

Feature Based Encryption Technique For Securing Forensic Biometric Image Data Using AES and Visual Cryptography*

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Abstract—with the current emergence of biometric image data applications on devices such as smart phones, security cameras, personal computers etc, there is a need for securing the image templates obtained from crime scenes as well as such devices before storing them in locations such as the cloud etc. In this paper, we proposed an encryption technique of securing the biometric image data collected from devices with an approach of feature based on encryption technique for securing forensic biometric image data using AES and visual cryptography method.

Keywords-*cryptology ; AES; image; visual cryptography*

I. INTRODUCTION

Imaging security and biometrics are two heavily connected areas in present day information security age. The quick evolution of biometrics with its usage in surveillance, verification and access control devices has raised the need of securing biometric data [1]. A majority of this image data from the biometric devices is visual, which has lead to intensive development of image security techniques for biometric applications [2]. Securing life forensic data over a communication channel and storing them must preserve the evidence by avoiding changes to the original image features such as the pixel values [3].

We chose Visual cryptography because it is the technique used to encrypt the data which is in the form of visual information such as images. Since the biometric templates stored in the database is usually in the form of images, the visual cryptography can be efficiently employed to encrypt the templates from attack [4].

The AES, Rijndael [5], is an adopted standard for the encryption of data established by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2001[6] and it is made up of a set of processes of transformations [7]. The AES-Advanced Encryption Standards has a key schedule for 128-bit, 192-bit, and 256-bit encryption and has all underwent thorough security strength analysis [8][9][10][11][12], application [13][14][15][16][17] and advancement by engaging several hybrid approaches [18][19][20][21][22] with other ciphers in order to test its security strength and also improve its strength. The hybrid approaches of the effective implementation of AES and other strong cryptographic tend to make it stronger and resistive to attacks [23].

This paper proposes an approach of encryption for securing forensic biometric image data using AES and visual cryptography. The encryption is done by engaging visual cryptographic encryption techniques based on image shares and transposition of the share. A key is extracted from the image and then encrypted using AES before using its engagement in the encryption process. At the end of the process, it has been observed that there was no pixel expansion hence there was no loss in image quality. The paper has the following structure: section II Methodology, section III Results and analysis, and section IV concluded the paper.

II. METHODOLOGY

In this paper, we presented an approach of encryption of images using AES and visual cryptography. The key was extracted from the image features and the AES-256 algorithm was used to generate the key used for the image encryption based on the extracted key. The Rijndael algorithm is a symmetric block cipher that supports key sizes of 128, 192 and 256 bits, with data handled in 128-bit blocks [24]. The pixel values of the images to be encrypted were encrypted using n-share visual cryptographic technique. The encryption process experienced no loss of pixel values during the process.

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


Figure 1. The summary of the processes engaged.


PI= Plain Image
 f= extracted feature
 k=key obtained from the extracted feature using the AES
 Alg= visual encryption algorithm employed
 CI= Ciphred Image

A. The Feature extraction

The features extracted from the image were the entropy and the geometrical mean.

Let $I = \text{an image} = f(R, G, B)$

I is a color image of $m \times n \times 3$ arrays



$(R, G, B) = m \times n$

Where $R, G, B \in I$

$(R \circ G)_{ij} = (R)_{ij} \cdot (G)_{ij}$

Where r_{i1} = first value of R

$r = [ri1] \ (i=1, 2 \dots m)$

$x \in r_{i1} : [a, b] = \{x \in I : a \leq x \leq b\}$

$a=0$ and $b=255$

$R = r = I(m, n, 1)$

Where g_{i2} = first value of G

$g = [gi2] \ (i=1, 2 \dots m)$

$x \in g : [a, b] = \{x \in I : a \leq x \leq b\}$

$a=0$ and $b=255$

$G = g = I(m, n, 1)$

And b_{i3} = first value of B

$g = [bi3] \ (i=1, 2 \dots m)$

$x \in b_{i3} : [a, b] = \{x \in I : a \leq x \leq b\}$

$a=0$ and $b=255$

$B = b = I(m, n, 1)$

The geometric mean is

$$m = \left[\prod_{i=1}^n x_i \right]^{\frac{1}{n}} \quad (1)$$

Where $x \in b_{i3} : [a, b] = \{x \in I : a \leq x \leq b\}$

$\delta(x_i) = \text{entropy}(I)$ which is the entropy of the plain and it is a scalar value representing the entropy of grayscale image. The entropy is a statistical measure of randomness that can be used to characterize the texture of the input image.

