CCJH

Cape Coast Journal of Humanities

University of Cape Coast, Ghana

Volume 5, 2013

CCJH

Volume 5, 2013

Articles

Editor

Managing Editor: Dr. Kwame Kwanteng

Editorial Advisory Board

Editorial Policies and Guidelines for Contributors

Cape Coast Journal of Humanities, a journal of the Department of History, University of Cape Coast, Ghana) is currently accepting manuscripts for publication, from scholars from various parts of the globe. The *Journal* is interested in original works, new insights and conceptual and empirical manuscripts that add to existing knowledge. Interested scholars and researchers in the fields of social sciences, arts, law, and education are to submit well-researched articles, book reviews, comments on articles, etc. CCJH is published once in a year.

Manuscripts should be typed, double-spaced using Times New Roman font size 12. Citations should conform to the CMS, MLA or APA documentation styles. The language of presentation should be English. The prescribed limit is 7,500 words on A4 paper. Electronic submissions are to be made on Microsoft Word, with the file name clearly indicated. Each manuscript should be accompanied by an abstract of not more than 150 words.

All works consulted should be listed serially at the end of each article under the headline REFERENCES. Notes commenting or explaining points made in the text should appear after the main text, not at the bottom of the page. Each article should be accompanied by a separate (cover) sheet indicating the title of the paper as well as the following information about the author: (i) Full name; (ii) institutional affiliation; and (iii) current status. For the purpose of blind peer-reviewing, the first page of each article should not bear the name(s) of the author(s).

The editor expects precision in presentation. Prospective contributors should therefore avoid unnecessary flowery language; write in simple easy-to-comprehend style. All articles should be sent as e-mail attachment to: **ccjheditor@gmail.com or ccjournalhumanities@gmail.com.**

All enquiries should be sent to **ccjheditor@gmail.com**

Editorial

This volume of the Cape Coast Journal of Humanities contains a variety of well-researched papers. The papers selected for this volume cut across the sub-discipline of History, Literature and Diplomacy. The first essay by De-Valera Botchway and Nyarkoah Gyamera discusses the gradual erosion of the dual-sex political leadership among the Akan-speaking Breman Asikuma people of Ghana. In his paper, David Aworawo examines how European activities impacted on two West African settlements i.e. the Benin and the Warri Kingdoms between 1500 and 1750.

In their submission, Sola Akinrinade and Olukoya Ogen traces the history of Indo-Nigerian economic relations emphasising on its implication for south –south cooperation. Michael Ogbeidi in his paper discusses the vexed issue of the role of government in business, while Irene Osemeka's paper addresses the use of multi-track diplomacy in the management of conflicts in West Africa. Zhe Zhang and Omon Osiki in their article examines the strategic thinking pattern of three great leaders in Asia and Africa. The last paper in the volume written by Felicia Ohwovoriole discusses the oral and literary strategies in Hope Eghagha's poetry. On the whole, all the papers makes an insightful and interesting reading.

Dr. Kwame Kwanteng
Univeristy of Cape Coast, Ghana
Editor, Cape Coast Journal of Humanities

Where are our *ahemma*? The Gradual Erosion of the Dual-sex Political Leadership among the Akan-speaking Breman Asikuma people of Ghana

De-Valera N.Y.M. Botchway,
Department of History,
University of Cape Coast, Ghana

& Nyarkoah Kakra Gyamera,
Ghana Institute of Languages, Ghana

Abstract

In all known human societies, there are mechanisms for ensuring the continued existence of order and stability and also the protection of societies' boundaries from external attacks. In Africa, chieftaincy remained the swivel of many cultures across the continent though the history of that institution differs in the various regions. While certain offices within the traditional political system of Africa are appointive, the usual mode of acquiring an office is through descent. Thus, in patrilineal or matrilineal descent systems, individuals acquire offices through lines that are reckoned paternally or maternally respectively. Indigenous political offices in matrilineal societies, in Ghana, are by tradition occupied by both males and females concurrently. Societies that have institutionalized this dual-sex system of rulership do so in order to ensure that the society benefits from the political division of labour and the role of complementation that guarantee the proper functioning of the political realm. Interestingly, within the post-colonial era, while more is heard of whether or not male traditional political offices are occupied, the same cannot be said of female offices. This article, which draws on a qualitative analysis of historical and ethnographical data, is a historical exploration and ethnographical intellectualization of the gradual extinction of the female mouthpiece at the highest order of the traditional political office, within the social

1

milieu of the Breman Asikuma traditional society, which belongs to the Akan ethnic in Ghana.

Introduction

The people of the Breman Asikuma traditional area belong to the Akan ethnic of Ghana, which constitute about 49.1 percent of the Ghanaian population (GSS, 2001). The traditional area is part of the Asikuma-Odoben-Brakwa District with Asikuma as the District capital. The total population of the Asikuma-Odoben-Brakwa District is 89,395 (GSS, 2005). Farming has been and remains the principal economic activity of the people in the traditional area. Equally important, however is animal husbandry. They rear animals like cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, poultries and rabbits. The agricultural sector employs about 70.4 percent of the people within the District (GSS, 2005).

Nearly three-quarters of the working population are self-employed with the population of male employees three times exceeding that of the females (GSS, 2005). There are about 7 percent private formal sector employment opportunities with less than 1 percent professional and technical employment opportunities (GSS, 2005). This state of the economy and employment continues to compel many individual, especially those who have achieved some appreciable level of training in the tradition of formal school education to migrate to the cities to look for adequate professional and technical employment opportunities and other economic prospects.

The people of the area speak the Breman language, which is a mixture of Fante and Asante. The Breman Asikuma traditional area comprises fourteen divisional towns with Asikuma as its capital; Amoanda, Asantem, Ayipey, Benin, Jambra, Kuntanasi, Nwomaso, Ochisua, Baako, Fosuansa, Kokooso, Anhwiam, Abookua and Amanfopong.

A Brief Examination of the Anatomy of Indigenous Political Institution of the Area

Matrilineal decent forms the basis for all socio-political organisations in Breman Asikuma. Thus, individuals for political offices and citizen

are reckoned through the female line. Every individual belong to one of the six matrilineal clans; Asona, Twidan, Abrade, Agona, Kwaana and Jumena. However, individuals for political offices are chosen from the Asona clan; the royal clan. Thus, the usual mode for acquiring an indigenous political office is through descent. As a result, both male and female lineage members of the royal lineage can qualify to hold political offices. This is particularly the case in traditional political systems that make the constitutional provision for females to rule alongside males. These traditional political systems usually have both the male and female rulers at the top of the political hierarchy. According to Okonjo (1976) this type of political system, usually found in West Africa, which ensures that the interests and views of groups are represented by sex can be labelled as the "dual-sex" system. This is because the system creates a division of labour, which allows each sex to manage its own affairs thereby ensuring that the needs of both sexes are adequately attended to.

The English term 'queen mother' often connotes the mother of a king or a chief and this has been erroneously used to refer to female co-rulers within the traditional political systems in Africa, and Ghana for that matter. Though the Akan are emphatic about motherhood and hence refer to the female co-ruler as o*hemma,* which is derived from the agglutination of *ohene* (Chief) and *maame* (mother) (Boaten 1992, 1996), she is not always the mother of the *ohene*. She is more often the real or classificatory mother, sister, or cousin of the *ohene*, but constitutionally, she is regarded as the mother, in the metaphorical sense, of the o*hene* (Rattray, 1923; Busia 1951; Aidoo, 1981). Both o*hene* and the o*hemma* are addressed as '*nana'*. The term o*hemma* is also used to refer to female leaders in most Akan markets. In this essay, the o*hemma* is described as a female selected from a royal family, based on customary procedures, to govern and hold authority with the o*manhene* (paramount chief of the state – *oman* means a traditional state or polity) and perform roles that complement those of an o*manhene* within a traditional area. This article is gives some knowledge on the factors militating against the "enstoolment" or appointment of an o*hemma* in the traditional area.

The o*manhene* and o*hemma* are usually the descendents of the first founder of the town or traditional area and its stool. They never assume their positions simultaneously and certainly cannot ever be married to each other since they are members of the same royal lineage (Stoeltje, 2003). Marriage between them would be considered as '*mogyafra'* (incestuous). The Breman Asikuma traditional area has various *ahenfo* (sub-chiefs), *abusua mpanyinfo* (male heads of lineages) and the *mmaa mpanyinfo* (female heads of lineages) within the town and village communities that constitute the area. These officers, as leaders of those communities, serve their people.

In Cohen's (1977) view, the role of the female co-ruler, in political areas that have them, is an indication of a well-organized monarchical state. To him, the female co-ruler in Africa is one of the important among several others, of the means by which non-centralized polities took the first step towards centralized governance. Thus, her position does not only serve the interest of the sex she represents but it is also an important institution for the establishment of centralized political systems in Africa. The dual-sex political institution, in this view, contributes to the development of centralized states as well as serves as the symbol that unites the various communities within the state.

The Current Condition of the o***hemma* Institution of the Breman Asikuma Traditional Area**

Succession to a throne, stool or skin[1] has been the means through which vacancies in the traditional leadership systems are filled.

---

[1] In the Akan society, the stool is a symbol of political power. Every ohene or ohemma has one or more stools, which he/she uses to identify and legitimate his/her rank. Stools therefore are august emblems of political, judicial and social leadership. A stool is the most important of the royal regalia. When a person becomes an ohene or ohemma he/she is "enstooled" in the office. Thus during the rule of the ohene or ohemma, he/she is said to "sit upon a stool." When he/she dies, the Akan say "the stool has fallen". For most of the ethnic groups in the northern part of Ghana, the symbol of political power and office is the skin (normally that of an animal, mostly a cow).

Vacancies come about as a result of the death of the previous incumbent, his or her removal from office or his or her incapacitation or abdication. The modes of succession among many ethnic groups may take into account, but are not limited to, age and seniority, personal attributes including appearance and comportment, leadership qualities, bravery, temperament and capacity to empathize with others (Busia, 1951). This is true for both societies that have only one person as a ruler and those that have two people ruling simultaneously. In the situation where one stool or the position of one ruler becomes vacant, in dual-sex political systems, the other ruler, male or female, must ensure that the stool is occupied. When the male stool of the Asante kingdom, for instance, became vacant in 1999 with the passing away of the then king, Otumfuo Opoku Ware II, the onus fell on the female ruler, Nana Afua Kobi Serwaa Ampem II and the elders to find a suitable person to take his place. The continuity of a particular institution is then questioned when a particular stool becomes vacant for a long time. The Breman Asikuma traditional area has been without an o*hemma* since the passing away of Nana Adwoa Adadzewa V in 1968. While this is so, on the other hand, the o*manhene*, Nana Amoakwa Boadu VII who passed away in 2007 was replaced by Nana Amoakwa Boadu VIII in 2009: that is in less than two years.

The *ohemma* combines executive, legislative, judicial, military, economic and religious roles, which complements that of her male counterpart. Looking at the Breman Asikuma traditional area from the structural-functionalist perspective informs one that the functions that the o*hemma* performs for the necessary maintenance of the whole society are missing. Although it can be argued that due to the duplication of the roles of the o*hene* and o*hemma* at the lineage level by the *abusua mpanyinfo* and *mmaa mpanyinfo*, the o*hene* and o*hemma* represent these interests at the top of the political hierarchy. As a result, the absence of an o*hemma* creates an imbalance in the representation of the views and interest of the sex she represents and undermines the very rationale behind the institution of the dual-sex political system.

The traditional area has had five successive *ahemma,* (queenmothers) as has been represented in diagram 1 below.

Diagram 1

The circle represents a female, the triangle a male, and the equal sign is marriage. The bigger circles represent the first female children of the various *ahemma*. 'QM' represents the various ahemma of the traditional area with:

QM I – Nana Jadua Adadzewa I
QM II - Nana Adadzewa II
QM III - Nana Akua Adadzewa III
QM IV - Nana Adwoa Fodwuo Adadzewa IV
QM V - Nana Adwoa Adadzewa V

The genealogy of the *ahemma* of the tradition area as is indicated in diagram 1 depicts that primogeniture was always the rule when it came to the choice of the potential o*hemma*. The office does not go to the o*hemma*'s sisters' children after her death even though there are

four segments[2] of the royal lineage unless the female children of the immediate past o*hemma* are incapacitated of have questionable characters. Instead, the office runs through only one line thereby bypassing the others. Thus, it can be argued that though rotation has not been the rule when it comes to enstooling an o*hemma* among the people of the study area, it would have contributed immensely to solving the vacancy of the o*hemma's* office.

To a larger extent, the absence of an o*hemma* in the research area and hence the prevailing virtual discontinuity of the o*hemma* institution are the refusal on the part of eligible individuals to occupy the vacancy and the minor disputes surrounding the choice of candidates. The refusal of candidates to occupy the stool is attributed to the difficulty of some royals to combine their roles as workers, mothers and wives with the role of an o*hemma,* which they claim is equally demanding. The inability of Ghanaian women to combine different roles has been extensively examined by Oppong and Abu (1987) where they look at the seven roles of women, namely maternal, occupation, conjugal, domestic, kin, community and individual, and how the introduction of education and modern formal sector employment opportunities and the associated migration impact on their maternal role. Though this article did not set out to investigate the roles of women in the Breman Asikuma area, it reveals that Western education and the lure of enhanced employment opportunities elsewhere and their associated migration impact negatively on the ability to take up the o*hemma's* position. Thus, the difficulty in combining roles by some female royals, negatively affect their community role: i.e. taking up the office and responsibility o*hemma*.

Arhin, (2007) documents that though the male ruler among the Akan may engage in constructive consultations with the members of his

---

[2] There, are four gates or segments of the royal lineage in the Breman polity, referred to in the local parlance as '*abusua abubuw'*, from which the *omanhene*, *ohemma*, sub-chiefs and *mmaa mpanyinfo* are chosen. They are the Esi Derwa '*fie'* (house), Abena Kyiriwaa *fie*, Afua Ome *fie* and Afua Sekyeraa *fie*.

council he has absolute discretion in the appointment of his female counterpart. Thus while the o*hemma*'s nomination of a candidate for a vacant male stool is subjected to scrutiny by the elders, the appointment of a female candidate to occupy a vacant o*hemma*'s stool is at the full discretion of the o*hene*. The implication of this is that the o*hene* may attempt to enstool an o*hemma* only when he deems fit. However, while, in the study area, the o*manhene* has to take the initial step of identifying a potential o*hemma*, the final decision lies with the lineage head, o*baa panyin* and members of the o*manhene*'s council who conduct the full investigation on the potential o*hemma*. The report of which would determine whether that particular female could become an o*hemma* or not. Thus a person's chances of being selected for the o*hemma*'s position are very much dependent on the type of relationship she has with not only the lineage heads (both male and female) of her lineage but also the members of the o*manhene*'s council. This situation has in some cases led to a misunderstanding between potential candidates and the eventual refusal of such candidates who were chosen earlier for the position. It can then be realized from the aforementioned that these traditional stakeholders also play a significant role as to whether the o*hemma*'s stool is occupied or not.

It is also important to mention that another factor that is leading to the changing significance of the ohemma institution in the traditional area is the duplication of the highest political arrangement in the various suburbs of the traditional area. This makes each of the suburbs to have a sub-chief and an o*baa panyin* who performs similar functions to that of the o*manhene* and the o*hemma*. Though this has always been the case even when was an o*hemma,* there was a female authority at the highest level of the political hierarchy who was the final authority when it came to women's issue. However due to this duplication, individuals, especially the female population, do not feel the effect of the absence of the o*hemma* and hence the need to agitate for one. Thus, the women who benefit immensely from the roles of an o*hemma* have declined interest in agitating for the enstoolment of one since her (the o*hemma*'s) roles, power and influence are being "usurped" to some extent, by the periphery.

Similarly, not all the sub-chiefs in the traditional area have female counterparts because of the "troublesome" i.e. assertive nature of some *mmaa mpanyinfo* and the demands they imposed on their sub-chiefs, their male counterparts. Some sub-chiefs also prefer to offer the office of o*baa panyin* to a uterine kin from their lineage rather than to somebody who is not. The reason being that a sub-chief can easily count on the loyalty and support of o*baa panyin* from their own lineages; this is important given that the o*baa panyin* can and could foment trouble and press destoolment charges against sub-chiefs. In light of this, if a sub-chief finds that there is no 'suitable' person within his lineage for the o*baa panyin's* position he does not suggest any other person to fill that office. Although there are evidences of 'troublesome' *mmaa mpanyinfo*, this does not warrant their reluctance to appoint female counterparts. Thus since these sub-chiefs do not have female counterparts they are not in any position to demand or agitate for an o*hemma*. The issue of power dynamics comes to play here since these male political leaders have occupied their positions without *mmaa mpanyinfo*, they do not want to relinquish some of the power to any female counterpart.

Oral tradition has it that Nwomaso, Kuntenasi, Baako and Kokooso townships, which were later brought under the umbrella of the Breman Asikuma traditional area had *ahene* or *ahenfo* (chiefs) and *ahemma* with their associated titles, duties and responsibilities and they were autonomous. The implication of this is that now that there is no paramount o*hemma*, these *ahemma* are enjoying the autonomy their predecessors enjoyed before their towns were brought under the rule of the Breman Asikuma. Consequently, these *ahemma* would not be keen about the enstoolment of a paramount o*hemma* to whom they would have to pay homage. Thus, the autonomous nature of authority some of the lower grade *ahemma* enjoy in the traditional area, in the absence of the paramount o*hemma,* has contributed to the current state of the o*hemma* institution of the traditional area.

The Breman traditional area has several indigenously venerated deities. Notable among them are *Apofram*, *Ayanyam,* O*chi* and *Nsachi*. These deities have their own priests and priestesses, and days for venerating them. Before the advent of Islam and Christianity, these

deities served as the primary medium between the Supreme Being and the people living in the traditional area. Traditional religious worshippers in the District are, approximately, 802, with 433 male and 389 (GSS, 2005).

However, since the introduction of Christianity and Islam, many indigenes have abandoned their indigenous ways of worship and adopted the Christian and Islamic forms of worship. Currently, there are approximately, 71,158 Christians with 33,466 males and 37,618 females in the Asikuma-Odobeng-Brakwa District (GSS, 2005). There are also 5,281 male Muslims and 5,261 female Muslims (GSS, 2005). One's religious beliefs and faith have been identified as factors that contribute to the vacancy in the o*hemma* office, which is inextricably linked to the indigenous spirituality of the area. One respondent explained thus: "some converts [to the Abrahamic religions] especially the Christians, would think it (the o*hemma* institution) is *abosomsem* (pagan/idolatry) and so would not take up the position or want to have anything to do with it."[3]

Though Christianity is not the only non-indigenous religion in the traditional area, it has negatively affected the survival of the Breman o*hemma* institution. The traditional political system, especially the rituals that go with it, is seen as not in accordance with the religious beliefs of some of royals eligible for the position. Thus royals, who find such rituals repugnant, will not take up the office at all. The mother of one of the royals who refused the office also explained:

> My daughter is a staunch Christian and is even a leader of one of the groups in her church. As a result she will not perform these rituals of the institution and so the best way to prevent this is to stay away from the institution altogether[4].

---

[3] Interview with Opanyin Kwesi Donkor, a renowned cocoa farmer in the traditional area, 27th March, 2011.
[4] Interview with Maame Esi Mfomaa, an obaa panyin of a segment of the royal lineage, 27th March, 2011.

Without a doubt, the conflict between the performance of these rituals and one's religious beliefs poses a threat to the survival of indigenous political institutions. It at the same time will make it impossible for some rituals to be performed if these people were to take up the offices at all. Thus, a person's religious belief plays a paramount role in the person's desire to take up the office by eligible royals. The implication for these refusals is that these people *'have spat on the stool'* and therefore the position bypasses the gate of these three people thereby reducing the number of eligible candidates for the position.

Conclusion

The o*hemma* institution is an institution of social cohesion especially for the female population in any society. Nevertheless, in the absence of an o*hemma* in the Breman Asikuma traditional area, the other indigenous role performers have been able to ensure, to some extent, that the views of the women are given some form of recognition and representation. Though these traditional role players are able to provide some sort of atmosphere and venue for the balance of views and expression between men and women in the society, they are not able to do so at the highest level of the political hierarchy. As a result, until a new o*hemma* is enstooled there will always be an imbalance representation of the interests of the female population at the top of the political hierarchy.

Although like the chiefship, the queenship has lost its shine: its prestige is gone, and the privileges once claimed by *ahemma* can no longer be claimed, if an incumbent could be found, the presence of an o*hemma* would provide the proper avenue for the balancing of the views of men and women in the traditional area. Tied to this is the reduced interest in the office. Women, who would have qualified for it, do not have a craving for it; such women have their own preoccupations. Some are in gainful employment elsewhere, or are married and raising families or just cannot be bothered. At the same time the rest of the society do not wish and therefore do not agitate for an o*hemma* to be enstooled.

According to the customs of the people of the Breman Asikuma traditional area, a vacant o*hemma*'s stool is supposed to be occupied

within forty days. However, the situation since the death of the last incumbent has been the contrary; the stool has not been occupied for over forty years. It is only when eligible individuals share the common value of the need for an o*hemma* to be enstooled as the highest female representative of the hierarchy of the political order, that a new incumbent can be enstooled.

References

Aidoo, A. A., (1977). "Asante Queen Mothers in Government and Politics in the Nineteenth Century". *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*. Vol. 9.

Boaten N. A. I., (1992). "The Changing Role of Queen Mothers in the Akan Polity". *Institute of African Studies Research review* [NS] VOL. 8, NOS. 1&2.

Busia, K. A., (1951). *The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Asante.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cohen, R., (1977). "Oedipus Rex and Regina: Then Queen Mother of Africa". *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 47, No, 1.

Ghana Statistical Service, (2005). *2000 Population and Housing Consensus. Central Region: Analysis of District Data and Implication for Planning*. Accra: Ghana Statistical Service.

Okonjo K. (1976). "The Dual-Sex political System in Operation: Igbo Women and Community Politics in Midwestern Nigeria". In N. J. Hafkin and E. G. Bay (eds). *Women in Africa: Studies in Social and Economic change*. Stanford University Press.

Oppong, C. and K. Abu, (1987). *Seven roles of women: Impact of education, migration and employment on Ghanaian mothers*. International Labour Organization. Switzerland.

Rattray, R.S., (1923). *Ashanti*. Oxford. Oxford University Press.

Stoeltje, J. B., (2003). "Asante Queen Mothers: Pre-colonial Authority in a Postcolonial Society". *Research Review* No 19.2.

Contrasting Fortunes: European Activities and Cultural Transformation in Benin and Warri, 1500 – 1750

David Aworawo
Department of History and Strategic Studies,
University of Lagos, Nigeria

Abstract

Interactions between Europeans and the diverse peoples of Africa with whom contacts were established in the period of European expansion from the early 15th century to the 19th century, affected the cultures of African peoples in different ways. European cultural influence was more intense in the African coastal communities, which had closer relations with European adventurers, traders and missionaries than those of the interior. This was the experience of Benin and Warri, two prominent kingdoms in the Bights of Benin and Biafra which came into contact with the Portuguese in the late 15th and early 16th centuries. This article explores the nature of European cultural influence in the two kingdoms beginning with the Portuguese, and the responses to the attempt to introduce a new way of life. It contends that attempts to introduce European culture were resisted in Benin while they recorded a measure of success in Warri. It argues that the existing social environment and political structures in the two kingdoms were the most important determinants of responses to the introduction of European culture. Using mainly oral and secondary sources, the article establishes that the assumption of cultural superiority by Europeans and expectation that their cultural practices would be embraced by African peoples was an illusion, which generally failed to materialize. The experience of the Portuguese in Benin and Warri also confirms that the acceptance of European culture by some African groups and communities in the early period of European expansion was not necessarily an acknowledgement of

the superiority of the new culture but was dictated by the influences of the prevailing political, economic and social conditions.

Introduction

In his study of Portuguese activities in Africa in the early period of European expansion, James Duffy states that the accounts of some of the dramatic events, especially the heroic achievements of some Portuguese adventurers "furnish a seemingly endless source of inspiration to chroniclers, poets, scientists, in Portugal and abroad, who so define, elaborate, and redefine past glories that these years have become an age of supermen whose inspiration is still a living presence in Portuguese colonial thought."[1] This is true of the analysis of Portuguese exploration and indeed of all the European colonial powers from the 15th century to the 18th century. Some of the works produced from the description of Portuguese colonial activities by the disparate group of analysts described by Duffy focused on Portuguese cultural influence and Christian missionary activities in the places visited across Africa. However, very little attention was paid to the impact of the introduction of a new way of life on affected African groups and communities as well as their responses. These themes became the focus of other scholars in later years. Still, much is left to be understood of aspects of these important events, which help to explain some realities of African social development even in contemporary times. This emphasizes the importance of the central issues broached in this article.

As already pointed out, European adventurers, missionaries, and traders travelled southward along the west coast of Africa from the first half of the 15th century onwards, beginning with the Portuguese who reaced Senegal in 1441, the Gold Coast in 1471, Benin in 1485 and Warri around 1520.[2] Adventurers from other European countries followed about a century later, and from the sixteenth century onward, Benin and Warri, like other African states visited by the Europeans, began intensely to witness "the impact of the West." Located around the Atlantic coast in Southern Nigeria, Benin and Warri were inhabited by diverse groups whose cultures came to be

greatly influenced by the activities of the Europeans. Many, including kings and princes, became Christians and learned the Portuguese language in Warri. However, whereas European cultural influence endured among the Itsekiri of Warri, it generally did not among the Edo-speaking people of Benin. This was a reflection of the differing perception of the people of European culture and the prevailing social and political conditions in the two kingdoms in the 16th and 17th centuries.

The general climatic condition of West Africa was insalubrious and the mortality rate among the European visitors was exceedingly high. This did not, however, frighten many of them from coming to different parts of Africa and staying long enough in some communities to exert cultural influence on the people. Benin and Warri were some of those communities where the people came under great European influence from the early sixteenth century. Christian missionary activities were carried out, and before long, the way of life many of the people became transformed. In both kingdoms, several aspects of the traditional way of doing things changed as many embraced the Christian faith. A good number also learned the Portuguese language and some of these were kings and princes. The result was that for the Bini and the Itsekiri, aspects of their culture, "that complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, customs and other capabilities acquired by man as a member of society," became transformed from about the mid-sixteenth century.[3]

By the third quarter of the sixteenth century, Portuguese cultural influence had become pronounced in Benin and Warri. However, from about the second quarter of the seventeenth century, the Bini generally reverted to their traditional way of life. The influence of Christianity waned so dramatically that when two missionaries visited Benin from São Tomé in 1695 they discovered that not only had many Bini people who had earlier embrace Christianity abandoned the new faith, but the native fathers called *Ohonsa* had also relapsed into idolatry and many of the churches had been converted into shrines of idols with sacrifices found in them.[4] Other aspects of Western cultural influence were similarly rejected by the

Bini. This trend continued with a few exceptions up to the end of the colonial period. On the other hand, among the Itsekiri, Christianity remained influential, and different aspects of the way of life of the people continued to reflect Western influence throughout the colonial period. The nature and varying responses to European culture in Benin and Warri up to 1750 is the focus in this article. The political, economic and culture factors responsible for the differing responses in the two kingdoms are also examined. A fascinating aspect of the differing perception of Western culture by the people in the two communities is that many of the features discernible in the eighteenth century have persisted to contemporary times.

Benin and Warri before the Advent of the Europeans

Benin was one of the largest and most powerful states in West Africa in the pre-colonial period. The heartland of the kingdom lies to the north of the Niger delta in Nigeria's Midwest area. Various sources indicate the Benin grew to become a state around the eighth century AD as thirty-one villages in the neighborhood of Ubini coalesced to form a bigger polity with Ubini as its capital. From the late fifteenth century, Benin expanded tremendously, conquering vast groups and incorporating diverse peoples from the Niger in the east to Lagos and Porto Novo in the west. Accordingly, from the sixteenth century the Benin kingdom began to be called an empire.[5] The dominant group in Benin are the Bini, and Edo-speaking group. Other Edo-speaking groups are the Ishan and Afenmai who inhabit the north and northeast of Benin. All these other Edo-speaking groups came under the control of the Benin kingdom at the height of its power in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Some Igbo communities to the east of Benin and the Urhobo and Itsekiri to the south as well as some Yoruba speaking communities to the west equally came under Bini hegemony during the same period.

Before the advent of the Europeans, the Bini had developed an elaborate social system and a complex world-view that distinguished them from their neighbours. By some process of socialization, the cultural practices were passed down from one generation to the other and the average Bini was very traditional in his approach to life.

16

From the late fifteenth century onwards, as the Bini monarchy expanded its power, an elaborate set of practices evolved around the person of the king, and he was elevated almost to the status of a deity. In addition, many festivals came to be established, and one of them, the *Igue,* was centered on highlighting the powers and achievements of the monarch.[6] There were also numerous rites that guided different activities in private and public life ranging from birth, marriage, and burial, to trading, farming, craftwork, and chieftaincy. Indeed, for the Bini, there was a well-established prescribed traditional way of dong virtually everything when the Europeans came to Benin in the late fifteenth century.

