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<title>Department of Classics &amp; Philosophy</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/1037</link>
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<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/11499"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/10784"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/10726"/>
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<dc:date>2026-04-14T23:27:45Z</dc:date>
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<item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/11499">
<title>An appraisal of Susan Haack’s Foundherentism  as a theory of justification</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/11499</link>
<description>An appraisal of Susan Haack’s Foundherentism  as a theory of justification
Wanimpa, Fataw
This study is an appraisal of Susan Haack’s foundherentism. Foundherentism as theory of justification is enmeshed in controversies. Some critics claim that the theory is not any different from already existing theories of justification such as foundationalism, coherentism and reliabilism. Haack on the other hand insists that foundherentism is a distinct theory of justification. By employing the method of epistemological theorizing, a means of conceptual analysis and critical argumentation, this study set out to ascertain whether foundherentism is actually distinct from the other theories of justification. The study, through an analysis of the internal dialectics of foundherentism and a critical examination of the critiques and responses to the theory, reveals that foundherentism is neither foundationalism nor coherentism inter alia but a hybrid theory of justification. The study found that the critics of foundherentism mainly ignore the character in virtue of which foundherentism is distinct from the other theories but brood over its similarity to the other theories. The study, however, identified some challenges with foundherentism, in its concepts of explication and ratification—the problem of transitioning from non-propositional to propositional source of justification, due to Haack’s double-aspect conception of justification. So, an attempt is made at the end to modify the theory in order to avoid those challenges.
viii, 121p;, ill.
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<dc:date>2021-09-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/10784">
<title>PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF LIBET AND WEGNER ON FREE WILL</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/10784</link>
<description>PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF LIBET AND WEGNER ON FREE WILL
Fosu-blankson, Ferdinard
The conventional notion of free will does not possess formidable counter arguments to modern neurobiological investigations, proving the implausibility of free will. The pool of evidence gathered by cognitive neuroscientists makes strong justifications to truncate the conception of free will. The research of Benjamin Libet and Daniel Wegner explicates the physical and cognitive limitations that make free will untenable. Their position purports that we are neurobiologically determined. However, their empirical assessment of free will misguides their conclusion. Free will as a conceptual problem requires an assessment beyond the empirical domain. Despite the solid claims from neurobiological determinism, it ignores the metaphysical entailment in action. Hence, it gives an unsatisfactory account for human action. To replace neurobiological determinism, this study proposes neurobiological freedom.
ii, ill:108
</description>
<dc:date>2021-04-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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<item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/10726">
<title>A Comparative Study of Imperialistic Strategies: Roman North Africa (2nd Century B.C -1st Century Ad) and British West Africa (1884-1956).</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/10726</link>
<description>A Comparative Study of Imperialistic Strategies: Roman North Africa (2nd Century B.C -1st Century Ad) and British West Africa (1884-1956).
Andoh, Christian Nana
The strategies of imperialism used by both Romans and British are very fascinating. However, these events happened in different eras, which have led Brunt (1965) and Miles (1990) to conclude that these strategies used by both imperialists are not comparable. For this reason, the research focuses on strategies of imperialism of the ancient Roman society from the second century B.C. to the first century A.D. and British imperialism from 1884 to 1956. This has resulted in the research title: A Comparative Study of Imperialistic Strategies: Roman North Africa (2nd Century B.C -1st Century AD) and British West Africa (1884-1956). To bring these strategies to light, a comparative analytical method was employed to answer the research questions. Moreover, in answering these questions, the research made use of Comparativism as a theory to reflect and compare the imperial histories of both the Romans and the British. The method and theory have therefore helped the research to draw the similarities and dissimilarities among the imperialistic strategies used by both Imperialists. Although the imperialism of the Romans and British happened in a different era, with the help of the theory and methods employed, the research findings have refuted what Brunt and Miles opine that their imperialism cannot be compared. Hence, the research concludes that Roman and British imperialistic strategies are comparable.
ii, 123
</description>
<dc:date>2022-07-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/8623">
<title>Philosophical implications of Libet and Wegner on free will</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/8623</link>
<description>Philosophical implications of Libet and Wegner on free will
Fosu-Blankson, Ferdinad
The conventional notion of free will does not possess formidable counter&#13;
arguments to modern neurobiological investigations proving the implausibility&#13;
of free will. The pool of evidence gathered by cognitive neuroscientists makes&#13;
strong justifications to truncate the conception of free will. The research of&#13;
Benjamin Libet and Daniel Wegner explicate the physical and cognitive&#13;
limitations that makes free will untenable. Their position purports that we are&#13;
neurobiologically determined. However, their empirical assessment of free will&#13;
misguides their conclusion. Free will as a conceptual problem requires an&#13;
assessment beyond the empirical domain. Despite the solid claims from&#13;
neurobiological determinism, neurobiological determinism ignores the&#13;
metaphysical entailment in action. Hence, it gives an unsatisfactory account for&#13;
human action. This leads to my proposal of neurobiological freedom.
x, 110p:, ill.
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<dc:date>2021-04-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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