into a more established discipline. Lund (2009) for instance, has deliberately attempted developing a theory and methodology for determining the right set of tools for addressing different stages of conflict. Three key stages have been identified and include the latent phase, manifest limited phase, and escalating violent phase. Lund argues in favour of assisting governments to address socio-economic conditions, institutional defects and policy deficits as sound structural interventions for latent conflict. Direct prevention is often applied at the latter stages to prevent or contain escalation of the conflict. In order to ensure viable interventions for achieving the desired peace outcomes, a methodology for measuring the effectiveness of prevention has been developed (Wallensteen and Moller, 2004).

Since the causes of conflict vary extensively, the adoption of different preventive approaches and mechanisms are essential for determining peace and development outcomes. Consensus on the notions of prevention with regard to tools and means of engagement has emerged, putting the causes of conflict at the centre stage in determining which action suits the situation and providers of tools to deploy (Lund, 2009). Boutros-Ghali's list of early warning, mediation, confidence-building measures, fact-finding, preventive deployment and peace zones has been expanded by the subsequent UN policy papers in the 1990s, such as an 'Agenda for Development'. The broader preventive agenda address

institutional problems, socio-economic issues and the global environment within which disputants operate. Consequently, the relevant actors involved have expanded significantly from official representatives to third party governmental and non-governmental actors in social, cultural and economic settings. Notwithstanding, the primary prevention efforts are most preferably the responsibilities of the government and other actors within the states where conflict becomes imminent. The complexity of this multi-tooled, multi-actored, multi-leveled concept has been referred to by Annan (2002) as the 'Culture of Prevention'.

Since the sources of conflict are key determinants for successful peace intervention, structural and proximate causes and triggers need to be distinguished for differentiation between structural and short-term prevention (Tonner, 2000). For examples, structural causes usually relate to issues of poverty, political injustice, economic exclusion and state weakness resulting from policy deficits and poor governance. Structural problems may be addressed through economic empowerment, development aid, local capacity building, good governance and human rights monitoring. The proximate causes however result from deliberate decisions by some leaders to exploit insecurity, vulnerabilities of some groups, and socio-economic divisions through violence. Unlike structural causes, proximate causes and triggers vary extensively and have not yet been fully advanced (Tonner, 2000).

The interaction of varying causes and dominant prevailing factors require analysing for formulating useful policies and strategies that address them on the

short, medium and long term (Adedeji, 1999). Moreover, contemporary conflicts have links with other challenges and require pragmatic measures focusing primarily on security, justice and jobs, to build confidence in the society (World Bank, 2011). An effective peacebuilding intervention requires diligent and participatory planning, coordination and sustainable commitments by the international, state and local actors. Tonner (2000) argues that peace is more achievable in multilateral settings with the application of multidisciplinary approach. The approaches developed by the international organisations and donor agencies involves using development aid, trade, foreign policy and security coordination to address structural causes of conflict (United Nations Secretary-General, 2004). It argues that security, development and human rights must be advanced together, and all governments must increase their efforts in order to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015.

In recent years, the UN, regional organisations, state entities and non-governmental actors have been involved in systematic ‘lessons learned’ and ‘best practices’ exercises regarding failed missions and missed opportunities. However, the international community remains unable to curb outbreak of conflict using techniques including peacekeeping, peacemaking, confidence-building and development programmes for building peace (Tonner, 2000). The scope of action of many other organisations also seems limited to minimizing the adverse effects of violence.

According to the Secretary-General’s Report on the Prevention of armed conflict (Annan, 2001), development plays significant facilitating roles in creating

opportunities, and political, social and economic spaces for indigenous actors to identify, develop and apply the available resources to build equitable, peaceful and just society. The World Bank World Development Report (2011) indicates that any peacebuilding initiatives unaccompanied by development would remain fragile and risk the incidence of violence. The developmental perspective on peace views the dominant importance of society's own processes and dynamics as paramount when instituting conflict prevention mechanisms and programmes (Ramsbotham, 2003). In spite of this, political instability and low intensity conflicts are development constraints in West African sub-region.

The new ECOWAS strategic vision aims at transforming the "ECOWAS of States" into "ECOWAS of the peoples", and giving priority to human security rather than regime security. The expectations are that, CSOs and NGOs will play critical roles in maintaining and promoting peace, security and development in ECOWAS region (ECOWAS, 2008). Governments and donors increasingly engage NGOs in development projects implementation and delivery of public services such as education, healthcare and portable water supply (Clayton, 1999).

The human, financial and political costs of managing violence are much higher than prevention which has many response options to deploy before the conflict escalates into crisis. Its effectiveness has been proven by a decline in conflict around the world since the end of Cold War and this, according to the Human Security Center (2005) has been attributable to the proactive approach by the international community toward prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding. Despite some successes at the community, national and inter-state levels,

available literature suggests there is insufficient attention, strategy and capacity, adequate local knowledge and networks necessary for stable peace. The advocacy for making prevention a full-time professional and governmental endeavour (Human Security Center, 2005) in order to systematically avoid the devastating consequences of conflict cannot be ignored completely.

### **Key actors in peacebuilding**

The maintenance of peace and security in any society is a collective responsibility of multinational, multi-stakeholder and multidisciplinary actors. These range from international organisations such as the United Nations to the unsuspecting victims. The complex global systems of institutions and mechanisms engaged in peacebuilding usually have different focuses. The various players therefore often deploy different approaches to building peace based on their perception of the nature and causes of the conflict under consideration. For instance, structural defects or root causes are addressed through aid, development and capacity-building programmes while the immediate causes and triggers are resolved by direct intervention (4<sup>th</sup> Asia-Europe Roundtable, 2005). Global institutions like the UN and its organs, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank play influential roles in the maintenance of international peace and security.

The creation of peaceful societies is one of the major founding purposes of the UN rooted in the first clause of its preamble and Article I (1) of the Charter which favours taking “effective collective means for the prevention and removal

of threats to peace” (Charter of the United Nations, 1945). The UN, the only body with global legitimacy, usually deploys peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations, diplomacy and economic development among other intervention strategies in dealing with conflict.

The regional and sub-regional organisations, governments, civil society, NGOs and community-based self-help associations are increasingly important and invaluable partners in security cooperation for peace (Tonner, 2000). The regional and sub-regional blocs have in recent years, increased their efforts at resolving conflict in their jurisdictions. According to the 4<sup>th</sup> Asia-Europe Roundtable (2005), the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN + 3, ARF and APEC have broadened their focus beyond economic issues to prevention and resolution of inter-governmental conflicts. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) are key non-state peacebuilding actors in the Asian continent. The scope and modus operandi of ASEAN inter-governmental mechanisms however, often tend to exclude intra-state conflicts and bilateral disputes citing principles of non-interference as basis for non-intervention.

The European Union, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the Council of Europe are prominent inter-governmental disputes resolution institutions in Europe. The African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) play important role in mediation and resolution of disputes on the continent. Sub-regional organisations such as the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC);

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); and ECOWAS ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) play important intervention roles to maintain peace and stability for Africa's development. The private sector, CSOs the academia, businessmen and women are all important non-state actors in the network of institutions and mechanisms for promoting peace and development around the world. (4<sup>th</sup> Asia-Europe Roundtable, 2005).

NGOs and the Media play distinct roles in the complex dynamics of non-state actors engaged in ensuring a conflict-free environment for socio-economic development. The general interest in a culture of peace obliges the various players to take responsibility for sustainable implementation of measures that go beyond violence management to make the use of military only a last resort (ECOWAS, 2008). For example, Leatherman (1999) argues that scholars, the media, international organisations, intelligence agencies, government and local community members can all contribute to early warning and prevention of conflicts. The 4<sup>th</sup> Asia-Europe Roundtable (2005) further proposes the establishment of coordinating mechanism among major stakeholders including NGOs and state, to avoid overlap of peace initiatives.

### *NGOs and peacebuilding*

Although all the aforementioned institutions and mechanisms contribute to peace and development, the specific role NGOs play in the multilateral network of actors remains the primary focus of this study. A precise definition of what constitute an NGO and the challenge of analysing NGO phenomenon has been illusory. According to Lewis (2009), NGOs comprise diverse set of organisations

ranging from structurally small informal groups to large formal agencies with different mandates and shapes across societies posing difficulties for generalisation. Moreover, some NGOs receive government funding while others generate revenues for their operations against the required status of independence and non-profit. Further complications exist in the “classification that emphasise what they are not rather than what they are”, making NGOs more complex and difficult to pin down analytically. These analytical constraints have led to the generation of different thoughts and perspectives about what is and what is not an NGO, and about the most acceptable approaches for the analysis of their roles (Lewis, 2009).

For example, in relation to origins, there are “Northern NGO” (NNGO) and “Southern NGO” (SNGO), and on the basis of membership, there are CBOs, and the intermediary “grassroots support organisations” (GSOs). There are also government-organised organisations (GONGOs) that front for government, and others formed by individuals for pure personal benefit. Yet there are both professionalised and volunteer-dependent NGOs, and secular and faith-based organisations. While some of these NGOs seek to meet the immediate needs of the people, others focus on long-term approaches to problem solving all compounding the difficulty in arriving at a specific definition for the term.

However, authors like Salamon and Anheier (1992) have argued that a complete structural/operational definition for a third sector organisation should not just focus on the legal, economic and functional characteristics but derive from a fuller analysis of its observable features. The five vital characteristics



proposed for NGO's definition are *formal, private, non-profit distribution, self-governing* and *voluntary*. From these structural/operational elements, Vakil (1997) has concisely defined NGOs as “self-governing, private, not-for-profit organisations that are geared towards improving the quality of life for the disadvantaged people”.

Although NGOs have received heaps of endorsement for being more effective than state agencies, they have also been strongly criticized for their role in shifting attention away from state institutions leading to more privatization and lack of accountability in public sector reform (Tvedt, 1998). Moreover, NGOs which are delegated with key public services have been found by Wood (1997) to have weak accountability to local citizens. They have also been criticized for the tendency to become self-interested actors which often result in the imposition of their own agenda on the communities they profess to serve. NGOs have also received strong criticism for failing to meet expectations in emergency situations, due to institutional self-interest, lack of coordination leading to duplication of effort, limited experience of local conditions among international NGOs, and naïve approach to the root causes of conflict and instability (Kaldor, 2003). The critiques of NGOs from both developing world and western think-tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) have raised issues about transparency and accountability in NGO operations. This could be mainly because of inadequate amount of data concerning their performance and effectiveness.

Notwithstanding, empirical evidence show that the concept of prevention has proved successful in averting imminent conflicts in South Africa, Macedonia,

the Baltics, Creambia, and the South China Sea, and in other countries where conflict was imminent (Zartman, 2001). However, there has been no established evidence attributing these successful prevention cases to the efforts of NGOs. But the UN with vast experience in post-war recovery regards socio-economic development as being crucial for any successful prevention strategy, and NGOs are icebreakers in countries where they operate (Annan, 2012).

NGOs indeed occupy advantageous position in communities where several years of presence and appropriate conduct have earned them good knowledge of the local society and reputation among the populations (Boutros-Ghali, 1994). They have existed for centuries, working to reduce human suffering and to promote the welfare of under privileged, marginalised and deprived populations in developing countries. During World War I and World War II, humanitarian relief and development NGOs emerged and contributed significantly to the recovery process of societies affected by war. Some of these entities included Save the Children Fund in 1917, Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (now Oxfam) in 1942, CARE in 1945, etc. (Werker & Ahmed, 2007).

Often in collaboration with governments, bilateral aid agencies, private-sector operators, traditional authority and self-help associations, NGOs initiate programmes seeking to improve the welfare of less endowed communities. Deemed instrumental in changing mind-set and attitudes by some (Keck and Sikkink 1998), others consider them efficient in the provision of goods and services and valuable in fixing the problems faced by the international development process (Edwards and Hulme, 1996). By virtue of their

advantageous position, they continue to play essential roles in development delivery and conflict prevention at both the policy and operational levels (Union of International Associations, 2005; DESA, 2004). For instance, coalitions of non-governmental actors have now been acknowledged as significant role players in transnational advocacy efforts such as in human rights, environmental protection and violence against women (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). They have also become more proactive in broader development activities such as the promotion of democracy, conflict resolution, humanitarian service delivery, policy formulation and analysis, and research and information provision.

Their activities have often been viewed as championing the rising set of development expectations and anxieties of the people (Lewis, 2005). According to DESA (2004), NGOs have contributed to ensure lasting peace by promoting broader participation in governance processes through advocacy and local conciliatory customs. In particular, their involvement in rebuilding social infrastructure, improving delivery of basic social services and promoting social integration is essential for avoiding relapse into violence in post-conflict societies.

According to Lund (2009), the speed of Information Communication Technology (ICT) enables NGOs such as the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, International Alert, WANEP, etc. to release periodic warnings and alerts to relevant authorities for the necessary action. To further promote public advocacy as a tool, the Global Partnership for Prevention of Armed Conflicts (GPPAC) seeks to build the capacities of NGOs for early warning and peacebuilding. More recent initiatives such as ENOUGH mobilises public support

for practical intervention in Darfur and similar zones in Africa. The effort to garner public support is a useful preventive measure in spite of its reliance on media coverage which usually results in belated responses rather than proactive ones.

According to Wood (2003), the international community, governments and non-governmental actors can empower societies to overcome conditions that increase the risk of conflicts by supporting long-term developmental efforts. Capacity development programmes enable individuals to obtain, strengthen and maintain abilities to set and achieve their own objectives over time (UNDP, 2009). The culture of prevention could be accomplished by focusing on analysing the causes and dynamics of conflict and peace in order to accurately affect the structural stability of a society.

Also, the relevant actors need to be aware of how their aims, design, and actions may interact with the political and economic dynamics in that society in which they operate. To Wood (2003), the various actors need to give practical weight to the culture of development for the proclaimed culture of prevention to flourish in place of the culture of reaction. Recent literature on conflict and peace domain indicates that the notion of a culture of prevention has gained global recognition and significant support of prominent scholars and practitioners around the globe (Mellbourn, 2004).

### **Challenges of conflict prevention in peacebuilding**

The devastating effects of conflict on African economies demand for concerted efforts by the continent's governments, development partners and private sector to formulate strategies for preventing violence and consolidating peace (African Development Bank, 2008). According to the United States Institute of Peace (2010), the idea of conflict prevention receives overwhelming endorsement in principle but not in serious practice, leaving a significant gap between rhetoric and action with regard to preventing violent conflict. Sadly at the global stage, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has been viewed as lacking representativeness and focusing more strictly on military interventions.

Although prevention is now widely considered the best economically feasible option and has been seriously discussed at the UN and other organisations it has been unfortunately given little attention in practice. As the first promise made by the UN in its Charter, it has often been betrayed by the international community, governments and local parties as well as the scholarly community which could not generate policy-relevant analysis until recently. The UNSC which is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security (UN Charter, 1945) unfortunately was not created with the primary objective of addressing intra-state conflict. This has been one of the challenges faced by the UN system in moving from the culture of reaction to that of prevention suggesting a need for a more comprehensive approach to the phenomenon (Hampson and Malone, 2002).