The Itsekiri kingdom, for its part, was founded in the late fifteenth century. Various traditions indicate that elements of the Ijaw, Urhobo, and some Yoruba groups had inhabited the area around the Forcados River before the Iginua migration of the late fifteenth century, which led to the establishment of a monarchical form of government in Ode Itsekiri, the leading settlement in the area. The founding of the Itsekiri kingdom is dated to this period when the monarchy was established. Iginua himself was a prince of Benin, whose father Olua experienced political turbulence during his reign. The opposition of the people to Olua during the latter part of his reign in Benin, and the part that Iginua is perceived to have played in encouraging his father to adopt unpopular policies, convinced Olua that Iginua was not going to be accepted as his successor. It was therefore arranged for Iginua to leave Benin to found a separate kingdom to the south along the Atlantic coast.[7]

The result was the establishment of a new kingdom with its capital at Ode Itsekiri whose inhabitants were variously called Selemon, Jekri, Iwere, Ouere, and Warri. The capital, Ode Itsekiri itself, has since the nineteenth century, been called by the more popular name of Warri. Many of the settlements around Ode Itsekiri which had been founded by Yoruba, Ijaw, and Urhobo elements before the Iginua migration came to be incorporated into the Itsekiri kingdom. Others were founded after the Iginua migration, some by Itsekiri kings who succeeded Iginua, and others by some of the noblemen who had accompanies Iginua to Ode Itsekiri during his flight from Benin.[8]

Thus, from the beginning the Itsekiri kingdom was composed of elements of different groups such as Yoruba, Urobo, Ijaw, and of course the Bini immigrants of the late fifteenth century. A study of the Itsekiri language shows that 90 percent of Itsekiri common words are identical with Yoruba words. Kingship terminologies are, however, distinctly Edo. A few words relate to the Ijaw and Urhobo languages, and there are also a few loan words from Portuguese and English.[9] This trend is not surprising, considering the fact that the Edo immigrants comprise the ruling class even though they were much smaller in population.

Itsekiri culture has been a reflection of the circumstance of the founding of the kingdom. Aspects of the cultures of the Yoruba, Ijaw, and Edo are prominent in the Itsekiri way of life [10] The political structure of the Itsekiri was, however, almost like that of Benin. The position of the king and the council of chiefs had a striking similarity with what obtained in Benin, although the Itsekiri monarch adopted the title of *Olu* instead of *Oba*, which was the title of the king of Benin. In the early seventeenth century when the influence of the Portuguese around the Benin River was becoming intense, the Itsekiri culture and political system were still evolving, hence the Itsekiri were generally not as traditional as the Bini.[11] This would have contributed to their more favourble reception of Western culture than the Bini in the 17th and 18th centuries.

Portuguese Cultural Influence in Benin up to 1650

A number of sources indicate that a group of Portuguese travellers led by Ruy de Sequeria reached the outskirts of Benin in 1472 and met the Bini king Ewuare the Great.[12] This was the first group of Europeans to meet a Bini king. It was in 1485, however, that another group of adventurers found its way into Benin City proper. This group, which was led by Joao Affonso d'Aveiro, became the first set of Europeans to enter Benin. Ozolua, who was king of Benin at the time, took some interest in the Portuguese visitors. D'Aveiro's party returned in 1506, and a closer relationship began to develop between the Bini and the Europeans.[13] Esigie succeeded Ozolua as the king of Benin in 1504, and he was more interested in the activities of the

Europeans than his predecessor had been He encouraged the Christian missionaries who came with Portuguese adventurers and traders, and the foundations of Christian missionary activities in Benin were laid.

Western culture gained much influence in Benin during Esigie's long reign, which lasted for over four decades. Esigie sent an ambassador to the king of Portugal in the person of Ohen-Okun, the *Olukun* priest of Ughoton. The Portuguese monarch was said to have responded by sending gifts to Esigie, along with Catholic missionaries whom the Bini king had requested in his message through Ohen-Okun.[14] The missionaries quickly commenced work and churches began to spring up in different parts of Benin. Traditions recall that some of the most prominent of the churches were located at Idummwerie, Ogbelaka, and Akpakpava. The Akpakpava church was called "Holy Cross Cathedral" and was sited on Ikpoba Road. Oba Esigie himself was said to have built a church, which he encouraged his subjects to attend. One of his sons and two prominent chiefs, the *Uwangue* and *Eribo,* were said to have become very strong Christians following the encouragement of Esigie. During Esigie's period as the king of Benin in the early 16th century,"the work of the Mission made progress and thousands of people were baptized," notes Jacob Egharevba.[15] Considering the strong influence that Bini monarchs exercised from the period of Ewuure's reign in 1440 to the beginning of the seventeenth century, Esigie's interest in Christianity would have greatly and positively influenced the expansion of the new faith of Benin.

The expansion of Christianity of Benin meant dramatic changes in the culture of the people. As already pointed out, social life in Benin had been conditioned by a web of traditions, taboos, festivals, and rituals before the advent of the Europeans. Many aspects of these changed for those who embraced Christianity. Polygamy, for instance, was common among the Bini before the sixteenth century when Christianity gained prominence. The acceptance of the new faith meant that monogamy began to be practiced among a section of the population.[16] In addition, the traditional marriage system began

to function along with the Catholic-style marriage. This was a fascinating social transformation among the Bini.

There were some areas where Christian belief was in agreement with Bini culture. In many areas, however, they differed markedly, and it was this that necessitated great adjustments in the way of life of those that embraced Christianity in Benin. In naming ceremonies, burial rites, ancestor worship and other religious practices, there was much that was diametrically opposed to Christian beliefs. Since the life of the average Bini was guided by practices surrounding these cultural issues, those who embraced Christianity had to struggle to make many changes in the style of life they had been used to. This took much determination in view of the fact that traditionalists opposed the cultural changes that Christianity was introducing. Even Esigie himself could not fully embrace Christianity as a result of the changes that the new religion required. As the king, he had to lead other chiefs and the generality of the people in elaborate state rituals and ceremonies, the practices of which were against Christianity's beliefs. He could, therefore, encourage others to embrace the new religion and offer support in other ways, but he could not fully take a stand for the new religion. Indeed, a clash occurred between Esigie and the Europeans in the 1540s over conflicts in traditional cultural practices and Christian beliefs.[17] For those who were able to take a stand for the new faith, however, what took place was a cultural transformation.

Apart from the impact of Christianity, the influence of Western culture was manifested in other ways among the Bini from the early sixteenth century. Many Bini took an interest in the Portuguese language and Oba Esigie himself is known to have had a good understanding of the language. Esigie's son Orhogbua, who was sent to Portugal by his father, had a good mastery of the Portuguese language as well.[18] Thus it occurred that some Bini began to speak and write a European language for the first time. The same was true of Western-style dressing. Some of the Bini envoys who were sent to Portugal became fascinated by the European style of clothing and began dressing in the Western way. Some who did not go to Portugal also copied Western-style dressing from the Portuguese whom they

saw in Benin. This was, however, more common among men than women, probably because all the Bini envoys sent to Portugal at this time were men, just as almost all the Europeans who came to Benin during this period were also men (indeed, the records mention no woman). Although fewer Bini people would have mastered the Portuguese language and adopted Western-style dressing than those who embraced Christianity, these aspects of the people's culture were nevertheless influenced by the coming of the Europeans to Benin.

Portuguese cultural influence in Benin was also facilitated by their promotion of education. The history of Western education in Nigeria began with a small elementary school established by Portuguese missionaries in the palace of the king of Benin in 1515.[19] The school was attended mainly by the children of the monarch and his chiefs, many of whom became literate. Although there is no evidence that these early beginnings led to the expansion of Western education in Benin, the small school established by the Catholics made it possible for the pupils to learn the Portuguese language, simple arithmetic and Christian doctrines. As a tool for social transformation, the rudimentary education organized by the Europeans undoubtedly enhanced "the impact of the West" in Benin in the 16th century.

Aspects of the material and food culture of the Bini were equally affected by the coming of the Europeans from the late 15th Century. Joao Affonso d'Aveiro is credited with introducing coconuts to Benin in the early 16th century, and cassava, which was to become the main staple food among the Bini, was introduced about half a century later. It was not long after the introduction of coconuts that the coastline to the south and many compounds in Benin became dotted with the trees. Since the seventeenth century, coconuts have become an important part of Bini food culture. It is used to eat maize, *gari*, and bread. *Gari,* which is made from cassava, has remained the staple food, not just in Benin, but in Nigeria as a whole since the early twentieth century.[20] For the Bini, starch and *tapioca* are other types of food that have been made from cassava. Although it was in the 20th century that the popularity of these food items really grew among the Bini, and indeed among other Nigerian groups, various sources indicate that they were fairly widely eaten as

early as the eighteenth century. It can therefore be concluded that European expansion influenced Bini food culture from the 16th century onwards and also that the impact has endured up till the present century.

The motives for European expansion from the early 15th century onwards varied widely, ranging from the desire to discover hitherto unknown lands, to the interest in spreading the Christian faith, sheer love of adventure, and of course trade. These motives some scholars have summarized under the broad headings of gold, God, and glory. The issue of which of these motives was strongest has remained a moot question, but what can hardly be doubted is that economic considerations were very strong.[21] Thus, in the interaction of the Bini with the Portuguese and later the Dutch and English, trade featured prominently. From the late fifteenth century and for much of the sixteenth century, articles such as the famous Benin "blue" cloth, ivory, pepper, brass works, wood works, and leopard skins were bought from Benin by European traders. Slaves began to feature in the "articles" of trade in the second half of the seventeenth century. From the last quarter to the seventeenth century and for the next one and a half centuries or so, the trade in slaves came to dominate the economic interaction between the Bini and the Europeans. In exchange, items such as glassware, firearms, leather materials, household utensils, iron sheets, and later, gin and tobacco, were brought to Benin by the European traders.[22] Some of the items such as trinkets, leather materials, iron sheets, glassware, and other household utensils came to form an important part of Bini material culture, and indeed, possession of some of them became a status symbol of sorts. European trinkets, for instance, began to be combined beautifully with locally made beads in Benin. Almost all of the goods imported from Europe were unknown in Benin before the coming of the Europeans in the late fifteenth century.

In Benin, as in most other parts of sub-Saharan Africa visited by the Europeans in the age of discovery, many prominent people hankered for the product brought from Europe in exchange for local items. Ade Adefuye has noted that when the king of Lagos, Oba Akinsemoyin, sent some gifts to Oba Akengbuda of Benin in the late eighteenth

century, the Bini monarch was very pleased, and he proudly displayed some of them in his palace and these were items obtained from Europeans.[23] Indeed, it has been argued that a major attraction of the slave trade for African leaders and traders was the desire for exotic goods from Europe. For the Bini, their material culture came to be greatly influenced by imported goods from Europe. Different types of locally made clay pots that had been the main household utensils that were used side by side with those made of glass and steel in the course of time in many households. At a much later period, a few houses with thatched roofs gave way to those with roofs made of corrugated iron sheets.[24] Items like and spirits simply indulged the Bini who had access to them, and the importation of European-made firearms made wars more destructive. Before the advent of Europeans in Benin, wars had been fought with weapons such as cutlasses, bludgeons as well as bows and arrows. More sophisticated weapons, the most prominent of which were guns of different makes and shapes, were imported from Europe from the 16th century. For Benin, access to European-made firearms helped the kingdom in its wars of expansion and conflicts with its neighbors in the 17th and early 18th centuries. For instance, when the *Attah* (king) of Igala, a kingdom to the north of Benin, declared war on the latter in 1515, Igala was said to have had the upper hand until Portuguese missionaries and traders joined Benin against the *Attah* in the war and supplied more sophisticated weapons imported from Europe. Igala was defeated in 1516.[25] European trade with, and presence in, Benin in the 16th and 17th centuries thus affected Bini material culture and the kingdom's politics, economy, and society in diverse ways.

A consideration of European activities in Benin in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the reaction of the Bini to them reveal that in the early period of the arrival of the Europeans in Benin, a large section of the population, including some kings and princes were fascinated by many of the novel things that the foreigners introduced. Thus, a good number embraced Christianity with the dramatic change in culture that this entailed. Similarly, a few Bini learned the Portuguese language just as the food culture of the people was enriched with new crops that the Portuguese introduced to Benin. Furthermore, as many as could afford the exotic goods

imported from Europe among the Bini acquired as much as they could, which conferred a new status on many. However, with the passage of time, the interest of the Bini in changing their age-old culture and adopting European values and ways of life surely waned. This was reflected in their commitment to Christianity, the rudimentary education that the Portuguese were trying to introduce, the Portuguese language, and other aspects of Western culture to which many Bini had earlier displayed a great interest.

Some scholars have suggested that what seemed to be a demonstration of interest in Christianity and Western culture by the rulers of Benin in the 16th and early 17th centuries was not really any genuine interest but some pretence to enable them to have access to European weapons, which they needed to fight their neighbours and expand their kingdom. A.F.C. Ryder argues that since papal decrees forbade the delivery of arms to infidels, the rulers of Benin had no choice but to pretend to be committed to the Christian faith since they desperately needed the weapons.[26] This point of view is difficult to accept without question. A careful consideration of developments in Benin during the reign of Oba Esigie, for instance, can only leave one with the conclusion that at least this Bini monarch was genuinely interested in the expansion of the Christian faith in Benin and the adoption of aspects of European culture. His permission for an elementary school to be established in his palace, his interest in learning the Portuguese language and his encouragement of his sons and noblemen to do same, his establishment of churches, and his very close relationship with the European missionaries and traders, all prove that Esigie's interest in the Christian faith and Western culture could not have been a mere pretense.[27] This is not to say that there were no Bini kings who made a pretense of supporting Christianity so as to secure European firearms, but it would be wrong to make sweeping generalizations on this. It should be stressed that it is always difficult to make an accurate assessment of issues having to do with motives.

If the question of the motive for encouraging Western culture by some in Benin remains a subject of bickering, what is not in doubt is that as the 16th century drew to a close, interest in Christianity and

other aspects of Western culture waned considerably in Benin.[28] This trend continued in the 17th and 19th centuries. The influence of Western culture on Bini social life was therefore ephemeral. The reasons for this and the extent of the attenuation of Portuguese cultural influence in Benin during this period are examined in the next section.

The Changing Response to European Culture in Benin, 1650-1750

The Europeans who visited the area around Benin from the fifteenth century, like those who visited other parts of the Gulf of Guinea, stayed for only short periods during each visit to area as a result of the insalubrious climatic conditions. Nevertheless, Europeans of different nationalities, beginning with the Portuguese and later joined by the English and the Dutch, never ceased to visit Benin throughout the three centuries that preceded the period of formal colonialism in the late nineteenth century.[29] In spite of this, after a measure of early success, European influence in Benin began to decline from the early seventeenth century, and the trend continued up to the establishment of formal colonial rule in the kingdom following the "Benin Massacre" by the British in February 1897.

One area where the loss of interest in Western culture in Benin was very clearly manifested was in the rejection of Christian values after initial acceptance by many. Different sources reveal that after the death of Oba Esigie around 1550, his son and successor Orhogbua, who had earlier been sent to Portugal and who had learned the Portuguese language, continued to encourage the expansion of the Christian faith and European activities in Benin. Thus, Western cultural influence continued in Benin in the second half of the 16th century during the reigns of Orhogbua and Ehengbuda. Oba Ehengbuda died around 1606 on the River Agan on his way to Lagos to suppress the revolts of some vassal states. His death plunged Benin into a political crisis that weakened the kingdom. As one source states: "The death of Ehengbuda… around 1606 had tremendous impact on the future development of the Benin empire. To worsen matters a split occurred between members of the *Eghaevbo n'Ogbe* and *Eghaevbo n'Ore* which led to serious rivalry among them. This

25

created instability which weakened the empire."[30] Under these circumstances, it was difficult for the rulers of Benin to be concerned with the promotion of European values or the Christian faith.

It would therefore seem that reduction in the influence of Western culture and resistance to the Christian faith in Benin became pronounced after the death of Oba Ehengbuda in 1606. The kings of Benin after Ehengbuda certainly did not encourage Christianity and other European activities, save for their interest in European weapons. In addition, the political crisis that engulfed Benin for much of the 17th century took all the attention of the rulers, so that even if any had been interested in encouraging European activities, the prevailing conditions would have made that impossible. By the mid-17th century, the attenuation of the influence of the Christian faith and European values had become glaring in Benin. For instance, when Father Joseph of Xison visited Benin in 1651 he found the churches in a deplorable state with hardly anyone attending them. Furthermore, his efforts to see the then Oba Ahenzae failed, as the monarch refused to have an audience with him.[31] A worse condition was described when Pope Innocent XII sent Father Angelus to inspect Christian activities in Benin in 1692. He described the condition of the Mission as "alarming and deplorable."[32] In 1692 a group of missionaries visited Benin from São Tomé to inspect the Mission in the city. They reported that the state of the Christian faith in Benin was "appalling." For the churches had not only been abandoned, but they had also been converted into shrines of idols, and sacrifices were actually found in them. As if that were not bad enough, the native fathers called *Ohonsa* had also relapsed into idolatry.[33]

A similar pattern of rejection was manifested toward European culture and values. The elementary school that had been established in the king's palace in 1515 was closed down and hardly anyone could be seen taking interest in the learning of any European language. The people simply returned to their traditional ways of doing things and the rites and rituals that governed different activities became as prominent as ever. It was not as if these traditional practices had disappeared at any time, but there were at

least some Bini people who abandoned them as they embraced Christianity and adopted Western values, and it was thought that the number would increase with time. This was in the 16th and early 17th centuries. By the middle of the 17th century, there was hardly any Bini who did not conduct his affairs in the traditional way. As already noted, even the native fathers were observed to have returned to the worship of idols in the second half of the seventeenth century. The only thing that was left was trade with Europeans, especially the slave trade, which continued to increase in value from the second half of the seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth century.[34]

The English joined the Portuguese in Benin in the second half of the sixteenth century. Windham, the first Englishman in Benin, visited the town in 1553. He was accompanied by the Portuguese navigator Francisco Pinteado. Other British adventurers, traders, and missionaries came to Benin shortly after Windham's visit and for the next three centuries before the area came under British colonial rule in the late nineteenth century.[35] The British, like the Dutch who joined them in the area toward the end of the sixteenth century, concentrated on trade. A few, however, such as John Bird and James Welsh, who came to Benin between 1588 and 1590, carried out Christian missionary activities and humanitarian work.[36] Their experience in Benin was worse than that of the Portuguese. For the Portuguese had established themselves in Benin for well over half a century before the arrival of the English and the Dutch, and they had forged excellent relations with the leaders of the kingdom and many of the ordinary people before the arrival of Europeans from other countries. Again, at the time when the English were beginning to establish their humanitarian and evangelical activities, the Bini had become antagonistic to European cultural influence. They therefore scarcely had any impact in the Benin up to the end of our period, and indeed up to the early nineteenth century. This was probably responsible for the shift of their activities to the south and southeast of Benin. They eventually recorded a measure of success among the Isoko and Urhobo.[37]

For the Dutch, their preoccupation was trade, and many of them became notorious as unscrupulous slave dealers. They made barely any cultural impact among the Bini. It is therefore clear that European influence in Benin had fluctuating fortunes from around 1520 to 1750. After some initial success, "the impact of the West" almost disappeared in Benin from the early seventeenth century. This trend continued until the mid-eighteenth century and even after.

What remains to be analyzed is the reason for the dramatic change in the response to European culture in Benin from the early sixteenth century to the eighteenth century. The character of the kings of Benin after the death of Oba Ehengbuda in the early seventeenth century and the political crisis that engulfed the kingdom throughout the century were undoubtedly critical factors in the rejection of Western culture. From the mid-fifteenth century, the kings of Benin wielded tremendous power as the kingdom expanded in different directions. This created a situation whereby the interest of the king greatly influenced the direction of things in Benin.[38] This was clearly shown in the nature and extent of European influence in Benin during the reigns of Esigie and Orhogbua. Their interest in Christianity and Western culture influenced many Bini to embrace the Christian faith and to adopt Western values. On the other hand, the lack of interest in European culture by the rulers of Benin after Ehenguda influenced many of the ordinary people to oppose the new way of life that the European were trying to introduce. A related issue was the political crisis that Benin experienced from the early seventeenth century. As already pointed out, the rulers of Benin for much of the century were so preoccupied with this problem that promotion European culture would have been the last thing to have interested them, even if they were not opposed to Western values.

Perhaps the most important factor that influenced the attitude of the Bini toward Western culture in the 16th and 17th centuries was the strong attachment of the people to their tradition. Before the arrival of the Europeans in Benin, the people had evolved elaborate traditions to which they were strongly committed. This made it difficult for them to adopt another culture whose value system was opposed to that of the Bini. It is this factor that explains why Oba

Esigie could not really embrace Christianity in spite of his strong support for the religion and other activities of the Europeans. As the king he had to lead the people on different occasions when certain festivals, ceremonies, and rituals were to be carried out. Since almost all these practices were against Christian belief, Esigie's becoming a devoted Christian would have logically led to his having to relinquish his position as king. Indeed, in 1529, on the advice of his mother Idia, Esigie brought to the capital a famous diviner named Azagbaghedi from Okada (a small village to the west of Benin). Azagbaghedi claimed that he saw through his magical powers the danger of throwing open the stranger's gate (meaning that the free hand that the Europeans were given to operate in Benin was dangerous).[39] All these came to affect the attitude of the Bini toward the Europeans. At least those who believed Azagbaghedi's warning were cautious in their attitude toward the Europeans.

The Bini have remained committed to their traditions down the centuries. It was the tradition forbidding foreigners from visiting Benin during the *Igue* festival, which the British colonial authorities could not accept, the led to the murder of the British Acting Consul C. Philip and his party by Bini chiefs in 1896,[40] and as late as 1979 when Oba Akenzua II died, Bini traditional leaders insisted that everyone must shave his head as a sign of respect for the dead king in accordance with the traditions. This led to much disquiet and generated tremendous controversy, especially among non-indigenes and foreigners in Benin.[41] The Nigerian government too, at both the national and the state levels, became torn between allowing Bini chiefs to have their way and defending the rights of the people to decide whether and when to shave their heads as stated in the country's Constitution. The conflict was eventually resolved in favour of the provisions of the Constitution.[42] Despite the position taken by the government on the issue, many indigenes of Benin and its environs, both educated and uneducated alike, shaved their heads as a mark of respect for Bini traditions. The point is that the Bini are very traditional. This factor played a critical role in their opposition to the Christian faith and Western cultural influences from the early 17th century to the mid-18th century. The situation was not quite the

same, however, among the neighbours of the Bini to the south, the Itsekiri of Warri.

European Cultural Influence in Warri

The first group of Europeans to visit Warri and interact with the Itsekiri was the Portuguese, just as was the case in Benin; but unlike the condition in Benin, the Portuguese did not keep much record of their early contact with the Itsekiri. "There exists no contemporary record of the first mission to Warri, nor indeed of the beginnings of Portuguese contact with that kingdom," notes A.F.C. Ryder.[43] P.C. Lloyd equally observed that "the Portuguese do not mention Warri in their reports of the discovery of Benin in the late fifteenth century."[44]

Some have suggested that during the early period of the evolution of the Itsekiri kingdom, the new state was regarded as part of the Benin Kingdom; hence it was considered unnecessary to mention Itsekiri separately.[45] Whatever may have been the reason for the omission, the result has been that the date of the beginning of Portuguese activities in Warri cannot now be precisely determined. What can nevertheless be concluded is that since the Portuguese mention their activities on the Benin and Forcados rivers from the first decade of the sixteenth century and their contacts with some groups in the area. The Itsekiri kingdom, which was the most important in the Forcados River area, would certainly have been visited. Thus, by at least between 1530 and 1540 close contacts had begun to be established between the Europeans and the people of Warri.[46]

As was the case in Benin, Catholic missionaries came to Warri in the second half of the sixteenth century. The first group of these missionaries were Augustinian monks who were sent from São Tomé by Gaspar Cao, the Bishop of São Tomé at the time. Shortly after their arrival in Warri, they founded a settlement named Santo Agostinho from where they carried out their missionary activities. Before long, many Itsekiri embraced Christianity and changed from their traditional way of life. A. F. C. Ryder described one of the early experiences of the missionaries among the Itsekiri thus:

One of these first Augustinian missionaries named father Francisco… acquired great prestige and authority among the Itsekiri. He crowned his achievement by one day gathering the population around "a certain tree which, thanks to charms and diabolical superstitions was held in great awe among them". He then proceeded to destroy it, presumably by cutting it down. When the gods of the *juju* failed to inflict immediate and condign punishment on the perpetrator of this outrage, father Francisco's prestige rose higher than ever.[47]

It is not known what percentage of the Itsekiri population ultimately embraced Christianity, but the number seemed large enough for Christian beliefs to be widely practiced in Warri. After the dramatic act of Father Francisco described above, the influential missionary was able to persuade the reigning *Olu* (king) of Itsekiri to present his son for baptism.[48] The young prince was baptized under the name of Sebastin, a name taken after the reigning Portuguese king. Sebastin became king in the 1590s, and being a Christian himself, did all he could to encourage Christian missionary activities in the Itsekiri kingdom. He consistently appealed to the Portuguese monarch for priests to spread the faith and administer the sacraments among the Itsekiri.

Sebastin subsequently sent his eldest son, who was christened Domingos, to Portugal to be instructed in theology and return home to serve as priest. Domingos studied in the Hieronymite College at Coimbra, as well as the Augustinian College and the Jesuit College, both at Lisbon. After almost a decade of theological education, Domingos returned to Warri with a large retinue, a sizeable amount of European goods, and his Portuguese wife, whom he had married toward the end of his schooling.[49] Domingos eventually became king in the second quarter of the seventeenth century. Even though he did not become a priest as had been expected, he nevertheless gave strong support to the Christian faith, although according to some sources, not as much as his father Sebastin had done. From the time of Sebastin's accession in the late sixteenth century up to the end to

the eighteenth century, all the rulers of Itsekiri, save for one nameless Olu who reigned from the 1730s to the 1760s, professed the Christian faith, so much so that some sources have claimed that Christianity was a court religion in Warri until the nineteenth century.[50] J.F. Ade-Ajayi also notes that from the late 16th century to the early 18th century, "the Warri rulers (of the Itsekiri kingdom) became well known as professed Christians."[51]

Beyond the circle of kings and princes, various records by missionaries, traders and sailors, however, state that many ordinary Itsekiri people also embraced Christianity and abandoned the traditional way to life as they sought to live according to Christian teachings. For instance, a report by Father Columbin of Nantes of December 1640 stated that in Warri "the ruler was a Christian and many of his subjects had been baptized."[52] Father Columbin was a French missionary who had been engaged in missionary work in the Gulf of Guinea since 1634. Similarly, a Dutch visitor to Warri in 1644 described the people as espousing the Christian faith. He was fascinated by his discovery of "a church and an altar complete with a picture of Christ on the cross, St. Mary and the Apostles, and two alter candlesticks… there were also many people entering the church rosary in hand." At a later period, another European visitor in Warri recorded that he saw "at Christmas a great procession which went from the town to a small village carrying a crucifix and some other symbols of Christianity.[53]

The conclusion that can be drawn from all these is that a drastic change in the way of life of many Itsekiri took place as a result of Christian teachings in Warri from the last quarter of the sixteenth century. It was not a phenomenon that was confined to the ruling class in the kingdom. Christian missionary activities were accompanied by the introduction of Western education in Warri at the elementary level, and some Itsekiri did go to São Tomé and Portugal for more schooling (the majority for theological training).[54] The interactions between the Portuguese and the Itsekiri created the condition for intermarriage between them. This gave rise to a good number of people of mixed blood among the Itsekiri from the seventeenth century onwards. At least one of the mulattos, Antonio

Domingo, became king later in the 17th century. Both the educated Itsekiri and the mulattos were inclined to live more according to Western values than to local customs and traditions, and many spoke the Portuguese language.[55]

Just as Western culture had influenced the way of life of the Bini during the early years of the advent of the Europeans in Benin, its influence was also noticeable among the Itsekiri: the introduction of new crops that affected the food culture; the importation of different products from Europe that added to the material culture; and the introduction of new styles of dressing that were used side by side with the indigenous ones.[56] It should be stressed, however, that in almost all aspects of cultural transformation in Warri, local traditions flourished with the foreign, even among many who embraced Christianity. One source notes that various records of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries indicate that "the Itsekiri [held] with considerable tenacity to certain of the external rites and symbols of the Roman Catholic religion without abandoning their more important social customs."[57] The veracity of this point of view is clearly revealed by the observation by Captain John Adams, the English sailor who visited Warri around 1795. He noted that although the Itsekiri king Manuel Otobia strongly encouraged Christianity and claimed to be a Christian, he nevertheless had over sixty wives. The irregular presence of priests in Warri is identified as an important factor that contributed to this situation. Despite the mixture of traditional culture with Christian practices, it could be said that cultural transformation took place among the Itsekiri from the late 16th century to the early 18th century and Ryder has concluded that it is difficult to "deny that [Christianity's] secondary effects upon the religion and culture of the whole Itsekiri state may have been very considerable."[58]

Clearly, European cultural influence was more pronounced and enduring in Warri than in Benin from the 16th century to the 18th century. Many factors were responsible for this development, which had very little to do with the acceptance of European culture as superior to the indigenous one. The factors shaping the varying responses to European cultural influences are to be identified in the

existing political, economic and social conditions at the time of the arrival of the Europeans. Benin was an old kingdom, which had developed a stable political structure, and an elaborate cultural system to which they had become strongly attached over many centuries.[59] The Itsekiri kingdom, on the other hand, was relatively young and its cultural practices were still evolving in the 16th century, drawing a great deal from the Bini and Yoruba. There was also the factor of the expectation of support from the Europeans in times of crisis and economic benefits to the Itsekiri kingdom.[60] This explains why sometimes the Itsekiri collaborated with the Portuguese and some other European groups that came in later years against some of their neighbours. Interestingly, some of these trends have continued to manifest themselves in relations between the Itsekiri and some of their neighbours until contemporary times.[61] For the Bini, their attachment to local cultural practices which they have evolved over the centuries has also generally endured.

