

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST

ORGANISING AND DECENT WORK CONDITIONS AMONG INFORMAL
STONE QUARRY WORKERS IN GHANA

MOSES SEGBENYA

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University of Cape Coast

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STONE QUARRY WORKERS IN GHANA

BY

MOSES SEGBENYA

Thesis submitted to the Department of Integrated Development Studies of the
School for Development Studies, College of Humanities and Legal Studies,
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of Doctor of Philosophy degree in Development Studies

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DECLARATION

Candidate's Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my own original research and that no part of it has been presented for another degree in this university or elsewhere.

Candidate's Signature: Date:

Name:.....

Supervisors' Declaration

We hereby declare that the preparation and presentation of the thesis were supervised in accordance with the guidelines on supervision of thesis laid down by the University of Cape Coast.

Principal Supervisor's Signature: Date:

Name:.....

Co Supervisor's Signature Date:

Name:.....

ABSTRACT

Informal workers as active agents could use collective identity as a means to achieve better working conditions for themselves. This study thus examined organising and decent work conditions among informal stone quarry workers in Ghana. The interpretivist approach and exploratory qualitative research design were adopted. A sample of 121 respondents from a population of 39,536 was selected from four districts. Purposive and snowball sampling techniques were used to sample waged and self-employed quarry workers, representatives from the Labour Department, Environmental Protection Agency, Ghana Trade Union Congress (TUC), and Minerals Commission for the study. In gathering data, unstructured interview guide, focus group discussion guide, and a non-participant observation guide were the instruments used. Forty-seven (47) individual in-depth interviews, three group interviews and 12 focus group discussions were conducted. The study found that membership-based organisation was a temporal organising strategy for formal trade union organising which had only started in one quarry firm. Workers have signed a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with management. Indicators of existing working conditions of quarry workers which had decent work deficits per the labour laws of Ghana and International Labour Organisation's decent work framework were found to be decent under the CBA yet to be implemented, suggesting that organising leads to decent working conditions. It was recommended that TUC should capitalise upon membership-based organisation forms in other quarries and among self-employed quarry workers to organise and represent informal quarry workers as a move towards decent working conditions.

KEY WORDS

Collective Agreement

Decent Work

Informal Workers

Organising

Quarry Workers

Working Conditions

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DEDICATION

To my lovely wife, Mrs. Dzifa Segbenya (Dzifa Atadika), and my children,
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

CBA	Collective Bargaining Agreement
CBMWU	Construction and Building Material Workers' Union
DWCP	Decent work Country Programme
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GCMQWU	General Construction, Manufacturing and Quarry Workers Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Products
GDWPPS	Ghana Decent Work Pilot Programmes
GEA	The Ghana Employers Association
GFoL	Ghana Federation of Labour
GOPDC	Ghana Oil Palm Development Corporation
GTUC	Ghana Trade Union Congress
ICDD	International Center for Development and Decent Work
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MBA	Membership Based Organisations
MNC	Multi-National Companies
NLC	National Labour Commission
NTC	National Tripartite Committee
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SSNIT	Social Security and National Insurance Trust
UCC	University of Cape Coast

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background to the Study

The effects of neoliberal policies on employment have extensively been contested in literature over the past four decades (Ahn, 2008; Harvey, 2006; Thorsen, 2012). The neo-liberalists and capitalists posit that neo-liberalism advances human well-being by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework with private property rights, free markets and free trade (Kotz, 2008). Critics of neo-liberalism, especially those from the dualist theory of informality paradigm and Rawls' theory of Justice, however, are of the view that neoliberalism is an extension of capitalism under mercantilism, an affront on social development and favours only a few elites against the majority (Papadongonas, 2013).

Thorsen (2009: 9) identified neoliberalism as the dominant ideology shaping the world and established that 'we live in an age of neoliberalism'. Papadongonas (2013) argues that the IMF and US treasury's continuous demonstration of ideological influence over the global monetarist distribution is a justification that neoliberalism has come to stay and is still relevant in contemporary socio-economic and political debates. Neo-liberalism policies extend to both the developed and the developing economies.

The major tools or medium for capitalist extension of the neoliberal agenda to both the developed and the developing economies were information and communication technology as well as globalisation (Britwum, 2010). The process

of globalisation has dramatically increased the mobility of capital across national borders, thereby increasing the interdependence of developed and developing countries and creating intensified competition across a broad range of markets especially labour markets (Kay, 2011). Globalisation has been a major factor behind significant changes in the employment and labour relations in terms of wage levels, labour deployment and labour standards (Ong, 2006). In this respect, the dualists' perspective of informality, that information technology did not only result in inefficiencies but more importantly led to the creation of surplus labour and weakening of labour unions becomes very instructive (Lewis, 2001).

The rise of neoliberalism as an extension of global capitalism has severely modified the nature and the associated working conditions of workers across the world. The capitalist approach of "changing the rules of the game" by moving away from the standard employment relationship has resulted in different production forms such as the formal and informal (Kay, 2011).

Capitalists under neo-liberal agenda attempt to reduce the cost of production has resulted in outsourcing and subcontracting some formal jobs to the peripheral or private and informal economy. This has lengthened the production chains as several nodes are now found along the chains (Webster, Britwum, Bhowmik, 2017). "Commodification" of labour as another strategy for reducing the cost of operation also has eroded workers' power and gains in the labour market of capitalist economies. The commodification of labour under global capitalism and neo-liberal policies, coupled with privatization and retrenchment has led to the failure of the formal economy to create the necessary jobs and its resultant massive shift to the informal economy for employment in both agriculture and non- agricultural

activities (Otoo, 2014). The resultant effect was transforming the productive workforce from secure to new levels of vulnerability (Webster, Britwum, Bhowmik, 2017).

Most workers in the informal economy do not have access to benefits such as social security and social protection, secured employment contract, leaves and severance pay among others. This, according to the theory of justice, makes the working conditions of informal workers very challenging.

Doorn (2010) argued that Rawls' theory of justice underpins the importance of respecting labour rights to ensure better working condition for workers. Rawls theory of justice is relevant in explaining organising as a basic right of workers that must be respected. The Rawls theory of Justice as the main theory of the study has the axiom that justice is the first virtue of all social institutions and remain the basic labour right to respected. The theory thus suggests that property rights should not take pre-eminence over labour rights. For these two rights to be fostered equally, there would be the need for strong institutions such as regulatory agencies for the enforcement of regulations such as the labour laws on employment. Rawls theory of justice only emphasised the importance of internal adjudicative bodies but failed to recognise the role of external adjudicative bodies to ensure labour rights are respected by employers. The institutional theory thus explains the need for strong internal and external institutions to enforce regulations.

The relevance of better working conditions for workers is enshrined in the philosophy of anthropocentrism which emphasizes that human beings have intrinsic values and hold the most important and central position in the universe (Madhabendra, 2003). Anthropocentrism believes that everything that exists is at

the disposal of wo/man, that wo/man is superior, and by possible extension, a wo/man deserves the best attention and care. Aristotle, in his book *Politics*, alluded to the fact that wo/man has a higher status in society than other gregarious animals suggesting the need for a decent condition of life. Aristotle's support for anthropocentrism stems from his belief that wo/man alone, of all the animals, is furnished with the faculty of language, which Aristotle differentiated from sounds.

The anthropocentric basis for a decent working condition for workers which is anchored in Aristotle's view of the 'elevated man' is also supported by the Judeo-Christian belief in the book of Genesis that "Be fruitful and multiply, fill the earth and conquer it. Be masters of the fish, sea and birds..." (Doorn, 2010). This highlights the importance of human beings and by extension, workers in the work environment hence the need for better working conditions. Emmanuel Kant's support for anthropocentrism and the need to treat human beings with respect was based on the virtue of rating men/workers as rational beings. Social importance can be seen at both the individual and the group levels.

According to the theory of collective action, the lack of workers' collective identity is a paramount contributing factor to the high rate of the vulnerability of informal workers to indecent working conditions (Baah, 2007). Organising workers has since 1990 been one of the four strategic goals of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) mainly for ensuring decent working conditions for workers (Ghai, 2001; ILO, 2002). The role of social dialogue or worker organisations (which is one of the ILO's for strategic goals with remunerative employment, workers rights and social protection) as part of the decent work agenda of ILO is to ensure better social integration and personal development for

workers, participate in decisions that influence workers' lives and ensure equal treatment for all women and men (UNDP, 2015).

Organising of workers in the informal economy whether for trade unions, associations and worker cooperatives, serves several purposes at the individual, local and national levels. According to Chen (2012), organising could add to workers' ability to negotiate with authorities for improved working conditions, share resources to achieve improved incomes, and influence policies, programmes and regulations that can directly affect them. Chen *et al.* (2015) further explained that organisations afford workers the opportunity of joining forces to provide many benefits to the working poor in the informal economy, and to women workers.

Worker organisations give voice to workers and empower them to demand and challenge policymakers and policy implementers at national, regional and district levels on issues that concern their enterprises (ILO, 2012; 2013). Osei-Boateng and Ampratwum (2011) observed that formal workers had better services and decent working condition because they are unionized and have a collective voice to argue with their employers when it comes to collective bargaining as compared to their informal counterparts.

In general, organising can confer greater visibility and voice for informal workers to exercise more significant influence at the enterprise/organisational level (Barwa, 1995; Ofori, 2009). At the highest level, which is the international level, international networks give workers a formidable, cooperative voice on the global stage to advance changes in international policies, which eventually can lead to changes in national legislation (Osarenkhoe, 2009).

According to Nkosi (2017) and Wilderman (2017), several informal farm workers in South Africa have adopted several methods and strategies for organising themselves to ensure better working conditions for themselves. Vyas (2017) have indicated that informal manufacturing workers in Indian have successfully achieved better working conditions for their members through a non-traditional method of trade union organizing.

Worker organisation is a component of social dialogue, which is also the fourth pillar of the decent agenda of ILO. Worker organisation can be said to be rooted in the 1948 universal declaration of human rights which emphasised that “... every worker has the right to form or join a trade union for the protection of his interest’ (Erbach, 2014: 16). The right to organise and to engage in collective bargaining is further grounded in Rawls’ theory of justice, which argues that organising and collective bargaining are fundamental rights of workers that should be upheld by employers. The role of the state and regulatory institutions from the institutional theory perspective thus become very paramount in ensuring employers respect labour rights.

Organising workers as part of the decent work agenda became a global development agenda in 2005 and forms part of the Millennium Development Goals until 2015(ILO, 2015). Additionally, goal eight target eight of the Sustainable Development Goals that serves as the global development agenda for the period 2016 to 2030 still makes worker organisation and decent work concept relevant (UNDP, 2015). Organising as a subset of social dialogue has the propensity of enabling the achievement of the other three strategic goals on remunerative employment, social protection and workers’ rights. This is because organised

workers have a better collective identity and representation (as compared to the capacity of individual workers) at enterprise and national levels to be able to confront policymakers and employers to demand better conditions for their members. Thus, organising gives workers some level of leverage in terms of power to demand their entitlement with regards to the remaining three pillars of the decent work agenda such as rights at work, remunerative employment and social protection.

Decent work in Africa was piloted from 2001 to 2003 as Decent Work Pilot Programmes (DWPPS) among eight African countries including Ghana (Abebrese, 2014). The experiences of the piloted countries had been used to prepare decent work programmes (DWPs) for other countries of the 185 ILO member states. This was because most of Africa's population and its workers were very poor. The decent work agenda from 2007-2015 for Africa was a further confirmation of the importance attached to ensuring decent work for workers in Africa (ILO, 2010).

Neo-liberal economic policies were introduced in Ghana as part of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP hereafter) in the 1980s (Otoo, 2014). During this era, the formal economy of Ghana employed 20 per cent of the total workforce, and the public sector was the primary source of employment for most labour market entrants from the tertiary education institutions in Ghana (ILO, 2002; Otoo, 2014). However, by 1999, the share of the formal sector in providing formal employment dropped drastically to 14 per cent and fell again to 13 per cent in 2010 as a result of the neoliberal economic policies (GSS, 2010).

Reasons for the reduction in the capacity of the public sector employment creation were government's continuous implementation of a policy of employment freeze in the public sector as part of International Monetary Fund's (IMF) conditionalities (Darkwah, 2005; Osei-Boateng & Ampratwum, 2011; Otoo, 2014). The neoliberal economic policies that underpinned the Structural Adjustment Programmes in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in massive retrenchment in the public sector (Britwum, 2010). According to Darkwah (2005), about 15 per cent of public sector workers in Ghana were retrenched during the SAP era. These outcomes of the SAP thus supported the assertion of the dualist approach of informality that neo-liberal policies resulted in removing labour regulations and cutting down public sector employment. This further resulted in the unregulated, cheap and non-unionized workforce (Boampong, 2005).

The formal private sector also failed to absorb new labour market entrants and those retrenched from the formal public sector as a result of the trade and financial market liberalization under SAP (Martinson, 2000). Trade and financial market liberalization led by neo-liberal ideological agenda resulted in increases in interest rates and cost of production in Ghana (Otoo, 2014). Domestic products also faced stiff competition from foreign products to the extent that many local producers were out-competed from the domestic/home market (Ghana) (Boafo-Arthur, 1999).

Thus, the formal private sector also became incapacitated, just as the formal public sector to provide the necessary jobs as well. The large-scale retrenchment of labour as overriding consequences of structural adjustment in Ghana in the mid-1980s coupled with the inability to provide employment for the emerging labour

force created a large pool of unemployed persons who naturally gravitated towards the informal sector (Abebrese, 2014) (a position supported by the dualist theory of informality).

One of the avenues for informal employment opportunities in Ghana which also absorbs informal workers is the stone quarrying subsector. In Ghana, stone quarrying as a component of the extractive industry supplies the bulk of aggregate stones for the construction industry (both building and road construction) in Ghana. According to the Ghana Statistical Service (2018), the industry sector comprising mining and quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, water and sewage, and construction recorded the highest growth in terms of contribution to gross domestic products (GDP) as compared to agriculture and the services sectors in 2017. The industry sector contributed a GDP share of 25.5 per cent and had its growth rate increase from -0.5 per cent in 2016 to 16.7 per cent, followed by Agriculture (8.4%) and service (4.3%) in 2017. Mining and Quarrying subsector recorded the highest growth of 46.7 per cent for the 25.5% growth rate recorded for the industrial sector in 2017.

The construction subsector which depends largely on the stone quarry activities has consistently witnessed growth in terms of contribution to GDP for more than a decade. The construction subsector's contribution from 2013 to 2017 respectively (recorded in Gh. Million) was 2,887; 2,888; 2,950; 3,037 and 3,175 for the past five years (GSS, 2018). Housing as a key component in the construction sector can be said to have played a key role in the growth of the construction sector due to increase in population and its accompanying demand for housing and aggregate stones.

Closely linked to the housing needs and its associated stone quarry products is urbanization. According to the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) (2013), more than one in two people (50.9%) in Ghana lived in a town or city with more than 5000 people. The increasing pace of urbanization in Ghana, as a developing country is expected to surge in the next foreseeable future. This indicates the tendency for continuous demand for stone quarry products for housing and construction needs in the urban areas of Ghana.

Gbeve (2013) posits that stone quarrying in Ghana involves the removal of sand, river stones, crushed stones, gravels mainly for road and building construction. Stone quarrying processes deployed several technologies which have both environmental and labour implications on communities and workers. There is more health-related effect of quarrying activities on quarry workers in the informal economy (GSS, 2013). Stone-quarrying and mining activities are rated as one of the most essential subsectors employing one per cent of 878,593 of the working population in the Central Region of Ghana (GSS, 2013).

The Central Region, per its location, shares border with the Greater Accra, Western and Ashanti Regions where most of the quarry products are highly demanded for building and construction purposes. The Central Region also has a high concentration of granites deposits. Four important quarry companies in the Central Region of Ghana are Sacorm Quarry Company, Pilot Quarry Ltd, Executive Quarry Ltd and Meliss Quarry Ltd. These quarries provide jobs for hundreds of Ghanaian and expatriate quarry workers. These quarry firms are well known for offering employment opportunities to hundreds of wage casual/temporal (informal)

quarry workers. Additionally, there are also other individual self-employed quarry workers usually termed as "own-account workers" in the Central Region of Ghana.

Most waged workers and self-employed stone quarry workers in the informal economy of Ghana are not entitled to benefits such as social security contribution, leaves and severance pay, among others (Abebrese, 2014). This is because Ghana's Labour Law (Act 651, 2003) requires that employment relationships are formalized with the signing of a written contract between employers and employees.

Ghana's decent work pilot programme started in the Central Region (Abebrese, 2014). Ghana started with the International Labour Organisation's Decent Work Pilot Project (GDWPP) planning in 2002 (ILO, 2006, Akorsu, 2010) aimed at bridging the gaps identified in the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) and to promote decent work in both the formal and informal sectors of the economy including the stone quarry subsector (Meridadi, 2013). Apart from influencing the socio-economic policy environment for poverty reduction, GDWPP also sought to tackle poverty through the promotion of decent work in the informal economy, which includes the informal stone quarry subsector.

Experiences gathered from GDWPP from 2003 to 2006 in the Central Region of Ghana were used to develop a decent work country programme (DWCP) from 2006 to 2009 (Abebrese, 2014). The DWCP sought to promote employment, productivity and income in specific sectors and to reduce vulnerability among the most vulnerable groups by protecting their fundamental rights (Abebrese, 2014). Despite all these efforts, decent work deficits still exist in the informal economy of Ghana.

Statement of the Problem

The failure of the Structural Adjustment policies to transform the economic structure of the Ghanaian economy has had an enormous impact on the employment structure in Ghana (Osei-Boateng & Ampratwum, 2011; Otoo, 2014). Most of the working population of Ghana (86%) is in the informal economy, an economy characterised with lack of social protection and security (Abebrese, 2014). Additionally, the economic returns of most informal workers including quarry workers in Ghana have been marginal despite the socio-economic contribution of the informal economy. This, according to the dualist's theory on informality, has succeeded in making informal workers the working poor, with little or no chance of improving their working and living conditions (Osei-Boateng & Ampratwum, 2011).

One challenge with the Labour Act (Act 651) is the presence of an employer as the defining feature. Provisions in the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) on payment of wages to employees and apprentices in the informal sector and by extension, informal quarry workers, are hardly complied with by their employers (Ofori, 2009). Ofori's observation calls for a strong institution to ensure that employers adhere to labour laws' provision for informal workers, a position underpinned by institutional theory and Rawls' theory of justice. Most employment agreements are established verbally, making monitoring and enforcement difficult (Barwa, 1995; Ofori, 2009; Osarenkhoe, 2009).

The dualist approach of informal economy posits that the exclusion of the informal economy from labour regulations creates exploitable reserves of informal labour (Boampong, 2005). Ghana's quest to achieve target eight of the global

development agenda of sustainable development goal eight from 2015 to 2030 after piloting the decent work initiatives in the Central Region of Ghana in 2002, largely hinges on dealing with decent work deficits recorded in the informal economy (Abebrese, 2014).

Worker organisations have been recommended as one of the ILO's four strategic goals that are expected to address decent work deficits in the informal economy in Ghana (Abeberese, 2014) which is underpinned by the theory of collective action. However, the task of organising wage and self-employed informal workers including quarry workers is a challenge facing the global labour movement and the TUC of Ghana (GTUC, 2012). The unionisation rate for informal workers in Ghana is extremely low since only 0.1 per cent of the workers are unionised (Britwum, 2010; Abebrese, 2014). The growing casualisation of employment in Ghana has gone parallel with declining trade union membership. However, trade unions in Ghana have not found it financially viable in organising informal sector workers (Osei-Boateng & Ampratwum, 2011).

The Construction and Building Material Workers' Union (CBMWU), which organises construction and quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana, have been suffering membership decline since the final quarter of the 20th century as the 39,553 membership in 1985 declined to 36,750 in 1998 (Anyemedu, 2002). The neo-liberal theoretical developmental approach by privatised state-owned enterprises and its retrenchment exercise is what wiped out a large section of the workers of the formal segment of the construction sector (Nyamekye *et al.* 2009). Since then the membership of the union has continued to decline mainly because of

the disproportionately large share of informal sector workers in the construction sector (Nyamekye et al., 2009).

It is therefore not clear how the CBMWU is currently reaching out to stone quarry workers in the informal economy in terms of organising these workers. Informal stone quarry workers as active agents are capable of using different methods of organising themselves as emphasized by the theory of justice and the philosophy of anthropocentrism to ensure decent working conditions for themselves and members. Studies by Boampong and Tachie (2017) in Ghana; Webster and Lugwig (2017), Wilderman (2017) and Nkosi (2017) in South Africa; and Vyas (2017) in India have shown that informal workers have been able to organize themselves to ensure decent working conditions for their members. The possibility of achieving both property right and economic right of both capitalist and workers from the Rawls' theory of justice is therefore supported.

According to the theory of collective action, individuals would not be willing to join larger groups if the group would not serve their interest. By inference, informal workers' perception of the relevance of traditional labour unions would influence their desire to join such unions. Some informal workers do not have the resources for the payment of dues and other contributions required of members of such unions

Though the informal economy holds about 86.3% of the Ghanaian labour force, organising is, however, predominant in the formal economy. Organising informal workers in the past has been studied from the neo-liberalist theoretical perspective. However, such studies appear to have been very inadequate in explaining decent work deficits and indecent working conditions as well as why

informal workers would not join trade unions. Informal stone quarry workers are not mere victims but social agents and potential political beings (Akorsu, 2010). Using collective action theory to explain the organising among informal economy workers remains a gap that this research seeks to fill.

Previous studies on decent work concept (Ghai, 2001; ILO, 2002; Maridadi, 2013) have been conducted with parallel importance to the four strategic goals yet decent work deficits still prevail in the informal economy. A major critique of the decent work framework is that it seems targeted at the formal sector with organised workers. Any attempt to apply it to the informal economy will not be possible without the firms of organising. Organising which affords workers with collective identity and representation at enterprise and national levels to be able to confront policymakers and employers, thus, has the enabling capacity for achieving other three strategic goals which are remunerative employment, social protection and workers' rights.

The quarry subsector is also under-represented in terms of studies in the extractive sector. Studies of the extractive sector of Ghana have concentrated on gold mining and oil exploitation (Agbesinyale, 2003, 2007; Akabzaa & Darimani, 2001). Other studies on stone quarry activities in Ghana such as Musah (2009); Nartey, Nanor and Klake (2012); Gbeve (2013); Asante, Kabila and Afriyie (2014) also focused on only the environmental and the health challenges associated with stone quarrying activities to the surrounding communities from the egalitarian and libertarian theoretical perspectives on natural resource governance. These earlier studies did not consider the effects of the quarrying activities on the workers involved, especially their working conditions compared to the dictates of the decent

work framework. Meanwhile, the working environment with the associated conditions under which quarry workers operate can lead to several health challenges. This gap, therefore, necessitated this study.

Objectives of the Study

The General objective was to explore organising informal stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana for decent working conditions. Specific objectives were to:

1. Examine the forms and drivers of informality among stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana.
2. Examine how the existing working conditions influence organising among informal stone quarry workers.
3. Assess how informal stone quarry workers organise themselves in the Central Region of Ghana.
4. Assess how existing forms of organising practices relate to decent working conditions for informal stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana.
5. Make recommendations as to how organising can be used to achieve decent working condition for informal quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana.

Research Questions

The four research questions set to guide the study were:

1. What are the drivers of informality and type of labour forms among informal stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana?
2. How decent is the existing working conditions of informal stone quarry workers and how does it influence organising among quarry workers?
3. How do informal stone quarry workers organise themselves in the Central Region of Ghana?
4. How does the existing forms of organising relate with decent working conditions for informal stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana?

Significance of the Study

The significance of this study is to influence existing knowledge, policy and practice. The outcome of this study is essential in various ways to workers and worker organisations in Ghana, the state as well as the International Labour Organisation. To workers and trade unions, the outcome of this study will highlight the reasons for which some informal stone quarry workers do not want to join trade unions; and how existing forms of worker's organisations can be used as a catalyst for organising informal workers by trade unions.

To the state, the findings and results of the study offer an understanding of the socio-economic challenges accounting for informality in the stone quarry sub-sectors of the country. The result of this study would also inform the state and the ILO on how organising of informal stone quarry workers can better catalyze

achieving the decent work strategic goals. To researchers, the results of the study will serve as literature to give additional insight into labour conditions and organising among stone quarry workers in the informal sector in Ghana.

Delimitation of the Study

The conceptual scope of this study was based on the informal labour organisations within the stone quarry sub-sectors. Thus, this study specifically investigated the extent to which worker organisations could be used to achieve decent working conditions for stone quarry workers and small-scale miners. This study further argues that until worker organisations, as part of social dialogue, are given much attention, the decent work agenda in the informal sector would achieve little or no result.

In terms of geographical delimitation for this study, quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana were selected for this study. Specifically, four districts each with a labour force of about 0.6 per cent and above in mining and stone quarry activities in the region were selected. The remaining 13 districts and nine regions were therefore excluded except for Senya Breku District which was used for pretesting data collection instruments.

Limitations of the Study

The first limitation of this study was the refusal of the management of Quarry B to participate in the study. Quarry workers in this quarry also appeared to have the most indecent working conditions. That notwithstanding, using different data sources for triangulation purposes, this limitation was well addressed. The second limitation was the methodological approach which was purely qualitative

from the interpretivism paradigm. The qualitative dimension posed subjective challenges to the overall generalisability of some outcomes of the study. These limitations notwithstanding, researcher's 'objective subjectivism' by following the scientific method in research contributed to quality and objective position of the study and its findings.

Definitions of Terms

Working conditions

Working conditions refer to the working environment and all existing circumstance affecting labour in the workplace. These include but not limited to job hours, legal rights and responsibility, organisational culture, workload and training. Yassin, Ali, Ali and Adan (2013) define the working condition as the working environment created as a result of the interaction of employee with their organisational climate which includes psychological as well as physical working conditions. For this study working conditions means the physical working environment, legal rights and responsibilities, workers' terms and conditions of employment.

Decent working conditions

Decent working conditions relate to work that seeks to promote opportunities for women and men to obtain productive work in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human dignity (ILO, 2014) in both developed and developing countries. The four pillars of decent work considered in this study for measurement were productive employment, workers' rights, social protection and

organising/social dialogue (ILO, 2002). The working conditions of informal stone quarry workers can be declared as decent if only the decent work indicators measure up to the dictates of the international labour organisation's framework and the national labour laws of Ghana.

Decent work framework

The decent work framework is a general structure developed by ILO to measure decent work in both the formal and informal economy. The four pillars of decent work are productive employment, workers' rights, social protection and social dialogue. All four pillars are relevant to this study. However, this study argues that unless the fourth pillar, which is social dialogue, is achieved, it will be very daunting if not impossible to achieve any success in the other three pillars of the framework.

Organising

Organising in this work is a component of social dialogue, the fourth mainstay of the decent work framework which is an essential trait of a democratic society and a means of dealing with predictable conflicts of interest over economic and social policies in a cooperative framework (Gbadebo, Kehinde and Adedeji, 2012). In this study, organising represents both workers' informal and formal groups/associations, cooperatives, membership-based organisations and labour unions; and their ability to negotiate on behalf of their members on matters of concern.

Collective bargaining agreement

Collective bargaining agreement is used loosely in this study to mean any enforceable agreement between workers and their management, and self-employed quarry workers and their suppliers/law state authorities to ensure better working conditions for their members.

Democratic association

Democratic association in this study means workers association characterised with the members' freedom of participating in the election of leaders and given the opportunity to freely express views and participate in decisions that affect members of the group/association. It also refers to freedom at which workers can decide to form or join the workers' organisation at their workplaces.

Informal workers.

The informal workers in this study are the self-employed and wage workers who are not recognised, regulated or protected by existing legal or regulatory frameworks. It also includes unpaid family workers who support the self-employed workers.

Organisation of the Study

The study has been divided into ten chapters. Chapter one outlines the background to the study, statement of the problem, objectives, research questions, scope and significance of the study, organisation of the study and key terms used.

Chapters Two and Three together constitute a presentation of a critical review of relevant literature on key aspects of the topic from theoretical and conceptual reviews respectively.

Conceptual perspectives of the review of related literature constitute Chapter Three of the study. The chapter begins with an introduction to the informal economy and delves into perspectives of informality such as the dualists' labour market approach; an alternative approach on informality and the structural articulation approach on informality. Characteristics of the informal economy, what drives informality, the link between formal and informal economy, the effect of the informal economy and the informal economy of Ghana, in particular, were also considered.

Chapter Four discuss the regulatory regimes and framework on regulatory regimes on stone quarry activities and organising among stone quarry workers in Ghana. Chapter Five outlines the methodology and the procedure for conducting the study. The chapter reveals why an interpretivists perspective is preferred in this study. Additionally, methods, sampling techniques and instruments and ethical considerations in gathering data for analysis are discussed with a justification of the choices made.

Results and findings of the study comprise chapters six to ten. Chapter Six presents findings that relate to forms of informality among informal quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana. Other specific issues presented in the chapter were findings on drivers of informality among stone quarry workers. Empirical findings of the study in terms of present working conditions of informal stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana was the focus of Chapter Seven. Specific

issues addressed in chapter seven centred on salary/wage, employment contract/appointment letter, social security, health insurance and occupational health and safety measures in the working environment among others.

Chapter Eight focus on results for how informal quarry workers organise themselves in the Central Region of Ghana. Specifically, the chapter also compares trade union strategies of organising workers against that of workers' strategies of organising. Benefits and challenges of organising from both workers, employers and trade unions as well as labour inspectors perspectives were addressed.

Chapter Nine of the study captured empirical findings for objective four. Specific issues reported in the chapter were on implications of existing forms of organising practices for attainment of decent working conditions for stone quarry workers. The chapter also reported how working conditions of stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana could improve with worker organisations and trade union organisations. Thus, the chapter compares the working condition of quarry workers without worker organisations(captured in Chapter Seven) to improve the working condition of quarry workers with workers and trade union organisations.

The final chapter, Chapter Ten presents a summary, conclusions and recommendations. The chapter started with a summary of the empirical findings which were reported on the five key objectives of the study. Finally, recommendations were made on how social dialogue can serve as a catalyst for ensuring decent working conditions for workers in the stone quarry.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INFORMALITY AND ORGANISING

Introduction

The previous chapter offered an introduction to this study. This chapter reviews the literature on some critical theoretical perspectives on informality and organising. The review starts with neo-liberalism as an extension of capitalism which was also said to have come to replace feudalism, communism and socialism. Other theories are Rawls theory of justice on workers' right to organising and collective bargaining for decent working conditions, the theory of collective action which highlights why informal quarry workers would not want to join trade unions at their workplaces and institutional theory which argues that strong institutions are needed to enforce labour regulations to ensure employers' compliance.

Neo-Liberalism as an Extension of Capitalism

The word 'neo-liberalism' has, during the past three to four decades, become quite widespread in many political and academic debates. Harvey (2005) described neoliberalism as a theory of political and economic practice that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by substantial private property rights, free markets and free trade. Neoliberalism is considered in this study as the classical form of liberalism and a modern form of capitalism. Thus, the relation between neoliberalism and capitalism in this study can be described as "old wine in a new bottle". Neo-liberalism was introduced to ensure efficiency and

growth in the form of privatisation, deregulation and labour and financial reforms. The pro-market theory aimed at tackling challenges associated with the perceived failure of the mixed economy under the Keynesian model of the 1950s to 1970s. During the late 1970s, inflation and unemployment rose together to much higher levels, unknown in previous decades among the developed countries. These developments questioned Keynesian demand management to regulate capitalism, hence the introduction of neoliberalism (Siddiqui, 2012).

In the next sections, I examine the claims of the neoliberalism theory. The claims are also compared to present developmental issues under the dispensation of neoliberalism to make a final determination of its achievement especially in the case of developing economies. The advocates of 'neo-liberalism' argue that market freedom and little intervention by the state would better serve many people as compared to what happened under the mixed economy (Siddiqui, 2012). The role of the state under neoliberalism for proponents is to create and maintain a suitable institutional framework for such neo-liberalism practices. Where markets do not exist, they must be created by the state for neo-liberalism to function, beyond which the state has no right to intervene (Thorsen, 2009). All other functions are better discharged by a private enterprise which will be prompted by the profit motive to supply goods and services.

The position of the neo-liberalist for minimal state intervention or control of markets in my view can be flawed with the position of Adam Smith's argument (in his book-*The Wealth of Nations*). Adam Smith indicates that if people rationally pursue their economic interests in free markets, they will exhaust all mutually beneficial opportunities to produce goods and exchange with one another and

further lead to full employment (Siddiqui, 2010). Smith further insists that there would be unemployment as a result of people's temporary search for another job or determination for higher pay. Also, there is a need for labour and capital as factors of production to be mobile under the classical liberal model to achieve higher efficiency and growth. However, during the current globalisation drive, notwithstanding some agility in the high skilled labour force, labour mobility has been highly constrained between nations, while capital mobility has increased immensely (Siddiqui, 2012).

The neoliberal argument that the increasing uncertainty in the world economy was as a result of too much regulation and government intervention (World Bank, 2014) can also not be entirely valid since some economies have defied this logic. The case of the East Asian crisis in 1996, for example, was blamed on the deregulation of national financial systems. The lack of regulation resulted in unwarranted lending in the region by Western Banks (Amsden, 2003). It was also observed that the East Asian miracle (coming out of their woes) was as a result of extensive and well-coordinated state intervention rather than 'free market' policies as claimed by the neo-liberal institutions and advocates like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Chang & Evans, 2005).

Expenditure deflating policy packages at the macroeconomic levels were to be achieved under Neo-liberalism (Harvey, 2005). India's adoption of neo-liberal ('market-friendly') economic policies to be able to come out from its inability to meet its international payment obligations, was cited as an example (Ong, 2006). Meanwhile, advocates of neoliberalism have failed to recognise that India's

adoption of neoliberalism changed the position of the big bourgeoisie (Gupta, 2012).

Additionally, it is also worthy to note that the World Bank and IMF have earlier applied neo-liberal market reforms in Latin America and Sub-Saharan African countries in response to the debt crisis in the 1980s (Carmody, 2010). However, the past decades of the neoliberal policies have been characterised by more significant trade imbalances, worsening social and economic conditions and sluggish growth in most of the developing countries. These conclusions are evident in UNCTAD reports that revealed that the average trade deficit in the 1990s was higher than in the 1970s by almost three percentage points of GDP, while the average growth rate is lower by 2 per cent per annum for developing countries (UNCTAD, 1999). UNCTAD's conclusion is further supported by the findings of Weisbrot, Baker, and Rosnick, (2005) that there has been a slower rate of economic growth and reduced progress on social indicators for the vast majority of low- and middle-income countries for the past twenty-five years (1980-2005) as compared to that of 1960-1979.

The neo-classical model and general equilibrium theory have served as the foundation and anchor for neoliberal policies. The neo-classical model contends that when the stakeholders in the market (buyer and seller) act out of egocentricity, the competition will produce a unique set of prices and quantities that will create a perfect match between demand and supply of every product and input used in the production system (Siddiqui, 2010). Neoliberalist further claimed that the attained "equilibrium" of price and quantities would result in better welfare for citizens. However, the adherent of the neo-liberal policies failed to recognise, in my view,

that general equilibrium model relied heavily on scientific and unrealistic assumptions. People are assumed to make rational decisions across the entire range of human choices, including but not limited to market transactions which are not always the case (Siddiqui, 2012).

Another argument for the need to adopt neoliberal policies was that globalisation and information and communication technology had introduced dramatic changes in recent decades (Kotz, 2008). For this reason, proponents argued that there was an urgent need to adopt the Anglo-American model of 'free market' (i.e. neoliberal policies) to be able to amalgamate all national economies into one global economy to the expedition of a free flow of goods and capital.

What the position of advocates of neoliberalism means to me is that the logic of the market is placed ahead of the society and the society should be administered as an adjunct to the market (Siddiqui, 2012). The existing order of placing economic systems under social relations is thus altered so that social relations are subsumed under the economic systems. The economic system is thus, organised in separate institutions, and based on specific motives which demand that society should be shaped in a manner that will best suit the functionality of the economic system to allow that system to function according to its laws (Carmody, 2010).

The adoption of neo-liberal policies also resulted in treating multi-national companies (MNCs) as critical agents of development. Neoliberal activists argue that MNCs were needed for the provision of advanced technology, capital (also known as FDI), and modern management skills along with distribution network to export to global markets resulting in better development and job creation (Fine, 2009). The modernised economy of Singapore by taking advantage of MNCs has

been cited by neo-liberalist to justify their positions. It is worthy of note that the advocates did not consider that the welcoming of foreign investors by the Singaporean government did not take a laissez-faire approach to MNCs, instead foreign capital was deliberately directed into strategic sectors (Kotz, 2008).

It is even more revealing to further consider the case of South Korea and Taiwan's attempts to modernise their economy in recent decades by restricting entry and ownership of foreign businesses to only foreign investors into modern technologies (e.g. synthetic fibres, petroleum refinery) and labour-intensive export industries producing for export markets. Foreign ownership above 50 per cent was thus, prohibited except for where FDI was strategically considered necessary. It is thus not surprising to find that only 5 per cent of the MNC subsidiaries in South Korea, 50 per cent in Mexico and 60 per cent in Brazil were wholly-owned companies by 1985 (Papadongonas, 2013; Siddiqui, 1990; Wade, & Veneroso, 1998). Opposite to the argument in favour of the neoliberal model, the markets are seldom competitive.

Harvey (2005) and Siddiqui (2010) contended that markets in the developed economies are dominated by massive corporations with too much control over the markets resulting in inactive competition, which defies the logic of neoliberalism and economic theories on which neoliberal policies are based. Neo-liberalism also reluctantly does not consider that since profits are a vital motive for production, there are possibilities that "capitalists could produce what really people want but also what the producers think they want. If it can do so profitably, they will produce what they mistakenly think people want" (Siddiqui, 2012: 18).

There are contradictions between neoliberal positions for liberty and development of human as well as actual outcomes as they manifest themselves globally (Harvey, 2005). The existence of infiltration of monopolies; how neoliberal hubs and the periphery share power and information; the emphasis on individualism as against neoliberal claims about a meaningful life and the externalization of market failure consequences to lenders are all part of the contradictions of the neoliberal state as a vehicle of neo-liberalism (Fine, 2009; Siddiqui, 2010). Thus, neoliberal authoritarianism can be criticized for its apparent violation of neoliberal claims on freedom.

The contradictions, as shown in literature so far have attracted some form of resistance and various reactions across the world in recent times. Specific reference can be made of anarchist, environmental movements, and social groups (Ong, 2006). Besides, there is a renewal of academic interest in the withdrawal of the state. Does the state really “disappear” under neoliberalism? The next section examines the role of the state under neoliberalism to prove that the state is still actively serving as a conduit for neo-liberalists to achieve their objectives.

The Role of the State Under Neo-Liberal Policies

The state in this study means political and geographical territories, administered by federal sovereign entities (Haynes, 2005). Despite the perception that the state has disappeared under neoliberalism, the fact remains that the nation-state is still relevant in securing the interests of capital because capital is tied to, and dependent on, the nation-state to ensure survival in its globalised form. It is common in the literature about anti-neo-liberalist that the technological, political,

economic and cultural aspects of globalisation (as a tool for neo-liberalism) are vital in influencing domestic outcomes and are carefully operated from and mediated by the state (Britwum, 2010). Additionally, international “superpowers” such as IMF, World Bank and the WTO that advance the course of neoliberalism and capitalist derived their power from specific nations and are nationally based.

Neo-liberalism advanced through globalisation is organised and controlled from the national base. Nation-states have not entirely “vanished” but rather ease the success of neo-liberalists under globalisation (Teschke & Christian, 2002). The role of the state under neoliberalism and globalisation in terms of function and relevance has not declined in the space of internationalisation of capital since nation-states aid domination and serve as a means for the expansion and reinforcement of neo-liberal ideologies through globalisation (Wood, 2004). Thus, Önder (1998: 5) assertion that "a better way of conceptualising the role of the state is to move away from viewing it as one with a diminishing role and to analyse it in terms of whose interests it serves" is relevant in this regard.

One of the many roles of the state under neoliberalism is the intensification of the oversight role for the implementation of economic policies that safeguard the interest of capitalists at the expense of social functions and eventually lose their democratic legitimacy of being national states (Munck, 2002; Teschke & Christian, 2002). Domination of capitalist interest would be possible because states remained subsets of the globalised capitalist system and their economic policies dominated by global capitalist interest. The immediate challenge that surfaced is federal tension between pursuing economic expansion and capitalism’s defined political authority threatening national unity sometimes (Rupert & Smith, 2002). The

survival role for states; thus, in this instance, was to undergo continuous change to be able to provide the legitimacy that neoliberalism and globalisation require to survive.

An economic model for development under structural adjustment programmes of neo-liberal policies allows trans-national companies to take over production through foreign direct investment (FDI), alters some roles and functions of the state. The new duty of a country or state under FDI and integration of national economies was to downgrade federal and state-led development strategies and import substitution policies' (Britwum, 2010; Haynes 2005). Two associated roles or duties surfaced for the state such as acting as agent for advancing the interest of transnational private capital, the ultimate beneficiary of globalisation (Harrod & O'Brien 2002) and secondly, acting as an intermediary between external and domestic interests through political, economic, and cultural avenues (Britwum, 2010; Teschke & Christian, 2002). Thus, 'key effect of globalisation is to enhance the porousness of state borders and to increase the significance of external actors for many domestic outcomes' (Haynes, 2005: 3)

Under neo-neoliberalism, nations were made to believe that the only best way to meet the needs and interest of their citizens was to adopt ultra-liberal modes of capitalist economic organisation. The national states lost the opportunity to implement any anti-neo-liberal global development model, and this takes away developing nations' ability to chart an independent course for development (Wood, 2004). Thus, the new role of the state in this regard is to continue to ensure the pursuit of a grand agenda of sustaining the spread of globalisation.

The state is a regulative agency designed to ensure that forms of capitalist relations are maintained and reproduced (Burnham, 2002). Neo-liberal policies that led to restructuring national economies also resulted in class relations and reconfiguration of national power and societal interests. Though the state was actively involved in the formation and articulation of social relations, obscure class antagonisms and struggles like citizens' rights, international human rights, it instead resulted in disorganising the labour in its attempt to secure better conditions for workers (Burnham, 2002; Haynes, 2005).