Moreover, the usual inadequacy in exploring the range of peaceful options provided under Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter (1945) has reduced the effectiveness of the organization's preventive mechanisms and strategies to a low confidence rating (UNSC, 2008). According to Tonner (2000), one of the most important challenges faced by the international community is its inability to credibly and correctly predict and respond rapidly enough to imminent armed violence. The failure to prevent armed conflict in Africa has huge cost implications that amount to resources equivalent to overall international aid received by the entire continent (IPI 2009). For example, the catastrophic consequences of prevention failures in Rwanda in 1994 and Somalia in the late 1990s are events that remind people around the world of the challenge faced by humanity.

Sovereignty norms, national complexities and the many other hurdles there are to external intervention in intra-state conflict have also made it difficult for the international community to interfere in internal affairs of states. Furthermore, the international community does not have the institutional setup to enforce internal peace to the extent that multilateral early warning and prevention actions are less proactive. However, the internalisation of early warning and prevention of internal conflicts have been introduced into the UN globally and OSCE and AU regionally. This is an indication that the international community attaches new importance to the avoidance of violence and the maintenance of peace and security. Fortunately, there is a reduction in impediments both to the advancement of collective preventive action and intervention in internal affairs of

sovereign states due to weakened nature of state sovereignty on the promotion of international norms and standards for the protection of individual and group rights and promotion of democracy (Leatherman, 1999).

While the rising presence of international organisations, states and non-state actors in conflict-prone zones provides hope for a reduction in the number of missed opportunities, it is far from adequate. The often lack of political will and willingness of the conflicting parties to resolve their disputes peacefully through negotiation is what sometimes lead to unsuccessful prevention and violence (UNSC, 2008). In most occasions, policymakers are often hesitant to invest capacity in addressing structural threats and underlying causes because, as Quantson (2010) pointed out, peace and security usually seem indefensible until they have been violated. Also, the exploitation of ethnic differences by the elites for political advantage, lack of well-established mechanisms for prevention in certain regions, and the destabilising role of external interference continue to hinder the formulation of effective preventive strategies.

The structural perspectives espouse a view that the lack of requisite early attention and action to extinguish disputes before an escalation into violence stems from structural defects in international cooperation. This is because early warning and conflict prevention still face problems of factual and political validity, consensus building where multilateral decisions are required, organisation and timing of collective action and weak cooperation and collaboration among NGOs, between NGOs and government and civil society (Leatherman, 1999). The first issues relate to analytical validity of various

methodological approaches and the capacities of actors to forecast with precision the level of risk of escalation. Second, the tools for identifying the underlying causes of conflict and how they fuel escalation are unavoidably necessary but are either limited or lacking. Third, there seems to be lack of context specific indicators which leaves the policy makers unable to anticipate and determine what action needs to be taken to avert violence, and how they could maximize peacebuilding effects more sustainably.

The exercise of early preventive action is politically sensitive, and actors tend to have different perception about the risks of conflict and means of prevention. Since they would either gain or lose base on how issues are managed, they often attempt to manipulate early warning and prevention to meet their interest. The consequent early warning misinformation and the incorrect diagnoses of root causes of the conflict often undermines prevention as was the case in Burundi in 1998 (Leatherman, 1999).

Although NGOs as humanitarian relief organisations are present on the ground and have good knowledge of potential conflict areas, states and their national interests remain dominant in decisions concerning preventive actions (Tonner, 2000). The agenda of states in pursuing their geopolitical interests may be incompatible with humanitarian relief and peacebuilding initiatives of international organisations and NGOs (Boutros-Ghali, 1994). And as observed by Collier et al (2003), the availability of primary commodities of export value such as oil, coltan, diamonds, timber, etc. also presents a possibility of 'resource curse' in many developing countries. This is because, rather than being useful for socio-



economic development, such natural resources have instead provided opportunities for self-enrichment through armed conflict in Angola, Sierra Leone, Sudan and the DRC during the 1990s.

The African Development Bank (2008) has pointed to relative economic deprivation as one of the important risk factors of violent conflict in Africa. The African states therefore face a challenge of formulating policies aimed at improving levels of incomes and education, and creating economic opportunities for their populations. These will not only address the risks of conflict due to unbalanced resource allocation, inequalities and poor economic conditions but it will also help to consolidate the existing peace and security in the society. In post-conflict circumstances where peacebuilding often takes much longer period than mere reconstruction, the possibility of experiencing re-emergence of violence remains a factor even after a decade of peace (Ali and Mathews, 2004). The process therefore, normally requires the establishment of new institutions that support more open and inclusive political participation, promote economic advancement and provides justice for all.

### **Role of non-governmental organisations**

During the 1960s and 1970s, the United States government's food aid and freight were channelled through "Private Voluntary Agencies" (PVAs) for distribution to the needy in the developing countries (Barrett, 2002). In recent years, NGOs have been trusted by the official development and humanitarian agencies to fix the problems of peace and development faced by the developing

nations in effort to free their people from conflict and penury. Wealthy donors and bilateral aid agencies therefore allocate and route significant amount of funds through NGOs which then make key decisions on how to apply such resources for the delivery of supplies to deprived communities in remote parts of the developing world (Werker & Ahmed, 2007). To that effect, Keck & Sikkink (1998) and Edwards & Hulme (1996) see their efforts and activities as being instrumental in transforming behaviours and attitude, and delivering goods and services to the needy populations in unattended areas.

Boutros-Ghali (1994) noted without reservation three distinct roles that non-state entities including NGOs could play in conflict management and peacebuilding. First, they are familiar with the practical situation in the communities and are better placed to alert state actors about imminent conflict for preventive diplomacy. Second, the recognition of NGOs as neutral parties makes them invaluable in peacemaking where they deliver humanitarian relief and social aid under difficult conditions. Finally, their efforts at re-establishing social networks in post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation consolidate peace in fragile communities.

According to Lewis (2007) however, NGOs undertake three main sets of activities that quite explicitly define their roles as major implementers, catalysts and partners in development. As implementers, they mobilise resources for use to provide goods and services for the populations who need them. They catalyse their beneficiaries by inspiring, facilitating and contributing to improved thinking and actions that ultimately promote change. NGOs have also been working in

partnership and cooperation with other relevant stakeholders such as governments, donors and the private sector in efforts to improve conditions for the general wellbeing and peaceful co-existence of diverse groups. Generally, their peacebuilding functions include protection, monitoring, advocacy, socialisation, social facilitation, social cohesion and service delivery.

### **Theoretical framework**

Scholars and practitioners in the field of peace and conflict analysis have often engaged two distinct and essentially complementary strands of conflict resolution schools of thought with different inter-disciplinary perspectives. These approaches study the phenomenon of conflicts and their possible remedies, and consequently bring insights and concepts to theory and practice (Babbitt and Hampson, 2011). The theories, methods and ideas explored and developed by Conflict Resolution scholarship improve the general understanding of conflicts and the collective practice for violence prevention at domestic, national and international levels. According to Bercovitch, Kremenyuk and Zartman (2009), Conflict Resolution studies focus on the application of insights of theory and research. These are drawn from diverse fields including political science, social psychology, sociology, economics and law for resolution and prevention of conflicts.

On the other hand, proponents of the traditional international relations theory view Conflict Resolution scholarship as being biased due to its concentration exclusively on peaceful means of dispute resolution and settlement.

It further argues that conflict resolution studies appear “soft” theoretically, and focus particularly on praxis rather than making inputs toward innovation and general understanding of conflict processes.

However, conflict resolution perspective deploys sophisticated and nuanced analysis and strategies that either mitigate or exacerbate inter-group or international conflict. The two theoretical strands of conflict resolution scholarship: “Conflict Settlement Perspective” and “Conflict Transformation Perspective” sometimes compete but often complement each other in explaining real-world phenomenon and contributing both theoretically and practically. For instance, Babbitt and Hampson (2011) argue that these strands offer significant insights to the general understanding of conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding, and have informed policy decision making even if less than the expectations of scholars.

Therefore this study is underpinned by the Conflict Resolution Theory because it supports inter-disciplinary approach to resolution and prevention of conflicts. The conflict resolution scholarship also focus exclusively on peaceful means of resolving disputes making NGOs very appropriate partners because they lack legitimate authority and access to engage coercive methods. The critical analysis in the study has bases rooted in the effective utilization of conflict settlement and conflict transformation perspectives briefly discussed in turn.

### **Conflict settlement perspective**

Since World War II, negotiation and diplomacy have been the most preferred means of settling disputes at the international, national or even family

levels. The cold war era with threats of nuclear warfare saw regular summits between leaders of the US and Soviet Union in diplomatic negotiations. These resulted in arms control and reduction, troop deployments and confidence building to reduce tensions and risks of escalation, and a relatively peaceful transition after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. Such an empirical experience projects bargaining and negotiation and for that matter the conflict settlement school as obvious choices for settling disputes, and conflict resolution scholars focus on understanding these processes as they succeed or fail (Bilder, 1997).

Under this approach, the essence of time and commitment tactics requires disputing parties to change their expected utility calculations about the potential agreement. Incentives for negotiations can be strengthened to make agreement attractive to the parties involved (Crocker, 1992). Some scholars argue that apart from costs of negotiation and settlement, the perceived risks of associated negative outcomes also matter to the parties. Coupled with mutual distrust, strategic behavior and refusal to cooperate fully is often anticipated and addressed to reduce risk of defection as the dominant bargaining strategy (Babbitt and Hampson, 2011). Practitioners in conflict resolution field often maintain principles of impartiality which requires that all parties, irrespective of their status and wealth, are given even-handed treatment (Babbitt, 2009b).

### **Conflict transformation perspective**

The *agenda for peace* (Boutros-Ghali, 1992) identified four important goals requiring actors' focal attention: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking,

peacekeeping and peacebuilding. These goals broaden conflict resolution research and policy agenda to include latent and active conflicts and state-building. It emphasised that understanding the dynamics and exploring ways of transforming relationships amongst adversarial groups are essential for avoiding reprisals in peacebuilding context.

Social scientific research has developed typology of tasks for execution, including internal and external security, judicial reform, rule of law, etc. which pose daunting challenges for practitioners and policymakers. Additional scholarship found out that internal security was the most essential pre-requisite for peacebuilding (Walter, 1997) since other tasks cannot be executed under unsafe environment. Several scholars and practitioners have conducted comparative analysis across different cases in the quest to find answers to questions of identity and inter-group relations and to improve their relationship in order to prevent violence (Volkan, 1998; Fearon & Laitin, 2000; Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 2005; Tilly, 2006).

Babbitt and Hampson (2011) acknowledge that the strands of conflict resolution theory are based on different assessment of bargaining relationships of adversaries. Relationship-based approaches argue that dialogue and communication lay the foundation of trust, dismantle stereotypes and shift focus from individual to collective interests. However, political risk perspective argues that negotiations will face difficult challenges if parties perceive the possibility of pursuing their goals using violence. This means that negotiation, communication and dialogue may not necessarily resolve issues of mistrust unless the parties

structure their interactions to reduce risks of defection from negotiated agreements.

The approaches are not incompatible considering that conflict passes through different stages, from rising tensions through confrontation and outbreak of violence to escalation of armed hostilities (Mitchell, 1994; Lund, 1996; Crocker, Hampson and Aall, 1999). Similarly the post-settlement stages of de-escalation include cease-fire, formal settlement, rapprochement and eventually reconciliation. Hampson (1996) has observed that during post-settlement phases, the possibility exist for a relapse of the conflict into violence as it happened in Angola in late 1980s and early 1990s. Conflict resolution research therefore obtains inspiration from practical challenges and the need to impact on prevention, mitigation and transformation of violent conflicts.

The ideas and insights generated by this approach have gained practical application in the United States and other governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental intervention programmes (Babbitt and Hampson, 2011). The indication is that negotiation as a conflict resolution concept provides powerful tools for assessing conflict dynamics and designing relevant strategies and mechanisms for constructive prevention. Progress has been noticeable in bridging gaps between policymakers and conflict resolution practitioners on one hand and the academia on the other hand with prospects of improved collaboration between theory and practice in the next decade.

## Conceptual framework

Peacebuilding involves multi-actor, multi-dimensional efforts since any single stakeholder faces the reality of being unable in isolation to ensure peace and stability in fragile emerging society. Therefore, peacebuilding practitioners often work in tandem with other actors to curb uprisings and promote peace and security for development. These actors normally include international and regional organisations, state institutions, non-state actors and local groupings and individuals as shown in figure 1 below. Lewis (2009) observed that these actors in theory and practice have been active at the international, national and local levels and constitute a network system of mechanisms and institutions for maintaining peace.

Non-interference principles that previously limited the international community from intervening in intra-state conflicts no longer obstruct legitimate preventive action in internal conflict. Hence the UN, AU and ECOWAS may intervene in internal conflict of sovereign member states to prevent civilian casualties resulting from armed hostilities as was the case in Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Libya and Liberia. The international bilateral agencies and donors also provide funds for both the state and non-state actors to promote humanitarian relief, human rights protection, economic empowerment, sensitization and mediation activities in neglected communities of emerging societies.


In Ghanaian conflict and post-conflict societies, armed military and police personnel are deployed for peacekeeping purposes. The Criminal Investigations Department (CID) and Bureau of National Investigations (BNI) however conduct



background monitoring of the situation in order to prevent degeneration of disputes as noted by Awedoba (2009). The judiciary and Houses of Chiefs are responsible for adjudicating disputes brought to them by the parties involved. Important local government institutions notably the Regional Security Council (REGSEC) and Municipal Security Committee (MUSEC) often institute measures to maintain peace and security in their jurisdiction.

The non-state actors which include NGOs, faith-based organisations and major youth groups often partner others to promote harmonious, peaceful and stable atmosphere for development. The local actors including traditional authorities, CBOs and the protagonists themselves are central to peaceful settlement of disputes. This complex network system of peacebuilding actors and strategies makes the consideration of a single actor in isolation daunting but the highlight of NGO's role is the priority of the study.

Figure 1: Conceptual framework of interactions among actors of peacebuilding



Source: Author's construct, 2014.

## **Empirical literature**

Until the emergence of conflict analysis and peace research as a distinct interdisciplinary academic field in the 1960s, the focus of most scholars in diverse academic disciplines was on issues of war and peace as the OECD (2008) has observed. In the late 1980s and early 1990s the international community successfully managed internal conflicts in Namibia, Nicaragua and El Salvador. Other empirical cases of successful peacebuilding actions involved South Africa, Mozambique and Ethiopia. However, in Angola, Liberia and Sudan, there was often resumption of open hostilities during efforts to establish peace (Ali and Mathews, 2004).

From mid-1990s, the United Nations experiences of failures in Rwanda, Somalia and Yugoslavia brought to realization the need to reassess the role of UN and other organisations in conflict prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding. Since external intervention by military force was unsuccessful in Somalia, the challenge to the international community has been whether or not to include coercive measures as integral part of conflict prevention (Tonner, 2000). In cases of Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995), the UN with troops on the ground had clear warning of impending massacre but missed the opportunities to prevent the conflicts from escalating into widespread violence, leading to genocide and ethnic cleansing.