Conclusion

From the analysis, it is clear that the European influenced the cultures of the Bini and Itsekiri from the early sixteenth century to the mid-eighteenth century in quite different ways. In Benin, after measure of acceptance at the initial stage, European culture and the Christian faith began to be opposed from the early seventeenth century onwards. In Warri, on the other hand, Western cultural influence remained prominent almost throughout the period, although local practices generally continued. The reasons for the rejection of Portuguese culture and abandonment of the Christian faith in Benin from the early seventeenth century onwards have already been discussed. Clearly, the absence of similar conditions in Warri was responsible for the enduring nature of Western cultural practices there. The prevailing political, economic and social conditions at the time of the arrival of the Europeans was therefore a major factor in the varying responses of the Bini and Itsekiri to European cultural influence. In addition, responses also reflected the interest of each state.

Endnotes

1. James Duffy, *Portuguese Africa* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), 9.

2. William Duiker and Jackson Spielvogel, *World History vol. to 1800* (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1998), 496. See also Walter Wallbank and Arnold Schrier, *Living World History* (Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1958), 330-32.

3. B. Taylor, *Primitive Culture* (London: John Murray, 1891), 1; R. E. Bradbury, *The Benin Kingdom and Edo-Speaking Peoples of South-Western Nigeria.* (London: International African Institute, 1957), 1-4, 181-82.

4. Jacob Egharevba, *A Short History of Benin* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1960), 38.

5. J. C. Anene, "Benin, Niger Delta, Ibo and Ibibio Peoples in the Nineteenth Century," in *A Thousand Years of West African History,* ed. J. F. Ade-Ajayi and Ian Espie (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1965), 299; Egharevba, *Short History of Benin*, 23

6. A. U. Osagie and D. Aworawo, "The Benin Kingdom: History and Culture up to 1800," in *History and Cultures of Nigeria up to AD 2000,* ed. Akinjide Osuntokun, David Aworawo, and F. Masajuwa (Lagos: Frankad, 2002), 58; Jacob U. Egharevba, *Benin Law and Custom* (Nendeln: Kraus Thomson, 1949), 24.

7. O. Ikime, "The Peoples and Kingdoms of the Delta Province," in *Groundwork of Nigerian History,* ed. O. Ikem (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1980), 90

8. P. C. Lloyd, *The Itsekiri* (London: International African Institute, 1957), 178-80

9. Lloyd, *The Itsekiri,* 174

10. V. Edo, "Peoples of the Niger Delta up to 1800," in *History and Cultures of Nigeria,* ed. Osuntokun et al., 34-35

11. Lloyd, *The Itsekiri,* 177-81

12. A. U. Osagie and D. Aworawo, "The Benin Kingdom."

13. A. F. C. Ryder, *Benin and the Europeans, 1485-1897* (London: Longman, 1969), 29-30, Egharevba, *Short History of Benin,* 27-28.

14. A. F. C. Ryder, "The Benin Kingdom," in Ikime, ed., *Groundwork,* 116

15. Egharevba, *Short History of Benin,* 28

16. Osagie and Aworawo, "The Benin Kingdom," 60; Egharevba *Benin Law and Custom,* 15-16.

17. A. F. C. Ryder, "Missionary Activity in the Kingdom of Warri to the Early Nineteenth Century," *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria,* 11/1(1960):1-2.

18. Egharevba, *Short History of Benin,* 32-35.

19. B. Fafunwa, *History of Education in Nigeria* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974), 74-75. See also K. Ihenetu, "The Development of Formal Western Education in Nigeria up to 1990," in Osuntokun, et al., *History and Cultures of Nigeria,* 454.

20. P. Vieger, *Trade Relations between the Bight of Benin and Bahia, 17th -18th Centuries* (Ibadan: I. U. P., 1976), 582; P. Kilby, *Industrialization in an Open Economy: Nigeria 1945-1966* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 185-91. See also S. Agboola, "The Introduction and Spread of Cassava in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century," *Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies* 10(1968):369-76

21. Duiker and Speilvogel, *World History, 496-47;* A. F. C. Ryder, *Material for West African History in Portuguese Archives* (London: The Athlone Press, 1965), 1; Igbafe, "Benin under British Administration," abstract.

22. Cassava was introduced to the area around Warri and Benin in the sixteenth century, but it was in the nineteenth century that it spread to other parts of Nigeria through the activities of returnee slaves from the New World who promoted the Christian faith and agriculture. E. J. Alagoa, "The Niger Delta States and Their Neighbours, 1600-1800," in *History of West Africa,* vol. 1, ed. J. F. Ade-Ajayi and M. Crowder (London: Longman, 1971), 295; D. Aworawo, "Relations between Nigeria and Europe," in *Nigeria*

and the Wider World in the Twentieth Century: Essays in Honour of Professor Akinjide Osuntokun, ed. A. Akinyeye (Ibadan: Davidson Press, 2003), 137.

23. A. Adefuye, "Oba Akinsemoyin and the Emergence of Modern Lagos," in *History of the Peoples of Lagos State,* ed. A. Adefuye et al. (Lagos: Lantern Books, 1987), 42

24. Egharevba, *The City of Benin,* 8-10

25. Osagie and Aworawo, "The Benin Kingdom," 60.

26. Ryder, "Missionary Activity in the Kingdom of Warri," 1

27. Egharevba, *Short History of Benin,* 27-28.

28. Osagie and Aworawo, "The Benin Kingdom," 64

29. R. July, *A History of the African People* (London: Faber and Faber, 1970), 111-12.

30. Osagie and Aworawo, "The Benin Kingdom," 63.

31. Egharevba, *Short History of Benin* 38.

32. Egharevba, *Short History of Benin* 37-38

33. Osagie and Aworawo, "The Benin Kingdom," 64

34. July, *History of the African People,* 111.

35. Philip Igbafe, *Obaseki of Benin* (London: Heinemann, 1972), 2-4.

36. Osagie and Aworawo, "The Benin Kingdom," 63.

37. Ryder, "Missionary Activity in the Kingdom of Warri," 1-2.

38. Bradbury, *The Benin Kingdom,* 14-19; Egharevba, *Benin Law and Custom,* 24.

39. S. B. Omoregie, "Forty Questions and Answers on Ubinology" in *Great Benin,* ed. S. B. Omoregie (Benin City: Neraso Publishers, 2000), 122-23.

40. J. B. Webster and J. A. A. Boahen, *West Africa since 1800* (Longman, 1980), 190

41. Interview, A. U. Osagie, Benin City, 16 March 2002

42. Interview, E. Idahosa, Benin City, 17 March 2002

43. Ryder, "Missionary Activity in the Kingdom of Warri," 1.

44. Lloyd, *The Itsekiri,* 181

45. Ryder, "Missionary Activity in the Kingdom of Warri," 23.

46. Lloyd, *The Itsekiri,* 181-82

47. Ryder, Missionary Activity in the Kingdom of Warri," 2.

48. W. E. Moore, *History of Itsekiri* (London: Frank Cass, 1970), 28-31

49. Lloyd, *The Itsekiri,* 181; Ryder, "Missionary Activity in the Kingdom of Warri," 6.

50. Ikime, "The Peoples and Kingdoms of the Delta Province," 104-5.

51. J.F. Ade-Ajayi, *Christian Missions in Nigeria, 1841-1891: The Making of a New Elite* (London: Longman, 1965), 3.

52. Ryder, "Missionary Activity in the Kingdom of Warri," 9.

53. Ryder, "Missionary Activity in the Kingdom of Warri," 9-10.

54. Bradbury, *The Benin Kingdom,* 181; Ryder, "Missionary Activity in the Kingdom of Warri", 21

55. Ikime, "The Peoples and Kingdoms of the Delta Province," 105; Brabdury, *The Benin Kingdom,* 181

56. J. Adams, *Remarks on the Country Extending from Cape Palmas to the River Congo* (London, 1923), 15; see also A. F. C. Ryder, "An Early Portuguese Voyage to the Forcados River," *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 1, no 4 (1959): 307-11

57. Ryder, "Missionary Activity in the Kingdom of the Warri," 23

58. Ikime, "The Peoples and Kingdoms of the Delta Provinces," 105-6; Ryder, "Missionary Activities in the Kingdom of the Warri," 23.

59. T. Falola and M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 25-26.

60. P. C. Lloyd, "The Portuguese in Warri", *ODU* (Old Series), 1956, 27-29.

61. Interview, A. Usifoh, Usen, 20 March 2002; Edo, "Peoples of the Niger Delta up to 1800," 40.

South-South Neoliberalism and Economic Development: Realities and Challenges of Indo-Nigerian Economic Relations in Historical Perspective

Sola Akinrinade
Visiting Professor,
National Universities Commision, Abuja, Nigeria
& Olukoya Ogen
Visiting Senior Research Fellow,
Centre for West African Studies,
University of Birmingham, United Kingdom

Abstract

This study provides a historical analysis of Indo-Nigerian trade relations by exploring the diversified nature of Indian investments in Nigeria. This exploration is situated within the purview of the undercurrents of neo-liberalism and South-South cooperation. The paper argues that ideally, India should invest in Nigeria's human capital and its inadequate and dilapidated social infrastructure. India should also be interested in sharing its technological know-how to help diversify the Nigerian economy. However, this study discovers that India is primarily motivated by its enlightened self-interest. This conforms to the realities on ground in this age of globalisation and neoliberalism. Indeed, the current pattern of Nigeria's economic relations with India is inherently asymmetric and as such it is a threat to the sustainable economic development of Nigeria. Studies have shown that asymmetric interdependence is inherently a relationship of dominance rather than that of equality. The paper, therefore, concludes that the prevailing skewed and asymmetric economic intercourse between India and Nigeria is capable of undermining Nigeria's developmental efforts. It also poses a veritable challenge to the attainment of the cardinal objectives of South-South cooperation.

Introduction

With more than 1 billion people, or one-fifth of the world's population, India's population, its rapid economic growth and neo-liberal economy have made it a very significant participant in the global economy. India is also the fourth largest economy in the world in terms of purchasing power parity and it is a *de facto* nuclear power (Singh, 2007:2). For many developing countries such as Nigeria, India simultaneously offers new vistas of hope as well as challenges. Indeed, through the sheer quantum of its investments and bilateral trade with Nigeria, India has been widely acknowledged as a major driver of Nigeria's economic growth. Yet, scholarly works on Asian-Nigerian trade relations have concentrated mainly on Chinese economic relations with Nigeria (Ogen, 2008a). Thus, the pattern of Indo-Nigerian trade remains largely an under-explored field.

This paper examines the growing economic relationship between India and Nigeria as manifested in the explosive growth in trade and investment. This economic relationship is largely driven by the sheer magnitude of economic exchanges, trade and investments within the framework of South-South cooperation. Interestingly, the paper aligns itself with what Zeleza (2008: 172) critiques as the 'emerging alarmist discourses' about the remarkable Asian economic interests in Africa. Our central thesis is that while it is indubitable that Indo-Nigerian economic relations can never fit into the framework of nineteenth century European imperialism in Africa, the fact must be underscored that India's phenomenal economic clout in Nigeria is predicated on its fervent quest for energy to drive its massive industrial infrastructure, the search for raw materials to feed its industries, the need to secure overseas markets for its industrial goods, and the craze for investment outlets to reinvest surplus capital. Whichever perspective one looks at it, this is economic imperialism at its best.

Specifically, this piece is primarily interested in determining the extent to which the Indian presence in Nigeria has facilitated Nigeria's drive towards economic development. This examination is situated within the theoretical trajectories of South-South cooperation and the economic theory of imperialism. Moreover, from a comparative

standpoint the paper also considers whether India's current aggressive proactive economic policies towards Nigeria would have been different without Chinese overwhelming presence in many strategic sectors of the Nigerian economy.

The paper concludes that the prevailing skewed and asymmetric economic intercourse between India and Nigeria have been undermining Nigeria's developmental efforts, thereby posing a veritable challenge to the attainment of the cardinal objectives of South-South cooperation.

Current State of Research on Indo-Nigerian Relations

The sparse literature on Indo-Nigerian relations is mainly dominated by the publications of non-Africans (Singh, 1986; Singh, 2007; Hawley, 2008; Wong, 2009). The implication is that this body of literature sometimes deflects very much from the reality on ground. Of course, this is due largely to inadequate knowledge about the undercurrents of the Nigerian socio-political milieu, over-generalisation arising from the regional or thematic focus of most of the available literature, and sometimes but rarely as a result of prejudice and racial arrogance. For instance, Singh (1996) appears to be the only authoritative book specifically devoted to the economic dynamics of the relations between Nigeria and India. In spite of the book's copious details and comprehensive analyses, the work is apparently written from an Indian perspective. Again, the analyses contained in the said book did not extend beyond the mid 1990s, leaving out the totality of the post-1995 developments. This temporal gap is the current focus of this study. Again, the edited book by Hawley (2008) concentrates solely on the vibrant cultural exchange between Africa and India. The book provides many examples of the cultural interactions that reinforce our understanding of globalisation as an all-embracing and pervasive cultural concept. Understandably, it says little about contemporary economic interaction between India and Nigeria. Other works such as Wong (2009) touches briefly on the exploits of major Indian oil companies in Nigeria in its broad analysis of the activities of Asian companies in Angola and Nigeria, while

Singh (2007) devotes some attention to contemporary Indo-Nigerian trade in its general assessment of the Indian presence in West Africa.

As far as Nigerian scholars are concerned, the kernel of the highly descriptive literature on Indo-Nigerian relations is celebratory of the new-found potentials of India as a preferred developmental partner to the West because of the general assumption that India and Nigeria share profound similarities in their historical experiences. For example it is widely believed that India and Nigeria shared similar experiences as former British colonies, are culturally diverse, have large populations and have similar developmental challenges. Igwe (2008) provides a fine illustration of the current delusion in Nigerian government circles about the significant similarities between India and Nigeria and the rationale behind the strong advocacy for the replication of the Indian developmental model in Nigeria. In the same vein, Magaji and Adamu (2008) greatly extol the alleged shared similarities between Nigeria and India, while Kura (2009) over-exaggerates the similarities between the two nations and the enormous possibilities of actualising the Indian developmental template in Nigeria. In the era of increasing globalisation, Agbu (2008) underscores the significance of South-South cooperation for the sustainable development of Nigeria and other countries of the South as a veritable alternative to North-South economic cooperation.

However, we argue in this study, that India and Nigeria only share broad characteristics. In fact, what is seldom remembered is the fact that these seeming similarities are also differences because the actual experiences of these nations are drastically different. The fact that Great Britain gradually withdrew from India over the course of 50 years ensured that India's struggle for independence created a greater sense of nationalism. Again, when Great Britain eventually pulled out of India, India's exposure to institutions, education, and democratic ideals led to the adoption of colonial political institutions (Lem, 2005). Even more significant is the fact that when India achieved independence in 1947, it already possessed what might be termed an "intellectual infrastructure" that put it head and shoulders above most newly emergent independent or developing countries. The universities

of Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta had been established for nearly 100 years. An Indian had won a Nobel Prize for Physics in as far back as 1930. Thus, India's comparatively well-developed intellectual infrastructure had endowed it with an intellectual elite who sought "cutting edge" research findings from all over the world and succeeded in internalising and utilising them (Lele and Goldsmith, 1989: 311-312).

In contrast, Nigeria's road to independence was much shorter. Great Britain withdrew over only ten years, leaving Nigeria with little resistance, limited infrastructure, and a very weak understanding of how to rule itself as a unit (Lem, 2005). In many ways Nigeria's experience with colonialism both caused and exacerbated ethnic tensions. Colonialism also weakened Nigeria's capacity for rapid development. Therefore, it is the contention of this paper that without a foundation in unity, education, and democratic ideals, Nigeria may have to find a separate path to development from that of India.

Approaches to the Study of Indo-Nigerian Relations

Theoretically, the concept of South-South cooperation started to influence the field of development studies in the 1990s, and in 2003, the United Nations started using the term to describe the cooperation among developing countries in promoting investments, expanding trade and facilitating development (Akinrinade and Ogen, 2008: 162; UNIDO 2008 and UNCTAD 2005). This realisation was informed by the fact that poor nations might find appropriate, low-cost and sustainable solution to their developmental problems in other developing countries rather than in the rich developed countries of the North (Melville and Owen 2005:1-2). Consequently, in 2003, the Asian-African Sub-regional Organisation Conference (AASROC) re-affirmed the fact that South-South cooperation was not an option but an imperative to complement North-South cooperation for the facilitation of the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (Ogen, 2008a: 82).

The World Bank also recognises the innate potentials of South-South cooperation for advancing the global development agenda and decided

to set up a multi-donor South-South Experience Exchange Facility (SEETF) in 2009. SEETF is a flexible funding mechanism to facilitate knowledge exchanges among development practitioners. As a leading advocate of South-South cooperation, India recently announced its intention to join SEETF (Fraeters, 2010).

Interestingly, the Nigeria-India Friendship Association (NIFA) was inaugurated in Lagos in 1978, ostensibly, to strengthen the skewed position of developing countries vis-à-vis the industrialised nations with regard to trade, science and technology. Thus, NIFA was formed to promote the goodwill between the peoples of Nigeria and India and to strengthen the industrial and technological ties between the two countries. Bolaji Akinyemi referred to this kind of South-South cooperation as 'Middle Power Solidarity' (Kura, 2009:12). However, it appears that Bolaji Akinyemi's coinage is at variance with the socio-economic realities on ground, as a matter of fact, India is by all means a Newly Industrialised Country (NIC) while Nigeria is still groping in the dark and remains an eminent member of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). In fact, India has been enjoying the status of a NIC since the early 1980s (Gasiorowski, 1985: 332-341).

Meanwhile, the theoretical debates on South-South cooperation have been approached from three perspectives (Agbu, 2008: 35-36). The first approach is the sub-imperialism theory in which case sub-imperial powers of the South have succeeded in becoming economic sub-imperialists in their own rights. The assumption is that traditional imperial powers now conduct their businesses through the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) of the South, especially Brazil. The other theory is from the proto-imperialist viewpoint. Protagonists of this view notes that the NICs which are the new Southern imperial powers do not act as puppets to the traditional imperialists but that their actions are governed by their own enlightened self-interests. The last trajectory is the mutual benefits approach, this approach paints a rosy picture of the inherent opportunities of South-South partnership as the panacea for the poverty and underdevelopment currently ravaging the South (UNIDO, 2008 and UNCTAD, 2005).

In this study, we reject the theory of sub-imperialism because it rests on very shaky theoretical and empirical foundations. In fact, the appropriateness of the example of Brazil that is often cited to support this theory is highly debatable. With the benefit of hindsight, the paper is also skeptical about the highly orchestrated potentials of the mutual benefits approach for engendering the rapid development of the underdeveloped world. It argues that the realities of Indo-Nigerian trade so far have not been fundamentally different from the patterns of Nigeria's trade relations with countries of the North. This chapter, therefore, adopts the concept of enlightened self-interest in its analyses. Significantly, this latter concept reinforces the theory of economic imperialism which is the integrated theoretical framework for this study (Toyo, 1988: 77-105; Falola, 1978:10).

As argued elsewhere, economic imperialism is a potent weapon of gaining and maintaining domination by one nation over another, not through military conquest, but by economic control (Ogen, 2008b: 524-525). This approach does not intend to disregard the vital political, military as well as the cultural significance of India's interest in Nigeria, it only accords primacy to economic factors as the primary determinants of social change. The approach, however, disregards the contention of liberal, neo-classical scholars, that all economic theories of imperialism fail the test of historic experience (Morgenthau 1993: 61-71). Indeed, the argument that historical evidence points to the primacy of politics over economics is unsustainable because it has very limited applicability.

It is also germane to consider another approach that has been used to explain away the seeming ubiquitous presence of India in the Nigerian economy. Parvathi Vasudevan, a former African Affairs specialist at the University of Mumbai, argues that India merely follows where China goes (Vasudevan, 2007). Admittedly, this study recognises the fact that India has to contend with fierce competition from other Asian countries, especially China, to secure Nigeria's energy resources and markets. It is also conscious of the fact that given the alarming growing clout of China in Nigeria, India must equally reposition its economic policies for Nigeria. Nevertheless, the work disagrees with the submission of Vasudevan (2007), and argues that even if the

China factor was not dominant in Nigeria, India would still have taken the same aggressive proactive policies towards Nigeria considering the monumental neo-liberal developmental dynamics within India itself. Naturally, the rapid economic growth of India under the framework of globalisation is a clear pointer to the fact that without any prompting from China, the Indian presence in Nigeria would still have been very significant.

Indo-Nigerian Trade in Historical Perspective

Historically, Indo-Nigerian trade predates the consolidation of colonial rule in Nigeria. Members of the Sindhi-Indian business community were the first set of Asian traders to arrive Nigeria in 1919 when the first Indian shop was opened in Lagos. However, in 1923 the first Indian company, K. Chellarams, commenced business operations in Nigeria. These early traders initially traded in textiles but later established supermarkets and departmental stores in major Nigerian cities especially Lagos, Ibadan, Onitsha and Port Harcourt (Gopalkrishna, 2008: 15-16). Again, during the colonial period, Anirudha (1979: 264) reports that some five million Indians migrated to the different colonies of the British Empire, including Nigeria, mostly under the system of indentured labour. Thus, socio economic relations between Nigeria and India also have their roots in colonialism. Currently, the Indian community in Nigeria has been estimated at about 30,000 (Wong, 2009: 10; Agboola, 2009).

Apart from Chellarams, there are numerous Indian joint ventures in Nigeria. These include, Prestige Assurance Company (New India Assurance JV), the Nigerian Engineering Works, the Indo-Nigerian Mercantile Bank which merged with six other banks to form Sterling Bank in 2006, Infosys, Satyam, NIIT, Aptech, Ranbaxy, Dana, ONGC-Mittal Energy, Essar, Sterling, MECON, RITES, and Petron Engineering, to mention but a few (Kura, 2009:22). Several Indian companies also have sizeable investments in textiles, chemicals, electrical equipment and many other areas.

It should be noted that India has long enjoyed strong economic links with Nigeria. Though, Kura (2009:17) contends that between 1960

and 1965, India imported only palm oil from Nigeria, available records point to the fact that during the 1960s, Indo–Nigerian trade was not only restricted to trade in palm oil, but included the exports of commodities such as raw cotton, cashew nuts, non-ferrous metals, ivory and rock phosphate (Singh, 2007:4).

Admittedly, while India's historic relations with Nigeria were once rooted in support for Nigeria's quest for independence and the development of socio-cultural relations. However, in the words of Singh (2007: 9), 'with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new world order, issues such as disarmament and non-alignment, which India embraced passionately, have taken a back seat in the new era of globalization. Relationships based on concrete economic, technological and educational cooperation have become highly significant.' Thus, since the outset of economic liberalisation in the early 1990s and structural adjustments of the late 1980s, India's foreign policy has been increasingly driven towards finding export markets, reinvesting foreign capital and searching for alternative sources of energy. Thus, as at 1987, Indian investments in Nigeria were estimated at about US$5 billion across various locations and industrial establishments (Kura, 2009: 22).

Currently, Nigeria is India's largest trading partner in Africa. As a matter of fact, bilateral trade between India and Nigeria stood at $13 billion in 2008. This trade was dominated by crude oil imports from Nigeria and India's information technology accessories and other industrial goods. Crude oil imports alone constituted 95% of Indian exports from Nigeria in 2008 (Wong, 2009:10; Agboola, 2009). Moreover, Nigeria is the largest African importer of Indian manufactured goods. In fact, it imports more pharmaceuticals from India than any other African country.

Indo-Nigerian economic relations gained momentum with the state visit of former President Olusegun Obasanjo to India in January 2000. It is also interesting to note that the visit of Dr. Manmohan Singh, the Indian Prime Minister to Nigeria in 2007 witnessed the signing of the Abuja Declaration on Strategic Partnership between India and Nigeria

and a number of Memorandum of Understanding in the varied areas of defence, agriculture, power generation, civil aviation, trade and technical services (Ohia, 2008). The MOUs also touched on a range of themes: the imbalances in the international financial and trading systems, the deleterious effects of debt, the need for sharing experiences on issues such as sustainable development and poverty alleviation as well as giving agriculture an industry status so as to efficiently tackle hunger and ensure food security (Vasudevan, 2009). Thus, the Abuja Declaration laid down the roadmap for future intensive and extensive cooperation between India and Nigeria. With this historical background, it appears apposite at this juncture to examine the nature of India's foreign aid to Nigeria and the Indian presence in other strategic sectors of the Nigerian economy.

The Nature of India's Foreign Aid to Nigeria

The Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) scheme provides an institutional framework for enhancing cooperation with developing countries. ITEC which was launched in 1964 has offered technical assistance to Nigeria. Nigeria has also benefitted immensely from India's Special Commonwealth African Assistance Programme (SCAAP). Essentially, the SCAAP package comprises training, projects and project-related activities, deputations of experts and study tours (Singh, 2007:4). As far back as the early 1960s, technical trainings were given to about 150 Nigerian telecommunication personnel by Telecommunications India Limited (Kura, 2009:11). Under the ITEC and SCAAP schemes, 200 training programmes in capacity building for various categories of Nigerians were scheduled for 2009 alone (Omokhunu, 2009).

In the sphere of military aid, it is a well-known fact that the Nigerian Defence Academy was set up by a team of Indian military officers in 1964 and that the Nigerian Naval College, Onne was established by 7 Indian officers in 1984 (Isa, 2008:58). Besides, India has been providing training to Nigerian Armed Forces personnel in military institutions in India, both on self-financing basis as well as under the SCAAP Programme (Ohia, 2008). However, it appears that the sale of military weapons to Nigeria by India is shrouded in secrecy. Agbu

(2008: 39) boldly asserts that '…very little interaction exists in the area of weapons procurement.' Kura (2009: 14) also notes that there has there has been very little co-operation in the procurement of weapons by Nigeria from India. Even Isa (2008), which appears to be an authoritative *expose* on Indo-Nigerian military relations, is silent on this fact. This development becomes worrisome when one considers the fact that Rear Admiral A.A.M. Isa is the Commandant of the National Defence College, Abuja.

The contention of these authors would appear to be a gross underestimation of the political economy of the popular Indo-Nigerian Defence Co-operation. According to Dutt (1980: 675), Indian military aid is not confined to only training or playing an advisory role. It includes the sale of Indian arms, weapons and ammunitions. Harshe (2002: 4119) observes that apart from helping Nigeria to build the Nigerian Defence Academy, the Nigerian government also purchased about 2,000 trucks from the Indian automobile giant, Tata, between 1997 and 1998. Nigeria have also been sourcing military vehicles and equipment such as arms and ammunitions, military helicopters, spares for Dorniers, military communication equipment and fast attack patrol vehicles from India since the 1970s.

As part of its foreign financial aid package, in 1984, India provided US$100 million in aid to Nigeria. This financial aid was intended to finance Nigeria's short- and long- term debts (Kura, 2009:22). The visit of the Indian Prime Minister to Nigeria in 2007 resulted among others in a US$100 million line of credit (LOC) to finance agriculture and mining projects and a US$5 million LOC to the NEXIM Bank of Nigeria to promote trade between Nigerian and Indian companies (Eze, 2008: ix). Again, in 2008, under a special bilateral arrangement the Indian government offered US$100million to the Informal Sector Operators of Nigeria and promised to assist in establishing small and medium technology incubation centres in all the states in Nigeria (Omokhunu, 2009).

Moreover, India is funding the proposed Pan-African e-network where there will be central IT connectivity between India and about

53 African countries. It will also provide hot lines between the Heads of Government in India and those of African nations. The Pan-African e-network is aimed at appropriating Indian expertise in ICT for e-medicine, e-government, e-education, etc to all countries in Africa. The estimated cost that will be provided by the Indian government is over US$100 million (Gopalkrishna, 2008: 19).

Broadly speaking, Indian aid programmes could be viewed from two broad perspectives: one sees Indian aid as part of India's legitimate desire to carry out the various resolutions calling for increased economic co-operation among the developing states in the spirit of South-South cooperation. The other view sees Indian aid as yet another manifestation of India as an emergent economic power, playing an increasing role in world affairs (Dutt, 1980:672). It is apparent that given the experience of Nigeria, Indian aid programme in the country fits into the latter categorisation. While, it is a fact that Nigeria has been receiving tremendous Indian aid, however, it is important to also appreciate the fact that Indian aid programmes naturally try to assist local Indian home industries by opening new markets for the supply of Indian goods to Nigeria.

Thus, as rightly observed by (Dutt, 1980: 674), Indian investment, particularly in industrial ventures, has been represented usually by the export of capital goods, machinery, management, and even labour. In some cases, Indian aid is tied directly to India's economic survival. Aid to Kuwait and other Gulf States in the 1970s and 1980s falls under this category. As a result of India's need for oil, aid to the Gulf countries was intimately linked with India's long-term economic stability. Kuwait is said to have received Indian help to diversify its economy, while in return India received low-priced furnace oil on a preferential basis for a short period (Dutt, 1980:677). This arrangement is currently being replicated in Nigeria.

The Indian Presence in the Nigerian Oil Sector

India has been a major oil importer since the 1950s. During the 1960s, oil accounted for about one-tenth of its total import bill, however, by 1974 it accounted for about a half of its total import bill. In fact,

during the world oil crisis of the 1970s, India was identified by the World Bank as the country worst hit by the phenomenal increase in oil prices. (Dasgupta, 1977: 70). Today, India is a rapidly growing giant that faces the critical challenge of meeting an increasing demand for energy. The country ranks sixth in the world in terms of energy demand and its economy is projected to grow by 8–9% annually over the next two decades. Invariably, this would lead to a significant increase in demand for oil since its oil and gas resources are relatively small. Apart from being the 4th largest importer of oil and gas in the world, the country currently imports approximately 70% of its oil. Thus, worried about its increasing reliance on oil imports from the Persian Gulf, India is following in the footsteps of other major oil-importing economies by looking for alternative sources of energy (Singh, 2007:7).