Thus, Britwum (2010) assertion that the fact remains that the nation-state is relevant in securing the interests of capital and capital is linked, and dependent on, the nation-state to ensure survival in its globalised form is still valid under neoliberal policies today.

Neo-Liberalists Views and effect on the Labour Market

Neo-liberalists perceived the national and local labour market as barriers for achieving increased investment and profitability. Deregulation of national economies through globalisation was thus, used to achieve the introduction of the new global labour market (Rupert & Solomon, 2006). The global labour market progressed from free markets to the economic rationality as well as efficiency. The new market has given capitalist and new opportunities to increase their wealth at the expense of decreasing the welfare of employees (Karagöz, 2009). The global labour market became polarised labour market due to neo-liberalism. Reasons for the polarisation was that the worldwide labour market instead consists of a relatively small and shrinking number of decent-paying 'high-skilled' and secured

jobs but rising number of precarious employment (Yüksel, 2017). Thus, the gap between the primary labour market (high skill) and secondary labour market (dangerous jobs) has been heightened by the global labour market due to neo-liberalism.

The deregulation of national economies for competition, innovation, product development, and reduction in the cost of production further brought flexibility into the global labour market formed (Teknik, 2009). The introduction of flexibility can be blamed for the increased non-standard work or casualisation of labour. Flexible work manifests in four primary forms such as flexibility of work hours or shift system, the flexibility of wages, functional versatility and numeric flexibility.

Neo-liberals also perceived trade unions as a very formidable force within the tripartite system before the introduction of neo-liberal policies. Trade unions draw their strength from economic policies, class formation, cultural background among others (Çelik, 2007). Trade unions are a significant stakeholder in industrial relations. Through the monopoly that they created, they obtain some certain rights which are unfeasible to be possessed without them (Gordon, 2011).

Deliberate attempts were made by neo-liberals to disarm trade unions which resulted in "de-unionism" of trade unions. "De-unionism" reflected in two primary forms such as a reduction in trade union density and trade union membership from 30 per cent to five per cent since the introduction of neo-liberal policies in the 1980s in Turkey (Dixon & Martin, 2012). The de-unionism affected unions in both developed and developing economies. The decline in the number of

trade union membership, as well as trade union density, started the debate on the functions and the future of trade unions (Yüksel, 2017).

Privatisation and its associated retrenchment that ensued after the introduction of neoliberal policies resulted in pushing formal workers out of jobs and these ended up losing their trade union membership (Bilgin, 2010). The new employment that was later formed or found in Turkey (with the latest working styles such as part-time work, fixed time work, telework) could not employ many retrenched workers or new labour market entrants (Tokol, 2011). Also, the transformation of neoliberal employment from industry to the service sector accelerated these changes against unionisation. The neoliberal dilemma which prioritised capital owners and their competition over labour also led to de-unionisation.

Neo-liberals also pursue decentralisation of the labour market where workers exercise their choice of “appropriate bargaining unit” either at the enterprise, sectoral or national level. The scope of the representation of the employees and beneficiaries of the collective agreements is directly linked to the hierarchy of the bargaining type (which could be either at the enterprise, sectoral or national level) (Karagöz, 2009). The level of collective agreements determines whether labour is maximised or marginalised in terms of realising their economic, cooperative, and social needs (Dawkins, 2010).

The resultant effect of the decentralisation agenda on the labour market was the weaknesses of workers due to the representation problem and however, strengthens the employers. The flaws served as the basis for the alarming rise in the

number of collective agreements, several strikes, numbers of workers and workplaces involved since the introduction of neo-liberal policies (Yüksel, 2017).

In summary, it is evident that neoliberalism has denied most of the universal personal freedom and the right to a decent and meaningful life. Additionally, it also ultimately comes down to the restoration of the control of a small group of capitalists against the vast majority of the working class. Addressing these challenges call for the need for theoretical and practical exploration in order to devise a socio-economic regime that is compatible with current times. The next section of the chapter focuses on Rawls' theory of justice, which argues that both economic rights of the neglected majority (of workers) should be pursued alongside the entrepreneurial property right of the capitalist who is in the minority.

Rawls' Theory of Justice

Rawls' theory of Justice as the main theory of the study has as a basic axiom that 'justice is the first virtue of social institutions (Leeson, 2007). This means that' social justice serves primarily as a matter of correctly organising society's major institutions termed (by Rawls) as the 'basic structure of society (Croucher, Kelly & Miles, 2012). It can be inferred from Rawls' position that the relevance of this basic structure lies in its ability to determine how basic rights, opportunities, income and wealth are distributed. Rawls' general procedure for determining what is just is what he calls 'reflective equilibrium'. The reflection starts in the form of conceptualising intuitive idea about what justice means to serve as a basis for developing a theory; further reflection shaped intuitivism until intuitivism reflects more objective views, in which case it reaches an equilibrium with theory.

The first principle of the theory of justice is concerned with *fundamental liberty* (Doorn, 2010). Fundamental liberty is a disparity on the liberal principle of liberty. Liberal principle of liberty suggests that one should be free to do whatever one wants so long as it harms no one else. Rawls' fundamental liberties include freedom of association and assembly, of speech, freedom to participate in the political process of conscience and freedom of thought, of the person, from arbitrary arrest and seizure and the right to hold personal property. Thus, for Rawls, these collective rights derive from and are dependent on individual rights.

The second principle of Rawls' theory of justice is, however, based on the attainment of the first, basic right (Costa, 2009). This second principle of justice comprises two components such as the 'difference principle' which posits that inequalities could only be accepted if they benefit the least advantaged, and, secondly, the caveat of equality of opportunity between persons (Doorn, 2010). This second principle concerns primarily with the distribution of goods, including both material wealth and more abstract things such as rights. Collins (2011) posits that social and economic inequalities are to be arranged to benefit the least advantaged and attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

What this later "equal opportunity" clause of the second principle of the theory of justice means, according to Croucher, Kelly and Miles (2012) is that any person with inherent abilities, talents and skills irrespective of his/her background has the same economic opportunities. Economic inequalities in the form of power, authority and income or wealth were, however, permissible only when such inequalities are to benefit the least advantaged.

Costa (2009) was of the view that Rawls's 'justice as fairness' constitutes the protection of workers by granting them a fundamental right to adequate protection against arbitrary interference in the workplace. Thus, a worker turns to damage his or her capacity to develop a sense of self-worth and self-confidence if his basic right is arbitrarily interfered with.

Freeman (2007) contends that the effective exercise of the right to protection against arbitrary interference might require the establishment of agencies such as adjudicative bodies internal to the firm, committees or worker representation rights on the board in order to contest managerial decision-making. Specifically, he envisages that unions can play a role as a body to constrain the scope of managerial discretion in the workplace. Freeman (2007) and Costa (2009), however, failed to recognise that the greatest adjudicative bodies should rather be national and supervisory in order to monitor the workplace relationship between management and workers.

According to Croucher, Kelly and Miles (2012), the ILO's Declarations on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998) can be linked to the Rawls' theory of Justice. ILO refers to four core rights applicable to workers in all countries, regardless of their level of economic development, which was freedom of association and right to effective collective bargaining, freedom from discrimination, effective abolition of child labour and freedom from compulsory or forced labour.

This study is focused on the need for organising among workers for better working conditions, for which the concentration is thus, on the freedom of association (i.e. right to organise) and the right to collective bargaining. Two of the

eight fundamental ILO Conventions encapsulate these rights (right to organize and collective bargaining). These conventions are Conventions 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise) and Convention 98 (Right to Organise and to Collective Bargaining) (Wedderburn, 2007).

The first conventions' position on freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining is rooted in Rawls's theory of justice as a basic right under the first principle. From the Rawls' first principle, workers are free to join unions and have the freedom to associate with whomever they want (unless it is in the pursuit of unlawful activity or conditions of dire emergency). This unlimited freedom of association further implies the right of associations with other associations. Hence, labour unions have the right to have fraternal relations with one another and to communicate with employers and employers' associations.

The second part of ILO's first convention "...effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining", can be traced to the second principle of Rawls theory of justice which borders on the distribution of goods including material wealth and human rights. Meanwhile, the typical opposition to the economic argument against collective bargaining that the principle of collective bargaining twists the price of labour upwards against the unemployed has not been catered for in Rawls second principle.

Meanwhile, other supporters of Rawls's theory of justice, such as Freeman (2007), Cohen (2008) and Costa (2009) have provided some rebuttals to the classical economic argument. They believed that higher wages rather have the propensity to increase the pool of labour available to employers and in turn increase employment through monopsony effects. Thus, the unemployed are

disproportionately likely to enter employment around minimum wages. Croucher, Kelly and Miles (2012) observed that those countries where minimum wages are set by collective bargaining are less likely to experience adverse employment effects.

All these scholars, however, have failed to establish that the collective bargaining serves as a medium through which associations and unions obtained strategic goods such as employment, education, training, income and job security that enable different citizens to pursue a diverse range of options. The scholars only looked at the two concepts of organising and collective bargaining separately; however, in this study, it is pursued as a twin goal as encapsulated in the ILO's convention.

The role of the state in the era where unions contribute to a more egalitarian distribution of primary good, is to promote unions as part of its more general duty to secure justice for its citizens (Scherrer, 2007). Following Scherrer's failure to indicate how states could promote unions, White in Croucher, Kelly and Miles (2012:22) posited that arguably the promotion of unions could be done by the inclusion of "unions in structures of public governance such as skills forums or wage settlement through national income policies".

Wedderburn (2007), based on workers' rights enshrined under the theory of justice identified two benefits of collective organisation of workers/unions. These were (1) unions presence strengthens individual's protection from discriminatory treatment, and (2) collective voice of workers advances individual worker's prospects of voicing any concerns they may have and makes it more difficult for employers to disregard and possibly victimise. Doorn (2010), and Croucher, Kelly

and Miles (2012) instead compared the relevance of the presence of collective organisation to the lack of it. The researchers revealed that unionised workers are more likely to exercise their rights thoroughly and comprehensively than their non-unionised counterparts. Individual rights include legal rights, often too costly and difficult for individual workers to enforce.

The inclusion of labour rights in public governance directly promotes union influence, enhances the public utility of unions, and may also enhance the legitimacy of unions in the eyes of the broader citizenry, thereby encouraging union growth. The scholars, however, indicated that a union to be promoted should be a union which has the capacities for coordinated decision making (Croucher, Kelly and Miles (2012)

Croucher and White (2008) concluded that the presence of workers' organisations/unions in the workplace tends to reduce racial-pay differentials. From a health and safety perspective, the researchers revealed that the presence of unions lower accident rates and ill-health than their non-union equivalents. Thus, collective organisation strengthens individual well-being, rights and equity. Conversely, lack of voice on the part of workers exacerbates existing problems and increases the possibility that they are treated in ways perceived by individuals as unfair.

The promotion of workers' rights in developing countries is always a challenge (Croucher & Cotton, 2009). This is because signatories to ILO's Conventions (Conventions 87 and 98 to enforce workers' rights) from both the developing and developed nations have pledged to give workers the right to form and join organisations of their choice without interference, but the implementation is always flouted in developing economies (Freeman, 2007). These collective

labour rights are also acknowledged by other international instruments, such as the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (*Article 20*), the UN Global Compact 2000 (*Principle 3*) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (*Article 8*) (Davidov & Langille, 2011).

The universal nature of workers' rights has also suffered resistance from many countries with developing countries being the worst culprits (Collins, 2011). It must also be indicated that some developed countries like Canada and the United States have both not ratified ILO Convention 98, Collins (2011) failed to recognise this in his submission of failure of developing economies to implement universal labour rights. Even in the UK, the goals of labour law policy which is dominated by the need to enhance competitiveness has led to comprehensive attacks on the institutions of collective bargaining, with marginal attention being paid to the 'social rights' of workers or the reality of the power of multinationals (Croucher, Kelly & Miles, 2012).

Limited enhancement of worker rights has been achieved amidst international conventions. Indeed, core labour rights remain vulnerable in the face of globalisation, the erosion of the employment relationship itself through various means and the resultant decline in trade unionism (Doorn, 2010). Meanwhile, comparatively, developing countries were more resistant to adopting core labour rights based on the justifications of prior need to achieve economic growth and the 'trickle-down' economics capitalist agenda underpinned by Rostow's five-stage model of development. Collins (2011) argued that developing countries must first develop before they can meaningfully engage in the 'rights' discourse and that the

implementation of labour standards currently encouraged by the ILO is highly premature, counterproductive and even neo-imperialist.

Elliott and Freeman in Croucher, Kelly and Miles (2012:8) challenged the 'trickle-down' effect and argued that there is no contradiction between 'development' and labour rights. Evidence was advanced by the authors to prove that protection of *labour* rights, and legal protection of *property* rights are both contributors to economic growth particularly in developing countries. Croucher, Kelly and Miles opposed the commonly held view of neo-liberal legal theorists that protection of labour rights is negatively associated with economic success when compared to the protection of property rights. That means that there is no 'zero-sum game' in the rights of employers and workers whereby again by one party must necessarily result in a loss by the other.

In conclusion, workers' organisation has been shown to have its theoretical bases as a basic right underpinned by Rawls theory of Justice. Entrepreneurial property rights should not be achieved at the expense of workers' socio-economic rights since the two can be achieved simultaneously based on the theory of justice. Achieving this call for the need to have institutions which will ensure that stakeholders comply with the tenets of regulations ensuring workers (the weakest in the employment relation) are not intimidated and prevented from embarking on the organisation and its associated collective bargaining rights.

The theory of justice argued for the need for employers to respect and accord workers their basic right of organising. The theory argued for internal adjudicative bodies to ensure that employers respect workers' rights of organising to ensure better conditions for themselves. The theory, however, failed to acknowledge the

relevance of external adjudicative bodies that oversee the activities of internal adjudicative bodies and also compel employers to adhere to labour standards. The relevance and roles of the external institutions can be found in institutional theory. It is for this reason that the next section discusses institutional theory and its role in ensuring decent working conditions for workers.

Institutional Theory and Informal Economy

An institution can be described as a framework of rules for achieving specific social or economic goals or a framework within which human interaction takes place (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). Institutions, therefore, reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life. The framework could be formal or informal. The written laws, constitutions, rules and procedures that influence and shape interaction and behaviour constitute the formal institutions or framework (Kingston & Caballero, 2008). The informal framework on the other hand also constitutes the 'unwritten rules' which govern behaviour or informally established procedures, norms, practices and patterns of behaviour, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct (Agyenim, 2011).

Institutions can be distinguished from organisations in that the former refers to 'the rules-of-the-game' and the later also described as 'how we structure ourselves to play' (North, 1990:4). Organisations are described as material entities possessing offices, equipment, budgets, personnel, and legal personality. Organisations have explicit structure and hierarchy of authority that possess enforcement characteristics such as norms, conventions and codes, and rules (Hodgson, 2004). The ordered arrangement of the organisation is usually referred

to as the “organisational structure”. Despite the view that institutions can hardly operate without organisations, Helmke and Levitsky (2004) argued that some institutional arrangements operate effectively in the absence of organisations or with the bare minimum of administrative apparatus.

One of the two ways to consider the link between institutions and organisation is how organisations come into existence and how they evolve which is fundamentally influenced by the institutional framework (Scott, 2008). For example, international agreements have given rise to multilateral organisations such as the UN. The conclusion that can be drawn is that institutions and organisations are inseparable, and together, they, provide a structure for human interactions. Once established, the organisations, in turn, influence how the institutional framework develops. The second view can be seen in Chambers (1999:6) assertion that “established organisations are in fact institutions” which suggest that established organisations can be seen as agents of institutional change.

There are four major approaches to institutional theory, and these are the normative approach, rational choice approach, historical institutionalism and empirical institutionalism (Guy, 2011). These four approaches can further be categorised into two such as macro perspective which is described as the web of social roles and lastly micro-foundations of institutions which also relate to the power of cognitive aspects guiding the behaviour of individuals (Najeeb, 2013).

Despite the different approaches, there are commonalities among the divergent perspectives. It is evident from the discussion of the approaches that structures do matter. At the basic level, these structures referred to formal structures of government. According to Guy (2011), the historical institutionalist version is a

little more complicated, but still has the notion of a formal structure that persists across time. However, the position of March and Olsen (1989) was that structure includes both a formalised organisational apparatus and the pattern of the values that those structures possess and inculcate into new members. For the rational choice advocates, on the other hand, structures are composed of incentives and or constraints on behaviours. Being rational animals' individuals are assumed to respond to those factors in the structure of the institution.

The second unifying factor that can be deduced from the different approaches to institutional analysis is that structures persist while individuals come and go (Guy, 2011). Therefore, even though individuals appear to be the primary of institutions, the institutions in question do appear to enjoy some existence outside of those individuals. The third commonality from the debate on the institutional approaches is that structures (institutions) create greater regularity of human behaviour that would otherwise exist.

Another characteristic of institutions that is missing among the three commonalities pointed out so far is that endogenous and exogenous forces continuously modify or change institutions (King, 1997). Institutions take on their independent form once created and mediate between the preferences of the actors that created them and the policy process and outcomes on the other hand (Sayilar, 2009). Institutions determine what is appropriate in a given situation and when dealing with matters involving human/environment relations, it is referred to as environmental or resource regimes (Agyenim, 2011). There are five different environmental/ resource regimes at different levels of social organisation such as local institutions, sub-national institutions, national institutions, regional

institutions, and global institutions. The differences in these institutions are dependent on the geographical domain, functional scope, the structure of administrative organisations among others.

Institutional Changes

It can be deduced from the discussion so far that two main factors are contributing to institutional change and these are exogenous causes and endogenous causes (Kingston & Caballero, 2008). The exogenous restriction shifts as the primary source of stimulus for institutional change. Endogenous factors including learning and structural features within institutions can also lead to institutional change (Kaufman, 2011). Theories that explained institutional change could be categorised into evolutionary theories (explaining the emergence of social conventions), market-based theories (emphasising institutional selection through competition), and lastly bargaining theories-explaining institutions in terms of asymmetries of power (Agyenim, 2011)

The evolutionary theories explain institutional change and survival in terms of social, cultural (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004), and economic factors. In the evolutionary theories, new rules, whether randomly or deliberately generated, undergo a decentralised selection process, by which some institutions persist, while other (unsuccessful) institutions die out (Scott, 2008). The idea of evolutionary pressure eliminating undesirable institutions is, however, opposed to attempts to design institutions being guided by consistent ideological principles (Kingston & Caballero, 2008).

The market-based theories (e.g. public choice theory and transaction cost theory) consider institutional change as endogenous to the economic process itself. They predict that institutional changes occur whenever their benefits exceed costs (King, 1997). As long as the beneficiaries of institutional change cannot commit to compensate the losers, those with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo may be able to block beneficial change.

The bargaining theories focus on the distributional consequences of institutions relying heavily on the role of political and social bargaining as a mechanism of institutional change. Different actors may favour the emergence of different rules at the individual levels before the final establishment of the rule that governs (Kingston & Caballero, 2008). Therefore, if some kinds of actors have higher bargaining power than others (example employers over workers), that this may systematically affect the kind of rule that ultimately becomes widely used by the society (Agyenim, 2011).

From the discussion, though formal rules can give "power" to specific groups in society, however, the ability to withdraw consent in the form of organised collective action or decentralised action by a weaker individual worker could also lead to an institutional change. Thus, "individual weak workers" may join an association of other workers to drive home an institutional change. It is an indication that though workers may be considered as weak as compared to the power of the employer in terms of bargaining, their (workers) weakness does not perpetually make them passive but instead can make them active agents (upon consciousness) for institutional change.

Role of Institutions and Factors that Influence the Performance of Institutions

The integral roles of institutions in terms of constraining and liberating individuals and group action cannot be overemphasised. Apart from this general role, there are specific roles that institutions play in society. First among these roles is that institutions bring about stability. Though institutions themselves also change, the changes are gradual over time and do not downplay its ability to ensure stability in society. Institutions continue to change the choices available to individuals as a result of changes in the priorities of society to ensure stability in society (Kaufman, 2011).

The second role of institutions is their ability to coordinate people to form expectations for dealing with others. Thus, institutions reduce uncertainty through the provision of structure to everyday life (North, 1990). Other roles of institutions are that institutions shape the actions of individuals and sometimes are affected by collective and individual choices (King, 1997). Institutions by undertaking the same activity over and over, succeed in reducing the transaction costs. Institutions also promote compliance by building trust and creating enforcement mechanisms in circumstances where trust is weak or absent” (Agyenim, 2011).

The overall aim of the existence of institutions can be said to enhance performance. However, several factors determine the performance of institutions and key among these factors is the cost of enforcement. Thus, the lower transactional cost can be used as a comparative factor to determine which of these institutions is performing well. How well-set rules are monitored and enforced also serve as another factor that influences institutional performance (North, 1990).

Jurisdictions, where credible mechanisms exist for establishing, monitoring and enforcing priorities, can lead to the high performance of institutions (Najeeb, 2013). Additionally, there is a need for a credible mechanism for the distribution of financial and human resources are necessary to get institutions right for sustainable development (Guy, 2011). For example, it will be very challenging for labour institutions to enforce labour laws for better working conditions without the credible and sustainable mechanism of resources distributions.

Apart from the credible mechanism, the tendency of informal rules overriding formal rules can also challenge the ability of institutions to enforce formal rules which subsequently affect performance. This calls for separating the rules from the players. The combination of extra-institutional factors, such as strategies, skills, knowledge, and coordination are essential for excellent performance (Majani, 2000). This calls for continuous investment in the people operating these institutions to enhance their capacity and competencies for institutional performance in a globalised world. The influence of endogenous and exogenous factors on the performance of institutions suggests that a well-performing institution today cannot guarantee for future performance of the same institution (Agyenim, 2011).

Institutional interplay fit and scales also play an instrumental role in determining the performance of institutions. “The hierarchic, nested and complementary features of institutions suggest that structural and functional linkages among institutional components influence performance” (Agyenim-Boateng, 2011: 86). Thus, the strength of structural and functional linkages among

the individual institutional components is an essential determinant of the performance of institutions.

The two theories-Rawls theory of justice and institutional theory suggest the need for internal and external adjudicative bodies to ensure that labour rights are respected by employers. These two theories assumed that challenges confronting workers organisation emanate mainly from the excessive power of the employer. Thus, intragroup forces or factors that militate against workers organisations seemed not addressed by the two theories. Meanwhile, the growth and sustainability of workers organisations could be influenced by endogenous factors to workers' organisations. It is for this reason that the next section reviews the theory of collective action.

Theory of Collective Action

Labour unions have conventionally served as organisers of workers who, before they can become members of unions, are already members/employees of capitalist enterprises. Thus, unions are "secondary" organisers and capitalist functions as primary organisers. Employers through contract acquire labour first and subsequently establish the exchange relationship between itself and labour (Chwe, 1999). Meanwhile, the labour that workers sell to the capitalist is not physically separable from the bearer of the labour-power (although his labour legally "belongs" to the capitalist). The aspiration, experiences, interests, and subjective willingness of labour to work will always influence the actual labour process (Kirdina, 2015).

Therefore, both "partners" of the exchange try to improve their respective positions by resorting to a wide variety of positive and negative sanctions. This is the only way in which the "equivalence" of a certain amount of labour and a specific wage is established, challenged, and re-established (Rowe, 2013). Meanwhile, there is a minimal scope of choice for the individual worker who is atomized and divided by competition against the capitalist or employer. Workers at best can associate in order to compensate for the power advantage that capital has partly over them. This serves as the genesis of collective action or identity for labour (Talmud, 2013). In the next section, I will present the principles of the theory of collective action with regards to the kind of interest unions organise, how membership of unions is maximised of membership and challenges associated with organising by unions.

The first principle of the theory of collective action of concern to this study is interest organised by trade unions. There is always the argument about whether labour really organises labour, workers or their interest. It must be noted that a worker is not only subject and object of the exchange of labour-power, but also consumers of the product of labour-power as well as inhabitants of the social and natural environment that is affected by the impact of capital industrialisation (Chwe, 1999; Czech, 2016)

This study takes the position that unions organise the interest of workers and that serves as the focus of discussion of the theory of collective action. This position is based on the view of Olson (1965) that organising takes care of not only material rewards but also job satisfaction, health, leisure time, and continuity of employment. Claus and Helmut (1980) rather categorised the interest of group members into three major forms: wage, employment security, and interest in

working conditions. Recently Kirdina (2015) added that the interest of groups is not limited to economic benefits but also include the desire to win prestige, respect, friendship, and to achieve other social and psychological objectives.

It can, therefore, be conveniently inferred from Olson's position that worker organisations are confronted with the task of organising the entire spectrum of needs that people have when they are employed as wage workers. Meanwhile, Claus and Helmut (1980) and Rowe (2013) were of the view that the multitude of needs of workers to be organised is not only comparatively more difficult to organize for quantitative reasons, but also because there is no common denominator to which all these heterogeneous and often conflicting needs can be reduced to "optimize" demands and tactics (Grodzicki, 2015).

The ability of workers' organisation to mobilise sanctions helps groups to realise their 'interests'. The strike is the ultimate sanction that unions can mobilise (Colander, 2008). Meanwhile, it can be argued that even most bureaucratic unions' leadership is not able to use sanctions at their discretion. Instead, the sanctioning potential in worker associations becomes effective only through the organised members and their explicitly coordinated action (Douglas, 2012). It can be inferred that the rank and file of members of a group/association would thus seem to be the 'top executives' in disguise as far as sanctions are concerned.

Common interests of members thus, has emerged as the basis for every individual in a group to act in favour of that group (Olson, 1965) which agrees with the earlier position of Schattschneider (1960) and Douglas (2012) that many economists of diverse methodological and ideological traditions agree that individual's contribution to a group is based on their common interest of the group.

This assertion is further grounded in Aristotle's philosophical statement that men journey together with a view to particular advantage, and by way of providing a particular thing needed for life, for the sake of the general advantages that come with it (Trumbull, 2012). This statement suggests that people would join groups that espouse their interest.

A twist to workers organisation has been the conclusion that political triumphs of labour unions were due to coercion either granted by state legislation or obtained by sheer violence (Claus, Helmut, 1980; Olson, 1965). This means that when the size of unions depended only on voluntary cooperation and membership of workers, their power was usually insufficient to pursue collective goals. It was the coercion that gave them enough power to bargain with employers. It can be contested that this could amount to an imposition of political forms upon worker associations and a limitation of either the types and objects of demands that they are legitimately allowed to make and or the tactics that they are permitted to employ in struggles for these demands. The common denominator of these measures is the attempt to push back the dialogical pattern of collective action and to impose the 'monological' pattern as the dominant one.

As much as the solidarity, imposition or interference in the union affairs by political powers enhances the power and the bargaining fortune of labour and trade unions with their employers, it could warrant some other negative implications for labour. The implication is that countries and governments who could not secure the state support due to weak institutions could end up emboldening the structural power of capitalist making labour more vulnerable than before. The self-capacity of the union could also suffer after the withdrawal of state support. This would

further influence the growth of unions. This could also depend on the stage of the evolution of the union in its developmental process to become a force to reckon with.

In terms of the evolution of collective action (Olson, 1965; Trumbull, 2012), the first stage represents the formative period of a working-class organisation. The first stage or collective identity is characterised by the formation of collective identity, cultivation of the members' "willingness to act", relatively small size, militant conflict, and low degree of bureaucratisation. At this stage, the dialogical pattern of collective action is dominant (Claus & Helmut, 1980; Kay, 2011). The second stage of the evolution of the collective action of workers is also characterised by the dilemma between dialogical and 'monological' patterns. The organisation has become strong enough in the second stage to derive some power over its environment. There will be intense pressure towards a structural transformation of the organisation itself. This transformation can result in a return to stage one, which is likely only under contextual conditions of a high level of politicisation of class struggle.

The third stage of the evolution of collective action is where transformation occurs such that attempts are made to make the organisation's survival as independent as possible of the motivation, the solidarity, and the "willingness to act" of the members (Bollier & Helfrich, 2012). These are achieved by substituting external guarantees of survival for those internal ones that the workers' organisation depends on for its members. Simultaneously, the internal structure of the organisation will be transformed into one that maximises the independence of the organisation's functionaries from the collective expression of will and activity of

members (Rowe, 2013). This can be accomplished by the bureaucratisation and professionalisation of internal decision making on the one hand and by the individualisation of members. The last stage is reached when the long-term costs of opportunism become manifest, in response to which a new phase of mobilisation and activation of members becomes necessary in order to defend both the survival and the chances of success of the organisation (Kirdina, 2015). This return to a type of collective action in which the members' "willingness to act" is of great importance.

Another principle of Olson's collective action theory is the maximisation of membership in terms of the ratio of actual to potential membership. This is needed to maximise the resources that are available to the organisation, and it supposedly minimises internal competition among those who are members (Czech, 2016), making union's size to align with union's strength with an inverse U-curve. Despite this relevance of membership drive for associations by Olson, he failed to recognise that increase membership presents some level of a dilemma of optimum size beyond which union power could decrease. Members in too large a group can become apathetic.

It can be argued that small and large groups have diverse competencies to achieve their goals. The former does have specific characteristics that allow them to organize quite smoothly and pursue a common goal, which the latter does not possess readily (Douglas, 2012). The political and axiological consequences in terms of social loafing or free-riding associated with the supply of public goods for coercion becomes obvious. In a society that values individual freedom over anything else, the supply of public goods would be disproportionately low assuming

the consistency of social values and policy (Talmud, 2013). Meanwhile, it must be contested here that the interests of small groups which organize freely could then be met at the expense of the whole society, which in the long run turn freedom into a meaningless slogan.

It has been observed that everyone in a group places different importance on the collective good pursued by his group and that could account for the difficulty in analysing the relationship between group size and the behaviour of individual group members (Bollier & Helfrich, 2012). Additionally, all groups face different cost functions in pursuing a collective good. The rising total cost function is one commonality among elements of groups (Kay, 2011). That is the more the collective good is taken, the higher the total costs may accrue to the group. Undoubtedly, it is also a fact that there will be significant initial or fixed costs. Sometimes a group must set up a formal organisation before it can obtain a collective good, and the cost of establishing an organisation entails that the first unit of a collective good obtained will be relatively expensive (Rowe, 2013).

In large groups, members typically assume that their efforts are negligible or infinitesimal in making any difference to the group's outcome. The group's decision, however, will be binding on the individual no matter how much or how little effort he puts into studying the issues (Axelrod, 1984). Accordingly, the typical participant may not take the trouble to study the issues as carefully as he would have if he had been able to decide by himself (Chwe, 1999).

Thus, the contribution that each member will be seen to be making toward achieving or improving these public goods will become smaller as the group's membership increases (Agrawal & Goyal, 2001). It is for these reasons, among

others, that organisations so often turn to the small group committees, subcommittees, and small leadership groups, which turn to play crucial roles (Talmud, 2013).

Arguments based on the importance of the theory of collective action indicated that labour unions or worker associations are thought to have common goals of achieving higher wages and better working conditions for their members. Organisations can, therefore, perform a function when there are common or group interests, and through organisations often also serve purely personal, individual interests, their characteristic and primary function is to advance the common interests of groups of individuals (Trumbull, 2012).

Each member of any worker organisation has a personal interest within the collective interest of the group to secure higher wages for members (Abreu, 1988; Douglas, 2012). Labour unions, thus, serve as a conduit for organisations through which better working conditions could be achieved for workers (Rowe 2013). This further supports the view inferred from Olson's conclusion in the theory of collective action that people face severe difficulties in organising themselves (Grodzicki, 2015). This view of Olson, however, lacks contextual validity since several informal workers though have not been contacted by the traditional trade unions have been able to organise themselves in developing economies like Ghana and others (Britwum & Akorsu, 2017).

The discussion so far depicts the relationship between trade unions (bigger or larger groups) and other informal worker organisations such as worker association and cooperatives (smaller groups). It can be deduced from the principles of the theory of collective action that if individual informal workers perceive that

their personal or individual concerns will not be addressed as part of the collective good of the larger group, but the social functional cost will be partly born by him/her, then their desire to quit a larger group becomes obvious. The self-withdrawn member has the propensity to become a strong advocate against the group's future membership drive. Thus, the formation of informal worker groups seems evident in this regard since group size affects group cohesion. The smaller worker group will allow any worker to also achieve better identity, recognition and immediate collective benefits and avoidance of social loafing on the part of the group among others. The next theory examines the role of institutions in ensuring decent working condition for informal workers since the decent work framework by ILO is an institutional arrangement.

Chapter Summary

The four theories reviewed in this chapter are the theory of neoliberalism, Rawls's theory of justice, institutional theory and the theory of collective action. The theory of neo-liberalism has highlighted the effect of neoliberal policies on formal employment resulting in informal employment such as informal stone quarry activities. The Rawls' theory of justice has also been used to argue that worker organisations and collective bargaining as encapsulated in ILOs conventions numbered 87 and 98 are fundamental socio-economic right for workers. The theory of justice also posits that there is a need for internal adjudicative bodies to ensure employers respect this fundamental socio-economic right of labour.

The institutional theory was also to argue and emphasise that strong external (not only internal) adjudicative bodies/institutions and not strong persons are needed to ensure that labour laws are adhered to ensure decent working conditions for informal workers. Through the theory of collective action, it has also been established that as trade unions grow in terms of membership, managing the diverse individual members' interest and group's goal becomes a challenge. This explains why workers break away from unions and affect subsequent membership drive of unions.

The next chapter, which also serves as additional literature review chapter focuses on crucial ILO pillars of decent work agenda. The chapter reviews literature with regards indicators of the four pillars of the decent work concept. The chapter also discusses the labour standards and institutions for ensuring workers fundamental rights of organising is respected by employers.

CHAPTER THREE

ILO'S DECENT WORK AGENDA AND LABOUR STANDARDS

Introduction

This section examines the ILO's decent work agenda with regards to the four strategic goals and the regulatory regimes on labour standards from international and national perspectives. The international labour standards by ILO and those of Ghana are examined in this section. Though the socio-economic challenges with stone quarrying activities are very much linked to the environment and labour, the environmental perspective would be left out in the discussion because of the focus of this study on labour and organising among workers. Thus, in this section of the study, the focus is on reviewing labour laws that regulate informal stone quarry workers.

Decent Work Concept/Agenda

Currently, the decent work agenda of the ILO has become pertinent in current conceptual debates in labour market analysis and is also shaping the global development agenda called Sustainable Development Goal until 2030 (UNDP, 2015). The decent work concept highlights the importance of labour standards in ensuring improvement in the lives of humans.

All types of workers and employers in the formal and the informal labour markets are expected to benefit from the ILO's goal of promoting opportunities for women and men to obtain decent and productive work (ILO, 2010). The relevance of the decent work concept reflects in ILO's statement:

“It is in the informal economy and among the poor that the needs are greatest. If we claim universality (that) ‘all those who work have rights at work’ – then we are obliged to tackle these issues (ILO, 2013:11)”.

ILO defines a decent work agenda/concept as opportunities for men and women to obtain decent work and productive work under the conditions of freedom, security, equity, and human dignity. Decent work concept with its four pillars (such as employment, rights at work, social protection and social dialogue) are needed to be given attention to be able to attain progress in human development (ILO. 2002).

Decent Work has become an internationally accepted reference point and is recognised not only as an end but as an essential means of achieving global development goals, including poverty eradication (ILO, 2015). The many characteristics discussed so far are clear indications and or justification for the relevance of the decent work agenda for the informal sector. All the four pillars of decent work such as employment, social dialogue, social protection and workers’ rights are closely linked with activities in the informal economy. The next section looks at how these four pillars relate to the informal economy.

Reproductive/Remunerative Employment as Decent Work Pillar

The need to expand opportunities for people to find productive work and earn a decent livelihood is the first pillar of the decent work agenda and informality (ILO, 2002). Decent incomes from quality work can be achieved through inputs that transform the informal economy actors’ capacity to find productive opportunities. These inputs include skills training, financial services, market

information and policies that open the space for the economic activities of the poor, utilise their assets and expand their markets (Ghai, 2001). Employment creation plays a pivotal role in poverty reduction and has clear links with economic growth, private sector development and trade policies

The incidence of formal employment is an indicator of employment quality for a good reason. Most formal sector jobs have some degree of protection associated with them with wages set well above the poverty line (Stuart & Kirsten, 2010). However, in considering both the quantity and quality of all employment then there is the need to pay attention both those who enjoy decent jobs and those who do not enjoy decent work even in the formal economy. Those who do not enjoy decent work are a significant percentage of workforces in both developing and developed country (ILO, 2013). The link between social well-being and work cannot be underestimated in this regard. That is, work is supposed to generate income in a commoditised economy, and revenue is a critical means of attaining well-being.

Though the category of the informal sector employment is sometimes based on nebulous definitions, the informal economy occasionally can also include relatively few prosperous people. The reason being that some self-employed are part of informal sectors, and many of these are non-poor. The level of informality is very high in developing countries and also exist in developed countries.

The relationship between the working poor as a percentage of the employed and national income also play a vital role in measuring remunerative employment as the first pillar of the decent work agenda (Stuart & Kirsten, 2010). In developing countries where effective social insurance systems do not exist, the poor work to

support themselves and their families (ILO, 2012). The advantage of using the working poor rate over the informal urban employment category is that it focuses on the poor and applies to both urban and rural areas. The working poor constitute around 25 per cent of the employed labour force in developing countries. About 95 per cent of *the* working poor of the developing world live in low-income countries. Their populations in low-income countries have increased, while these have declined in the middle-income countries (Maridadi, 2013). It calls for focus for employment policy target in both the short and long term.

Although the bulk of the efforts in addressing the problem of the working poor are likely to come initially from the expenditure side of a country's budget, there must be a deliberate attempt at to include the working poor in the growth process itself as opposed to them just being second-round beneficiaries of growth multipliers. Thus, on the growth side, some attempt must also be made to focus on improving the productivity of the working poor. Both redistributive credits with peer monitoring as well as direct enhancement of productivity are ways to do this at the micro and community level (Stuart & Kirsten, 2010).

Social Security as a Decent Work Pillar

Social security as a pillar of decent work agenda refers to set of public measures that society provides for its members to protect them against economic and social distress that would be caused by the absence of a substantial reduction of income from work (ILO, 2010). The protection can be against contingencies like employment, unemployment, injury sickness, old age, maternity, invalidity, and death of the breadwinner. The measures also include the provision of health care;

and, the provision of benefits for families with children (Bonilla & Gruat, 2003). Indicators of social protection include social cash transfers (regular cash payments by governments, donors or NGOs to individuals or households), pensions; workers' compensation for injured workers; feeding programmes; public works programmes; social security or unemployment benefits; and healthcare provision (ILO, 2011).

Social protection can be very relevant to the informal economy in terms of the protection against vulnerabilities. The need to address the contingencies that take people out of work, whether these arise from unemployment, loss of livelihood, maternity, sickness or old age is prevalent in the informal sector. Informality, as far as social protection is concerned, occurs when social security systems are out of reach to certain types of workers and leave entrepreneurs vulnerable to risks of sudden impoverishment; and when occupational safety and health advisory services do not extend beyond formal enterprises (Maridadi, 2013).

Social protection can be said to have positive effects on growth by supporting access to education and health, protecting assets to help people earn an income, encouraging risk-taking as well as encouraging participation in labour markets minimizing the social pain of economic transition and enhancing social cohesion (UNDP, 2015). Extending social protection programmes has been seen as a particularly powerful tool for responding to the poverty implications of the global economic crisis (World Bank, 2014).

It is important to note that for decent work concept to attain universal coverage, there must be social protection mechanisms that covers all workers, particularly the working poor. This is more important for developing economies, given that social insurance is most at times the preserved of workers in the formal

sector and social transfers are often targeted at people who are outside the labour market (Stuart & Kirsten, 2010). It is necessary to ensure that social protection schemes reach vulnerable informal sector workers who almost always left out by social protection policies.

Workers' Right as a Decent Work Pillar

The third dimension of decent work framework is workers' rights at work irrespective of where they work. Workers' rights measures compliance with the fundamental principles and rights at work enshrined in ILO conventions ratified by individual states. These have been expressed in the ILO's core labour standards, namely as the freedom from forced labour, freedom from discrimination, and freedom from child labour.

The ILO calls for improvements in the conditions in which work is carried out. That is, whether work is occurring in the formal or the informal economy, whether at home, in the community or the voluntary sector, whether workers are organized or not. In terms of rights, more abuse can be found among populations that are not protected by labour legislation, where these workers lack access to a dispute settlement mechanisms and cannot form legally recognised workers' associations (ILO, 2012, 2015).

One critical aspect of the work rights dimension is the equality of overall access to work for women. However, gender biases are reflected in all dimensions. An even more significant issue related to gender inequality is reflected in the social sphere where it pertains to the structure of the family itself. This lack of rights usually reinforces obstacles to equality of access for women. Active social biases

existing in education are revealed acutely in the freedom of women to seek employment outside the space of the family. This unfreedom has multiplicative effects on their empowerment as social beings, as well as the setting of welfare priorities within the household.

Closely related to inequality are women right to maternity leave. Maternity leave remains a reproductive right that enables a pregnant female worker to spend at least twelve/fourteen weeks after delivering. Both male and female workers are also entitled to annual leave not less than fifteen working days. Other leave that workers have the right to enjoy is sick leave depending on the gravity of the sickness.

Another indicator of workers right, which is child labour is located both in the realm of rights at work and is an independent human rights issue. Working children tend to lose the opportunity for education and restrict building their capacities for a future as adults. They can also be subject to forms of work that are directly hazardous to their well-being. Therefore, the larger societal aim in this context is appropriately the right of children to be educated unhindered. Child labour can obstruct that goal. Ultimately children ought not to be working unless that work is non-damaging and demonstrably a part of their education itself.

Other important indicators of the right of workers include the right to the safe working environment or non-threatening working environment. Both the responsibility of the employer which also automatically becomes the right of the worker. The employer thus is obliged to supply workers with protective clothing and workers are also mandated to use the protective clothing provided for their safety. There is widespread recognition that poverty can be reduced drastically if

rights are respected Economies of countries thus depend upon fundamental labour rights, as does the development of human capital necessary for sustained growth.

Social Dialogue as a Decent Work Pillar

Social dialogue is the fourth dimension which allows workers to exercise their rights to present their views, protect their interests and welfare as well as to engage in discussions to negotiate work-related matters with employers and authorities (ILO, 2006). The fourth decent work pillar relates to social dialogue between employers and workers, governments, as a means of achieving wider input into and understanding and acceptance of social and economic policies as well as greater democratisation.