According to OECD (2008), recent years have witnessed the approaches to understanding and dealing with both the structural and immediate causes of conflict being advanced by scholars and practitioners alike. The deployment of

concrete measures in fragile and emerging states has become integral part of the challenge and a pre-requisite for sustainable peace and human security. While the long-term conflict prevention measures of the OSCE were successful in Estonia, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova and Ukraine, they failed in Bosnia, Chechnya, Georgia, Tajikistan and Kosovo where violence manifested. The experience of OSCE suggests that regional bodies adopt long-term strategies on structural issues including democracy-building, minority rights, and promotion of civil society instead of direct intervention.

In recent times, scholars have made deliberate efforts to understand the negotiation process and disputes resolution dynamics in conflict situations as antagonists resort to resolving their differences through negotiated approaches. As a result, majority of conflict in the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Babbitt, 2009a) were settled through negotiations involving third parties as facilitators. This tendency have been explained by a number of perspectives: most of the protracted conflicts ended with negotiated settlements since neither party could achieve military victory (Licklider, 2005).

The necessity to end intractable 'proxy wars' in the late 1980s and early 1990s motivated the superpowers to engage in negotiated interactions for solutions to the costly prolonged conflicts they funded (Crocker, 1992; Weiss, 1996). After the collapse of the bipolar system as noted in Bartoli (1999) and Saunders (2005), conflict management approaches transitioned, and the UN Security Council permanent members became engaged in peaceful resolution of international disputes. Thereon, states and non-state actors including NGOs have

also rendered services in conflict management processes, bringing disputants to the negotiating table and creating platforms for dialogue at both the national and societal levels.

The significance of negotiation to settlement of conflicts has generated profound interest among scholars of various disciplines regarding the conditions underpinning the process. Some scholars point to concession and commitments problems due to mistrust during dialogue but interactions are usually designed to manage risks and strengthen credible commitments to negotiation. It ensures that the application of enforcement mechanisms and security guarantees reduce negotiation costs and increase that of non-compliance (Zartman, 1989; Haass, 1988; Zartman and Touval, 1985).

Studies conducted on prejudice reduction and social categorization by Marshall and Gurr (2005) highlight the inherent human propensity to view the society from the point of “us” and “them” with negative stereotypes. These fundamental perceptions, attitudes and behaviours of disputing parties’, according to Kriesberg (1997) are what conflict resolution processes seek to change toward promoting understanding and trust. The informal dialogue and pre-negotiation interactions enable disputants to analyse their motivations prior to discussing the conflict, leading to trust and eventual restoration of cordial relationship. Fostering change of attitudes often involves consultative meetings, problem-solving workshops, capacity building at the communal level, all compatible with the local culture and norms. Individuals have been observed (Babbitt and d’Estree, 1996)

to exhibit cooperative behavior more in smaller, informal, inter-group activities than large formal ones.

Problem-solving workshops include a third-party assisted dialogue sessions carried out by both official and non-governmental actors for ethnic, religious or racial groups in a hostile relationship (Saunders, 1996). Very often, heads of NGOs, community developers, leaders of refugee camps, ethnic and religious groups, intellectuals and academia are targets for dialogue. Specialised training programmes enhance dialogue processes aimed at exploring and building relationships, facilitating, mediating and brokering, fact-finding and other cooperative decision making that support peace efforts (Kriesberg, 1996). Empirical findings show that many regional organisations practice confidence-building pre-negotiations using communication, dialogue, consultation, problem-solving and moral norms to transform perceptions and attitudes of conflicting parties. For example, Chigas, McClintock and Kamp (1996) claim the OSCE High Commission for National Minorities applies this approach in its conflict prevention work.

Recently, another useful research discussed by Dwyer (1999), Rouhana (2000) and Kelman (2008) relate strongly to trust-building in post-conflict reconciliation. Several scholars in their analysis of reconciliation agree on the responsibility for harm; justice-seeking process; reaching understanding and empathy; recognition of mutual dependence and collective goals; and “letting go” as a healing process. Huyse and Salter (2008) depict stages of reconciliation as replacing fear with peaceful coexistence, building confidence and trust, and

finally empathy and readiness to acknowledge the feelings of opponents. The experiences of various authors in the conflict resolution scholarship reveal that protracted conflicts over the years were ended by negotiations. This empirical evidence suggests that the Dagbon chieftaincy secession conflict and similar disputes elsewhere could also be resolved through negotiated settlement rather than more violence.

### *History and politics of Dagbon Kingdom*

Oral history claims the modern day Dagbon Kingdom originated from ancient Mali through migration, wars and marriages (Tsikata and Seini, 2004). King Sitobu founded the Kingdom in 1403 from a split of the Gbewaa Kingdom. Dagbon stretches over 9,611 square miles in area with Yendi as the capital and seat of Ya-Na, King of Dagbon. Ya-Na is vested with all lands; rights of Damba and Eid-ul-Adha festivals; and appointment of sub-divisional chiefs. Dagbon tradition abhors deskinment of Ya-Na hence any unwanted King was rather eliminated by consensus of the kingmakers (Ladoucer, 1972). Dagbon suffered severe chieftaincy succession crisis that reflects historical antecedents of conquest and empire-building, and how Dagombas value institutions like chieftaincy that evolved over time (Ahorsu and Gebe, 2011).

Efforts to resolve the perennial disputes over succession to Nam (Kingship) transcend centuries. The Nayiri, King of Mamprugu, intervened in the 17<sup>th</sup> century and established Karaga, Savelugu and Mion as the 'chiefly succession gates' (Ferguson *et al*, 1970). From 1824-1849, the unilateral family

succession to Nam was replaced with rotational system between male descendants of Ya-Na Yakubu I. Afterwards, Princes Abudu and Andani successfully rebelled against their father and occupied the Mion and Savelugu Skins respectively. When Yakubu I died, the Kingmakers selected Mion Lana Abudu as Ya-Na Abudulai I. He ruled from 1849–1876 and Ya-Na Andani I succeeded him from 1876–1899. Since then, succession to Nam has rotated between the Abudu and Andani families.

The British colonial administration reaffirmed the Nayiri solution in 1930 but in 1940s, encouraged the Dagomba elites to secularise the selection criteria instead of soothsaying. Succession disputes and national politics became interwoven as the Abudu and Andani elites aligned themselves with the United Party (UP) and Convention People's Party (CPP) respectively in the late 1940s. They also, in 1948, influenced the replacement of the original four kingmakers with a Selection Committee of eleven chiefs which in 1954 selected Gbon Lana Abudulai to succeed his father, Ya-Na Mahama III as Ya-Na Abudulai III. This action violated the system of selecting Ya-Na from the gates skins and denied the Andanis their turn (Sibidow, 1970). Unable to find solution at the Dagbon State Council (DSC), the Andanis appealed after independence (Mahama and Osman, 2005) and got the CPP Administration to appoint Justice Opoku-Afari Commission to inquire and advice the government. Consequently, the Legislative Instrument (1960), L.I. 59) issued reaffirmed rotation and prescribed two consecutive chieftaincy terms for Andanis to regularize the pattern of rotation.



Ya-Na Abudulai III died in 1967 and in November 1968, Mion Lana succeeded him as Ya-Na Andani III although fourteen chiefs of the DSC supported Gbon Lana Abudu. Unfortunately, the LI 59 was set aside by the National Liberation Council (NLC) regime and the Mate-Kole Committee established to further investigate the disputes. Ya-Na Andani III died on 14th March 1969 and on 3rd September 1969, the Progress Party (PP) government assumed power and released the Mate-Kole Committee's Report the following day. The LI 59 had been reversed, throwing the factions into violent confrontations. Before the funeral rites of Andani III could be performed, his family was, on 9th September 1969, ejected from the Palace by the Abudus assisted by heavily armed police and military officers. More than thirty-five Andanis were killed (Mahama, 2009) and on 12th September 1969, Ya-Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV was enskined.

The National Redemption Council (NRC) overthrew PP government in 1972 and also appointed the Ollenu Committee to probe the enskinment of both Andani III and Abudulai IV. The Committee's Report (1974) confirmed the legitimacy of Andani III but recommended the deskinment of Abudulai IV. The NRC regime also issued a decree (NRCD 299) prohibiting all Courts from adjudicating Dagbon kingship cases, particularly the deskinment of Abudulai IV (Ahorsu and Gebe, 2011). The Abudus' attempted unsuccessfully to reverse Abudulai IV's deskinment as the Peoples' National Party (PNP) government which assumed power in 1979 showed no interest in the delicate matter. However, the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) terminated the PNP rule in

1981, repealed the NRCDC 299, and constituted a tripartite committee to re-examine the crisis. Consequently, the Ollenu Committee Report was referred to the Supreme Court which upheld it by a 6-1 ruling, bolstering the rotational system and elevating it to the status of national law. But the Supreme Court added a caveat to its ruling that caused complications for future interpretations of Dagbon traditions:

*Having regard to the Dagbon Constitution that deskinnment is unknown in (Dagbon), all persons who have ever occupied the Nam of Yendi shall without regard to how they ceased to be Ya Na be regarded as former Ya Na's. Consequently their sons do not qualify for appointment to the gate skins of Savulugu, Karaga and Mion (Ghana Law Report (1984-86) Vol. 2, page 239).*

The former Ya-Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV died in 1988, exposing certain complexities and contradictions about interpretations of the Supreme Court caveat in relation to Dagbon traditional practices. Abudulai IV died outside the Royal Palace that was occupied by a sitting King, Andani II which made both his burial and funeral at the Gbewaa Palace problematic in Dagbon tradition although the Abudus insisted on doing so.

The Wuaku Commission Report (2002) claimed that the electoral victory of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in 2000 emboldened the Abudus' to challenge Ya-Na's supreme authority over traditional ceremonies of *Bugum* and *Eid-ul-Adha* festivals. The security structures at both the national and local levels were

dominated by the Abudus (The Chronicle, May 7, 2002). Therefore, the 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2002 decision of DISEC (now MUSEC) to ban the celebration of Bugum festival; impose dusk-dawn curfew; and cancel Ya-Na's programme for the celebration was without consultation.

However, the decision was revoked by the Regional Minister, Chairman of REGSEC, for celebrations to proceed as scheduled. But the Palace was attacked by the Abudus from March 25<sup>th</sup> to 27<sup>th</sup>, March 2002, killing the Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II and his elders (Mahama, 2009; Wuaku Commission, 2002). Soon afterwards, state of emergency was declared; well-equipped military and police were deployed; and curfew was re-imposed on Dagbon. Perceptions about Ya-Na's death focused on Abudus' alignment to the NPP, electoral promises two years earlier and government's complicity (Mahama, 2009). On 25<sup>th</sup> April 2002, President Kufour appointed a Commission of enquiry into the regicide, comprising Justice Wuaku (Chairman), Professor Kwesi Yankah and Mrs. Florence Brew, to recommend appropriate actions for redress. The Commission recommended among other things that, government promote genuine process of reconciliation, including the burial of Abudulai IV and Andani II.

The Committee of Eminent Chiefs (CECs) made up of the Asantehene, Yagbon Wura and Nayiri constituted in 2003 is resolving the traditional differences between the factions. The eminent chiefs presented a 'road map' to peace in 2005 which prescribes (1) burial of the late Yakubu Andani II; (2) installation of Gbon Lana; (3) funeral of the late Mahamadu Abudulai IV (4) funeral of the late Yakubu Andani II among others (Ahorsu and Gebe, 2011). The

slain king was buried in 2006 and his elder son made Regent of Dagbon but the funeral of Mahamadu Abudulai IV has stalled (Ghanaian Times, May 29, 2008:3). Also, families of the victims still await justice as perpetrators of the carnage remain unpunished. The fourteen suspects arraigned before court in 2009 were subsequently acquitted for lack of evidence. The emergency measures including the curfew that had been imposed since 2002 were finally lifted in 2010.

The fragility of peace in Yendi attracted the CSOs, faith-based groups, NGOs, UN agencies, and individuals who play diverse important peacebuilding roles to minimize the risk of recurrence. The Catholic Bishops Conference, Christian Council, the Chief Imam's Office and Ghana Pentecostal Council have influenced the mediation and negotiations processes towards peaceful settlement of the conflict. CSOs have organized humanitarian relief and trainings for chiefs and opinion leaders in conflict resolution and restorative justice, leading to the formation of National Peace Committee (Ahorsu and Gebe, 2011). NGOs have been critical trust-building actors where the government and disputants are mutual suspects. However, these organisations are unable to codify their results in enforceable instruments and are also viewed with suspicion about their motive and influence on the peace process.

## CHAPTER THREE

### METHODOLOGY

#### **Introduction**


This Chapter explains the methods and approach employed in conducting the research process. It provides insights into the study area, design, and population; sample and sampling procedure; sources and method of data collection. Moreover, the instruments of data collection and analysis as well as ethical issues have been adequately explained. Qualitative research method has been deemed the most appropriate for this study due to its flexibility and allowance for probing respondents to elaborate on the information given.

#### **The study area**

The Northern Region of Ghana has experienced several inter-group conflicts over the last few decades (Awedoba, 2009). This study was conducted in Yendi Municipality, one of the 56 Municipalities nationwide and 2 in the Northern Region (MLGRD, 2013). The Municipality, located at the center in the eastern corridor of the region, shares boundaries with Saboba, Zabzugu and Tatale/Sanguli to the east; Nanumba North to the south, Mion to the west, and Gushegu to the north. Its estimated population stands at 117,780 comprising 50.0 percent each for males and females (GSS, 2014). The ethnic composition of the municipality include the Dagomba majority, Konkomba, Basare, Chokosi,

Hausa, Moshie, Ewe and Akan (Yendi Municipal Assembly, 2013). A map of the study area is shown in figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Map of Yendi Municipality



Source: Ghana Statistical Service, 2014

Yendi, the Municipal Capital, as well as the traditional capital and seat of Ya-Na, Over Lord of Dagbon, is located about 98 km east of Tamale, capital of Northern Region. Dagbon produced the most horrendous headlines in Ghana's chieftaincy history when on March 27<sup>th</sup>, 2002 the King, Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II and about 40 others were killed at the Gbewaa Palace in Yendi (Awedoba, 2009). Violent conflict had broken out two days earlier between the Abudu and Andani gates over the legitimacy to celebrate the *Bugum* (fire) festival. The warfare (Wuaku Commission, 2002) resulted in regicide, setting ablaze of Gbewaa Palace, several houses and properties (Yakubu, 2005). It is worth noting that the area was also engulfed by armed hostilities during the 1994 Guinea Fowl War.

The protracted conflict and instability is reflected in the vision adopted by the Yendi Municipal Assembly (YMA): "To develop a Municipality where the people live peacefully together as one people in an environment of good health, enhanced education and prosperity". It recognizes the chieftaincy crisis as having serious financial implications on its budget due to huge expenditures for maintenance of peace and security. The YMA further notes in its composite budget statement that "the municipality still needs the support of stakeholders and development partners in peacebuilding and reconciliation of the people towards lasting peace and development" (YMA, 2013).