Traditionally, Nigeria has been a major supplier of crude to India, mostly bought on the spot market. However, with the outset globalisation, an important feature of India's new policy towards Nigeria is the recognition that Nigeria's Niger Delta region is an attractive source of energy. Consequently, India has entered into a long-term deal with Nigeria on the purchase of about 44 million barrels of crude oil annually. Nigeria's crude is of particular strategic importance owing to its low sulphur content. Statistics released by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) put Nigeria's estimated proven crude reserves at 31.5 billion barrels, which constitutes 96% of the estimated proven crude reserves in the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria also has the ninth largest natural gas reserves in the world and is developing several projects to utilise its vast reserves of both associated and non-associated gas (Singh, 2007:7-9).

Since 2005, there have been several significant developments in India-Nigeria hydrocarbons cooperation. An Inter-Ministerial Task Force of the Government of India visited Nigeria in November 2005 and subsequently, the Nigerian government offered to guarantee the acquisition of oil blocks by Indian oil companies at discounted rates or with signature bonus waivers. Otherwise known as the 'oil-for-infrastructure' deal, Indian companies would also secure lucrative contracts in return for Indian investments in downstream and

infrastructure projects (Wong, 2009: 7). Undoubtedly, the concept of the 'oil for-infrastructure' deal was novel and Nigeria fervently looked forward to a 'development dividend.' For the Indian government, not only would it acquire oil blocks to enhance its energy security, but its companies would also win large contracts. Thus, for both sides, it seems the deal was a clear manifestation of the much orchestrated South-South, win-win situation.

Wong (2009: 14) reports that by early 2008, President Obasanjo was reportedly 'fed up with the Shells and Exxons' because they had repeatedly declined to build new refineries, on grounds of cost, or to otherwise invest in job-creating projects outside their core business. The general feeling in Nigeria's official circles was that Western international oil companies (IOCs) came only to exploit Nigeria, were responsible for the environmental degradation of the Niger Delta and gave little back in return. The Indian Prime Minister, in his address to a Joint Session of Nigeria's National Assembly in 2007, underscored the importance of the 'oil-for-infrastructure' deal when he said, 'It is a partnership for energy security. Nigeria's rich natural resources provide the base for our mutually beneficial cooperation.'

Hence, under the 'oil-for-infrastructure' deal, India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) acquired about 45 per cent share of South Atlantic Petroleum in the Akpo deep offshore oil field in December 2005 (Kura, 2009:21; Oduniyi, 2005). Some other Indian companies like ESSAR and STERLING were also allocated oil blocks in May 2007. In the upstream sector, ONGC Videsh (OVL) won a 15 per cent stake in Block II of the Joint Development Zone (JDZ) of Nigeria and Sao Tome Principe (Singh, 2007:8; Salau, 2009). Significantly, in 2005 ONGC teamed up with Mittal Steel, the world's largest steel company, to form ONGC Mittal Energy Ltd (OMEL). It was subsequently awarded three blocks (OPL 279, 285 and 216). In return it agreed to construct a 180,000 bd refinery, a 2000 MW power plant, and a railway line connecting Eastern and Western Nigeria (Wong, 2009: 16). The blocks OMEL got for exploration have potential recoverable reserves of at least one billion barrels of oil and natural gas equivalent (Salau, 2009).

Ironically, there is no clear evidence to show that Indian oil companies operating in Nigeria will behave differently from the traditional oil producers. Recently, the Nigerian authorities had to threaten ONGC-Mittal Energy Limited (OMEL) that unless it fulfills its promise to invest in Nigeria's infrastructure, the Federal Government may not allow it explore for oil and gas at any further hydrocarbon blocks in the country (Salau, 2009). As noted earlier, OMEL promised to invest $6 billion to build a refinery, a power plant and a railway line in lieu of the right of first refusal for three hydrocarbon blocks it acquired between 2005 and 2006.

Activities of Indian Companies in the Nigerian Steel Sector

The highly strategic steel sector is another area where India has registered its presence in Nigeria. The Hindustan Machine Tools Company of India (HMT) set up the Nigerian Machine Tools (NMT) in 1982 with 15% equity participation. An Indian firm, Global Infrastructural Holdings Limited (GHIL) was granted concession to manage the Ajaokuta Steel Company (iron processing mill) in 2004. Mr. Pramod Mittal, the major owner of GHIL was also granted concession through his other company, Ispat Industries Limited (IIL) to manage the Nigerian Iron Ore Mining Company (iron mining firm) as well as the Delta Steel Company (steel rolling mill). This gave Mittal considerable control over iron mining, iron processing and steel rolling. Mittal's companies have been found to be incompetent and lacking in the technical expertise as well as the financial wherewithal to handle these strategic and gigantic projects. It was later revealed through an Administrative Panel of Inquiry that Mittal succeeded in securing these concessions through some underhand deals with Nigerian government officials. The concessions were subsequently cancelled in 2007 (Musa, 2008: 30).

India has also executed a number of turnkey and consultancy projects in Nigeria. For instance, the Metallurgical Consultancy (MECON), which is an Indian joint venture in Nigeria, has been involved in the Nigerian steel industry. MECON has trained personnel from the Delta Steel Complex and supervised the completion of the design bureau and operation of the complex (Badejo 1989, cited in Kura, 2009:24).

In addition, in 1997, an additional USD5 million in aid was provided to Nigeria by the Indian authorities in order to enhance the revitalisation of the Nigerian Machine Tools Industry. However, the implementation of the deal was delayed by disagreement between the Nigerian and Indian authorities. The Nigerian argument was that allowing India to monitor aid implementation through direct involvement of its machine tool industry would mean that India, could install obsolete technology that would only serve to further jeopardise Nigeria's quest for technological advancement, thereby increasing the dependence of the Nigerian economy on India. Ironically, the NMT was originally built by HMT in 1982. The position of Nigeria was that the grant be provided in cash to the Nigerian government who would then decide how the funds would be used in accordance with the needs of the Nigerian Machine Tools Factory. Interestingly, the Indian authorities insisted on providing the company with materials and expertise from the famous Indian Hindustan Tools Company to cover the USD5 million grant (Kura, 2009:22-23). The Indian position was that as the object of the aid was to help the technological development of Nigeria, so New Delhi should monitor its implementation through the involvement of its popular tools company. Given the propensity of the Nigerian ruling class for siphoning public funds it will not be far-fetched to assume that part of the underlying motives of the Nigerian officials is to sit atop the disbursement of the USD5 million grant in order to corner a sizeable percentage of the grant for their personal benefit.

Indo-Nigerian Economic Relations: South-South Mutual Partnership or Asymmetric Economic Relations?

Shortly after the Bandung conference of 1955 where India endorsed the principle of economic cooperation among newly independent nations, Indian industrial missions with explicit government backing fanned out over Africa and Asia in pursuit of new markets and investment opportunities (Encarnation, 1982: 56-57). The 1980s witnessed the active encouragements given to Indian firms by the Indian government to invest overseas and to export Indian goods for use in those countries (Aggarwal and Weekly, 1982: 20 & 24). India's determination to reduce its dependence on export of primary products and become a major exporter of industrial goods was significantly

achieved in the 1990s. It is also fact that India's aid policy, like that of many other countries, is driven not by pure altruism but, above all, by the domestic and international political and economic benefits that accrue from it (Singh, 2007:6).

Against this backdrop, the fundamental questions that should bother our minds with respect to Indian foreign aid to Nigeria are: What are the motivations behind Indian aid? Are these motivations fundamentally different from those of other states with aid programmes? Dutt (1980: 676) opines that the models which have been presented for big power aid - the US, China and the former Soviet Union - with differences in scale seem to fit closest the Indian aid model. Thus, Indian foreign aid does not differ radically from other 'big-power' aid programmes in motives or goals. India's aid to Nigeria fits perfectly into the schema that sees aid as a means of advancing the donor state's private economic interests. This view sees aid in alliance with private trade for the opening of new markets and tying the recipient to the donor state's economy. However, while the economic motive is important, in many cases Indian strategic and political motives are also often tied to its economic aspirations (Dutt, 1980:676).

India has often used high sounding words to describe its aid programme in Nigeria but this cannot obscure the fact that Indian aid, like others, is based on selfish and enlightened self-interest. For instance, the ITEC programme from which Nigeria has greatly benefitted has been described as '… basically a programme to highlight the enlightened self-interest of India in its economic relationships with developing countries' (Dutt, 1980:676). The activities of Indian multinational corporations have also spurred the government to link its diplomacy more explicitly to its economic requirements. Much of the current economic assistance and aids offered by India is linked to purchases of Indian goods and services.

For instance, the $27.5 contract awarded to Petron Engineering Construction Limited, Mumbai, for the erection of two cement plants for the Dangote Group in Northern Nigeria would involve the deployment of about 2000 workers from India. Again, the $8 million

contract awarded to Ayoki Fabricon Limited, Pune, for the upgrading of a sugar mill in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria would involve the deployment of 600 workers from India. Again, many Indian expatriates in Nigeria hold offices that are meant for Nigerians. According to Danjuma, (2008:111), several products imported into Nigeria from India are of far less quality than goods made for consumption in India. Some Indian producers also connive with some unscrupulous Nigerians to import or produce sub-standard and fake products. Other issues raised by the author include, deliberate refusal by Indian expatriates to transfer their technical know-how to their Nigerian assistants, casualisation and underpayment of Nigerians working in Indian firms, financial fraud and economic sabotage on the part of major Indian businessmen operating in Nigeria. No wonder, the *Financial Standard* observes that "Indo-Nigerian bilateral trade is warped" and that India should redress the imbalance by "transfer of technology in the key areas of knowledge economy and biotechnology" (cited in Vasudevan, 2007). Unless this skewed arrangement is addressed tensions may be exacerbated by the flooding of Nigerian markets by cheap Indian goods, with a consequent effect on weak domestic manufacturing bases, and by the presence of a large number of Indian workers in Nigeria (Singh, 2007:13).

Eze (2008: x) reveals that some Indians operating in Nigeria were caught engaging in money laundering and other unlawful business practices. The unpalatable revelations concerning the handling of the Ajaokuta Steel Company by Global Infrastructural Holdings Limited and the accusation of asset-stripping is most unfortunate and it illustrates the commitment of India to the sustenance of the current skewed economic relations between the two countries. Again, whereas Nigeria has opened its doors to Indian investors and goods and has granted Indian firms several concessions, India continues to put in place stringent business conditions for intending Nigerian investors. Thus little or no Nigerian business exists in India.

Generally, the Nigerian civil populace has been suspicious of the genuine intentions of the Indian oil companies operating in Nigeria. Many believe that the Asians were only interested in the blocks and that

their linked promises were hollow. The financial details for the 'oil-for-infrastructure' deal were also not favourable to Nigeria. India's proposals, for instance, were to be funded by direct investment and the projects undertaken on a build, operate, manage and ownership basis. The most worrisome aspect of the Indian approach was that the projects would not start until the oil blocks were in production, and this could take between 3–5 years of prospecting (Wong, 2008:21-27).

Notwithstanding the fact that since 1991 the balance of trade between the two countries has been in favour of Nigeria, due to the volume of crude oil imported from Nigeria, Indian economic activities in Nigeria have exemplified what might be termed an unequal relationship in which India has an edge over Nigeria. Agbu (2008:34) convincingly argues that developing countries rely mainly on the export primary products to the developed world in exchange for manufactured goods and that such a trade pattern is not in the long term interest of developing countries. Curiously, the pattern of Indo-Nigerian trade is also characterised by the export of Nigerian crude oil and agricultural raw-materials in exchange for Indian manufactured goods. The big question, therefore, is: To what extent has the much touted south-south cooperation engendered mutual development? According to Agbu (2008:45) although India and Nigeria:

> … should ideally conduct their trade under the aegis of South-South cooperation, the structure and pattern of this trade could easily be mistaken for that between a country of the North and that of the South. The reason lay in the fact that Nigeria's imports from India consist mainly of manufactured industrial goods, consumer products and pharmaceutical products, while its exports are basically agricultural products and crude oil.

He concludes that Nigeria is yet to benefit significantly from the long years of relations with India in the important areas of science and technology development. Thus, in spite of Agbu's fascination for South-South cooperation, the author laments the fact that the pattern of Indo-Nigerian trade reflects that of North-South trade.

There is no doubt that the current pattern of Nigeria's economic relations with India is inherently asymmetric and as such it is a threat to the sustainable economic development of Nigeria. Gasiorowski (1985: 332-341) argues that asymmetric interdependence is inherently a relationship of dominance rather than that of equality and that the trade interdependence of LDCs crude oil exporters such as Nigeria with NICs such as India is inherently asymmetric. Moreover, finance capital flows give creditors much less influence over debtors than do flows of direct investment or aid. Foreign aid generally gives the donor substantial influence over the recipient. Invariably, Nigeria's aid interdependence on India is also inherently asymmetric.

Conclusion

This paper focuses on India's relations with Nigeria. Specifically, it examines the economic framework that forms the core of this burgeoning relationship. More importantly, it considers the importance of Nigeria for India's energy needs and analyses other factors such as the need to reinvest surplus capital and the quest for markets for industrial goods. The study reveals that many scholars, analysts and commentators on Indo-Nigerian economic relations are fond of comparing and contrasting India's economic challenges in the 1960s with the position of Nigeria today. Indeed, comparisons between India's economic crisis of the 1960s and Nigeria's current socio-economic difficulties have become a commonplace in the current South-South development debate. India's success story is, therefore, often frequently cited as an example of a hopeless situation turned into a success that ought to be emulated by Nigeria. This study, however, supports the view of Zeleza (2008: 182) that Africa should be wary of turning itself into 'a developmental tabula rasa awaiting the inscription of models from abroad.' To him, Africa needs to develop its own models, its distinctive paths to development, carved out of its specific and complex histories, rather than the histories of others, however inspiring. In a well-written article, World Bank experts, Lele and Goldsmith (1989: 336) opines that Africa's future development will depend critically on scientific advances in agriculture adapted to African conditions.

Thus, what is important for Nigeria is not India's pursuit of self-interest, but the pursuit of Nigeria's own self-interest. History has shown that every country seeks to maximize its self-interest. Indian investors want high returns on their investment. Indian interest in Nigeria is not driven by south-south philanthropy but the need to make more profit. India, therefore, has its own its own conditionalities: patronage of Indian firms, procurement of Indian goods and services. Deployment of Indian labour where the employment of local labour could have assisted in easing Nigeria's worsening unemployment situation. The current nature of Indo-Nigerian economic relations or South-South cooperation in whatever guise cannot be the *sine qua non* for Nigeria's monumental developmental challenges. The major challenge for Nigeria is to turn the proceeds from its commodity trade with India into investments for economic diversification and sustainable development, and avoid frittering them away in conspicuous consumption and capital exports to Western banks. Economic history reveals that the only path towards economic development remains the development of a virile agricultural sector, rapid industrialisation and the diversification of the economy away from reliance on raw materials.

The activities of Indian companies in the strategic Nigerian steel sector between 2004 and 2007 speak volumes about the commitment, and indeed, the sincerity of India to the pursuit of technological transfer and South-South mutual partnership. The take-off and proper management of Nigeria's comatose steel infrastructure is fundamental to rapid industrialisation, but if Nigeria suddenly becomes industrialised that would automatically results in the loss of the Nigerian large market for Indian manufactured goods. It is, therefore, in the enlightened self-interest of India that Nigeria should continue to export primary products to India in exchange for industrial products. There is no doubt that India has the capacity to offer the kind of technology and services that is appropriate, adaptable and affordable for Nigeria. With a constellation of more than a dozen remote sensing and telecommunications satellites, India is a leader in remote sensing applications.

Currently, India ranks second worldwide in farm output, thus, agriculture plays a significant role in the overall socio-economic development of the country (Adenekan, 2010). India could offer its expertise in remote sensing and satellite technology for the attainment of sustainable agricultural production, environmental health, and the development of Nigeria's social infrastructure. India is also well-positioned help in reducing the menace of HIV/AIDS in Nigeria because of its widely recognised capabilities in developing low-cost retroviral drugs that have been approved by the World Health Organisation (Singh, 2007: 12). Ideally, India should invest in Nigeria's human capital and share Indian technological know-how to help diversify the Nigerian economy. In addition, it must strive to invest in Nigeria's inadequate and dilapidated social infrastructure. However, available evidence suggests that India is not primarily motivated by these altruistic goals and Nigerians should not be deceived that Indo-Nigerian economic relations will automatically translate into significant improvement in the well-being of Nigerians. The realities on ground in this age of globalisation and neoliberalism are very different from this utopian dream.

Appendix

Table 1: Articles involved in Indo-Nigerian Trade

India's main exports to Nigeria	Nigeria's main exports to India
pharmaceutical products	crude oil
mechanical / electrical equipment	metal scrap
rice and cereals	wood
automobiles, iron and steel	cashew nuts
plastic and paper products	cotton
textiles	gum arabic

Source: Singh, S.K. (2007) India and West Africa: A burgeoning relationship. Chatham House Briefing Paper. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, AFP/ASP/BP 07/01, April, 1-16 and Indian High Commission of India, Abuja (2008). Nigeria-Fact sheet and bilateral cooperation. Retrieved January 10, 2010 from http://www.indianhcabuja.com/Nigeria-Fact-Sheet.htm

Table 2: Value of India's Oil Imports from Nigeria, 1999 – 2004:

Year	Quantity (MMT)	Value (US $ million)
1999 – 2000	15.450	2597.7
2000 – 2001	12.570	2140.4
2001 – 2002	11.320	2001.9
2002 – 2003	11.578	2389.0
2003 – 2004	11.074	2393.0

Source: Indian High Commission of India, Abuja (2008). Nigeria-Fact sheet and bilateral cooperation. Retrieved January 10, 2010 from http://www.indianhcabuja.com/Nigeria-Fact-Sheet.htm

Table 3: Value of Nigeria's Import and Export Trade with India, 1969 – 1984 (N'000).

Year	Imports	Exports	Balance of trade
1969	3,532	40	–3,4 92
1970	6,064	30	–6,034
1971	13,614	24	–13,590
1972	10,870	114	–10,756
1973	11,466	122	–11,344
1974	12,132	92	–12,040
1975	23,790	1,290	–22,500
1976	36,037	63	–35,974
1977	33,423	36	–33,387
1978	43,447	10	–43,437
1979	24,731	363	–24,368
1980	N.A	N.A	N.A
1981	74,354	694	–72,660
1982	50,284	5,948	–44,336
1983	41,707	280	–41,427
1984	26,452	371	–26,081
Total	**411,903**	**9,441**	**–40,2462**

Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria, Annual Abstracts (Lagos: Federal of Office Statistics), 1958–1982 Editions. Cited in Kura, S.B. (2009). Nigeria-India economic, political and socio-cultural relations:

critical reflections for continuous mutual cooperation. International Journal of African Political Science, 1 (1), 28.

Table 4: List of Major Indo-Nigerian Joint Ventures in Nigeria

S/N	Name and Address of Joint Ventures	Field of Collaboration
1	Nigeria Engineering works, plot No. 49, Trans-Nigeria Industrial Layout, Port-Harcourt, Box 519, Nigeria	Light engineering goods
2	Pan African Consultancy Services (Nig.) Ltd., 22 Idowu Taylor, St. Victoria Island, Lagos	Consultancy services
3	Best & Crompton Engineering (Nig). Ltd., 4A Taslim Elias Close, Victoria Island, Ikoyi, Lagos	Execution of contract for transmission lines, substations and rural electrification.
4	Ranbaxy Montari (Nig) Ltd., P.O. Box 2526, Ikeja, Lagos	Manufacturing of drugs, pharmaceuticals and chemicals
5	Nigeria Abestos Industries Ltd., Alhaji Tafawa Balewa Road, Bauchi	Technical services and know-how
6	Nigeria Machine Tools Ltd., Osogbo	Machine tool complex with foundry and tools' room
7	Chellco industries Ltd. Plot A1 & F2, Kaduna Industrial area, Bye-Pass Road, P.O. Box 1847	Manufacturing of blankets and allied products
8	Prestige Assurance co (Nig) Ltd., 34 Balogun Square P.O. Box 650, Lagos	Insurance services
9	Indo-Nigerian Merchant Bank Ltd. 42 Adeola Hopewell Street, Victoria Island, P.M.B. 12656, Ikoyi, Lagos (Now part of Sterling Bank)	Merchant banking
10	Allind Nigeria Ltd. P.M.B. 0264, Bauchi	Manufacturing of cables and conductors
11	Telecommunication consultants Nig. Ltd., 108 Bode Road, Industrial Area, P.O. Box 2355	Consultancy services
12	Ballarpur Glass Nig. Ltd. Plot 4-8 Kaduna, Bye-Pass Road, Industrial Area P.O. Box 3030 Kaduna	Manufacturing of glass, bottles and containers

13	Hilltop Bottling Co. Ltd., 13 Rwang Pam Street, Jos	Manufacturing of glass, bottles and containers
14	MECON (Nig) NUJ Building ground floor, Adeyemo Alakija Street, Victoria Island, Ikoyi Lagos	Consultancy services

Source: Badejo A. B. (1989). Nigeria and India relations, 1960–1985: A study in south-south cooperation. In: Akinyemi, A.B. et al. (Eds.). Nigeria since independence: The first 25 years, Vol. X. Ibadan: Heinemann, 101–105. Cited in Kura, S.B. (2009). Nigeria-India economic, political and socio-cultural relations: critical reflections for continuous mutual cooperation. International Journal of African Political Science, 1 (1), 28.

References

Adenekan, S. Nigeria should learn agricultural financing from India. *The Punch*, Friday 01 January 2010.

Agboola, T. (2009) Government seeks India's assistance in revival of textile, sugar industries. *The Nation*, 12 February 2009

Agbu, O. (2008). Nigeria-India relations under south-south cooperation. Nigerian Journal of International Affairs. 34 (1), 32-51.

Aggarwal, R., and Weekly, J.K. (1982). Foreign operations of third world multinationals: A literature review and analysis of Indian companies. The Journal of Developing Areas, 17 (1), 13-30.

Akinrinade, S., and Ogen, O. (2008). Globalization and de-industrialization: South-south neo-liberalism and the collapse of the Nigerian textile industry" The Global South 2 (2), 159-170

Danjuma, N. (2008). Issues and challenges of Indian investments in the critical sectors of the Nigerian economy. Nigerian Journal of International Affairs. 34 (1), 105-113.

Dasgupta, B. (1977). World oil, development, and India. Social Scientist. 5, (6/7), 49-72.

Dutt, S. (1980). Indian aid to co-developing countries. Economic and Political Weekly, 15 (14), 672-678

Encarnation, D.J. (1982). The political economy of Indian joint industrial ventures abroad. International Organization, 36 (1), 31-59.

Eze, O.C. (2008). Forward: Nigeria-India relations in the 21st century. Nigerian Journal of International Affairs. 34 (1), 1-153.

Falola, T. (1978). Yoruba historiography: Need for socio-economic analysis. Department of History Seminar Papers, University of Ife, 1-14.

Fraeters, H. (2010). Innovating development: The South-South opportunity. Retrieved January 16, 2010, from http://south south.ning.com/profiles/blogs/innovating-development-the

Gasiorowski, M.J. (1985). The structure of third world economic interdependence. International Organization. 39 (2), 331-342.

Gopalkrishna, S. V. M. (2008). Indians in Nigeria: Socio-cultural contributions and impact. Nigerian Journal of International Affairs. 34 (1), 15-28.

Harshe, R. (2002). Recasting Indo-African development cooperation. Economic and Political Weekly, 37 (40), 4116-4120.

Hawley, J.C. (Ed). (2008). India in Africa, Africa in India: Indian Ocean cosmopolitanisms. Indiana: Indiana University Press.

Igwe, I. (2008). India's developmental patterns: What lessons for Nigeria? Nigerian Journal of International Affairs. 34 (1), 65-80.

Isa, A.A.M. (2008). Nigeria-India military relations: Issues and challenges. Nigerian Journal of International Affairs. 34 (1), 53-63.

Kura, S.B. (2009). Nigeria-India economic, political and socio-cultural relations: critical reflections for continuous mutual cooperation. International Journal of African Political Science, 1 (1), 1-31.

Lele, U., and Goldsmith, A.A. (1989). The development of national agricultural research capacity: India's experience with the Rockefeller foundation and its significance for Africa. Economic Development and Cultural Change. 37 (2), 305-343.

Lem, C. (2005). A broken mirror: How the similarities between India and Nigeria led to their differences. Associated Content. Retrieved January 09, 2010 from http://www.associated content.com/article/7867/a_broken_mirror_how_the_similarit ies.html?cat=37Magaji, S., and Adamu, A.M. (2008). Nigeria-India economic relationship since 1960. Nigerian Journal of International Affairs. 34 (1), 81-92.

Morgenthau, H. J. (1993), Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace. New York: Mcgraw Hill.

Musa, S. (2008). Background to Nigeria-India relations. Nigerian Journal of International Affairs. 34 (1), 29-32

Ochu, C. (2009). FG to get $100m Credit from India. *ThisDay*, 27 January 2009

Ogen, O.J. (2008a). Contemporary China-Nigeria economic relations: Chinese imperialism or South-South mutual partnership? *China aktuell-Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 3, 78-102.

Ogen, O.J. (2008b). The economic lifeline of British global empire: A reconsideration of the historical dynamics of the Suez canal, 1869-1956. *The Journal of International Social Research.* 1 (5), 523-533.

Ohia, P. (2008). Nigeria: At 50, its all gains for Indo-Nigerian relations. *ThisDay*, 15 October 2008.

Omokhunu, G. (2009). Indian Government offers $100m to Informal Sector. *The Nation*, 24 January 2009.

Salau, S. (2009). Govt may stop Indian firm from further oil exploration bid in Nigeria. *The Guardian*, 21 January 2009.

Singh, D.M. (1996). Indo-Nigerian economic relations. New Delhi: Kalinga Publications.

Singh, S.K. (2007) India and West Africa: A burgeoning relationship. Chatham House Briefing Paper. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, AFP/ASP/BP 07/01, April, 1-16.

Toyo, E. (1998). Economics as an aid to history. In: M.B. Abasiattai (Ed.), Expanding frontiers of African history: The interdisciplinary methodology, (pp.77-105). Calabar: University of Calabar Press.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2005). South-south cooperation in international investments arrangements. New York: United Nations.

United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (2008). South-south cooperation. Retrieved May 16, 2008, from http://www.unido.org/index.php?=877

Vasudevan, P. (2007). Indo-Nigerian ties: Strategic for energy security. Hindu Businessline. Retrieved October 30, 2008 from http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2007/11/08/|stories/2007110851090800.htm

Wong, L. (2009). Asian national oil companies in Nigeria. In: Vines, A., Wong, L., Weimer, M., and Campos. I (Eds.), Thirst for African Oil: Asian national oil companies in Nigeria and Angola (pp:1-28). London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Zeleza, P. T. (2008). Dancing with the dragon: Africa's courtship with China. Global South, 2 (2), 171-187.

Government Policies and Business Development in Nigeria Up To 2000AD

Michael M. Ogbeidi,
Department of History and Strategic Studies,
University of Lagos, Nigeria

Abstract

Regulating the economy in general and business entities in particular has been a feature of government-business relations in Nigeria since the colonial times. This paper thus examines policies put in place by the colonial and post-colonial government of Nigeria to regulate the activities of business organisations in the country. It discusses government policies and business development in Nigeria up to 1959 and from 1960 to 1985 as well as the adoption of the privatisation, commercialisation and deregulation policies by the government between 1986 and 2000. The paper concludes that government cannot shy away from its responsibility of regulating the business environment because such policies and legislations are of critical importance in determining the path and speed of economic development. Government, thus, must have a reasonable degree of authority over business entities.

Introduction

In every country of the world, businesses are conducted in a regulated environment. Government initiates policies, institutes agencies and promulgates laws, which regulate the business environment and the conduct of business within its domain. Even in the period before the coming of the Europeans into the area now designated Nigeria, businesses were conducted in a regulated environment because there were rules and regulations that guided production, trading, and commercial activities as well as labour relations among the various peoples and communities. Local chiefs initiated policies and programmes that moderated economic relations

within their territories as well as other control mechanisms that protected local industries and facilitated the development of agricultural and industrial production.

The Nigerian government since assumption of responsibility for governance at independence has initiated different policies and programmes of economic development at different times, which shaped and conditioned activities in the business sector in line with its plans and in the overall interest of the economy. Governments undertake to regulate all activities that directly or indirectly affect the performance of the economy in order to ensure a super enabling environment for growth and development. Since policies are established course of action or rule of practice and procedure that must be followed, the activities, decisions and organisation of businesses within the country are in so many ways influenced by the implementation of these public policies and institutions of government that implement them. Indeed and significantly, the social, economic and political environments created by these policies have been either conducive or otherwise for investment and business development in Nigeria.

The business sector represents a very important aspect of the economy. This is because it shares tremendously in the responsibility and decisions involving the allocation of scarce resource, the methods by which those resources are turned into goods and services and the way in which the rewards from production are distributed.[1] But in a mixed economy, like Nigeria, where a combination of market forces with government intervention and control allocate the scarce resources, government policies and economic programme bear directly on the business environment with serious consequences for business development.

It is against this background that this paper seeks to discuss the measures introduced by government in Nigeria to regulate business and the effects of these policies on business development on the Nigerian business environment before and after independence, examining the successes and failures of some of the major policies

that have come to shape the business sector in Nigeria. It must be noted that government is duty bound to discharge its responsibilities to individual and corporate citizens.

