http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/1512 Tue, 14 Apr 2026 23:26:49 GMT 2026-04-14T23:26:49Z http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/6359 The regress challenge, infinitism and rational dialectics Inusah, Husein I argue in this paper that infinitism is the best answer to the dialectical regress challenge. Infinitism, as a theory of rational dialectics, has not received enough attention from scholars because major proponents of the theory have focused mainly on using infinitism to answer an epistemic regress problem. Rather than construing infinitism as an answer to the epistemic regress question, I take the theory to be addressing a dialectical regress challenge and subsequently pitch it against its dialectical rivals. It emerges that dialectical infinitism addresses the regress challenge far better than its competitors if it is couched as a social contextualist thesis 19p:, ill. Wed, 01 Jan 2020 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/6359 2020-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/6358 The problem of qualia and knowledge in Plato and Aristotle Gawu, Peter Sena; Inusah, Husein This paper sparks the debate of qualia and knowledge in the works of Plato and Aristotle. The debate on the relevance and logical chronology of qualia and knowledge has been an implicit tension in the works of Plato and Aristotle. However, we seldom find scholars exploring these aspects of Plato-Aristotle philosophy and connecting it to the contemporary debate of qualia. It is on this account that this paper re-examines Plato and Aristotle’s debate on the relevance of qualia to knowledge and how this debate has influenced theories relating to sense data. The core objective of this paper is to resurrect the debate of qualia and knowledge in the works of the legends as a way of contributing to the contemporary problem of qualia as suggested by Clarence I. Lewis and others in mid-20th century 6p:, ill. Tue, 01 Jan 2019 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/6358 2019-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/6357 The feasibility of self-reliancism as a foundation for democracy Eromosele, Usifoh Eric In popular discourse, democracy often centres on concepts such as liberty, equality, consent, choice, rule of law, participation, accountability, transparency, etc. This popular rendition, more often than not, excludes the notion of self-reliancism. This study argues that the exclusion of this notion weakens the etymological foundation of democracy as government by the people and undermines the development of an authentic and sustainable democratic culture. Indeed, self-reliancism surmises the reality of the human condition and is fundamental since it complements the meaning of democracy in the discourse of governance. This study is based on the theoretical foundation of personalism, which affirms the unique dignity and interrelationality of the human person. The methodology adopted is dialectical realism, which proposes the need for societies to explore their historical and cultural experiences as the bases for a self-reliancist orientation in comprehending reality. The study seeks to establish the feasibility of self-reliancism as a foundation for democracy 8p:, ill. Mon, 01 Jan 2018 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/6357 2018-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/6356 The fall of the tragic hero: A critique of the “hubristic principle” Cudjoe, Richard V.; Grant, Peter Kojo T.; Otchere, Jonathan Asante The idea of attaching moral depravity to the fall of the tragic heroes (according to Aristotle, those men who enjoy prosperity and high reputation like Oedipus and Thyestes etc.) did not start with the three tragic poets, namely; Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides, but rather it dates back even to Homer. This idea is, of course, influenced by the old Greek tradition of Koros, Hubris, Nemesis and Ate. The totality of this traditional view and its application is equated to the phrase ‘hubristic principle’, in the scheme of this work. The hubristic principle makes specific that the fall of the hero is as a result of a sin or wrong that he committed. The commission of this wrong must not go unpunished. In effect, the hand of Justice, what they call nemesis, no matter how delayed must fall on the hero. The problem is how then do you reconcile situations where the fall of the hero is not his making? In other words, where do you place undeserved misfortune that befalls the hero? Apparently, it is this inadequacy of the hubristic syndrome that Aristotle proposes hamartia (Greek, for error) as the appropriate means in accounting for the fall of the tragic hero. This paper discusses first, the hubristic principle and its application and second, assesses the reliability of the theory in accounting for the fall of the tragic hero 33p:, ill. Sat, 01 Jan 2011 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/6356 2011-01-01T00:00:00Z