The municipality is challenged by key development issues of inaccessible quality education, lack of grassroots participation in local development decision-making, high incidence of youth unemployment and lack of employable skills (Awedoba, 2009). These issues as noted by Annan (2012), Sulemana (2009), and

Collier (2000) are risk factors of conflict and cannot be discounted by stakeholders in the study area. The area also faces problems of poor access to healthcare; portable water and sanitation; road network, educational and communication facilities; environmental degradation; and low electricity coverage. As a post-conflict environment, Yendi continues to experience threats of re-mergence in addition to religious and land disputes. Awedoba (2009) has already pointed out that the conditions that breed violence exist in the Northern Region and the study area is not exempted.

Yendi has been deliberately selected for the study mainly because the area has been experiencing conflicts and instability emanating from land ownership and control, politics, religious beliefs and more importantly challenges to chieftaincy succession. Its suitability was further justified by the presence of NGOs actively involved in conflict resolution, conflict prevention, conflict management, peacebuilding, and development activities. These include the Catholic Center for Peace and Justice (CPJ), West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), Federation of Muslim Women Association of Ghana (FOMWAG), and Bangumanga Integrated Rural Development Society (BIRDS) among others.

The climatic and economic conditions of the municipality are similar to that of the rest of the Northern Region. Although there is only one short crop production season, the local economy is hugely agro-based and engages majority of the labour force in cultivation and trading of grains, legumes, tubers and Shea products. As observed by Awedoba (2009), the conflict disrupts agricultural



production, derails economic development process, and worsens the socio-economic conditions of the affected population.

### **Research approach**

Qualitative research methodology has been employed in this study because the phenomenon under investigation is best suited for qualitative rather than quantitative approach. This method provides for broader and less restrictive design than the traditional quantitative approach. Moreover, qualitative methodology is often used in the field when the intent is to understand people's belief system, perspectives and experiences, and it flags the key ethical issues of consent and confidentiality (Patton & Cochran, 2002). According to Yin (2003), rigorous qualitative study enables the researcher to explore deeply and describe the phenomenon in context using a variety of data sources. It also allows the researcher to explore both individuals and organisations through interventions, relationships, communities or programmes as well as supporting the deconstruction and the subsequent reconstruction of the phenomenon.

This approach has been valuable in social science research for developing theory, evaluating programmes and formulating interventions due to its flexibility and rigour (Baxter and Jack, 2008). It ensures exploration of the phenomenon through a variety of lenses, allowing for its multiple facets to be revealed and understood. The approaches proposed by Stake (1995) and Yin (2003) that guide qualitative case study methodology are based on constructivist paradigm seeking to ensure that the topic of interest is adequately explored and the essence of the phenomenon is revealed. Another advantage of this approach is the close

collaboration between the researcher and the participants while enabling the latter to tell their stories frankly (Crabtree and Miller, 1999). Through these stories, Lather (1992) asserts that the participants are able to describe their views of reality which enables the researcher to better understand their actions.

Therefore, semi-structured interviews consisting of several key open-ended questions were used to explore the understanding, perceptions, views, ideas, experiences, and beliefs of the respondents regarding NGOs' role in peacebuilding. Qualitative approach offers flexibility and allowance for the researcher to probe further for elaboration and discovery of information that could otherwise have been lost (Gill, 2008). Moreover, the approach assumes less formal relationship that provides for greater spontaneity and adaptation of interaction between the researcher and respondents. Apart from being very instrumental for understanding aspects of social lives, people's belief system and perspectives, it also adequately caters for important ethical issues such as consent and confidentiality (Brikci and Green, 2007).

### **The study design**

It is worth acknowledging the assertion of Frankel and Devers (2000) that qualitative research designs are often emergent and flexible, and the research process can be quite dynamic. Qualitative case study design has been adopted for this research in recognition of the need to cover contextual conditions deemed relevant to the phenomenon under study as suggested by Yin (2003). An exploratory design provides insights and deep understanding of the issues relating to the topic under study. It offers flexible and unstructured research process that

enables the researcher to explore and describe the central phenomenon of interest to the study.

The main purpose of the study was to gain in-depth understanding of post-conflict peacebuilding and the role NGOs play within the complex network system of institutions and mechanisms involved. This study design generates new ideas and assumptions about the phenomenon being investigated, and also provides an opportunity for defining new terms while clarifying the existing concepts. Notes were taken of any observed field characteristics of interest to help in describing, interpreting and explaining attitudes of subjects relevant to this work without exerting personal influence whatsoever that could lead to biased judgment. The descriptive design enabled the researcher to obtain information concerning the present state of the phenomenon, and for describing what currently pertains to early warning, peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Yendi.

### **The study population**

Conflict resolution and peacebuilding NGOs and CBOs, state institutions and the protagonists constituted the study population for this research. NGOs included the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), Catholic Center for Peace and Justice (CPJ), and Federation of Muslim Women Associations of Ghana (FOMWAG). The CBOs interviewed included Women in Peacebuilding (WIP) and Bangumanga Integrated Rural Development Society (BIRDS). The Executive Directors or representatives of these organisations were interviewed to solicit relevant information about their role in resolving the conflict and building peace in Yendi.

The state establishments involved in the study were the Bureau of National Investigations (BNI), Ghana Armed Forces (GAF), Ghana Police Service (GPS), and the Municipal Security Committee (MUSEC). These security agencies are engaged in peacekeeping, intelligence gathering and peace enforcement operations in the area. The Yendi Municipal Assembly (YMA), National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), Department of Community Development, and Gender Desk Office also participated in interviews. These establishments were each represented by the Head in providing vital information concerning peace operations in Yendi Municipality.

The protagonists including the Abudu and Andani Gates who are primary beneficiaries of peacebuilding interventions were well represented. Each faction was represented by an elder in one-on-one in-depth interview in addition to a focus group discussion (FGD). All respondents in the study population were purposefully selected for being directly involved in the Yendi peace process. This was so because of their ability to provide deep insightful information about the phenomenon.

### **Sample and sampling procedure**

The purposive sampling criterion was the most appropriate method for this qualitative research approach because it permitted deliberate selection of respondents with deep insights into the peacebuilding process. Purposive sample is fundamental to the quality of data collected because it focuses on data sources that provide sound insights into the phenomenon being researched and ensures

reliability and competence of the informants. In order to obtain the required data, only peacebuilding NGOs were deliberately selected because of the qualities they possess. Besides, purposeful sampling strategies have been recommended for qualitative research particularly where data collected are analysed thematically (Russell, Gregory, Ploeg, DiCenso, & Guyatt, 2005).

The respondents under purposive sampling method are also usually selected for their knowledge, experiences and insights into the issue under consideration. Purposive sampling technique therefore provided room for selecting participants capable of generating useful data for the study. The area and respondents sampled for interviews have not only experienced conflict and instability but they contribute directly to its resolution and peacebuilding in Yendi. The selected respondents are all part of the peace process and have enough understanding about the peacebuilding activities and NGOs' role in avoiding relapse and cementing peace for sustainable development.

### **Sources of data**

Data for this research was obtained from both the primary and secondary sources. Primary sources of data included in-depth interviews with respondents and focus groups, key informants, and field notes. The secondary sources of data include textbooks, articles, previous research, government reports and Newspaper publications. The combination of both primary and secondary data sources as a strategy in qualitative research has been prescribed by Patton (1990) and Yin (2003) to enhance data credibility and dependability.

### **Method of data collection**

The methods of data collection used include face-to-face in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. In-depth interviews involved probing respondents for their views, experiences and perspectives on peacebuilding and NGOs' operations in Yendi. Such interviews delved deep into the minds of interviewees for high quality volume of information needed for the study. Krueger and Casey (2008) believe that collecting data from carefully and purposefully recruited participants with good knowledge and insights into the phenomenon is crucial for qualitative study of practices and perceptions. The interviews were conducted either at the office premises or home of respondents at their convenience.

There were three focus group discussions, with 11 members of the Abudu faction, 9 members of Andani faction, and 8 elected members of YMA. Although the turn-out was lower in all three cases than the requested 12 persons, the actual numbers fall within the range of 8-12 required for a FGD. This was necessary for ensuring broad representation by capturing diverse perspectives of the people since every individual in the study area could not be interviewed. Both in-depth and group interviews essentially required the researcher to listen attentively, observe carefully and remain open to new concepts and ideas in line with the proposition of Frankel and Devers (2000).

Interview participants were not only asked broad, general questions, they were probed further and deeper and detailed information was collected on the topic. All in-depth interviewees and focus group participants expressed their

perspectives and experiences freely with an opportunity to create options for responding. In some cases, responses were tape-recorded in addition to notes-taking and then transcribed for analysis. An unstructured interview was conducted in the most rigorous manner possible in order to ensure validity and reliability of the research process.

### **Instruments of data collection**

Two main sets of data collection instruments were used: in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. Brikci and Green (2007) opine that credible and reasonable interview questions are necessary for generating valid and honest accounts of the phenomenon. Therefore lists of carefully developed key questions permitting room for probing were used to solicit the appropriate information from respondents. Interview questions were neutral, sensitive and understandable. The probing space provided by these kinds of instruments contributed to the credibility and reliability of data collection procedure.

Questions for the NGOs were framed slightly differently from that for other respondents so that relevant views and perspectives could be obtained from them. This made it possible to cater for the perception of NGOs about their own role which could differ from that of other respondents. The protagonists answered in-depth interview questions that sought their views about the peacebuilding process, their involvement, and perceptions of NGO operations, successes and challenges observed. A focus group discussion guide was administered to the three focus groups including Assembly members, Abudus and Andanis. The instruments sought to explore the current peacebuilding practices and possibility

of preventing future conflict for an uninterrupted development. Notes were also taken of certain observed characteristics and behaviours of protagonists towards each other for sound analysis and interpretation of data. For example, people sat in groups of only Abudus or Andanis, revealed a clear-cut evidence of broken social relations and deep divisions between factions.

### **Data analysis**

Data collection and data analysis in qualitative research often proceed concurrently as observed by Frankel and Devers (2000) and also Baxter and Jack (2008). Data gathered from the two sources were converged and each data source was considered one piece of the “puzzle”. This contributed to greater understanding of the whole phenomenon in corroboration with Baxter and Jack (2008). Triangulation of data sources, a primary strategy in case study research (Knafl and Breitmayer, 1989) enabled viewing and exploring of the phenomenon from multiple perspectives and increased the credibility and validity of findings for broader applicability.

The application of theoretical and methodological triangulation in case study is appropriate (Denzin, 1970) for enhancing confidence in the results by ensuring reliability, dependability and verifiability of the research process (Baxter and Jack, 2008). Following the procedure for primary data analysis, the qualitative information was transcribed from an audio-tape and field notes and subjected to the appropriate analytical model. The transcribed information was analysed and coded for description and themes, and for comparison with the information gathered from literature and other sources. The secondary data



mainly literature from books, journals and reports provided the basis for comparing results and drawing conclusions on findings.

The thematic descriptive approach has been used for analyzing the qualitative data captured. It involved thorough examination of all the information gathered and summarizing the views and observations of the most frequently recurring issues under main themes and sub-themes identified. To Brikci and Green (2007), this is one of the dependable standard methods for analyzing qualitative data in social science research. The interpretations of meaning of the information analysed are based on consensus of respondents, reflections and past research. The adoption of situation approach, pragmatism and note taking during fieldwork has helped tremendously in data analysis and interpretation of findings.

### **Ethical issues**

The entry strategy took into consideration traditional protocols, customary practices and cultural norms, values and expectations of communities and respondents in Yendi. Every respondent in this study freely and voluntarily consented to participation without being coerced, persuaded or unfairly drawn into taking part. Participants were well-informed about the purpose of the study and what participation therein entails. Formal consent was often obtained verbally since WHO (2003) observed that written ones frightened some individuals and created greater chances of declining interviews.

Explicit permission was always sought for the interview proceedings to be tape-recorded to compliment the field notes taken. Permission requested to tape-

record interview proceedings was denied on some occasions especially by the security agencies. It also appeared that audio tape-recording could raise undue suspicion and lead to dishonesty and misinformation on the part of respondents so it was avoided with the protagonists. In order to increase the likelihood of honesty on the part of respondents (Rocha, 2004) participants were assured of confidentiality and protection of their identities through coding. During data management including transcription and processing, practical issues of anonymity and security of respondents were addressed appropriately.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

#### **Introduction**

This Chapter presents the results and discussion of the study under main themes and sub-themes. It reflects the outcome of in-depth interviews with respondents during fieldwork conducted in Yendi. The chapter looks at the background of respondents, how NGOs view conflict and conflict prevention operations, role in peacebuilding, strategies employed and perception of their prevention operations. It went on to examine the successes achieved and challenges faced by NGOs in peacebuilding operations, and finally how NGOs' involvement in peacebuilding may be improved.

#### **Background of respondents**

The interview respondents were in three main categories based on their classification and role in the peacebuilding process. These include the Protagonists, NGOs and State Actors involved in the peacebuilding efforts. Among the NGOs were WANEP represented by its 40 year old programmes Officer and the CPJ represented by its 69 year old Head and Catholic Bishop of Yendi diocese. The Secretary stood in for the YPC, an offspring of CPJ. The Executive Director of BIRDS spoke on behalf of his organisation while the President of FOMWAG represented the federation during the interviews.

For the security services, BNI was represented by the station Officer and his Deputy, and GPS by the Divisional and Municipal Commanders and their Crime Officer while the 34 year old Captain and Detachment Commander answered on behalf of the Military. The Municipal Chief Executive (MCE) who is also the Chairman of MUSEC stood in for the Committee. The security agencies are peacekeepers whose enforcement role provides the atmosphere conducive for peacebuilding activities. The views and experiences of NCCE were shared by its Municipal Director, YMA by the Municipal Coordinating Director, and the Department of Community Development and Gender Desk Office by the respective heads.

The protagonists are the *Abudu Yili* (Abudu family) and *Andani Yili* (Andani family) who constitute direct parties to the conflict and are indispensable players for building the peace in Yendi. The Abudu and Andani royal families were represented by their elders of 67 and 58 years old respectively. Also, 11 Abudus aged 28-51; 9 Andanis aged 32-58 and 8 YMA members aged 25-55 years participated in FGDs conducted to collect information from them. For each group, 12 participants were requested but the actual numbers indicated here fall within the range of 8-12 persons required for a FGD. Incidentally, all the FGD participants were Dagombas from both royal and non-royal families..

The total number of respondents was 49 in 21 interview sessions that stretched over a period of 11 days (19<sup>th</sup>-29<sup>th</sup> August, 2014). The cumulative period of time spent with all the interviewees was 22 hours, 45 minutes at an average of approximately 1 hour, 4 minutes per session. The shortest session

lasted 32 minutes whereas the longest one was 1 hour, 36 minutes. Respondents comprised of 5 females and 44 males representing 10.2% and 89.8% of the study population respectively. This imbalance raises issues of gender equity and fairness in Dagbon where sensitive matters of chieftaincy nature are considered men's affair. The average age of respondents was 45, ranging between the youngest (25) and the oldest (69). Their level of education ranged from Middle School Leaver's Certificate (minimum) to a Ph.D. All respondents were gainfully employed with overwhelming majority being native Dagombas and twelve persons being of other ethnic origins including Nanumba, Mossi, Akan, Dagaaba and Frafra.