Government Policies and Business Development in Nigeria Up To 1959

A detailed study and analysis of the history of the Nigerian area during the pre-colonial period revealed that the people were actively engaged in business activities and evolved a well-developed social system and vibrant economy based on a thriving business sector. Trade particularly was a principal factor in the rise and fall of such great cultures as the Sokoto Caliphate, Kanem Borno, Ife, Nok and Benin Kingdoms. Trade encouraged the production of surplus values,[2] which in turn led to the development of markets and mutual trade relations among the various groups that inhabited the Nigerian area. The peoples of the south had particularly been long engaged in trade along the coast of the Atlantic and had the first contact[3] with European merchants.

A network of inland and coastal routes was created which further facilitated business interactions. The most striking significance of the business environment at that period was that the road and water routes linking the hinterland and coast that facilitated trade was in place before the advent of the Europeans.[3] Through these routes, local and foreign articles of trade were carried to where they were needed. Traders and hired porters or slave carriers moved in caravans. Rulers of kingdoms and neighbouring communities had working arrangements to guarantee the safety of caravans and their goods as well as ensure an enabling business environment for the safe conduct of businesses.

An examination of policies initiated to maintaining an enabling environment for trade and other economic activities at this period, showed that rulers and local chiefs imposed tolls on traders who passed through or conducted businesses within their territories as well as taxes on local producers. Policies that encouraged fair play and local industrial and agricultural production were equally

initiated. Although pre-colonial governmental policies were somewhat demanding, they were nevertheless not detrimental to the conduct of business.

However, following the coming of the Europeans into the scene and the subsequent colonisation of the area, business relations took a different dimension. Historically, the period 1884 to 1960 is generally regarded as the colonial era in Africa. During this period, the primary fact of African life was the political and military dominance of Africa by colonial governments.[4] Prior to this period, European contact with Africans had been through explorers, traders and missionaries. Thus, the change in the attitude of the Europeans towards Africa led to the scramble and partition of Africa into spheres of influence by the colonial powers. Consequently, direct imperial administration was imposed on the African continent. This hugely affected the existing business environment in the various African territories.

By 1851, the British had already made their presence felt more significantly in Nigeria with the bombardment of Lagos Island and a decade later, as a pretext to total colonisation, a Crown Colony Administration was imposed on it, and trade relations in the area became regulated by the policies of the Crown Colony Government. Also in the Niger Delta region, the expedition led by Dr William Balfour Baikie in 1854 opened up the interior of the territories along the River Niger. The expedition was followed by increased volume of trade between the British merchants and natives of the region.

At the initial stage, commercial relations were mutual. Business transactions were carried out by barter system due to the absence of a common currency, and because trade relations were based on mutual arrangements between the Europeans and the natives. Also, it is important to mention here that other forms of cooperation existed between the Europeans and the native traders. For instance, in 1854, Dr. Baikie described a court of commerce, which was also a commercial or mercantile association organised by some of the merchants at Bonny, arguing that it consisted of the principal white

and black traders in the place and the chair occupied by the white supercargoes in monthly rotation. All disputes were brought before this court and with the consent of the king, fines were levied on defaulters. If anyone refuses to submit to the ruling of the court, or ignores its jurisdiction, he is tabooed and no one trades with him. The natives stand in much awe of it and readily paid their debt when threatened with it.[5] The arrangement was largely successful and enabled an environment conducive for the conduct of business, until the European traders began to display greed in their dealings with the native traders and it became clear that the European merchants were only agents and forerunners of colonialism.

With such friendliness and mutual understanding that characterised business relations between the European merchants and the natives, British traders made unprecedented profits, which encouraged them to press for permanent business relations. A surprising contradiction was, however, woven into the relations with the introduction of British forces along the coasts, especially in areas like Lagos, Asaba and Calabar. The presence of the military assisted the British merchants to obtain goods more easily with limited bargaining power.[6] This, thus tilted the balance of what was hitherto a level playing ground more to the advantage of the British merchants.

This changed pattern of business described above on the banks of the Niger created confusion and changed the character of the business environment with the emergence of different opposing policies, which stifle business development. Expectedly, the natives responded with much resentment to the development. Consequently, the communities on the banks of the Niger, especially, Asaba, which by 1878 was the commercial nerve centre of the British trading outlet across the Niger, imposed commercial embargoes against British merchants to protest the changed pattern of business relations. However, by 1879 some effective measures to protect British business interests in the Niger had been taken. First, all the British interests on the Niger were merged into the United African Company. Other measures included military bombardments and

unequal treaties, which brought the entire region under the exclusive control of the British Government.

On June 5, 1885, the British government declared a protectorate over the Lower Niger. However, prior to this event, Lagos Island was annexed in 1861 and the rest of Yorubaland gradually fell under British control. This trend continued into the early part of the 20th century. For instance, the British Imperial Army conquered the Aro's after three months of fierce fighting. The campaign continued until 1910 when the whole of the old Eastern Nigeria came under the imperial authority of Britain at about the same time Northern Nigeria also came under total control of the Royal Niger Company.

By the terms of the Treaty of Berlin of 1884, freedom of Navigation on the River Niger and the connected rivers was recognised and guaranteed. Thus, on the establishment of the British protectorate over the Lower Niger, the Consul introduced the policy of free trade or *laissez faire* as in visiting the interior markets.[7] *Laissez faire* as a trade policy though seemed good, because it allowed for unfettered access to the markets but its introduction to trade relations at this point was a strategy to allow European merchants easy penetration of the interior markets at the expense of the native traders. Seeing how this threatened their position, some of the prominent commercial princes of the Niger, such as Jaja of Opobo, Nana Olomu of Itsekiri and Dappa Pepple of Bonny among others offered strong resistance against the policy by forbidding the people of the Upper Niger from trading with the whites. Furthermore, in protest against the unfavourable trade policies of the British Consul, the natives made several attempts to hold up trade with the interior markets in 1889, as booms were placed across creeks and other waterways to stop boats carrying European merchants.[8]

But prior to this, it will be recalled that although the British Government had on June 15, 1885 declared a protectorate over the Lower Niger indicating Her Majesty,s imperial interest, the government was not keen at committing funds to run the administration of the area. Consequently, the National African

Company, a joint venture, led by Sir Taubman Goldie applied to the British Government for a Royal Charter, which would confer on it power; and administrative rights over the territories. The application, which was initially turned down, was eventually granted in July 1885 and under the name "The Royal Niger Company, Chartered and Limited", the company consequently became constituted as the government of the Niger territories. With this development, the entire business environment of the Niger came under the exclusive control of the Royal Niger Company.

Unlike the Consulate Government, the Royal Niger Company imposed stringent trade policies on the territories. Indeed, it will not be wrong to argue that the Royal Charter granted it a sort of unlimited license to do as it pleased. This argument can be collaborated with the fact that the company embarked on the acquisition of land and properties of the natives without payment or compensation of any kind to their owners. Towns that rose in opposition against its policies were attacked and burnt down. Rents were not payable on lands which the company occupied and were then transferred to the British Government in 1900 on the revocation of the Charter and takeover of administration.[9] Furthermore, the company imposed heavy tax and stringent custom regulations on the territories under her control, some of which were excluded from their 'former' market such as the Brass people, a situation that degenerated into the Akassa Outrage of January 29, 1895. Indeed, while keeping strictly within the letter of the Charter and its legal rights, it established a practical monopoly, which infringed on the spirit of free trade, which it claimed to pursue.[10]

Following, the Anglo-French agreement of 1898 the British Government decided to take over direct administration of the territories. Consequently, the Royal Charter granted to the company was revoked on January 1, 1900 paving the way for the direct administration of the territories by the British Colonial authority using the indirect rule system. By 1906, the merger of the Crown Colony of Lagos and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria was completed, and in 1914, the amalgamation of the Protectorates of

Northern and Southern Nigeria was accomplished bringing the entire country under a single administration under a Governor-General.

Like the Royal Niger Company's administration, the Colonial administration never encouraged fair play and equity in business relations with Nigerians. As a matter of fact, colonial business policies were geared towards promoting the economic interest of the Home State. Colonial business policies were anchored on establishing markets for the finished goods of home industries as well as feeding them with the resources harnessed from Nigeria rather than develop entrepreneurship or establish industries in the regions. There was a deliberate policy to destroy the indigenous economy as a strategy to protect the interest of the trading enterprises.

An appraisal of the Nigerian business environment under colonial rule showed that there was an absence of policies and provisions for protection of properties and resources of Nigerians. Nigerians, thus, were left vulnerable in an environment controlled by the whims and caprices of the trading companies. The colonial authorities appropriated and expropriated the properties and natural resources of the natives and paid little or no attention to payment of compensation. At this point, there is no gainsaying that the business and economic policies of the Colonial government resulted in the massive exploitation of the abundant natural resources of Nigeria, exclusion of Nigerians from capital investments and neglect of development of potential natural resources and investment climate.

Records and evidences are abound that until independence was achieved, Nigerians were not parties to capital investments and large concerns, such as commercial firms, banking, shipping, and industries.[11] Only a small number of industries existed, most of which processed agricultural goods for domestic and export markets. Though foreign investments were limited, the little available was channelled into agricultural production and mining, which were the primary focus of colonial business and economic policies.

The institutional obstacles inherent in the colonial economic structure also greatly hampered the development of entrepreneurship as it made it impossible for Nigerians to be the first source of initiative on Nigeria's economic problems; instead, they became absorbed into an economic system in which they became mere agents of European economic institutions. In commerce, Falola observed that commercial monopoly by Europe relegated the Nigerian merchant class to a position of disadvantage and were replaced by Europeans and Lebanese agents.[12] The large business concerns and trading companies exerted strong influence on the policies that shaped the business environment. These trading companies, such as the United African Company and other colonial trading enterprises, which dominated the economy deliberately, rejected industrialisation in Nigeria for the primary motive of protecting their trading interests.[13] This unfavourable economic situation and other social and political events inevitably culminated in the demand for independence by Nigerian nationalists, which was achieved on 1st October, 1960.

Government Policies and Business Development in Nigeria, 1960 – 1985

At independence, the Nigerian economy had become wholly capitalistic, focused and hinged on commerce with the trading companies that dominated and shaped the colonial economy still very much in advantageous position to influence policy and the economy. The new independent government that replaced the colonial authority inherited an economic structure which had been designed to benefit Europe, some infrastructures to facilitate this objective and a few people to sustain it.[14] This inheritance imposed a certain rigidity on the course of future development as it robbed the new government the freedom to fabricate its own kind of economy from the start. The entrepreneurs and the few large trading enterprises dominated virtually all the sectors of the economy and controlled the business environment.

Since the economy bequeathed to Nigeria at independence was primarily a raw material producing one characterised by low degree

of industrialisation, the promotion of agricultural export crops and importation of finished goods from Europe, Government's business policy at independence was focussed on the promotion of foreign direct investment particularly in view of the abundant natural resources in Nigeria, without encouraging the development of local entrepreneurship which became a primary policy focus of government since the 1970s when government began the indigenisation programme.

The drive towards refocusing and strengthening the economy to achieve economic growth however culminated in what came to be known as the National Development Plans. A Development Plan is a government policy document that embodies future action targets and strategies to achieve accelerated and sustainable development in the nation's economy. The plans are essentially policies that reflect the short, medium and long-term goals of a government's strategy at developing all facets of its economy.[15]

The First National Development Plan (1962 – 1968) was planned based on the philosophy of an open private economy (capitalism) to encourage private enterprise and foreign investment in the economy. The Nigerian Government under the 1962 - 1968 plan adopted a policy of private sector business expansion as well as measures to ensure greater private investments in the diversification of the economy and expansion of industries.[16] Foreign private investors were given equal access to all incentives which were given to their Nigerian counterparts except that full Nigerian participation in the ownership, direction, and management of foreign investments was emphasised. This was to enable Nigerians to acquire the necessary experience in managing businesses.

There was to be no nationalisation of property held by foreigners, inflationary tendencies were to be resisted and foreign companies would be permitted to repatriate earnings with relatively few formalities. Protective import duties were levied to encourage industrialisation and the formation of large-scale companies by

Nigerians. An important fact about this Development Plan was that it placed foreign enterprises in strategic sectors of the economy.

Akeredolu-Olu observed that "by 1968, beginning from the promulgation of the Companies Decree, the government had started to adopt a less subservient attitude towards an orthodox principle of the free enterprise economy."[17] The Companies Act of 1968 was enacted to replace the Companies Ordinance of 1922 and for incorporation of companies in Nigeria and incidental matters. Prior to the enactment of the Companies Act, a major legislation that regulated business enterprises was the Industrial Development (Income Tax Relief) Ordinance of 1958, which remained in force even at the attainment of independence in 1960. It provided income tax relief for companies incorporated in Nigeria and classified as 'pioneer industries' as well as exemption of profits of 'pioneer companies' from income tax. Much other legislation was promulgated to regulate the business sector and other sectors of the economy under the period covered by the Development Plan.

The political crises that culminated in a civil war that lasted from July 1967 to January 1970 significantly hampered business development in Nigeria. The flow of foreign investments into the economy was affected. For instance, only ten foreign companies were incorporated in 1968, while none was incorporated in states located in the war areas.[18] At the end of the war in 1970, a well-articulated plan to further strengthen the economy was initiated; this was evidenced in the Second National Development Plan (1970 – 1974). As the document clearly pointed out "experience has shown throughout history that political independence without economic independence is but an empty shell".[19] The policy therefore emphasised the enforcement of rapid and meaningful 'Nigerianisation' of the employment force of foreign businesses in Nigeria and Government acquisition of equity shares in a number of strategic industries for the benefit of Nigerians.

Also, It prohibited indiscriminate nationalisation of existing or future enterprises in the country and in cases where nationalisation

is deemed appropriate compensation arrangements were to be made in line with internationally accepted norms of equity and fairplay.[20] Consequently, to give the policy the force of law, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 1972 commonly referred to as the Indigenisation Decree was promulgated on 7th February, 1972.

Between 1972 and 1984, the Nigerian Government vigorously implemented the indigenisation programme. The Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree which gave the policy the force of law was modified twice, first in 1977 and later in 1989 in order to ensure full realisation of local control of enterprises and protection of national interests. Indigenisation is an economic measure usually designed to wrest the ownership, control or domination of local industry from foreigners.[21] The indigenisation policy is not peculiar to Nigeria so also is its objective which is to complement political independence with economic independence as obtainable elsewhere in the world. The Second National Development Plan therefore afforded Nigerian investors vast investment opportunities while foreign investors had the indigenisation policy to contend with.

The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and Business Development in Nigeria 1986 – 1993

The oil boom of the seventies that brought about an unprecedented surge in revenue for the nation came to an abrupt end in the early 1980s. Most developing countries like Nigeria felt the effects of the slump in the international petroleum market. Export volumes declined precipitously in response to diversified global supplies, moderated demand and more stringent OPEC quotas. The international debt crisis, which accompanied the development coupled with the global economic recession dictated to most African countries to adopt a structural adjustment programme,[22] as a measure to address the fundamental problem of the economy which had become largely reliant on oil, and to diversify the export and industrial bases of the economy. The Nigerian government adopted the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in June 1986. The government adopted the policy as a strategy to alter and realign aggregate domestic expenditure and production pattern to

minimise dependence on import, enhance the non-oil export base and bring the economy back on the path of steady and balanced growth.[23]

The major features of the structural adjustment programme were to, first, reduce the role of the state and increase reliance on market forces; second, increase import liberalisation and easier access to the foreign exchange market; and devaluate the currency to encourage domestic production and reduce reliance on imports. Other features included privatisation of many of the public enterprises, deregulation of the financial systems and liberalised policies on foreign investments.

By design, the structural adjustment programme was to correct the imbalance evident in the economy and the inequalities in the distribution of national wealth by placing a high premium on private initiatives in key areas such as agriculture, industrial production and price adjustment.[24] Import licences were issued to industries based on specific priority areas mentioned earlier, a ban was placed on importation of all agricultural products while the distribution of major non-oil export commodities was liberalised and the colonial marketing board system was abolished.

However, the poor implementation of the programme objectives, which resulted in its failure and the consequent collapse of the economic foundation of the nation adversely, affected the business environment. The harsh effects of the structural adjustment policies and its implementation strategy inflicted serious strain on businesses and industries. Investment and entrepreneurship suffered as several small and large scale enterprises were stifled out of existence; capacity utilization among manufacturers dropped sharply, while the unit cost of production rose dramatically. The dismal failure of the structural adjustment programme and the high degree of corruption in the management of the economy among other factors left the Nigerian business environment less desirable for profitable investment.

Privatisation, Commercialisation and Deregulation

The Nigerian Government announced its privatisation policy in 1986 but it was not given the force of law until July 5, 1988 when the Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree was promulgated. The objective of the policy was the divesture of government holdings in non-strategic enterprises. By definition, privatisation , as contained in the Privatisation and Commercialisation Act, "…is the relinquishment of part or all of the equity and other interests held by the Federal Government or its agency in enterprises whether wholly or partly owned by the Federal Government".[25]

Commercialisation according to the same Act, can be defined as "…the reorganisation of enterprises wholly or partly owned by the Federal Government in which such commercialised enterprises shall operate as profit commercial ventures and without subventions from the Federal Government."[26] Globally, the economic benefits of privatisation have been identified to include improving enterprise efficiency and performance, developing competitive industry, accessing the capital know-how and markets which permit growth, effective corporate governance and getting the best possible price for the sale.[27]

Privatisation in Nigeria started as a mere export expansion and liberalization programme. The policy constituted a deviation from the import substitution strategy hitherto maintained. Angela Nwaneri observed that under the privatisation and commercialisation policy of the Federal Government effort was devoted to increased export of manufactured goods.[28] To this end, government readjusted its regulatory environment, introduced Export Free Zones, (EFZ) liberalised access to foreign exchange to attract foreign investors, and introduced a market-determined exchange rate for the currency. Financial incentives through fiscal policies were equally guaranteed to induce domestic manufacturers to increase production in the agricultural sector.

The implementation of the privatisation and commercialisation policy of the Federal Government continued until 1995 when the

first phase of the programme was suspended. A new Decree, The Public Enterprises (Privatisation and Commercialisation) Decree, was promulgated in December 1998 to set the second phase of the programme rolling. The Bureau of Public Enterprise (BPE) under the supervision of the National Council on Privatisation in 1999 commenced a three-phased second privatisation programme with the similar objective of divesture of government holdings in both competitive and non-competitive sectors of the economy.

The deregulation policy of the Federal Government like the privatisation and commercialisation programme opened up the Nigerian business environment to investment and created an investment climate that supports open private enterprise. Deregulation is the process by which government removes restrictions on businesses in order to encourage the efficient operation of markets. The policy was hinged on the rationale that fewer restrictions[29] on enterprises in the competitive sector of the economy will raise the level of competitiveness, ensure higher productivity, more efficiency and lower prices. In practice however, the deregulation programme though has improved market operation efficiency and stimulated competition in the business and industrial sector, its expected effect on price is yet to be effective. The deregulation of the downstream oil sector has led to the emergence of new operators and competitive pricing for petroleum products across the nation. The deregulation of the information and the communication sectors have equally stimulated entrepreneurship with the establishment of many broadcasting firms, print media and communication companies.

By and large, the privatisation, commercialisation and deregulation policy of the Federal Government has positively impacted on the business and industrial environment. It has led to the establishment of free market operations, fostered market operation efficiency, and capitalistic competition. It also encouraged more foreign investments and entrepreneurship. Thus, it will not be out of place to argue that the investment climate created by the policies can only tend business development upwards.

Conclusion

This paper has considered how the Nigerian business environment developed overtime and the impact of government policies and legislations on business development at the different stages of the nation's history. What is noteworthy, however, is that most of the legislations and policies that had come to shape the Nigerian business environment emerged as a response to the pressing national political and economic needs of the different periods, some of which were designed to meet miscalculated situations and therefore failed dismally only to prop up the need for new policies to meet the need of the present. Policy failure due to poor implementation or wrongly prescribed strategy has largely retarded business development in Nigeria. The failure of SAP[30] and the consequent collapse of the economy inevitably resulted in the harsh economic situation that stifled many small and large-scale businesses out of existence. Therefore, since government policies and legislations are of critical importance in determining both the path and speed of economic and business development, economic planners and policy makers must be more conscious and thoughtful in policy formulation and the strategies for implementation of such policies.

Endnotes

1   Mathew Glew *et al*, *Business Organisation and its Environment,* Book II (Heinemann Educational Books, 1979), 19.

2   Surplus Value refers to the production of goods over and above the immediate subsistence need of the producer.

3   Ngozi Ezeigwe-Fakeye, "The Nigerian Economy and Society Since the Pre-Colonial Period" in *History and Cultures of Nigeria Up to AD 2000* edited by Akinjide Osuntokun, David Aworawo and Florence Masajuwa (Lagos: Frankard Publishers, 2002), 364.

4   Igwe J. U. K., *Business – Government Relations in Nigeria 1854 – 2003: Policies, Laws and Institutional Frameworks* (Lagos: Law Development Research, Publications and Consultancy Limited, 2000), 23.

5   Alan Burns, *History of Nigeria* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1929), 141.

6   Igwe, *Business – Government Relations ...* 24.

7   Alan Burns, *History…* 153.

8   Ibid., 156.

9   Igwe, *Business – Government Relations ...*30.

10 Burns, *History…,* 170.

11 Igwe, *Business – Government Relations...,* 33.

12 Toyin Falola, *et al*, *History of Nigeria: Nigeria in the Twentieth Century,* vol. 3 (Lagos: Longman, 1991), 39.

13 For details see Gertzel C. "Relations between african and European Traders in the Niger-Delta, 1880 -1889" in *Journal of African History*, Vol. 3, No.2 (1962).

14 For details see Michael Crowder, *The Story of Nigeria*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1978).

15 Ngozi, *The Nigerian Economy…,* 372.

16 Igwe, *Business – Government Relations…,* 106.

17 Akeredolu-Olu, E. O. "Private Foreign Investment and the Underdevelopment of the Indigenous Entrepreneurship in Nigeria", in *Nigeria: Economy and Society* edited by Gavin Williams (London: Rex Collins Ltd., 1976), 112.

18 Maurice N. Andem, *International Economic Co-operation in Developing Countries* in *Business – Government Relations…,* 111.

19 Federal Republic of Nigeria, *Second Development Plan,* 1970 – 1974, 289.

20 Ibid.

21 Igwe, *Business – Government Relations…,* 113.

22 Ibid., 141.

23 Ibid.

24 Falola, *et al*, *History…,* 189.

25 Decree number 25 of 1988.

26 Ibid.

27 Igwe, *Business – Government Relations…,* 266.

28 Angela N. Nwaneri (ed.), *Nigeria: Vision for the Future* (Lagos: McMillan Nig. Publishers Ltd, 1998) 13.

29 In business and economics, a restriction is a type of boundary or regulation placed on the trade of certain goods or services.

30 For a detailed reading on the Structural Adjustment Programme see Eskor Toyo, *Economics of Structural Adjustment: A Study of the Prelude to Globalisation* (Lagos: First Academic Publishers, 2002).

A Comparative Analysis of the Use of Multi-Track Diplomacy in the Management of the Touareg and Casamance Conflicts, 1960 – 2007

Irene N. Osemeka
Department of History and Strategic Studies,
University of Lagos, Nigeria

Abstract

The paper examines the utility of the multi-track approach in the resolution of the Touareg and Casamance rebellion in northern Mali and southern Senegal respectively. The multi-track approach encompasses various processes and approaches which involves the state (officials of governments) and non-state actors, including civil society organisations in peace processes. The intractability of the Touareg and Casamance conflicts has been partly attributed to the exclusion of civil society actors at the emergent stages of both conflicts. The paper argues that despite the growing desire for an increase in the participation of actors at the level of civil society in peace processes the experience in Mali and Senegal suggests that a multiple level of actors are required for effective conflict resolution considering the inadequacies associated with the various tracks.

Keywords: Touareg, Casamance, Peace Process, Track one Diplomacy, Track two Diplomacy, Multi-track Diplomacy, Civil Society

Introduction

There is a growing appreciation of the multi-track diplomatic approach in conflict resolution as it offers opportunities for the participation of actors at the level of civil society in peace processes which was the exclusive preserve of state actors. Besides, the participation of functional organisations that represent the civilian

population in the efforts to resolve conflicts, is necessary as civilians account for a high proportion of the dead and wounded, displaced persons and refugees from African conflicts.[1] Another study by the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool, noted that an estimated 8.5 million people have died in African conflicts since 1947 with the vast majority comprising of civilians.[2] In the first two decades of their outbreak, the Touareg and Casamance rebellions claimed between 6000 – 8000 and 3500 – 5000 deaths respectively with civilians accounting for a significant proportion of the injured and displaced population.[3] As such, the effective resolution of conflict requires solutions that move beyond military aspects of conflicts that traditionally fall within the purview of state actors and must include actors from the domain of civil society to ensure that broader societal issues which lie at the root of conflicts are addressed.

There are numerous works on the Touareg and Casamance rebellion and the authors covered various aspects of the conflicts and offered diverse reasons for their intractability. One of the submissions by Humphreys and Ag Mohammed in their comparative study of the Casamance and Touareg conflicts was that the amenability of the Malian state to external intervention contributed to the de-escalation phase of the Touareg rebellion particularly under Konare's administration. On the other hand, the Casamance peace process failed to attract external intervention partly because the Senegalese government (GOS) initially projected the conflict as a case of banditry, which was a ploy to maintain her image as a stable democracy to the international community.[4] This implies that the stance of the state is a determinant factor of the extent and promptness to which external intervention and civil society actors can develop the willingness to contribute to a peace process.

Vincent Foucher discussed the role of the Catholic Church in Casamance separatism and highlighted their contributions to the peace process. He noted that the Catholic Church mediated between the GOS and MFDC at various times. One of such efforts resulted in the signing of the 1993 Peace Agreement. The effort of the Catholic Church was significant in view of the fact that the conflict had lasted for about a decade indicating the difficulty of bringing the parties to

the negotiating table.[5] Kouga and Ecawel, x-rayed efforts by the various actors to resolve the Touareg revolt in Mali and stressed that the responsiveness of the Konare administration advanced the peace process positively. Konare's handling of the Touareg rebellion shows that the quality of leadership of those who preside over a peace process can either minimize or amplify the advantages associated with state or track one diplomatic actors in a peace process.[6] In a related study, Clarke examined the contributions of civil society actors in the Casamance peace process and acknowledged that micro, meso and national level NGOs and organisations have their advantages and disadvantages which makes their collaboration necessary to balance their strengths and weaknesses.[7]

Yacouba Kone asserted that one of the reasons for the continued restiveness in northern Mali was that the democracy which began with Mali's Arab Spring of 1991, failed to work for the poor. The poor still lack equitable access to productive assets while land grabbing by those close to high ranking government officials continued to alienate farmers and pastoralists alike.[8] In other words, participants involved in peace processes must aim at identifying what needs to be changed about a conflict and how the changes can be effected in order to improve conditions in the affected communities.

While the paper benefits from the works sited, it examines the interaction between official and unofficial actors in both peace processes. The paper pays attention to the role of state actors, the extent of their collaboration with non-state actors and the effectiveness of a multi-track approach in resolving the Touareg and Casamance peace process

Definition and Conceptual Analysis

Peace processes refer to all efforts that are put in place to terminate hostilities between warring parties. Such efforts may take the form of preventive actions to ensure that parties do not resort to violence as a means of resolving their conflicts. However, peace processes are more observable when conflicts have assumed a violent dimension as most conflicts fail to attract the required attention at their emergent stages.

The conflict in Casamance was popularised when the warring parties became entangled in the Guinea Bissau war of 1998 while the Touareg rebellion gained global attention in the 1990s and more recently in the 2012 episode which involves terrorist Islamist groups such as, Al Qaeda in the Magbrib (AQIM) and the Ansar Edine.[9]

According to David Zuern, Civil society encompasses a broad range of human associations with various interests and objectives. Such associations include non-governmental organisations (NGOs) indigenous associations, women groups, youth associations, charities, and professional bodies. Civil society organisations often act as balancers of state power particularly in the course of resolving conflicts, which is traditionally dominated by the state.[10] Thomas Imobighe linked the importance of civil society to conflict resolution when he stated that "it is the means by which the citizenry influence the state, engage in activities to change or reform the states policies and seek or demand greater responsibility and accountability."[11]

The different tracks of diplomatic approach gained popularity from the 1980's when John Montville, a psychodynamics expert and a former US diplomat, coined the terms, track one and two diplomacy. Susan Nan described track one diplomacy as the efforts by representatives of the state or state-like authority and involves interaction with other states or state-like authorities and the aim is to influence structures of political power. Such representatives include high ranking government diplomats, heads of states, state department or ministry of foreign affairs and other departments or ministries.[12] Montville defined track two diplomacy 'as an unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop strategies, influence public opinion and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict."[12] Unlike track one actors, track two actors are from outside the formal government structure but also have direct contact with state officials. Multi track diplomacy is accredited to John McDonald and Louise Diamond and in practice; it is a systems approach to conflict resolution since it encompasses all other tracks.[13] Multi track actors include individuals or organisations, professional bodies, business concerns, religious leaders, Non-governmental organizations, media,

conflict resolution practitioners exchange programs in education and advocacy workers.

Each of the tracks that make up the multi-track diplomacy has attracted various criticisms, which makes it imperative to use the various tracks in concert in the prevention and resolution of conflicts. Track one diplomacy remains vital even in the handling of contemporary conflicts, which features a complex chain of actors including state actors, private military organisations and civilians. Firstly, conflicts of various dimensions including violent conflicts such as those of in northern Mali and Casamance occur within territories that are under the control of specific governments so that their management necessarily involves state actors. The involvement of the state in a peace process confers legitimacy on the process and tends to attract the attention of regional and international actors. This is more so in intra-state conflicts with regional dimensions such as the Touareg and Casamance conflicts. Algeria and Guinea Bissau have been compelled to play crucial roles in both peace processes because of the trans-border activities of rebels, which have remained a source of instability in their respective territories. Furthermore, track one diplomacy is not often a choice but the order that most peace processes take especially in cases where the state is a participant in a conflict. Moreover, track one actors have the capacity to access resources such as military, funding and intelligences sources required to counter belligerents, support agreements, mobilize and monitors peacekeepers.