Right to association and social dialogue are the cornerstones of good democratic governance in the labour market. Informality and segregation from social dialogue processes occur when informal economy actors are unable to organise and articulate their needs and interests. Informality and exclusion can arise when organisations formed among workers and own-account workers are not recognised but are suppressed (Gbadebo, Kehinde & Adedeji, 2012). Informal workers can be excluded from social dialogue when avenues of participation are captured by overriding benefits to the exclusion of workers and the poor; and when the tripartite formations are not inclusive of specific categories of workers and entrepreneurs. Social dialogue, however, can serve as a conduit for resolving probable conflicts of interest over economic and social policies in the organisational framework. It can promote equity, efficiency and adjustment and hence sustain economic progress (ILO, 2013).

According to Fajana (2011), social dialogue concerning crucial issues such as terms and conditions of employment, over the functioning of the enterprise, and social and economic policy takes place at either the enterprise or national levels. Clearly, the right to freedom and association is closely linked to social dialogue (Gbadegbo, Kehinde & Adedeji, 2012).

For most economic agents, the social dialogue closest to them takes place in their immediate working environment. That is, social dialogue takes place among the workers and between their representative associations and the representatives of the groups for which they work. In most countries, such discourse assumes the form of collective bargaining between unions and employers' organisations, whether at the enterprise, organisational or national level, irrespective of whether the enterprise is private, corporative or state-owned (ILO, 2002).

Organising can lead to variations in the status of informal workers from social and economic exclusion to acknowledgement of their voice and giving them broader representation. Informal workers can be united under the umbrella of different forms of workers' organisations, such as associations, cooperatives and trade unions. Workers can use different methods to organise themselves (Ahn, 2008).

Workers' organising or social dialogue could be a technique for mobilising the unorganised groups such as youth, women and migrant workers because trade unions are an instrument to provide their members with education, collective bargaining, vocational training, legal aid, rights-based approaches and community mobilisation. A sense of working-class consciousness and solidarity can be created

to reflect their aspirations for improving working conditions and protecting labour rights (Maridadi, 2013).

Although organising informal workers has an enduring union investment for increasing membership, which involves a massive amount of financial and human resources as well as organisational mobilisation and leadership commitment. Nevertheless, once unionised, informal workers can leverage their voice and representation to policy-making and bipartite and tripartite dialogue (Ahn, 2008).

In conclusion, it is clear that organising as decent work pillar can be an essential conduit for increasing unions' members. It can serve as a cornerstone for uniting the unorganised under diverse forms of workers' organisations. Organising is also a tool for mobilising the poor to address workplace-level pitfalls. Additionally, organising promotes the goal of decent work of the ILO, which strives for inclusive poverty reduction, economic development, and social justice, including respect for freedom of association and collective bargaining, social safety nets and eradication of discrimination (Ahn, 2008).

Thus, organising is the only pillar that affords informal workers collectivism or collective power to challenge the structural power invested in the employer in every employment relationship. All the other three pillars of decent work agenda (employment, rights at work, social protection) depend so much on the labour law and regulatory agencies for the protection of vulnerable informal workers. Meanwhile, the labour laws are hardly complied with by employers, and the regulatory agencies are mostly not resourced to be able to carry out their mandate.

This could explain why despite previous approaches to studying decent work concept (Ghai, 2001; ILO, 2002; Maridadi, 2013) with parallel attention to the four strategic goals, yet decent work deficits still prevail in the informal economy. Thus, this study argues that organising can serve as a catalyst for achieving decent work for all the other three decent work pillars due to the strategic position and opportunities it offers informal workers.

International Labour Standards Ratified by Ghana

Ghana under the convention people's party joined the ILO in 1957 and immediately ratified many of the international labour standards including core labour standards that seek to promote workers' rights in terms of right to collective bargaining (Convention number 98), freedom to form and join unions (Convention number 87) and conventions numbered 29 and 105 which were on abolition of forced labour.

Additionally, several other ILO Conventions aimed at promoting workers welfare and industrial harmony was equally ratified. These conventions included Conventions on hours of work in the industry, working environment, minimum wage fixing, weekly rest, social policy, child labour, employment services night work by women, underground work by women labour inspection, and labour administration, among others. Among all the 51 ILO Conventions ratified by Ghana as of 2019, all the eight fundamentals conventions, two out of four priority governance convention, 41 out of 177 technical conventions were ratified. Out of 51 Conventions ratified by Ghana, of which 37 are in force, 10 Conventions have been denounced; 4 instruments abrogated; none have been ratified in the past 12

months (ILO, 2019). The next section discusses specific sections of the Ghana labour standards as enshrined in the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) in relation to the ILO conventions.

Working Conditions and the Ghana Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651)

The discussion in this section focuses mainly on specific sections of the Labour Act, 2003 of Ghana (Act 651) on working conditions of workers and how such provisions relate to the ILO conventions. The reason for this choice is that it is more recent and has some provisions on both working conditions and worker organisations, which is the focus of the study. The Labour Act has also come to replace several other regulations on labour. These were the Labour (Amendment) Decree, 1967, 1969, 1973 and 1976; Industrial Relation Act 1965; NLCD 110; and Trade Union Ordinance (Cap 91) among others. When necessary, sections from the workmen compensation act and the constitution of Ghana were brought to support and strengthen the argument of this study in this section. Specific issues addressed in this section include hours of work, health and safety of the working environment, leaves, forced labour, minimum wage and age and rest period among others.

Elimination of Forced and Compulsory Labour

The Ghana Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), section 117 described forced and compulsory labour as “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and from which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily”. This section of the labour law is in line with two ILO conventions; convention number 29 of 1930 on forced labour and convention number 105 of

1957 on the abolition of forced labour. These were ratified in Ghana on May 20, 1957, and December 15, 1958, respectively (Hodges & Baah, 2006).

Hours of Work

Hours of work is covered under sections 33 to 39 of the Labour Act. The act stipulates a maximum of 8 hours a day or 40 hours a week, except in cases expressly noted in the Act as the hours of work. Though the Act made provision for paid overtime, it also permits unpaid overtime in certain exceptional cases such as circumstances relating to accident threatening human lives or the very existence of the undertaking (Akorsu, 2010).

Hours of work (industry & commerce and offices) is encapsulated in ILO convention number 1 (1919) and number 30 (1930). Ghana ratified these two non-core conventions on July 19, 1973. It can be inferred from the provisions that the Act grants concessions for certain kinds of work that require compulsory overtime in order to be viable and or in order to prevent or avoid a threat to life and property. Apart from these exceptions, compelling a worker to engage in overtime work against his/her will is prohibited, and all overtime work is to be duly paid for as a matter of statutory requirement and not at the discretion of the employer. Section 44 of Act 651 however, exempted domestic and task workers from the 8 hours a day or 40 hours a week maximum (Ghana Labour Act, 2003).

Rest Period

Closely related to hours of work is rest period which is captured under section 40 of the Act. Thus, provisions are made for workers to enjoy daily, weekly

and annual periodic rests from work. Workers in continuous workdays are entitled to a 30 minutes rest period counted as regular hours of work. However, in a situation where the regular hours of work are split into two, the worker is entitled to the break period not less than one-hour duration which should not be counted as part of the regular work hours. Section 40 of the Act, (Act 651) also enjoins workers to have the right to a continuous daily rest period of at least 12 hours between 2 consecutive workdays, and a weekly rest period of 48 consecutive hours in every seven days of regular working hours (Hodges & Baah, 2006).

Minimum Wage

The national daily minimum wage was GH¢ 9.68 or \$ 2.0979 (i.e. \$1= GH¢ 4.63 as at December 2018). The national minimum wage is reviewed annually to cater for inflation rates among other factors. Once fixed and announced, all employers are expected to comply with mandatorily. The national minimum wage is fixed by the National Tripartite Committee and serves as the basis for decentralized bargaining and adjustment in the formal sector wages through CBAs. The current composition of the NTC is five representatives each from organised labour, the employers' association and government.

The minister for employment and social welfare is the convener and chair of the committee. The ILO convention number 26 on minimum wage fixing ratified by Ghana in 1928 compels the government of Ghana to create and maintain machinery through which minimum wages could be fixed for the protection of vulnerable groups of wage earners. In 1970, the ILO introduced convention number

131 on minimum wage fixing as a compliment especially for developing countries (Akorsu, 2010).

Minimum Age and Protection of young Workers

The Labour Act pegged the minimum legal age of entering the labour market at 16 years. Sections 58 to 61 of the Labour Act specifically, exclude the employment of young persons in hazardous work. Hazardous work was defined to include work likely to expose a person to physical or moral danger. The exact types of work to be classified under hazardous work were left to the discretionary power of the Minister for Labour and Employment (Ghana Labour Act, 2003). That notwithstanding, Section 58 (3) specifically forbids an employer from employing a young person (age above 18 but less than 21) in underground mine work. The employer must keep a register of young persons employed in undertakings. ILO's convention number 138 of 1973 on minimum age and convention number 182 of 1999 on and worst form of child labour seeks to achieve the elimination of child labour. Ghana ratifies convention number 182 and 138 in 2000 and 2011 respectively. Convention 138 however, served as the most recent core convention to be ratified by Ghana (Hodges & Baah, 2006).

Occupational Health and Safety

Occupational Health and Safety convention which is ILO convention number 155 is a non-core convention adopted by the ILO in 1981 but has not yet been ratified by Ghana. However, section 118 through to 121 of the Labour Act 2003, stipulates that an employer must ensure that every worker employed by him or her works under satisfactory, safe and healthy conditions among others. Section

118 (3) also obliged every worker to use the safety appliances, firefighting equipment and personal protective equipment provided by the employer in compliance with the employer's instructions. Section 120 of the Act also requires an employer to inform as soon as practicable and not later than seven days from the date of the occurrence to the right government agency, occupational accidents and diseases which occur in the workplace (Akorsu, 2010).

Leaves

Sections 20 to 32 cover annual leave with pay and a worker is entitled to a minimum leave of 15 working days in every calendar year of continuous service, deemed to mean not less than 200 days in the particular year. Closely related to annual leave is maternity leave captured under Section 57 which grants at least 12 weeks, with extensions in certain circumstances, and nursing pauses of one hour during the working hours for women to nurse their babies up to the babies the first year of age. Section 57(8) forbids an employer from dismissing a woman because of her absence from work on maternity leave (Ghana Labour Act, 2003).

Contract of Employment (Including Termination of Employment)

A written contract (signed by both parties) of employment is required under section 12 of the Act for work done for a period of 6 months or several working days equivalent to 6 months or more within a year. The contract shall express in clear terms the rights and duties of the parties. Schedule 1 of the Act named the required elements that such written contract should include such as names of parties, job title, date of the first appointment, hours of work, holidays, sickness,

pay (including overtime rates) and work-related injury entitlements. Other relevant particulars are social security or pension scheme, termination notice and disciplinary rules/grievances (Hodges & Baah, 2006).

Part X of the Labour Act which captures a special provision for temporary and casual workers stipulates that a contract of employment for a casual worker need not be in writing; and indicate that casuals have rights to minimum remuneration for each day worked, overtime and medical facilities. Temporary workers are entitled to the Act's minimal in respect of minimum wage, hours of work, rest periods, paid public holidays, night work and sick leave, irrespective of whatever terms agreed by the parties (Akorsu, 2010).

Organising

Workers' right to organize or form/join a trade union has been guaranteed in the 1992 constitution of Ghana. Section 24 of the constitution stipulates that: Every person has the right to work under satisfactory, safe and healthy conditions, and shall receive equal pay for equal work without distinction of any kind. In terms of worker organisations, the subsection three and four indicate that every worker has the right to form or join a trade union of his choice for the promotion and protection of his economic and social interests. These provisions have also been captured in section 14 of the Labour Act. This emphasized the relevance of the provision to workers within the jurisdiction of the constitution of Ghana.

Freedom of association with respect to worker organisations is captured under Part XI of the Labour Act. Section 80 on the formation of trade unions, stipulates that two or more workers employed in the same undertaking may form a

trade union. Any organized trade union has the right to draw up its constitution and rules, elect its officers and representatives among others. A trade union is supposed to be registered and must obtain a certificate from the Chief Labour Officer. Meanwhile, the translation of the union objective of ensuring better working condition into reality for workers under the union is achieved through a collective bargaining agreement between the union and the respective employers of workers under the union. The next section focuses on collective bargaining as a tool for attaining decent working condition for informal quarry workers (Ghana Labour Act, 2003).

Collective Bargaining Agreement

Section 96 of the Labour Act indicates that subject to the provisions of this Act, representatives of one or more employers or employers' organisations may arrive at a collective agreement relating to the terms and conditions of employment of workers. The Act compels parties to the negotiation of the collective agreement (workers and employer/s) make every reasonable effort to reach an agreement in good faith; and should not make false or fraudulent misrepresentations as regards matters relevant to the negotiations (Ghana Labour Act, 2003).

The content of collective bargaining, according to Act 651, should include, the class or category of workers to which it relates; the conditions of work, including the hours of work, rest period, meal breaks, annual leave, occupational health and safety measures; and the remuneration and the method of calculating the remuneration of the workers. Other elements of the content are period of probation and conditions of probation; and the period of notice of termination of employment,

and transfer and discipline. The rest are the procedures for avoidance and settlement of disputes arising out of the interpretation, application and administration of the agreement. The trade union must also obtain collective bargaining certificate from the chief labour officer to be able to engage the employer/s of workers covered by the union (Ghana Labour Act, 2003).

Section 101 of the Labour Act (2003) (Act, 651) indicates that trade unions certificated under section 99 and their employer shall each nominate representatives authorized to conduct negotiations on their behalf. These representatives shall constitute a standing negotiating committee to negotiate on matters referred to it. The parties to the negotiations shall bring the terms of the concluded collective agreement to the notice of all the workers concerned. On the duration of collective agreements, Section 107 of Act 651 states that every collective agreement concluded under Section 103 shall be for a term of at least one year. However, in an instance where either party gives no notice within thirty days after the expiration of the collective agreement, the collective agreement shall be deemed to have continued in force until rescinded by the parties (Ghana Labour Act, 2003).

The Labour Act (2003) (Act 651) also made provisions for the payment of union dues. Section 111 of Act 651 stipulates that a trade union to which this section applies may issue to the employer of any workers who are members of that trade union a notice in the form in Schedule II to this Act. The notice issued should direct the employer to deduct from the wages of his or her workers covered by a certificate issued under section 99, the sums specified by the trade union; and to pay over the sums deducted as may be directed by the trade union, and, subject to this section, the employer shall comply with the notice. A sum deducted following a notice given

under this section shall be in discharge of the liability of the respective member of the trade union to pay dues to that trade union (Ghana Labour Act, 2003).

The traditional labour market institutions in Ghana for implementing labour standards include the National Labour Commission, legally instituted in 2003 by Act 651 representing the government in the adjudication of all labour disputes in Ghana, the Labour Department and the Division of Factories Inspectorate of the Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare (Akorsu, 2010). These latter two agencies represent the government in the day to day implementation of policies and in the monitoring and regulation of the operations of the labour markets. Other agencies were Ghana employer's association and Ghana trade union. Apart from the traditional agencies, Akorsu (2010) found the civil society and consumer associations as equally playing significant roles in administering labour standards in Ghana in recent times. This means that these institutions could be part of the successes and failures of labour standards in Ghana.

Institutional Arrangement for the Labour Market

Institutional arrangements refer to the governance structure that establishes the rules for ensuring decent working conditions (Agyenim, 2011). Achievement of the expected outcome depends on institutional arrangements that provide incentives and limits labour and employers' behaviour. Adherence and execution of obligations and responsibilities for each of these stakeholders in the regulatory frameworks is critical to ensure decency of working conditions for workers. In terms of labour laws, the International Labour Organisation, Labour Unions,

Employers' Association and the State constitute the institutional arrangement for decent working conditions (See figure 1).




Figure 1: Labour institutional arrangement in Ghana
Source: Adapted from Akorsu (2010)

The ILO as a Labour Market Institution

The ILO is a tripartite institution made of governments, employers and labour. ILO, as a labour market institution, established in 1919 as a result of signatory nations to the treaty of Versailles, has been the main international body with oversight responsibility for working conditions and employment issues in general (Akorsu, 2010). The ILO developed a set of international labour standards in the form of conventions and recommendations to deal with injustices and hardship that threatens peace and harmony in the existing labour market (ILO, 2012). The decent work agenda of the ILO is captured under goal 8 target 8 of the sustainable development goals shaping the world development agenda until 2030 (ILO, 2015). The decent work agenda and the international labour conventions and

recommendations are underpinned by human rights discourse underpinned by Rawls theory of justice. Specific ILO conventions and recommendations, as well as decent work framework, have been explained in the next two chapters under international labour standards.

The State as a Labour Market Institution

Another labour market institutional arrangement is the state as a regulator. The state has traditionally been responsible for the creation of a conducive working environment through legislation, administration and enforcement of labour standards (national and international standards). Agencies and departments represent the state in carrying out its mandate of enforcement of labour standards to protect the working poor from the abuse of the employer. Akorsu (2010) observed that one key challenge that has characterised the state's role has been weak supervision, monitoring and enforcement of labour standards in both the formal and the informal economies. Akorsu further revealed that logistic and financial as well as neo-classical maneuvering have affected the state's ability to enforce labour standards.

The Labour Department is one of the major arms of the Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations representing the state as part of the labour market institutions. The Labour Department exists to carry out functions subject to ILO Convention No. 150 ratified by Ghana in 1986 on Labour Administration system. Sections one and twelve of the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) provides for the establishment and mandates the Labour Department to conduct labour inspections on workplaces (Ghana Labour Act, 2003). The mission of the Labour Department

is to enforce labour laws and regulations in Ghana and provide, for the benefit of workers and employers, employment-related services such as job-matching, job counselling and mediation; and to produce reliable labour market information for employment policy and national development planning (Ghana Labour Act, 2003). The Labour Department operates in all the regional capitals, 36 district offices, 63 public employment centres, six youth employment centres and one disabled resettlement unit throughout the country (Akorsu, 2010). Akorsu also revealed that the Labour Department is challenged with inadequate total labour force and logistic challenges.

The Division of Factories Inspectorate (DFI) is the second state agency as part of the labour market institutions which falls under the Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare. The Factories, Offices and Shops Act of 1970 (Act 328) established the Division under the Labour Department until 1985 when it was separated as a result of management prerogative. The Division seeks to promote measures that would safeguard the health and safety of persons employed in premises which fall within the purview of Act 328, being one of the few legal instruments not repealed by Act 651 (Ghana Labour Act, 2003). The scope of inspection of the DFI is thus limited to issues of occupational health and safety. Meanwhile, the DFI has only 67 workers out of 170 required to carry out its mandates effectively. Poor working conditions and logistical challenges also affect the performance of the DFI (Akorsu, 2010).

The Ghana National Labour Commission (NLC) is the third state institutional arrangement for ensuring decent working conditions. The Labour Act, 651 (2003) gave birth to the NLC. The mission of the NLC is to develop and sustain

a peaceful and harmonious industrial relations environment through the use of effective dispute resolution practices, promotion of co-operation among the labour market players and mutual respect for their rights and responsibilities (Ghana Labour Act, 2003). The functions of the NLC include facilitating the settlement of industrial disputes, investigating labour-related complaints, particularly unfair labour practices and taking steps that it considers necessary to prevent labour disputes among others. The NLC is also confronted with inadequate human, logistical and financial resources needed for the effective performance of the Commission (Akorsu, 2010).

Trades Unions as a Labour Market Institution

The seemingly better working conditions in terms of pay, leave, working hours among others that labour enjoys today (as compared to the pre-industrial revolutionary era) is an outcome of the labour movement worldwide. The Trades Union Congress (TUC), Ghana formed in 1945 has also played the role of hard work and struggle to promote and defend workers' rights in Ghana all these years (Britwum, 2010). TUC, Ghana has been the leading trade union centre in Ghana, with 17 national trade union affiliates. The introduction of neo-liberal policies in the early 1990s witnessed a steady decline in trade union membership and density of about 26% among the TUC, Ghana (Akorsu, 2010). Retrenchment and redundancies of the public sector workers following the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programme were blamed for the decline of TUC, Ghana membership (Britwum, 2010). Recent challenges of the TUC, Ghana has been (split and) infighting and divisions among unions coupled with the inability to organise

informal workers who constitute the most significant workforce (Britwum & Akorsu, 2017). That notwithstanding the TUC, Ghana has established the Labour Research Institute that conducts researches that inform labour policy formulation in Ghana. Though the TUC, Ghana does not have any monitoring unit, it largely depends on the enterprise level representative for monitoring and ensuring the implementation of labour standards (Akorsu, 2010).

In 1998 the Ghana Federation of Labour (GFoL) was established as a new national centre. The founding organisations were the Ghana National Association of Teachers, the Ghana Registered Nurses' Association, the Textiles, Garment and Leather Employees' Union and the Lotto Receivers' Association. Subsequently, the Ghana National Association of Teachers withdrew from the new labour centre. The initiator of GFoL was Abraham Koomson, who was Deputy General Secretary of ICU, but broke from ICU and formed the Textiles, Garment and Leather Employees' Union, TGLEU. Today GFoL does not seem to have any significant strength. GFoL, though, reports that more associations are expected to join the centre soon. Other registered workers' associations or labour centres, not affiliated to TUC or GFTU Union Members include Ghana National Association of Teachers, Civil Servants' Association of Ghana, and National Association of Graduate Teachers.

The Ghana Employers Association as a Labour Market Institution

The last traditional labour market institution to be discussed is the *Ghana Employers Association (GEA)*. The GEA established in 1959 as a reaction to the collective voice of workers in the form of a trade union confederation, seeks to bring together employers from all sectors of the economy, to protect and push for

the common interest of its members (Akorsu, 2010). Specifically, the GEA seeks among others to influence policy and labour legislation; help members to improve the efficiency of their businesses and provide employers with technical assistance in their negotiations with organised labour. The GEA is a member of the National Advisory Committee on Labour, which advises the Minister responsible for Employment issues in Ghana and is also a prominent member of the National Tripartite Committee, which determines minimum wages and general industrial relations issues (Ghana Labour Act, 2003). The GEA also faced challenges such as limited coverage and membership is not compulsory. This explains why several private and informal employers are not members of the association.

The National Tripartite Committee Ensuring Social Partnership in the Labour Market

The National Tripartite Committee was instituted in 1972 to facilitate dialogue between the social partners at the national level. The NTC is composed of 5 representatives each from organised labour, employers, and government and is supported by a technical sub-committee, which is also tripartite in its composition (Ghana Labour Act, 2003). The original mandate of NTC was fixing of the national minimum wage has now been expanded under the Labour Act, 2003 (Act, 651) to include advising the sector minister on all labour market issues. A key challenge associated with the NTC has been hostile and antagonistic relationship since each member wants the best of the bargain for its constituents (Ghana Labour Act, 2003). The next section discusses the theory of collective action explaining reasons why

informal workers might not want to join the formalised trade union but prefer their own enterprise-level of association.

Chapter Summary

In summary, the chapter reviewed the ILO decent work agenda and its four pillars; and the labour standards that apply to labour. The discussion was done from the international level by considering international labour standards by ILO which were grouped into core and non-core labour standards. The chapter also discusses the national labour standards enshrined in the Labour Act of Ghana, Act, 2003. Specific sections that relate to informal workers were equally reviewed. The next chapter examines the conceptual and empirical issues of the study.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INFORMAL ECONOMY AND ORGANISING

Introduction

In the previous chapter literature on theories of informality and organising among workers was reviewed. This chapter reviews the literature on concepts and empirical studies on the informal economy and organising among informal workers. The conceptual review shall focus on the characteristics, drivers and the link between the informal and the formal economy. Other conceptual issues with regards to the informal economy considered include the relevance of the informal economy. Another area of concern to this review chapter will be working conditions of informal workers and how organising of informal workers affects the decent working conditions of informal quarry workers' working conditions.

This chapter discusses strategies for organising informal workers, benefits and challenges of organising informal workers. The third focus of the review of related literature will consider empirical evidence on decent work and stone quarry activities. For this purpose, studies carried out by Nanor (2011), Gbeve (2013), Asante, Kabila and Afriyie (2014) among others would be examined in the section. Finally, the concluding part of the chapter shall focus on lessons learned, and the conceptual framework of the study.

The Meaning of Informal Economy

Several labels have been used by academics to describe what is now called “the informal economy”. Ferman and Ferman (1973) referred to it as an irregular

economy. Simon and Write (1982) and Houston (1987) called it the underground economy, while Guttman (1987) decided to call it the subterranean. Other labels were the black economy by Delnot and Morris (1981) and the informal economy by McCrohan and Smith (1996). Losby (2002) gave a more detailed description as an invisible economy, hidden economy, submerged economy, shadow or irregular and clandestine economy in the media circles. The standard bases for the description and labelling are that these activities are not recorded or are wrongly reflected in conventional national accounting systems. However, in this study, it will be referred to as the informal economy.

Discussion on informal economy started with economic theorist such as Arthur Lewis. Keith Hart cited in Britwum (2010), and Akorsu (2010) contested that the “informal economy” was discovered in the early 1970s by Keith Hart on urban employment in Ghana. The economic anthropologist Keith Hart observed from his research on Ghana that the ‘informal sector’ had not just persisted but expanded. The ILO’s attempt to describe these informal activities used the terminology ‘informal sector’ which gained prevalence acceptance and usage after the ILO used it to analyse economic activities in Kenya for an ILO employment mission in 1972 (ILO, 2011). Thus, it is not clear in the literature as to whether Keith learnt the term from ILO or the vice versa.

The term informal economy is sometimes used to refer to only illegal activity, such as individual earn wages but does not claim them on his or her income tax, or a cruel situation where people are forced to work without pay (Sibhat, 2014). Sibhat however, failed to admit that informal activities include legal activities such as jobs that are performed in exchange for something other than money.

The World Bank defined the informal economy in a more detailed form to refer to activities with income that are partly or wholly outside government observation, taxation and regulation (Chen, 2012). Over time, the definition has tended to broaden, and ILO (2014) defined the informal economy to mean activities that engage the self-employed and wage workers who are not recognised, regulated or protected by existing legal or regulatory frameworks. It also includes the non-remunerative work undertaken in an income-producing enterprise (Ghai, 2001; ILO, 2002; 2014).

These several definitions point to the difficulty in arriving at a commonly accepted definition for the informal economy. These varied perspectives exist due to different theoretical ideologies. The debate about nature and causes became more prominent in the 1980s with the different schools of thought such as the dualist, legalist and the structuralists.

Deepened understanding with renewed interest and the fundamental rethinking of the informal economy together with its dimensions and dynamics surfaced in the 1990s. The International Labour Conference broke new grounds within the contestation on informality by arguing that the informal sector should instead be called the informal economy in 2002 (Chen, 2012). ILO also further suggested the need to move from perceiving and conceptualising the informal economy as an enterprise-based concept to one that included not just the production unit but also the characteristics of the job or worker (ILO, 2012). This elaborated explanation of informality by ILO then opened opportunities for a more nuanced and country-specific perspective on the causes and consequences of informality, the

characteristics of informality, and the linkages with the informal economy and formal regulatory environment (ILO, 2013).

Stuart and Kirsten (2010) argued that it is more appropriate to use informal “economy” instead of “sector” as indicated by ILO. Stuart and Kirsten’s position could be justified based on the heterogeneity and complexity of informal activities that do not relate to a specific industry group or economic activity.

Meanwhile, other justifications why the ‘informal economy’ can no longer be considered a temporary or residual phenomenon include the fact that the sector has been proliferating in almost every corner of the globe, including industrialised countries (ILO, 2011). Most of the new jobs in recent times especially in developing and transitioning countries have been in the informal economy.

Approaches to Informality

This study adopts three approaches that dominate the informal economy literature in terms of causes and composition (Kay, 2011). These three approaches are the dualistic labour market approach, the alternative approach and the structural articulation approach. In this section, I reviewed these perspectives providing how it relates to the historical perspectives on informality and their implications for a developing economy like Ghana. The discussion begins with the dualistic labour market approach, the first approach to the informal economy.

The dualistic labour market theory is traced to Lewis’ (2001) seminal work on “economic development with unlimited supplies of labour”. Lewis developed a general model of development which was very useful for the less developed countries in the 1950s (Kay, 2011). Lewis’ model holds the view that an economy

can be divided into a modern industrial sector and a traditional agricultural sector (Lewis, 2001). Three major characteristics of the modern sector are capital modes of production, capital accumulation and economic growth. The traditional subsistence agriculture sector was described with pre-capitalist modes of production as key characteristics of the sector (Kay, 2011).

Lewis (1954) posits that economic development took place as unskilled labour at a subsistence wage was reallocated from the traditional sector to the new sector. It was conjectured in the Lewis model that as the modern sector absorbing unskilled labour, efficiency and productivity would be boosted, and consumer prices would drop. It would then result in increased consumer demand as well as the appropriation of profits for capitalists (Lewis, 2001).

Lewis assumed that in order to continue to increase revenue, capitalists would continue to reinvest profits in the capital since capitalists were consumed by the profit motive (Geeta, & Knight, 2006). The reinvestment would result in increased demand for unskilled workers from the traditional sector (Kay, 2011). This process was said by Lewis (2001) to continue until all surplus labour in the traditional sector was reallocated to the modern sector, and wages in the traditional sector began to rise above subsistence levels. The result would be modernization, an increase in the level of employment, and average income per capita (Harris & Todaro, 1970; Geeta & Knight, 2006; Kay, 2011).

The dualist theory on informality viewed the informal economy as traditional, offering bare survival on the margins of developing societies (Boampong, 2005). Boampong posits that from the perspective of the dualist theorists the state was regarded as a barrier to the growth of the urban sector in

terms of employment creation. Conditionalities of neo-liberal policies compel governments to cut down on public sector employment. Even in cases where labour regulations existed, the exclusion of the informal economy from labour regulation created exploitable reserves of informal labour (Meagher, 1995; Boampong, 2005).

Linking the dualistic assertion to the African situation from the perspective of Kay (2011), three main implications can be made. Firstly, unemployment has been high and still is high due to labour force participation and preference for formal sector employment as well as the failure of the formal sector to absorb available surplus labour. Lastly, mention can also be made of the adoption of production methods that require fewer labour forces with high skills due to globalization and advancement in information technology which though has led to improved efficiencies also led to the creation of surplus labour and the weakening of labour unions (Boampong, 2005).

The conclusions that can be drawn from the dualist approach on informality suggest that the *dualists* subscribe to the impression that the informal economy and its activities have few (if any) linkages with the formal economy. However, the dualists subscribe to governments 'creation of more jobs; provide credit and business development services to informal operators; as well as basic infrastructure and social services to their families.

Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2009) came out with the second perspective on informal employment in less-developed countries namely the neo-liberal approach. However, other authors like Boampong (2005) and Borjas (2008) named it the alternative theory. The latter is adopted and used in this study. The alternative perspective is credited with the ability to recognize the potential of the informal

economy to play a central rather than a subordinate economic role in the modern context of development. Kay (2011) argues that the alternative theory posits that informal workers engage in job creation, creative enterprises and capital accumulation in the urban environment (Portes & Schauffler, 1993). However, the dualists seem not to have considered these in their positions.

The anthropologist Keith Hart first articulated the alternative perspective in 1973 in his ethnographic study of the informal economy in Accra, Ghana (Chen, 2007; 2012). Hart found that formal and informal employment opportunities existed in Accra and ascribed the former to salaried jobs and the later to self-employment. Keith highlighted the dynamism of self-employed entrepreneurs whose activities prospered (Kay, 2011).

Thus, instead of the dualists' view that the informal economy is a temporal job, the alternative perspective posits that the informal economy contained low barriers to entry for entrepreneurs. The informal economy was therefore conceived as a place where low levels of physical capital would be compensated by higher levels of human capital and where savvy entrepreneurs could start their businesses at low cost (Portes & Schauffler, 1993).

Borjas (2008) and De-Soto (1989) argued that causes of informality were not due to surplus labour but too costly government regulations such as health care mandates, high minimum wage, lengthy incorporation procedures, and collective bargaining agreements. It can, therefore, be deduced that the main characteristics of the informal economy, espoused in the alternative market perspective, is the voluntary nature of informal employment. Kay (2011) cited various studies from

Latin America to demonstrate that informal employment is primarily a voluntary savings strategy instead of an involuntary subsistence strategy.

Portes and Schauffler (1993) found that over 60 per cent of workers in Brazil and 80 per cent in Argentina left the formal sector to the informal economy voluntarily for greater independence or higher wages. The conclusion that can be drawn on the evidence is that the informal economy is not a temporary substitute for formal sector employment. Instead, the sector is a dynamic environment for entrepreneurship, and that entry requires not a high degree of business expertise.

The structural articulation perspective, the third perspective on informality, surfaced due to theoretical shortcomings of both the dualistic and alternative perspective on causes and constituents of the informal economy. The structural articulation perspective posits that there are multifaceted implications associated with surplus labour generated by rural-to-urban migration, then was explained by either the dualistic or alternative perspective. The structural articulation perspective does not recognize the informal economy as separated from the formal economy (Portes & Schauffler, 1993).

Structural articulation perspective recognizes the heterogeneity of the informal economy with two basic classifications (Boampong, 2005; Chen, 2007) which are micro-entrepreneurs with access to some capital and labour resources and unprotected workers who involuntarily eke out a subsistence wage. Kay (2011) indicated that the label, "structuralist", denotes structure of formal-informal relationships as part of a unified economic system. Thus, the structuralists are interested in describing the roles played by the informal economy in support of

modern capitalist accumulation, specifically with the potential of the informal economy to lower consumption and labour costs within the formal sector.

The structuralist approach holds that rigid laws protecting formal workers should motivate employers to avoid expanding plants instead to take advantage of casual labour and subcontracting. The structuralists, however, do not advocate for complete removal of state controls from the labour market (Kay 2011). The structuralists, however, failed to consider that the lack of expansion would result in a pattern of worker abuse, minimal wages, and a disincentive for worker training and technological innovation. The result would not lead to the formalization of informal workers, but the "informalisation" of the entire economy.

Characteristics of Informal Economy and Factors Driving Informality

The discussion under this section focuses on the general and specific characteristics and later into the characteristics based on people and lastly activities the informal economy engages in and factors driving informality. Todaro and Smith (2003) and Sibhat (2014) revealed some general characteristics of the informal economy to include many small-scale productions and service activities that are individually, or family-owned and use labour-intensive (usually less than ten) and simple technology. ILO (2013) also revealed other general characteristics to include reliance on indigenous resources, setups operated by the owners with few or no employees. Other characteristics identified by ILO include skills acquired outside the conventional school system, having little or no access to regulated markets, to credit institutions, unregulated and competitive markets.

According to ILO (2002), the informal economy is characterized by irregular operation and working hours. Sibhat (2014) revealed that the informal economy could also be identified with other features such as setups not registered as companies or co-operatives, and no full written book of accounts.

The broader categorisation of ‘informal economy’ revealed by ILO, (2014) captures other features other than unregistered and unrecognised enterprises. It also includes workers who are in precarious circumstances within both the formal and the informal economy. The new categorization also highlighted informality in terms of both the production unit and the characteristics of the job or worker. This has been a significant innovation by the international statistical community in capturing informality in terms of data which is dealt with in more detail in the discussion on measurement.

In contributing to the characteristics of the informal economy, Chen, Vanek and Carr (2004) and Chen (2012; 2006) used a model to further depict and explain gender and risk as well as earnings depending on risk levels associated with informal activities. The global action-research-policy network called Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organising (WIEGO) came out with six statuses in employment such as informal employers, informal employees, own account operators, casual wage workers, industrial out-workers or subcontracted workers, and unpaid but contributing family workers. These can be seen from Figure 2.

To make the model more relevant to the informal sector, WIEGO commissioned two reviews in the late 1990s to identify links between informality, poverty, and gender (Charmes, 1998; Sethuraman, 1998). The outcome of the

reviews was that the similar hierarchy of earnings and segmentation exist for employment status and sex. The result can be seen from the model in Figure 2. However, the multi-segmented model was tested in 2004 in six developing countries - Ghana, Egypt, Costa Rica, India, El Salvador and South Africa (Chen, Vanek & Carr, 2004; Chen, 2012). It was found from the pilot study that in all countries, average earnings went down and the risk of being in a poor household went up as workers moved down the employment statuses in the WIEGO model as can be seen from Figure 2.




Figure 2: WIEGO (2004) model of informal employment: Hierarchy of earnings
Source: Chen (2012).

Losby's (2002) assertion on the characteristics of the informal economy is also relevant within the framework of this study. Losby categorised the informal economy into four thematic areas - legal versus illegal activities, cash as the most medium of exchange, unreported wages or income and conditions of labour. The

first thematic area, legal versus illegal activities mainly described informal activities as one that can either be legal or illegal.

Economic activities within the informal economy can be termed "unlawful" since they violate some non-criminal rules or laws such as not adhering to labour laws (Castells & Porters, 1989; Porters & Sassen-Koob, 1987; Sassen-Koob, 1989; Stepick, 1989). The legality debate also extends to the income generated through economic activities within the informal economy which could be differentiated by the legality of the means of production and the legal status of goods and services produced within the system (Chen, 2012).

Apart from using cash as means of payment, bartering or swapping is also another method which takes place without any official records. The third characteristics can be seen from the perspective that income or wages earned are also not recorded for taxation purposes. For this reason, both the employer and employee in the informal economy may not be visible for taxation purposes, and this could have serious repercussion on the economy (ILO, 2014).

Lastly, the labour condition is another area for categorisation in terms of the characteristics of the informal economy. Castells and Porters (1989), Porters and Sassen-Koob (1987) reported that labour conditions under which informal workers are employed are always found wanting in terms of labour laws, health conditions, safety hazards or location of a business. Thus, it can be concluded that the informal economy workers suffer in terms of earnings, protection and security as compared to the formal economy worker.

In terms of factors driving informality, multiple driving factors have been mentioned in literature. These driving forces of informal economy sometimes differ

from one country to another in terms of geographical location and developmental status (Kay, 2011). However, some selected factors have been identified to be conventional driving forces applicable to either developed or developing economies or even both. Some of the factors or forces of informality do have entrenched theoretical justifications. These driving forces of informality are the concern of the next section.

Lack of economic growth or weak absorption capacity of the industrial sector and or slow rate of economic growth as against the faster rate of population growth is one of the pushing factors of informality (Chen, 2012; ILO, 2014). This is because the industrial sector has not been able to create equal job opportunities to match surplus labour created by population growth (Sethuraman, 1998; Tokman, 1978). Chen (2012) revealed that the mismatch usually results in labour migration from agricultural to manufacturing industry, which has contributed to the underdevelopment of continents like North America, Asia and Africa.

The nature of capitalist development is also another theoretically entrenched driving force of informality cited by the structuralist school of thought. Structuralists believe that the informal economy should be considered as subordinated to the formal sector. Structuralists argue that the cause of informality in production relation is the nature of capitalist development (Moser, 1978; Castells & Portes, 1989). Due to the cumbersome nature of government's rule and regulation, the legalist observed that informal workers operate informally in order to avoid the costs, time and effort of formal registration (Chen, 2012; De Soto, 1989; Mwaniki et al, 2015).

Apart from the theoretically entrenched driving forces of informality named and explained earlier, there are several other factors cited to be responsible for informality. Among this category of drivers of informality is the challenge of poverty and the inadequate opportunities for the working poor (ILO, 2014). Sibhat (2014) also mentioned globalization and economic restructuring and changing production structures as other factors.

The Link Between Formal and Informal Economy

Several schools of thought have developed over the years to describe the relationship between the formal and informal economy. According to the dualist school of thought, the informal economy is an autonomous segment of the economy producing mainly for consumption (ILO, 2002). The second school (alternative) believes that the informal economy has a dependent relationship with the formal economy and the former is exploited by the latter (Kay, 2011). Several other linkages have been identified in the literature and are better explained through different theoretical justification, and this is the focus of the current section.

According to Ranis and Stewart (1999), formal and informal economies are connected through technological linkages, production linkages, and consumption linkages. Bairagya (2010) observed that the traditional informal economy produces consumer goods only which are sold mainly to the low-income consumer while the modern informal economy produces both consumer goods and capital goods that serve both low- and middle-income consumers. Bairagya, however, failed to recognize that “free” goods often compete with the goods produced by the formal sector. People usually consume goods produced in the formal and informal

economy. The intermediate products and simple capital goods produced by the modern informal economy are partly used by both the formal and informal economies (Grant, 2013).

The informal economy consists of self-employment and wage employment. Income from self-employment in the informal economy is combined with a regular wage or salary employment, private investment, or savings (Tienda & Raijman, 2000). This is in line with Ranis and Stewart's (1999) position that some people used informal employment and its source of income as a secondary income source to primary formal employment. Thus, to achieve this, such workers usually switch between formal and informal economies within the same day of work.

Another linkage can be seen from other people involved in wage employment but are described as poor (Williams, 2005). This suggests that there are considerable numbers of people working in the formal sector whose wages or salaries are comparable to a high number of informal workers (Slavnic, 2010). In a related development, Schneider and Williams (2013) said that costs saved by formal organisations in using informal workers as a strategy in times of tight labour market can be used to increase the wages or salaries of high-level workers employed in the formal sector.

Additionally, Raijman (2001) revealed three perspectives on the standard linkage between the formal and the informal economy. The first of these linkages is the informal marketing chain used by industries to eliminate the cost involved in maintaining permanent staff. The second linkage is the informal supply chain. The supply chain enables local buyers to get their inputs from informal workers who also supply this product to the central wholesalers in the formal sector. Using

informal workers for construction and repair services is the third linkage between the formal and the informal sectors. This subcontracting allows the formal sector to retain small regular workforce (Taiwo, 2013).

The Effects of the Informal Economy

The informal economy has both negative and positive effects. Taiwo (2013) opines that the informal economy accounts for a sizeable proportion of the urban labour force, even in developed countries. Secondly, the informal economy plays a key role in the provision of urban-based services and production, especially in construction and manufacturing. Additionally, the informal economy contributes significantly to the gross domestic product of an economy (Arimah, 2001). All these scholars, however, failed to add a key relevance such as it serving as a source of innovation, creativity, capital saving and growing production. The informal economy represents an integral part of the economy and indeed of the labour market in many countries especially developing countries, and thus plays a significant role in employment creation, production and income generation (ILO, 2012).