### **The view of NGOs about conflict prevention operations**

The peacebuilding actions of NGOs reflect their view of conflict and what they think ought to be done to secure peace for development in a post-conflict environment. They perceive conflict as a negative outcome of interaction and its prevention as an important development agenda.

#### ***Peacebuilding NGOs' perception of conflict***

The NGOs view conflict as a destructive societal problem that impact negatively on the development of communities concerned. WANEP Official explained that:

*“People living in post-conflict societies prefer acquiring arms for protection or perpetuation of violence than investing in gainful economic ventures. This inhibits wealth generation and*

*socio-economic development. As a result, post-conflict societies like Yendi are characterized by poverty, hunger, malnutrition, diseases, fear, insecurity and impunity”.*

***Perceptions of conflict prevention intervention actions***

The peacebuilding NGOs see the prevention of conflict as a major development issue. Post-conflict peacebuilding is therefore essential in practice for finding lasting solutions to instability and insecurity and paving way for socio-economic development in affected societies. WANEP’s representative used an analogy to illustrate his point as follows:

*“Prevention remains the best and most preferred option for maintaining peace at far lesser cost than managing crisis, reconstruction and conciliation. This is because the diversion of resources to peacekeeping in post-conflict peacebuilding disrupts development process in emerging society. Prevention of violent conflict is indispensable to ensuring peace for uninterrupted socio-economic development and poverty reduction in Northern Ghana”.*

The NGOs’ view of conflict and its prevention is similar to that of the UNDP (2009), World Bank (2003), Wood (2003) and OECD (2001) who describes it as a destructive phenomenon that ruins development efforts. Thus peacebuilding is an important preventive measure for ensuring stability as a prerequisite for development progress in post-conflict societies.

### **Role of NGOs in preventing conflict in Yendi**

The NGOs were at the center of peacebuilding, managing the conflict to maintain an atmosphere of consensus and cooperation in Yendi. The study uncovered a variety of functions performed all geared towards providing suitable environment for socio-economic development. These include sourcing funds for peace programmes; facilitating dialogue, mediation and negotiation; capacity building; awareness creation and advocacy; and establishment of early warning systems among others. These are discussed in turn. The Catholic Bishop of Yendi diocese observed that:

*“Almost all the job of managing the conflict and reconciliation were done by NGOs, who else could? They initiated the peace projects because they were cordially accepted by both the Abudus and Andanis for supporting neither ‘party A’ nor ‘party B’. Most of the ground activities were championed by WANEP, CPJ and YPC which are committed to restoring peace and security in Yendi”.*

The roles played by the NGOs in building peace are outlined and discussed in turn.

### ***Funding of peace programmes***

One most important contribution NGOs made to peacebuilding includes sourcing funds from bilateral donor agencies for peace programmes to ensure stability in Dagbon. The MCD and Catholic Bishop did not mince words on the role of NGOs in providing money for peace activities:

*“They are major sources of funding for peacebuilding activities in Yendi. Funds for peace education and sensitization, capacity building, training and economic programmes were all provided by the NGOs who donors view as community workers”.*

*“Majority of the grassroots peace projects run on NGO funds and end abruptly when funds stop flowing. Some of the programmes like community peace advocacy campaigns have terminated because NGOs have ran out of funds”.*

### ***Facilitation of peace negotiations***

The dominant view among respondents named the CPJ and WANEP as instrumental facilitators of peace talks between the Abudus and Andanis to resolve the impasse. All interviewees acknowledged the Catholic Bishop of Yendi Diocese for pioneering negotiations after the 2002 carnage. On this subject, the Andani elder and the President of FOMWAG thought that:

*“Successful initiation of negotiation by CPJ marked the most crucial moment of the conflict lifecycle by averting*



*resumption and spread of mayhem in Yendi and the rest of Dagbon”.*

*“NGOs’ acceptance by both factions won them the legitimacy to successfully facilitate negotiations between them. The government only deployed Police and soldiers to stop the fighting. But NGOs led by the Bishop brought the feuding parties together for peaceful negotiations and reconciliation talks”.*

This was buttressed by a 45 year old Chairperson of WIP and the Secretary of YPC that negotiation seemed impossible without NGOs’ intervention:

*“Their search for negotiated settlement has helped to forestall violence, ensuring stability and coexistence among conflicting gates”.*

*“Without NGOs’ intervention, it would have been impossible to assemble the factions for negotiations since the state institutions were already suspects and have been maligned by the conflicting parties”.*

Every respondent thought that Dagbon regained relative peace due to NGOs’ promotion of negotiation and bargaining as the most constructive process of resolving the conflict.

***Local capacity development for disputes resolution***

The respondents indicated that NGOs have developed the capacities of many indigenous people to peacefully resolve conflict before it manifests violence. The community leaders, women and youth leaders, security services and selected individuals have been trained in alternative disputes resolution (ADR) processes. Therefore interviewees believed the local people are now capable of successfully mediating disputes to keep their communities safe. A 54 year old Secretary of YPC, MCD and the Director of NCCE acknowledged respectively that local capacity building has drastically reduced risk of escalation:

*“The support of CRS, AAG and WANEP enabled us to organize 105 workshops to train over 2,600 persons in handling individual and group differences. Our trained agents, women and youth groups, community and opinion leaders are encouraging only peaceful means of dispute settlement in the communities”.*

*“The capacity building programmes have benefited all parties involved in the peacebuilding work. The Municipal Assembly, youth, women, Pastors, Imams, Police Officers, Abudus and Andanis have all gained. I participated in one of the workshops held in Damongo where we learned about tolerance and mediation of conflict”.*

*“They have been able to turn some trouble makers and sponsors of violence into peacemakers by training and engaging them in Peace Committees”.*

The disputants are now engaged in processes to resolve their grievances peacefully. This conforms to the assertion of conflict settlement school (Licklider, 2005) that protracted identity conflict, where no military victor emerges, is best resolved through negotiated settlement.

### ***Dialogue promotion and mediation***

Almost all the respondents indicated that NGOs promoted dialogue processes and mediated conflicts that could become crisis. The Catholic Bishop, Assembly members, Abudu faction and FOMWAG President respectively commented that:

*“Before dialogue was initiated, the adversaries were not talking to each other. Silence and suspicion brewed more hatred and enmity until they were brought to the negotiating table to dialogue. Once the disputants agreed to dialogue, platform was provided”.*

*“The NGOs have not only provided platforms, they have also facilitated dialogue processes towards peaceful settlement of the conflict. They continue to organize dialogue sessions to brainstorm on how to achieve complete reconciliation”.*

*“We the Abudus and also the other side have full trust and confidence in CPJ. If dialogue sessions were not organized by this center, we would not be sitting here thinking about peace”.*

*“Their proactive settlement initiatives have been instrumental in lowering tensions, building confidence and trust among disputants. They have successfully mediated the conflict because they are non-political, non-discriminatory and fair in dealing with both factions”.*

In consonance with relationship-based approach, dialogue and communication laid foundation of trust and focused on collective interest as suggested by Babbitt and Hampson (2011).

### ***Peace education and advocacy campaigns***

Peace builders also engaged awareness creation activities to increase people’s understanding of resolving differences through peaceful means rather than violence. Sensitization and advocacy campaigns were integral part of NGOs’ peacebuilding strategies which respondents claim has changed behaviour and mindsets of people about using violent means to a solution. The importance of this strategy was underscored by the MCE and Andani elder in their comments below:

*“Education has been useful in changing mindsets of the youth and those who see violence as a means of pursuing*

*their aims. The relationships among members of the Abudu and Andani factions are lubricated by sustained awareness education and sensitization programmes”.*

*“Educational campaigns were the magic behind this relative peace and stability in Yendi. The people have become aware of the dangers of war and benefits of peace. Our youth were bent on taking revenge against the Abudu gate for killing the Ya-Na but they have changed their stance. They now understand that vengeance is not the solution, it won’t bring back the Ya-Na”.*

Clearly, transforming relationships between adversaries as noted by Boutros-Ghali (1992) is essential for avoiding reprisals in post-conflict peacebuilding. These narratives fall in line with the conflict transformation process (Kriesberg, 1997) which seeks a change in fundamental perceptions, attitudes and behaviours toward promoting tolerance and trust.

#### ***Creation of early warning systems***

The study revealed that WANEP has initiated information gathering by establishing early warning mechanisms in local communities. These early warning systems are aimed at detecting signs of danger for early action to nip in the bud potential outbreak of violence. The Programme Officer of WANEP took time to explain how the system functions:

*“We have formed ‘early warning teams’ in all communities of Yendi, comprising of youth, women and some men. They monitor happenings in the communities particularly of hardliners and report suspicious movements to WANEP or the Bishop. For example, some youth had mobilised to attack a chief and his elders for indiscriminately selling lands to outsiders. We were hinted of an impending clash and when we confirmed it, the security agencies were alerted. It was averted by quick deployment followed by a negotiated settlement”.*

The respondents also indicated that the trust reposed in NGOs has made them the preferred recipients of complaints about breaches to peace agreements.

#### ***Cooperation with other peace actors***

The NGOs worked in partnership with other players to promote peace and security in the Dagbon State. WANEP’s official, WIP Chairperson, Divisional Police Command as well as the Army Captain agreed on their ability to forge cooperation and coordinate peace interventions among actors:

*“Many stakeholders have contributed to peacebuilding activities either through networking or direct engagement. We provided technical expertise in building capacities of others to participate more effectively in building peace. Those we train are positioned to perform critical roles*

*based on whether they were 'spoilers' or 'builders' of peace".*

*"The NGOs' community peace initiatives were implemented by collective effort of all stakeholders including youth and women groups who actually championed grassroots activities".*

*"The Police regularly attended NGO peacebuilding strategy meetings and also provided safety and security for participants and organisers of peace activities. The CID normally conducts background checks for advising the NGOs on anticipated problems and measures being taken to forestall disorder".*

*"The NGOs enhanced fostering of friendly relations and cooperation between the Military and the youth by sometimes offering us the platform to interact with them during peace campaigns".*

The involvement of particularly the security agencies corroborate the argument of conflict transformation school (Walter, 1997) that security is an essential pre-condition for peacebuilding since actors cannot operate in fear and insecurity.

### **Strategies employed by NGOs in peacebuilding**

The NGOs adopted integrated multi-sectorial approach, targeting leaders of groups, families and communities with peace programmes of multidimensional

nature. Indications point to substantial overall impact on relative peace and stability, although some strategies were less effective. Activities including socio-cultural events, sensitization, job creation, financial aid, trades training and alternative livelihood programmes among others were implemented simultaneously to alleviate the risk of violence. The various strategies and activities have been categorized based on their intended impact on the peace process and are briefly discussed in this section.

### *Attitudinal change education*

This strategy is intended to overcome ignorance and alter the worldview of the protagonists and their sympathisers. It involved educating and sensitizing the population to create societal consciousness about peace. The study found out that practitioners employed educational, awareness creation, sensitization and advocacy programmes that have reformed protagonists from quick resort to violence in favour of peaceful disputes settlement. The selected Abudus and Andanis who received conflict resolution skills training are assisting in educating their communities about tolerance as explained by their elders respectively:

*“Since our training by the YPC and WANEP, we have served as the links between NGOs and the communities”.*

*“We do not only mobilise community members for conflict prevention awareness campaigns, we also educate people during weddings, funerals and naming ceremonies”.*

This has achieved a shift from the previously entrenched adversarial positions to one of tolerance and acceptance of other people’s opinions. A 40 year



old WANEP Official and a group of Assembly members narrated their observations respectively as follows:

*“The change of attitude was achieved through deliveries of peace messages at advocacy meetings, community durbars and forums, socio-cultural events, religious services in Mosques and Churches, conferences, and open broadcast to communities”.*

*“The educative programmes were crucial in changing mindset of the youth in particular about chieftaincy rivalry as a competition and not a war between them. The youth of Yendi are no longer eager to take up guns against their brothers as they were previously”.*

This conforms to the propositions of conflict transformation scholarship (Babbitt and d’Estree, 1996; Chigas, McClintock & Kamp, 1996) about fostering change of perceptions and attitudes of conflicting parties.

### ***Joint projects strategy***

The joint projects strategy encouraged regular interactions between the protagonists in a working relationship that required cooperation and consensus. The method induced collective management of shared facilities by members of the feuding families. The Bishop, a 67 year old Abudu elder, and the Secretary of WIP respectively made positive comments about this strategy:

*“Communities that lacked basic social facilities like boreholes and corn mills were provided for collective use and maintenance. It enhanced social reintegration among members of neighbouring communities and clans”.*

*“Women from both factions have been jointly provided with multi-purpose grinding mills, Shea-butter and groundnut oil extraction machines to foster cooperation and coexistence among them”.*

*“The formation of group farms and social clubs such as football teams of Abudu and Andani youth has increased confidence and networking among the factions”.*

The joint project approach focused on community needs to enhance social cohesion deemed critical for communities emerging from divisive conflict. It sought to provide avenues for building more integrated communities with minimum tension to enhance social progress. The MDG-F adopted this strategy for building peace in Serbia, Sudan, Guatemala, Macedonia and Haiti (Buescher, 2013) which practically improved communication, interaction and collective decision-making of communities, leading to tolerance, social cohesion and reduction of conflict drivers. The conflict settlement school of thought projects these forms of diplomacy and negotiation (Bilder, 1997) as an effective *modus vivendi* for resolving highly adversarial disputes.

### ***Economic Assistance Programmes***

It was realized that NGOs attempted addressing poor socio-economic conditions of people in the study area. In partnership with UNDP, they tackled extreme poverty by providing cash grants, agriculture inputs and other facilities to induce income generating activities leading to reduced risk of conflict emanating from economic factors. The alternative livelihoods initiative launched by the UN-HSP and FOSDA was also an economic-related programme designed to discourage local manufacture of arms in the area. The Community Development Officer and the MCE had more to say about these:

*“The economic model involved job creation, small grants, and farm inputs (fertilizer, seed, small ruminants, pesticides), aimed to engage beneficiaries in profitable economic activities. The facilities provided for women serve as sources of incomes for them”.*

*“The alternative livelihoods programme aimed at the reformation of artisans from manufacturing and trading in small arms. In its implementation, some blacksmiths were identified, given more training and supported with cash and tools to switch to coal pots, trunks, ploughs, hoes and other farm implements instead”.*

### ***Early warning monitoring***

Early warning information gathering appeared an important strategy for detecting early signs of dispute escalation and potential sources of conflict.