Entropy is defined as

$$\delta(x_i) = -\sum_{\eta=0}^{\varepsilon-1} \Psi(x_i) \cdot \log_2(\Psi(x_i)) \quad (2)$$

Where:

δ = Entropy of image

ε = Gray value of an input image (0-255).

$\Psi(\eta)$ = Probability of the occurrence of symbol η

B. The Rijndael-Advanced Encryption Standard Algorithm

All the input values, output values and cipher key values for the Advanced Encryption Standards are sequences containing the following bits values 128, 160, 192, 224 or 256 bits with the same cipher block size. The AES has a fixed block size at 128 bits. The number 'i' associated with a bit will hence be in one of the five ranges $0 \leq i < 128$, $0 \leq i < 160$, $0 \leq i < 192$, $0 \leq i < 224$ or $0 \leq i < 256$. All the bit sequences are interpreted as one-dimensional arrays of 8-bit bytes where byte n consists of the sub-sequence $8n$ to $8n + 7$. The arrays are denoted by a , the n 'th byte will be referred to as a_n or $a[n]$, where n is in one of the ranges $0 \leq n < 16$, $0 \leq n < 20$, $0 \leq n < 24$, $0 \leq n < 28$ or $0 \leq n < 32$ [25]. The bit order within a byte has the value $7-k$, where k is the bit's index, and the bit with order in a byte b will be denoted by b_i . Internally bytes are polynomial representations of finite field elements:

$$b_7x^7 + b_6x^6 + b_5x^5 + b_4x^4 + b_3x^3 + b_2x^2 + b_1x + b_0 = \sum_{i=0}^7 b_i x^i \quad (3)$$

The state array, s , and each distinct byte has two indexes: row number r with range $0 \leq r < 4$, and column number c , with range $0 \leq c < Nc$. Hence we have s_{rc} or $s[r, c]$ and the range for c is $0 \leq c < 4$ has a fixed value of 4.

in_0	in_4	in_8	in_{12}	...
in_1	in_5	in_9	in_{13}	...
in_2	in_6	in_{10}	in_{14}	...
in_3	in_7	in_{11}	in_{15}	...

(a) Cipher input bytes

$s_{0,0}$	$s_{0,1}$	$s_{0,2}$	$s_{0,3}$...
$s_{1,0}$	$s_{1,1}$	$s_{1,2}$	$s_{1,3}$...
$s_{2,0}$	$s_{2,1}$	$s_{2,2}$	$s_{2,3}$...
$s_{3,0}$	$s_{3,1}$	$s_{3,2}$	$s_{3,3}$...

(b) Cipher state array

out ₀	out ₄	out ₈	out ₁₂	...
out ₁	out ₅	out ₉	out ₁₃	...
out ₂	out ₆	out ₁₀	out ₁₄	...
out ₃	out ₇	out ₁₁	out ₁₅	...

(c) Cipher output bytes

Figure 2. Input(a), and output(c) from the cipher state(b) array.

Hence the input array is copied to the state array according to the schemes:

$$\left. \begin{aligned} s[r, c] &= in[r + 4c] \\ out[r + 4c] &= s[r, c] \end{aligned} \right\} 0 \leq r < 4 \text{ and } 0 \leq c < Nc \quad (4)$$

The 128 bit key is then expanded as an array of 44 entries of 32 bits words; 4 distinct words serve as a round key for each round; key schedule relies on the S-box. The method composed of three layers– Linear Diffusion, Non-linear Diffusion and Key Mixing. The Cipher is as follows: Cipher(byte in[4*Nc], byte out[4*Nc], word k[Nn+1, Nc], Nc, Nn)

```

Begin
  byte state[4, Nc]
  state = in
  XorRoundKey(state, k[0, -], Nc)
for round = 1 step 1 to Nn - 1
  SubBytes(state, Nc)
  ShiftRows(state, Nc)
  MixColumns(state, Nc)
  XorRoundKey(state, k[round, -], Nc)
end for
  SubBytes(state, Nc)
  ShiftRows(state, Nc)
  XorRoundKey(state, k[Nn, -], Nc)
  out = state
end

```

The notation $k[Nn+1, Nc]$ above implies that the array k contains $Nn + 1$ individual round keys that are each arrays of Nc words.