Sibhat (2014) added that the informal economy plays a vital role in income distribution, makes active competition, improves productivity and technical change and finally creates economic development. Meanwhile, Copisarow and Barbour (2004) were of the view that the informal economy increases income and self-confidence, improves skills, expands work experience, and develops the habit of work. Other obvious relevance that was not stated by the researchers but is closely linked is that it offers flexible working hours and conditions, and promotes entrepreneurial spirit.

In terms of the negative impacts of the informal economy, the World Bank (2014) disclosed that governments generally lack commitment towards the informal economy. Reasons, why the informal economy is not very attractive to the government, include failure to adhere to law and order and economic losses due to undeclared economic activity. Williams (2014) also agrees with the World Bank and added that for most governments, these concerns outweigh any advantages that the informal economy offers as a source of job creation and as a safety net for the poor.

Schneider (2013) posits that the informal economy directly negates social benefits. Tax avoidance and fraud result in a loss of revenue to the state, which in turn hinders the ability of the government to pursue socially beneficial initiatives (Williams, 2014). Undeclared work skews statistics (such as employment figures), meaning that public policy is premised on inaccurate information. This may make policies less effective. The informal economy thus leads to a high tax burden on registered labour and taxpayers (World Bank, 2014). Taiwo (2013) observed that informal employments weaken collective bargaining, thereby worsening workers' rights.

Organising Efforts of Informal Workers

The vulnerability and the effects of socio-economic forces on the working conditions of informal workers exist at the local, national, regional and international levels. The effects of vulnerability could have pushed informal workers to organize themselves at all levels from the local to the global (Chen, Bonner & Carré, 2015; Chun, 2009).

The history of organising informal workers is traced to the dawn of capitalist production era in the 18th century where the whole economy was said to be informal (Dickinson, 2015; Gallin, 2011; Webster, Britwum & Bhowmik, 2017). Informal workers in the era organized themselves into unions, fought and won their fundamental rights. This brought improvements in their situations, which led to formalization. However, women (alongside other workers), especially in developing countries, were left out of this process and became known as the informal economy.

The development of organising the informal workers could be traced back to the founding of the Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA) of India in the 1970s; formation of Ghana Private Road Transport Union in 1935 and General Agricultural Workers Union in 1959 in Ghana (Bonner & Spooner, 2011; Chen 2000, 2012, UNDP, 2015). In 1983, SEWA was recognized as a trade union and accepted as an affiliate by the International Union of Food, Agriculture, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers (IUF). In the 1980s, domestic workers, waste pickers, and home-based producers in Latin America, Africa and other parts of Asia began forming local organisations as well (Gallin, 2011). It was not until the 1990s and 2000s that a significant number of them united into regional, national, and transnational networks, which in turn led to a rapid acceleration in local organising.

Organising as a pillar of decent work attracted the attention of the ILO and was discussed at the 2002 International Labour Conference (ILO, 2002; Webster, 2015), making this a strategic moment for transnational network building and alliances. Since 2000, several transnational networks of organisations of informal

workers such as HomeNet South Asia formed in 2000; StreetNet International in 2002; the Latin American Waste Pickers Network (Red Lacre) in 2005; and the International Domestic Workers' Network in 2009 have been formed. The International Domestic Workers Federation was officially launched in 2013.

Organisational Challenges

Challenges confronting unions and other workers' organisations undoubtedly could be grouped into internal or organisational, intra-organisational and external challenges. The internal challenges in this study relate to challenges emanating from the management of organisations where informal workers work. Intra-workers organisational challenges related to those pertaining to leadership of unions or other forms of workers organisations and their members. Other challenges from the external environment such as political and legal among others are equally considered in this section.

The first challenge to organising is political or conceptual challenges. There is always a conceptual challenge with the clear definition of informal workers due to the varying degrees of informality and the lack of a clear dividing line between employer and employee (Bonner & Spooner, 2011; Gallin, 2001). Some unionists do not consider the self-employed workers as within their organising ambit because most informal workers are not regarded as real workers. Even more, the Labour Act of Ghana somehow supports this assertion in that contents of the Act largely support only workers in an employment relationship. The informal workers themselves mostly do not also perceive themselves as workers and their organisations do not perceive themselves to be part or allied to labour unions (Bonner & Spooner, 2011).

The second challenges to organising informal workers are the lack of commitment from employers/management of firms where informal workers operate. Employers or management are often ignoring the labour laws, so informal workers are easily dismissed with little or no recourse to legal remedies. If regulations do exist, city authorities or law enforcement agencies use these provisions as a source of harassment of informal workers, rather than helping to improve their situation. While harassment or harsh employers can provide the impetus for organising and collective action, they can also create a fear of organising with regards to losing jobs or livelihoods.

Lack of commitment from informal workers to the organising processes is also a challenge worth mentioning. Many informal workers are situated in scattered, individualised workplaces or are mobile because many informal workers have multiple jobs. These all make recruiting members and building democratic structures of informal workers more difficult. Additionally, informal workers mainly, the self-employed often work long hours for survival and time spent on organising can result in income loss for them. Self-employed informal workers also most at times turn to compete with each other for customers, space and raw materials among others. Thus, even when they succeed in organising themselves together to face the authorities in crises, this collective action/organisation may be short-lived unless an ongoing common interest and purpose is identified.

Also, challenges of organising could also be a consequence of the leadership of trade unions or workers organisations. The leadership of most informal worker organisations may be unelected or may not be subject to recall. Most informal organisations often do not have a tradition of democratic functioning which reflects

in terms of lack of agreed rules (constitution) or, where they exist, low levels of compliance (Chen, 2007). The leadership of informal workers also are mostly such that women are generally do not have the confidence to take up leadership positions. This can make it challenging to form larger organisations since women dominate the numerical strength of informal workers. Chen (2007) observed a lack of rules and compliance for informal associations of informal transport workers, street and market vendors, rural workers, fishers, among others. Leaders of informal workers have been identified to have been working for or controlled by politicians.

Another significant challenge for organising informal workers is the lack of adequate resources. Majority of informal economy workers especially, women have precarious livelihoods and many faces extreme poverty. Payment of regular membership dues is severely restricted and may be erratic and vulnerable to external shocks (economic crises, natural disasters) (Bonner & Spooner, 2011). Even where organisations have some income stability, it is hardly enough to cover the costs of paid staff, meeting expenses, adequate premises. Similarly, it is true for many unions of workers in the formal economy so that even where informal and formal workers are organised within the same union, they are rarely financially self-reliant. Organising informal workers is therefore seen as a drain on union resources with inadequate financial return in the form of union dues.

Even more, adequate resources for regulators to monitor and ensure compliance is also another challenge that is associated with organising in both formal and informal economies. Employers of regular wage informal workers do not always support the efforts and processes that will lead to the collective identity of workers. This is because employers mostly find it difficult to easily push away

the requests of organised workers as compared to unorganised workers. Thus, some employers deliberately or unintentionally work against the organising effort (the fundamental human rights) of informal wage workers. Thus, the role of the regulator in policing and making sure these workers basic human right is not abused cannot be overemphasised. Meanwhile, regulators' roles are often compromise due to lack of adequate resources such as logistical and human resources challenges.

All these challenges confronting the organising of informal workers necessitate new approaches to defining a workplace, new organising strategies, structures, communication tools, and dues collection methods. It for this reason that the next section examines the organising innovations and emerging issues.

Organisational Innovation and Emerging Issues

Carré (2013) revealed that the various forms that informal worker organisations take were *trade unions, cooperatives, self-help groups, associations, or hybrid forms*. However, with registered organisations, regulations of their respective countries dictate what their legal forms should be and may, therefore, differ from their de facto structure, strategies and activities. Chen, Bonner and Carré (2015) acknowledged that despite the differences in forms, the most relevant issue in this regard is how innovative each organisation handles the economic interests of its members, and the extent to which democracy is upheld in the organisation's governance (internal democracy).

Agarwala (2009) posits that there are three criteria to determine the extent to which democratic principles are practised in internal governance by organisation leadership and membership. These were types of leaders from either the working-

class membership and/or middle class, leadership that reflects the gender, class and ethnicity of the membership. The second criterion is the degree of member control which focuses on how leaders were elected. The last criterion looks at internal governance system, which focuses on the regularity of meetings for elected members and elections and committee structures in place.

Another innovation in organising to address the challenges is varied organising forms. Rosaldo, Tilly and Evans (2012) revealed that conventional non-member-based organisation often play a crucial role in establishing and supporting member-based organisations (MBOs) such as cooperatives, associations and unions. Two main strategies are used by MBOs to increase worker economic and political power. Firstly, they build cooperatives and other collective enterprises that enable workers to pool resources and move up the value chain. Secondly, MBOs achieved labour rights for their members using representation, protest and advocacy to make workers' voices heard at the business, national and internal levels. Workers may seek welfare benefits from the state, or more traditional work benefits such as living wages, improved working conditions, and pensions (Chen, 2012). The former strategy is mainly used by own-account workers, while both own-account and employed workers commonly use the latter.

Debdullal (2014) opined that in many cases, MBOs involving own-account workers make demands for an array of quasi-property rights which include right to ply one's trade free from harassment or extortion by police; access to preferred street vending locations, trash collection contracts or preferential access to recyclables. Due to low-income member bases, informal worker MBOs commonly

rely on outside funding sources such as foundations and development banks to supplement membership dues (Gallin, 2011).

Rosaldo *et al.* (2012) distinguish between traditional NGOs and MBOs. Rosaldo *et al.* reveal that most informal worker organisations employ hybrid approaches. A typical case to support this assertion is that of SEWA (Bonner & Spooner, 2011). SEWA, though a trade union, however, uses the double strategy of struggle and development. SEWA members protest, advocate, and negotiate to win concessions from government and business, but also have formed over 100 cooperatives. SEWA contains “sister organisations” that operate more like conventional NGOs, engaging in research and advocacy, or providing housing, childcare, insurance, education, and banking services.

Braga (2012) revealed another innovative recruitment through a standard model used by NGOs in organising informal economy such as a “Worker Center Model”. Bonner and Spooner (2011) described the term “worker centre” model to encompass a variety of social movement organisations focused primarily on empowering immigrant workers engaged in precarious informal work. Rosaldo *et al.* (2012) describe NGOs as “non-bureaucratic grass-roots organisations with small budgets, loose membership structures, improvisational cultures and strategies that are funded by foundation grants.

In terms of how political parties and formal sector unions can assist in organising the informal economy, Braga (2012) suggested that trade unions can sensitise workers in the informal economy on the importance of having collective representation through education and outreach programmes. Rosaldo *et al.* (2012)

also added that political parties and formal trade unions could also make efforts to include workers in the informal economy in collective agreements.

Another innovation in terms of organisational actors at the regional level, organisations allow workers to share information and learn from successes in other locations, while also influencing regional decision-makers. At the highest level, which is the international level, international networks give workers a formidable, cooperative voice on the global stage to advance changes in international policies that can eventually lead to changes in national legislation (Chen, 2012).

Joining forces of informal workers to provide many benefits to the working poor in the informal economy, and women workers. The benefits are felt in different domains of workers' livelihoods and lives. Generally, organising can confer greater voice, visibility and validity on informal workers. As a result, this enables them to exercise more considerable influence on the broader environment that impinges on their livelihoods.

Empirical Evidence on Stone Quarrying Activities and Organising of Informal Workers

The empirical review under this section as part of the literature review chapter reviews seven different studies. These studies are Gbeve (2013), Erbach (2014), Debdulal (2014), Asante, Kabila and Afriyie (2014), Britwum and Akorsu (2017), and Akorsu and Odoi (2017). Review of these studies is done from perspectives such as the purpose of the study, applicable theories, research and study designs, population and sampling procedure, data collection, analytical techniques and key findings and conclusions.

Gbeve (2013) conducted a study on the environmental impacts of construction aggregate mining in the Greater Accra Region, a case study of Amasaman in the Ga West Municipal. The study specifically identified the key environmental risks associated with stone quarrying activities in surrounding, stakeholders' perceptions on the environmental impacts of aggregate mining for construction in Ghana, and assessed the impact of the enforcement of statutory regulatory provisions and policies governing construction aggregate mining in Ghana by Environmental Protection Agency. Gbeve also situated his study within the egalitarian and libertarian theoretical perspectives of natural resource governance. The study adopted the quantitative approach from the positivist paradigm and specifically, a descriptive research design was used.

A study population of 626 housing units and 207 registered construction aggregate mining companies in the Greater Accra region were used. The study used simple random sampling techniques to select 75 mine operators, 95 nearby residents from Amasaman. The sample size was determined using the Kish formula for determining sample size. Data collection instruments were questionnaire and interview schedule for residents, quarry workers and a representative from EPA. Quantitative analysis was adopted for environmental impacts and mitigating measures. Specifically, descriptive statistics such as mean, median, mode, standard deviation, bar chart and pie charts were employed for the data analysis.

Gbeve (2013) found that health hazards arising from such impacts to mine workers, nearby residents, and the general public are identified as cold and catarrh, respiratory disorders, and asthma. Additionally, aggregate miners in Ghana were found to have no significant reclamation programmes for degraded areas. Such areas

were used as landfills sites, refuse dumps, or are left for natural regeneration. It was recommended that Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) which have the primary authority for regulating aggregate mining operations should issue local permits and require performance bonds or some other form of financial assurance in order to ensure the enforcement of hours of operation, noise and dust mitigation measures, and reclamation programmes.

Erbach (2014) undertook a study on the Decency of Women's Working Conditions in Peri-Urban Dairy Buffalo Production System in Pakistan. The study looked at components of decent work such as working hours, salary or income, and equality of payment, body condition, and safety at the workplace. Other variables of the study were social protection, forced work and alternatives. Erbach posits that elements of workers' working conditions bordered on fundamental human rights as espoused in the theory of justice. The mixed method, specifically the exploratory sequential mixed method was used to conduct qualitative research, analysed the results and then used to develop appropriate instruments in a follow-up survey conducted.

Erbach (2014) sampled 98 women farmworkers and 26 women farm labourers for the study. Instruments for data collection were focused group discussion guide and semi-structured interview guide for the 72 women farmworkers. An interview schedule was, however, used to collect data from the 26 women farm labourers. Quantitative data were analysed with descriptive statistics while the qualitative was grouped and presented under themes after the data were transcribed and coded.

The study of Erbach (2014) found that the daily working hours of women on peri-urban dairy farms was 12.1 hours and exceeded the number of decent working hours defined by the ILO (2012). Additionally, Erbach also found that due to heavy workload, harsh weather conditions and absence of safety measures at work, women felt several negative impacts on their bodies. It was also found that there was no social protection for women working on Pakistan farms and women did not receive equal pay as men. It was therefore concluded that the working conditions of women workers on Pakistan Farms were not decent. It was therefore recommended that managers of Pakistan Farms should conform to decent work labour standard of ILO on working hours, pay and safety to make working conditions very decent for female workers and labourers.

Another study carried out by Debdulal (2014) was on Decent Work for Urban Informal Workers. The case of Street Vendors in Mumbai. The study looked at the working life of street vendors in Mumbai. The working life of vendors was explained in terms of their financial conditions and the extent of indebtedness, the number of bribes they had to pay in order to sustain themselves in the market, their working hours, the issues of public space utilisation, and the legal aspect of their activity. Debdulal used the theoretical framework of 'structural economic sociology' developed by Granovetter and Swedberg in 2001 based on principles such as economic activity in the form of social action, economic activity which is socially embedded and lastly economic institutions that are social constructions.

An explanatory sequential mixed method was used for the study. A sample of 400 vendors was selected from four places (clusters) in Mumbai namely Chembur, Dadar, Kandivali, and Vile Parle, based on the volume of street vendors

from the records of the various trade unions since the population was not known. Data collection instrument for the survey was an interview schedule. Observation guide, focused group discussion and semi-structured interview guide were used for the collection of qualitative data. Surveyor quantitative data were analysed with descriptive statistics while the qualitative was also transcribed and analysed with themes and codes teased out from the data.

The study found that income and employment status of vendors, their rights to work, social security coverage and their collective bargaining status and most significantly, dignity at work hardly conform to decent work standards of ILO. Low levels of income, as well as lack of access to public space, long working hours, large scale rent-seeking, lack of access to formal financial sources and lack of collective bargaining among others, were main indications that their work was not decent. It was therefore recommended that government regulate and secure street vending and vending places respectively at hawking zones. Additionally, strengthening the collective bargaining process was equally recommended since it was said to be responsible for promoting other objectives.

Asante, Kabila and Afriyie (2014) undertook a study on Stone Quarrying and Livelihood Transformation in Peri-Urban Kumasi. The authors used the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework which centred on both people and their livelihood; prioritizing both the tangible and intangible assets they utilise to achieve their desires. The approach also considers the vulnerable environment the poor operate in and their ability to withstand shocks and stresses, amidst external forces such as policies that affect the accessibility of the assets upon which people depend.

Asante, Kabila and Afriyie (2014) used convergent parallel mixed methods in which the researchers converged or merged quantitative and qualitative data in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the research problem. Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected at the same time integrating the information in the interpretation of the overall results. With a sample size of 110 respondents, comprising 106 household respondents small scale quarry workers from two purposively selected communities of Nkukua-Buoho (56) and Ntiri-Buoho (50). A representative each was selected from the three quarry companies in the area and a representative from EPA. Data collection instruments were interview schedules for the representatives of the quarry firms and EPA. An interview guide was, however, used for the household respondents including small scale quarry workers from the two communities.

Asante, Kabila and Afriyie (2014) established that even though stone quarrying is one of the key extractive economic activities in the Ashanti Region, supplying bulk stone of varying aggregates to the construction industry within the region and beyond, the resource-rich communities have seen little socio-economic improvements. Asante, Kabila and Afriyie (2014) found that while quarrying is a major economic activity, its effects on socio-economic and environmental terms were unsatisfactory. The paper, therefore, recommended that effective collaboration involving all the stakeholders would make the industry socio-economically beneficial to the communities and environmentally sustainable. The summary of the empirical review can be seen in Table 1.

Britwum and Akorsu (2017) undertook a study on organising casual workers in Ghana Oil Palm Development Corporation (GOPDC). The study sought

to examine the working condition, organisational needs, forms, strategies and sources of power for casual workers with Ghana Oil Palm Development Corporation (GOPDC). The study draws on the theory of power to explain sources of power available and used by casual workers to ensure decent working conditions for themselves. Britwum and Akorsu adopted the qualitative perspective using an interview guide, observation guide, and focus group discussion guide as the main research instruments for data collection. Narration and themes emerging from the data were used to code and analyse the data.

The study found that poor working conditions and associated vulnerability of casual workers of GOPDC were due to the representation gap in the labour market. The study also found the organisational effort of workers of GOPDC to mean that informal workers were not passive, uninformed, victims of labour abuses but have the potential to organize to secure better working conditions for themselves. The study also revealed that innovative strategies used by casual workers of GOPDC to organize their members were appealing to social relations between the company and community members such as landowners, traditional leaders, and political powers as well as engaging the media. Britwum and Akorsu (2017) recommended that the alliance between trade unions and casual workers to augment the power of informal workers can only work if the internal contradictions of traditional unions have been dealt with.

Another study was also conducted by Akorsu and Odoi (2017) on Collective Agency and Organising among Domestic Workers in Ghana. The study sought to examine how domestic workers in Ghana constitute themselves as active agents rather than passive victims of exclusion. Additionally, the study also sought to

explore the interaction between individual agency, collective action and external organising agents. The study used the theory of power to explain the categorisation of power available to domestic workers in Ghana. These were "power to", "power within" and "power with" The study design was purely a qualitative design for the empirical data collection. Data collection instruments included unstructured and semi-structured interview guide. In all thirty-three (33) informants participated in the study that included seven key informants, twenty-two (22) domestic workers, and four (4) employers.

Akorsu and Odoi found two main labour type “*live –in*” and “*live-out*” and the main forms of organising as membership-based organisations, individual organising; NGOs and trade union organising. The study identified three power type utilized in organising domestic workers in Ghana such as “power within”, “power to” and “power with”. Sources of the three types of power identified were religious leaders, politicians and MPs; Media; placement and agencies and trade unions. Akorsu and Odoi concluded that the adoption of self-organised groups of domestic workers by trade unions had several right-claiming challenges. It was therefore recommended that trade unions should be proactive in their quest to organize domestic workers by changing their attitudes, approaches and structures. The study also recommended that trade unions could provide nurturing support while guarding against claiming right over them as a temporary measure.

Table 1: Summary of Empirical Review on Informal Economy Workers

Author	Topic	Methods	Findings
Gbeve (2013)	The main environmental impacts of aggregate mining in Ghana, and measures to mitigate such impacts – Greater Accra	A quantitative and exploratory study using a structured questionnaire and random sampling	Health hazards to nearby residents were cold and catarrh, respiratory disorders, and asthma. No major reclamation programmes - landfills sites, refuse dumps or are left for natural regeneration.
Erbach (2014)	The decency of women's working conditions in the peri-urban dairy buffalo production system in Pakistan	Mixed method & discussion guide and Questionnaire	The daily working hours of women exceeded the recommended (ILO, 2012). It was also found that there was no social protection for women; women did not receive equal pay compared to men.
Debdulal (2014)	Decent work for urban informal workers, the case of street vendors in Mumbai	A mixed-method and explorative design were adopted for the study	Income, rights to work, social security coverage and their collective bargaining status, dignity at work hardly conform to decent work standards of ILO
Asante, Kabila and Afriyie (2014)	Stone Quarrying and Livelihood Transformation in Peri-Urban Kumasi	Quantitative method and questionnaire	economic benefits, socio-economic and environmental effects were unsatisfactory
Britwum and Akorsu (2017)	Organising casual workers on in Ghana Oil Palm Development Corporation (GOPDC).	Qualitative- interviews and focus group discussion guides	Innovative strategies for organising workers as well as engage the media were appealing to landowners, traditional leaders, and political powers
Akorsu and Odoi (2017)	collective agency and organising among domestic workers in Ghana		the adoption of self-organised groups of domestic workers by trade unions had several right-claiming challenges

Source: Author's Construct (2017)

Lessons Learned

It is evident from the empirical review that there were various theories used depending on the focus of each study. Studies like Nanor (2011), Gbeve (2014) and Asante, Kabila and Afriyie (2014) which were based on stone quarry activities in the informal economy were much concerned with the environmental impact of quarrying activities on nearby communities. For this reason, the theoretical focus was more of egalitarian and libertarian theoretical perspectives of natural resource governance.

Other later studies (Debdulal, 2014; Akorsu & Odoi, 2017; Britwum & Akorsu, 2017) in the empirical review on organising informal workers also had different theoretical approaches such as the theory of power and ‘structural economic sociology’ developed by Granovetter and Swedberg. The theory of justice underpins the study carried out by Erbach (2014) on the working conditions of informal workers. The theory of justice by Rawls’ was thus adopted in this study serving as the theoretical background for ILOs introduction of a convention on the right to organise and rights to undertake collective bargaining.

All theories underpinning the various studies under the empirical review; however, treated informal workers as vulnerable non-active agents at the mercies of employers/capitalist, a position shared in the neo-liberal theoretical positions reviewed in this study. Meanwhile, this study sees the self-initiated processes of organising abilities of informal quarry workers to demand decent working conditions for its members as a clear indication that informal workers are active agents who can rise to marshal tools, strategies to challenge the status quo in order to attain decent working conditions of workers. It is based on this background that

the theory of collective action missing in all other earlier studies was used in this study.

Both the qualitative and the quantitative approaches from the positivist and interpretivist paradigm were recorded among the studies reviewed. Some other studies also used the three different types of a mixed-method such as explanatory, exploratory sequential mixed methods and current embedded mixed-method from the pragmatist paradigm. Specifically, descriptive design was recorded for studies adopting the quantitative approach. On the other hand, studies from the interpretive and constructionist perspective also adopted multiple case design and exploratory research designs. This study thus used the multiple case study design since this study adopts the qualitative approach or perspective.

In terms of data collection, instruments used in the reviewed studies were a questionnaire, interview schedule, interview guide and observation guide. This study adopts the interview guide, observation guide and documentary review of collective bargaining agreement between informal quarry workers' organisations and management of quarry firms.

Analytical methods of analysis of data were purely descriptive statistics such as mean, median, mode, standard deviations, percentages, frequencies and bar charts and pie chart. In terms of qualitative studies, thematic content analysis was used to analyse qualitative data after transcribing and coding. Thus, this study also adopted a thematic content analysis. The qualitative design of this study thus, helps to delve deeper to ascertain the reasons behind certain actions.

Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework of the study (see Figure 3) shows that neoliberal policies have contributed to the forms of informality. Forms of informality include self-employed, own-account workers/operators, irregular and regular wage quarry workers among others. These forms of informality among the informal stone quarry subsector present different working conditions for male and female quarry workers as well as wage and self-employed quarry workers. The potency of organising to lead to the decent working condition could be direct (as indicated in literature) or indirect through a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Meanwhile, the framework argues that an established CBA and sustenance of decent working conditions achieved under organising depends on management and workers with their leaders' commitment to the process as well as effective monitoring by regulators.




Figure 3: Conceptual framework of the study showing how organising relates to decent working conditions among informal workers.

Source: Adapted from Agyenim (2011), Chen (2012), ILO (2012) and Britwum and Akorsu (2017)

CHAPTER FIVE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

A research methodology is a science of studying how research is carried out. According to Rajasekar, Philominathan and Chinnathambi (2013), research methodology is the procedures by which researchers go about their work of describing, explaining and predicting phenomena. It can also be defined as the study of methods by which knowledge is gained (Bryman, 2008).

Research methodology deals with the various procedures, schemes and algorithms used in research, which are necessarily planned, scientific and value-neutral. Burdess (2010) opined that research methods help researchers to collect data and find a solution to problems by giving explanations based on collected facts, measurements and observations and not on reasoning alone. A research methodology is underpinned by the research philosophies which guide a study process through either inductive and or deductive study approaches as suggested (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009).

Every study is rooted in epistemological and ontological philosophy which leads to a tradition such as positivism and interpretivism. Issues captured in the methodology of this study were the research design and paradigms/philosophy (quantitative or qualitative designs), study area, population, sample and sampling methods, data collection instruments and procedure, data processing and analysis, and chapter summary.

Research Design

There are two main approaches to research such as positivist and interpretivist approaches. The positivist ontology believes that the world is external (Bryman & Bell, 2007) and that there is a single objective reality to any research phenomenon or situation regardless of the researcher's perspective or belief. Thus, positivists take a controlled and structural approach in conducting research by identifying a precise research topic, constructing appropriate hypotheses and adopting a suitable research methodology (Saunders, Lewis, Thornhill, 2009). Positivist researchers maintain a clear distinction between science and personal experience and fact and value judgement. The goal of positivist researchers is to make time and context-free generalisations.

The main features of the positivist approach are quantitative method and large samples are used for generalisation purpose. Additionally, hypotheses are tested, and the reliability and validity of the instrument are insured. According to Creswell (2009), the quantitative research design is a design which leads to findings that are mainly the product of statistical summary and analysis. The main feature of quantitative research is the heavy reliance on data analysis to arrive at findings or conclusions. Frequency distributions are assigned to the properties in the phenomena to represent their qualities.

Closely associated with the positivist and the quantitative approaches is the deductive logic of carrying out a study. Deductive logic places emphasis on arguing from the general to the area of research (Creswell & Clark, 2007). The researcher forms a theory based on hypothesis allowing the conclusions to be deduced which are then examined to establish whether they add to the general knowledge (Creswell

& Clark, 2007). The hypothesis that is formed must be tested empirically, and the researcher must identify the methods of data collection (Bryman & Bell, 2007) the deduction follows processes such as theory, hypothesis, data collection, findings, hypothesis confirmation or rejection and revision of the theory.

In contrast, Creswell and Clark (2007) opined that the interpretivists approach has subjective epistemology that usually follows inductive logic and uses qualitative methods that rely on investigating theories. The theory may be an existing one or one that the researcher creates in order to have in-depth knowledge of the main study. Reliability is low, and validity is high in the findings of the interpretive approach. With the interpretative approach, researchers are subjective in the way they look at their findings and attempt to understand and describe the way people view the world. Moreover, the researcher understands that his interpretation of the findings is influenced by his own culture, beliefs and experience (Creswell, 2009). A key feature of the interpretive approach is qualitative research.

Interpretivism comes from two intellectual traditions such as phenomenology and symbolic interactionism (Livesey, 2006). While phenomenology focuses on how humans make sense of the world around them, symbolic interactionism also interprets the social world and has established that interpretation of actions of others with whom one interacts leads to the adjustment of interpreters' meanings and actions (Bryman, 2008).

Crucial to the interpretive epistemology is that the researcher must adopt an empathetic stance. The challenge here is to enter the research subjects' social world to understand their world from their points of view. According to Livesey (2006),

the interpretive approach has little regard for reliability but high importance to validity in its findings. In the interpretative approach, researchers are subjective in the way they look at their findings and attempt to understand and describe the way people view the world. Moreover, the researcher in the interpretive approach understands that his interpretation of data is influenced by his own culture, beliefs and experience (Creswell, 2009).

This study adopted the qualitative research design from the interpretive approach due to the characteristics and more so because of the need to understand organising and decent working conditions among informal quarry workers from their perspectives or "from their world". This study also adopts the qualitative approach in order to understand the "why and how" organising is undertaken among informal quarry workers and it relates to decent working conditions within ILO's decent work framework.

The specific qualitative research design adopted as a study design was exploratory qualitative study design. According to Merriam (2009), exploratory research design focuses on collecting either secondary or primary data or both using unstructured format. Exploratory research design uses techniques such as focus group interviews and pilot studies.

Merriam (2009), posits three main reasons under which qualitative exploratory research design may be necessary. The first condition is when the researcher wants to identify relevant or salient behaviour pattern, beliefs, opinion, attitudes, motivation and to establish the structure of these constructs. The second condition is when a researcher wants to develop an understanding of the structure of beliefs and attitudes in order to aid the interpretation of data structures. Lastly, it

is to explore issues that respondents may hold deeply, that is difficult for them to rationalise and may find it difficult to articulate.

Exploratory research design is used to explore ideas and understanding. Typical characteristics of the exploratory research design are the flexibility and versatility that it brings to the research process. This study, therefore, adopted the qualitative exploratory design to identify and understand salient behaviour pattern, beliefs, opinion, attitudes as well as to explore organising issues that are held deeply by informal quarry workers that could not be studied very well from the quantitative perspective.

Study Area

The Central Region was chosen for this study because it hosted the piloted Ghana decent work pilot project (GDWPP) in 2002 (Abebrese, 2014). Thus, the Central Region represents the first region in Ghana where the decent work concept was piloted. The Central Region is also noted for high deposit of granite. Additionally, the region is located between the Greater Accra Region, Ashanti Region, Western Region and Eastern Region which are the busiest for commercial activities and urbanization activities in terms of constructions in Ghana. This means that there are high demand and competition for quarry products from the Central Region by these other regions. Thus, the Central Region obviously stands tall among all the regions to be selected for this study. Hence, the presentation on the study area basically starts with the Central Region and later specific districts in the region.

Central Region

Central Region was the former administrative centre of the Gold Coast. Its capital, Cape Coast, with the local name Oguaa was the capital of the Gold Coast until 1877 when the capital was moved to Accra (GSS, 2013). Central Region shares common boundaries with Western Region on the west, Ashanti and Eastern Regions the north, and Greater Accra Region to the east. On the south is the 168-kilometre Atlantic Ocean (Gulf of Guinea) coastline (GSS, 2013).

Workers in the region can be found in about 19 industries (GSS, 2013). The education sector employs 4.7 per cent of people within the working population; 42.6 per cent were employed in agriculture; 17.3 per cent were employed in the wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles industry, and 11.6 per cent were employed in the manufacturing sector (GSS, 2013).

In terms of stone quarry activities which is the focus of this study, the statistics were added to small scale mining and the subsector employed about 0.9 per cent of all workers (aged 15 years and above) in the region. The mining and quarrying industry is rated the 11th most important industry in terms of the percentage or the number of people employed per industry in the region.

In 2010 the population of Central Region was 2,201,863, accounting for about 8.9 per cent of the population of Ghana with an annual growth rate of 3.1 per cent. It occupies an area of 4.1 per cent of Ghana's land area, making it the third smallest in the area after Greater Accra and Upper East (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013).

The Central Region of Ghana has 17 districts and 19 constituencies (GSS, 2013). Out of the 878,593 workers in the Central Region, mining and quarrying

employed about 79,073 people in the Central Region. The percentage distribution of this population along mining and quarrying activities in the respective districts in the Central Region is summed up in Table 2.

Table 2: Level of Mining and Stone Quarrying Activities per Districts in the Central Region of Ghana

SN	Districts in the Central Region of Ghana	Number of people employed (all industries)	% employed in Mining and Quarrying
1	Upper Denkyira West	54,767	8.6
2	Upper Denkyira East	60,330	5.3
3	Twifo-Hemang-Lower Denkyira	47,292	1.6
4	Assin North Municipal	74,286	1.1
5	<i>Gomoa East</i>	<i>57,465</i>	<i>1.0</i>
6	Effutu Municipal	52,975	0.8
7	<i>KEEA Municipal</i>	<i>23,937</i>	<i>0.6</i>
8	<i>Gomoa West</i>	<i>79,199</i>	<i>0.6</i>
9	Mfantsiman Municipal	79,517	0.5
10	<i>Cape Coast Metro</i>	<i>34,757</i>	<i>0.2</i>
11	Abura-Asebu-Kwamankese	48,281	0.2
12	Ewutu Senya	46,683	0.2
13	Ajumako-Enyan-Essiam	41,957	0.1
14	Agona East	70,072	0.1
15	Agona West Municipal	48,243	0.1
16	Assin South	32,829	0.1
17	Asikuma-Odoben-Brakwa	26,003	0.1

Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2013)

From Table 2, Upper Denkyira West (8.6), Upper Denkyira East (5.3) and Twifo-Hemang-Lower Denkyira (1.6) recorded the highest number of people engaged in mining and quarrying activities. However, reconnaissance visits to these districts suggest that mining dominated stone quarrying. Thus, the first three

districts are highly influenced by the number of workers engaged in mining rather than stone quarrying activities. This further confirmed that data on stone quarrying activities and specially documented quarry sites in Ghana are scarce as compared to those on mining because the quarry industry is under-researched.

In terms of the numbers of people employed in the mining and quarrying subsectors, the 4th to 9th were Assin North Municipal (1.1); Gomoa East (1.0); Effutu Municipal (0.8); and KEEA Municipal (0.6), Gomoa West (0.6); and Mfantsiman Municipal (0.5). The study selected four districts out of the six districts to represent stone quarry workers (see Figure 4). These were Cape Coast Metropolis for Own Account Workers/operators, Gomoa East, KEEA Municipal and Gomoa West chosen for regular wage informal stone quarry workers. Reconnaissance and anecdotal evidence suggest that both mining and stone quarrying have the same prominence in these districts and in some cases the latter has performed better. Hence, the choice of these districts for the study. All other districts were therefore not included in the study.



Figure 4: Districts map of the Central Region of Ghana

Source: Author's Own Construct

Population

The study population was 39,536 stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana. These workers are mostly found in the four districts where stone quarry activities were mostly found. These districts were Gomoa East, Gomoa West, KEEA and Cape Coast Metropolis. Four sites representing four quarry firms were selected from three districts out of the four districts to represent temporal/casual wage quarry workers. These quarry firms were Pilot Quarry Ltd,

Executive Quarry, Sarcon Quarry Ltd and Melliss Quarry Ltd. Self-employed workers were selected from Cape Coast Metropolis. Reasons for not including other quarries located in the Central Region study is explained next section.

The management of GN Quarry (located in KEEA district) indicated that the working conditions of their workers were not for public consumption and do not have casual/temporal workers that were of interest to this study. Meanwhile, an informant in the quarry indicated otherwise. For this reason, GN Quarry was not involved in the study. Also, as at the time of data collection, Modern Kosa Quarry Ltd (located in Goma East) had had a machine breakdown, and there was no worker at site hence it could not be included in the study. M & J Quarry (located in Abura Asebu Kwamankese district) was also not included since the Minerals Commission temporarily closed the quarry as at the time of data collection. Nsokot Quarry located in Senya Awutu East could also not be included in the study because it had been in operation for barely six months as at the time of data collection.

Sample and Sampling Procedure

Sampling methods adopted for the selection of respondent was multistage sampling techniques from the non-probability sampling techniques to cater to the qualitative dimensions of the study (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merriam, 2009). Specifically, the purposive sampling method was used to select two management members of two quarry firms, two inspectors of mines from the Minerals Commission, and a representative from the Environmental Protection Agency.

The rest of the respondents purposively selected were three labour inspectors from both district and Regional Labour Office, two Trade Union

representatives, an administrator each from Ojobi Clinic, Breku Clinic, St Gregory Catholic Hospital, OTMS Clinic, Sanford World Clinic and Kisi Health facilities were interviewed (see Table 3). According to Davis (2009), purposive sampling is a non-probability sampling method where samples are often chosen for a particular purpose. That is, respondents are chosen because they can serve as *informants* or people who can give the researcher inside information about the group the researcher is studying.

Snowball sampling technique was employed to select wage temporal/casual quarry workers. An employer of some of a quarry firm refused involvement in the study. Thus, the only way to identify casual/temporal quarry workers was through the recommendation by other workers. According to Davis (2009), snowball sampling is a sampling method adopted in a research study when participants in the study are asked to make referrals to other potential participants, who in turn make referrals to other participants, and so on.

Table 3: Categories of Sample Drawn for the Study

Sample Categorization	Sample
Self-employed quarry workers	27
Wage Quarry Workers	77
Labour Inspectors	03
Inspector of Mines	02
Administrators of Health Facilities	06
A Representative from EPA	01
Trade Union Reps	02
Management of Quarry Firms	03
Total	121

Source: Field data (2018)

A sample of 121 comprising 27 self-employed (self-employed workers); 77 waged casual/temporal quarry workers, three labour inspectors, two trade union reps and two inspectors of mines were drawn for the study. The rest of the sample was, six administrators of health facilities; a representative from the Environmental Protection Agency, and three management members of three quarry firms from the selected districts were selected for the study.

Data Collection

This section on data collection focuses on data needs, data type, sources of data, methods and instruments used. Data needs for the study basically focuses on organising strategies, forms of organizing, actors in organising informal quarry workers, forms of informality, causes and challenges of informal quarry workers. Other data needs were indicators of decent workings conditions such as employment and workers' rights, safe working environment and social protection.

Data type was exclusively qualitative from multiple data sources based on the qualitative research design used. In terms of data sources, two main data sources were used - primary and secondary data sources. Primary data collected from respondents purposely for the study was done using interview schedules, observation guides, and focus group discussion guide. Secondary data collection dealt with the analysis of collective bargaining agreement, an outcome of organising in quarry firms to determine the extent to which it influences decent working conditions among stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana. Two main methods of data collection adopted were interviewing and observation. The interviews included unstructured in-depth individual interviews and focus

group discussions. Observations conducted focused on non-participant observations.

Data collection instruments were mainly the unstructured interview protocol/guide and the focus group discussion guide supported by a non-participant observation guide and documentary review. Hair, Bush and Ortinau, (2003) stated that an interview is a form of question characterised by verbal questioning of respondents for answers in face to face situation or by phone, it helps to elicit information that could not be obtained and to crosscheck the views expressed on the questionnaire items.

Hair, Bush and Ortinau (2003) stated that Focus Group is a type of in-depth interview carried out in a group whose meetings present features defined with respect to composition, size, proposal, and interview procedures. The focus or object of analysis is the interaction inside the group. The participants influence each other through their answers to the ideas and contributions during the discussion. The moderator stimulates discussion with subjects. The fundamental data produced by this technique are the transcripts of the group discussions and the moderator's reflections and annotations.

Observation, as the second research instrument is a technique that involves systematically selecting, watching and recording behaviour and characteristics of living beings, objects or phenomena (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Observing human behaviour can take two main forms such as participant observation (the observer takes part in the situation he or she observes), and non-participant observation (the observer watches the situation, openly or concealed, but does not participate). The rest are: open, conceal general or more focused observation. This study adopts the

more focused non-participant observation methods for its data collection. Quarry sites and process, as well as workers' group meetings, were observed. Main issues observed centred on gender dynamics in activities carried out by worker organisations and the quarry processes.

The last instrument for data collection for this study was a documentary review. Document review is a way of gathering data by reviewing existing documents. The documents may be internal to a program or external. Documents may be electronic or hard copy and may include program logs, reports, funding proposals, performance ratings, meeting minutes, newsletters, and marketing materials (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

A documentary review is needed when a researcher wants to gather background information, determine if the implementation of the program reflects program plans, and s/he need the information to help develop other data collection tools for evaluation. A drafted collective bargaining agreement yet to be signed by both trade union representatives both at the national and the enterprise levels, and management of executive quarry ltd was reviewed. The review was to show how informal quarry workers as an active agent were able to organize to achieve this success. This review also indicated how conditions of informal quarry workers could be improved through organising.

Instrument Design

All the four instruments apart from the documentary review were divided into two main sections; Sections A and B respectively focused on demographic characteristics and issues bothering on the objectives of the study. Section B was

further divided into four parts. Part 1 dealt with major themes such as forms and causes of informality, needs and challenges of informal stone quarry workers. Part 2 also addressed issues with regards to the determinants of decent working conditions of stone quarry workers. These were employment and workers' rights, safe working environment and social protection. Part 3 of section B was used to tackle issues that relate to forms of organising, actors of organising, organising strategies, challenges associated with organising among others.

The last part which was part 4 also assesses how organising relates to decent working conditions of stone quarry workers. This last part examined how collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between management and workers, a by-product of organising leads to decent working conditions for informal stone quarry workers. It compares the working conditions of quarry workers before and after the introduction of CBA.

Reliability and Validity

Reliability and Validity carry different connotation with regards to qualitative study and quantitative study. Qualitative reliability indicates that a procedure used by a researcher is consistent across different researchers and different projects (Gibbs, 2007). Gibbs (2007) and Yin's (2003) suggestions on the need for detailed documentation among other steps were used as guidelines for ensuring reliability in this study. Specifically, the following steps were taken in this study.