Information on small arms smuggling, illegal military training, suspicious plotting and movement with negative implications on peace are picked-up and dealt with appropriately to forestall violence. On its modus operandi, WANEP's Programmes Officer, Secretary of WIP and a group of Andanis revealed respectively as follows:

*“Early warning monitoring teams in local communities detect signs of danger and alert us for the appropriate response. Our mediation and dialogue committees are also on the ground to facilitate non-violent settlement of disagreements by mediating inter-personal, communal and inter-group disputes peacefully”.*

*“The Queen Mothers and Overlord Queen Mothers (daughters of Kings) Associations were formed to facilitate access to royal families for early warning information gathering”.*

*“Now anytime we hold a family meeting, people from the community especially the women inform the Bishop or Police about it. Then the CID Officers would come asking us what is happening and what our meeting was about. Some people are hypocrites and they are always watching what others are doing”.*

### *Cooperation with relevant peace actors*

The study found out that the NGOs cooperated with the relevant institutions in order to deliver peace to Yendi. For example, when the ‘show of force’ became necessary to quell potential violence, the security agencies were alerted to intervene. This was explained by WANEP’s Official and further expatiated by the Chairman of MUSEC:

*“We used two main options to ensure peace and stability in Yendi: preventive diplomacy, the most preferred option, and ‘show of force’, the last resort for preventing open fight”.*

*“When force became necessary to avert violence, NGOs relied on the Military and Police through preventive deployment of armed personnel. This normally provided a safe atmosphere for the peace builders to operate”.*

This approach reflects the position of Annan (2012) on credible threat of force as being instrumental for averting violence in post-conflict peacebuilding. However, the conflict resolution scholarship proffers only peaceful means of resolving dispute (Bercovitch, Kremenyuk & Zartman, 2009) which excludes coercive intervention measures.

### **Summary**

The volatility and fragility of post-conflict peace in Yendi necessitated simultaneous deployment of a range of interrelated efforts to re-establish stability and security. These according to Walter (1997) are essential prerequisite for

development. Peace builders therefore adopted some already existing state and traditional mechanisms including local government and chieftaincy institutions as well as developing context-specific ones for implementing peace programmes. For example, WANEP, FOSDA, CRS, UNDP, AAG and UN-HSP operated through the Department of Community Development, Gender Desk Office, and traditional authority, YPC, NCCE, FOMWAG and BIRDS. As implementation of the roadmap to peace is being guided by the Committee of Eminent Chiefs, NGOs and their partners rely on the peacekeeping operations of the Military and Police to perform their functions.

In addition to institutionalized mechanisms, the NGOs have also established channels for delivery of peace in Yendi. The representative of WANEP revealed as follows:

*“The network has put in place a number of community-based structures for curbing violence in Yendi and its environs. These include WIP, ‘Youth for Peace’ groups, peace committees and ambassadors, early warning teams, mediation and dialogue committees, and education and sensitization teams, to aid the peace processes.*

*For example, some specific activities undertaken by the various teams included radio discussions on conflict resolution and participatory decision-making; early warning data collection on potential hotspots; and early warning information reviews”.*

### **Successes achieved in NGO peacebuilding operations**

Some intervention methods appeared fruitful in achieving the immediate objective of preventing imminent relapse to sustain relative peace. The respondents attributed the prevailing relative security and stability in Yendi to NGO operations that nurtured tolerance among the youth of both the Abudus and Andanis. The achievements include violence and crisis prevention; awareness, tolerance and coexistence; local capacity development; installation of Regent; peaceful disputes settlement among others. The extent of success was described by the Catholic Bishop as follows:

*“Chiefs from the feuding gates are peacefully discussing outstanding issues of contention at the auspices of CECs, WANEP and YPC, charting consensual way forward to re-establishing brotherhood relations. The widespread devoice cases that plagued spouses immediately after the 2002 disturbances have been halted and inter-marriages have resumed. Both Abudu and Andani youth now share camps and interact together for days without being provocative or hostile to each other.*

### ***Violence and crisis prevention***

The interventions appeared effective in curbing outbreak of violence as most respondents claimed that NGO operations had prevented upheavals of major scale since 2002. Moreover the Abudus and Andanis are negotiating in attempt to address their grievances through peaceful means instead of violence. The official

of WANEP, a group of Andanis and the MCE commented respectively on how violence has been avoided:

*“Previously Abudus and Andanis perceived each other as sworn enemies. They were full of rage and hatred, extremely hostile to each other. Upheaval was imminent but they are now engaged in dialogue and reconciliation”.*

*“Peace education and sensitisation of people on tolerance and peaceful coexistence have been the determinant of this prevailing tranquility in Yendi Township. It has brought understanding and changed the mindset of our youth whose main objective was vengeance and retribution”.*

*“I can state emphatically that the extensive educational and advocacy programmes by the NGOs have converted many radicals into peacemakers thereby helping to reduce tension and maintain peace in the municipality”.*

This conforms to the assertion of conflict resolution theorist (Babbitt and Hampson, 2011; Bercovitch, Kremenyuk & Zartman, 2009; Licklider, 2005; Bilder, 1997) that peaceful interaction of disputants will normally lead to reconciliation and lasting peace.

### ***Awareness, tolerance and coexistence***

The study revealed that persistent awareness-creation, sensitization and advocacy campaigns about peace and development have raised protagonists’ understanding of the effects violence has on their families. In that regard, the



Municipal Director of NCCE, Bishop and Community Development Officer observed respectively that:

*“The youth in particular have become conscious of the practical reality that, without peaceful atmosphere for socio-economic development, they cannot make meaningful progress and therefore face a miserable future”.*

*“The energetic youth who are usually recruited for perpetuating violence have, through persistent education, understood the essence of peace and the need to eschew anarchists’ schemes for collective societal harmony”.*

*“The advocacy workshops, community durbars and forums, meetings, conferences, socio-cultural events have created understanding amongst people that negotiation rather than violence can address the issues of disagreement”.*

BIRDS with support from FOSDA also implemented the annual ‘Rights for Peace’ programme to boost confidence, intensify interactions and mend networks of adversaries. The Executive Director of BIRDS had this to say:

*“The ‘Rights for Peace’, a yearly event engages the youth and communities in pleasurable competition. These are bicycle racing, cultural dance, football matches, athletics and other games to ensure cordial interaction in healthy relations”.*

***Development of indigenous capacities***

All respondents asserted that the indigenous leaders and grassroots organisations have been empowered with conflict resolution skills and capabilities to successfully mediate in settling disputes. The MCE's position also indicated that Yendi natives can peacefully settle conflicts:

*“The people have become more self-reliant in resolving disputes and avoiding violence as an option to achieving grievances. The unemployed youth have also been trained and resourced to pursue gainful economic objectives thereby reducing poverty levels and risk of violence. Even members of MUSEC participated in essential skills training programmes to complement peacekeeping and peace enforcement”.*

***Installation of Regent of Dagbon***

The respondents view the installation of Regent and the gradual reintegration of Dagombas in Yendi as key milestones in the peace process. The BNI Officer and elders of both Abudus and Andanis held positive impressions about NGO contribution in restoring normalcy to Dagbon state:

*“Until the Abudus and Andanis were brought to the negotiating table, the rival gates hitherto perceived each other as bitter enemies who could not interact on peaceful grounds of dialogue”.*

*“The umbrella achievement of relative stability and social integration is due to the hard work of NGOs and other partners in ensuring non-violent pursuit of our goals. Unlike previously, now some of our people visit the Palace without being suspected of ill motives”*

*“The interventions provided a good atmosphere for burial of the late King, Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II according to our custom. It has also paved way for the installation of his son, Kampakuya-Naa Abdulai Yakubu Andani as the Regent of Dagbon.*

The installation of Kampakuya-Naa Abdulai Andani, son of the late Ya-Na Yakubu Andani, as the Regent of Dagbon marked the crossing of one of the difficult hurdles in the peace process.

### ***Peaceful resolution of disputes***

Responses indicated that several individual and communal disputes have been resolved peacefully through NGO-mediated talks. The peace builders averted possible destabilizing escalation of disputes by mediating decisively to maintain peace and order. The WANEP’s and Abudu’s representatives indicated that disputants have gained confidence in peaceful disputes resolution:

*“Many potentially explosive individual and group disputes have been resolved peacefully by engaging the concerned parties in dialogue for an amicable settlement. Even when preventive deployment was used to quell agitations and*

*imminent uprising of the youth against chiefs, it went along with a negotiated settlement”.*

*“These days we share love, gifts, mosques, and events like marriages, outdooring and funerals. Devoices by spouses from opposing factions have ceased because there is less hatred and bitterness. We are only pushing for the implementation of the ‘Roadmap to Peace’ and other agreements however slowly. All our misunderstandings are settled by elders without any fight”.*

Clearly NGO peace activities were immensely instrumental in averting violence because, in corroboration to the claim of Awedoba, (2009), both parties had stockpiled arms and ammunitions for a violent showdown.

#### ***Other success stories***

Obviously the economic assistance and alternative livelihoods programmes also contributed however modest to reducing unemployment and proliferation of small arms. This in turn reduced the availability of youth for recruitment and pre-disposition to use firearms simply because one has it. The President of WIP thought that these programmes were beneficial:

*“Some of the beneficiaries of cash grants ventured into economic activities and are more inclined to managing and protecting their livelihoods than supporting destructive decisions. Also the gun blacksmiths who received skills*

*upgrade and financial support to switch trade are doing well economically”.*

An assumption could be made to the effect that the current environment of vibrant economic activities in Yendi is attributable to NGOs’ injection of resources through peace intervention programmes.

The joint projects design appeared effective in enhancing interdependence and interconnectedness among adversaries thereby fostering interactions and reconciliation. The Municipal Police Commander thought that ‘joint projects method’ helped in mending relationships:

*“Being made to think and work together encourages discussions and consultations to solve common problems. This helps to promote tolerance and acceptance of others’ right to opinions and views”*

### **Challenges faced by NGOs in peacebuilding operations**

The remarkable achievements of NGOs in bringing peace to Dagbon were not devoid of obstacles and difficulties. Rather the implementation stages of their operations were faced with diverse hindrances and impediments. These include inadequate logistics and funding; weak institutional mechanisms; mistrust; political infiltrations; proliferation of small arms; and perceived injustice which are outlined and briefly discussed below.

*Logistical and funding challenges*

The study revealed that NGOs quite often run out of funds for implementing peace initiatives thereby forcing programmes to terminate abruptly. Since peacebuilding requires persistence to succeed, premature termination of its operations is a recipe for relapse of violence in post-conflict situation. In relation to funding, the Bishop and the President of WIP observed respectively that:

*“They (NGOs) often experience shortage of funds for peace programmes and tend to demand receipts for every item purchased with their money. Such a situation normally posed problems to implementers in Yendi”.*

*“NGOs’ extreme cautiousness in attempt to avoid being maligned and quick dissipation of funds usually lead to slow pace of implementation progress and too quick termination of peace initiatives”.*

The President of FOMWAG and Military Commander also made some observations on lack of adequate resources for peacebuilding activities:

*“After building our capacities, mobility issues and lack of funds have limited our sensitisation and awareness creation drive in certain communities. This has compelled us to seek political party platforms for delivering peace messages which has its own implications”.*

*“Sometimes request for protection of peace activities are not adequately met due to faulty equipment that sometimes*

*take days to fix. This does not auger well for our operations here in Yendi because arms and ammunitions have become their household goods”.*

It was clear that incompatible modes of operation by the various peace builders meant varying prioritization of issues and differing resources allocations that could not be harnessed together for peace work.

### ***Weak institutional mechanisms***

Certain structural weaknesses of practicing institutions hindered the process of achieving lasting peace in Dagbon. Apart from short-term project design and hiring of experts, NGOs also lack enforcing powers to implement agreements as pointed out by the Bishop and a group of Andanis:

*“NGOs often hired temporary workers who leave them after a particular project ends. So they lack qualified and experienced personnel committed to full-time implementation of peace programmes”.*

*“The NGOs are incapable of enforcing agreements and recommendations that address remote causes of the conflict rooted in Dagbon tradition and custom”.*

Identity conflict emanating from custom and tradition of the people involved is difficult to resolve. This is why authors like Mahama (2009) thought that Dagombas are indeed the right people to solve the puzzle woven intricately into their history, beliefs, culture, custom and tradition. Furthermore, some tendencies of NGO Executives notably the propensity to amass wealth, decline

cooperation and terminate initiatives prematurely affect their credibility as reliable peacebuilding partners. A group of Assembly Members, Municipal Police Commander and the BNI Officer observed respectively that.

*“Some NGOs solicit funds from donors to amass wealth at the expense of peacebuilding. This affects the image of others which are serious with the peace process. Therefore they tend to antagonise each other in competing for donor funds, leading to poor collaboration among them”.*

*“Sometimes they prefer to operate exclusively until sensing imminent threat of danger before requesting our intervention. This normally requires emergency mobilization of men and logistics that are not usually readily available”.*

*“NGOs’ declining presence in Yendi, the epicenter of trouble poses serious threats to the relative peace because long-term efforts are needed for durable peace”.*

The Catholic Bishop credited for being the pioneer of peace negotiations between Abudus and Andanis also encountered some challenges associated with the peacebuilding operations:

*“Some NGOs lack sufficient time and patience to monitor programmes through, leading to abrupt termination of initiatives. They also tend to handout cash and snacks to people during programmes, creating impressions of*



*entitlement to financial compensation for attending peace programmes. Such impression discourages people from participating in educational programmes where resources are unavailable to meet their material expectations”.*

***Mistrust among key peace actors***

There were indications of suspicion and mistrust among key peace actors including the protagonists and NGOs which impeded intervention efforts. Lack of confidence and trust in some cases led to uncooperative or antagonistic behaviours of some players. WANEP’s Official touched on the Protagonists’ unpredictability while the Abudu elder shed some blame on the NGOs:

*“The disputants backslide at peace implementation stages and refuse to cooperate with settlement efforts. Their entrenched positions and lack of full cooperation greatly impede peacebuilding process”.*

*“Some NGOs deliberately attempt to create divisions among our members by inviting individuals as opposed to the leader of Abudus for meetings. We find it difficult to trust those NGOs as genuine peace seekers if they seek to create confusion among us”.*

The Secretary of WIP, MCE and the Andani elder also remarked on the problem of trust among peace actors:

*“In Yendi, they don’t trust anybody. If Andanis see you with an Abudu, you are their sympathizer and if Abudu sees you*

*with an Andani, you sympathise with them. The mistrust and suspicion among Abudus and Andanis is very deep”.*

*“The NGOs face difficulties in maintaining neutrality amidst increasing pressure from both gates for sympathies. A decline to such requests increases suspicions of disputants about their genuineness and credibility”.*

*“As opinion leaders of Andani Gate, our participation in peacebuilding processes is considered hypocritical by our brothers because they do not share our view. Those who preach tolerance and civility are viewed as pogues and traitors, conniving with NGOs for monetary gains”.*

WANEP, in performing its core function, also faced similar challenges of mistrust as explained by its representative:

*“Other organisations perceive our effort as a competition with them which negatively affect cooperation among us. Also the policy shift to human security from state security and the creation of early warning system encountered severe resistance from security agencies. This is because they associated it with intelligence gathering which is deemed a sole preserve of state security apparatus”.*

The level of suspicion between Abudus and Andanis remains high, affecting cooperation and compliance to peace agreements. The conflict settlement scholarship proposes an application of enforcement mechanisms and

security guarantees that reduce cost of negotiation and increase that of non-compliance (Zartman, 1989; Haass, 1988; Zartman and Touval, 1985) in order to ensure compliance to agreements. Similarly Crocker (1992) posits that incentives for negotiation should be attractive enough to enhance the possibility of agreement.