Nevertheless, Susan Nan reminds us that track one actors are more concerned about the interest of their states and are often constrained in taking certain actions in their capacity as state officials, all of which may not always auger well for the prompt resolution of a conflict.[14] This suggests that wider forums for discussions that can accommodate unofficial participants in the efforts to resolve conflicts is necessary especially because conflicts involve and affect populations outside the formal state structure. Unofficial actors (track two to twelve) are less wary of the rigid rules associated with track one processes. Track two actors tend to focus more on humanising a peace process by listening to voices of those who have been shut out of the negotiation

processes, focussing on building a positive perception of the enemy, gauging the thoughts of adversaries, anticipating the agenda for discussions and seeking to secure positions from each party that will enable discussions to take place.

In other words, the primary aim of track two actors is problem-solving which is articulated through a network of influential people who make up peace constituencies that work to positively change the position of warring parties. As Aviva Shemesh, rightly argued, participants in track two and by extension multi-track processes are to create enough pressure from below to induce the political will for policy makers to take actions that support the peaceful settlement of conflicts. Thus, track two actors tend to replicate Back Channel diplomacy but differ in that the actors are not representatives of the state.[15] Much as unofficial actors act as *peace conductors* in peace processes, Dalia kaye, stressed, like official actors, "they cannot insulate themselves from the political environment of their own communities or that in which the conflict is taking place."[16]

Based on the strengths and weaknesses of the various tracks, the paper anchors the discourse on Montville and Diamond's view that effective conflict resolution requires a combination of tracks. Similarly Julian Hottinger noted, multiple levels of negotiations are required in complex conflict situations and concluded that, "it would be unrealistic to think that one track could work without the others, or that you can totally separate the track roles to the extent that each level can work autonomously, ignoring the others."[17]

The utility of the multi-track approach was demonstrated in the course of the Malian and Casamance peace processes. Initially, the governments of Mali and Senegal under various leaders dominated the efforts to resolve the Touareg rebellion but the alienation of civil society organisations contributed to the escalation of both conflicts. However, under specific administrations that were more inclined to civil society participation the peace process translated to more stable conditions in both conflict regions but these periods of stability were often short-lived because for the most part, actions taken by various

participants in the search for peace failed to reverse the conditions, policies and attitudes that lie at the root of the conflicts.

Origin of the Casamance and Touareg Rebellion

The causes of the Touareg and Casamance rebellion can be traced to disparities in French colonial policies in Senegal and Mali during the colonial period. The Touareg are a Berber group who inhabit the Adrar des Iforas region located in northern Mali. The French concentrated their developmental efforts in the southern region around Bamako and its precincts. As a result, the Touareg did not benefit from the developmental efforts by the French colonial government. At independence in 1960, the Touareg desired a separate state to include Touareg tribes inhabiting the Sahara region. Rather, they were distributed in various proportions across Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, Algeria and Mauritania by the French colonial government.[18] The grievances of the Touareg include their geographical isolation owing to the remoteness of the northern region from the southern region and their claims of marginalisation from the Malian government, which is dominated by the Bambara. Another source of discontent among the Touareg is the land policy adopted by the Malian government, which removed the control and distribution of land from indigenous rulers and ultimately altered traditional land use systems.[19]

The Casamance is the territory located in the southern region of Senegal and it is inhabited by Senegal's minority groups including the Fulakhunda, the Manding, Balante and Diola. Similarly, Casamance rebellion is rooted in the structure of the Senegalese state. The territorial structure of Senegal is such that the Casamance is cut off from northern Senegal by the state of Gambia. Just like the Touareg, the inhabitants of Casamance desired a separate state at independence but related groups were distributed into the states of Guinea Bissau, Senegal and Gambia. In addition, while the rest of Senegal and the Casamance are predominantly Muslims, the Diola who are a majority in the MFDC are mainly Catholics. There are also grievances over the land policy of 1964. With the policy, land distribution and allocation came under the control of the GOS. This paved the way for the acquisition of fertile land in Casamance by northerners from the

drought-prone region of northern Senegal.[20] The demand for independence has been articulated by the MFDC, dominated by the Diola ethnic group but the organisation claims to represents all other groups in the Casamance.

A Comparative Analysis of the Touareg and Casamance Peace Process

Efforts to resolve the Casamance and Touareg revolts were similar in terms of the domination of both peace process by track one or official actors at the emergent stages of the conflicts and the trend was understandably so, since both states are involved as warring parties. The analysis will focus on the various administrations to assess the role of specific track one actors and to examine the extent to which track two and other multi-track actors were able to contribute to the peace processes.

The Casamance Peace Process

The Casamance peace process dates back to the 1960s as there were minor protests by some members of Casamance elite during the period. However, Leopold Senghor who became the president of Senegal between 1960 and 1981 was able to maintain cordial relations with notable members of Casamance elite. Senghor incorporated some members of Casamance elite including Emille Badiane and Ibou Diallo into his government. More importantly, he made efforts to improve the state of infrastructure through the rural development programme.[21] Although the programme was largely unsuccessful owing to lack of funds it was indicative of Senghor's commitment towards creating better living conditions for Casamancais. In addition, Senghor was a Catholic like most MFDC members such as Emile Badiane and Victor Diallo but there were also claims that he promised to grant independence to Casamance twenty years after Senegal's independence in 1960.[22]

Relations between the MFDC and the GOS under Abdou Diouf's presidency assumed a violent dimension from the early years of his administration. In 1982, the MFDC led by a Catholic priest, L'Abbe Diamacounne Senghor resorted to open protests in Ziguinchor, the

regional capital of Casamance. The GOS responded using the police and gendamerie to quell the protest. However, reliance on the military personnel resulted in the death of an unconfirmed number of people while many were injured and several others were arrested and detained in the following months[23] The repressive action by the GOS provoked another protest by the MFDC in 1983 and protesters demanded the release of those arrested in 1982 but the GOS matched the second incidence with sterner measures. Between 80 and a 100 people are estimated to have lost their lives and as a result of the high rate of casualties recorded, the incidence is now celebrated as the 'Red Sunday' in Casamance.[24]

Apart from reliance on the military, the GOS also sought other means to resolve the Casamance rebellion. In 1983, the GOS set up the Commission of Casamance professionals (Cadre Casamancais) to study the situation in Casamance. In 1984, civil servants presented proposals for peace in Casamance. As part of the ameliorative measures by the GOS, two Casamance born politicians were appointed as ministers by the Diouf administration. However, the Ziguinchor area was put under strict military surveillance and military governors were appointed to administer the region. The policy of militarising the Casamance region necessitated a counter response by the MFDC and led to the establishment of Atika, (warrior in Diola language), the military arm of the organisation.[25] The development gave rise to human rights abuses by the GOS and MFDC with accounts by Amnesty International showing a high number of extra-judicial killings and the disappearance of people associated with either the GOS or the MFDC.[26]

Despite the occurrence of intermittent violence in Casamance, a peace agreement was signed in 1991 between the GOS and Sidi Badji, leader of the front Nord faction of the MFDC while Diamacounne's front Sud faction refused to be a part of the deliberations on the grounds that independence for Casamance was excluded from the terms of the agreement.[27]

After 1991, the GOS continued to create room for dialogue with the establishment of the Commission Pour la Paix en Casamance and the

Committee of Reflexion created in 1992. Members of the Commission recommended greater autonomy for Casamance and the establishment of a regional assembly among other suggestions.[28] A notable effort from the Catholic community to resolve the Casamance conflict was the establishment of the Clerical Committee in 1992. With the assistance of Diamacounne Senghor, rebels were contacted and persuaded to accept to negotiate with officials of the GOS. The pre-negotiation stage contributed to the Peace Agreement of 1993.[29]

In spite of the 1993 agreement, both parties continued to renege on their promises to halt military campaigns. To demonstrate the ineffectiveness of previous peace agreements about 1,500 soldiers were sent into the Casamance to maintain peace in that region and the decision by the GOS to militarise the region received a further boost with the presidential election in 1993. The election provided reasons for increased violence by the MFDC and about 110 people died in Bedene and the Ziguinchor area from armed confrontation between the GOS and the MFDC rebels.[30]

Another incident that fuelled violence in Casamance was the report by Jacques Charpy, a French historian who was commissioned by the GOS to determine the actual status of Casamance before 1960. According to Charpy's report, which was released in 1994, the status of the Casamance was not considered before Senegal attained independence in 1960 and with the report the Casamance peace process took a turn for the worse. In 1995 four French tourists disappeared around the Cape Skirring region in Casamance.[31] The incidence increased the cycle of violence in the Casamance. Diamacounne Senghor and his top four aides in Ziguinchor were arrested and detained and the Cape Skirring region was flooded with Senegalese soldiers. The MFDC resorted to guerrilla tactics and land mines became increasingly used particularly by MFDC elements to secure their hideouts from the reach of Senegalese forces.[32]

In the midst of intermittent violence in the western parts of Casamance, efforts were made by civil society organisations to contribute to the Casamance peace process and such attempts gained momentum from 1997. One important effort by a coalition of religious

groups was the peace rally that was organised by Mgr. Maxient Coly, Bishop of Ziguinchor and Sheriff Alioune Aidara Imam of Ziguinchor during which they urged all parties to support peace in the Casamance. In the same year, Sant' Egidio, a Catholic organisation established to support peace efforts around the world attempted to reconcile the MFDC factions. However, efforts by the organisation failed as relations between the GOS and Sane Nkrumah who initiated the peace effort had been strained, following his imprisonment in Senegal and subsequent sojourn in Paris.[33]

The Guinea Bissau war in 1998 which also involved the GOS and MFDC on opposite sides revealed the regional implications of the Casamance conflict on security in the sub-region but more importantly it raised the level of commitment on the part of various tracks of actors to adopt more concrete solutions to resolve the Casamance conflict. For instance, President Diouf raised possibilities for negotiations by increasing contact between members of the MFDC and his emissaries. The liberal posture of the GOS generated support from NGOs and civil society associations within and outside the country. Organisations such as United States Agency for International development (USAID), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) the Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Rencontre pour la defense Droits de L'Homme, (RAHDO) Association de jeune agriculture Casamance pour la promotion de L'Arrondisement de Nyassia (APRAN) contributed in diverse ways to reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts in Casamance. The Red Cross engaged in water supply projects by repairing and constructing new water wells while World Education (WE) directed their efforts to social and political peace building. Notable efforts by WE was the organisation of cultural weekends that aimed at restoring indigenous institutions and traditional conflict management regimes through ceremonies which had tribal leaders and MFDC rebels in attendance and featured indigenous, music, dance and sports. The combined efforts of the civil society association and international and local NGOs contributed to the restoration of more stable conditions in Casamance and this encouraged greater support from the GOS for negotiations with the MFDC.[34]

There were major events at the end of Diouf's tenure that set the pace for a future of more participatory peace process in Casamance. First, was the historic meeting between the MFDC leader, Diamacoune Senghor and president Diouf in 1999. Second, was the Banjul conference of 1999, which was supported by the governments of Guinea Bissau and the Gambia. The meeting provided the opportunity for an integrated multi-track approach. In attendance were the representatives of the governments of Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Senegal and various women organisations, traditional chiefs and representatives of local NGOs.[35] But the divide and rule approach by Diouf had contributed to the inability of MFDC splinter groups to unite. A major reason for discord was the closeness between the GOS and the Front Nord faction of the MFDC under Sidi Badji's control, which was perceived as pro-government.[36] The trend has continued to undermine the Casamance peace process as the splinter groups under various leaders have established control over specific regions where they engage in illegitimate trade in cashew, lumber, cannabis and arms and ammunitions.[37]

There was a renewed hopes for peace in Casamance when in 2000 Abdoulaye Wade became the president of Senegal. From the onset, Wade took a more positive attitude and this translated to greater participation by civil society organisations in the peace process. In 2001, Maxient Coly Bishop of Ziguinchor facilitated the peace agreement between the MFDC and the GOS led by Abdoulaye Wade.[38] In 2003, World Education organised meetings between official representatives of the GOS and Asie Casamancao Casamancais, an association of Casamance elders. More progress was recorded with the historic meeting between General Abdoulaye Fall, Latif Aidara and factions of the Front Nord faction in Bandikaky and Mongone in 2004. A major breakthrough occurred in the same year when Ousmane Ngom, the minister of interior and Diamcounne Senghor signed a peace agreement in 2004.[39]

The participatory approach to the Casamance peace process by Wade, received a boost in 2007 when the GOS set up the, Committee de sages, to assist in reconciling the MFDC factions by utilising their position as elders in the community. However, Clark noted "their

bases were too limited, their practices of buying access to the MFDC were not sustainable and the perception of skimming undermined their credibility."[40] Also, with the prolonged war in the Casamance, armed authority, as exercised by the leaders of the militant groups, acquired a greater significance than the authority of the traditional office holders such as chiefs. Occasional violence is still experienced in the Casamance but the stumbling block has remained the existence of splinter groups with leaders who have refused to unite and speak with one voice.

The Touareg Peace Process

The Touareg rebellion began in the immediate years after Mali gained independence and efforts to resolve the conflict started under the administration of Modibo Keita who like Leopold Sedar Senghor was the first president of Mali. However, in contrast to Senghor, Keita's authoritarian administration left little room for opposition. As a result, the Touareg felt neglected as in the colonial period and resorted to rebellion in 1962 demanding independence of the northern region.[41] In a similar vein, the Keita administration relied on the military under the command of Captain Diby Silas Diara, also known as the "Butcher of kidal'' illustrating the brutality of the Malian government. [42] As part of the measures to pacify the Touareg, the Malian government established military posts in many parts of the northern region and subjected the population to strict surveillance. The military hunted down insurgents within Mali and with the assistance of President Ben Bela, of Algeria rebels who fled to Algeria were repatriated to Mali where many of them were tried and imprisoned. Apart from physical torture of detainees, wells were poisoned and many courts were set up at various parts of the north to try offenders while the movement of civilians was restricted.[43]

At the end of Keita's administration in 1968, the grievances of the Touareg were not addressed. Infrastructure remained inadequate in the northern region while the government continued to exercise monopoly over land and the policy of control over sub-soil tended to interfere with traditional system of land use by the Touareg.[44]

With the coup of 1968, Moussa Traore became the head of government. The Touareg remained passive in the early years of Traore's administration but there were incidents that presented opportunities to build closer ties between the Malian government and the Touareg community. The incidents were the droughts of 1972 – 1973 and 1984 – 1985 that occurred in northern region.[45] Although international organisations such as the United Nations Sahelian Office(UNSO), mobilised aid to the affected region, the distribution of medicines and food by Malian state officials was poorly managed and this intensified animosity among the Touareg. While the death of over 66,000 people was attributed to the drought and famine during the period, soldiers in charge of distribution sold some aid for proceeds with which they enriched themselves and many built 'castles of drought' in the south. The inability to access aid materials contributed to the emigration of many Touareg to Mauritania, Libya and Algeria.[46]

Libya was a popular destination for many Touareg refugees. Touareg refugees were employed within the oil industries and others were conscripted into his Islamic Legion and were used to pursue his pro-Islamic ambitions in Lebanon, Pakistan and Chad.[47] However, Libya provided only a short-term solution to the Touareg problem and indirectly prepared them for another rebellion in 1990. From the late 1980s when Libya began to witness a downward economic trend attributed to dwindling oil prices, many Touareg refuges were forced to return to Mali. The presence of the returnees created tension in northern Mali but more importantly, many had become accustomed to earning a living from rendering military service. The crop of returnees combined their efforts with disgruntled elements in northern Mali and resorted to violence in 1990 as a means of expressing their grievances.[48]

The second Touareg rebellion occurred in 1990 and as in the past, the Malian government responded with such brutality that the rebels elicited popular support from civilians in the northern region. With the popular support given to rebel groups and the pressure for a transition to a democratic government in Bamako, President Mousa Traore initiated dialogue between the government and the Touareg rebels. The effort led to the Tamanrasset Accord in 1991 which was

supported by the Algerian government and signed by the Azouad Popular Movement (MPA) led by Iyad al Ghali, the Arabic Islamic Front (FIAA) and the Malian government.[49] With the Accord, all militant groups and the Malian forces were to refrain from any form of armed confrontation while the Malian government was expected to reduce the number of military posts particularly in zones of pastureland and densely populated areas. Generally, military forces were to disengage from running civilian administration and be confined to the defence of the integrity of the Malian territory and frontiers. However, both sides continued to pay lip service to the cease fire as they relied more on the use of force. Forty-eight Touareg traders and notables were executed in the Lere village in 1991 on account of their violent activities with some of the militants.[50]

Mali witnessed another coup in 1991, which brought General Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) to power. There were efforts by Toure's administration to implement aspects of the Tamanrasset Accord but lack of funds from countries who pledged to support Mali financially undermined the efforts of the government. The failure to implement the terms of the Accord contributed to recurrent violence in the northern region and the military continued to adopt repressive tactics as they felt that government had conceded too much to Touareg rebels. For instance in 1992, a group of Touareg from the Meneka market were executed for their links with members of the militant groups while the government was also involved in armed confrontation with the Front Islamique Arabe de L'azawad (FIAA).[51]

The continuation of hostilities in the northern region motivated the intervention of regional track one actors and with the support of the Algerian government, Baba Miske of Mauritania and Edgar Pisani of France the various Touareg factions were brought together to form the United Movements Fronts of Azawad (MFUA). With the harmonisation of the militant groups the National pact was also signed in 1992. In the main, the Malian government agreed to allocate funds for the socio-economic development of the northern region and an autonomous status was granted to the northern cities of kidal, Gao and Timbuktu. [52]

Shortly after the signing of the National Pact, elections were held in Mali and Alfa Konare was sworn in as president in 1992. In contrast to previous Malian governments, Konare identified more with civil society actors within the country and encouraged international organisations to participate in the resolution of the Touareg rebellion. As an example, the grass root population was mobilised through the establishment of District transitional Colleges. At a higher level of administration, a Commissioner of Touareg origin was appointed for northern Mali. Apart from this, former Touareg rebels were incorporated into the Malian administration and this went a long way to evoke a feeling of inclusion. Al Hassan noted that, "about 9,511 combatants who were not reinstated into the police, army and civil service benefited from the, Socio-Economic Reinstatement Consolidation Programme"[53] With the assistance of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), rebels were encouraged to return their weapons for a fee of 200 dollars and the Flame of Peace ceremony was marked to commemorate the programme.[54]

Nonetheless, like civil servants in southern Mali, corruption and the lack of accountability of the so-called commune leaders in the northern region became so rife that the decentralisation programmes turned out to be avenues to exclude a majority of the population and perpetuate poverty in the region. Land policies did not change drastically as only those with close links to the regime could acquire land. Besides, government service was accessible to those who could afford to bribe officials.[55] On the whole, violence did not cease in the north and as a result, other ethnic groups followed in the pattern of the Touareg to establish militant groups. One of such groups was Ganda Koy (masters of the land) established by the Songhai to protect the group from violence and banditry in the northern region.[56]

Konare was succeeded by Ahmadou Toumani Toure in 2002 and he set out to address the problem of Touareg marginalisation with the appointment of a Prime Minister of Touareg origin, Mohammed Ag Hammani.[57] In spite of the appointment of a Tuareg to a top government position, the poor state of socio-economic conditions in the north was yet to be addressed so that grievances against the southern controlled government endured and provided additional

reasons for the Touareg rebellion of 2006.[58] The 2006 incident was attributed to an earlier incident of a Touareg uprising in Niger, which extended to Mali. The Malian episode started with an attack and kidnap of Malian soldiers at Meneka. Unlike the past, when Algeria was the major regional actor, Toure relied on Libya's assistance to suppress the rebellion. Besides, like Diouf and the front Nord faction of the MFDC, he identified more with a faction of the Touareg militants, the Democratic Alliance for Change.[59] Toure's close association with a faction meant the exclusion of other factions and this explains the continued armed confrontation against the Malian military by Ibrahim Bahanga and his supporters. Just like the Casamance, the emergence of various factions of Malian rebels has complicated efforts to resolve the Touareg rebellion and the northern region has continued to experience violence after 2007.

Conclusion

Both peace processes illustrate that the repressive approach by the Malian and Senegalese states deterred the participation of civil society groups in the peace efforts at the emergent stages of both conflicts. Nevertheless, while a militarist approach was necessary to restore order and to demonstrate that the state has a monopoly over the use of violence, both states tended to focus too heavily on the use of force.

The analysis of both peace processes also shows that the Malian and Senegalese states were reluctant to negotiate with Touareg and Casamance rebels respectively because of the demand for independence. As an example, the Senegalese government was more willing to negotiate with the Front Nord faction of the MFDC when independence was dropped on the agenda for deliberation and this compromise by Sidi Badji contributed to the 1991 Cacheu Accord. Similarly, presidents Toure aligned more with a faction of the May 23, 2006 Democratic Alliance for Change, because of their shift from the demand for independence to greater development and autonomy for northern Mali in 2007.[60] But the exclusion of independence on the agenda for negotiations has in both cases led to rifts between the more agreeable rebel leaders and the pro-independence factions and this has undermined efforts to achieve durable peace in both regions.[61]

On the whole, participants at the level of civil society were more active in addressing issues such as the rehabilitation of refugees, displaced persons, reconstruction, demobilisation and demining activities. While these are crucial actions necessary to create conditions that will restore normal daily activities, there was little effort to engage in negotiations between the states and the militant groups by a majority of the civil society organisations. This vital aspect of both peace processes was played mainly by religious leaders as demonstrated by the Catholic Church and Muslim leaders in Casamance and traditional rulers in Mali.

The account reveals that the protracted nature of both conflicts cannot be blamed on the lack of a multi-track diplomatic approach as such but on a number of factors. One was the failure to attract the intervention of unofficial actors at the emergent stages of the conflicts because of the repressive approach by both states and the inadequacies of civil society actors in both regions. Although the locally based CSOs have the advantage of the knowledge of the conflict environment, they depended too heavily on international organisations for funding and logistics. As a result, many of the locally based CSOs competed for the attention of international organisations rather than collaborate to work towards the termination of the conflicts. Being dependent on external funding, they were compelled to organise their activities around the agenda of the donor agencies even where such programmes were inappropriate in the context of the conflict. More importantly, the contributions of the locally based CSOs were limited by their lack of training, institutional capacities and funding.

The trend in Africa among donor countries and international organisations have been to mobilise resources to assist in terminating conflicts in wartime but these resources could be channelled to investments in conflict-torn region in peacetime. The intervention of France in the Touareg conflict in 2012 cost the country about 7 billion dollars in the first six months of its operations. The United States of America has also channelled huge investments into the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) to counter terrorism in West Africa.[62] But for these efforts to have positive effects on the local communities there is need to increase investments that could improve

the socio-economic conditions in the affected regions of Casamance and northern Mali. This is considering that France, China the USA are all involved in the extraction and trade of mineral resources including uranium, gold and oil in the Sahel region which includes Mali.[63] Without a clear policy that is targeted at improving living conditions, providing basic needs such as portable water, health care, housing and education, the inhabitants will seek avenues of survival and this explains the emergence of drug cartels with links between the coastal regions of Guinea Bissau, Gambia, southern Senegal, the Sahel region and other destinations around the world.[64]

Thus, the multi-track process is not merely a strategy that provides for inclusiveness in peace processes. Such inclusiveness must be backed by resources and actors who are sincere in administering the resources and are willing to work in a collaborative manner so that they can collectively address various aspects of the conflicts. The multi-track process is much more a game of roles than a game of numbers with each track of actors identifying their roles and developing the capacity to perform such roles in ways that relate to conflict prevention and resolution.

Endnotes

1. Paul. D Williams, *War and Conflict in Africa*, Polity Press, 2011, Cambridge, 106
2. "Reducing Conflicts in Africa: Progress and Challenges, Africa Conflict Prevention Pool Report, 2001 – 2005, http://www.dfid, gov.uk/Documents/publication/perf-rpt-Africa-conflict-prev-pool. 2001-2005.pdf. Accessed 11/09/2011. Also see, Anke Hoefler, *Dealing With Consequences of Violent Conflicts in Africa, Background Paper of ADB Report,* Center For the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, March, 18, 2008. user.ox.ac.uk/-techguidancetracing/andlysing-health system. Accessed, 12/05/13
3. Macartan Humphreys and Habaye ag Mohamed, "Senegal and Mali: A Comparative Analysis of Conflicts in West Africa," http://heisun.unige.ch.2003, 4. Accessed, 11/07/2009
4. Humphreys M. and Ag Mohammed, 2003, 258

5. Vincent Foucher, Church and Nation: The Catholic Contribution to War and Peace in Casamance (Senegal), *Centre d' Etudes d' Afrique Noire,* Bordeaux.2003 www.academia.edu/3162390/church_and_nation__the_catholicocntribution_to_war_and_peace_in_casamance_senegal. Also see, Rupesinghe Kumar, Multi Track Diplomacy and Sustainable Route to Conflict Resolution CSQ Issue: 19.3 (Fall 1995) *Culture, Resources and Conflicts,* 2010.

6. Kouga, A, Ecawel, E. "The Experience of Northern Mali" In, Adedeji, A., Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts, African Centre For Development and Strategic Studies (ACDESS) Ijebu Ode, Nigeria. 1999, 207 – 214.

7. Kim Mahling Clarke, "Ripe or Rotting: Civil Society in Casamance Conflict," *Conflict and Peace Building Review* 1, no. 2 (Fall, 2011): 153

8. Yacouba Kone, "Lessons From Mali's Arab Spring: Why Democracy Must Work for the Poor," *Christian Aid Occasional Paper,* no. 8 (September 2012).

9. International crisis Group Mali: Avoiding Escalation, Africa Report, no. 189 (July 2012): 8

10. David E. Zuern, "The Changing Roles of Civil Society in African Democratization Processes," in, H. Solomon and I. Liebenberg*, The Consolidation of Democracy in Africa: A View from the South* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 97

11. Thomas A. Imobighie, "Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria," *Africa Strategic and Peace Research Group*, Spectrum Books, 2003, 6

12. Susan Allen Nan, "Beyond Intractability, the Beyond Intractability Project, the Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, 2003 – 2012, http//: www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essy/track1-diplomacy. Accessed 08/07/13

13. Joseph Montville, cited in Volkan Vamil, Demetrio A. Julius, (eds), *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, Concepts and Theories* 1 (Lexington: M. A. Lexington Books, 1990), 62.

14. John W. McDonald, "Multi-Track Diplomacy: Beyond Intractability," September 2003, www.beyondintractability.org/bi-

essay-multi-track-diplomacy. Accessed 12/05/2013; Susan Nan, Beyond Intractability, 2

15. Peter Jones, "Non-State Actors who bring Nations Closer, *The Hindu*," www.hindu.com, Jan 2013. Accessed, 12/07/2013

16. Avila Shemesh, "Citizen diplomacy-creating a Culture of Peace: the Israeli-Palestinian Case," Annual Conference on cultural Diplomacy, the Academy for Cultural Diplomacy, 2011, Berlin, www.cultural diplomacy.org/academy/content/pdf/participant-papers/2011-12-cda/citizen-Diplomacy-Creating-a-culture-of-peace. Accessed, 10/05/13

17. Dalia Dassa Kaye, Talking to the Enemy: Track Two Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia National Security Research Division,1, www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND-M592.pdf. Accessed 10/07/2013

18. Julian Hottinger, The Relationship between Track 1 and Track Two, Canadian International Institute for applied negotiations, 2005. www.zoominfo.com/p/julian-hottinger/1100086158. Accessed 10/06/12

19. Riki Gold, "Initiatives for Peace in Northern Mali in the 1990's: Lessons Learned," Initiatives 02/13, initiatives-for-peace-in-northern-mali-in-the-1990-s-lessons-learned,ICRMP.acontrarioic.com.2013. Accessed 10/06/2013.

20. Yacouba Kone, "Lessons from Mali's Arab Spring, 2010," 10.

21. Halliet, R., *Africa since 1878* (Heinemann: University of Michigan, 1971), 356.

22. Vincent Foucher, "Les Evolue, La Migration L'Ecole," in Momar Coumba Diop, *Sénégal Contemporain* (Karthala, Paris : 2002), 376

23. Diaw, A., Diouf, M. (eds.), "Ethnic Group Versus Nation: Identity Discourse in Senegal" In, Nnoli Okwudiba, *Ethnic Conflicts in Africa,* Codesria Book Series.1998, 227

24. Genevieve, G., "Que Veulent Les Opposants Armes Casamancais?" In: *Senegal Contemporain*, Momar Coumba Diop, Paris Edition, Karthala.2002, 214.Promise of independence

25. *Casamance Conflict (History and Resistance of Casamance)* Http://members.tripod.com.Casamance html. Tamba Network Inc. 1999. Accessed 11/09/08.

26. Senegal : Casamance Civilians Shelled by MFDC, Amnesty international,1999, 2.

27. Aminatou Diaw., Mamadou Diouf, M.(Eds) "Ethnic Group Versus Nation: Identity Discourse in Senegal" In, Nnoli Okwudiba, Ethnic Conflicts in Africa, Codesria Book Series.1998, 227

28. Diaw and Diouf,1998, 227

29. Diaw and Diouf,1998, 228

30. Vincent Foucher, Church and Nation, 2003, 36.

31. Casamance Conflict (History and Resistance),1999

32. Martin Evans, *Africa Program- Armed-Non State Actors Project, Senegal. MFDC-Marquis*. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portals/issuesareas.html. 2004,8 Accessed,14/5/2006.