Firstly, in terms of data management, transcripts were checked to remove obvious mistakes and avoidance of drifting in the "definition for codes" by consistently comparing data with codes as well as writing memos and their

definitions about codes. Another step taken as part of the reliability procedure was manual coding and checking for 'inter-coder agreement' where other persons were engaged to crosscheck the codes. These other persons engaged in this activity were competent qualitative data analyst in the department. Trained research assistants and the researcher's transcriptions were then compared to that of the analyst in the department. 'Inter-coder agreement' in this study sort to achieve agreement between coders on codes used for the same passage in the text. The aim was not to code the same passage of text but whether another coder would code it with the same or similar code.

Qualitative validity, on the other hand, is one of the strengths of qualitative research and involves the tendency for the procedures employed by a researcher to result in accuracy of findings (Creswell, 2009). According to Creswell, qualitative validity refers to determining whether the findings of a study are accurate from the standpoint of the researcher, the participant or the readers of an account.

The triangulation method which allows data to be obtained from different sources was the first strategy used to ensure validity. For this study data collected from quarry workers were compared to what was obtained from the management of these quarry companies, trade unions, regulatory agencies such as labour and mines' inspectors and EPA. Different data collection instruments were also employed, and data obtained with one instrument was equally compared with data obtained from other instruments. The focus group discussion guide was limited to only casual quarry workers. An in-depth individual interview guide was used to gather data from some quarry workers.

A key informant interview guide was used for management reps of quarry firms, regulatory agency representatives and trade union representatives. Observation guide and documentary review were equally employed to validate what respondents had indicated in separate interviews. Thus, by employing data collection methods such as interviews, observations and documentary review, it was expected that the validity of the outcome of the study would be achieved. Secondly, member checking was equally adopted wherein a follow-up interview with some respondents in the study; opportunities were given to them to comment on some earlier findings.

Thirdly, the researcher's own bias brought to the study were indicated. This is what Creswell (2009) termed as researcher's self-reflection (reflexivity) and deals with how his/ her interpretation of the findings is shaped by his/her background characteristics such as gender, culture, history and socioeconomic origin. For this reason, a brief background about the research with regards to the aforementioned areas was provided in the last chapter of the study.

Another strategy adopted to ensure the validity of the outcome of this study (the fourth strategy) was spending prolonged time on the field. Prolonged time in this context is relative but the focus is to make sure the researcher gets an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon under study and allow one to obtain detailed information about the site and the people that lend credibility to the narrative account (Creswell, 2009). Thus, for this study, considerable time (about ten months out of 24 months) was used for the data collection. The ten months' time-space was spent on reconnaissance visits, data collection and follow up on data collection. The reconnaissance visits afforded the researcher the opportunity to understand the

settings better, build rapport with respondents as well as ensure easy entry into these sites for the main data collection.

The fifth strategy adopted to ensure validity was peer debriefing. To achieve this, two PhD colleagues and an external ‘debriefing’ read, reviewed and asked questions about the qualitative study. The outcome of this strategy helped enhance the accuracy of the research accounts. The last strategy adopted to ensure qualitative validity in this study was the use of external auditors who reviewed the entire project. Before the external auditors were engaged, two internal auditors in the capacity of principal and co-supervisors and an associate professor of the School for Development Studies, UCC, assisted in auditing the entire work. This first step set the tone for external auditors who were not known to the researcher, chosen by the Department of Integrated Development Studies, University of Cape Coast for the external auditing of the entire study.

Entry Procedure

Entry into the study area was done in phases. The first phase was basically for reconnaissance visits to all quarry sites selected for the studies. The duration for reconnaissance visits was six months. These visits enabled the researcher to introduce himself to various possible respondents of the study. The entry depended largely on key informants. At this early stage of the process, non-participants observation was heavily relied upon. The second phase of entry into the study sites was the main data collection which largely depended on gains and acquaintances initiated in the reconnaissance phase. The entry for the second phase was also made possible by introductory letters from the university further introducing the

researcher to research participants. The last phase of entry into the study sites was purposely to validate analysed data based on data collected from respondents.

Ethical Issues

Gravetter and Forzano (2006) stated that research ethics concern the responsibility of researchers, to be honest, and respectful to all individuals who are affected by the research studies or their reports of the studies' results. The first step taken in this study about ethics in research was to obtain ethical clearance from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the University of Cape Coast. The IRB of the University of Cape Coast granted the researcher an approval with ethical clearance identification number of *UCCIRB/CHLS/2018/04* to carry out the study on the chosen topic. The ethical clearance given by the board to the researcher was an indication that the board had assessed the protocol and determined that it would not violate ethical principles in research. Find attached a copy of the IRB's letter in Appendix D.

The second step taken with respect to ethics in research was to obtain an introductory letter from the Institute for Development Studies of the College of Humanities and Legal Studies, University of Cape Coast. The introductory letter from the department was forwarded to the management of the four quarry firms chosen for the study. Other stakeholders who received the introductory letter were health administrators, Central Regional Labour Office, the chief inspector of mines at Minerals Commission, Accra, Cantonments, among others. The introductory letter was successfully used to seek the consent of participants to be involved in the study. Apart from the management of two of the quarries involved in this study, all

other recipients consented to be included in the study. In some cases, the researcher followed up with other letters (at the request of specific authorities) clarifying specific data that would be needed for the study.

Upon the submission of the introductory letter, the management of two out of the four quarry firms involved in this study sought clarification from the researcher on several issues. These issues cover why the sites were chosen, what activities would occur at the site during the research study, whether the study would be disruptive and what the sites chosen would gain from the study. After addressing these issues and others on data collection method with the management, data collection dates were successfully scheduled.

Another important measure adopted to meet the ethical requirement in research was to explain the purpose of the interview to research respondents and address terms of confidentiality. Additionally, the format of the interview was explained, the duration of the interview was indicated, and interviewees clarified any doubt about the interview before data collection started. Permission was also sought from respondents to record the interview, and the mode of the recording was also made known to the respondents. In all cases, respondents' consent was sought before the interview was administered. Lastly, to address anonymity in this study, the four quarries used in the study have been represented with pseudo names such as Quarries A, B, C and D in the analysis chapters of this study.

Expected information to be collected was on the legal operation of respondents. However, where information on illegal operation of respondents was obtained, such information was only used with consent from such a respondent/s and if it would not harm and identify such respondent/s. This is because the

researcher is not obliged to disclose such illegal information about respondents and it is unethical to reveal such information that could subject respondents to any form of harm.

Field Work

The researcher with three specially trained research assistants went to the field for data gathering. The data gathering process had two phases. The first phase was reconnaissance visits carried out in June 2017 to June 2018 which helped in coming out with the problem statement and research instruments. The first part of the second phase was the main data collection from the field, started from July to December 2018.

Forty-seven individual in-depth interviews comprising eight females and thirty-nine males were conducted with some informal quarry workers as well as administrators and representatives from EPA, Labour office, Minerals Commission, and TUC. These interviews were conducted in the offices of representatives of all the regulatory agencies as well as trade union representatives and management of quarry firms at an agreed time during their break time. Work premises and specially arranged venues outside the workplace were used as venues to conduct individual in-depth interviews with the quarry workers. Break time and after work period was used for the interview with quarry workers. The in-depth individual interviews were conducted from 15th June to October 30th, 2018.

Twelve (12) focus group discussions (eight male groups and four female groups comprising eight members each) were also carried out for only some temporal/casual and own-account workers from the five quarry sites in the four

districts adopted for the study. The focus group discussion took place at both work premises and a specially arranged venue for data collection during and after working hours. The focus group discussion validated or triangulated data obtained through individual in-depth interviews. The focus group discussion guide was carried out in August 2018. Additionally, three male group interviews were also conducted. The three research assistants who were experienced qualitative researchers were further briefed and trained before the main data collection. The training took place at the College of Distance Education on 14th May 2018.

The non-participant observation guide was also used for triangulation purposes. This was done during and after the reconnaissance studies, interviews and focus group discussions. Workers, management relationship, working environment among other things were observed. The second part of the second phase of the data collection and follow up interviews took place in September 2018. The main field challenge was that the management of one quarry firms did not want their workers to join their study. This was addressed by arranging and meeting these workers outside the work premises after work.

Data Management and Analysis

In any qualitative study, the data collection and analysis occur concurrently. Data analysis involved collecting data from asking general questions and developing an analysis from the information supplied by participants. The type of analysis engaged in depends on the type of case study. According to Creswell (2009), in case studies and ethnographic research, the researcher gives a detailed

description of setting or individuals, followed by the analysis of the data for themes or issues.

The unit of analysis for the study was informal quarry worker with/as either a quarry company or as a self-employed quarry worker. The data for this study (qualitative data) was analysed by employing several steps, the first of which was organising and preparing the data for analysis. This specifically dealt with transcribing the interview data gathered and sorting the data into different types according to sources of information. Transcripts were read through to obtain a general impression and overall meaning. Notes and general impressions were written in the margins of the transcripts.

Thirdly, the transcribed data was coded by organising the transcripts into chunks and segments of text. Specifically, the coding involved taking the text data gathered, segmenting sentences and labelling those categories with terms. After this, a list of all topics was made and clustered based on similarity to form categorisation based on the objectives of the study. Codes were based on both what was identified in the literature, addressing broader theoretical perspective (predetermined) and other codes emerging from data collected from participants.

The next step that was taken after coding was the description for categories, themes and respondents. The study used themes such as informality, working conditions, organising and decent work based on the objectives of the study. These themes also had several layers. For example, informality had layers such as forms and drivers. The process also included some specific illustrations, multiple perspectives from individual quotations. The last step used for data analysis in this

study was an interpretation or assigning meaning to data from the researcher's perspective based on the literature reviewed.

This study specifically used qualitative interpretative analysis. Morrison (2012) states that the interpretative analysis in the qualitative study involves deduction from the data obtained, relies more on what it feels like “to be a participant in the action” understudy. In an interpretative analysis, the researchers rely on their experience of settings to be able to read the information provided by the subjects involved in the study. Theories and conceptual issues supported by labour laws and ILO's decent work framework captured in literature represent the "experiences and settings" of this study upon which empirical data from the field were compared. The interpretative qualitative analysis adopted in this study also made use of thematic analysis where research questions guided the processes of data analysis. Before the analysis, the interview data were transcribed and coded according to the emerging themes but guided by the research questions. The research questions served as the major themes under which sub-themes were put.

Reflexivity

This section highlights the researchers' biases and how they might have affected the outcome of the study and how readers should regard the results of this study. The researcher is a teaching staff in one of the public universities in Ghana with a background in management studies and majored explicitly in human resource development and development studies. The researcher is born and brought up in a patriarchal society and cultural setting in Ghana.

Stone quarry activities have both environmental and labour issues. However, due to the academic background of the researcher, the environmental effects of the stone quarrying activities were not reported or analysed in this study. The researcher was culturally brought up in a male-dominated society, and this could have also affected the importance attached to some of the issues reported by females. Despite these biases, all principles of scientific research have been followed in carrying out the study and analysing the result. Thus, the findings reported should be respected in that regard.

Chapter Summary

In conclusion, this chapter has explained and justified the use of qualitative and the interpretive philosophical approach for this study. Additionally, the chapter also discussed the qualitative multiple case designs or strategy as well as the purposive and simple random sampling techniques used. From the discussion in the chapter, it came to light that the qualitative dimension adopted posed subjective challenges to the overall generalisability of some outcomes of the study. This limitation notwithstanding, the researcher's subjective objectivism contributed to the quality and objective-subjective position of the study and its findings.

CHAPTER SIX
FORMS AND DRIVERS OF INFORMALITY AMONG STONE QUARRY
WORKERS

Introduction

This chapter looks at the empirical findings from the field on informality among stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana. Specific issues addressed in the chapter include forms of informality and drivers of informality among stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana. The analysis in this chapter is based on in-depth individual interviews and focus group interview data collected from quarry workers. Responses from the management of the four quarry firms as well as observation data are also used for the analysis.

Forms of Informality among Stone Quarry Workers in the Central Region of Ghana

This subsection looks at labour forms or categorisation that exists among informal quarry workers. It also considers the gender segregation associated with forms of informality among informal stone quarry workers. The analysis in this chapter is based on the conceptual framework of the study as well as the Labour Act of Ghana (2003) (Act, 651). Six primary forms of informality captured in the conceptual framework were employers, regular informal waged workers, self-employed without workers, casual, informal waged workers, industrial out worker's/home workers and unpaid family workers. The theory of neoliberalism and the three approaches or perspectives of informality such as dualists, alternative

and structural articulation schools of thought and most importantly the conceptual framework guided the analysis in the chapter.

In order to understand the informality context, the analysis centred on four quarry sites. During the FGD and individual interviews, respondents revealed three main forms of informality. The first form of informality identified among stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana was casual wage quarry workers. Casual wage quarry workers found in the subsector were workers who had worked with a quarry firm for more than six months without the regularisation of their engagement. The Ghanaian Labour Act, 2003, (Act 651) section 78; defines “casual worker” to mean ‘a worker engaged in a work which is seasonal or intermittent and not for a continuous period of more than six months and whose remuneration is calculated daily. Though the casual workers identified in this study had worked for more than the required six months, employers were still treating them as such without any intention of making them permanent workers.

Technically, per the dictates of section 78 of the Labour Act of Ghana (Act, 651), the casual status should end at a maximum of 6 months. If the employer still needs the services of the worker after the six months, then steps would have to be taken to make such a worker a permanent worker. It was, however, found that these casual quarry workers had worked for more than six months and yet remained as temporal workers. Reasons cited for the continuous "casualty" were employers desire to reduce the cost of operation since the cost of keeping permanent workers was far more than that of casual workers, and lack of employment avenues in the country.

The second form of informality identified was irregular contract quarry workers. It was only one quarry firm that irregularly hired the services of contract workers. This category of workers was, however, not observed for the other three quarry firms involved in this study. Section 78 of the Labour Act described this type of workers as temporal and defined them to be "a worker who is employed for a continuous period of not less than one month and is not a permanent worker or employed for a work that is seasonal in character". This means that the contract workers' engagement with the quarry firms was not regular. Sometimes this worker gets a contract once in a month or every three months. Meanwhile, in the parlance of the quarry workers, any other work apart from a permanent worker was termed as a casual worker. Thus, in this study, casual workers are adopted for this study.

The third form of informality identified among informal stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana was self-employed quarry workers also referred to as own-account workers. This category of informal workers identified was particularly located in the Cape Coast Metropolis. Self-employed quarry workers served as retailers within the chain of quarrying activities and buy their stock from quarry firms located at Atabadzi, Elmina. Self-employed quarry workers buy larger grades of rocks from the quarry firms; break them further into smaller sizes for retail purposes. This was generally confirmed in the entire focus group discussions and individual in-depth interviews with workers supported the following quote:

We buy both the medium size rocks and small chippings from quarries such as Ndum Quarry and further retail to individuals who buy in small quantity. Those who buy in large quantity like "Double Axle Cars", "Tipper and Kia" do not buy from us. (Non-Waged Workers).

It is clear from the above quote that self-employed quarry workers served as intermediaries between quarry firms and individual customers who buy quarry products. It emerged that self-employed quarry workers were competing with these quarry companies. However, these quarry firms had the opportunities to sell to other retailers and wholesalers within the marketing chain of quarry products.

The main forms of informality among informal stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana were three out of the six categorisations (which are regular wage, irregular contract and self-employed quarry workers) that exist in literature and the conceptual framework of the study. It also means that only informal waged workers (regular) and self-employed quarry workers (and sometimes contract workers) out of the six categorisations found in the conceptual framework of the study were supported by this study. The reason why the other three categorisations in the conceptual framework were not found in this study could be due to the limited focus of this study on only stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana. Chen's study, however, was broader in focus and looked at the entire informal economy of six selected developing economies from Asia and Africa.

The next section under the forms of informality looks at the sex categorization amongst the three forms of informality identified of quarry workers

in the Central Region of Ghana. This is based on WIEGO's model developed by Chen (2012) presented in chapter three. The model argues that the various forms of informality appeal to different-sex categorization.

Sex categorizations identified among the regular wage (casual/temporal) quarry workers and contract quarry workers were both male and female sex categorization. The male regular wage quarry workers were artisans with very low educational level. Some of these male wage quarry workers had professional certificates in driving, welding, masonry, carpentry, electrician or mechanic. Other male temporal male quarry workers who had no artisanal certificates were found as cleaners, security and labourers.

In terms of schedules for male regular wage quarry workers as can be seen in Figure 5, it was found that labourers who had no skill were trained to attend to crusher machines. The labourers were also responsible for the cleaning of machines and vehicles after work to make them ready for crushing activities. Graded welders were also responsible for welding the excavator's "bucket" and speedloaders among others. Mechanics were in charge of repairing the machines and cars, changing the oil filters, changing oil and total overhauling and resolving engine-related problems. Operators also continue after the repairs by the mechanics. The operators further break down rocks into smaller sizes as well as loading the cars of customers with the gravel/stones.

Despite the specific schedules for these workers in their specific departments, it was also revealed in an individual interview that there was some job rotation. That is some male wage workers were taken to other departments to assist

especially when there were no other tasks to be performed by specific workers in their specific departments.

Job schedules for female regular wage quarry workers were limited to either clerical or administrative duties such as issuing receipts (see the profile of quarry workers in Figure 5), checking the buckets of customers or checking and recording of car numbers and cooking or cleaning services for female quarry workers. There was no female temporal quarry worker observed among the male counterparts in the field undertaking the main stone quarry activities. The main reason for females absence in the main fieldwork was the perception that stone quarry activity was “difficult” for women to do. A female quarry worker admitted that women were weak and could not do the main stone quarrying activities in the field. A female FGD participant shared widely accepted view of the group that: “*oh we women are not strong and cannot do the fieldwork that is why we are in the office doing the clerical activities*” (Waged worker).

There was the notion or the perception that the stone quarrying activity was a difficult job reserved for men. Some women still believed that they were weak in terms of dexterity or physical strength as compared to their male counterparts to take up certain job opportunities.

Additionally, it was also discovered through interviews with management of these quarries that in the general history of the operations of these four quarry firms, no female worker had ever applied or qualified to work in any of the artisanal departments of these quarry firms. From the individual interviews, a management

member explained that the lack of female participation in the fieldwork of quarrying activities is lack of the required skills:

For now, we have not had any woman with the experience of working on the machines to crush stones applying for a job in this company. The women we have are mostly administrative workers, and they are about five out of 35 casual workers we have. (Management Member).

The unavailability of female quarry workers in the fieldwork was basically based on qualification and abilities of the individual that works with the quarry firms. The exclusion of women also relates to the labour market segmentation where different characteristics appeal to the different-sex categorization of labour. Interviews and observations suggest that female regular quarry workers were in the minority as compared to their male counterparts. An observation that was also true for all the other three-quarry firms.

The finding of this study shows that there were more male workers among wage quarry workers with quarry firms. The result is in tandem with the finding of Chen (2012) who found the same in Ghana, Egypt, Costa Rica; India, El Salvador and South Africa. The findings on the male dominance in the stone quarry subsector further agree with the findings that quarry workers in Ghana were made up of 31.7% females and 69.3% males, an indication that the sector is attracted to both sexes in terms of employment (Nanor, 2011). Gbadebo, Kehinde, and Adedeji (2012) findings that quarry sites in Nigeria had more male workers as compared to female workers also share similarities with the findings of the current study.

Sex categorisation observed for self-employed quarry workers, however, was purely female-dominated. Almost all the self-employed quarry workers observed in the Cape Coast metropolis were female quarry workers except for the one male self-employed worker observed. The reason for which women dominated this form of quarry activity was men usually perceive self-employed quarry activities along the value chain as 'demeaning' and not very lucrative. This was confirmed in a male focus group interview that:

"Sometime ago men were involved, but I guess they have had some better jobs and have stopped and for now only elderly women are engaged in this level of activity in this area. Our husbands now prefer to do better work and no longer want to do stone quarry activity". (Waged Workers).

Men who use to be engaged in self-employed quarry activities were only there as a temporary measure but had better job opportunities either in the same informal or formal economy. This agrees with the dualist approach on the informal economy that jobs in the informal economy are temporal jobs awaiting permanent jobs upon expansion of the formal economy (Kay, 2011). The quotation also points to the fact that men were mostly found in activities that earned them higher income as compared to female counterparts. This result is in line with the conceptual framework and WIEGO model and the study that women are found in the poorest informal activities.

It emerged from the FGD sessions and observations that there were female children helping their mothers at the site (see plat 9). Children were seen at the

quarry site after school between 3:30 pm to 6:00 pm on weekdays and within all working hours on Saturdays and holidays. These children assist in the further breaking of the big stones into smaller sizes. Some children explained in an interview at the quarry site that their parents sometimes entrust operation and selling activities under their care on Saturdays. This normally happens when parents of these children were attending funerals and weddings of either colleague workers or relatives. The two quotes below respectively confirm the assertion.

Yes, our children help us after school or weekends when such help from them will not interrupt their academic work or activities...I used to come here with my grandmother when I was four years. I only observed till I was seven years before I started working with her...We come here after school and the whole of Saturdays, but we do not come on Sunday...(Non-waged workers).

Children activities at the site did not prevent these children from going to school. However, there was a possibility that their engagement could affect their academic activities. This is because these children hardly get time to attend to academic activities after school since they were present at the site on Saturdays and holidays. This result corroborates that of ILO (2015) which observed that children involved in quarrying activities might perform poorly academically.

Profile of Quarry Workers in the Selected Quarries in the Central Region

The profile of quarry workers in selected quarries in the Central Region along the stone quarrying processes can be found in Figure 5. Stone Quarry workers

along the quarrying processes are divided into formal/permanent and informal/temporal workers. The formal quarry workers were in the management and supervisory positions in the quarry firms. The formal quarry workers had both male and female composition. This study focuses on the informal quarry workers who are divided into two such as those working with the quarry firms called waged quarry workers and those working on their own called self-employed quarry workers. The rest of the section looks at the detailed profile of their activities along with the quarrying processes.

Informal male quarry workers (wage workers) were mainly artisans with professional certificates in welding, masonry, carpentry, electrical, security & driving among others. Informal female wage quarry workers also had secretarial certificates and some of them also serves as cleaners and cooks at quarry firms. Age of informal male quarry workers ranges from 24 to 60 years while that of self-employed quarry workers (females) ranges from 20 years to 70 years. Most of these informal quarry workers hold secondary school certificates while the others (in the case of self-employed quarry workers) had no formal education but learned the trade from their parents. Tenure for informal wage quarry workers (males and females) ranges from a month to ten years and that self-employed quarry workers (females) ranged from one year to twenty-five (25) years.

The first field activity of the stone quarrying (see figure 5) is detonating and blasting of the rocks with chemicals. Though experts blasting firms do this for some quarries, male informal quarry workers were used by the other quarry firms for blasting the rocks. The decision to use the expert firm or informal male quarry

workers was, however, dependent on management members who were permanent workers.

The next stage was the conveyance of the blasted rocks (big rocks) by drivers (informal wage workers) supervised by formal/permanent worker into the primary chamber for the first level crushing. The crushing is done by crushing machine operated by informal crusher operators (male) under the supervision of a permanent worker. However, before the crushing begins, welders, labourers and mechanics repair and prepare the system for effective blasting. The primary crushing further breaks the blasted rocks into mid-range sizes. Self-employed quarry workers (SEQW) (predominantly women) buy midrange rocks from the quarry firms for further breaking and retailing to their customers at their separate workplaces. Meanwhile, this latter category of informal quarry workers was supported by family members and children in their day to day operations.

The third stage of the quarrying processes in the quarries is to break further the midrange rocks into smaller rocks at the secondary level crushing unit by crusher operators who were male informal workers. The smaller rocks from the secondary crushing unit then move to the screen box with varied nets where different grades of gravels are determined under the operation of crusher operators (informal male workers).




Figure 5: Profile of stone quarry workers along the quarrying process from the field to the market

Source: Field data, 2019

The excavator and speedloader operators then load and convey these varied gravels into a yard where stockpiles of gravels are kept for marketing and sales to customers/final consumers such as building and road contractors among others. The marketing and sales activities were done by clerical staff who were solely female informal quarry workers. The entire quarry processes (see figure 5) do not depend on only customers' orders but also quarry firms or self-employed quarry workers start the processes and keep the worked-on gravels for sale at their stockpiles.

Perceived Drivers of Informality among Stone Quarry Workers

This subsection examined reasons informal quarry workers assigned for choosing to work in the informal economy of the stone quarry subsector. These reasons are also termed as push factors or factors responsible for informal stone quarry activities in the Central Region of Ghana. The analysis hinges on data provided by both self-employed and regular wage quarry workers from the four quarry firms selected for the study in addition to that of management of the four quarry firms.

This subsection's analysis helps to examine the extent to which existing drivers/factors identified in the literature by Sibhat (2014), ILO (2014) and Mwaniki (2015) such as economic restructuring, globalisation, poverty and limited livelihood, and the lack of economic growth have influenced informality. The drivers identified to be responsible for informality are then traced to specific approaches on informality in order to make a case for the dominant approach/approaches in the informal stone quarry subsector.

The first factor or reason identified from the empirical findings responsible for informal stone quarry activities in the Central Region of Ghana was lack of employment avenues/opportunities in the country. Lack of employment opportunities, according to both informal regular wage quarry workers and self-employed quarry workers has resulted in difficulties if not impossible for them to be engaged in informal jobs. According to these respondents, they needed a job to be able to take care of themselves, their children and any other family dependants. A participant of the FGD voiced a widely shared view that: “*Master, there is no better job in the country "ooo" and we have families to cater for, so we are forced to do something. After all, it is said, "a bad job can never be likened to stealing"* (Waged workers).

From the quote, it is clear that regular wage stone quarry workers would have preferred to work in different subsectors. This means that the stone quarrying activities were their last resort in their attempt to find a job or livelihood. This, according to these wage quarry workers, was due to the tediousness of the quarrying activities as well as the high level of risk associated with it. It can also be deduced from the quote that these informal wage quarry workers stood the chance of quitting the stone quarry subsector anytime they find a decent or respectful job of their preference.

Two dimensions of the result of this study, support what was found in the literature. The first dimension was unemployment as a driving force of informality in the stone quarry subsector which agrees with the findings of Sibhat (2014) and ILO (2014) that found unemployment to be a driving force behind informal jobs in

developing countries. The dualist approach or perspective by Geeta and Knight (2006) and Borjas (2008) that workers in the informal economy use informal jobs as a “lunch pad“ for permanent jobs in the formal sector is also upheld.

The second reason identified as a driving force for informality in the stone quarry subsector was employers’ desire to reduce the cost of operation since the cost of taking care of informal worker is relatively cheaper as compared to a permanent worker. Regular wage quarry workers revealed that management’s arrangement in the subsector does not allow artisans to be employed as permanent workers. The basic entry point into the quarrying activities with these quarry firms, according to the respondents, was through casual status. Though there were promises of regularising their appointment as permanent workers, that was not forthcoming from the employers. A comment from a focus group discussion elucidates this assertion better.

Per the nature of management arrangement "casualty" is the only means we can become workers with this company. We were told our status would be changed to permanent status after three months of probation, but that never happened (Waged workers).

The quote revealed that wage quarry workers would have preferred to work as permanent staff in these quarry firms. However, a deliberate entry measure set by the employer made it impossible, and the last resort was through a casual status. Based on the low level of education of these casual workers, the quarry firms, however, employed these workers as temporal workers promising to change their status after fully serving their probation.

The management's views were sought to confirm or otherwise the claim by workers on management decision not to employ them (workers) as permanent quarry staff for their firms. The management admitted using "casualty" or informality as the first resort of employment for these quarry workers. A statement from a management member in an in-depth interview explains management assertion that:

Generally, after six months, we formalise casual appointment. However, because of the high cost of operation we sometimes "drag our feet" to avoid re-inventing the wheel... some of them have been casual workers for more than two to four year now. (Management Member).

Management was using the high cost of operation as a justification for using "casualty" as a means of employment. The results suggest that it was cheaper to manage casual workers than permanent workers since casual workers' entitlements were minimal as compared to permanent quarry workers. Thus, the position of critics of neo-liberal theory that capitalist agenda to reduce the cost of production has resulted in informality (Kotz, 2008; Mwaniki, 2015; Papadongonas, 2013) was upheld by this study.

Another driving force of informality identified but limited to only self-employed quarry workers was the need for livelihood for the economic capacity to support children and husbands. Self-employed quarry workers who were predominantly women indicated that because their husbands were not earning much from their respective employment, there was a need for them to work in order to

support their husbands financially. A participant from FDG shared a widely held view of the group that:

We needed something to do to support our husbands and children's education. There are challenges such as the seasonal nature of farming, perishability of farm produce and fish stock. However, with the core gravels and the chippings, we do not encounter the seasonal problems. We can do this activity at any time in the year. Though we rarely experienced theft of our wares, we think the risk level is quite bearable as compared to other occupations (Non-waged workers).

Women were engaged in informal stone quarry activities to support their husbands to take care of their children's educational needs. These informal self-employed quarry workers had compared several employment opportunities in different subsectors and concluded that the quarrying subsector was less risky and better in terms of revenue.

The findings corroborate that of the alternative approach on informality (Borjas, 2008; Kay, 2011) that the informal economy allows savvy entrepreneurs to start their own businesses because of the lower cost of capital requirement. Voluntarists' perspective that informal workers voluntarily enter the informal economy because of a low barrier of entry after carefully, examining the cost and benefits associated with entering the informal economy (Chen, 2012) is thus, upheld by this study. The results thus disagreed with the dualist (Kay, 2011) perspectives that informal jobs are temporal jobs awaiting permanent jobs in the formal economy.

The flexibility of informal quarry activities was also identified as a reason for informality in the stone quarry subsector. Two forms of flexibility were identified. The first form of flexibility identified was flexible work "agreement" between employers and informal quarry workers. According to wage workers, lack of long term binding agreement between them and their employers could afford them the opportunity to exit the "employment" or engagement with or without notice to the employer. Most importantly the wage quarry workers revealed through interviews that with or without notice of disengagement to the employer does not also result in any legal consequences. Thus, these workers could easily take up any available better job opportunities. This reason thus endeared these wage quarry workers to take up the informal quarry job.

The second form of flexibility identified as a reason for informality among wage quarry workers was flexible work schedules. The flexible work schedule was a driving force of informality for female wage quarry workers who worked with quarry firms with shift arrangements and male security workers who worked in the night. Female shift workers interviewed in in-depth individual interviews revealed that they chose the night shift work schedule in order to use the day time for reproductive roles. A female quarry worker in explaining had this to say:

I decided to work with the quarry firm because of their shifts system.

I wanted to work on the night shift so that I could use the day time for another job somewhere and for house chores as well as to take care of the kids... I now work as a mobile banker during the day and work as a quarry worker in the night. (Waged worker).

Wage quarry workers who were females sought to work in the informal stone quarry subsector because of flexible work schedule. Workers who were also security personnel were also found to be very interested in flexible work schedules. These workers used their free time during the day for other productive activities. Female workers also used the day time for both productive and reproductive roles. The result is in agreement with Chen (2012) that female workers desire to have time to perform both reproductive and productive roles influence them to take up informal jobs. Chen's assertion is even more supported by the views of self-employed quarry workers who linked flexibility to the opportunity to be their "own bosses".

Proximity to quarry sites was identified as the last reason for informality among stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana. It was found that there were no other companies in some of the communities where these quarries were sited. In an attempt to find a livelihood, quarry workers revealed through interviews that proximity influenced their choice of quarry activities. Proximity, according to these workers could save transportation cost and time spent to commute from their homes to workplaces. A quote from a male quarry worker further confirms the assertion. He indicated that:

I decided to work with the quarry firm because of proximity. I was a tube technician by the street before 2009 but decided to quit and join the quarry because I like the company and I loved to work with them. (Waged worker).

Proximity coupled with consistency in seeing the quarry firm over time endeared a self-employed informal tube technician to take up a job opportunity with a quarry firm as a temporal or casual worker. Proximity as a reason, however, was absent in literature and seemed to be one of the new reasons identified by this study.

Chapter Summary

The chapter discussed the main forms of informality identified among quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana to be self-employed, regular and contract wage quarry workers (casual/temporal). The discussion also looked at the sex categorisation among the three forms of informality among stone quarry workers. The subsector is highly characterised with male dominance in terms of wage and contract quarry workers justifying the patriarchal theoretical existence in the subsector. That notwithstanding, female dominance was recorded in terms of self-employed quarry workers. Self-employed quarry workers were supported by non-paid family members and children. Children involvement in terms of providing support for their parents was, however, restricted to after school and during weekends.

Five main drivers or reasons were identified for informality in the stone quarry subsector. Lack of employment opportunities, the flexibility of work scheduled and arrangement influenced both self-employed and wage quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana. Economic capacity to support husbands and children was however found to be a "driver" of informality among self-employed quarry workers. Employers representing the interest of capitalist

purposefully used casualisation as an agenda to reduce the cost of operation, and it explained why these wage quarry workers ended up as casual or temporal quarry workers in the subsector. Proximity was the last driver found to have influenced the choice of informality among wage quarry workers. Dualist, neoliberalism and the alternatives approach on informality were thus, upheld for the case of informal stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana

CHAPTER SEVEN

**INFLUENCES OF EXISTING WORKING CONDITIONS ON
ORGANISING AMONG INFORMAL STONE QUARRY WORKERS**

Introduction

The chapter presents findings on how the existing working conditions of stone quarry workers influence organising among informal stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part of the analysis focuses on the decency of existing working conditions and the second looks at how the existing conditions influence organising. Three main areas of concern under the first part are remunerative employment/work, workers' rights and social protection.

The analysis in this chapter is based on in-depth individual interviews and focus group interview data collected from quarry workers and management of the four quarry firms. Responses from representatives of regulatory agencies such as Minerals Commission, EPA, District and Regional Labour Inspectors as well as observation data are used for the analysis of the data. Health data collected from selected health facilities that attend to health needs of quarry workers in the Central Region are also used to support appropriate sessions of the discussion.

The theory of neoliberalism and institutional theory serve as the theoretical anchor of this chapter as it will be useful to ascertain the present working conditions of workers considered in this study. The analytical framework is the Labour Act (2003) of Ghana (Act, 651) as well as the ILO decent work framework along with three of the four strategic pillars of ILO such as employment, workers' rights and

social protection. All indicators that fall below the standards enshrined in both the national labour laws and ILO's decent work framework would be described as indicators of indecent working conditions and vice versa.

Indicators of Decent Work

This section discusses the decency of the existing working conditions of informal stone quarry workers. The subsection focuses on the analysis of remunerative employment (first pillar), workers' rights and social protection (second pillar of decent work agenda). Indicators under remunerative work/employment considered are security of appointment (appointment and appointment letters), wages/earnings and working hours. Workers' rights - in terms of entitlement to leaves (annual and maternity leave), safe working/non-threatening working environment, protective apparel, and visitation by regulatory agencies are also part of the focus of the discussion. Indicators considered under social protection the third pillar was the provision of social security and national health insurance schemes for workers. The discussion begins with the indicators of the first pillar, which is remunerative employment.

Technically, every employment process entails three basic steps- recruitment, selection and placement. Recruitment deals with attracting a pool of interested applicants whilst selection deal with screening the recruits to choose the applicants who are likely to be successful on the job. The screening is done with application forms and interviews as well as selection tests. Placement is where the successful applicants are given an appointment letter and placed on the job. These

processes have been termed recruitment or engagement by the waged quarry workers. Thus, the use of recruitment, engagement or employment in this section basically refers to the employment processes described above.

Employment of wage quarry workers by the quarry firms in the Central Region of Ghana basically starts with recruitment which normally sees potential employees send application letters to the management of the quarry firm. Management then scrutinizes after filing these application letters and later invites applicants for interview if their services are needed. After the interview, a successful applicant is handed over to an experienced worker or supervisor in the department who would likely work with for a practical test on applicants' suitability for both management and supervisors. Management claimed that getting supervisors' approval was necessary because a successful applicant and the existing workers work as a team; hence it was needful that the supervisor of the team approves of the staff. Additionally, management was also avoiding a situation where existing workers/supervisors would blame management for appointing unqualified applicants.

Some quarry firms (three out of the four) also put together orientation programmes for successful applicants before they are placed on their jobs. A female temporal clerical worker who attested to this practice indicated that:

I was told by a clerical worker in the quarry firm that one of the three ladies with the organisation had left the quarry firm, so I sent my application letter there. I was immediately interviewed but my application letter was returned to me afterwards, and I was taken

through an orientation, which I did for one week at the office. I was told to start work by the general manageress, and my wage would be increased after three months. (Waged workers).

Prospective wage quarry applicants get to know of job vacancies through colleagues on the job - a typical characteristic of non-managerial jobs (blue-collar jobs). It is also evident that successful applicants were not given an appointment letter before the commencement of work with the quarry firms. The reason for this was that these workers were to be employed as temporary workers for six months or less. However, almost all these workers had worked for more than the maximum of six months stipulated in the Labour Act (2003) of Ghana (Act 651).

The failure of the firm to give an appointment letter for this category (wage quarry workers) of workers, which was against the labour law of Ghana (Act, 651) was very much known to the labour inspectors. This was indicated in an interview by a labour inspector for one of the districts who shared the same views with all other regulatory representatives interviewed:

Yes, lack of appointment letter for these casual workers who had worked for more than six months is one of the things we meet on our visits. So, we always advise that appointment letters, files and registrations are done for these workers. (Labour inspector).

The workers enumerated the effects and implications of lack of appointment letters for them. Every worker interviewed in either individual or focus group interview held on to this view that the lack of appointment letter exposes them to vulnerabilities and always at the mercies of their employers. Most importantly, the

employer can sack any casual worker at any time without compensation regardless of how long one had worked with the organisation without any compensation.

It was discovered that one of the four quarries (Quarry C) used a form for a six-month contract between temporary workers and the organisation. The form, however, does not play the role of a permanent appointment letter. It only met the temporal six months' contract requirement by the labour law of Ghana.

The casual worker status for more than the required six months maximum stipulated coupled with the lack of appointment letters for quarry workers in the Central Region, is a breach of the labour law of Ghana. Section 75 of the Labour Act stipulates that a casual/temporal worker qualifies for permanent status if the worker works with the same employer continuously for more than six months. Thus, the lack of appointment letters makes workers very vulnerable, insecure and at the mercy of the employer. This finding is similar to the findings of Nkosi (2017) that several informal farm workers in South Africa did not have appointment letters because the employer wanted to terminate the contract any time s/he wanted to. The finding also agrees with Ofori's (2009) position that informal workers are characterised by little or no job security. The current finding further supports the observation of Akorsu (2010) that labour laws are hardly adhered to in the informal economy. It can be implied that the position of the neo-liberal theorists that neo-liberalism empowers individuals is not upheld in this study.

It was also found that self-employed quarry workers did not engage paid workers. They were, however, assisted by non-paid family members, including children. Thus, appointment letters were not relevant in this regard. Meanwhile, in

responding to how they got into the stone quarry activities, self-employed quarry workers revealed that it was inherited career from their parents (parents passed it onto them).

Compensation is the second indicator of concern. Compensation systems identified for temporary quarry workers in the four quarry firms studied in the Central Region of Ghana were wage and salary systems. Artisans who were male quarry workers, received wages while their female counterparts who were cleaners, cooks, clerical and administrators were paid salaries. Though much was not revealed about the rate of compensation for the female temporary workers, a clerical female temporary worker hinted in the interview session that they received GH600 a month (\$4,633 a dollar at the time of data collection divided by 600 gives \$129.50). The payment, according to her, was made to them not through the banking system but rather as a physical cash payment, a scenario she described as "tabletop payment". She explained:

I do not receive below or more than GH600 a month. I was promised salary increment after 3-month probation; however, I have worked for more than a year now with the same amount. My problem about this payment apart from the rate is the 'tabletop' nature of the payment where it does not go through the bank so that you can be entitled to take a loan from the bank to do any project. (Waged worker).

The employer reneges on his promises to increase workers' compensation, and workers had no power to challenge the status quo. This can be because of the lack

of appointment letter (discussed earlier) as it could serve as a basis for workers to demand what the employer had voluntarily promised.

The case of the male temporary quarry workers was rather different. They were very much prepared to talk about the rate received as their wages. According to them, the rate differs based on profession and schedules among the various departments. The minimum daily wage recorded for drivers was GH12 (2.59 US\$), and the highest, GH36 (7.7 US\$) was for chief excavator operators. The minimum wage, however, is above the national daily minimum wage (NDMW) for 2018 which was pegged at GH9.68 under which no work is to be paid in Ghana. With a daily minimum rate of GH12 (2.59 US \$) and maximum rate of GH36 (7.78 US \$), it is clear that it is above the ILO estimated daily minimum income of 2.25 US\$ (Ebach, 2014). This further suggests that each of these workers could take care of the daily living cost of at least two people, according to ILO (ILO, 2012). It can, therefore, be concluded that regular wage quarry workers were receiving decent wages.

Comparatively, some male temporary workers had estimated monthly wages higher than what their female counterparts received (GH600). Meanwhile, there were other rates that were also lower for male workers as against that of the female workers. The finding, thus, is contrary to those of Chen (2012) that informal male workers earn more than informal female workers.

It was difficult to determine income for self-employed workers (Only one respondent indicated she sometimes make GH5 a day). It is either these workers do not keep proper books of accounts or were refusing to disclose this information for

fear of being taxed by city authorities. A respondent shared her view on the difficulty in stating the income indicating:

It is difficult to determine even how much we make a month. For the past three days, there were no sales and any sale afterwards will have to be used to pay for expenses for the previous days in terms of feeding and cost of transportation to site. More than half of our capital would have eroded away by the time the consignment is finished. We borrow money from others to be able to order the next consignment. (Non-waged worker).

This means that sales of their wares were not regular and that made it very difficult to determine how much one earns. It also means that workers sometimes spent part of their capital on the cost of transportation for commuting to the site and feeding, which eventually erodes their capital. Thus, the study went ahead to find out how long a consignment/stock lasts. These workers also revealed that it took about a month to finish selling their stock pegged around GHc.500 minimum. A focus group participants shared a widely held view of participants indicated in an interview that: *'Formerly, our stock turnover was about three days, but now it takes sometimes a month or more'* (Non-waged workers).

From observation, it seems that a very long time is required to sell their stock because sales were not regular. This could explain why these workers were engaged in additional livelihood. It was evident at the quarry site that these women had additional sources of livelihood such as food crops. These food crops were mainly cassava, plantain and vegetables (See plate 1).



Plate 1: Other sources of livelihood (farming) for self-employed workers.