***Political infiltrations of Dagbon Kingship affair***

Almost all respondents decried the level of political infiltrations, interference and lack of will to implement peace agreements. Referring to elites Dagomba politicians, the MCD and elders of Andani and Abudu Gates were explicit in their statements that:

*“The dominant political parties notably the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) are suspected of deriving political capital by unduly delaying and manipulating peace process”.*

*“Some unseen people take decisions for people in Yendi to act violently against their brothers. Party politics impede efforts to build lasting peace because the youth are partisans and do not listen to those who are not members of their political party”.*

*“The political elites are behind the so-called ‘concerned groups’ who without any consultation organise press*

*conferences to propagate grievances that stir tensions and agitations in Yendi”.*

An Abudu elder (aka ‘Show Boy’) and focus group as well as the Assembly members also lamented as follows:

*“Cooperation with NGOs faced a lot of resistance from conflict profiteers and chieftaincy contractors who either ignite or sponsor violence for political reasons”*

*“Certain enforcement decisions of MUSEC are intimidating sections of the society and making their participation in peace activities difficult. For instance, one faction was barred from celebrating a festival while the other faction was allowed, how does this support peace?”*

*“Adopting intimidating tactics rather than peaceable interventions by political actors create unnecessary tension and agitations among the people that could lead to breakdown of law and order”.*

### ***Proliferation of small arms***

Another major threat to peace is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the municipality. A 34 year old Army Captain and Commander of the Military Detachment in Yendi, the Community Development Officer and the Secretary of YPC made some observations about Armament that has continued alongside the peace process:

*“Dagbon especially Yendi is awash with arms like short guns, AK 47s and G3 Rifles, M16, etc. and the people are willing to use them at the least misunderstanding. Arms smuggling into the area has not stopped and this threatens security and stability. The question is, if these people really want peace, why are they arming themselves?”*

*“Some of the small arms blacksmiths who switched trade are returning to it because it is more lucrative than the alternative products”.*

*“The current peace is temporary and both sides continue to arm themselves because everyone thinks another fight may occur in the future as we don't have a final solution yet”.*

This structural instability rife with war-preparedness pose daunting challenges to peace and development in the municipality, a corroboration of Yakubu (2005) and more recently Harriet, Tika and Anin (2013). Peace builders therefore have a huge task of dealing with the challenges to mitigate risk factors and ensure lasting peace and security in Yendi.

### ***Perception of injustice and impunity***

The families of victims mainly Andanis who continue to demand punishment for the killers of Ya-Na as a pre-requisite for lasting peace in Dagbon feel ignored. The inability of NGOs and other peace builders to meet their

demand and the perception of injustice on the part of the victims is viewed by WANEP official and Bishop as a dangerous trend.

*“The Andani faction keeps demanding that the killers of Ya-Na must be brought to book as a pre-requisite for lasting peace without which the likelihood of retaliation in the future is predictable. They have also demanded an apology from the Abudu side for killing the sitting king and destroying Gbewaa Palace but none is forthcoming”.*

*“The inability of state actors to deliver justice to the victims and their families has made lasting peace almost impossible. Without justice, no society can maintain peace forever”.*

In analysing post-conflict reconciliation and trust-building, scholars of conflict transformation school (Dwyer, 1999; Rouhana, 2000; Kelman, 2008), concede that the ‘responsibility for harm, justice seeking process, and empathy’ are essential for transforming relationships, attitudes and perceptions of conflict parties. However, these important components are missing in the Dagbon solution because, as the MCD put it, “the Abudus have denied wrongdoing and are unwilling to apologise for the King’s death”. This standoff obstructs smooth negotiation and mediation efforts and impedes the process to lasting peace.

#### ***Failed peace intervention methods***

The study discovered that the economic and alternative livelihood initiatives were not very successful as intended. Therefore some beneficiaries

were returning respectively to joblessness and small arms manufacture for profitability. The MCD, Andani elder and Director of BIRDS indicated that some of these methods may have even ‘caused harm’ in pursuit of solution.

*“Some cash grants beneficiaries purchased more sophisticated weapons with the money as opposed to investing in gainful economic ventures. Also, the ruminants, mainly exotic breed of sheep from Burkina Faso, perished under harsh weather conditions shortly upon arrival”.*

*“Some Blacksmiths have returned to trading in arms which has a more lucrative ‘black market’ than trunks, ploughs, hoes and coal pots. The training has sharpened their skills to make better quality weapons than previously”.*

*“FOSDA’s ‘Arms for Development’ programme failed because people would not surrender their guns for development projects”.*

### ***Outstanding issues of contention***

The NGOs have been unable to resolve some contentious issues regarded by respondents as sources of threats to the peace. The claims and counterclaims of Abudu and Andani elders complicate NGOs’ search for lasting peace, the reason why WANEP’s Official thought the peace is fragile:

*“The late Naa Mahamadu’s funeral must be performed at the Gbewaa Palace because he once occupied the Yendi skin as Ya-Na and was buried according to custom for interment of Kings.*

*Custom demands that we perform his funeral at the Palace to qualify his sons for kingship”.*

*“Naa Mahammadu was wrongfully enskinned as Ya-Na but was lawfully and customarily deskinned in 1974. He died in 1988 as a non-Ya-Na and could not be give royal funeral at the Palace. Once he was not a king, his sons including the so-called Bolin Lana are unqualified for consideration as potential occupants of the Yani Nam (Yendi Skin)”.*

*“Peace in Yendi is fragile referred to as warm, unstable or negative peace. The remote issues remain unresolved and deep mutual suspicions persist. Factions have failed to compromise and often show aggressive tendencies toward each other when negotiating on contentious issues”.*

Such a situation is equivalent to “non-war” described (Wiberg, 1987, as cited by Brock-Utre, 2000) as absence of organized physical violence. It contrasts *stable peace* or *positive peace* defined by Galtung (1967) as the absence of structural violence. Dagbon tradition and custom permit only the sons of deceased Ya-Na the opportunity for ascendancy to the Yendi Skin as noted by Awedoba (2009). Therefore authors like Mahama (2009) argue that peaceful settlement of the contentious interconnected issues requires strict adherence to Dagbon history, customs and tradition.



### **Improving NGOs' involvement in peacebuilding**

The respondents made suggestions that hold potency for resolving the conflict and restoring stable peace to Yendi. These include strategic reviews of interventions, creating broader resource base, pursuit of justice, reconciliation and reintegration briefly explained in turn.

#### ***Strategic reviews of intervention methods***

The effectiveness and viability of intervention strategies and practices need regular objective reviews to identify lapses and find ways of improving performance. NGOs could take steps necessary to overcome impediments to peacebuilding as revealed by WANEP's Programmes Officer:

*“We will continue with periodic reviews to improve upon strategies and processes for overcoming the obstacles. Our early warning systems and response mechanisms are being revised and sharpened to increase effectiveness and efficiency of prevention while the social and economic dimensions are addressed with long-term measures”.*

#### ***Creation of sustainable peacebuilding resources***

The NGOs could raise adequate funds for peace programmes by expanding donor community base to ensure continuous flow of funds for peace activities. This position reflected in the view of WANEP's representative as he opined that:

*“We need to intensify our effort in soliciting funds to ensure complete stabilisation and reconciliation. More potential sources of funding must be explored to broaden the base of donor organisations for peacebuilding resource sustainability.”*

***Pursuance of justice, reconciliation and reintegration***

The respondents thought the pursuit of justice was necessary for reconciliation and reintegration of communities in Yendi. The NGOs and other peace practitioners could adopt the practical approaches offered to effectively address the impasse. These include political, legal and traditional approaches which are briefly discussed in turn.

***Political approach***

All the respondents view dissuasion of political actors from interfering in the chieftaincy conflict as a necessary step to lasting peace in Dagbon State. For instance, the Bishop, Municipal Police Commander, FOMWAG President and YPC Secretary commented respectively as follows:

*“How can we ensure that the political parties do not support one faction or the other?”*

*“The government should master strong political will to implement the ‘Roadmap to Peace’ and other peace agreements towards genuine reconciliation”.*

*“The elite politicians who benefit political capital from the crisis should be dissuaded from doing so by identifying and engaging or naming and shaming them”.*

*“The protagonists need to be persuaded to abandon entrenched positions and compromise for a negotiated settlement”.*

The NGOs also need to strengthen their resilience to cope with politics of accusations of bias and lobbying by both the politicians and protagonists. In that regard, the MCD observed as follows:

*“In spite of enormous pressure exerted by political actors and protagonists alike, NGOs must maintain neutrality as their locus of legitimacy for sustaining the trust and confidence repose in them”.*

#### *Legal approach*

The demands of victims’ families only confirm the notion that peace is difficult to attain without providing justice for the afflicted. This was reflected in the comments made by the Bishop, a group as well as an elder of Andanis:

*“People have been killed, how can the perpetrators be brought to book?”*

*“The killers of Ya-Na and his Elders are still walking free. How can we talk of lasting peace when criminals who murder other people go unpunished?”*

*“The mastermind and perpetrators of 2002 violence are well known and must be punished. It’s impossible to convince people to just forget of it, we all expect justice that is necessary for lasting peace”.*

*Traditional approach*

The traditional perspective of tackling the stalemate was also espoused as a viable means of resolution. The Bishop and the Secretary of YPC had these to say respectively:

*“Ya-Na is dead, how can we enskin the next Ya-Na? This needs to be done in consonance with Dagbon custom for the enskinment of the King”*

*“Customs and traditions can be modernised while maintaining original values and practices. Abudus and Andanis need to be flexible about the processes for the enskinment of Ya-Na”.*

Clearly, practitioners must continue to redesign and deploy issue-specific strategies based on careful analysis and evaluation of the conflict dynamics for addressing core challenges. This practice reflects transformative peacebuilding approach described by Fisher and Zimina (2009) which seeks to mainstream transformative elements into project designs with a deliberate focus on building relationships. More locally-grounded approach to building peace as opposed to liberal peace model exudes legitimacy for its bases on practical realities (Jarstard and Belloni, 2012) and can be further improved.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### **Introduction**

This chapter is made up of three sections namely the summary, conclusion and recommendations. In the summary section, the purpose, brief description of methodology used and key findings of the study are presented. The concluding section presents the decisions drawn in relation to the objectives of the study. Consequently, recommendations are made based on general findings of the study.

#### **Summary of findings**

Post-conflict societies like Yendi lag behind other peaceful ones in terms of social and economic development progress. This corroborates the assertions of the World Bank (2011) that all conflict-affected countries could not achieve any of the MDGs by the 2015 target. The reason being that, states, donors, NGOs and conflict-affected populations are more concerned with improving the practice of building peace and securing safety. In paving way for socio-economic development therefore, peace practitioners have engaged in diverse activities to curb violent conflict and promote stability and security. In Yendi for instance, interventions included alternative disputes resolution (ADR) methods, education

and advocacy, capacity building, joint projects, alternative livelihood initiatives, and socio-cultural events among others.

This research studied peacebuilding in post-conflict societies with a geographical focus on Yendi, the seat of Dagomba Kingdom. This is because the March 2002 violence in Yendi shocked the entire nation with a regicide thereby inviting multitudes of peacekeepers and peace builders to quell continuation of violence and possible reprisals. These actors included the international community, state actors, traditional authorities and NGOs. Since then, they have been pre-occupied with activities aimed at maintaining peace and security in Yendi Township and its environs. The study assessed the view of NGOs about conflict prevention and how they contributed to the Dagbon peace process. It also examined the strategies employed and made recommendations for improving NGOs' involvement in peacebuilding. Analyses of interview proceedings were presented in narrative form under relevant themes as suggested by Brikci and Green (2007).

The study found out that NGOs view conflict prevention as a very important necessity for ensuring favourable conditions for social work and development progress. Prevention is easier, cheaper and more preferred option of maintaining peace than crisis management. The reason is obvious, once violence breaks out resources are channeled to peacekeeping operations, reconstruction and reconciliation. Therefore, preventing violent upheavals in Yendi became a necessity for protecting human lives and property; providing human and environmental security; saving resources for investment in healthcare, education,

infrastructure; and ensuring a peaceful atmosphere for socio-economic development.

With this importance attached to prevention, NGOs directed their efforts towards reestablishing stability and security in post-conflict Yendi after the carnage. Since then, the UN agencies, international and local NGOs and traditional authorities have joined forces in reconstructing social relations for peace in Dagbon. Interviewees gave an indication that WANEP particularly focused on creating structures for interaction and cooperation towards addressing both the immediate and underlying causes. It came to realization that their interventions succeeded in providing short-term solution of relative peace and stability while long-term measures for lasting peace are still being pursued.

For example, peace education, capacity building and joint projects were found to have changed people's mindset while equipping them with ADR techniques. The early warning systems were also functioning properly in averting imminent violence through either timely mediation or preventive deployment. Although the economic assistance and alternative livelihood initiatives produced some unintended by-products of human behaviour, economic risk factors and circulation of locally manufactured arms were reduced. The installation of Regent and the ongoing social reintegration process are also some of the key successes shared by the NGOs and other actors. Beside the successes discussed, there were also challenges that militated against the peacebuilding efforts.

The challenges were many and varied, including institutional defects, inadequate funding and logistics, political infiltration and interference, small arms

proliferation, injustice, mistrust and suspicion, and lack of cooperation among others. The 'warfare' as referred to by the Wuaku Commission (2002) left legacies of hatred, animosity, acrimony, and insecurity among the people of Dagbon. This situation is reflected in the protagonists' refusal to cooperate with mediators at the final stages of implementation of agreements and roadmap to peace. Moreover, governments' failure to punish perpetrators of the carnage and provide justice for victims' families as noted by Mahama (2009) is interpreted by the Andanis as deliberate cover-up. It is perhaps the reason why both factions expressed pessimism about the ability of state institutions to contribute credibly to durable peace in Dagbon.

The findings corroborate Awedoba's (2009) observation that biased involvement of NDC and NPP in the past affect their ability to objectively and peacefully resolve the Dagbon conflict. The conflict thus remains stubbornly difficult to resolve more than a decade after the incident. Its intractability conforms to the claims of psycho-cultural conflict theorists (Horowitz, 1998) about the difficulty involved in resolving identity conflict. The consequent insecurity and structural instability continue to pose formidable hindrances to peace and development in the area. This sad reality confirms the observation of Yakubu (2005) and Harriet, Tika and Anin (2013) concerning unresolved divisive conflict that is likely to degenerate into worse violence. Nevertheless, the application of multifaceted approach gave dynamism to the peacebuilding effort as observed by Gawerc (2006), and contributed positively to various phases of the peacemaking process. But of particular importance concerns the protagonist



themselves and their voluntary actions which are essential for achieving the desired outcomes in conflict resolution process.