The SubBytes(State, S-box) above is as follows:




Figure 3. SubBytes acts on every byte in the state in isolation.

The transformation is defined by

$$b'_i = b_i \oplus b_{(i+4) \bmod 8} \oplus b_{(i+5) \bmod 8} \oplus b_{(i+6) \bmod 8} \oplus b_{(i+7) \bmod 8} \oplus c_i$$

(5)

Where $0 \leq i < 8$ and b_i is the bit i of the byte and c_i is the bit i of a byte c .

ShiftRows(State) above is as follows:




Figure 4. ShiftRows acts independently on rows in the state.

$$s'_{r,c} = s_{r, [c+h(r, Nc)] \bmod Nc} \text{ for } 0 \leq r < 4 \text{ and } 0 \leq c < Nc \quad (6)$$

Where the shift amount $h(r, Nc)$ depends on row r number and block length and block size, Nc , is fixed at 4

The MixColumns(State) above is represented as follows: The MixColumns transformation operates separately on every column of the state and treats each column as a four-term polynomial




Figure 5. MixColumns acts independently on each column in the state.

$$\begin{bmatrix} s'_{3,c} \\ s'_{2,c} \\ s'_{1,c} \\ s'_{0,c} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \{02\} & \{01\} & \{01\} & \{03\} \\ \{03\} & \{02\} & \{01\} & \{01\} \\ \{01\} & \{03\} & \{02\} & \{01\} \\ \{01\} & \{01\} & \{03\} & \{02\} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} s_{3,c} \\ s_{2,c} \\ s_{1,c} \\ s_{0,c} \end{bmatrix} \text{ for } 0 \leq c < Nc \quad (7)$$

XorRoundKey above is presented as follows: with this the transformation words from the key schedule are each added into the columns of the state as shown in (8).



Figure 6. Words from the key schedule are XOR'd into columns in the state.

$$[b_{3c}, b_{2c}, b_{1c}, b_{0c}]' = [b_{3c}, b_{2c}, b_{1c}, b_{0c}] \oplus [k_{round,c}] \text{ for } 0 \leq c < Nc \quad (9)$$

Where the round key words $k_{round,c}$ (as K_r^c in the diagram above). The round number, round, is in the range $0 \leq round < N_c$, with the value of 0 being used to denote the initial round key that is applied before the round function.

Let $Sk=f(k,Ar)$ where k is the Secret Passphrase and Ar is the AES result obtained from the encryption results.

C. The Visual Cryptographic Encryption Process

The image encryption process engaged $Alg(k,PI)$ in ciphering the image and displacing the pixel values using a visual cryptographic technique.

Engagement k was used encrypt the plain image.