The inability of the majority of the self-employed quarry workers to determine their daily/weekly or monthly revenue attributed to the lack of proper book of account was also found by Ofori (2009) to be a typical characteristic of informal micro employers. For Ofori, most of these self-employed workers do not record expenses and revenue for taxation purposes, a situation which could have a serious repercussion on the economy. The finding further corroborates that of Sibhat (2014) who indicated that informal workers had "no full written" book of accounts.

Time spent on the job is the last indicator to be discussed. Respondents were asked the number of hours they worked to earn the stated salary/wages or revenue. Their responses revealed both regulated hours of work and possible overtime perspectives. There were observed disparities in terms of duration of work with respect to the quarry firms and type of work. For instance, only wage quarry workers with Quarry C worked for the maximum hours of 8 a day. Working hours observed for all the other three quarries ranges from 12 to 15 hours a day. Among the wage quarry workers, security workers, cooks, cleaners and clerical workers

worked for a maximum of eight hours a day while all other category worked for more than eight hours a day. However, the working hours ranged from 8 hours to 15 hours for all the quarries. The minimum working hours of eight hours were recorded mostly for female wage quarry workers who were on the shift system and few male wage quarry workers who were not entitled to working overtime.

Working overtime was, however, compulsory for some wage quarry workers whilst it was optional for some others. A commonly held view of workers during interview sessions is, thus, supported with the following statement from a focus group discussion:

We only close early on Sundays at 2 pm, but for all other days, we do 12 hours instead of 8 hours for our daily mark plus three hours for overtime. Some of us commute from nearby communities which are quite a distance with public means of transport. One would then have to start the journey around 4:30 am in order to get a car and be able to start work at 6 am to avoid the deduction of Gh 5 for lateness. (Waged worker).

Wage quarry workers of some of three out of the four quarries considered in this study worked for a maximum of fifteen hours a day and seven days a week. Quarry workers were, however, aware of the eight hours usually required for a day's work. The places of residence of these quarry workers were quite far from the quarries and workers would have to spend almost two hours (searching and waiting time for the next available taxi to the site) to be able to get to the workplace.

The maximum of fifteen working hours (15 hours) for seven days in the week observed for wage quarry workers reduces their rest period and seriously affects workers' work and life balance. Workers were not able to attend funerals, weddings and pursue weekend courses/programmes for further studies. Workers also complained about their inability to have time for their children and partners. The situation is worsened by the management of one of the quarries' decision to deduct GH10 from its workers' wage for each day of work the worker will be absent. A worker shared a widely-held view of respondents in an interview that "*We are stressed up since there is no day to rest. We were here even on 26 December 2017 and 2nd January 2018* (Waged worker).

The maximum working hours observed contradicts subsection B of clause 34 of the Labour Act of Ghana, which indicates that where long hours of work is fixed, the average number of hours of work reckoned over a period of four weeks or less shall not exceed eight hours a day and forty hours a week. Working hours observed in the quarry sub-sector also exceeded ILO's Convention No 1, which stipulates that the number of working hours per week should not exceed 48 hours per week and eight hours per day for six days a week to qualify as decent working hours (ILO, 2012). This confirms the position of critics of neo-liberalism that employers who represent the neo-liberalist or capitalist should be blamed for the precariousness of jobs (Kotz, 2008).

Above the 48 hours duration, working hours were declared by ILO (2012) to be "excessive hours of work" when a worker works for more than 49 hours per week, and "extreme hours of work" for more than 59 hours of work. Thus, the

minimum of eight hours of some of the quarries (Quarries C & D) recorded could be classified as decent working hours of work. However, working hours observed for over 100 informal male wage quarry workers with two of the quarries both (Quarry A & B) could be classified under the ILOs, “excessive hours of work” (more than 59 hours per week), hence could not be described as decent working hours. This confirms Erbach’s (2014) conclusion that a high frequency of excessive hours is an indication that working conditions are not decent.

An essential aspect of time spent at work is the tendency to work on holidays. Though workers were paid for work done on holidays and weekends, workers never had the option of rejecting the arrangement. Refusal to comply with this provision would result in the termination of one's appointment with the quarry. Hence, temporary quarry workers had no option than to work on holidays and weekends. A worker of one quarry firm alleged that management members of one of the quarry firms who were Chinese observed all Chinese holidays in the quarry. On such holidays, these management members do not work for respect for China national holidays whilst Ghanaian wage quarry workers could not do the same on national holidays in Ghana.

The self-employed quarry workers, in terms of working hours, also worked 12 hours maximum for workers who were not married. That is, they work from 6 am to 6 pm from Monday to Saturday mostly and sometimes on Sundays. Those who were married, however, left the quarry site around 4 pm in order to attend to house chores. For example, a married woman during an interview indicated that: *‘We normally report to work around 6 am and leave the site around 6:00 pm but*

those of us who will have to cook for our husbands and children leave the site around 4:00 pm'(Non-waged workers).

Thus, the reproductive roles of married quarry workers affected their productive roles, but the unmarried (never married) were not much affected as they had more hours (additional two hours) to work. This could explain why some workers were observed washing their family clothing at the site, suggesting work and life conflict. All these were as a result of the long hours spent by these women at the quarry site (See plate 2). The findings of this study on maximum working hours observed for self-employed women is not in agreement with that of Gbeve's (2013) findings. The 12 hours maximum working hours by non-married self-employed workers, however, is in tandem with Gbeve's finding. The source of disparity was that Gbeve recorded the maximum working hours for female quarry workers, whilst this study found these hours in relation to only non-married women.



Plate 2: A mother washing and pupils uniform washed and dried at the quarry site

The Decent Work Deficit along Workers' Rights

The first of the four indicators of workers' rights to be examined is workers' entitlement to leave such as annual and maternity leaves. According to Section 22

of the Labour Act of Ghana (Act, 651), public holidays and absence from duty due to sickness certified by a medical practitioner, and pregnancy and confinement shall not affect the annual leave entitlement of a worker. For this reason, the study went ahead to find out from wage quarry workers the extent that these provisions were adhered to by their employers. It was found that all wage quarry workers (males and females) in the four quarry firms examined in this study were not entitled to annual leave. The “casualisation” nature of their engagement was cited as a reason for that development by management. A comment by a management representative in an in-depth interview explains this *“the casual workers do not go on leave because their schedules are like ‘by day’ sort of work. Thus, the company does not buy their leaves because they are not entitled to it”* (Management member).

The lack of long-term contractual agreement between management and workers still influences workers’ ability to go on annual leave recommended by the Labour Act (2003) of Ghana (Act 651). Thus, wage quarry workers do not receive any special or extra payment or compensation for the number of days they could have used for their leaves if they were to be entitled to one.

Quarry workers confirmed what management said about their lack of entitlement to annual leave. Generally, it was chorused by almost all workers interviewed that none of them ever enjoyed annual leave. The following excerpt from a discussant in a focus group discussion with workers confirms the assertion. *“There is nothing like leaves for us, unlike the permanent workers. Even with that, management buys their leaves if they are unable to go on that leave”* (Waged workers). Whilst permanent workers who were entitled to annual leave do not

actually utilize it, wage quarry workers who wished to have enjoyed such annual leave never qualified to enjoy such a privilege.

In terms of maternity leave, female quarry workers in two of the four quarry firms interviewed revealed that female quarry workers with these quarries were not entitled to maternity leave. The reason assigned to this was that management of these firms was not prepared to maintain their schedules/positions for the three months' maternity leave guaranteed under the Labour Act (2003) of Ghana, (Acts 651). According to these workers, there were several others looking for the quarry job opportunity and management was prepared to replace them if they decided to embark on any maternity leave. A pregnant quarry worker would then have to sever her employment relationship with the quarry upon getting pregnant. A female worker with one of these quarries disclosed that:

You do not have to get pregnant else you would have to leave this quarrying firm. I am married and pregnant, so I am about to leave the organisation by the end of this month. The situation is compounded with the introduction of security cameras (as a new rule) monitoring us to ensure that we do not even lean against anything or bend down in the absence of customers. I can't do that with my situation; hence, I must leave. (Quarry worker).

This means that female quarry workers had to choose between getting pregnant and losing their jobs. Reproductive roles of female quarry workers, thus, competed with their productive roles as the two could not be achieved concurrently. Thus, the only option left for this female quarry workers was to leave. The situation for this worker

was worsened with the introduction of a camera in her office which prohibits her from even bending down or leaning the back against anything in a situation when there are no customers to be served.

The management, on the other hand, defended its position for not reengaging female quarry workers from maternity leave. According to a management member, the female quarry workers mostly do not indicate before leaving for maternity their readiness to return to work with the quarry. Additionally, wage quarry workers generally do not seek permission to be absent from work if they knew they would not return to the quarry any longer. A management member disclosed in an in-depth interview that:

We always ask a worker in that category whether she would be prepared to come back to work after delivery so that we can make provision for her. If she would not return, then that is it. We would have to find a full replacement for her. However, there was a pregnant lady who left recently without informing us, and we have replaced her. (Management member).

The earlier part of the quote suggests that the management makes an effort to find out from pregnant workers if they would be prepared to return to work after the maternity leave in order for the management to prepare to receive the worker back. However, the last part of the quote suggests that it was the responsibility of the worker to indicate her intention of coming back to management. Given that the female worker is not aware of the arrangement management claimed was in place

or management did not know of the pregnancy of this female quarry worker before she left, the worker loses the right to her job.

It is unlawful, per section 57 of the Labour Act (2003), for management of some quarries to terminate the appointment of any woman because of pregnancy and maternity leave. Pregnancy is a reproductive right of a worker which entitles her to three months of maternity leave. Despite the practice being unlawful, Britwum and Akorsu (2017) also found that casual women workers with Ghana Oil Palm Development Corporation (GOPDC) were not entitled to maternity leave.

The second indicator considered is workers' entitlement to safe and non-threatening working environments. Specific issues addressed under this indicator are occupational injuries (fatal and non-fatal injuries), management of the effect of dust and noise in the quarry sites, scents from chemicals and smokes, others include the provision of protective clothing and visitation of regulatory agencies.

The presence of occupational injuries in the stone quarry subsector is essential in assessing the extent to which workers are protected from work-related hazards and risks. The ILO's (2012) definition that an occupational injury is any personal injury, disease or death resulting from an occupational accident serves as a foundation for this analysis. An occupational injury could be fatal (as a result of occupational accidents where deaths occurred within one year of the day of the accident) or non-fatal with loss of work time.

Both fatal and non-fatal occupational injuries occurred in the quarry subsector in the Central Region of Ghana. However, fatal injuries were irregular as compared to non-fatal injuries in the four quarries used for this study. Though there

was a record of death, respondents claimed the worker was sick and died. Death could not directly be traced to quarrying activities. This is summed up in a comment by a management member in an in-depth interview that: *"for death through injury, we have not had one yet. The only death reported that I could remember is about a worker who died after a short illness which could not directly be traced to quarrying activities"* (Management member). The indirect effect of the quarrying activities on the health and its consequential, indirect effect on the death of the workers was, however, not ruled out or denied as indicated in the quote.

The most frequent injury recorded in the four quarries was the non-fatal occupational type of injury. The first of this kind identified was an injury on the head. The crusher and excavator operators who were male wage quarry workers were pointed as being prone to suffering such type of injury. A crusher operator in an in-depth interview revealed that:

As a crusher operator, there was a day power went off, and I entered the machine to remove the big rocks locked upward in the machine, and suddenly the power came on, and some big rock came down on me and hit my head. I quickly came out with force with injured and swollen head.... (Waged workers).

The dedication and commitment of this crusher operator to get his machine ready for duty rather resulted in an accident which affected his head. The crusher operator had not experienced such a sudden come back of the electrical power for his two years' operation as an operator. This worker, however, failed to put off the power

source for the machine as the standard practice. That explains why he was taken by the event and hence the injury.

Injuries on the leg and hands form the second type of non-fatal injuries. According to wage quarry workers in the four quarry firms and self-employed quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana, these injuries resulted in the loss of working hours. These types of injuries were said to be the most common/regular in terms of non-fatal occupational injuries in the sub-sector. The main cause of these types of injuries was identified to be a lack of communication between workers when handling heavy metallic objects. Both workers and management admitted that injuries on the leg or hand dominated all forms of injuries suffered by workers. The assertion by the two categories of respondents is summed up in what a management member disclosed in an in-depth interview that:

The frequent occupational injury in this place is an injury on the hand or the leg. It happens most at times when there is a lack of communication between workers handling heavy metallic materials.

(Management member).

The lack of communication or miscommunication highly contributed to the increased record of injuries on the hand or legs of wage quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana. It frequently happens when two groups of workers are working on different parts of a machine, and one worker or group failed to properly communicate to the other before operating the machine being worked on.

The third form of injury suffered by informal quarry workers (wage and self-employed quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana) was an injury on the

eye. Flying smaller particles which emanate when bigger rocks are broken into smaller sizes is the main cause of injury on the eye. An excavator operator confirmed that among others, he had suffered this category of injury in the quarry. The excavator operator shared a widely held view (in addition to a sign of injury on the eyebrow observed by the researcher) in an in-depth interview that:

As an excavator operator with his quarry, I was breaking the bigger rocks into smaller ones. During the process, the hammer machine broke a little particle of the rock which eventually hit the eyebrows. I got injured and could not see well or work because of the pain and the plaster. (Waged worker).

This means that the worker's eye was exposed or was not protected, hence the injury. If the worker had protected the eyes during the process of flying rock particles, the eyes would have been safe. The provision and usage of protective clothing by workers are discussed later in this section. Type of technology employed by self-employed quarry workers made their situation worse in terms of injury on the eyes. Basically, unlike wage workers, self-employed quarry workers were observed using very primitive technology for breaking the bigger rocks into smaller sizes (See plate 3). All that a prospective own account operator needed to be able to operate this business were a hammer, rake, head pan, a bowl (See plate 3) and capital (money). This came to light during a focus group discussion where one of the workers indicated that "*all that one needs to operate are tools like a rake, hammer both small and big headpan, shovel and "hurander" and capital of GH 500 (non-waged workers).*



Plate 3: Technology used by self-employed quarry workers

The capital was used to buy stock from quarry firms and to pay for the cost of transportation. The rake (a very short one) was used to draw some amount of the bigger rock from a heap for further breaking. The hammer was also used to further break the rocks into smaller sizes/grades (gravels). Finally, the bowl was used to fetch the worked on (smaller grades) gravels into a head pan for sale. The head pan, thus, serves as the measuring container, especially in times of making sales.

All the four types of injuries identified (injury on the head, hand, legs and eyes) were experienced by only male wage workers and self-employed quarry workers (female workers) considered in this study. The study also identified other forms of injuries that were common to all informal quarry workers (male and female wage and self-employed quarry workers). This latter type is better described by ILO (2012) as an occupational disease. An occupational disease is a disease contracted as a result of exposure over a long period to risk factors arising from work activity.

The first of this kind identified was inhaling of dust and smoke from the dusty working environment. Some female clerical workers with three out of the four quarries revealed that dusty working environments affect their health as they are noted for "*giving us cold and catarrh*" (Waged worker). The offices that housed

these female clerical workers were situated near the loading points of piled gravels while that of the fourth quarry was situated very far away from the main piles of gravels. The case of male quarry workers was worse because they worked in the field and were very exposed to the dust more than female quarry workers. The air conditioners on the cars used for breaking and loading big and small rocks/gravels never functioned for the entire duration of the working hours. Male field workers and discussants in a focus group discussion indicated “*we have very bad working conditions here. The air conditioners in the cars are not functioning so we inhale the dust every day*” (Waged workers). This paints a very disturbing long-term health effect on these workers.

The key informant at the regional office of the Environmental Protection Agency also admitted that dusty environment was one of the challenges that workers face in their working environment. The key informant in an in-depth interview mentioned that:

Roads to the quarry sites are very dusty and workers commuting along such roads suffer from dust. Inhaling the dust has a health implication for these workers. However, it is also very expensive for quarry firms to water dusty roads. (Regulatory representative).

The regulatory agent is aware of the plight of these workers but concluded that it was too expensive for management of the quarries to always water the roads leading to the quarry sites. Workers plied those roads for only a few minutes but the cumulative effect in weeks, months and a year of the challenge could be grievous as what they experienced at the main quarry sites daily.

The mines inspectors of the Minerals Commission interviewed equally revealed that dust suppression at the quarry sites was one of the things management of the quarries found difficult to comply. The statement from a mine's inspector elucidates this better:

I noticed during our visits that management of quarry firms find it difficult to comply with dust suppression. The reason being that there is a perception that the water material clogs with water and slips conveyor belts and slows operations. Some quarries do not have readily available water as well. (Mines inspector, June 2018).

The mines inspector, second regulatory agency, is also aware of the challenges faced by workers with the dusty working environment and admitted that management of these quarries hardly complied with provisions on dust suppression, a situation that worsens the condition of work for wage quarry workers.

Plate 4 and plate 5 confirm that the working environment was very dusty. The bonnet of a car parked at the quarry sites for three hours shows pre and post-observation data of the study on how dusty the environment was. Plate 5 also shows the amount of dust that gathers on surfaces just after 24hours of rains. The implication for workers who often stay at the site from 8 am to 9 pm can be very devastating.



Plate 4: A bonnet of a car showing the collection of dust on surfaces before and after 3 hours at the quarry site



Plate 5: Collection of dust on surfaces at a quarry site after 24 hours of downpour

Meanwhile, the Mining Regulation 492 of LI 2182 of the Minerals Commission compels these quarries to suppress dust on haul and access roads, and dust related to crushing operations must always be suppressed. Dust suppression is also a condition in the permit that EPA issues and expects that these quarries would comply. Under the air quality management of EPA's environmental permit, a quarry, in addition to the above, is supposed to attach dust bags to drill rigs. The quarries are also to increase the use of the watering system to reduce dust generation as well as plant trees to serve as windbreaks and shield stockpiles and working area from the prevailing wind.

A medical perspective was sought on the effect of inhaling the dust. The report from health facilities that usually provide healthcare for the quarry workers revealed that the common medical conditions that quarry workers reported at the health facilities were dust-induced/related sicknesses. These conditions include respiratory tract infections in the form of cough, fever, running nose and pneumonia. According to the medical officers, inhaling the dust over time develops into cancers, the inability of the lungs to function correctly and tuberculosis due to accumulated respiratory challenges. The report is well captured in a medical officer's statement that:

For the past two years, I have been taking care of stone quarry workers. Mostly their challenges come from the dust inhaled at workplaces. Specifically, they suffer from respiratory tracts infections which over time develop into cancers and weakening the functions of the lungs. (Medical officer).

Thus, though the workers were not able to mention the exact medical effect of the dusty working environment on their health, their fear is confirmed by the medical experts. A female nurse added that some quarry workers have also reported other medical conditions. These, according to her, included abdominal pains and vomiting, which could be linked with the type of food and water these quarry workers take at the quarry sites (also observed by the researcher) and their failure to properly wash their hands. Data obtained from one of the health centres that attends to the quarry workers in one of the quarry districts (KEEA) considered for

this study confirmed that there were reported cases for respiratory tract infection for 2017 and 2018 (See appendix D).

Another medical officer disclosed that the long-term exposure to the dust in the quarry-working environment had a severe health implication for the quarry workers. According to the medical officer, workers stand greater chances of being affected with silicosis. Silicosis is the oldest recorded untreatable chronic occupational lung disease caused by 'Silica'. The medical officers indicated that drilling, blasting, loading/unloading of ore, crushing, etc are some of the dustiest operations and thus, quarry workers were at a higher risk of developing silicosis. The medical officers also revealed that the level of exposure determines the type or degree of silicosis infection a worker is likely to suffer. Sub-acute and chronic silicosis could be developed after quarry workers are exposed to silica dust for many years. Acute silicosis, however, can also be developed when a quarry worker is heavily exposed to silica dust. One doctor made a very scaring statement with regards to the cure of the silicosis disease:

This silicosis disease is incurable and progresses even when exposure stops. Most quarry workers do not know this long-term effect of the dusty environment. Even if they know, due to poverty and the need for livelihood during lack of employment would not allow these workers to stop the stone quarrying activities over time.

(Medical officer).

The medical condition identified in the above quote tends to relate to the long-term effect of about five to ten years' exposure to the dusty environment. Most of the

waged quarry workers had, however, worked for more than five years but less than ten years. Workers were not aware of this long-term health condition; management, however, was aware but never made arrangement for workers to undertake medical test or examination in relation to that. The need for livelihood and the lack of employment opportunities as drivers of informality (indicated in the previous chapter) continuous to expose workers to long term health conditions. The fact that it is incurable makes their working conditions more petrifying especially for some self-employed quarry workers who have worked for more than ten years.

Another form of occupational risk suffered by waged quarry workers in selected quarries in the Central Region is inhaling of fumes and bad odour or scent from chemicals used for blasting. The inspector of mines interviewed indicated that "*Other obnoxious fumes released during crushing and blasting can affect some workers*" (Mines inspector).

It was discovered that two of the quarries (Quarries A and B) in this study used their workers for detonating and application of chemicals for blasting purposes. The in-house blasting by these quarries saves the cost of engaging an external company to undertake this service.

However, the external organisations comprise experts, who would have done the blasting with little or no effect on quarry workers and their communities. Workers, especially with Quarry A, revealed that the chemical used has a bad sharp/powerful scent which becomes very unbearable during blasting. Apart from the scent, all other workers on the premises were always asked to hurriedly leave the workplace to the nearest highways during every blasting/detonating. The reason

for this was that during the blasting process, the whole premise vibrates. This vibration is also characterised with flying rocks in the sky, which can easily hurt a worker. In the course of running away to the roadside, one can get injured or hit by a flying rock and could be injured. A female worker who was engaged in an in-depth interview revealed that:

We do not do proper blasting here too. During the blasting, every worker must run to the roadside because the whole workplace will be shaken like there are earth tremor and “flying rock”. So, if one does not hurry up, he or she could be injured even in the process of running to seek refuge. The scent from the chemical used is very unfriendly to us even in the office so you can imagine our own workers involved in the process. (Waged worker).

Workers of three out of the four quarried seem to know the right method of blasting which their organisation had not adopted. The workers were suffering from the consequences of using the wrong methods. These workers (in Quarries A & B) pointed to one of the quarries (Quarry C) as making use of the best method of blasting which had less or no effect on their workers. The assertion held by the female quarry worker was equally confirmed by the medical officers interviewed. A doctor indicated that “*Quarry workers are equally affected by heart trauma due to vibrations and explosions at the sites*” (Medical officer).

Meanwhile, the mines’ inspectors revealed that Regulation 176 of L.I. 2177 requires that quarries design their blast to ensure that incidents of fly rocks are minimised or avoided by using competent people in blasting operations. Quarries

must as well comply by Regulation 176 of the legislative instrument (L.I. 2177) which deals with exclusion zones for surface blasting.

It was, however, observed that one of the quarries (Quarry C) used an expert company to undertake the blasting exercise. The process used was termed "underground blasting". It was at the cost of the company but had no effect on workers since no worker was involved in the process and the shock and sound from the tremor were also avoided. A female worker in an interview disclosed that:

The blasting in our company is done by Woleb, a licensed rock blasting company in Ghana. No one hears of the noise and there was no shock to the community and the workers. However, our competitors used their workers for such a dangerous activity to save cost. The blasting by our competitors are done anyhow and any time and this has developed cracks in building structures in the Ojobi community including that of my mother's building property. (Waged worker).

This shows that workers of this quarry are aware of the crude method of blasting adopted by their competitors. The effect of the wrong method of blasting had extended beyond the workplace to the nearby communities where these quarries were located.

The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) informant did not corroborate with the workers' claim of the need to engage expert companies for blasting of rocks. According to the informant, some quarry firms do have the expert staff or personnel termed as 'blast men' as workers in the quarry and do not need

to engage an expert company from outside the organisation as was claimed by the workers.

Data gathered from Mines Inspectors from the Minerals Commission interviewed, however, settles the disagreement between the previous stakeholders on who qualifies to blast the rock for the quarries. According to the informant, most quarries do not own explosive magazines for the storage of explosives. However, with the few who own magazines, the storage rules as prescribed by Regulation 135 of L.I. 2177 are followed. That is, any person who has been issued a certificate of competency by the Chief Inspector of Mines (Ref: Reg 15, 21 and 171) qualifies to blast the rock.

Regulation 21 of LI 2177 explicitly forbids "blast men" with explosives certificate of competency from engaging others in the blasting activities. The manager of the quarry is required to ensure that "no other person is put in charge of or permitted to instruct another person to be in charge of, a section or working place of a mine where blasting operations are being carried out unless that person or that other person is a holder of a certificate of competency" (p. 23). (Mine Inspector).

Occupational Diseases in the Working Environment

A unique risk in terms of occupational diseases in the working environment (workplace) for female quarry workers was inhaling of smokes of cigarette in the office. This was identified with only two quarries (A & B). According to these workers, the Chinese with whom they share office do smoke in the office, but because the Chinese were their superiors, they could not complain. The researcher

studied the reported practice more closely on three occasions during the data collection in July and August 2018 and can confirm the assertion of these workers. The workers revealed that the smoke gives them cold and catarrh. The workers' assertion was equally validated in an in-depth interview with a medical expert from one of the medical facilities. According to the doctor, workers who inhale smoke from the cigarette in an enclosed office stood the chance of experiencing higher effects as compared to those who smoke at the office.

The continuous inhaling of dust and fumes/smoke from the working environment, cigarette at the office and stench from chemicals used for blasting of rocks without any adequate measures by the management of this particular quarry (Quarry A) violates the Factories, Offices and Shops Act 1970 (ACT 328) of Ghana. Section 23 of the Act requires that when any factory process emits dust, fumes or other impurities which are likely to cause injuries to the persons employed, all possible measures shall be taken to protect the persons employed against inhalation of the dust, fumes or other impurities. Also, to prevent them from accumulating in any workroom, and, where the nature of the process makes it practicable, exhaust appliances shall be provided and maintained, as near as possible to the point of origin of the dust, fumes or other impurities, to prevent them from entering the air of any workroom.

Related to fumes and stench from chemicals for blasting was noise and vibration from blasting from one of the quarries. The excessive noise production which was equally against section 26 of Factories, Offices and Shops Act 1970 (ACT 328) which requires that noise and vibrations likely to affect the health of

persons employed in any factory, office or shop ought to be reduced as far as possible by appropriate and practicable measures.

The study, therefore, went further to find out who was responsible for the medical conditions/expenses for injuries suffered at work by workers. It was found that the management of some quarries (Quarries C and D) paid the medical bills for their workers concerning injuries suffered at work. Some workers (of Quarries A & B) revealed that they either paid medical bills themselves or lived and worked with the injuries as the firm did not usually pay their medical bills. This, they claimed, was because management would not pay a worker's daily wage until he works regardless of the level and degree of injury suffered by the worker on the job. A male welder revealed that:

...my case is an example. I went for an oxygen bottle alone, and due to the weight I could not lift it, and it eventually fell on my hand and got my finger injured about three weeks ago. However, the work must be done so I forced and worked with the injured finger. Many of us get injured on the job, but management does not take us seriously since their interest is to get the job done but not so much concerned about our welfare. Even if you are injured, you are not catered for. Even if you are taken to the hospital and later discharged since you did not work for that period your wage would not be paid. (Waged worker).

Some workers paid all expenses concerning injuries sustained at work after the first day of hospitalisation. Management of these quarries only paid the first day

of medical expenses. It is also clear that supervisors of these workers were task-oriented leaders and had fewer regards for human relation and welfare of these workers. This also clearly relates to Taylor's scientific theory era where leaders' basic concern was to get tasks executed irrespective of workers' conditions. Workers were forced to work with injuries since an injured, and hospitalised worker loses the daily mark as long as he does not work with his/her medical conditions.

The third indicator of workers' rights to be discussed is adherence to the provision and usage of protective clothing for workers. Data provided by regulatory agencies, workers and management of quarries involved in this study were used for the analysis within the labour laws of Ghana and ILO's decent work framework. Section 122 of the Labour Act (Act, 651) stipulates that inspection shall be carried out to secure the enforcement of the provisions of the Labour Act relating to conditions of work and the protection of workers at their workplaces. The provisions include those relating to hours of work, wages, safety, health and welfare of the workers. Clause "b" of the same section 122 also entreats the labour inspectors to provide technical information and advice to employers and workers concerning the most effective means of complying with the provisions of this Act.

Labour inspectors interviewed mentioned that their outfit checks for compliance with provisions in the Labour Act with regards to a safe working environment and the provision of protective clothing. The inspectors indicated expressly that fire extinguishers, protective gears, among others, were checked. They also ensured that employers provided all types of protective gears for their workers. The inspectors' assertion of the compliance with the provision of

protective apparel entirely agrees with a management member's position on the subject matter. A management member confirmed in an interview that:

Management provides protective clothing like safety boot, dresses and helmet for workers. Those who are closer to the machine receive goggles to protect the eyes, and those who are closer to the dust receive nose mask. (Management member).

The claims of management of the quarries that they adhere to the provision of protective apparel to workers confirm what labour inspectors indicated. The type of protective apparel, according to the quote, thus, depended on a workers' schedule and where a worker is located along the chain of the quarrying activities.

Workers, however, had two different views on the adequacy and timely supply of protective gears by management. The position of the first group of workers in two of the quarries confirmed the assertions of management and labour inspectors on regularity and timely supply of protective gears. However, views of the second group of workers in other quarries (Quarry A and Quarry B) contradicted the views of both the management member and the labour inspectors. These workers revealed that management either failed to provide some protective clothes or delayed in providing protective clothes. A respondent indicated in an interview that:

We are given protective clothes like Safety helmet, reflectors, safety boots and hand Gloves. However, the requisition is not supplied on time, and some times we are not given all the quantity requested. Other times, we work with tattered protective clothing for so long a

time. Some times when we request for googles, management would want to be sure that the old one is destroyed beyond recognition in order to be willing to replace it for us. You can also be verbally abused by management for requisition of simple safety tools. Things that we quickly get include mouth and nose covers. (Waged worker)

There were delays in the supply of protective apparel for workers in some of the quarries. Additionally, there was a challenge with the adequacy of the apparel management provided for workers in some of the quarries. Mouth and nose covers were, however, generally supplied adequately and timely. The study further solicited these workers' views on what steps were taken by them during times of delay and non-provision of protective gears by management. Workers claimed they had to buy some of these protective gears themselves to be able to work for their daily wages. Some workers indicated that they gave money to some management members to buy some protective gears for them if they do not have the time to buy. This came to light in a focus group discussion where it was unanimously disclosed that:

We are not given working gear or safety boot. We buy the overcoat to work; I bought the safety boot I am currently using. We are being referred to buy our protective clothing since some colleagues/workers have done the same. Mostly, we are supplied and asked to wear protective clothing when some government officials/regulatory representatives are visiting the company. When these

officials are not visiting, and you make a request for protective clothing, it will not be supplied. (Waged worker).

It is, thus, evident that management regularly supplied protective gears before and during visitations by regulatory authorities. Some workers, therefore, bought their protective gears during other times that regulatory authorities were not visiting these quarries. It could also be inferred from the quotation above that management seems to be aware of regulatory agencies' visits to the quarries. Against this backdrop, the study went ahead to examine the regularity of regulatory agencies' visits to these quarries and whether management had prior knowledge of their visits or otherwise. A quote from a labour inspector in an in-depth interview provides several perspectives to the issues at stake. The labour inspector disclosed that:

*...It is our duty; that is why we visit these **places [quarries] twice in the year**. When we hear of something untoward, we have the authority or the power to visit without giving notice which sometimes we do, but courtesy demands that we notify them. If we have information that notifying the employer might be detrimental to what we want to find out, then we go undercover to that place (Labour Inspector).*

It is worthy of notice that all labour inspectors' visits to these quarries were communicated to management of these quarries ahead of time because courtesy demanded it. This could explain why management allegedly provided protective clothing for workers when authorities were visiting these quarries. Management of these quarries was able to prepare to satisfy the requirements of labour inspectors

during their visits. Hence the conclusion drawn by labour inspectors was that quarries adhered to provisions of protective gears to workers. Undercover visits to these quarries were only a discretionary power exercised by labour inspectors depending on the situation that warranted the visits. Labour inspectors have the mandate to visit the quarries, just like any factory, twice a year. This means that inspections by labour officers were carried out once in every six months. Thus, injustices and non-compliance on the part of the employers could be possible within every five months out of the six months of visit.

Some workers (Quarries B & D), however, disclosed that labour inspectors had never visited them; a situation admitted by labour inspectors in separate in-depth interviews. Meanwhile, these workers indicated that other regulatory authorities have been visiting them on a very regular basis. A statement from a focus group discussant elucidates this better. The discussants said that:

Sometimes management adheres to some directives like watering the working environment and asked us to put on our protective clothing only when authorities from GRA, military, policemen are visiting the company. We have had to even close the company down temporarily for non-adherence to directives but unfortunately, these measures do not last long, and we think when the management gives these authorities money then they do not pursue them any longer. (Waged workers).

From the statement of the focus group discussant, it can be deduced that apart from the labour inspectors, other governmental authorities such as the police, military,

Ghana revenue authority, among others, have been visiting these quarries. Meanwhile, it is also clear that these authorities were alleged to have been bribed by management. This, thus, explains why management was alleged by these workers to have refused to adhere to the directives of these authorities. Female clerical staff in the office confirmed the bribing allegation in an in-depth interview that authorities who have been visiting her quarry have been bribed so that management does not comply by directives. She said:

We are in the office, and we have been seeing how management bribed the police and the military and other authorities from GRA who have been visiting the quarry. This happens either once or twice a week, but I cannot tell how much management gives to these authorities. Management takes money from the sales in the office, envelope it and pacify the authorities from Winneba, Kasoa, Ojobi, Swedru among other places. That is why the workers continue to suffer in the hands of the employer. Employers do not comply with the directives of the labour law of the country because of the bribe.

(Waged worker).

The specific locations of these authorities in terms of districts can be found in the quote. It is also clear that the visitation of these authorities seems very regular even though such regularity was not to ensure that the laws are adhered to but as an opportunity to amass wealth through the threat of closure and its subsequent attainment of money as bribes from management. While labour inspectors find it challenging to visit the quarries, others that were able to visit were also allegedly

bribed, a situation that makes management too powerful and workers always vulnerable and at the mercies of the employer. Meanwhile, mines inspectors refute the claims of bribing their officials. According to the mines' inspectors, though it was true that management of some quarries does not provide protective gears for their workers that could not be as a result of bribery. According to an inspector of mines, the reason for non-compliance was that some employers see protective gears as an added cost to their operations despite its regulatory requirement in regulation 543 and 559 of L.I. 2182.

Management of the quarries also denied ever bribing authorities that visited them. Management and labour inspectors, however, indicated that some workers instead do not adhere to employers' directives of wearing protective apparel supplied to them. It was revealed that workers sometimes complained about discomfort when they put on protective apparel provided for their jobs. A labour inspector interviewed explained this:

Sometimes, workers are such that management will provide this safety equipment /gadgets, but in the process of their work they will tell you it is heavy/hot, so they would not want to put it on. However, when they see management or any external person around, they quickly put it on especially for helmet or protective clothing. We see some of them working without protective clothing on some of our visits. (Labour Inspector).

This means that regulatory authorities and management concluded that workers were ready to put on protective gears, especially during the visits of regulators.

Non-compliance was also found on the part of workers. Thus, it was not only management that sometimes failed to provide the protective gears, but workers also failed in some cases to use what management provide for them. The environmental protection agency's informant at the regional office also supported the assertion that workers in some cases or always do not use the protective clothes provided by the employers. Management, however, had no measures in place for non-compliance since management in the first place failed to supply the protective clothes to the workers.

The situation for one quarry was, however, different. The workers of this quarry never complained about non-provision or delay of some protective apparel or buying protective clothing themselves. Probably, the labour inspectors and other authorities were doing very well in making sure those authorities in this quarry adhere to their directives. It is also possible that the management of this quarry was determined to adhere to the dictates of the labour laws of the country. A statement by a management member in an in-depth interview (in the extract below) confirms this:

The Minerals Commission, labour inspectors, environmental protection agency do come here. We do not see a level playing field for all of us the employers. They come affecting everything to work here and allow others to be doing otherwise. We those who are doing the right things end up suffering because our cost and prices keep on escalating. (Management member).

It can be deduced from the management representative of this quarry that regulators were not ensuring that all quarry firms adhered to the labour laws. Some quarries were, thus, favoured or were “in bed” with the regulators, which served as a trump card for lower cost of operation. This, according to the management member, unduly gives advantage to such quarries to sell at cheaper rates.

Governmental regulatory agencies do not pose any challenge to the self-employed quarry workers in terms of bribing. The workers explained this in a focus group discussion that they do not encounter any challenge with city authorities in terms of tax/licensing. According to these workers, they only pay annual rental charges to the owner of the land for the plot of land occupied for their activities. There was no fixed charge/s or levy by the landlords but self-employed workers contributed annually and whatever amount accumulated was then forwarded to the landlords. All the numerous regulatory authorities (Labour & Mines Inspectors, GRA, Police, Military) revealed in interviews that they never visited self-employed quarry workers to ensure the use of protective clothing for their operations. Secondly, there was no financial support for these workers who had knowledge and willingness to use these protective clothes but could not afford them.

The inadequate supply of protective apparel leading to workers buying their protective clothes suggests that the employers (Quarry A & Quarry B) have reneged on their duties. Sub-section E of clause 118 of the Labour Act requires the employer to supply, and maintain, at no cost to the worker, adequate safety appliances, personal protective equipment and instruct the workers in the use of appliances and equipment. Article 16 of ILO convention 155 requires the employer to "ensure that,

so far as is reasonably practicable, the workplaces, machinery, equipment and processes under their control are safe and without risk to health. Employers are also enjoined to provide where necessary, adequate protective clothing and protective equipment to prevent, so far as is reasonably practicable, risk of accidents or adverse effects on health". Thus, it can be concluded that since these elements were lacking with regards to some quarries (Quarry A & Quarry B), then working conditions for these workers were not decent.

Additionally, the findings are similar to that of Britwum and Akorsu (2017), who found that casual workers of GOPDC do not have a regular supply of protective clothing and some workers resorted to buying these protective clothes themselves. Additionally, the situation where workers had refused to use the protective clothes provided by management could be termed as an offence on the part of such workers. Section three of clause 118 of the Labour Act (2003) mandatorily requires every worker to use safety appliances and personal protective equipment provided by the employer. Such a worker, thus, commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding 1000 penalty units or three years imprisonment or both. It is also obvious that the position of the institutional theory that strong institutions are needed (as indicated in the conceptual framework of the study) becomes very relevant in this regard.

Decent Work Deficit Under Indicators of Social Protection for Quarry

Workers

The last pillar of decent working conditions to be examined is based on two main indicators-healthcare and social security provision for informal quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana. The various employers had several different arrangements in place to cater for the health-related needs of their workers. However, what pertains in three of the four quarries could be termed as “worse practice” as against what happened in the other (Quarry C) described as “good practice”. Management of the latter (Quarry C) had registered all workers, including temporary workers and their families, with the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). The company (Quarry C) also continues to renew the National Health Insurance (NHI) card for all temporal workers and their families when the card expires.

The management of this quarry (Quarry C) absorbs GHC.400 and GHC.150 of the medical expenses of their workers and their families respectively. A management member of the quarry disclosed this in an interview that “*we renew the wife and children’s health insurance and pay GhC.150 of their medical bills. We pay up to GHC.400 of workers’ medical bills and register all workers on national health insurance scheme*” (Management member). This is a clear indication that both workers and their families are partially supported by management as a fixed amount is given to support payment of their medical bills. There were indications that most at times workers spent less than the stated amount.

The case of the three other quarries described in this study as the worse situation was that management of these quarry firms (Quarries A, B and D) only paid the first day of the medical expenses of their workers and the workers to bear the remaining amount. However, medical assistance by management for the first day was limited to fatal injuries. These quarries also had separate designated medical facilities for their workers. There was no provision like registering workers on the National Health Insurance Scheme. These quarries also do not extend any medical benefit or facilities to the families of the workers. Focus group discussants explained this further that "*the company pays for the first day of your medical bill for fatal injuries. As for non -fatal injuries, it is the responsibility of the worker to bear all the cost of your medical bill*" (Waged worker). It is evident that management has nothing to contribute towards workers' medical bills as far as the injuries sustained by these workers fall under the non-fatal categorization.

Some of the self-employed quarry workers had individually registered themselves on the national health insurance scheme of the country. The rest of these workers were, however, not registered on the health insurance scheme. All self-employed quarry workers also paid the cost of their medical expenses.

The second indicator of social protection considered in this subsection is the provision of social security for wage quarry workers with the four quarry firms. The subsection also considers how self-employed quarry workers take care of their social security needs. It was observed that except for wage quarry workers of two quarry firms, all other quarry workers of the other two quarry firms were all registered social security cardholders/members. Workers who had worked for more

than four years with the two quarries had the opportunity to be registered by the company with the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT). Wage quarry workers whose tenure was less than four years did register with SSNIT themselves.

Despite the SSNIT registration for these quarry workers some workers were, however, not sure if management had been paying their social security contributions. All workers engaged in a focus group discussion and in-depth individual interviews from two quarries collectively indicated that they were not aware of any payments for their social security by the firm. A statement from focus group discussants captures this better. The discussant said, *"we are not aware of any deduction from our wages for social security and cannot even tell if the company pays anything like that to SSNIT"* (Waged workers).

Workers could not be sure of any SSNIT payment because there was no evidence of deduction from their wages. This is a clear indication that wage quarry workers were very much aware of the respective personal and organisational deductions for SSNIT contributions. Another reason why workers were not sure was that they had never obtained statements of their SSNIT contributions to verify any payment into their SSNIT accounts.

Workers were then asked whether they contributed towards their social security for retirement since they were not aware of any payment from management. It was discovered that these wage quarry workers had not made any personal contribution to any pension scheme including SNNIT, towards their

retirement age either, even though they were very much aware of the relevance of social security or retirement scheme (SSNIT) for their retirement age.

The management of these quarries in an interview disagree with workers’ assertion that their social security contributions were not paid on their behalf by management. The management claimed that though it was not deducted from workers’ wages, management pays its workers’ social security as part of its own “goodwill” towards workers. Ascertaining the veracity of the claim of either management or workers was difficult at this stage because workers were not ready to lose their daily mark by forfeiting a day’s work in order to go for statements on their social security contribution at the nearest district office. Upon several contacts with these workers within three months, a worker finally agreed to take a daily wage from the researcher in order to go for his statement. Plate 6, thus, shows the statement of social security contributions of a wage quarry worker who had worked with the quarry since April 2016.