33. *Interfaith March for Peace in Troubled Senegalese Province*, BBC NEWS, Sunday, 23 November 1997. Also see, Foucher, Church and Nation, 2011,30

34. Linda Beck et al, *West Africa: Civil Society Strengthening for Conflict Prevention Study,* USAID, West Africa Regional Program, Dakar. payson.tunlane.edu/gsd/collect/final/ index/assoc/HASHO168.DIR/DOC. 2001. 12. Accessed 24/06/05.

35. Amnesty international, 1999,AI INNDEX AFR, 49/00/99,1

36. Amnesty International, 1999, 6

37. Martins Evans, "Ni paix no guerre: the Political Economy of low level Conflicts in the Casamance", in Sarah Collinson, Power Livelihoods Conflicts Case studies in Political Economy, Analysis for Humanitarian Actors, Overseas Development Institute, at Http:// www. Odi uk/hpg, 2003, 42. Accessed, 10/05/2006

38. Vincent Foucher, Church and Nation, 2003, 29

39. *The Casamance Conflict, 1982-1999*, Research and Analytical Papers, Africa Group, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, August, London, 1999, 7

40. Kim Mahling Clarke, 2011, 1

41. Humphreys and Ag Mohammed,2003, 256

42. Lt. Col. Kalifa Keita, Conflict and conflict resolution in the Sahel, http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps12312/carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs98/tuareg/tuareg.pdf.Accessed 11/06/2013

43. History of Algeria, en.wikipaedia.org/wiki/history_of_Algeria.

44. Kouga, B.S., Ecawel, S. Ag, (eds.) "The Experience of Northern Mali; A History of Armed Conflict" in, Adedeji A., Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts, African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies, & Zed Books, London. 1999, 211

45. Kouga and Ecawel, 1999, 211

46. Yacouba Kone, Lessons from Mali's Arab Spring, 2010, 10

47. Humphreys and Ag Mohammed, 2003, 256

48. Humphreys and Ag Mohammed, 2003, 257

49. Humphreys and Ag Mohammed, 2003, 258

50. Humphreys and Ag Mohammed, 2003, 208. Also see, *How the Touareg Revolt Came to an End*, wwwgppac.net/document/pBbp/15-peace-html., 2010 Accessed 15/05/07.

51. A. Alhassane, "Northern Mali: Democracy and the Peace Process", In, Adedeji A., *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts,* African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies, & Zed Books, London. 1999, 217

52. Alhassane, Northern Mali, 1999, 217

53. Alhassane, Northern Mali, 1999, 218

54. Yacouba Kone, Lessons from Mali's Arab Spring, 2010

55. Riki Gold, Initiatives for Peace, 2013

56. Riki Gold, Initiatives for Peace, 2013

57. Yacouba Kone, Lessons from Mali's Arab Spring, 2003

58. Riki Gold, Initiatives for Peace, 2013

59. Sache Ivan, *Flag Report*, Obtained from Mamadou Nkrumah Heal, Attached to General Secretary of MDFC, External Wing, Paris, Accessed11/15/08

60. Yacouba Kone, Lessons from Mali's Arab Spring, 2003.

61. Mali War Costs debt laden-France 70 million Euros, www.france.24 com/en/20130207-mali-war cost france 70 million-107k

62. Yacouba Kone, *Lessons from Mali's Arab Spring*, 2003.

63. Amado Philip de Andrés, *West Africa Under Attack: Drugs, Organised Crime and Terrorism as the new threats to Global Security, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime*, UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 16 (Enero /January 2008

64. Leo Zeiglig, "Resisting Intervention: Imperialism and Protest in Northern Mali," www.socilaistreview.org.uk/article.php?article number 12239. March 2013. Accessed 09/06/13

A Comparative Study of Xiang Yu, Hannibal Baca and Shaka the Zulu's Strategic Thinking

Zhe Zhang
& Omon Merry Osiki
Department of History,
Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing, China

Abstract

The name of Ji Xiang Yu occupies an important place in the history of strategic thinking in Chinese history. His rise into limelight was occasioned by the opportunity provided by the decline in the political fortune of the Late Qin Dynasty. Like Xiang Yu, Hannibal Baca, the famous North African military strategist was brought up to accept strict and hard military discipline. He was excellent in military and diplomacy and helped to build a formidable force that could hold its own in the then Mediterranean World. Several centuries after the exploits of these two great strategists, Africa south of the Sahara produced a military strategist of world acclaim, Shaka the Zulu, who was as shrewd and militarily strategic as both Xiang Yu and Hannibal to merit a place in the annals of the "fathers of strategic thinking." This work, thus, analyses the historical forces that shaped the strategic thinking of these historical figures and discusses their tremendous contributions to the development of military science and history.

Keywords: Xiang Yu, Hannibal, Shaka, Strategic Thinking

Introduction

About the 3rd century BC, both the East (Asia) and West (Europe) were active on the stage of numerous wars that produced two outstanding heroes who changed the direction of warfare and

109

strategic studies. The Chinese people are familiar with the king of Western Chu, Xiang Yu (BC 232 BC - 202 BC) who contributed to the military and political development of the area. In 208 BC, the anti-Qin rebellion led by Yijun gradually broke the defense of the Chu commander Xiang Liang, who died afterwards. Thereafter, the fortune of the Qin state hit the rocks. At this critical moment, Xiang Yu rose to the occasion and turned the tide of the Chu State. He led his troops in the Julu area and defeated the invaders of the Qin State in 207 BC. This act of bravery was the main indelible contribution of Xiang Yu to the evolution of the Chinese political system. At the same time in North Africa, ancient Carthage produced the famous military strategist, Hannibal, in about 247 BC. These two heroes not only lived in the same era, coincidentally, the fate of their history and the trajectory of the wars they fought were very similar in both the way they organized their armies and how they deployed them in battlefields. Thus, both men are sometimes referred to as "masters of strategic thinking" (Yan, 1992: 20).

But the third character in this analysis, Shaka the Zulu was successful all the way until his death caused by his bodyguard and his half brothers. Although there is no evidence to indicate that Shaka ever read the lessons of strategy from the examples of Xiang Yu and Hannibal, his military innovations and tactics survived long after he left the scene. His is credited with creating the first professional standing army in southern Africa, because before him there was no strict division between those who fought in the wars and ordinary citizens. The military and strategic exploits of Shaka had some striking similarities and differences with to those of Xiang Yu and Hannibal.

The Concept of Warfare

Although war may have been dreaded by many, the reality is that history is replete with numerous communal, national and international violent conflicts and confrontations, with a heavy toll on lives and material resources. In fact, warfare is an aspect of the evolution of settled communities and the history of the human struggle for control of resources in their environment (Goyne, 2002:

31). People and communities fight wars for numerous reasons, including economic, political, social, religious, cultural and strategic considerations, among other factors. Military historians and other analysts have opined that methods of war stand on a scale between maneuver warfare and attrition, both of which are essentially the focus on achieving victory through defeating, killing or capturing an adversary. Although there are technical difference between the two, in reality maneuver warfare involves both maneuver and attrition (Simpkin, 2000: 3-16, 139-186; Leonhard, 1991: 1-5; Lind, 1985: 3-7). However, a key requirement for success in maneuver warfare on the part of the country or group executing the war is accurate, up-to-date intelligence on the disposition of key command, support and combat units (Leonhard, 1991). War theorists and strategists such as Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz (1780-1831), Antoine-Henri, baron Jomini (1779-1869), Sun Wu or Sun Tzu (c. 544 B.C.-496 B.C.), Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821), Xiang Yu, Hannibal and Shaka, among others were aware of these facts (Gray, 1991: 85-91). The last three military strategists occupy a central position in this paper.

The Battle of Julu provides an insight into the strategic thinking of Xiang Yu, who was an ancient Chinese strategic thinker and military commander. In that battle, Xiang Yu's forces carried out unprecedented attacks against the forces of the Qin Dynasty Emperor (221 B.C.-207 B.C). For an extremely ambitious youth of barely 24 years old, that feat by Xiang Yu was unprecedented in the history of warfare in China. Along with his uncle, Xiang Liang, Xiang Yu commanded a number of peasant armies against the Qin Dynasty Emperor, Chen Sheng. He believed in accurate, up-to-date intelligence, reliance on and the mobilization of local peasants and adequate preparations, coupled with surprise attacks in defeating the adversary.

Like Xiang Yu, Hannibal understood the importance of accurate, up-to-date intelligence and surprise attacks on the adversary as indispensable parts of warfare. He demonstrated this in most of his battles, including the Battle of Cannae (Liddell Hart, 1967). Shaka lived several centuries after both Hannibal and Xiang Yu, but his approach to warfare bore some similarities with the approaches of

the former. He is perceived as a heroic and protean nation-builder, whose activities helped to shape the politico-military configuration of southern Africa in the nineteenth century and thereafter (Chanaiwa, Dec. 1980: 1-20). The experience of growing up without a biological father and the humiliation and cruel treatment he received from his mates probably shaped the warlike character of Shaka. He believed in accurate, up-to-date intelligence, surprise attacks and total annihilation, which earned him the nickname *Nodumehlezi* ("the one who when seated causes the earth to rumble") (Chanaiwa, Dec. 1980: 1-20). Like both Hannibal and Xiang Yu, he emphasized merit over family background as the easiest way to motivate his soldiers, most of whom were recruited from among the peasants. His association with his military godfather, Dingiswayo under whose leadership he gained most of his military experience was instrumental to the formation of his military regiments. In fact, at the death of Shaka's father (c. 1816), Dingiswayo lent him the military support necessary to oust and assassinate his senior brother Sigujana, and make himself chieftain of the Zulu. At Dingiswayo's death in c.1818, Shaka immediately assumed leadership, added the forces to his own and conquered the surrounding chiefdoms, thus uniting more than a hundred chiefdoms in southern Africa.

Basic Strategic Maneuverings of Xiang Yu, Hannibal and Shaka

Xiang Yu's strategic manoeuvrings manifested during the conflict between the Han Chinese and the rulers of the Qin Dynasty. The Qin dynasty was mainly composed of a group of linguistically related ethnic minorities in southwest China. The Qin State became strong during the Warring States after it successfully implemented political and economic reforms that enabled it to dislodge the other states, including Han, Zhao, Wei, Yan, and Chu to form the first unified multi-ethnic China. In order to consolidate power, the Qin leaders carried out harsh political, economic and cultural reforms, which later provided the impetus for the challenge of the regime by the Han Chinese. For instance, the people resented the Qin's tyranny, endless military service, heavy hard labour and taxes such as the

construction of many palaces, and severe punishment. This caused peasant uprising, but the most successful one was led by Xiang Yu.

After the initial success, Xiang Yu had to act decisively to establish the Han Dynasty. However, Xiang Yu faced all kinds of unfavourable conditions at the Battle of Julu. First, the opponent's strength was unusually strong. Indeed, Xiang Yu faced hundreds of thousands of elite regular army of the Qin Dynasty, as well as some of the most famous generals of the Qin. Second, the strength of Xiang Yu's own army was extremely weak. His army constituted a complex but weak force. Although his army numbered between 50,000 and 60,000, their combat effectiveness in general was difficult and poor to command. Third, the army faced fatigue due to the distance of the battlefront. In essence, Xiang Yu was more or less fighting in a "foreign land". It took his army three months to reach Julu and so there was fatigue on the part of the army. Fourth, his allies were wary of war and marched cautiously in order to preserve their strength. The brightest of them, the prince of the army did not mobilize the full force of his army.

Faced with such a perilous situation, Xiang Yu had to act decisively to capture the weakness of the Qin and dislodge the Qin layout. He decided to implement the Black Tiger tactics by cutting off the contact lines of the two allies of the Qin. He concentrated on a possible win and advised the Po general to bring 20,000 troops to cross the river to attack the Qin corridor. The general lived up to his expectations and defeated the guard corridor of the Qin army. Xiang Yu then took advantage of the situation, seized the opportunity and attacked the Qin army. Furthermore, he led his forces to cross the river and gave a speech to boost the morale of his troops. Chinese historians believe that Xiang Yu was very clever in the art of warfare. He wrecked all ships that approached him and burnt farmhouses (Si, 1959:307). In essence, he effectively combined the Black Tiger tactics with the scorched earth strategy, also used by Shaka several centuries later. That battle fully demonstrated the determination and indomitable spirit of Xiang Yu.

Thereafter, Xiang Yu was confident of victory, and how to attack the main corridor of the Qin Dynasty became his major focus. When Zhang of the Qin Dynasty heard the news, he immediately took his army to the corridor to wait for Xiang Yu at the entrance to the kingdom, but Zhang's army was defeated. Records of the historian, Zhang Er Chen reports that: "The army of Xiang Yu attacked Zhang's corridor. The king and the army lacked food, but Xiang Yu learned that the ability to lead his troops to cross the river would break Zhang" (Si, 1959:307). Indeed, Xiang Yu repelled Zhang's army and immediately killed them. He made the necessary tactical deployment, and interspersed with the scattered Qin army. The leaders of the other states earlier conquered by the Qin Dynasty immediately joined with Xiang Yu to build on this effort. In the end, Xiang Yu prevailed and won the war. He was later defeated and forced to commit suicide.

A different but related strategy was employed by Hannibal Baca in projecting and defending the military might of ancient Carthage. When Hasdrubal was assassinated in 221 BC by the Celtics (Celts), Hannibal took over military power and was formally appointed to the government of Carthage. He sent troops to capture the Spanish city of Sagunto, thus marking the beginning of the Second Punic War. Although Hannibal used the scorched earth strategy to weaken the enemy, his most important strategic thinking was to dare external enemies of his territory by deploying the strategy of surprise attack (Ayrault-Dodge, 1995). With the help of infantry and cavalry, he often used the strategy of joint attacks made up of ambush and surprise attacks (Cottrell, 1965; Yang Jun-ming, 1993: 5). This clever use of cavalry to ambush opponents stood Hannibal out among ancient military strategists.

At the Battle of Lake, Hannibal cleverly employed this strategy. He led his army to attack the Italian peninsula by taking the war to the enemy's territory. In order to avoid anti-Hannibal sentiments in his anticipated attack against the city of Rome, Hannibal tried not to attack the common people and unarmed peasants, but Rome sent the newly appointed consuls Gaius Flaminius to station their troops in the two war-fronts leading to the main city of Rome. Hannibal

encountered great difficulties crossing the Arno River because of swamp and other climatic and geographical problems. In spring, the melting snow ensured that the Arno River flooded the path that Hannibal intended to take. Indeed, this was like a poisonous gas that filled the air, filling the dangerous road with death. Therefore, the shortest path, but also the most combat-prone path, was to face the Roman legion along their line of formation. This caused his army much fatigue owing to lack of sleep because they marched through the swamp and crossed it after four days and three nights. He also crossed the Apennines, but unlike in the case of the Arno River, he encountered less difficulty. When he passed through the marshland, Gaius Flaminius was shocked because he had no idea that Hannibal could lead Carthaginian army along that path so soon in his left wing.

When Hannibal had arrived Etruscans (Etruria), he decided to lure Gaius Flaminius in battle with him by deliberately wreaking havoc around the farmland estate. He opened his army to the left of the Roman army to cut off the road leading to the city of Rome. He also decided to march toward Apulia expecting Gaius Flaminius to come along. Thereafter he retreated to Lake Trasimeno where Gaius Flaminius sent troops to ambush him under the setting of the northern shore of Lake Trasimeno. Lake Trasimeno was surrounded by mountains and the landscape was a narrow path leading to the valley from west to east. By night, Hannibal used his cavalry formation to ambush Gaius Flaminius in the lane at the entrance to the mountain. The light infantry configuration was placed in the steep hill at the exit of the eastern end of the valley (De Beer, 1974).

Thereafter, Hannibal led the remaining troops to attack the Roman front. The next morning, the Roman army entered the narrow mountain pass. Gaius Flaminius led the Roman army to the column through the narrow channel of the lake. Hannibal immediately attacked and caught the Romans unaware. The Roman army was taken off guard and was suddenly in confusion. With the violent attacks carried out by the Carthaginians, Roman soldiers were killed, even though the fighting only lasted a few hours (Michael Grant, 1990: 99). Hannibal with his military genius and a flexible strategy

and tactics brought victory to the Carthaginians. This campaign marked a turning point in the history of war and ambush strategy in the Western world (Ayrault-Dodge, 1995; Zhang Xiao-xiao, 1992, 5).

Hannibal's approach to the strategy of surprise and attack was slightly different from that of Shaka. Shaka demonstrated this strategy of surprise and attack during his first major battle with Zwide of the Ndwandwe after the death of Dingiswayo and his emergence as the leader of the combined forces of the Mthethwa and the Zulu clan. Zwide had plotted to defeat Shaka. He moved all his army into Zululand in April 1818. Shaka wore out the invaders by pretending he was retreating. He drew Zwide's forces deep into his own territory and successfully exhausted them. He then flung his own regiments on them and defeated them conclusively at the Mhlathuze River. In 1826, under Zwide's successor, Sikhunyane, the Ndwandwe again fought the Zulu, but were totally routed forcing the majority of them to submit to Shaka. Shaka was able to recruit additional warriors from among them and proceeded to train them in his own methods of close combat. During his brief reign, his regiments continuously went on campaign, steadily extending their assaults further afield (Omer-Cooper, 1965: 12–15).

Shaka introduced new military tactics, by arming his warriors with short-handled stabbing spears and trained them to move up to their opponents in a close formation with their body-length cowhide shields forming an almost impenetrable barrier to spears thrown at them. Although the throwing spear was not discarded, it only served as an initial missile weapon before close contacts with the enemy were made and the shorter stabbing spear was used in hand to hand combat (Hamilton, 1998: 5-34). The crescent-shaped formation was highly favoured and a number of regiments extending several ranks deep formed a dense body known as the chest, while on each side a regiment moved forward forming the horns. The main purpose of the horns formation (or the bull horn formation) was to make it curve inward around the enemy so that the main body would advance killing all those who could not break through the encompassing lines.

The whole military arrangement was generally partitioned into three levels: regiments, corps of several regiments, and "armies" or bigger formations. With this tactics in place, Shaka's war cry was "victory or death" (Guttman, 2008: 23). He taught the Zulus that the most effective way of becoming powerful quickly was by conquering and controlling other tribes. This motivated the social outlook of the Zulu people and helped to build a "warrior" mindset in them, which Shaka turned to his advantage.

Organization, Mobilization and Defence Plans

Efficient organization, mobilization and defence plans are essential in the success of armies and the three strategists examined in this work were aware and conscious of their importance in military strategies. When Xiang Yu was faced with a sinister political and military environment, he adopted the option of developing the idea of a bold strategic plan. He concluded that he needed large forces to fight the army of the Qin emperor. The commander of the army of the Qin, Liu Bang was encouraged by the mobility of his cavalry. He led thirty thousand (30,000) elite troops to reach Pengcheng southwest of Xiaoxian. At this point, most of his coalition was to attack Pengcheng by deploying defense systems in the north of the city. Xiang Yu chose the opportunity to launch a surprise attack in the morning during the cover of night. Xiang Yu was outstanding in this regard and his tactical early morning raids on the enemy fully demonstrated his superb strategy of mobilization and artistic prowess, although he faced some unprecedented crises.

First, Xiang Yu had to face two fronts. First, the Qin Dynasty was not yet put down. Second, there was a great disparity in forces between the two armies in favour of the Qin Dynasty, which had a total strength of about 16 million people, an unprecedented grand scale, while Xiang Yu's full strength at this time was numbered far less than 560,000 (Zhang Xiao-xiao, 1992: 6-8). Third, the political foundation of the Chu state (which was part of the coalition led by Xiang Yu) was weak. The Qin's coalition waited at the fortifications to resist the return of the Chu army. Fourth, Xiang Yu's allies

betrayed him and forced the political environment into the situation of extreme isolation.

It is instructive that Xiang Yu preferred to raid Liu Bang's command center instead of the outposts, resulting in paralysis of Liu Bang's coalition command system. The Pengcheng war became a one-sided situation (Si Ma-qian, 1959: 321). The death toll of Liu Bang's soldiers far outweighed that of Xiang Yu (Li Wei-tai, 2011:312).

Hannibal experienced a similar victorious and well coordinated battle in 216 B.C. He led about 40,000 infantry and a thousand cavalry from northern Apulia, south to promote pre-emptive capture of the Romans' supply powerhouse, Canny (Cannae) to cut off the food supply of Rome. The development forced the Roman Senate to elect two new consuls: Sterling Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus with the express directives to mobilize the huge historical might of the Roman Republic in support of coalition forces in order to completely eliminate Hannibal. The two consuls marched immediately to Cannae to face the Carthaginian army. In August 2, 216 B.C., the battle in Cannae started. Rome put a full strength of infantry numbering about eighty thousand (80,000) and six thousand (6,000) cavalry to face the Carthaginian military, which had invested forty thousand (40,000) footmen and 14,000 cavalry. Hannibal himself commanded the center all the way, while his nephew, Hanno commanded the right-wing (Michael Grant, 1990: 88-99). Hannibal's brother, Mage commanded the left wing. Three thousand (3,000) cavalry of Hannibal's army was also selected as a reserve force. Hannibal also designed an arrangement to make five hundred (500) lightly armed soldiers carry spears, shield and dagger to carry out the task of fake surrender, a strategy also used by Shaka centuries later.

Moreover, in that war, Hannibal used his world-famous crescent tactics, which was like a convex toward the enemy. The infantry was deployed in the center to weaken the army of the opponent while the two wings were manned by powerful cavalry (Liddell, 1967: 12-34; Yu, 1988: 96). When the fighting began, the Roman army encountered a strong opposition from the Carthaginian side. They

had to temporarily change strategy, narrowing the front, increasing depth, to strengthen the power of the central square, in an attempt to defeat Hannibal's central square in one fell swoop.

It was important for Hannibal to understand the weather of Cannae because it was a major factor in the battle. For instance, at noon, a strong southeast wind was blowing and the southeast of the Roman infantry was blown by the wind with great consequences on their sight because they could not easily open their eyes. As a result of this, the wind greatly enhanced the killing effect. Suddenly, the Roman soldiers were faced with chaos. Hannibal's army attacked with various weapons such as spears, archery, slings and so on. Consequently, the Carthaginian army formation into a crescent depression surrounded by the Roman main force was impressive. Hannibal also ordered the left-right step, riding with the attack from both wings surrounded by enemies. Further, he quickly defeated the heavy cavalry of the left-wing right-wing cavalry of the Roman army, and then divided his own forces toward the lateral of the Roman army left wing cavalry. The Roman army's left wing cavalry stood up before and after the attack, and quickly fled. At the same time, five hundred (500) Carthaginian prisoners of war also took the opportunity to pull out their daggers to attack. The Romans were thrown into a battle chaos, while the Carthaginian cavalry fled in pursuit of the enemy cavalry and other troops with the infantry encircling the Roman infantry (Ayrault-Dodge, 1995; Ren, 1962: 94). This was to become the most painful defeat in Roman history. It is also one of history's most severe battle casualties in a single battle. Thereafter, the Romans of the post-Cannae war worked hard to reintroduce the Fabian strategy in order to avoid a decisive battle of the magnitude of the Cannae Battle.

Most of Shaka's successes rested on the mobility of his army, his ability to organize the forces and to close in on the opponents when they were less prepared. By means of much drilling and discipline, he built up his forces, which soon became the terror of the land. For example, he is said to have prohibited the wearing of sandals, but toughened his warriors' feet by making them run barefoot over rough thorny ground and in so doing secured their greater mobility.

Although this record may have been over exaggerated, it nevertheless indicates the level of discipline and training that Shaka subjected his army to. In this connection, unlike both Xiang Yu and Hannibal, Shaka ensured that the young men were taken away to be enrolled alongside others from all sections of the kingdom in an appropriate age-regiment. This strategy produced a sense of common identity among the fighters. Similarly, a female age-regiment was also organized. Members took part in ceremonial dancing and displays. They were given permission to marry members of the male regiments when it was necessary (Chanaiwa, Dec. 1980: 1-20). This combination of male and female regiments to balance the gender structure of his army separated Shaka from both Xiang Yu and Hannibal.

Moreover, Xiang Yu, Hannibal and Shaka developed a strong strategic decision-making structure and a high level of meticulous planning. They understood the techniques and flexibility in the use of military experience to bring about the fall of opponents. They all employed bold and surprise moves to achieve the desired strategic objectives. In addition, they took full account of the use of terrain and weather characteristics, although the later applied more to Xiang Yu and Hannibal. Specifically, both Xiang Yu and Shaka made use of early morning attacks against their adversaries, while Hannibal capitalized on the southeast strong winds to decimate the rank of the Roman army.

The Strategic Thinking of Xiang Yu, Hannibal and Shaka: Some Comparative Notes

From the various wars analyzed above, we can make the following observations: First, the Battle of Julu and the Battle of Lake Trasimeno were both successful warfare and attacking ventures because of the unique strategies and tactics deployed by both Xiang Yu and Hannibal. Specifically, Xiang Yu and Hannibal demonstrated extraordinary courage in their ability to plan surprise attacks against the enemy's hinterland. Secondly, the two battles revealed excellent use of raids, maneuvering and secret attacks beyond the enemy's imagination. Again, at the two battles, both

Xiang Yu and Hannibal demonstrated superior battlefield commanding ability and were both good at capturing the insight and long-lasting endurance of the fighters. They both led the armored cavalry and motivated the infantry division to carry out their order and command successfully.

In the same vein, Shaka deployed unique strategies and tactics in the execution of his battles. Like both Xiang Yu and Hannibal, he made excellent use of raids, secret attacks and maneuvering. He also deployed the scorched earth policy to devastate the enemy camps, and his armies raided their targets in the process. In the course of time, raiding and collection of booties became part of the whole military arrangement of Shaka. He encouraged looting, which was part of his military victory and celebration. Like in ancient times, Shaka's spoils of war included the defeated populations, which were often enslaved, and the women and children, who were often absorbed into his army.

In another sense, both the Pengcheng Battle and the Battle of Cannae represented great moments in the history of world's military encirclement. They both destroyed the enemy's well-arranged plans and designs. The battlefield and the choice of tactics, the excellent riding techniques, the use of the infantry, and the collaborative combat and other aspects of the battles can be called the masterpiece of the history of warfare. These two battles show that Xiang Yu and Hannibal were excellent commanders of war and masters of the art of warfare and strategic thinking. At the Battle of Cannae, for instance, Hannibal used the "encirclement strategy" and wiped out the enemy. In contrast, Shaka developed a new strategy of military encirclement. He had seen that the traditional type of spear, a long-handled known as *assegai* thrown from a distance, was not the best for the regulated fighting in close formation he introduced and therefore replaced it with *iklwa*, a short stabbing spear with a long, sword-like spearhead. It is possible that Shaka inherited this idea from his mentor, Dingiswayo, but it was refined by him (Shaka) and developed into an enduring pre-colonial traditional military strategy. His army usually deployed the crescent tactics by gradually

encircling the adversary. That way it was difficult for the enemy to escape.

In specific instances, we can argue that Shaka was closer to Hannibal than to Xiang Yu in the use of a combination of warfare and diplomacy. For instance, even though Shaka's hegemony was primarily based on military might, he supplemented this with a mixture of diplomacy and patronage. He incorporated friendly chieftains such as Jobe of the Sithole, Zihlandlo of the Mkhize, and Mathubane of the Thuli. He did not wage heavy war against them, but won them over by subtler tactics, such as patronage and reward. In the same vein, Hannibal employed diplomacy in his dealings with some powers in the Mediterranean world. He believed that commanders would do well to be shrewd in both war and politics as they must use diplomacy and cunning to appease and satisfy their political leaders. He demonstrated this during the Punic War when he cultivated key alliances with Gaul and Syracuse. In contrast, Xiang Yu relied on the peasants for his warfare, but in some instances, he needed to court the relationship of the other minor groups in China in his battles with the Qin rulers.

Both Shaka and Hannibal also shared the military ingenuity of deploying elephants at crucial moments of the campaigns. While Shaka was fighting Zwide of the Ndwandwe, at the Battle of Gqokli Hill, he sealed his victory by sending elephants in a sweep around the hill to attack the enemy's rear. The same tactics was deployed by Hannibal in several of his battles, but there is no evidence that Xiang Yu made use of the same tactics. Instead, the latter used the impact of force of cavalry to break up the enemy's stronghold.

Conclusion

It is fascinating how Xiang Yu, Hannibal and Shaka shared remarkable military ingenuity in the prosecution of their respective battles, even though there is no evidence that they had any knowledge of one another. The three military strategists employed the strategy of fast-moving surprise attacks and ambushes, the use of crescent tactics to encircle the opponents, and use of knowledge of

military planning and logistic. In this connection, Shaka turned warfare in the area of Southern Africa from a ritualized exercise into a true method of subjugation and wholesale slaughter. He also turned warfare into a professional endeavour. He shared this reputation with Hannibal, who lived all his life either fighting or thinking about how to fight and overrun the adversaries. In contrast, Xiang Yu simply reacted to the event of the moment. His mission was to overthrow the Qin Dynasty and replace it with the rule of Han Chinese.

Moreover, Shaka's "buffalo horns" attack formation that involved surrounding and annihilating enemy forces can be likened to that of Hannibal's crescent formation and the Roman legionaries' use of *gladius* and *scutum* (Guttman, 2008: 23), as well as the encirclement tactics used by Xiang Yu at the Pengcheng Battle. There is no evidence that Shaka copied the tactics from either the Romans, the Carthaginians or from Xiang Yu. What this implies is that the genius in the three leaders was obvious in the way they managed their forces into an organism to achieve victory for them. In that connection, Hannibal's genius is unanimously affirmed by both ancient and modern historians. The Greek historian Polybius paid him tribute saying:

> Who can help admire this man's skillful generalship, his courage, his ability; ... he kept vast numbers under control like a good pilot, without any sign of dissatisfaction towards himself or friction amongst themselves. And the troops under his command, so far from being of the same tribe, were of many diverse races who had neither laws nor customs nor language in common (Howe and Howe, 1987: 219).