Start

Reading the image data,

Let $PI=f(R, G, B)$

$new_image=imread(PI);$

PI is a color image of $m \times n \times 3$ arrays

$(R, G, B) = m \times n$

Where $R, G, B \in PI$

$(R \circ G)_{ij} = (R)_{ij} \cdot (G)_{ij}$

Where r_{11} = first value of R

$r = [r_{i1}] (i=1, 2 \dots m)$

$x \in r_{11} : [a, b] = \{x \in I : a \leq x \leq b\}$

$a=0$ and $b=255$

$R=r=I(m, n, 1)$

Where g_{12} = first value of G

$g = [g_{i2}] (i=1, 2 \dots m)$

$x \in g : [a, b] = \{x \in I : a \leq x \leq b\}$

$a=0$ and $b=255$

$G=g=I(m, n, 1)$

And b_{13} = first value of B

$g = [b_{i3}] (i=1, 2 \dots m)$

$x \in b_{11} : [a, b] = \{x \in I : a \leq x \leq b\}$

$a=0$ and $b=255$

$B=b=I(m, n, 1)$

$kn=abs(mod((c*x(k)),p))$

for $i: \Delta i:kn$

Let $t'(i,j)$ =Transpose of $r(i,j)$

$t'(i,j) = f(r',c,p);$

Let $y'(i,j)$ =Transpose of $y(i,j)$

$y'(i,j) = f(g',c,p);$

Let $u'(i,j) =$ Transpose of $u(i,j)$

$u'(i,j) = f(b',c,p);$

end

Transformation of $t'(i,j)$ into $f(t'(i,j),c,p)$

$r = f(t'(i,j),c,p) = f(r, c, p)$

Transformation of $y'(i,j)$ into $f(y'(i,j),c,p)$

$g = f(y'(i,j),c,p) = f(g, c, p)$

Transformation of $u'(i,j)$ into $f(u'(i,j),c,p)$

$b = f(u(i,j),c,p) = f(b, c, p)$

$CI = f(3,r,g,b);$

end

III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

AES is a block cipher supporting any combination of data and key size of 128, 192, and 256 bits. However, AES merely allows a 128 bit data length that can be divided into four basic operation blocks. Each cipher produced by AES uses several rounds of fixed operations to achieve desired output which determines its security level which is measured in terms of diffusion (strict avalanche criterion (SAC)) and confusion hence the number of rounds are chosen such that the algorithm provides the SAC value.




Figure 7. Results of Avalanche effect on AES




Figure 8. A graph of the results in figure7.

In figure 7 and as seen in the graph as well in figure 8, the end of 1st round, 20 bits of cipher value have changed out of 128-bit cipher text. This resulted in an SAC value of 15% and the SAC at the end was 51%.




Figure 9. A biometric finger print image and an iris image.



Figure 10. A biometric finger print image.




Figure 11. The graph of the normalized cross-correlation of the matrices of the plain image in figure 10.




Figure 12. A ciphered biometric finger print image of figure 10.




Figure 13. The graph of the normalized cross-correlation of the matrices of the ciphered image in figure 11.

The normalized cross-correlation of the matrices of is

$$\gamma(u,v) = \frac{\sum_{x,y} [f(x,y) - \bar{f}_{u,v}] [t(x-u, y-v) - \bar{t}]}{\left\{ \sum_{x,y} [f(x,y) - \bar{f}_{u,v}]^2 \sum_{x,y} [t(x-u, y-v) - \bar{t}]^2 \right\}^{0.5}} \quad (10)$$

f is the mean of the template, \bar{t} is the mean of t in the region under the template. $\bar{f}_{u,v}$ is the mean of $f(u,v)$ in the region under the template.

TABLE I. GEOMETRIC MEAN AND ENTROPY VALUES

xi	m	$\delta(\text{xi})$
PI(R)	2.5910	214.0351
PI(G)	2.5910	214.0351
PI(B)	2.5910	214.0351
CI(R)	2.5910	214.0351
CI(G)	2.5910	214.0351
CI(B)	2.5910	214.0351

The plain image in figure 10 was encrypted by implementing the algorithm in MATLAB. The graph of the normalized cross-correlation of the matrices of the plain image was plotted as shown in figure 10 as well as its ciphered image as shown in figure 13. Table 1 has the geometric mean value and the entropy value of the respective RGB values for both the plain image and the ciphered image.

IV. CONCLUSION

The basic design and strength of an encryption algorithm such as AES depends on diffusion and confusion. This engaged the use of Advanced Encryption algorithm and visual cryptography in securing forensic biometric images.

The Entropy value and the arithmetic mean value of the pixels of the plain image and the ciphered image was found to be 2.5910 and 214.0351 respectively, this means that there was no pixel expansion after the encryption process. Hence the quality of the image will remain the same after decryption. The advantage of the engagement of the Rijndael is that, it is resistant to linear and differential cryptanalysis .

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