SSNID: A118310110034 OWUSU FRANCIS 17-JUL-18

SOCIAL SECURITY STATEMENT AS AT 17/07/2018
CONTRIBUTION AND SALARY DETAILS SINCE THE DATE OF FIRST CONTRIBUTION

YEAR	RECEIPTS		DEDUCTIONS		BALANCE		SALARY	
	NO. OF MONTHS CONTRIBUTED FOR EACH YEAR	CONTRIBUTIONS PAID FOR EACH YEAR	NO. OF MONTHS OF CONTRIBUTIONS USED FOR REPAYMENT OF STUDENT LOAN	CONTRIBUTIONS USED FOR REPAYMENT OF STUDENT LOAN	NO. OF MONTHS OF CONTRIBUTIONS AFTER STUDENT LOAN DEDUCTION	CONTRIBUTION PAID AFTER STUDENT LOAN DEDUCTION	TOTAL SALARY BASED ON CONTRIBUTIONS PAID FOR EACH YEAR	ACTUAL SALARY
2007	7	GHC84.00	0	GHC0.00	7	GHC84.00	GHC480.00	GHC480.00
2010	9	GHC243.00	0	GHC0.00	9	GHC243.00	GHC1,800.00	GHC1,800.00
2011	12	GHC324.00	0	GHC0.00	12	GHC324.00	GHC2,400.00	GHC2,400.00
2012	12	GHC459.00	0	GHC0.00	12	GHC459.00	GHC3,400.00	GHC3,400.00
2013	2	GHC67.50	0	GHC0.00	2	GHC67.50	GHC500.00	GHC500.00
2014	12	GHC405.00	0	GHC0.00	12	GHC405.00	GHC3,000.00	GHC3,000.00
2015	1	GHC52.79	0	GHC0.00	1	GHC52.79	GHC391.04	GHC391.04
2018	3	GHC162.00	0	GHC0.00	3	GHC162.00	GHC1,200.00	GHC1,200.00
TOTAL	58		0		58			

NOTE: PAST CREDIT – Applicable to ACT 766 members ONLY.
 Past Credit amount earned on contributions prior to 2010 as at today is **GHC73.24**.
 Amount shall be paid as part of your Benefit when it falls due.
 You may contact the nearest SSNIT Branch if you have any questions regarding this Statement or call the SSNIT Contact Centre on: 0302-611622 or Toll free line: 0-800-94. Email: contactcentre@ssnit.org.gh, Pension House, P.O. Box MB149, Ministries, Accra.

Plate 6: Statement of social security contribution of a quarry worker

The worker had worked in several places before joining the quarry in April 2016. Previous employers of this quarry worker had also made some payments towards his social security contribution as can be seen. Most importantly, the statement revealed that the quarry worker had received only three months out of 26 months of his social security contribution paid by the quarry firm (the employer). The worker, however, concluded that the management might have paid the amount after the interview with them. Indeed, the duration between the time of the interview and printing of the statement was almost four months which made the worker's assertion a possibility.

A management member of one of the quarries that never registered or paid social security for their workers explained what informed their decision in an interview. According to the management member, the wage system where wage workers were paid every two weeks could not make it possible for such social security deductions to be made. For this reason, the management did not see how feasible it was to start the process.

It is, therefore, clear that all the four quarry firms were not paying social security (pension) for their wage workers. This is a clear violation of schedule 1, clause 9 of the labour act on social security provision of workers under contract employment. The Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention 1952 (No. 102) of ILO requires the employer to provide medical care, sickness benefit, unemployment benefit, and old-age benefit. This is an indication that the working conditions of these workers were not decent. This finding is similar to that of ILO (2014) that informal workers mostly lack social security provision. It also revealed

an institutional failure or weak institutions leading to failure to comply with provisions.

Social security or retirement planning by the self-employed quarry workers was also a concern for the study. For this reason, the study sought to find out from self-employed quarry workers how they prepared for their retirement age. Respondents, both in focus group discussion and in individual in-depth interviews, indicated that they had not registered with SSNIT- formal social security. These workers also indicated that they had not contributed any amount in terms of social security for their retirement. This was blamed on the dwindling returns/revenue which was absorbed in high overheads of running their enterprises.

That notwithstanding, self-employed quarry workers had informal forms of social security for their retirement. This retirement package, according to these workers, was non-financial security for their future. That was an investment in their children's education. Self-employed workers explained that better education for their children would grant them (children) better jobs so that these children will, in turn, take care of them in their old age or after retiring from quarry activities. The discussants said:

All our investment and our social security are our children. We hope that if these children are gainfully employed, they will be able to take care of us when we grow old. We do not have any social security anywhere apart from this. (non-waged workers).

This is a clear indication that these workers were aware of the need for social security for their old age. However, these workers' inability to pursue the financial

type of social security had resulted in a non-financial form of social security for their old age. These self-employed quarry workers were very hopeful that all things being equal, their children would live longer and they would be able to look after them during their old age. Meanwhile, this category of respondents had earlier indicated (chapter 5) that the lack of employment opportunities and the need for livelihood to support husbands and children were reasons for informal stone quarry activities. It also means that from the viewpoints of these self-employed respondents, good jobs are tied to “better education”. Inability to secure better jobs on the part of these workers could, thus, be partially attributed to their lack of better education. Though there are several graduates without jobs, these quarry workers seem to suggest that they (the educated) had better chances of getting better jobs than the illiterate.

Factories, Offices and Shops Act 1970 (ACT 328) require that other facilities should be available for use by workers. For this reason, the study went further to find out the availability of other facilities at the four quarry sites. These other facilities included washing facilities, sanitary convenience, drinking water, a room dedicated to keeping clothes (changing room), first aid, fire extinguisher and how chemicals were kept/stored. Table 4 shows the extent to which these facilities were available at the respective quarries.

This information was gathered through observation and responses from respondents in an interview and a focus group discussion. From Table 4, apart from sachet drinking water and males changing room which were provided and available in Quarries A & B, all other facilities were either “not available”, “not provided”

or “available but not functioning”. The male changing room in Quarry A was used as temporary accommodation for some quarry workers who could not travel back to their places of abode after work. This means that the employer was also providing some free shelter for some informal quarry workers. Additionally, apart from non-provision of drinking water for workers by the management of Quarry D, all other facilities were provided, available and functioning in Quarry C and D.

Table 4: Availability of Other Facilities in the Selected Quarries

Facility	Details	Quarry A	Quarry B	Quarry C	Quarry D
Washing facilities	Baths	ANF	NA	AAF	AAF
	Soap	NP	NP	Always Provided	Always Provided
	Water	NA	A	A	A
Sanitary Convenience	Male	ANF	NA	AAF	AAF
	Female	ANF	NA	AAF	AAF
Drinking water	Sachet	A	A	A	NA
Changing rooms	Male	A?	A	A	A
	Female	NA	NA	A	A
First Aid	Present	ANF&	NA	A	AAF
	Manage	Staff	-	Safety expert	Staff
Storage of chemicals		Separate room	No separate room	Brought by Woleb & used	Separate room

Keys: NP= not provided; ANF=available but not functioning; AAF=available and functioning; NA= not available; A= Available, A? =Available but used for other purposes such as temporary accommodation among others.

Source: Field data (2019)

The non-availability, available but not functioning and no provision of washing facilities like bathroom and soap, sanitary convenience, and first aid on the part of Quarry A and B was a clear violation of provisions in the Factories, Offices and Shops Act 1970 (ACT 328). Section 16 of the Act demands that adequate and suitable *washing facilities*, conveniently accessible for the use of all persons employed, shall be provided and maintained in a clean and orderly conditioned in every factory, office and shop. Article 18 of ILO safety and health at workplace stipulates that “employers shall be required to provide, where necessary, for measures to deal with emergencies and accidents, including adequate first-aid arrangements” to ensure decent working condition for workers.

Section 19 of Factories, Offices and Shops Act 1970 (ACT 328) of Ghana further demands that adequate and suitable sanitary conveniences, conveniently accessible to persons employed shall be provided, maintained and kept clean in every factory, office and shop for both male and female workers separately. Finally, Section 28 obliged every factory, office and shop to provide and maintain a *first aid* box or cupboard of the prescribed standard and where more than 150 persons are employed, an additional box or cupboard shall be provided for the additional 150 persons.

The next subsection looks at how all the present working conditions of informal quarry workers influence organisation among these quarry workers. The analysis begins with how workers perceive their relationship with the management of these four quarries in the Central Region of Ghana.

Working Conditions and Organising among Quarry Workers

Wage quarry workers of two quarries (A and B) revealed that the relationship that exists between workers and management of the quarry could best be described as an exploitative relation. Workers indicated that the relationship was not symbiotic since workers were never consulted on any issue. The management just told the workers what the management felt they wanted to tell them through notices and word of mouth. Though these workers received their wages, they were never happy with the kind of treatment they received from management. According to these workers, there was no means for them to challenge management's decisions, especially on the lack of appointment letters with very inhumane working conditions and human treatment. The only option available to these workers was to stop the work and sever their relations with the management of these quarries.

Wage quarry workers of the remaining two quarries, however, described their relationship with management as very cordial and characterised by mutual respect. The permanent workers of these quarries had a union, and the union had served as a mouthpiece for both temporal and permanent workers. Though temporary workers were not part of the union in terms of payment of dues, among other provisions, the union had been addressing their challenges with management. Through the union, workers' opinions were sought and all workers felt they were part of the organisation. This explains why working conditions for wage quarry workers in these latter two quarries seem better as compared to the earlier two quarries (from discussions in this chapter). In terms of organising, these workers did not consider embarking on any other form of organisation aside from the formal

trade union. This means that better working conditions for these workers were a by-product of workers' organisation.

Wage quarry workers of the two quarries were with high decent work deficits concluded the present working conditions and treatment meted out to them by their management had pushed them to seek for organising. These workers had consulted formal trade unions to assist them for the organisation. According to these workers, though the processes of unionization were still ongoing, they were hopeful that it would eventually transform their working conditions. This means that indecent working conditions among these workers serve as the basis for seeking collective identity or organisation.

This subsection only serves as a teaser for the next chapter where details on this last pillar of ILO's strategic objective (workers' organisation/collective identity), which also serves as the third objective of the study, would be explored in detail. Thus, the next chapter examines the forms, strategies and challenges associated with organising among these informal quarry workers

Chapter Summary

The chapter looked at the working conditions of quarry workers of four quarry firms and self-employed quarry workers and how this influenced organising among these workers. Some quarry workers (especially with C & D) and their management were responsible for the provision of protective clothes and female workers with these quarries could not go on maternity leaves. These workers (especially Quarry C) also enjoy support from management for their medical bills.

Workers of the other three quarries took care of their medical bills mainly by themselves.

Apart from the wages of informal quarry workers with the last two quarries (A & B), all other elements of their working conditions could not be described as decent per ILO's decent work framework. These other indecent indicators were working hours, social security, health insurance, leave (annual and maternity), provision of protective clothing, and a safe working environment. Thus, there were varied working conditions for self-employed workers and wage quarry workers as indicated in the conceptual framework of the study. The neo-liberalism theoretical argument for freedom and individual development could not be supported with current findings on quarry workers.

Neo-liberalism as a phenomenon had instead lead to precarious and inhumane working conditions for informal quarry workers. Labour inspectors' visitation to these quarries (A & C) were not regular as compared to other regulatory agencies such as EPA, GRA, police and the military, among others. Wage quarry workers with better working conditions used an existing trade union for formal workers as a trump card to achieve that. Workers with indecent working conditions have decided to organise themselves to better their condition.

CHAPTER EIGHT

ORGANISING FORM AND STRATEGIES AMONG INFORMAL STONE QUARRY WORKERS

Introduction

The previous chapter examined the existing working conditions among quarry workers. This chapter discusses organising among informal stone quarry workers in the selected quarries in the Central Region of Ghana which serves as the third objective of the study. This is to assess whether these workers remain as vulnerable and powerless agents or active agents who can marshal resources and support to drive home better working conditions for themselves. Specific issues addressed in the chapter are forms of organising among informal stone quarry workers, actors involved in organising informal stone quarry workers and strategies for organising informal stone quarry workers. The chapter also discusses the reasons for organising among stone quarry workers and the challenges of organising informal stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana.

The analysis in this chapter is based on data provided by quarry workers and management of four quarry firms in the Central Region of Ghana used in this study. The analysis is equally supported with data provided by trade union representatives as well as representatives of labour inspectors. The data for the analysis in this chapter is based on in-depth individual interviews and focus group discussions with the respondents. Interpretative qualitative analysis was employed to interpret empirical findings from the field and compare with what exists in the literature and the ideal situation recommended by the Labour Act of Ghana 2003 (Act 651). The

analysis is situated within three main theories: the Rawls' theory of justice, institutional theory and the theory of collective action. The analysis in the chapter is divided into two sections. The first section deals with forms and strategies adopted for organising among informal quarry workers and the last section focuses on challenges to organising.

Forms of Organising among Informal Stone Quarry Workers

Rawls' theory of justice very much underpins workers' right to organise enshrined in ILO's convention 98 and declaration on fundamental principles and rights at work. Thus, this first section categorically looks at the extent to which basic rights of workers are exercised among both wage and self-employed quarry workers found in the four districts in the Central Region of Ghana. The discussion in this section is on forms of organising that exist among these workers and their respective strategies. The latter part of the chapter discusses challenges associated with forms of organising and strategies of organising adopted by informal quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana.

Organising among informal stone quarry workers in the Central Region is a strategic effort by workers to make their voices heard and gain representation at the enterprise level. Organising of these quarry workers has taken two major forms—*Membership-Based Organisation* and *Trade Union Organisation*. Though trade unions are also membership-based organisation, the term is used to refer to a welfare-based association in this study. The membership-based form of organising extends to both self-employed and regular wage quarry workers. However, trade

union organising in the Central Region of Ghana appears to be limited to regular wage informal stone quarry workers. The discussion of membership-based organising among informal quarry workers in this section will initially start with wage quarry workers before the perspective of self-employed quarry workers will be presented.

Casual wage quarry workers with some of the quarries realized the need to form the membership-based organising when management allegedly unfairly sacked a colleague. Also, solidarity and safety nets such as helping members in financial needs were purposes for which the membership-based organisation was formed in these quarries. Workers in this organisation contributed GHC.5 every week to the organisation. A member who later doubled as the leader of the membership-based organisation purposively informed all the workers about the formation of the organisation, but only 19 out of 29 workers consented and became members of the welfare association at the workplace for one of the quarries. However, the lack of acceptance of the association by management resulted in the lack of space and time for these workers to meet. Consequently, the membership-based organisation lasted for only 20 weeks.

Though workers alleged that the lack of management support and time made it difficult for members to meet, it was also discovered that the autocratic leadership style exhibited by the leadership of the welfare association could also be cited as a contributing factor. The narration of the initiator and leader of the association in an in-depth interview attest to this. The leader indicated that:

A worker was sacked unfairly, and we went to see management as a group of casual workers to apologize, but management refused our plea and refused to reinstate our colleague and did not pay any compensation to him. I then concluded that as workers, we need a welfare association to help each other, so I asked a few colleagues that we should contribute Gh 5 every week for a worker in turn since our wages were paid every two weeks. Nineteen (19) out of 29 casual workers agreed and started with the contribution. I was the leader and any week that the money/contribution was ready, I envelop it and give it to one worker until all the nineteen workers benefited from this self-arranged welfare scheme within 19 weeks. I then decided that the next round of contribution should be increased to Gh 10. Members neither concerted openly or otherwise; however, nobody ever contributed any amount from then, and that was the end of the self-arranged welfare association that I led to form for casual workers in my company (Waged worker).

As much as the initiative on the part of the leader was right, it can also be seen that the leader dictated the weekly amount paid as dues by members. How the leader emerged as the leader of the association could be traced to the fact that he initiated the whole process of forming the membership-based organisation at the quarry. The benefit of this association to members was financial support for the 19 weeks of its existence. It is also apparent that his (self-acclaimed leadership)

attempt to increase the amount unilaterally without seeking the views of members of the association led to the end of the association.

However, some members of the organisation concluded in a focus group discussion that reviving the group could be very helpful provided leadership style would change. According to members of the defunct association, the reviving of the association would support members financially and show solidarity to members when in need. The membership-based organisation could develop to become a formidable force to challenge management on decisions that do not favour workers.

According to the members, when the association is managed well, it could give workers a voice and a better identity. Meanwhile, all these expectations of members remained in the “coffin” until the leadership of both the quarry and the associated change in a way that members would be willing to revive the defunct group. This finding agrees with Wilderman’s (2017) observation that employers’ resistance was a challenge facing unionizing efforts among farmworkers in South Africa. According to Rawls’ theory of justice, this attitude of management interfering with the basic rights of workers can damage workers’ capacity to develop a sense of self-worth and self-confidence (Freeman, 2007).

That notwithstanding, the study also identified the existence and functioning of membership-based organisations in two other quarries. Both informal wage quarry workers and permanent quarry workers in these quarries belong to the same welfare association in the company. The welfare association had executive members and contributes financially and emotionally to support members in times of need. There was management support for the welfare associations found

in these quarries. Through the support of the management, the welfare association involved almost every worker in the organisation, and the monthly dues were deducted at source from workers' wages and salaries. Membership of the association also never complained about the leadership style of leaders of the association (suggesting it could be democratic). Democratic association in this study means workers association characterised with the members' freedom of participating in the election of leaders and given the opportunity to freely express views and participate in decisions that affect members of the group/association. every decision It was, however, observed that there was no membership-based organisation in one of the quarries (Quarry D).

The case of the self-employed workers was not different from what pertains among wage quarry workers in terms of membership-based organising. The women ever had a welfare association with the purpose of receiving a contribution from members. Such contributions were made towards funerals and weddings of members and their families. However, the lack of leadership and commitment of members contributed to the defunct status of the group. The women group (self-employed quarry workers) revealed in a focus group discussion that they used to have a welfare group that was focused on funeral and wedding supports for member's children and relatives. The group had no written constitution and had not been in existence for two years at the time of data collection.

What led to the collapse of the group was that some members who benefited from the group sometimes refused to contribute financially to support other members when the need arose. There was nothing like monthly dues or executives

for organising or determining how much to pay. It was based on what individuals could afford to pay. Participation and organising were not properly coordinated. It was therefore clear that even without management's interference, these workers could not sustain their membership-based organisation.

Thus, the democratic leadership style of welfare associations and commitment of members are the key characteristics for sustaining welfare (membership-based associations) among quarry workers as captured in the conceptual framework of the study. Without which welfare associations becomes very unresponsive to the needs of members. The finding shows that welfare associations for both self-employed workers and some informal wage quarry workers were unresponsive to their needs. This further supports the findings of Boapong and Tachie (2017) that the welfare association of public municipal waste pickers in Accra, Ghana was unresponsive to their needs. Thus, the position of the theory of collective action that group members can only sustain their membership if their interests are catered for (Rowe, 2013) is supported by this study.

Trade Union Organising

Trade union organising of informal wage quarry workers was only identified with two of the four quarries involved in this study (Quarries A & C). Trade unions were not aware of the existence of Quarry B and D as well as the self-employed quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana. There were two main trade unions involved in organising wage quarry workers in the two quarries in the Central Region of Ghana. These trade unions were the Construction, Building and

Material Workers Union (CBMWU) and lately the General Construction, Manufacturing and Quarry Workers Union (GCMQWU). While the latter was responsible for organising informal wage quarry workers in Quarry A, the former focused on organising only permanent workers in Quarry C. The discussion in this section will thus, focus more on General Construction, Manufacturing and Quarries Workers Union (GCMQWU) organising activities in Quarry A because the study is focused on informal quarry workers in selected quarries in the Central Region of Ghana.

The General Construction, Manufacturing and Quarry Workers Union (GCMQWU) has been in operation for barely two years six months as of May 2019. It is a breakaway union from the Construction, Building and Material Workers Union (CBMWU). The main strategies identified were either the union representatives approach the workers, or the workers approach the trade union (GCMQWU) for unionisation. Industrial relation officers and union organisers spearhead the organising activities on behalf of the union. Workers approach depended mostly on enterprise-level organisational form, with executives in place, and trade union was just called upon to enrol them into a union. Once a while, some employers also called the trade union to unionise their workers.

Reasons for organising informal wage quarry workers from the trade union perspective as disclosed in an interview by the trade union representative of GCMQWU were to create and promote a harmonious relationship between workers and the employer and to bring cooperation and understanding between them. Most importantly, it is to protect and promote the right and interest of workers through

collective bargaining for better condition of service and focus on training and education of members.

In the case of organising informal quarry workers, the workers' approach was used where a worker called the union executive for the unionisation process to start. The union executives met workers outside the work premises, both during their break time and after work, educated them on benefits of the union. After these, enrolment forms (see plate 14) were given to workers to provide their details. Local executives of the proposed union were elected, introduced to management and a meeting was arranged with the management of the quarry. The union's proposal was sent to management for negotiations to begin. A statement from a trade union representative in an in-depth interview confirms this. The representative said:

With Quarry ..., one of the workers called us. We sent someone there, met the workers and gave them enrolment form [see plate 14] to fill after which the union and its executives were introduced to management. That is how we started the process (Trade union representative).

It means that if wage quarry workers had not consulted the trade union themselves, they would have been left unattended to like other quarry workers who were never contacted by the trade unions. Thus, the organising strategy indicated by workers was corroborated by trade union representatives. It also means that other quarry workers who had no trade union organising going on in their workplaces had not yet contacted the trade unions. It is, however, essential to note that the defunct

welfare association was capitalised upon for the unionisation process by the trade union.

The next stage, according to the trade union representative, was that a labour inspector from Swedru was informed and came to verify and ascertain that there was no existing union in the workplace. The labour officer also facilitated the process by sitting in the drafting of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) document with workers and with management. As at the time of data collection, the GCMQWU had successfully obtained a certificate for unionising workers of Quarry A. Through the effort and leadership of GCMQWU, workers of Quarry A now have collective bargaining agreement with management. The veracity of the trade union and workers' assertion of the formation process and successes chalked were checked from the labour inspector for the district. The labour inspector confirmed that:

A union under TUC from Accra came with permission and certificate obtained from the labour office/head office at Accra to do a unionization activity in Quarry A. I was informed and went to the company to meet the union and workers, and they were able to strike an agreement with management. There was the need to sit with management to look at the nitty-gritty of their collective bargaining agreement and if it happens like that labour officers would have to supervise or sit-in as an observer and advise which way is the best for them. For this reason, I was there around June 2017 thereabout.

(Labour Inspector)

From the extract, there is a clear indication of the involvement of the labour Inspector in the unionisation processes at the quarry. The statement also shows that the processes agreed with the conventional practice of forming a trade union among workers. The involvement of the labour inspectors met legal requirements and helped to solicit management support and agreement successfully. The unionisation process with stages of success can be found in Figure 6.

It is, therefore, clear that the main actors for organising wage quarry workers in the Central Region have been limited to trade unions and workers themselves initiating the organising processes. There was no record of non-governmental bodies and individuals organising for and to be paid by trade unions in the Central Region of Ghana.




Figure 6: Unionisation process for informal quarry workers in the Central Region

Source: Author's Construct (2018)

Trade union representatives' lack of knowledge on the existence of some quarry sites (Quarry B & D) and self-employed quarry workers questioned the appropriateness or suitability of the organising strategy used by the trade unions. Workers organising themselves and calling for the support of trade unions for unionisation largely depends on their knowledge on trade union's offices or contacts. This could easily and unnecessarily delay the unionization process. Apart from these two strategies identified in this study, the other two strategies in the conceptual framework of this study and found by Akorsu and Odoi (2017) among domestic workers in Ghana were absent among quarry workers.

Akorsu and Odoi (2017) found that individual organisation and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as churches and mosques and politicians were approaches adopted for organising domestic workers in Ghana. Thus, a combination of both traditional and secular notions of power and authority to mobilize informal quarry workers as was the case of market traders identified by Britwum (2010) was not found in this study. Specifically, Chun's (2009) assertion that union organisers had successfully drawn on the public arena intending to restore the dignity and justice for socially devalued and economically marginalized workers was also not found as a strategy used by unions for organising informal quarry workers in Ghana.

At the international level, organising strategies such as rallies, struggles, mobilization and public profile with strategies that had mass appeals such as street theatre, song and oral traditions were found to be useful in organising informal workers in India. However, these strategies were missing in the case of organising

informal stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana. This questions the commitment and effort of trade unions organising in the informal sector of Ghana.

More so, informal workers were not passive agents who could not do anything about their situation. Informal quarry workers, realizing the indecent working condition, decided to take their destiny into their own hands to form “membership-based association” and later sought trade union’s assistance for a more formidable and formalized union. The relevance of the theory of collective action is, therefore, in vogue at this stage. This suggests that individual quarry workers had “power to” and “power within” but needed “power with” as termed by Webster, Britwum and Bhowmik (2017) as association power to turn their working conditions around.

The findings of Dickinson (2015) that trade unions did not organise casual workers, but the workers instead used disruptive tactics and were able to transform temporary jobs into permanent jobs in South Africa successfully was not found in this study. The findings of this study rather corroborate that of Webster and Ludwig (2017) that deepening and extending traditional sources of power such as structural, association and institutional power using logistical and societal power could be possible to challenge "informalisation" or casualisation.

Challenges Associated with Forms and Strategies of Organising among Informal Stone Quarry Workers

The discussion of challenges of organising informal quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana is presented from stakeholders’ perspectives. These

stakeholders are quarry workers, management, trade union and regulators. This is done to determine whether these challenges explain why some of the quarries do not have any form of organising. Workers of all the quarries visited indicated high levels of awareness of the trade union and its relevance to the attempt to achieve decent working conditions.

The first challenge with unionisation was the lack of permanent membership. According to the workers, wage quarry workers were quickly sacked by management upon non-grievous offences. Wage workers also indicated that workers do not have appointment letters and could be sacked at any time, which could, therefore, affect the strength and sustainability of their membership in the union. These workers revealed that the management of their quarry knows the implication of unionised workers, hence, frowns on workers gathering at the workplace for any reason.

The management uses termination of appointment and dismissal of workers suspected of trying to bring workers together. According to the workers, it had discouraged them from coming together for any welfare and unionisation issues. As part of the unionisation process during the early part of the data collection, the researcher witnessed a meeting between the management of the quarry and workers on the 24th July 2018. In attendance were union representatives and a labour inspector. Workers indicated that the unionisation process before that time witnessed a setback and came to a halt because management deducted an unauthorised amount from their wages and all workers decided not to join the union again.

A management member at the meeting, however, explained that the deductions were statutory deductions that management hitherto, paid for workers. These deductions were income tax, social security and expected union dues. The workers' representative revealed at the meeting that such payments were never indicated on their payslips, which challenges the veracity that such payments were made by management for workers. He concluded that management had been using that as manoeuvring tactics to discourage workers from joining the union. For fear of being sacked, workers of some of the quarries without any form of workers' organisation said that any unionisation process for them should start behind the scene to make sure no worker gets sacked or gets his wage reduced for his desire to join a union.

Management's use of threat and reduction in weekly wages to discourage informal wage quarry workers from unionising is an affront to the labour laws of Ghana. Section 79 of the Labour Act (Act 651) provides that every worker has the right to form or join a trade union of his or her choice for the promotion and protection of the worker's economic and social interests.

The category of workers the Labour Act prevents from unionising include workers involved in policymaking, decision making, managerial, holding a position of trust, performing highly confidential duties, and lastly serving as an agent or a shareholder of an undertaking. It is evident that informal quarry workers do not form part of the category of the forbidden categorization, hence could not be lawfully prevented from joining any trade union of their choice. Thus, the structuralists' power of the employer (Webster, 2015) was used to bully vulnerable

informal quarry workers. It also means that these employers did not respect the position of Rawls' theory of justice that organising among workers is a fundamental human right.

The second challenge of wage informal quarry workers was the lack of trust in the trade union executives. According to these workers, trade union executives were allegedly bribed by management to avoid unionisation of workers. A worker interviewed during the time the unionisation process was on hold indicated that he no longer had trust and confidence in the union. According to this worker, union representatives are noted for taking bribes from management to allow the perpetuation of injustice and unfair labour practices against workers. The worker was of the view that a similar situation could have explained the reasons why the unionisation process came to a halt in his quarry. The bribing allegation, to a large extent, influenced workers' decision not to join a trade union.

From a management perspective (Quarry C), the key challenge with organising/unionization of quarry workers was high wage bills of unionised workers, coupled with the high cost of production. The high cost of production had translated into high prices of goods/stock for customers. The resultant effect was that they had lost their customers to their competitors who had no respect for the fundamental labour rights of organising or unionising. Therefore, customers decided to buy from competitors because their prices were lower. For example, a management member indicated in an in-depth interview that:

Our competitors will only and always say that we are always ahead in terms of quality, but for them, they will do what the customers

want to get going. Then also customers preferred our competitors due to the price variation. Our competitors' prices are lower because there is no unionization activity and their wage bills are lower (Management Member).

Despite the benefits of organising to workers, the management representing capitalists' interest thought otherwise. Management concluded that it was costly to take care of unionised workers as compared to non-unionised workers due to unionised workers' varied entitlement especially under collective agreement backed by labour laws. Since their competitors had a lower cost of production because of the lower wage bill of the non-unionised workforce, competitors were able to sell better than they did. Management said their "*revenue level had dropped sharply, and management has no option than to lay some workers off*" (Management member). Management concluded that they were suffering unduly because their competitors were taking advantage of them.

Additionally, management had introduced labour redundancy policy since 2016 as a result of the quarry's inability to make enough revenue to offset its cost of operations. Informal wage quarry workers were most affected by the redundancy policy which was in existence for two years as at the time of data collection. This position supports that of the critics of the economic argument of Rawls' theory of justice who were of the view that higher wage instead has the propensity to increase the pool of the unemployed if it lacks the corresponding high productivity (Costa, 2009).

A close observation of the quarry where there were no unionisation activities revealed that the quarry sells better than quarries with a unionised workforce. A clerical staff confirmed that: “*We sell better than other quarries because our prices are lower. Customers look at a lower price. We served more than 100 customers a day*” (Waged worker). Comparatively, observations at the two quarry sites for three days shows that at most two customers were attended to at the quarry with unionised workers. Customers instead highly patronised quarries without unionised workers. At least six customers were recorded within one hour each day for each of these quarries.

In terms of price comparison, it was observed that a quarry product (gravel product), sold at GH80 by the quarry with unionised workers, was sold by their competitors at GH42. Similar price differentials were observed for several quarry products among these quarries in the Central Region of Ghana. It was also revealed by a management member of the quarry with unionised workers that regulators could be blamed for their inconsistencies in ensuring that all the quarries adhered to labour and environmental provisions. According to management, such inconsistencies give their competitors an undue advantage to lower their prices in order to attract more customers. This suggests institutional failure as underpinned by institutional theory.

The unionised labour issues that contributed to the high wage bill included the free provision of drinking water, highly subsidized canteen services, milk, and health insurance for workers and their families as well as medical bills reimbursement. The rest were bars of key soap, monthly profit sharing/bonuses,

end of year packages such as live chicken, a bottle of oil, and a 5kg of rice and end of year party.

The first challenge identified with the two trade unions involved in organising quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana was infighting for legitimacy. Construction, Building and Material Workers Union (CBMWU) focused on organising permanent workers in Quarry C and the General Construction, Manufacturing and Quarries Workers (GCMQWU) were responsible for organising informal wage quarry workers in Quarry A. GCMQWU was a breakaway union from CBMWU and was headed by the former Deputy General Secretary of CBMWU.

As at the time of the main data collection, there was still rivalry between the old and the new union to the extent that the old had taken the new union to court to challenge its legitimacy to organise construction and quarry workers regardless of the fact that the latter had been recognised by the Ghana Trade Union Congress (GTUC). The GCMQWU representative interviewed also indicated that CBMWU wrote to some employers claiming that the latter union had no locus to organise workers. A trade union representative disclosed this in an in-depth interview:

The general secretary of the former union sent a circular to companies that my union was not a legal union, not in good standing, and not affiliated to GTUC among a whole lot of issues. Some recipients of the circular (letter)/ (companies and workers) called me and forwarded a copy of the letter to me because I was doing well and had a good rapport with these companies. In our

response, we wrote a letter and attached all our certificates and circulated to all the companies so when I saw the content of the letter, I also responded and circulated everything (Trade union representative).

This means that time and scarce resources of these unions were then spent on proving to workers and management about who had the legitimacy to organise quarry workers. However, during the validation interview on the 25th July 2018, it was disclosed by a union representative that the former union had opted out of court settlement with the latter union. It was the expectation of the respondent that the differences would be addressed as soon as possible.

Infighting among trade unions over the legitimacy of organising quarry workers in the Central Region wasted time and resources and consequently undermined unionisation efforts of these unions and how seriously employers would take them. Similarly, Boapong and Tachie (2017) also identified rivalry among Local Government Workers Union (LGWU) and Civil and Local Government Self Association (CLOGSA). Additionally, Britwum and Akorsu (2017) identified infighting among the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) and Ghana Agricultural Workers Union (GAWU) over the legitimacy of organising GOPDC workers in Tema, Ghana. The infighting records among trade unions affirm that there are cracks within the rank and file among organisers of workers. Obviously, this undermines unions' efforts of organising as well as respect accorded to unions by both workers and management.

The second challenge identified was the lack of management cooperation. The management concluded that expenses on unionised workers increases the cost of production and reduces profits. For that reason, some management members threaten and discourage workers not to join unions to maintain the status quo. This challenge had also been reported by workers earlier in this subsection. Union representatives interviewed revealed that due to low levels of education of informal quarry workers, some quickly get swayed by these management threats.

Trade unions also had a challenge with workers as well. Some informal wage quarry workers also do not consider their future in terms of social security, tax deductions for the government for the development of the country, redundancy packages, among others. These factors influenced the workers, and the union had to take time and resources to orient these workers to be able to unionise them.

The trade union representative interviewed was also asked whether management bribing authorities also served as a challenge to them and it was admitted that workers' allegation of management bribing union executives had come to her notice. This, according to her, makes the unionisation exercise for workers very difficult, if not impossible. The new union representative interviewed claimed her executives could not be bribed and that was why the new union was making incursions even in areas where the old union failed. He said:

We have encountered management attempt of bribing union executives severally, but we did not compromise. It is our integrity and taking bribe will mean selling our birthright to bargain on behalf of workers. Some management especially Chinese can tell

their workers they have bribed unions so that the union will not be there again. Such statements destroy the integrity and breach of trust with workers. When I was with the former union...Chinese employers are like that. They can open a bag for you to see the cash physically. We are not moved by those things (Trade union representative).

This is a real confirmation of bribery attempt by management of some quarries- a practice that makes the unionisation process very difficult for trade unions. Management also uses such statements to discourage workers in order not to join trade unions, a fundamental labour right. Chinese employers had been cited as the worse felon. Two of the quarries in this study which were Chinese quarries had no unionised workforce and some of their workers sported similar tactics. This finding, however, would not be a surprise to Vyas (2017), who stated that bribing of state agents, including the police, by employers in Delhi dates to the 1980s and is still happening in the 21st century. The institutional role of promoting compliance by building trust among stakeholders as suggested by Agyenim (2011) captured in the conceptual framework is hereby challenged.

Another challenge facing trade unions in organising quarry workers in the Central Region was inadequate logistics and human resources. Though GCMQWU had about 6,000 organised workers, including three quarry firms in Accra, the inadequacy of resources was hampering its progress. Apart from Ashanti, Greater Accra and Volta Regions, the union could not establish regional branches in other regions. Though the union receive calls from workers in the ten regions of Ghana

to organise them, due to logistical challenges, the union could not easily and quickly move to these sites for the organising process and subsequent follow-ups. Some of these challenges were indicated to have also affected organising quarry workers in the Central Region. In terms of staff strength, the union had only “skeletal“ staff strength of six workers who were on monthly allowance because the union could not afford to pay salaries at this stage.

From the observation, representatives of the trade union indeed attended the meeting on the 24th of July 2018 very late. A meeting scheduled to start at 10 am started at 12:00 noon because union executives could not arrive on time. The union executives explained that the fact that the union did not own a vehicle and spent much of their time at the bus terminals waiting on vehicle explains their lateness.

The last stakeholders’ challenge with organising quarry workers to be presented has to do with regulatory agencies. The study interviewed labour inspectors and mines inspectors, and a representative from EPA on organising issues. The first challenge from the labour inspector’s perspective was a logistics challenge. The inspector is expected by the Labour Act (2003) of Ghana (Act 650) of Ghana to visit the quarries at least twice in the year. Though the number of visits seemed very inadequate to the inspector, it could not be changed due to the lack of official vehicles. This makes the movement of labour inspectors from one organisation to the other very challenging. An inspector disclosed in an interview that:

Sometimes we go for a visit by public means of transport. Some of the quarries are not very close to them, and one would have to walk

for a distance. For example, walking from the roadside to Pilot, Executive and Sarcon Quarries are all at a distance. The situation is alarming when the weather is sunny coupled with loaded trucks using the dusty road in the afternoon (Labour Inspector).

The lack of vehicles explains the inadequate number of visitations to ensure that basic labour rights are not trampled upon by employers in the quarrying subsector. The situation also exposes the inspector to several health-related challenges.

The Central Regional labour inspector explains that the challenge with the labour department was not limited to logistic challenges but also inadequate human resources for the department. For the labour inspector, there were about 300 to 500 enterprises, including these quarries, which his outfit was supposed to visit at least twice in the year. However, with the inadequate labour force, the minimum visits could not even be achieved for all these enterprises. According to the respondent, it had come to his notice that some quarries disregard labour laws especially laws regarding workers' freedom to unionise. Regardless of this challenge, the labour inspection department remained an advisory body and played advisory roles. It needs to be mentioned that the department could not prosecute such offenders. This suggests a systemic challenge which also means that workers could be taken for granted for as long as labour inspectors would not be able to visit these quarries and even prosecute the offender adequately. Thus, Kaufman's (2011) assertion based on institutional theory that institutions overtime required some level of institutional change due to exogenous and endogenous forces is therefore upheld by the findings of this study

The inadequate two times visit in a year to over 300 to 500 enterprises in the Central Region was further challenged by inadequate facilities and under-resourced labour department. Juxtaposing this with the high level of graduate undertaking national service who could have been posted to the labour department to beef the human resource needs at no extra cost, really questions government's commitment to its regulatory role as a tripartite member in ensuring structural power vested in the capitalist/employer is not used to 'bully' labour.

The situation of Mines Inspectors looks better as compared to Labour Inspectors. Instead of two visits to the quarries by labour inspectors, mine inspectors visit each of the quarries ten times. The mines inspector's lookout for the general conditions (health and safety) of workers and technical arrangements of the quarry to ensure compliance. An inspector revealed that there were occasions where some quarries were closed for failure to adhere to inspectors' directives. M and J Quarry were cited as an example. The researcher upon visiting the site confirmed the revelation. This explained why the quarry was not included in the study. Unlike labour inspectors, mines inspectors do not inform quarry workers of their visits to ensure that the conditions precedent is observed for the legal action to be taken by the inspectors.

Additionally, mines inspectors never complained about the inadequacy of logistics for their inspections. An inspector disclosed in an interview that: "*pick-up vehicle, fuel and drivers are provided for routine inspections, GPS and a camera provided for pre-licensing inspections*" (Mines Inspector). The resources and people were readily available for mines inspectors to always undertake their

schedules as at when it was due. Mines inspectors, thus, seemed better resourced and poised for the better inspection, as compared to the labour inspectors.

An area of challenge to mines inspectors in terms of logistics was “*limited resources for monitoring of blast impacts and dust*” (Mines Inspector). The inspectors of mines interviewed, however, denied the bribing allegation by quarry workers against them. One mines inspector, however, conjectured that there could be the possibility of bribing of task force engaged by the mines’ inspection divisions of the Minerals Commission to close down quarries illegally operating. The interviewee indicated that some members of the task force could have been bribed but not the mine inspectors.

The main challenge registered by the mine inspectors was that some of the quarry managers do not have recognised mining certificates (required by section 16 of Act 703, Regulations 38 and 44) but do have supervisors with the appropriate surface mining certificates. The ignorance of some workers about the dictates of the Mining Regulations leading them to conduct activities without recourse to the regulations was also a challenge. The mine’s inspector also disclosed that the police who escort explosives to sites often do not ensure that the left-over explosives are taken back to the source magazine and that labour inspectors seldom visit quarry sites.

The Environmental Protection Agency also had some challenges with policing quarry workers to ensure compliance with directives. According to the key informant at the regional office of EPA, the EPA had only an office responsible for all environmental-related activities of companies in the Central Region of Ghana

till 2016. The additional two area offices responsible for three districts each were situated at Dunkwa-on-Offin and Kasoa. The remaining fourteen districts are still under the regional office.

The specific administrative challenges mentioned were that some quarry firms start their registration process from the regional office and later end up at the national level without the knowledge of the regional office. This makes it difficult for the regional office to determine whether these applications were successful and licenses to operate duly granted to the quarry firms. According to the informant, this makes monitoring of these quarry sites very difficult. It was, therefore, impossible for the key informant at EPA regional office to mention the number of quarry sites in the Central Region as at the time of data collection in June 2018.

Thus, the conclusion on how regulatory agencies contributed to organising challenges facing informal quarry workers in this study was their inability to visit the quarries regularly (in the case of labour inspectors) to ensure that employers are prevented from using threat among others to discourage workers from unionising. The regulator-labour inspectors could at best advise offending employers in this regard but could not prosecute the offending employers.

Chapter Summary

The chapter has highlighted that self-organising efforts by informal stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana in the form of membership-based organisations (welfare) were just a short-term strategy by these workers. Membership-based organisations, though confronted with the lack of management

support and autocratic leadership style, also served as a catalyst for trade unions for a more formalised unionisation. Apart from trade unions and workers organising themselves, other actors such as churches and individuals were absent. Traditional organisational strategies were still employed by trade unions which was shown to be inadequate; hence several other quarry workers were yet to be contacted by trade unions (that was workers of Quarry B and Quarry D and the self-employed). Much of the unionisation activities in the sub-sector was left to workers calling on unions to unionise them.