Despite facing numerous challenges, NGOs have contributed tremendously and continue to impact positively on prevention efforts. Due to lack of ultimate recourse to legitimate coercive mechanisms for implementing peace agreements, NGOs usually relied on the security services for coercive measures when necessary. The general impression gathered from respondents indicates that NGO interventions have been instrumental to the relative peace and stability in the municipality.

### **Conclusion**

After careful analysis of interview proceedings regarding peacebuilding in a post-conflict society, certain conclusions have been drawn about NGOs' contribution to violence prevention and stability. Although the study focused specifically on analysing the Dagbon kingship succession conflict, the applicability of its findings to similar conflicts elsewhere cannot be overemphasized. The observable characteristics of Yendi Township included insecurity, mistrust, suspicion, polarization, investment shortfall, slow economic activity, unemployment, and low productivity which are expected in any emerging society. The active presence of security services including a combined armed military and police deployment at the Gbewaa Palace and vantage locations was indicative of yet an unstable peace. These observations confirm the positions of scholars and practitioners like Best (2006) Jinado (2007) and

Oviasuyi and Uwadiase (2009) on unintended long-term legacies of violent conflict.

Obviously, reprisals and violent upheavals in Yendi were imminent in the aftermath of Ya-Na's death in 2002. Such an eruption could spread to the leanage gates in Mion, Savelugu, and Karaga, and engulf the rest of Dagbon state. The NGOs predicted this dangerous situation and ultimately launched massive peacebuilding campaigns to avert relapse as the immediate objective since any resurgence could make the region a war zone. To them, this was not a threat to Dagbon alone but also to their own social and development work. Therefore, preventing possible violence through peacebuilding measures became the only way of protecting human lives and providing a more conducive and safe security environment for development.

Consequently the CPJ and WANEP began serious mediation efforts that eventually convinced the Abudus and Andanis to accept negotiation as the best means of resolving the impasse. While facilitating negotiations, the peace builders also took the opportunity to introduce other interventions targeting the chiefs and elders, leaders of youth and women groups, and the entire communities. These included education on peace and conflict; developing indigenous capacities; creating job opportunities; and encouraging interactions using socio-cultural events to rebuild relationships and social networks. Their interventions appeared to have disengaged active segments of the population from imagining and waging war, resulting in the current relative peace.

Peacebuilding NGOs adopted two major strategies namely, operational prevention and structural prevention. Operational measures involve short-term actions undertaken to prevent imminent escalation of specific disputes. Some of these included sensitization and advocacy workshops, diplomacy, fact-finding, mediation, negotiation and bargaining, monitoring and confidence-building which prevented imminent upheavals. Structural solutions tackled unemployment, poor economic conditions, high rate of illiteracy and ignorance. Its scope of actions aimed at reducing risks and addressing underlying causes to provide human security, well-being and justice on the long run as opined by the Carnegie Commission (1997). The measures included economic assistance, education and advocacy programmes. These programmes were successfully delivered through workshops, conferences, seminars, meetings, durbars, forums, religious platforms and social events.

Generally, analyses reveal that peace builders, of which NGOs are key, have increased the understanding of communities about tolerance, coexistence and non-violent approach to dispute settlement. Initiatives such as peace ambassadors, peer educators, socio-cultural events and neighbourhood confidence building campaigns have led to more interaction, social networking and reintegration. Educational activities have changed people's mindset and significantly lowered tensions, hatred and acrimony between the adversaries. Additionally, cash grants, agricultural inputs and trades training have reduced economic risk factors by engaging previously unemployed youth thereby

eliminating provocative behaviours emanating from economic pressures and frustration.

Serious challenges to peacebuilding included inadequate logistics; political interference; parallel installation of sub-chiefs; indiscriminate land sales; mistrust; illicit arms infiltration; and uncooperative behavior of protagonists. NGOs also face the obstacle of lacking legitimate coercive mechanism for implementing peace agreements. It made success dependent on the willingness of disputants to voluntarily cooperate with efforts to conduct peace activities. This was compounded by non-availability of sufficient funds for full implementation of peacebuilding initiatives, usually leading to premature exit to the detriment of the peace process.

Also politics consistently featured as a major problem that impede the implementation progress of agreements for lasting peace in corroboration with Yakubu (2005) and Alhassan (2007). Political elites belonging to the NDC and NPP are manipulating the impasse for political capital and electoral victories as observed by Mahama (2009). Both the Abudu and Andani factions have failed to agree on certain contentious issues crucial for resolving the conflict. For example, Abudus demand to perform the funeral of Naa Mahammadu at the Gbewaa Palace following his interment at the place of deceased kings. Completion of such rites will qualify his sons for ascendancy to kingship throne in Yendi. However, the Andanis have refuted this claim insisting that Naa Mahammadu was lawfully and customarily removed from office in 1974 and subsequently died in 1988 as a non-Ya-Na as highlighted by Mahama (2009).

Indeed, peacebuilding involved multifaceted, complex processes ranging from long-term structural measures that promote stability, to short-term operational interventions to resolve specific disputes (preventive diplomacy). Some interventions monitored and tackled early stages of conflict (crisis management) while others prevented resurgence of violent confrontations (post-conflict peacebuilding). These activities primarily concerned with, but not limited to, the period preceding outbreak of violence. Conflict prevention activities also included gathering information on potential hotspots (early warning) and providing platforms for identified actors to negotiate and bargain (Dialogue) for peaceful settlement. Neutral third party facilitation (Mediation) was necessary for disputants to peacefully resolve their differences. These processes were conducted impartially by the peace builders in Yendi, thereby providing an atmosphere of relative peace needed for development.

Interventions of NGOs encompass the aforementioned processes and other measures essential for developing both new and more effective paradigms for building peace and appropriate strategies for resolving the conflict. However, at the moment, the Dagbon peace process have become interminably protracted partly because the disputants maintain entrenched positions on contentious issues and are, for now, unwilling to compromise. Nevertheless, the collective efforts of all peace practitioners may, in the long run, find settlement to deadly and destructive disputes that worsen poverty and under-development conditions in Dagbon and elsewhere. And NGOs who have strong community links,

information gathering and early warning capabilities occupy excellent position to identify danger signs and take relevant actions against threats of destabilization.

### **Recommendations**

The relevance of non-state actors including NGOs in resolving societal challenges and building peace for development is unquestionable. However, their strategies for peacebuilding in post-conflict societies must be sharpened and fashioned to provide more efficient solutions that address both the underlying and immediate causes of conflicts. This will promote the right atmosphere for societies recovering from destructive conflicts to make progress in their social and economic development agenda.

The general findings of the study point to certain measures and steps needed for ensuring stable peace and security in Dagbon and possibly other traditional states in similar crisis. Such measures are intended to enhance the collective effort of stakeholders at achieving the goals of sustainable peace in emerging societies like Yendi. The recommendations provided in this section are based on the findings of the study. It is hoped that NGOs involvement in peacebuilding would be improved and lead to more peaceful societies conducive for socio-economic development and wellbeing of people.

NGOs rely on international donor funding shortage of which causes peace interventions to terminate abruptly. Their continual relevance as peace builders depends on relationships with these donors and the ability to secure funds for prevention activities. This means healthy inter-linkages between NGOs, donors

and protagonists, though difficult to maintain, are necessary for achieving the ultimate goal of peace. Therefore, they must expand the donor community in order to solicit sufficient funds for successful completion of peace initiatives.

‘Spoilers’ including political parties, concerned groups aligned to factions, hardliners and Diasporas create tension and threaten peace agreement implementation. These segments and their activities, as stressed by Newman and Richmond (2006), obstruct or undermine the conflict settlement and peacebuilding processes. NGOs must expand their scope of operations, devise a comprehensive approach for addressing adverse activities and turning them into ‘builders’ in post-conflict settings.

There were significant rates of illiteracy, poverty and youth unemployment in the municipality. People reeling under ignorance and poor economic conditions are usually more vulnerable to recruitment into perpetuation of violence against perceived foes. Peace builders including NGOs should focus more on intensifying education and awareness creation to overcome ignorance and promote civility and coexistence. Also priority may be given to job creation and employability skills training to help engage the active population in gainful activities and make them unavailable for recruitment.

The provision of justice for the families of victims has been emphasized in Brusset et al (2011) as an unavoidable pre-requisite for ensuring post-conflict peace and reconciliation. Failure of the state to identify and punish the perpetrators of killings and human rights violations erodes confidence in the security and judicial establishments and leads to cyclical culture of impunity that

exacerbates tensions in communities. NGOs and other stakeholders should lend support to justice seeking efforts for the affected people to put the past behind them.

Social and political tensions are features of any society experiencing socio-economic progress. Therefore, sustainable development strategies must be underpinned by institutions capable of managing socio-political tensions to avoid destructive conflict as noted in the OECD-DAC (2008) guidelines. NGOs and their partners should focus on techniques that link crisis management and humanitarian activities to longer-term goals of conflict resolution, peace and sustainable development. Preference should go for development efforts that create opportunities and build the capacities of indigenous actors to build a peaceful, equitable and just society as proposed by Annan (2001). Such strategies should lead to transformation of conflict in a manner that promotes sustained and comprehensive reconciliation among the warring factions.

The Dagbon chieftaincy affair relates to eligibility and legitimacy of succession rooted in ancient unwritten history of the Dagomba customs and tradition as noted by Awedoba (2009). In that regard, the groups involved are themselves the right people to resolve their impasse peacefully with emphasis on both competition and compromise. Hence NGOs should build their capacities particularly non-royal Dagombas to objectively mediate in resolving the stalemate according to the prescribed custom (Wuaku Commission 2002) of rotation.

WANEP's early warning mechanisms are already functioning properly in detecting signs and averting outbreak of violence. NGOs should strengthen



cooperation with the security agencies to increase the effectiveness of information gathering, coordination and precision of pre-emptive actions. A key informant claimed both factions have received illegal military training, small arms and ammunitions in anticipation of a possible re-emergence of violence. NGOs must intensify advocacy campaigns while impressing upon government to adequately equip the security agencies to present demonstrable threat of force and capability to deal expeditiously with any resurgence.

Over the past decade, NGOs have demonstrated their impartiality and competence in mediating the conflict and securing peace agreements. These entities should continue to engage the disputants in negotiations to ensure non-aggressive pursuit of grievance. Regular interactions in negotiations increase socialization and build confidence and trust towards social cohesion and lasting peace in Dagbon.

The scholarly community would need to further conduct an evaluative study of NGO approaches to peacebuilding to scientifically determine which intervention methods are more effective in making the most impact for lasting peace. This could facilitate the development of straight forward choices of appropriate procedures for future application by all peace practitioners.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX: A

#### IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW FOR NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

##### Introduction

I am conducting a research on the topic: “**PEACEBUILDING IN A POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY: A STUDY OF NGOs IN YENDI**”. The purpose of this exercise is purely academic and will not be used otherwise. The views and experiences you share here will be very important contribution to this research. I urge you to express them freely and sincerely. You will not be identified by name in the research report as it will be attributed to your NGO. The information you provide will be used solely for the preparation of my thesis for a Master of Philosophy Degree in Peace and Development Studies at the University of Cape Coast.

Thank you for accepting to participate.

GEORGE B KONLAN (Tel. 0272070210).

##### Background of Respondents

Name: ..... Position..... Age: ..... Sex: .....

Level of Education: ..... Organisation: .....

Contact..... Date: ..... Time: ..... - .....

Venue of interview: .....

How long has this NGO been in existence? .....

Is conflict prevention the core mandate of this NGO? Yes / No

1. How does your NGO view conflict?
2. How is conflict prevention work important to your organisation?
3. What is the state of your NGO’s effort in preventing conflict in this area?
4. What mechanisms do your NGO deploy for peacebuilding in this area?
5. What specific actions do your NGO take in its conflict prevention work?
6. What strategies do your NGO adopt in its conflict prevention efforts?

7. How are other stakeholders involved in your NGO's peacebuilding activities?
8. What have been the successes achieved so far in your peacebuilding work in this area?
9. What challenges do you face in your quest to deliver peace?
10. How do you intend to overcome the challenges in order to ensure peace and stability for socio-economic development of the area?

**APPENDIX: B**

IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW FOR PROTAGONISTS/PARTNERS

**Introduction**

I am conducting a research on the topic: “**PEACEBUILDING IN A POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY: A STUDY OF NGOs IN YENDI**”. The purpose of this exercise is purely academic and will not be used otherwise. The views and experiences you share here will be very important contribution to this research. I urge you to express them freely and sincerely. Your identity will not be revealed in the research report as it will be attributed to opinion leaders in the district. The information you provide will be used solely for the preparation of my thesis for a Master of Philosophy Degree in Peace and Development Studies at the University of Cape Coast.

Thank you for accepting to participate.

GEORGE B KONLAN (Tel. 0272070210).

**Background of Respondents**

Name: ..... Age range: .....- .....

Level of Education: Min ..... Max .....

Contact..... Date: ..... Time: ..... - .....

Venue of interview: .....

1. In what ways is your organisation involved with the activities of conflict prevention NGOs?
2. What challenges do you face in your dealings with these NGOs?
3. What have been the successes of these NGOs
4. Have you enjoyed a fruitful working relationship with these NGOs? Please explain
5. What method of the NGOs would you consider successful?

6. What methods or approaches of the NGOs do you think have not worked too well?
7. Do you think these NGOs have been relevant in the effort to prevent conflict in this area?

**APPENDIX: C**

**FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR BENEFICIARIES**

**Introduction**

I am conducting a research on the topic: “**PEACEBUILDING IN A POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY: A STUDY OF NGOs IN YENDI**”. The purpose of this exercise is purely academic and will not be used otherwise. The views and experiences you share here will be very important contribution to this research. I urge you to express them freely and sincerely. Your identity will not be revealed in the research report as it will be attributed to opinion leaders in the district. The information you provide will be used solely for the preparation of my thesis for a Master of Philosophy Degree in Peace and Development Studies at the University of Cape Coast.

Thank you for accepting to participate.

GEORGE B KONLAN (Tel. 0272070210).

**Background of Respondents**

Name: ..... Age range: .....- .....

Level of Education: Min ..... Max .....

Contact..... Date: ..... Time: ..... - .....

Venue of interview: .....

1. Some NGOs are involved in promoting peace and stability, how do you see the importance of these NGOs in resolving conflict?
2. What strategies do these NGOs employ for preventing conflict in Yendi?
3. How effective are the methods adopted by the NGOs for peacebuilding?
4. What has been the successes achieved so far in building peace by NGOs?
5. What challenges face NGOs’ peacebuilding efforts in Yendi? How can these challenges be overcome?

Table 1: Form for focus group discussion participants. Group:

.....

<b>S/N</b>	<b>Name of Participant</b>	<b>Address/Community</b>	<b>Contact</b>
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			