The same ability to mobilize people from different clans was exhibited by both Shaka and Xiang Yu in building their armies. Hannibal is also seen as setting a model of military art (Niu, 2003: 170; Ralph, 1987: 297), in the same way as both Shaka and Xiang Yu introduced unprecedented innovations in their military planning

and executions. To this end, both Shaka and Xiang Yu have been called military geniuses for their reforms and innovations in military science and their understanding of a need for efficient organizational machineries in warfare (Omar-Cooper, 1965: 12-86; Wang Zuan-zhong and Wang Min, 2009: 7-8).

Unfortunately, both Xiang Yu and Hannibal had a strikingly similar tragic fate. Both men were forced to commit suicide when they were defeated by their opponents. Hannibal committed suicide when the Roman authorities attempted to extradite him in 183 B.C. Similarly, Xiang Yu committed suicide to avoid being captured by enemy forces (Wang Zuan-zhong and Wang Min, 2009:9). On the other hand, Shaka was murdered by his half-brothers and body-guard for what they perceived as his high-handedness, brutality and cruelty. In a nutshell, the three men ended their military careers tragically, just as their contributions to strategic thinking and military science have been spectacular.

References

Ayrault-Dodge, Theodore (1995), *Hannibal: A History of the Art of War among the Carthaginians and Romans Down to the Battle of Pydna, 168 B.C.*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Da Capo Press.

Boyd and American Security, Smithson Institute Press, Washington", *A Journal of Battlefield Technology*, vol.5, No.3.

Chanaiwa, David Shingirai (Dec. 1980), "The Zulu Revolution: State Formation in a Pastoralist Society," *African Studies Review*, 23(3), 1-20.

Cottrell, Leonard (1965), *Enemy of Rome*, London: Evans Bros.

De Beer, Sir G. (1974), *Hannibal: the Struggle for Power in the Mediterranean*, London: Thames and Hudson.

Goyne, David (2002), "Book Review: Grant T. Hammond, the Mind of War: John

Grant, Michael (1990), "History of Rome," (Shi Liao Tao Translation), Beijing: International Culture Publishing Company.

Gray, Colin S. (1999), *Modern Strategy*, Oxford UK: Oxford University Press.

Guttman, Jon (2008), *Military History*, Vol. 24 Issue 4.

Hamilton, Carolyn (1998), *Terrific Majesty: the Powers of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical Invention*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Howe, Helen and Howe, Robert (1987), *Ancient and Medieval Worlds,* New York: Longman.

Leonhard, Robert (1991), *The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and Air-Land Battle*, Novato, CA: Presidio Press.

Li, Wei-tai (2011), *Xiang Yu Qin Policy's Review*, Nanjing: Phoenix Pub. House.

Liddell Hart, B. H. (1967), *Strategy*, New York City, New York: Penguin Group.

Lind, William S. (1985), *Westview Special Studies in Military Affairs*, Westview Press Inc. Boulder, CO.

Niu, Xian-zhong (2003), *History and Strategy of Western Military History*, Guangxi Normal University Ralph Lerner Burns.

Omer-Cooper, J. D. (1965), *The Zulu Aftermath*, London: Longman.

Ralph, Lerner Burns (1987), *History of World Civilization*, Beijing: The Commercial Press.

Ren, Bing-xiang (translat) (1962), *Roman Republic* (1), Beijing: Commercial Press.

Si, Ma-qian (1959), "Xiang Yu Ji," *Historical Records*, Volume 7, Beijing: Zhonghua Press.

Si, Ma-qian (1959), "Zhang Er Chen remaining Biography" *Historical Records*, Volume 89, Beijing: Zhonghua Press.

Simpkin, Richard E. (2000), *Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare*, London: Brassey's Defence.

Wang, Zuan-zhong and Wang, Min (2009), "The Father of Hannibal in the Test Classification Strategy to enter the Apennine Strategic Thinking", *The Modern Weapons*, (vol. 9).

Yan, Zhu (ed.) (1992), *Introduction to Military Strategy*, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press.

Yang, Jun-ming (1993), "Hannibal is an outstanding military strategist", *Journal of Social Sciences*, Hunan Normal University.

Yu, Gui-xin (1988), *Ancient Roman History*, Jilin University Press.

Zhang, Xiao-xiao (1992), "The Father of Strategy-Hannibal," *Military History*, vol. 5.

Navigating Oral and Literary Strategies in Hope Eghagha's Poetry

Felicia Ohwovoriole,
Department of English,
University of Lagos, Nigeria.

Abstract

The written and oral literature in Africa have a common tradition of drawing nourishment and inspiration from oral culture. They are also vehicles of expressing personal experiences, ideas on morality and ethics, human and political relationships, socio-cultural problems in the continent. The assertion of black values or Africanness and nostalgia for his roots pervade Hope Eghagha's poetic trajectory. As a contemporary poet, he has appropriated the resources of his oral traditions and subject them through an individual creative forge, into varied new and interesting forms. Apart from infusion with a strong sense of orality, his poems also serve as an avenue for dissipating animosity against the social ills of the society The study investigates the use of oral resources and devices of repetition used by Hope Eghagha and how he has justified these important aspects of the poet's work in his poetry's collection; Rhythms of the Last Testament; This Story Must Not Be Told; The Governor's Lodge and other Poems; Premonitions and other Poems; Mama Dances into the Night and other Poems and Pepper in My Throat and other Poems.

Introduction

Oral literature influences written literature including contemporary African poetry in profound ways. It affords a poet clear and transparent examples of different strategies for creating symbols,

metaphors and motifs. Walter Ong (1982) demonstrates how literacy has penetrated oral discourses, but it is also possible to see elements of orality in written texts. Pedrosa (2003) views oral tradition as the source of all of the world's literary traditions. In navigating poetic or literary strategies in any given piece of literature whether oral or written, we must look for stylistic attributes-features like heightened language, metaphorical expression, structural repetitiveness and prosodic features.

In addition to exploiting oral resources, some of the poems in Eghagha's texts appear to be verbal duels used to vent anger against the social-political systems. Correspondingly, Karel Van Der Toorn (1991) looking at ancient Near Eastern poetic duels, explains them as vehicles for critical reflection on social and political changes and underlines their political importance. In Eghagha's poetry the insult to individuals is veiled as shown in 'Fregene and adjarho' p. 24 from *Mama dances into the Night and other Poems* and in the words of Valentinal Pagliai (2009) insults are not necessarily threatening, and cannot always be interpreted as aggressive or violent behaviour or even as 'causing offense' to the other party.

The modern African poet strives for original expression of his or her individual vision and the better he or she is, the better the text bears the mark of his or her personal signature. Folklore however, is anonymous, its signature is collective and its essence is not to be found in the artist's solitary act of creation, but in everyday life. The folklore act, image or motif in itself is autonomous, crosses the boundaries of language and time, and finds a local context in the soil of whatever culture it happens to take root. But folklore elements, once they are used in a poem, lose their autonomy and become identified with the poet's work and his cultural background. So, while folklore fragments can be transplanted-and can be traced and classified according to motif indices-the literary image derives most of its value from its context in the soil into which it has been transplanted. For Bernth Lindfors (2002) accomplished works of art communicate in such a universal human idiom that they are capable of transcending their particular time and place and speaking to all mankind. In the words of I. A. Richards (1936),

words and images are animated by their relation to surrounding words and images, and the lights and shadows cast by the second can shape and transform the first in ways that are not possible for folklore units. And if a literary image or metaphor happens also to be a piece of folklore, then it carries into the poem an additional level of meaning which originally belonged to the folklore tradition. At its simplest level, the function of folklore element in a poem is identical with its function in the cultural group, it is a rhetorical device and serves to affirm some collective belief of the group and to unite them for religious, national, or political purposes.

For example, the poems in *The Governor's Lodge and other Poems* (ix) explore political and religious intrigues, corruption and bigotry as well as problematic inter-personal relationships and societal interactions.

Oral Heritage in Poetry

Paul de Carvalho-Neto's concept of folklore is that it must be cultural, anonymous, non-institutional and pre-logical. Eghagha dips into the collective store of Urhobo folklore to find materials for his imagery. As Nabofa (2004:37) puts it:

> For the Urhobo, all manner of entities can assume symbolic religious significance. Living things like plants and animals, sacred persons like priests and priestesses, natural objects like stones, molehills, anthills, valleys, river rapids, sun, moon, stars, wind, water, and fire, human properties like saliva and blood, man-made things like boats, and abstract things like numbers, the square, or the circle can be considered sacred religious objects. An Urhobo can transform any object or form into a...symbol, both consciously and unconsciously, endowing it with religious importance and using it in...art

Proverbs are the most frequently used folklore category in various contexts. One finds proverbs being used in daily discussions to give more emphasis to claims or statements. A skilled speaker saturates his speech with pertinent proverbs, thus making it more enjoyable and effective. We feel the impact and profundity of proverbs in 'Mama dances into the night' 'The fire of revenge' 'You have carried it too far' 'How can they forget their garments' 'Let them remember' in *Mama dances into the night and other Poems.* Eghagha has used the proverbs as part of building blocks for most of the poems. As observed by Akporobaro (2004:8)

> the poetic texture, form and quality of the Nigerian proverb, derive from the insistent vividness of the tropes, similes, hyperboles and metaphors which act as the communicative vehicle of the proverb. The Nigerian proverb belongs to the realms of poetical wit, and imagery, and in general to the mode of poetry...many poems are composed through assemblage of proverbs presented and welded together.

In many of the poems, certain phrases are repeated as in the oral performance. Helen Chukwuma (1976:16-17) stresses the importance of proverbs especially when they are borrowed and modified to project opinions in modern African writing:

> Proverbs are used to express an essential idea. When they are used in verse, they are not usually subject to a rendition in their original forms. Rather they are modified and adapted according to the demand of rhythm and beat. Adaptation may take the form of adding a few words or of contrasting the proverb words while still retaining the essential image necessary for its identification.

Furthermore Ogunjimi and Na'Allah (2001: 65) define and highlight the properties of the African proverb as:

> The oral compositions and their various thematic and stylistic constituents derived from all the layers

of what we described as the hierarchy of African values. Proverbs embrace the philosophical and socio-cultural value systems of the people. They point to the individual, domestic and collective patterns of the society from which they are derived...Chinua Achebe says that a proverb is the 'palm oil with which words are eaten' This shows that proverbs are essential ingredients to harmonize the life rhythm of any community.

In consonance with what Tayo Olafioye (2000:81) observes about Ojaide's poetry, the proverb in Hope Eghagha's poetry offers a literary tool that projects tradition, and rhetorics that illustrates socio-cultural realities. Besides, it highlights African contribution to universal literalism, regardless of the syntax being used.

Myths, Proverbs and Axioms

In *Rhythms of the Last Testament* there is 'Labalaba'(33) an indigenous name for the butterfly. Humans are likened to the butterfly that would hover around plants with nectar for its food. In 'My burden' (p.41) there is myth of the snail that bears the burden of its shell whether it is heavy or light. A lot of people bear their burdens of worries, fears, hunger, poverty and so on. Omotete is also an Urhobo word for a child, which connotes innocence. 'Night call' (44) highlights the proverb about the testimony of pot as fire's prerogative. 'Dance of the naked mothers' (51), alludes to traditional protest by women who dance naked to protest grave injustice especially meted to one of them or an avenue of sending strong messages to those who have committed any heinous crime against humanity or the society. One can easily prevent an accident that has been foreseen hence 'an overflowing river/which gets pregnant in our eyes/must not drown us. In 'The cannons give way to rags' (52) traditional women's group (eweya) bare their buttocks to protest any injustice. This action is regarded as a taboo. Disrobing by women in public is considered a serious and permanent curse on those to whom the women expose themselves. The curse is related to mothering, agricultural productivity and fertility in general. Urhobo

traditional ululation is depicted e-e-e-! eye! 'Sun-god'(53) Sacrifice of dog to the gods is a traditional ritual. 'The call of Akpobrisi'(57). A strange call made from an unusual source, the *akpobrisi* tree which is supposed to be the abode of gods and only the notable medicine man can approach it.

This Story Must Not Be Told the second collection among the texts has many stories to tell. In the titled poem 'This story must not be told'(1) indicates a tradition of invoking any unpleasant thing into a calabash and made to flow away, thereby taking away the problem as the calabash flows away along the course of a river to 'obliterate traces of existence.' Marine sacrifices are a common sight in the riverine areas of the Niger-Delta. Sometimes problems recur like the image of the calabash, which flows back after we may have forgotten about it. 'The colour of rape' (3) has *Umuama* symbol of what has been kept away from prying eyes. 'Prelude to the great fall' (4) has the proverb about the fall of the elephant, when the elephant falls not even his brother can lift him up. 'You are just a memory' (45) depicts the proverb about the kernel and its metamorphosis to a palm tree. The beginning of a tall palm is a small kernel seed, which dies for a new life to begin, and the refusal of anything that has attained its height to give way can only lead to stagnation. One forgets easily the humble beginning of the plant when it starts flourishing. Similarly, those celebrated today are soon forgotten when they pass away, at best the individual becomes only a memory.

As illustrated by the 'The story is an egg' (51), preserving the story is imperative, otherwise it can be likened to an egg that breaks with its content spilling. When it does, its content cannot be retrieved fully neither can its broken shell be mended. The damage is irreparable. 'the story is an egg that will break/if its contents spill out.' 'For the rampaging vice chancellor' (86) we have the proverbial saying of the ambitious goat. The subject's head is likened to the ambitious goat that indulged in an abominable act of climbing his mother at the funeral of his father. 'Cenotaph of the poor'(92) 'The rags of the old woman/ commands the respect of her age. This is akin to the proverb that says a young person may have as many clothes as the old but not equal number of rags. 'Your

sacrifice scares me'(96) 'Yet the food of the spirit/ does not fill the stomach' because sometimes all that is needed to be sacrificed to the spirit may be a lobe of kola nut which will not fill a stomach yet satisfy spiritually.

From *The Governor's Lodge and other Poems,* we have an array of proverbs and axioms incorporated in the poems. 'Nakedness of the naked'(8).The colours of trouble do not warn anyone. It is not the size/ of a man's head that determines the quality of his brain. I swear with the breast/ of my departed mother. A maternal link has spiritual implications, which can be used to bless or invoke curses, and it is believed that such curses are very efficacious. 'For Abiodun Adetugbo'.(16) When a big masquerade steps out/the lesser ones bow their masks. 'The feast is over' (44). It is not the shape of a man's mouth/that gives him sense. Okot has warned the world/no one must uproot the pumpkin. Worthwhile habits in a tradition should be preserved and not discarded in favour of modernity. 'The Colour of your canopy' (63).

If a man's eyes sees a snake/and the weak hands of a woman kill it/the heavens will not fall. What is imperative when there is a problem is for a solution to be provided regardless of gender. No matter how rich you are/You cannot feed the world. This is uttered to indicate the rich do not have solution to every problem 'The Woman's anger' (68) Hunger has no brother/ anger has no friend. Both emotions are felt by the young and the old, the rich and the poor. 'Against the grain' (73) How may you recall the/ word that has gone on air. It is almost impossible to recant words spoken especially when the hearer will be hurt deeply. We do not leave the world/through the road we came. Natural human movement is from womb to tomb and not vice versa. 'Status quo is sweet'(80). If we cannot scratch our back/with our fingers/we must rub our belly in consolation. This proverb indicates we can only do what is within our possibility and be ready to derive satisfaction from that 'The monkey man'(82). When a monkey takes a leap/it makes sure there is a tree nearby. A safe landing is what animals and human beings crave especially when faced with challenges. 'The Floods'(87). Even the watchful dog/recognises witches/in broad daylight/it barks at

them. There is a traditional belief that dogs are clairvoyant and can sniff out evil people then bark at them to show disapproval for evil deeds.

In *Premonitions and other Dreams* we have the proverb that counsels us to accept whatever life brings the way of a person in 'We must eat each day's yam/as it comes. And a true observation that a' stinging tongue makes enemies, (49) 'A salute to the King'(53) indicates the traditional reverence and myth of ogriki. 'Great king of obireko/ ogriki salutes you/if you cut it for firewood/your ancestors will send the rain'. In many communities in Urhobo land, as observed by S.E Erivwo (2005) ogriki is a particular tree planted on the compound, street, or town, and through which mother-earth is accorded worship It also indicates the ownership or founder of any particular compound, street or town. Ogriki is besought for the fertility of crops and of wives, for the blessing of wealth and health with which till the soil. Tradition proffers a reason for the restlessness of the monkey. 'The monkey knows it is ugly/that is why it dances always' (57). We are presented with one of the characteristics of death. 'Death comes to every hamlet/ wearing different banners beads' (61) and the mythic belief about the tiger, 'Tigers give birth when the sun/fights with the moon' (65). As we come into the wicked world/we carry our own book of life. This is an allusion to the Urhobo belief in destiny hence a dog that is destined for death/ ignores the call of his master'.

From *Pepper in my Throat and other Poems* we have 'Eating the crow of the cock'.(12) which refers to a taboo about eating the crow of the cock that can result to several ailments. Proverbs are uttered to make foolish people learn and be made wiser hence 'warnings are for open ears/not for mountain-roaming goats' (22) It is a known fact one cannot be shaven in absentia. 'You cannot shave my head in my absence' (23) 'The fire is no friend to the bush' (30) because of its destructive nature. Valuable things ought to be kept properly to prevent them from being stolen or damaged. 'You do not hang fish on the rack and chase after lizards' (38) Nene is an endearing Urhobo name for grandmother.

In *Mama dances into the night and other Poems,* several traditional sayings have been used to intersperse the poems. For example, 'The persistence of angry rain drops can/reduce a mountain of stone to miserable sand... The stone in the marketplace /may land on your daughter's head' It is wisdom not to throw stones in a crowded market as on e may unknowingly harm a relation or friend. (27) There is also a common traditional prayer here; 'when the callers call for a head/may we be absent from the gathering' (32) The need for mutual co-existence is shown proverbially. 'The tooth and the tongue quarrel/yet they do not go to court/before the next meal' (35) and that 'The tree of this life can be climbed from/different and many branches'. (60)

Rhythms and Relevance of Repetition

Repetition is one of the most fundamental characteristic features of oral literature and it is a basic unifying device in all poetry. Repetition as expressed in the work of Okpewho (1992:71) has both an aesthetic and a utilitarian value:

> In a fundamental way, the repetition of a phrase, a line, or a passage does have a sing-song quality to it...Besides this general aesthetic impact, repetition does have more stylistic values within the text. There is repetition of a sound, syllable, word, phrase, line stanza or metrical pattern. Sometimes repetition reinforces or even substitutes for meter (the beat) another controlling factor of poetry. Repetition found extensively in free verse includes parallelism and alliteration which contribute to rhyme and rhythm and these frequently supplement the use of other unifying devices.

Helen Chukwuma (1976:16) also locates repetition as ' a basic principle of oral art and can be viewed as a stylistic and fundamental grammatical form'. There are different types and functions of repetition. According to Persson (1974:10) there is lexical repetition that is used for intensifying, emphatic, imitation and purposive reasons. He identifies several types of syntactic repetition, such as

the exact repetition of a syntactic unit in the form of a substitute and syntactically parallel constructions. Another type of repetition is thematic which is composed of paraphrase, repetition with variation, reverse paraphrase and rewording...repetition is used for expansion purposes when the writer or speaker aims to provide new information or specific information. For Shepherd (1990) repetition serves as a means of intensification, humor, control in conversation, expression of anger/pleasure/displeasure, cohesion/coherence, emphatic, evaluative and thematic functions...exact repetition of words of emotions and perceptions that denote anger, fear sarcasm, happiness, pleasure, displeasure create cohesion. Cohesion is poetic and for Tannen (1991:30-46) '...all discourse is poetic, operating on systems of coherence in which form and meaning intertwine. Repetition is one of an array of dynamics by which conversation, like literary discourse, achieves this aesthetic effect'. He further opines that repetition may show up as self repetition or repetition of others, exact repetition or paraphrase, and as repetition with the variation which is defined as 'questions transformed into statements, statements changed into questions, repetition with a single word or phrase changed, and repetition with change of person or tense.' Eghagha uses a variety of repetition and it contributes immensely to the music of his poetry.

Repetition has been used for sarcasm. For example in *Rhythms of the Last Testament* we have sarcasm in 'The Song' to indicate how military rulers issue instructions:

> they bark orders
> they ban orders
> they create organs (12)

This tone of mockery is also shown in 'The Dictator' from *This story must not be Told* where rulers are shown to undemocratically issue decrees:

> i decreed you into existence
> i shall decree you out of existence
> i declared you a person

> i shall declare you a non-person...
> armoured car
> armoured plate
> armoured food
> armoured wife...
> unarmoured lovers
> unarmoured apples
> unarmoured strangers (10)

In 'The telephone' from *This story must not be Told* we also have repetition to express anger and displeasure at the negative aspects of a telephone as well as expression of disgust about the brutal murder of an innocent citizen in 'wailing in the house of Ige':

> you bring news...
> you do not celebrate
> you do not mourn
> you just do your duty...
> you do not prepare the ears...
> you do not know whether or not...
> you do not know whether or not
> you obey the voice spoken into you
> you travel into the bedroom late at night...
> you ignore the wailing that follow (20)

'Wailing in the house of ige'
> ige of the sharp tongue
> ige where is is ige
> ige whose siddon look...
> ige was not hobbled by disease
> ige's brother was ill
> ige cuddles his brother nursed him...
> ige who looked you in the eye...
> ige o ige...
> ige of ige's house
> ige husband of atinuke
> ige of the house of courage (41)

Repetition has been used thematically for expansion in many of the poems. For example, *In Rhythms of the Last Testament* we have:

'The love of a lover'
        i swim against the tide
        i will catch the moon of your songs
        i will cup your laughter...
        i will play the music of our first encounter...
        i will love with the love of a lover...
        i will continue to love you with the love of a lover(67)

Furthermore, we also have thematic repetition with variation for the purpose of expansion in *The Governor's Lodge and other Poems* as indicated in 'For Biodun Adetugbo' and 'The Prayer'

'For Biodun Adetugbo'
        so the fire has leapt up the trunk
        so the canon has been fired..
        the fire has gone off the trunk
        the embers give birth..
        post modern songs
        post modern English...
        post modern god...
        we unmask for biodun
        we shed our toga
        we climb the tree after him...
        although God hovers around biodun
        although biodun shuts his eyes to providence...
        the fire has leapt up the trunk
        the trunk has a baby
        the baby has many babies...
        the fire
        the trunk
        the fire
        the embers
        the fire at sixty five leaps on (16)

'The prayer'
 let all the governor's enemies be vanquished
 let his opponents be confused at night...
 let the millions of naira rain in the state
 let us have our share of the national cake
 let it reach us here in this room
 the wife her share
 the friends their share
 the brothers their share
 the unmarried sisters their share
 the married sisters their share
 the children their share
 the priest his share...
 amen amen amen amen amen
 amen amen amen amen amen...
 amen
 amen
 amen
 amen
 amen (29)

Lines are also repeated for expansion in *Premonitions and other Dreams* as shown in 'The face of your words' and 'End of Premonitions:

'The face of your words'
 words make the world
 words can make a day
 words can drive a knife into a day
 words can knock life out of a man
 words can knock out the spirit of a man
 words can light the lantern of a man's life
 words can make a heart leap into the air
 words can make a man go to the moon (44)

'End of premonitions'
      alliteration in
      iteration and reiterations fan the fire of fantasy
      boredom of the kingdom...ignorance of the power
      boredom of the boring king...bears a chalice...malice in the
      air...
      holy ghosts and grotesque ghosts gain in stature
      repetitions in
      hirelings seek a way
      hirelings seek the way...the way to heaven...
      sorrows in the field...harvest of the last times
      sorrows in the field...the backdrop goes asunder
      sorrows of the harvester...pristine premonitions
      sorrows in the field...
      sorrows between the sheets...
      the pyramid pirouettes into the depth of the altering altar
      this pyramid...this pyramid...and the depth of the rush hour
      this pyramid...this pyramid...and the death of the waving
      flag...
      it is finished...
      finished...
      fini...
      fi...
      finally finalised from the finger of the first filament (81)

In most of the poems, we also find syntactic repetition that is exact repetition of a syntactic unit.

For example in *Pepper in my throat and other Poems,* we have the following poems syntactically repeated:

'Buy me a bicycle'
      buy me a bicycle
      bicycle bicycle
      bicycle to play with
      bicycle bicycle
      now i have a bicycle

bicycle bicycle
i can ride like my mates
bicycle bicycle

thank you
mummy
thank you mummy
thank you mummy
thank you daddy

but the bicycle has no support
bicycle bicycle
each time i ride it i fall to the floor
bicycle bicycle

why did mummy buy this bicycle
bicycle bicycle
bicycle without support
bicycle bicycle

i do not want this bicycle
bicycle bicycle
take the bicycle away
bicycle bicycle...

did he carry a burden to bed
did he carry the burden all night
did he plan to make mummy happy...

let me ride my bicycle
i want my bicycle now
my bicycle my bicycle
bicycle bicycle (56)

'In some poems we have lexical repetition for emphatic use and to create cohesion. For example, in *In Mama dances into the Night* we have:

'The passionate rebel' (for my obukowho)
let the flame burn on and on
on and on
on
on
on on on
oooooooooooooooooooonnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn (46)

Examples of repetition are plentiful in Eghagha's poetry, but it suffices to mention a few for the purpose of this paper. In fact he has imbibed many qualities of oral tradition in his poetry.

Conclusion

In the foregoing, we have discussed how Hope Eghagha in his creative interactions combines artistic and oral elements. The oral and literary strategies have been masterfully invoked in his poetry. Proverbs, axioms which embrace the philosophical and socio-cultural systems of African (Urhobo) people and repetition with variation have been depicted in the six collections of poems. These include lexical repetition, syntactic repetition and thematic repetition as an expanding and cohesive device. The array of repetition is reminiscent of oral traditional songs. The most refreshing aspects of the poems are revealed in sage-like comments and imagery created through tales, myths, parables and proverbs which are resuscitated from the traditional treasury and some of these elements are combined for striking effect. The statements are generally about a personal observation or any social occurrence that strikes the poet as important enough to be worthy of poetry. The poet draws his imagistic or symbolic reference from nature; birds, animals and intimate features of everyday living.

The artist like the average man, is unconsciously formed and influenced by the ideology of the collective, but unlike the average man the artist articulates these ideologies in an individual voice. While the lore of the folk embodies everyone's fears, values, and aspirations it is left to the literary artist to identify them, reveal their psychological implications and to interpret them. It is this

consciousness of African oral tradition that makes Eghagha's poetry very lively, incisive and overly effective.

Works Cited

Primary Texts

Eghagha, H. *Rhythms of the Last Testament*. Lagos: Concept Publications Ltd. 2002.

-------- *This Story must not be Told*. Lagos: African Cultural Institute. 2003.

---------*The Governor's Lodge and other Poems*. Lagos: Deocraft Communications. 2004.

--------- *Premonitions and other Poems*. Lagos. Concept Publications Ltd. 2005.

---------*Mama Dances into the Night and other Poems*. Lagos: Concept Publications Ltd. 2007.

----------*Pepper in my Throat and other Poems*. Lagos: Concept Publications Ltd. 2007.

Secondary Texts

Akporobaro, F.B.O. *African Oral Literature*. Lagos: Princeton Publishing Company, 2005.

Chukwuma, Helen. 'The Oral Nature of Traditional Poetry and Language' *Journal of the Nigerian English Studies 8*, 1 (May 1979):16-17.

De carvalho-Neto, P. *The Concept of Folklore*, trans. J. M.P. Wilson. Coral gables: University of Miami Press. 1971.

Finnegan, R. *Oral Poetry, its Nature, Significance and Social Context*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1979.

Lindfors, B. *Folklore in Nigerian Literature*. Ibadan: Caltop Publications (Nigeria) Ltd. 2002.

Nabofa, M.Y. 'Urhobo Art and Religious Belief' in Foss, Perkins ed. *Where Gods and Mortals Meet: Continuity and Renewal in Urhobo Art*. Ghent: Snoeck Publishers. 2004.

Ogunjimi, B and Na'Allah, A. *Introduction to African Oral Literature*. Ilorin: University of Ilorin, 1991.

Okpewho, I. *African Oral Literature; Backgrounds, Character, and Continuity*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1992

Olafioye, T. *The Poetry of Tanure Ojaide, A Critical Appraisal*. Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited. 2000.

Ong, W.J. *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word*. London: Methuen 1982.

Pagliai, V. 'The Art of Dueling With Words: Toward a New Understanding of Verbal Duels Across the World' *Oral Tradition*, 24/1 (2009): 61-88

Pedrosa, J.M. 'Oral Tradition as a Worldwide Phenomenon' *Oral Tradition*, 18/2 (2003): 166-168.

Persson, G. *Repetition in English*. Uppsala, Sweden: University of Uppsala, 1974.

Richards, I.A. *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* London: Oxford University Press, 1936.

Shepherd, S.C., 'Functions of Repetition: Variation in Narrative and Conversational Discourse' in J.A. Edmondson, C. Feagin, and P. Mulhausler (Eds), *Development and Diversity: Language Variation Across Time and Space* (629-638) Dallas, TX: Summer Institute of Linguistics, University of Texas, Arlington. 1990.

Tannen, D. *Talking Voices: Repetition, Dialogue and Imagery in Conversational Discourse.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1991.

Van Der Toorn, K. 'The Ancient Near Eastern Literary Dialogue as a Vehicle of Critical Reflection' in *Reinic and Vanstiphaut* 1991: 59-75.