The unionisation activities of trade unions in the sub-sector were met with the lack of management support, logistic challenges, and rivalry over legitimacy among unions and educational level of workers and their preparedness to sacrifice a portion of their present wage for their future social security. Others include unpreparedness of some wage quarry workers to pay union dues out of their wages. Workers also had their challenges such as sustainability of membership since workers had no appointment letters and could be sacked at any time. All these challenges had culminated into delaying the unionisation process for workers.

Labour inspectors, police and soldiers, minerals commission, Ghana Revenue Authority, among others, who also visited the quarries were alleged to have been bribed by the employers, especially in the two managed by Chinese (Quarry A & Quarry B). Labour inspectors also had their challenges with visitation to the quarries to ensure that employers do not use threat and intimidation as well as victimisation to discourage unionisation, a legitimate worker right. These

challenges included logistics, human resource and lack of power to prosecute offending employers.

CHAPTER NINE

ORGANISING AND DECENT WORKING CONDITIONS NEXUS

Introduction

The chapter examines how organising among informal quarry workers can achieve decent working conditions for informal stone quarry workers. A single case study of Quarry A dominates the discussion in this chapter since it was the only quarry firm that had started the formal unionisation process for informal stone quarry workers as at the time of data collection. The unionisation process for wage quarry workers in quarry A was completed during the data collection. The researcher was called upon to witness the signing of the CBA by both management and workers. Plate 7 is a picture of the meeting to sign the CBA.



Plate 7: Group picture with representatives of workers, management and a union representative

This study has argued with the objective of the study that the potency of organising among wage quarry workers is embedded in coming out with a CBA.

The CBA shows how differently workers would be treated if management and workers were committed to implementing the tenets of the CBA. Thus, the chapter compares the present working conditions of workers as indicated in the previous chapters (in terms of the four pillars of decent work concept such as employment, rights at work, social protection and social dialogue/organising) to what would be experienced under the signed CBA. The degree to which the latter portrays better working conditions, according to decent work indicators, the possibility that organising relates positively to the attainment of decent working conditions for informal wage quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana.

The analysis in this chapter used documentary review by examining the content of the CBA by comparing the content of the CBA with what is recommended in the labour laws of Ghana and ILO's decent work framework. The chapter is situated within Rawls' theory of justice which argues that both organising and collective bargaining are fundamental labour rights and should be respected. The theory guides the discussion in terms of the extent to which the basic right of workers to organise was respected in the sub-sector. The analysis is also guided by the ILO's convention 98 which treats collective bargaining and organising as two in one goal to be achieved under fundamental human rights.

Indicators of Collective Bargaining Agreement and Decent Work

The analysis compares indicators under the four pillars of ILO's decent work framework such as remunerated employment, workers' rights, social protection and social dialogue. The indicators discussed can be found in Table 5.

Table 5: Comparing Working Conditions of Quarry Workers before and after the Introduction of Proposed CBA

S/N	Decent work indicator	Status in Place (Before)	The outcome of proposed CBA (After)
1	Appointment letter for job security	Non-existence	Will be provided.
2a	Hours of Work and Overtime	About 70 hours a week	40 hours per week.
2b	Overtime calculation	Half of daily mark plus Gh. 2 for feeding	1. Monday to Friday = NHR*1.25 2. Saturday: = NHR*1.50; and 3. Sunday and Holidays: NHR* 2.00.
3	Wages and salary increment	Determined arbitrary	To be determined annually
4	Training and Development	Orientation to start work	Refresher courses and further studies
5	Leaves including holidays, sick, annual and maternity leave	Not observed	21 days annual leave 10 days of casual leave 12 Weeks minimum maternity leave Two times medical check in a year
6	Occupational injury and health (safety at the workplace)	Employer cares for the 1 st day of medical bill	Work Men Compensation Act of Ghana would be activated
	Night shift risk allowance	Not catered for	25% of basic daily wage
	Risk allowance for field workers	No provision	20% of daily wage
7	Provision of protective clothing	Responsibility of both worker and employer	Employer's responsibility based on wear and tear for provision of: Torchlight and safety boot for <i>watchmen</i> masks for welders , aprons, helmet, working gear, boots, nose covers for <i>operators</i> ; aprons and gloves for <i>storekeepers</i>

Source: Field data (2018)

Table 5: Continues

S/N	Decent work indicator	Status in Vogue (Before)	The outcome of proposed CBA (After)
			Raincoats for field workers
			Dust masts for workers in dusty areas
	Usage of protective clothing	Used sometimes by workers	Compulsory for workers with sanctions for culprits
8	Provision of health insurance	Not in existence	Compulsory for an employer to register workers on NHIS
9	Termination of appointment and entitlement	Employer's discretion and entitlements hardly paid	By worker based on ill-treatment, sexual harassment By employer based on medical ground, unfit; inadequate residual capacity, proven misconduct
10	Disciplinary measures	Sacked outright	A one-month notice from either party Absent without permission for less than 4 days = warning letter with one-day wage deduction
11	Death of a worker and relatives	No provisions	A suitable coffin or Gh. 2000.00 & 2 bottles of schnapps/full piece of Calico & Gh1,000.00 (Muslim) Transportation of corpse to hometown Gh. 300 for a worker whose father/mother dies Gh. 1, 500 for and cost of the coffin for the death of spouse or children below 18 year

Source: Field data (2018)

The first element or indicator of the collective bargaining agreement of concern to this study is the appointment letter for job security. Securing job through a statement of assurance in appointment letter was virtually and mostly not in existence for informal quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana. However, under the new CBA, these workers would be issued appointment letters which would be renewed after every two years to replace the daily contract between

workers and management in vogue. This means that workers cannot be easily sacked without justification by the employer.

Workers' casual status will also be valid for only three months probational period, and workers would have to be made permanent workers compulsorily upon expiration of the three months. All these provisions were captured under clause 3.1 of the proposed CBA document. This would, therefore, mean that quarry firms would be adhering to dictates of section 75 of the Labour Act of Ghana and workers would be more secure than before.

Hours of work would also be restricted to 40 hours maximum for every wage quarry worker, with daily hours of work left to the discretion of the employer. This provision as encapsulated in clause 3.3 (a) will, thus, afford the workers 48 hours rest periods after every 40 hours of work. This would amount to full adherence to both sections 33 and 39 of the Labour Act of Ghana. This recent development through collective bargaining would also mean that management of Quarry A upholds Convention No.1 on maximum working hours for decent work by ILO.

Closely related to working hours were wages and salaries. The current practice where informal quarry workers worked for more than five to eight years without the commensurate annual wage increment would be terminated under the CBA provisions when unionised. The CBA, when operational, will compel the employer and workers to review workers' salary and wages upwards every year as stipulated in clause 3.4 (c) of the CBA. Thus, Hodges and Baah's (2006) assertion and description of collective bargaining agreement in Ghana having indexation and

other mechanisms for wage increment due to general economic condition would be upheld in the stone quarry sub-sector as well. This means that though the wage rate workers received was already decent; it would be improved annually to take care of economic realities.

Over time, working under the proposed CBA would no longer be compulsory for quarry workers. Instead, it would be carried out by the employer when required (clause 3.5 sub-section b). The formula for computation and payment for overtime looks very transparent and very rewarding as compared to what was in vogue. Sub-section C of clause 3.5 of the CBA stipulates that where the average working week is 40 hours' work from Monday to Friday, overtime will be paid at standard hourly rate multiplied by 1.25; Saturday: standard hourly rate multiplied by 1.50; and Sunday and Holidays: Normal Hourly Rate Multiplied by 2.00. Sub-section d of the same section of the CBA computed the basic hourly rate as defined as basic daily rate divided by eight.

Enhancing the competencies of quarry workers through either internal or external training by the employer is another new area that the CBA will help to improve upon working conditions under the CBA. Section 10 of the CBA indicates that the employer will encourage and assist employees to attain a higher level of education and skills in those fields of education and crafts applicable to the employer's interest through internal and external training under NVTI Act 352 (1970).

Additionally, the sub-section "b" of the said CBA added that where the employee pursues a course with the approval of the employer, the employer shall

reimburse tuition fee, cost of education materials and examination fees to the successful employee. This means that the current situation where some quarry workers could not further their education either through the mainstream or distance mode will be changed. Thus, the opportunity for these informal quarry workers to continue enhancing their productive capacity or find productive work as a decent livelihood which is the first pillar of the decent framework agenda would be upheld.

Informal wage quarry workers in Quarry A were not enjoying annual leave. However, the unionisation process backed by the CBA will ensure that workers (non-supervisory grade) who have done 12 months continuous service shall be granted leave with pay for 21 days. A worker is also entitled to a casual leave for ten days in any calendar year after the worker has taken his/her annual leave. Wage quarry workers currently do not enjoy any sick leave. Thus, this employer would have conformed to sections 20 and 32 of the Labour Act on the 15 working days minimum annual leave provision. Within the decent work framework, the ILO holiday with pay convention (revised) 1970 (No. 32) on a worker's entitlement of three-week paid leaves every year would have been adhered to, culminating into decent working condition. However, the 21 days provision in the collective bargaining agreement was higher than the regulatory requirement. This would then agree with ILO's (2006) assertion that paid leaves in the collective agreement are more beneficial than statutory entitlements.

Quarry workers, for fear of losing their jobs, sometimes worked with ill-health conditions. Unionising these workers as a trade union strategy by the *General Construction, Manufacturing and Quarry Workers Union (GCMQWU)*

will change this status quo. Clause 4.4 of the CBA addresses this concern of workers by stating that sick leave, paid at the basic rate, shall be granted to employees who are absent from work due to short illness, where such absence on excused duty is authorised by a medical certificate, by the employer's doctor or an approved medical practitioner. ILO medical care and sickness benefits convention 1963 (No. 130) entitles a worker to leave from work due to sickness and cash benefits that replace the wage during the time of leave. Decent work agenda sees sick leave as a basic worker's security which defines a quality job.

Further, female wage quarry workers in the quarry do not enjoy maternity leave. Female quarry workers would have to choose between their job and giving birth. A pregnant clerical female quarry worker who was an interviewee for this study had to leave Quarry A because she was pregnant. The proposed CBA had a provision to address this challenge facing female temporal/casual quarry workers. Clause 4.5 of the CBA proposed that a female worker who has completed at least 12 months service before her confinement shall be granted 12 weeks of maternity leave with pay. In a situation where, medical service or attention for a female worker during ante- and postnatal period who qualifies for maternity leave is not available under the national health insurance scheme, the employer shall be responsible for such medical services. This latter provision in the collective bargaining agreement would meet the dictates of the Labour Act of Ghana (2003) (Act 651) and articles 8 and 9 of the maternity protection convention, 200 (No. 183).

Quarry workers of Quarry A do not observe public holidays in Ghana, but Chinese workers in the same quarry observed China's public holidays in the quarry here in Ghana. This discrimination was well tackled by clause 4.6 of the CBA, which stipulates that workers of the quarry shall observe public holidays under holiday law currently in force or another announcement as applicable.

The provision of protective equipment/apparel for workers to ensure their safety and health was one major challenge facing wage/temporal quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana. The situation where some wage quarry workers in Quarries A and especially B had to buy some safety apparel themselves would no longer be the case. This is because the sub-section one of clause 5.3 of the proposed CBA made it compulsory for the employer to provide torchlight and safety boots for guards; masks (for welders), aprons, helmet, working gear, boots, and nose covers for operators; and aprons and gloves for storekeepers.

Additionally, all field workers were to be provided raincoats in the raining seasons. The proposed CBA also stipulates that management shall provide dust masks for workers in dusty sites. The CBA, when operationalised, would also ensure that safety equipment would be supplied regularly and would remain the property of the employer for a maximum of 12 months but would be replaced at the employer's cost only on standard wear and tear basis. This provision would, thus, conform to article 16 of ILO's convention 155.

Specifically, the employer of Quarry A will be providing two sets of uniforms to all female workers once a year. Every worker in the quarry would also undergo a medical check-up twice a year by the company doctor or a certified

medical practitioner. Clause 5.3.2 also outlaws the refusal or failure by a worker to use the protective equipment supplied by the employer for the work for which they were supplied. Currently, the labour inspectors indicated the refusal of workers to put on protective apparel provided by the employer as one of the challenges facing them during their inspections. Thus, this provision in the CBA, when implemented, would help not only the labour inspectors but also the employer in order to reduce the level of occupational injuries and its subsequent cost implications to the employer.

Another area of decent working conditions of quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana is occupational injuries, diseases and insurance coverage. The arrangement in vogue for quarry workers, especially in Quarries A and B, is that workers bear almost every cost of medical bills for injuries sustained at the workplace. The employer pays for only the first day of medical bills. There was also no health insurance provider for these workers, though the majority of them had registered with the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). However, sections 3.9 and 5.3.6 jointly addressed these challenges with the introduction of Workmen Compensation Law. The CBA stipulates that in an event where a worker suffers occupational diseases, dies or suffers personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his/her employment, the Workmen Compensation Act 1987 (PNDC 187) will apply.

The signed CBA (sub-section 2 of section 5.3.6) made it compulsory for the employer to ensure that all workers register with a reputable insurance company. Additionally, the employer would pay for the registration/premium for the worker

and the spouse under the NHIS. When prescribed drugs are not under the NHIS drug lists, the employer shall reimburse the cost of the drugs to the worker. Should a worker suffer any illness outside the working time, the worker shall visit the designated hospital of the company for medical attention and submit bills and records on visitation to the employer. The employer may investigate medical bill receipts from external health facilities for their genuineness make payment to cater for some part or even all the bills-the highest amount to be paid for non-occupational illness is GH. 600 per annum.

Female quarry workers in Quarry A, as well as all-male wage workers in Quarry B, worked on a shift basis. The provision in vogue is that these workers were not entitled to any special allowances for the risk they took in coming to work for the night shifts and high-risk allowance for the dangerous quarry activities they do. These challenges would soon be catered for as captured in section 6.5 of the proposed CBA between workers and management of the quarry. The CBA establishes that workers normally work standard day time hours but are required to work at night shift between 10 pm to 6 am for production reasons and would receive 25% of basic daily salary as *night shift allowance*.

However, guards who usually work during the night because of their duties were exempted from this provision. All other quarry workers working in hazardous areas in the quarries would be entitled to 20 per cent of their daily wages in addition to the standard daily rate as a high-risk allowance. The management of Quarry A, however, must be careful that a pregnant worker would not be engaged from 10 pm to 7 am as stipulated by the Labour Act of Ghana unless her consent is sought.

The disciplinary procedure is another area that the CBA sought to inject sanity to favour both management and workers. Currently, a wage quarry worker loses his/her job if he/she is absent from work even for a day without permission. Clause 7.1 of the CBA addresses this with a provision that a worker who absents himself/herself from work without permission but returns to work before the expiration of the fourth day risks an action of suspension of one day (without pay but warning letter served) for each day of absence. The proposed CBA also handled warning notices, suspension, interdiction as well as the termination of employment of a worker.

In terms of the notice of warning, the provision in clause 7.3 indicated that if a worker commits an offence against any clause of the CBA, the employer might issue a written warning to the worker. However, such a written warning would cease to affect after 12 months of good conduct from the worker. A quarry worker of Quarry A would, however, be suspended for five working days for a continuous offence only after two written warnings from the employer. On a third offence, the employer could terminate the employment of the worker. In a situation where the employer accuses the worker of a criminal offence and proceedings are instituted against the worker, then such a worker would be entitled to 50% of his/her salary and the remaining half paid when the worker is found not to be guilty.

Grounds for termination as established in the proposed CBA included a mutual agreement between a worker and the employer, by the worker on the grounds of ill-treatment or sexual harassment, and by the employer on the death of the worker. The employer of quarry workers in Quarry A could also terminate a

worker's appointment if the worker is found to be medically unfit for employment, unable to carry out his/her work due to accident, incompetence or has proven misconduct. A one month notice of written termination of appointment would be required from either party to terminate a contract of employment.

Remuneration on termination of employment was also considered a provision. A worker is entitled to any remuneration earned or deferred before the termination. Benefits to be paid to the worker upon the termination of appointment would depend on the tenure of the worker. One-half of a worker's salary was to be paid for tenure of three months to 12 months, and two months for tenure above 12 months. Other issues addressed by the proposed CBA agreed upon by both workers and management of Quarry A included severance pay, severance benefits, and ex-gratia entitlement. Others included long service awards, grievances procedure and strikes and lockouts, and vehicle maintenance allowance.

Chapter Summary

The chapter outlined eleven key indicators of the four ILO's decent work agenda captured under the proposed collective bargaining agreement between workers and management. The implementation of the CBA will highly improve upon the working conditions of these quarry wage workers as compared to their working conditions in vogue without the CBA.

Specific decent indicators of employment as one of the ILO's decent work pillar tackled in the chapter included appointment letter for job security, hours of work and overtime, wages and salary (compensation), and training and

development of workers to enhance their skills and competencies and termination of appointment and disciplinary measures. Indicators of workers' rights at work as another pillar of decent work agenda considered were leaves including holidays, sick, annual and maternity leaves; occupational injury and health and safety at the workplace; provision of protective clothing and death of a worker and entitlement to the bereaved family. Indicators analysed under social protection pillar of decent work agenda were social security including pension, health insurance.

The CBA was one of the products of the unionisation processes of the quarry workers by a trade union. Thus, the conclusion was drawn that trade union organising of workers served as a catalyst for ensuring decent working conditions among quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana. Thus, the positioning of organising as a conduit for the attainment of decent working conditions for quarry workers in the conceptual framework is justified. Meanwhile, the direct influence of organising on decent working conditions supported by previous authors depicted in the conceptual framework could not be supported by this study.

Instead, the indirect effect of organising on decent working conditions through CBA as can be seen from the conceptual framework was established in this study. The collective bargaining agreement in this study could also be seen as any verbal or written agreement between workers' group/associations (especially in the case of self-employed quarry workers) and regulators or suppliers in order to ensure better working conditions of workers. That is, the chapter has shown that agreement/collective bargaining agreement between workers and management/suppliers or regulators is very instrumental in using organising of workers to

achieve a decent working. It also means that Rawls' theory of justice and ILO's decent work agenda were adhered to by the management of this quarrying firm. However, as can be seen from the conceptual framework, commitment and monitoring are needed to sustain the decent working conditions. This study could not measure this aspect of the conceptual framework since the CBA was signed during the data collection and more time is needed to conduct such analysis.

CHAPTER TEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

This chapter serves as the final chapter of the study and presents key issues such as the overview of the entire thesis. The chapter takes into consideration summaries for each research objective of the study. The concluding part of the chapter extracted issues from the key findings for each objective of the study. Lastly, recommendations and suggestions for further research as well as reflexivity were captured in the chapter.

Overview of the Purpose of the Study

The general purpose of the study was to explore organising and decent working conditions among informal stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana. The study specifically sought to evaluate forms and drivers of informality among stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana, examine how existing working conditions influence organising among informal stone quarry workers. The rest were to assess how informal stone quarry workers organise themselves, assess how existing forms of organising practices relate to decent working conditions among informal stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana, and to make recommendations on how decent working conditions of informal quarry workers can be achieved.

The study employed the interpretive approach from the epistemic position and exploratory qualitative study design. The study population comprised of 39,536

stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana. Wage quarry workers were selected from four quarry firms such as Pilot Quarry Ltd, Executive Quarry Ltd, Sarcon Quarry Ltd and Melliss Quarry Ltd from Gomoa East; KEEA Municipal, and Gomoa West districts, and self-employed quarry workers from Cape Coast Metropolis for the study. Purposive and snowball sampling techniques were used to sample 121 respondents who were wage and self-employed quarry workers and representatives from EPA, labour offices, Ghana Trade Union and management members of the selected quarries.

Data collection instruments were mainly unstructured interview guide and focus group discussion guide supported by the non-participant observation guide. One hundred and nine (109) individual in-depth interviews (comprising 16 females and 93 males) and twelve (12) focus group discussions (eight male groups and four female groups) were also carried out. Ethical standards were adhered to throughout the study. The primary data collection from the field started from July to December 2018.

The qualitative data was analysed by transcribing the interview data gathered. Secondly, the transcribed data were coded based on meaningful segments identified in the data, and finally, categorisation was developed based on the objectives of the study. This study used interpretive qualitative data analysis to compare what existed in labour laws and the literature to empirical findings from the field.

Summary of Results

The first objective of the study was to evaluate the forms and drivers of informality among stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana. Key findings with regards to the objective were:

1. Drivers of informality were lack of employment opportunities, the flexibility of work scheduled and arrangement, livelihood and proximity influenced informality among quarry workers. Wage quarry workers were in the sub-sector temporarily awaiting better job opportunities while the self-employed decided to stay permanently.
2. Three primary forms of informality influenced by neo-liberal policies identified were self-employed, irregular contract and regular wage quarry workers.
3. In terms of sex categorisation, male dominance was found among wage quarry workers while female dominance was observed for self-employed quarry workers.
4. Non-paid family members and children supported self-employed quarry workers. Children involvement in terms of providing support for their parents was, however, restricted to periods after school and on weekends.

The second objective was to examine how existing working conditions influence organising among informal stone quarry workers, and its key findings were:

1. Indicators of working conditions of wage quarry workers were reasonably decent in just one quarry firm.

2. Apart from wages, all other indicators of working conditions for wage quarry workers in the other three quarries and the self-employed could not be described as decent per ILO's decent work framework and the labour laws of Ghana. These other indicators were working hours, social security, health, insurance, leave (annual and maternity), provision of protective clothing, and a safe working environment.
3. Irregular visitation of labour inspectors, coupled with alleged bribing of other regulatory agencies such as the EPA, GRA, police and the military, among others, empowered the employers/capitalist to flout the national and international laws on decent working conditions in the Central Region of Ghana.
4. Informal quarry workers as active agents in the quarries with indecent working conditions had decided to organise themselves for voice and representation to drive home better working conditions for members.
5. An informal form of social security of investing in children now and to be recouped in the future in the form of better care from children was identified among the self-employed quarry workers.

Examining forms and strategies used by informal stone quarry workers to organise themselves in the Central Region of Ghana was the third objective of the study.

Key findings for this objective were:

1. Self-organising effort in the form of membership-based organisation (welfare) was a temporal strategy due to intimidation and victimization by management, and autocratic leadership style. Formal trade union

organising among informal quarry workers was observed in only one quarry firm after a leader of the existing membership-based organisation contacted a trade union.

2. The absence of formal trade union's organising in other quarries and for self-employed quarry workers was explained as lack of knowledge on the part of trade unions of the existence of such quarries with its workers.
3. Trade union's organising efforts for informal stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana was met with the lack of management support, logistic challenges, rivalry over legitimacy among unions, lack of commitment and sustainable membership on the part of quarry workers.
4. Labour inspectors' inadequate two times visitation was observed for only two quarries due to logistics, human resource challenges and the lack of power to prosecute employers who flout organising rights provisions in the labour laws of Ghana. Other regulatory agencies such as the police, soldiers, Minerals Commission, GRA, among others, who also visited the quarries regularly were also alleged to have been bribed, making employers/neo-liberalism, "the player and referee" in the quarrying subsector.

Assessing how existing forms of organising practices relate to decent working conditions among informal stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana was the fourth objectives. Key findings with regards to this objective of the study included:

1. Organising wage quarry workers in the Central Region had resulted in a signed collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between management and

workers under the guidance of trade union representatives and labour inspectors.

2. The CBA, when implemented, would afford temporal quarry workers decent working conditions by meeting the requirement of the Labour Act of Ghana (Act 651) and ILO decent work framework, in terms of issuance of appointment letters for job security, and work for a maximum of 40 hours per week. The rest, among others, were entitled to refresher courses and further studies to train and develop their skills and competencies; entitlements to sick, annual and maternity leave; payment of occupational injuries; and provision of protective clothing, and health insurance.
3. The findings of this study have not supported the direct relationship between organising and decent working conditions indicated in the conceptual framework of the study. Instead, the indirect relationship through a collective bargaining agreement was found among quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana

Conclusions

The forms of informality were self-employed which has female dominance and receives support from non-paid family members and children; and irregular contract and regular wage quarry workers (working with quarry firms) with male dominance. Drivers of informality among these quarry workers were the lack of employment opportunities in the country, flexibility of work schedules and arrangement, need for income to take care of family members and proximity to

quarry sites. Some quarry workers were engaged in informal quarry activities as a temporary measure while others took up informal quarry jobs as a permanent activity. The assistance provided by children after school and on weekends could affect their academic activities.

The existing working conditions of informal quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana could not be generally described to have overcome decent work deficit (except for one quarry firm) per ILO's decent work agenda/framework and the labour laws of Ghana in terms of respect for workers rights, social protection and safe working environment for quarry workers. The precarious working conditions had influenced organising (both membership-based and trade union) among informal quarry workers. This is because these workers, as active agents, wanted to join forces to have a voice and representation to be able to achieve decent working conditions for their members.

It can also be concluded, for the third objective of the study, that self-organising effort in the form of membership-based organisations (welfarism) was a temporal strategy due to intimidation and victimisation by management and autocratic leadership style. Formal trade union organising among informal quarry workers was, however, observed in only one quarry firm after workers approached a trade union. Challenges such as lack of management support, logistic challenges, rivalry over legitimacy among unions, lack of commitment and sustainable membership on the part of quarry workers negatively affected the organising effort of trade unions among quarry workers. Inadequate times for inspections by labour inspectors due to logistics, human resource challenges as well as lack of power to

prosecute employers who flout organising rights provisions in the labour laws served as a barrier to successful organising among quarry workers. These challenges also explain the absence of formal trade union's organising in other quarries and for self-employed quarry workers.

Despite the above challenges, joint efforts by some wage quarry workers and a trade union had resulted in a signed collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between management and workers. Contents of the CBA indicated very decent indicators for the working conditions for quarry workers in terms of social protection, workers representation, respect for workers' rights and a safe working environment for quarry workers. Thus, organising indirectly relates to decent working conditions for quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana. The indirect relationship was through a collective bargaining agreement.

Findings of this study did not support the direct relationship between organising and decent working conditions indicated in the conceptual framework of the study and literature. It, therefore, means that the indicators of decent working conditions such as workers' rights, remunerative employment, social protection and safe working environment can be achieved for informal regular wage quarry workers only when attention is paid to organising through CBA or agreement. ILO's position of achieving decent working conditions for the same decent work pillars in a parallel fashion is, therefore, not supported by the findings of this study.

Recommendations

Based on the above conclusions, it is, therefore, recommended that:

1. Alternative job opportunities are created by the government and private entities for processing quarry products in communities surrounded by quarrying activities. This would allow quarry workers to decline employment offers from quarry firms with very indecent working conditions.
2. The labour departments in the quarrying districts should be resourced to be able to inspect and enforce international and national laws on decent working conditions in the stone quarry sub-sector. In the short term, the labour department should write to the National Service Secretariat to annually send graduate personnel to beef-up the human resource needs of the department. In the long run, the government of Ghana should employ more permanent labour inspectors for the labour department and its district offices. Logistical support should also be readily provided by the government of Ghana or development partners.
3. The labour department in the stone quarrying districts should collaborate or have joint monitoring teams with other regulatory agencies such as Minerals Commission, the Police, Ghana Revenue Authority, and the military for enforcement of regulations on decent working conditions for quarry workers in the Central Region. The collaboration would serve as a watchdog against alleged bribing of some regulators and help to share resources and team up to be able to effectively ensure that decent working conditions at the quarry sites are not compromised.

4. The mandate of the labour department could be reviewed through the Labour Act (2003) of Ghana (Act 651) to make it more binding. The review is needed so that the labour inspectors and the department do not only exercise the advisory role provision in vogue but to be able to prosecute managers of quarries found flouting labour directives and provisions in the Labour Act.
5. All defunct membership-based organisations among wage and self-employed quarry workers where there is no formal trade union organising should be revived by members under the support of trade unions. This is because the former served as a catalyst for undertaking formal trade unionism to achieve decent working condition among quarry workers in the central region of Ghana. This calls for orientation by trade unions for quarry workers on the importance of organising.
6. Trade unions involved in organising informal wage quarry workers in the Central Region should use more proactive organising strategies. These would help to organise other wage and self-employed quarry workers without trade union form of organising in the Central Region of Ghana. Strategies such as individuals, churches, mosques, community-based and non-governmental organisations could be useful in this regard. The trade union (GCMQWU) could also be more aggressive by contacting workers through their employers' details at the Registrar General Department for organising rather than waiting for workers to contact them. Funding for these activities could be obtained by partnering government, employers'

association, NGOs and international development organisations such as Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), among others.

7. Alternative livelihood programmes which support parents of children involved in quarrying activities should be implemented by the government of Ghana and/or development partners for self-employed quarry workers. This would resource these parents to be able to hire the right calibre of labour for their activities. Eventually, the children involved in supporting these workers would be freed to concentrate on their academic activities after school.

Limitation of the Study

The findings of this study were limited to the four quarry firms and self-employed quarry workers from the four districts in the Central Region of Ghana. The findings could not be extended to other regions and other quarries in the same regions because of the methodological approach of using exploratory qualitative design as the methodology for this study. This method was appropriate because the available limited studies on quarrying activities in Ghana were limited to environmental and child labour issues without focusing on labour and organising issues. Thus, if a mixed-method from both the qualitative and quantitative dimensions is adopted, several other issues could have been brought to bear.

This study used the qualitative interpretative analysis where empirical findings from the field were interpreted with the lenses of labour laws, ILO's decent work framework and prevailing conditions in literature.

Thus, the use of other analytical frameworks such as discourse analysis, cross-site or casual pathway could have unearthed several other different results or findings. The effect of these issues is that the findings of this study cannot be generalised to represent all the working conditions of quarry workers in Ghana. Despite this, objective “subjectivity” was employed to ensure that the findings are situated within the scientific research processes.

Recommendation for Further Studies

Stone quarry activities have both labour and environmental implications. However, this study focused on the labour implications and supports the need for further studies on the environmental effects of stone quarry activities in the Central Region of Ghana. The current study also focused on only the Central Region. It is, however, possible that similar or different conditions of workers exist in the other 15 regions of Ghana. This calls for a further comparative study on organising among informal stone quarry workers in Ghana. The study revealed infighting among trade unions and bribing allegations against trade union executives and state agencies. Further undercover studies could be conducted to ascertain the veracity of these allegations and its impact on the working conditions of informal quarry workers.

Contribution to Knowledge

This study has contributed to knowledge in terms of serving as literature in the form of secondary data for future studies on informality and organising in the

Central Region of Ghana. The stone quarry subsector has been one of the under-researched areas in the extractive industry. Theoretically, all available studies on the subsector in Ghana looked at the environmental and child labour issues without focusing on labour issues. Thus, this study has at least partially filled that knowledge gap. More importantly, this study has greatly shown arguably one of the best methods of achieving decent working conditions for informal quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana.

Thus, policymakers such as governments and trade unions can adopt the approach or model of using organising through CBAs to achieve decent working conditions agenda for all other quarry workers in the region and beyond by the year 2030. Instead of pursuing the ILO's four strategic pillars or goals in a parallel fashion as being done by ILO and governments, this study has shown that using organising through CBA as a catalyst, decency of all the other three strategic pillars such as remunerative employment, social protection and respect for workers' rights could be achieved among informal workers by the year 2030 as envisaged in SDG goal 8, target 8.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

RESEARCH PROTOCOL FOR DATA COLLECTION

A. FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR STONE QUARRY WORKERS

Objective 1: To evaluate the existing form of informality among informal Stone Quarry Workers along the value chain of stone quarry activities in the Central Region of Ghana.

Themes

1. Forms of work and why
2. Characteristics of workers in terms of age, sex, race, education, etc
3. Supplies of input, customers and associated work related needs
4. Challenges with activities and city authorities as well as redress

Objective 2: To examine the present forms of organisation (strategies for organising) employed among informal Stone Quarry Workers along the value chain of stone quarry activities in the Central Region of Ghana

Themes

1. Existence, formation and purpose of association/group/cooperative
2. Membership, reasons and expectations for joining group
3. Experience with unions and present need for it
4. Main actors (possible NGO link) and strategies in organising own account stone quarry workers
5. Benefits and challenges as a group member/union member?

Objective 3: To assess how the existing forms of informality among informal quarry workers influence organising among these workers.

Themes

1. Type of quarry work, vulnerability and the need to join group
2. Organisation, actors, strategies and purposes of informal stone quarry worker organisations
3. Sustainability of own account stone quarry worker organisations

Objective 4: To assess how existing forms of organising practices can be used to achieve Decent Working Condition for informal Stone Quarry Workers in the Central Region of Ghana

1. Challenges with city authorities with registration process/operations/marketing and how these challenges are handled
2. Association/group and better working condition achievement
3. Decent work indicators such as working hours, wages, tenure and social security provisions, freedom and respect or recognition before and after your joining association
4. Members expectations from union leaders, cooperation from regulators for sustainable decent working conditions
5. Members/workers contribution to policies that influence stone quarry activities
6. Rights and responsibilities as own account stone quarry worker

B.INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR *INFORMAL QUARRY WORKERS*

Objective 1: To evaluate the existing form of informality among informal Stone Quarry Workers along the value chain of stone quarry activities in the Central Region of Ghana.

1. Tenure, reasons and benefits of working with the organisation
2. Needs, interest and challenges of casual workers in this organisation
3. Company's relation with casual quarry workers
4. Nature of contract, processes and cost of renewing contract with the organisation?
5. Formalization processes and stage with the organisation

Objective 2: To examine the present forms of strategies for organisation among Stone Quarry workers

1. Type of Workers organisation, tenure, membership and dues
2. Characteristics of leaders of workers organisation in terms of gender/age/ value chain activities as well as satisfaction level
3. Group meetings - convening and democracy at meetings
4. Management threats of unionizing/joining group and its impact
5. Organisational actors, purposes and strategies for organising casual workers
6. Previous/past experiences with trade unions?

Objective 3: To assess how the existing forms of informality among informal quarry workers influence organising among these workers.

1. Vulnerabilities as a quarry worker
2. Type of quarry activity and the need to join group/union
3. Sustainability of casual stone quarry worker organisations

Objective 4: To assess how existing forms of organising practices can be used to achieve Decent Working Condition for informal Stone Quarry Workers in the Central Region of Ghana

1. Tenure and challenges with quarrying activities and contract renewal
2. Risks associated with quarrying activities, occupational injuries (frequency of fatal and non fatal) and type of protective clothing provided
3. Wage per day, increment and overtime, and working hours
4. Health insurance/care facilities, social security provision, and retirement packages
5. Appointment, training, channels for addressing disagreement; and disengagement process
6. Engendered quarrying activities and impact on wages, hours of work, positions, injuries, social security, safe working environment, social security, retirement package, annual leave and maternity leave
7. Characteristics and percentage of unionised as against non-unionised workers
8. Management and society's respect and perception on the relevance of quarry activities
9. Workers stake in decision making (contributions sought, accepted and used by the company)
10. Expectations from union leaders, cooperation from regulators for sustainable decent working conditions
11. Unionizing and better working conditions

C. INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR WORKERS GROUP/ASSOCIATION'S LEADERS

Objective: To assess how existing forms of organising practices can be used to achieve Decent Working Condition for informal Stone Quarry Workers in the Central Region of Ghana

Themes

1. Interest and needs, and organisational actors in organising workers
2. Living wage of workers, overtime payment and security of employment before and after the introduction of the group/union
3. Quality of employment such as hours of work, provision of protective clothing before and after the introduction of the group/union?
4. Conditions of work- social security, leave (annual and maternity), health care/insurance provision, strength of workers voice/representation and retirement packages after joining the group/union
5. Nature of activities and risks associated, safety of working environment frequency of occupational injuries (fatal and non fatal) and organisations provisions
6. Appointment, training, channels for addressing disagreement; and disengagement processes

7. Engendered quarrying activities and its effect on wages, hours of work, positions, injuries, social security, safe working environment, social security, retirement package, annual leave and maternity leave.
8. Management and society's respect and perception on the relevance of quarry activities
9. Workers stake in decision making (contributions sought, accepted and used by the company)
10. Expectations from union leaders, cooperation from regulators for sustainable decent working conditions
11. Unionizing (duration, dues, process) and better working conditions
12. Challenges with the union executives and management?

IF NOT PART OF GROUP/ASSOCIATION/UNION

- a. *Why are you not unionized and was it the consent of members or group leaders?*
- b. *What challenges do the group face for refusing to be unionized*
- c. *How does it benefit the group for not unionising?*
- d. *Do you think the group is better off without the union and why?*
- e. *What has been your experience with city authorities for organising workers*

D. INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR UNION LEADERS (CONSTRUCTION, BUILDING AND MATERIAL WORKERS UNION)

Objective: To assess how existing forms of organising practices can be used to achieve Decent Working Condition for informal Stone Quarry Workers in the Central Region of Ghana

1. Type of quarry workers organized, interest and needs, experiences with organising quarry workers
2. Organising strategies, action plan for both informal and formal quarry workers
3. Other organisational actors and their strategies of organising
4. Kind and source of support, benefits and challenges of organising quarry workers
5. Working conditions and impact on organising
6. Living wage of workers, overtime payment and security of employment before and after the introduction of the union
7. Quality of employment such as hours of work, provision of protective clothing before and after the introduction of the union
8. Conditions of work- social security, leave (annual and maternity), health care/insurance provision, strength of workers voice/representation and retirement packages after joining the union
9. Nature of activities and risks associated, safety of working environment, frequency of occupational injuries (fatal and non fatal) and organisations provisions

E. INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR ADMINISTRATORS OF QUARRY AND REGULATORS.

Objective: To assess how existing forms of organising practices can be used to achieve decent working condition for informal stone quarry workers in the Central Region of Ghana

1. Differences in company's relation with wage/casual workers and permanent/formal workers in the organisation
2. Risks associated with quarrying activities, occupational injuries (frequency of fatal and non fatal) and type of protective clothing and organisational provisions
3. Wage per day, increment and overtime, and working hours
4. Health insurance/care facilities, organisational social security provision, and retirement packages
5. Appointment, training, channels for addressing disagreement; and disengagement process
6. Engendered quarrying activities, wages, hours of work, positions, injuries, social security, safe working environment, social security, retirement package, annual leave and maternity leave
7. Characteristics and percentage of unionised as against non-unionised workers
8. Cost and processes for workers contract renewal
9. Means of redress for workers who felt cheated and unfairly treated by management
10. Management supports for workers association/union and experiences with unions
11. Formalization processes, stage and consequences/effect on decent working condition
12. Expectations from union leaders, cooperation from regulators for sustainable decent working conditions

F. OBSERVATION CHECKLIST

1. Nature of activity along the value chain
2. Gender and activities along the value chain
3. Children and activities along the value chain
4. Possible effects of activities along the value chain on workers
5. Time of reporting to work and departure
6. Management and workers relation at the sites
7. Leaders and workers relations at the sites
8. Democracy at workers or and management meetings

APPENDIX B

OTHER PLATES (PICTURES) FOR THE STUDY

Wage informal quarry workers



Plat 8: A Quarry Site

Roads to a quarry site



Plate 9: Technology for breaking stones further into smaller sizes



Plate 10: Activities of Self-employed quarry workers



Plate 11: Children taking rest after assisting parents at the quarry sight



Plate 12: FGD with participants



Plate 13: Activities of self-employed workers along a major road

TRADE UNION ENROLLMENT FORM

GENERAL CONSTRUCTION, MANUFACTURING AND QUARRIES WORKERS' UNION (GCMQWU), GHANA

Tel: +233 (0)20 618 7120
+233 (0)20 062 3629
Email: gcmqwu.gh@gmail.com

Please enrol me as member of the General Construction, Manufacturing and Quarries Workers' Union. I shall abide by the Rules, Regulations, Bye-laws and or NEC decisions as formulated from time to time.

Authorisation of Deduction of Trade Union Contribution from Pay (Checked)
I hereby authorise my Employer to deduct the following dues from my monthly salary by the check-off system.

(i) Union Dues	1%
(ii) Educational/Solidarity	1%

From 20..... and pay same to the General Construction, Manufacturing and Quarries Workers' Union (GCMQWU), Ghana.

Full Name Male Female

About Your Job

Employment/Company:

Date of Employment:

SSF No:

Staff No:

Job Title:

Age:

Location of Employment/Company:

Work Address: E-mail:

Mobile: Date:

Plate 14: Trade union's enrolment form



Plate 15: Researcher in group photograph with management, workers, union reps and labour inspector after a meeting

APPENDIX C

SAMPLE INTRODUCTORY LETTER
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST

INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD SECRETARIAT

TEL: 0558093143 / 0508878309/ 0244207814

C/O Directorate of Research, Innovation and Consultancy

E-MAIL: irb@ucc.edu.gh

OUR REF: UCC/IRB/A/2016/261

YOUR REF:

OMB NO: 0990-0279

IORG #: IORG0009096



14TH JUNE, 2018

Mr. Moses Segbenya
Institute for Development studies
University of Cape Coast

Dear Mr. Segbenya,

ETHICAL CLEARANCE –ID: (UCCIRB/CHLS/2018/04)

The University of Cape Coast Institutional Review Board (UCCIRB) has granted **Provisional Approval** for the implementation of your research protocol titled *Organising for Decent Working Conditions among Stone Quarry Workers in the Central Region of Ghana*. This approval requires that you submit periodic review of the protocol to the Board and a final full review to the UCCIRB on completion of the research.

The UCCIRB may observe or cause to be observed procedures and records of the research during and after implementation.

Please note that any modification of the project must be submitted to the UCCIRB for review and approval before its implementation.

You are also required to report all serious adverse events related to this study to the UCCIRB within seven days verbally and fourteen days in writing.

Always quote the protocol identification number in all future correspondence with us in relation to this protocol.

Yours faithfully,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'S. Owusu'.

Samuel Asiedu Owusu, PhD
UCCIRB Administrator

.....
ADMINISTRATOR
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST
Date: 14 - 06 - 2018

APPENDIX D

RECORDS OF RESPIRATORY TRACT INFECTION AND OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES REPORTED AT KISSI HEALTH CENTRE

Respiratory Tract Infection							Occupational Injury					
Age	2018			2017			2018			2017		
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>
20-34	58	126	184	57	0	57	17	4	21	20	9	29
35-49	32	65	97	45	78	123	10	2	12	6	3	9
50-59	25	43	68	24	56	80	0	0	0	3	0	3
60-69	25	40	65	17	43	60	1	1	2	2	0	2
60-69												
Total	140	274	414	143	177	320	28	7	35	31	12	43